Counterinsurgency:the challenge for NATO strategy and operations

Edited by Christopher M. Schnaubelt

NATO Defense CollegeCollège de Défense de l’OTAN

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Research Division • Rome, November 2009

NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE

COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN

Research DivisionDivision Recherche

Counterinsurgency:

the challenge for NATO strategy

and operations

Edited by Christopher M. Schnaubelt

Rome, November 2009

NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE

NATO Defense College Cataloguing-in-Publication-Data:“COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE CHALLENGE FOR NATOSTRATEGY AND OPERATIONS”

(NATO Defense College “NDC Forum Papers Series”)

Edited by Christopher M. SchnaubeltCopy-editing: Maria Di Martino

The views expressed in this NDC Forum Paper are those of the authorsand do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the NATO DefenseCollege, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or any of the institutionsrepresented by the contributors.

Extracts of this NDC Forum Paper for academic purposes may be quotedor reprinted without special permission, provided that a standard sourcecredit line is included. To copy, to republish or to post on the world wideweb, requires the permission from the NATO Defense College.

© NDC 2009 all rights reserved

Copies of this NDC Forum Paper may be obtained directly from theNATO Defense College, Research DivisionVia Giorgio Pelosi, 1 - 00143 Rome, ItalyFax +39-06-50 52 57 97E-mail: m.dimartino@ndc.nato.intWeb site: http://www.ndc.nato.int

Printed and bound byTipografia Facciotti s.r.l.Vicolo Pian Due Torri, 74 - 00146 RomaTel. 0655260900 - Fax 0655260907

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

IntroductionThe Counterinsurgency Challenge for NATO ...................................... 6Christopher M. Schnaubelt

Chapter oneThe Obama Strategy for Afghanistan-Pakistan: Counterinsurgency Implications for NATO........................................ 13Christopher M. Schnaubelt

Chapter twoNATO and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Afghanistan .............. 43Benjamin Schreer

Chapter threeHybrid Adversaries – a Challenge but Unifying Theme for NATO? ... 58Chris Collett

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Chapter fourThe Goldilocks Choice: the “Just Right” Balance for Setting Civil – Military Governance Goals in Post-Conflict and Counterinsurgency Operations ............................................................ 73Christopher A. Jennings

Chapter fiveMeasuring Counterinsurgency Effectiveness. Easier Said than Done........................................................................... 94Kirk A. Johnson

Chapter sixThe Trap for Doctrine: The Perils of Evolution in the Face of Revolution ........................... 113Alexander Alderson

Chapter sevenNATO and Counterinsurgency: The case of Germany .................... 129Timo Noetzel and Martin Zapfe

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Chapter eightLocal Security Forces: Lessons for NATO in Afghanistan .............. 152Daniel Marston

Chapter nine“To Free the Oppressed” – NATO Special Forces in Future Operations .................................... 175Kalev I. Sepp

Chapter tenNATO Should Take the Lead in Police Training .............................. 196Alex Crowther

Chapter elevenFixing Foreign Assistance for Counterinsurgency ........................... 209Terrence Kelly, Larry Crandall and Laurel Miller

About the contributors........................................................................ 241

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Introduction

The Counterinsurgency Challenge for NATO

Christopher M. Schnaubelt

“Capturing the will of the people is a very clear and basic concept,yet one that is either misunderstood or ignored by political and militaryestablishments around the world. The politician keeps applying force toattain a condition, assuming the military will both create and maintain it.And whilst for many years the military has understood the need to win the‘hearts and minds’ of the local population, this is still seen as a support-ing activity to the defeat of the insurgents rather than the overall objective,and it is often under-resourced and restricted to low-level acts to amelio-rate local conditions and the lot of the people. This brings us back to therelationship between the trial and the clash of wills. Since the overallobjective we seek by employing force is to win the clash of the wills, it fol-lows that every trial of strength must be won in such a way that each suc-cess complements and supports the measures to win the clash of wills.Only then will the forces we send have utility and deliver the politicalresult desired.”

General Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World1

Counterinsurgency has been a contentious topic for NATO; thereappear to be wide differences among the members on how to approach it.

11New York: Vintage Books edition (2008), pp. 279-280.

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United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates caused a stir in January2008, when he appeared to criticize non-US members of NATO by saying:“I’m worried we’re deploying [military advisors] that are not properlytrained and I’m worried we have some military forces that don’t know howto do counterinsurgency operations.”2

According to the Los Angeles Times, “NATO officials bristled at sug-gestions that non-U.S. forces have been ineffective in implementing acounterinsurgency campaign. They argued that the south, home toAfghanistan’s Pashtun tribal heartland that produced the Taliban move-ment, has long been the most militarily contested region of the country.”The paper reported that an anonymous European NATO official “angrilydenounced the American claims, saying much of the violence is a result ofthe small number of U.S. troops who had patrolled the region beforeNATO’s takeover in mid-2006, a strategy that allowed the Taliban to recon-stitute in the region.”3

Yet Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has stated “We can dobetter” in Afghanistan. In a Washington Post Op-Ed, he wrote that NATO“needs a more cohesive approach.”4

Our operations are still too much of a patchwork, with indi-vidual countries assigned to specific geographic areas…Multiple approaches to military operations and developmentassistance within one mission reduce effectiveness and canstrain solidarity. We should have more common approaches toour efforts, including fewer geographic restrictions on whereforces can go in support of each other.5

2 “Gates says force unable to fight guerrillas”, Los Angeles Times, January 16, 2008. Available at:http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/16/world/fg-usafghan16.

3 Ibid.4 For a detailed analysis on NATO’s problems in applying a comprehensive approach in such condi-tions, see NDC Forum Paper #9, Operationalizing a comprehensive approach in semi-permissiveenvironments. It can be downloaded at: http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=79.

5 January 18, 2009. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/16/AR2009011603717.html

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This issue poses a strategic challenge for NATO, not only because thelargest and longest duration combat operation in the history of the Alliance isongoing and primarily consists of fighting insurgents in Afghanistan, but alsobecause of the fissures that the International Security Assistance Force(ISAF) has exposed among NATO members. These differences include relat-ed questions on how to characterize and approach the violence in Afghanistan(COIN or stability and reconstruction?) and the relative military contributionsby member states to the first and thus far only operation conducted by NATOunder Article V (in addition to the size of force contributions, caveats pre-clude some national troops from conducting full spectrum combat opera-tions). The spectre of a “two-tier” alliance has been raised by allegations thatsome members have not been carrying their fair share of the burden.

While military and civilian defense leaders from the US, UK, andCanada clearly identify the mission in Afghanistan as a COIN effort, otherNATO members are more reticent. For example, Timo Noetzel andBenjamin Schreer (who also contribute chapters to this Forum Paper) havewritten that Germany, one of the largest NATO military partners, charac-terizes its efforts in Afghanistan as a “stability and reconstruction opera-tion” rather than COIN. In addition to domestic politics, they posit that thereasons for this distinction include a different concept of the conflict with-in the German defense establishment: “…unlike many of its allies, theFederal Republic never engaged in a ‘small war’. Germany lacks histori-cal memory of such conflicts which could inform current debate.”6

In an interview with the ISAF commander at the time, General DavidMcKiernan, the German paper Spiegel argued that “Germans are preparedto support the government of Hamid Karzai and to push forward withreconstruction, but they clearly aren’t interested in waging war. More andmore civilians are falling into the line of fire in the fronts between theinsurgents and ISAF, and ISAF soldiers are dying everyday.”7

6 “Counter-what? Germany and Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan.” RUSI February 2008, Vol 153No. 1, p. 44.

7 August 11, 2008. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,571345,00.html

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When asked whether German and other national “so-called caveats”presented a problem for operations in Afghanistan, General McKiernanresponded: “If there is something the German military cannot do that theAmerican military can do, then the decision has been a legal and politicaldecision back in Germany, and I accept that. But as a soldier, I don’t under-stand it. I don’t understand ever putting your men and women in harm’sway without their having the full ability to protect themselves. That alsomeans operating on actionable intelligence to defeat insurgents and protectyour forces. That’s how you keep your soldiers alive.”8

Meanwhile, the deployment of additional US troops to Afghanistaninitially considered by the Bush administration has been continued underthe direction of President Barrack Obama. Obama has promised to switchthe focus of US military efforts from Iraq to Afghanistan and to increasethe US troop levels even further, approving an increase of 17,000 US sol-diers and marines plus another 4,000 trainer/advisors while stating: “Fromour partners and NATO allies, we seek not simply troops, but rather clear-ly defined capabilities: supporting the Afghan elections, training AfghanSecurity Forces, and a greater civilian commitment to the Afghan people”.However, cracks in resolve may already be appearing. Secretary ofDefense Gates told a Congressional panel on January 27, 2009 that thenew administration was getting ready to send more troops but lacked aclear plan for using them. Besides saying the US still required “a fully inte-grated civilian-military strategy”, Gates hinted the bar for success mightbe lowered by saying the US also needed to establish “modest, realisticgoals.”9

Buried within rhetoric that the new White House is “elevating” theimportance of the war in Afghanistan were hints the US would reduce itsobjectives while expecting allies to take up a heavier share of the burden

8 Ibid.9 David Wood, “Pentagon ready to beef up troops to Afghanistan without clear strategy.” BaltimoreSun January 28, 2009 at: http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nation/politics/bal-te.gates28jan28,0,7175932.story.

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at least in respect to improving Afghan governance and economic growth.Gates told the New York Times in January 2009 that “If we set ourselves theobjective of creating some sort of Central Asian Valhalla over there, wewill lose” and said that goals under the Bush administration had been “toobroad and too far into the future.” According to the Times, other officialssaid the Obama administration “would leave economic development andnation-building increasingly to European allies, so that American forcescould focus on the fight against insurgents.”

From several different perspectives, this NATO Defense CollegeForum Paper explores the challenges that counterinsurgency operationspose for NATO. The next chapter provides an analysis of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy (“Af-Pak”) announced by the White House in March2009 and its implications for NATO and finds that the Obama administra-tion’s strategy is largely a continuation of the Bush administration’s plansbut with much greater resourcing. It implies that NATO will be called uponto extend its operations in Afghanistan and provide more troops and otherresources to complement the increasing efforts by the Americans.

This is followed by Benjamin Schreer’s chapter on the counterinsur-gency lessons from Afghanistan for NATO. He argues that the effective-ness of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is hampered bya conceptual divide between NATO members regarding counterinsurgencystrategy and operations, compounded by a failure to adequately resourceISAF. He concludes that “NATO’s future existence will not depend on itsability to confront a sustained insurgency; its persistent weaknesses in thisarea might at the same time decrease the Atlantic Alliance’s credibility asan international security actor.”

After that, Chris Collett provides a description of “HybridAdversaries” and argues they are the most likely threat to NATO in boththe near and foreseeable future. These are opponents that simultaneouslyand adaptively employ combinations of conventional, irregular, terroristand criminal means or activities. Rather than a single entity, these will typ-ically be a combination of state and non-state actors. According to Collett,

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a common view of this threat is needed and should result in NATO bolster-ing its ability to conduct counterinsurgency and stability operations.

In the fourth chapter, Christopher Jennings writes on the necessity ofachieving the correct balance of civilian and military efforts during coun-terinsurgency operations as well as the need to identify and accept trade-offs between short term security goals and long term development goals.Focusing on the importance of building key state institutions, he providesa framework that should be useful to both military and civilian leaders indesigning more effective counterinsurgency plans.

Kirk Johnson next contributes an analysis of the need for, and prob-lematic nature of, measures to indicate whether counterinsurgency opera-tions are succeeding. He asserts that three topics are critical: populationsecurity, “hearts and minds,” and measures of normalcy. His chapter alsoprovides useful advice on selecting and interpreting data, including civil-ian casualties and polling.

Examining the experience of the United Kingdom during severalcounterinsurgency campaigns, Alexander Alderson’s chapter addresses thetime lag that results from the evolutionary process of military doctrinedevelopment in the face of the revolutionary pressures created by insur-gents in the midst of war. He concludes that the British military has histor-ically resolved this challenge by applying practical lessons in the field wellbefore they are codified in doctrine. Given the need for whole-of-govern-ment approaches to counterinsurgency, however, the political/civilianaspects tend to lag because they lack concepts for evolutionary doctrinedevelopment and the capability for revolutionary adjustment on the ground.

Chapter seven scrutinizes the particular aspects of Germany’s contri-butions to ISAF. As one of the largest force providers to ISAF specifical-ly and to NATO in general, legal, political and conceptual restraints onGerman operations present a significant impact. Timo Noetzel and MartinZapfe trace the development of German counterinsurgency policy anddoctrine and argue that bottom-up pressure resulting from unit combat

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engagements in Afghanistan is producing change in German military doc-trine and politics in regards to counterinsurgency.

The subsequent chapter by Daniel Marston draws lessons from his-torical experience with irregular local security forces and recommendshow they should be applied to Afghanistan. Marston notes that locallyrecruited security forces have been a key factor in successful COIN cam-paigns for at least the past 150 years. Critical considerations in raisingsuch forces include flexible, adaptive, and culturally knowledgeable regu-lar officers who can provide training, leadership, and tactical expertise. Heobserves that in modern campaigns, special operations forces have provenparticularly well-suited for such tasks.

Kalev Sepp expands on the theme of NATO special operations forces,arguing that they are under-appreciated and under-utilized for contempo-rary counterinsurgency operations. When used, they are typically toofocused on kinetic or direct action missions, while training and foreigninternal defense missions are likely to have a greater long term impact atlower cost and political risk.

The penultimate chapter, written by Alex Crowther, argues thatNATO should develop the necessary political will and take on police train-ing as a major mission in support of counterinsurgency and stability oper-ations. Unlike the United States, according to Crowther most other NATOmembers are well suited for conducting such missions given the preva-lence of national Gendarmerie and Carabinieri police forces.

This Forum Paper concludes with a detailed study of American for-eign assistance written by Terrence Kelly, Larry Crandall and LaurelMiller. They note that foreign assistance is an important component ofCOIN but current US legislation and policy is too restrictive and slow tomeet the needs of officials responsible for implementing programs incountries where the US is carrying out COIN or stability operations, andrecommend several specific changes to legislation, executive branch poli-cy, and human resources practices.

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CHAPTER ONE

The Obama Strategy for Afghanistan-Pakistan:Counterinsurgency Implications for NATO*

Christopher M. Schnaubelt

“We are in Afghanistan to confront a commonenemy that threatens the United States, our friends andallies, and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan whohave suffered the most at the hands of violent extrem-ists. So I want the American people to nderstand that wehave a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle,and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, andto prevent their return to either country in the future.”

President Barack Obama, March 27, 20091

Introduction

This paper presents an analysis of the so-called “Af-Pak” strategyand what it means for the NATO and its International Security AssistanceForce (ISAF) mission. Because the role of NATO in the Pakistan portion ofthe strategy is extremely limited, this paper focuses on the elements direct-ed toward efforts in Afghanistan. It is based completely upon open-source

* A revised version of this paper was published as “NATO and the new US “Af-Pak” strategy”, NDCResearch Paper 51, September 2009

1 White House Press Office, “What’s New in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,”http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Whats-New-in-the-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/ (accessed May 28, 2009)

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materials. The primary sources are three key documents: the White Housepress release on what’s new in the strategy, President Obama’s remarksannouncing the strategy, and an interagency white paper that was releasedsimultaneously. These are complemented by published interviews with andnewspaper quotes from key individuals such as General David Petraeus, thecommanding general of US Central Command and head of the Americancombatant command responsible for US military efforts in Afghanistan.

Analyzing the strategy is complicated by fact that its developmentand implementation will be an interdependent and evolutionary process.Although the official description of the Af-Pak strategy and related state-ments by the White House will be unlikely to change—at least within thenext year or two—the next logical step in the process of implementing thestrategy is for the entities responsible for execution to write subordinateplans. Recent press reports indicate that US Secretary Defense RobertGates has tasked the new Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF)/ISAF com-mander, General Stanley McChrystal, to write a new “60-day Assessment”of the situation in Afghanistan.2

This process may well result in significant changes to the JointCampaign Plan developed by General Chrystal’s predecessor, GeneralDavid McKiernan.3 However at the time this paper was written, no infor-mation was publicly available regarding the content of a new campaignplan to implement Af-Pak strategy.

Eight years of military and political intervention since the US ini-tiated combat operations in October 2001 have obviously had a majorinfluence on the operating environment in Afghanistan (as well as theneighboring situation in Pakistan). As should have been expected, AlQaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist groups have continually adjusted

2 Peter Spiegel, “Commander Maps New Course in Afghan War,” Wall Street Journal June 12, 2009:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124476295460908195.html.

3 Catherine Dale, “War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress,”Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, January 23, 2009, p. 8.

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their tactics in response to the actions of the US, NATO, and Afghanistan’selected government. And, US and other NATO forces in Afghanistan haveexperienced a long series of incremental changes in policy, strategy, andplans not only in response to the evolving situation in Afghanistan but alsodue to Alliance and domestic political considerations. It would be naïve, ifnot negligent, to believe that any new strategy will produce a quick suc-cess that would put an end to the action-reaction cycle and obviate the needfor future adjustments.

The context

Understanding and appraising the Obama administration’s strate-gy requires placing it in the context of the situation inherited from theBush administration.4 This approach is useful not only to provide an appre-ciation of how we arrived at the current juncture, but also in deriving les-sons from what has been attempted in the past and proven effective orfutile. The myopic thinking that has often characterized US strategy andplanning for Afghanistan (and Iraq) has been counterproductive not onlyby inhibiting sufficient investment and long-range planning, but alsobecause military officers and civilian officials on relatively short tourstend to look neither far into the future to establish long-range goals norinto the past to examine what their predecessors have done. It may be acliché to say that the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over andover again and expecting different results, but this truism is nonetheless agood one.

This is particularly worrisome given the tone of Obama adminis-tration pronouncements and media accounts that greatly exaggerate thenewness and innovation displayed by the Obama Af-Pak strategy. Forexample, in the July/August 2009 issue of Foreign Affairs, Fotini Christia

4 For broader historical view, see Mark A. Burroughs, “A Historical Case Study of U.S. StrategyTowards Afghanistan,” U.S. Army War College, April 2009. Available at:http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA499080.

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and Michael Semple begin their article breathlessly with the assertion:“After seven years of the Bush administration’s neglect and mismanage-ment of Afghanistan, President Barack Obama was prompt in ordering thedeployment of 21,000 more U.S. troops.”5

The frequent Bush administration strategy reviews, numerous evo-lutions in policy, and the creeping but multiple increases in troop strengthand funding may say something about the level of foresight and quality ofmanagement but seem to belie the accusation of neglect. More important-ly, Christia and Semple fail to mention that the troop increase implement-ed a recommendation developed by the Bush administration as part of a2008 strategy review but had been put on hold in deference to the incom-ing president.6 The Bush administration’s strategy review and recommen-dations to send more troops meant the Obama team did not have to startfrom scratch and prompted Pentagon planners to begin preparations for thetroop increase should it be approved. Yet if Bush made the formal decisionto commit the additional forces as a lame duck, there surely would havebeen complaints about him handcuffing his successor.

As will be described in further detail below, the bulk of the “new”strategy is a continuation of Bush administration plans and policies. Thisshould beg the question: if they didn’t work for George W. Bush, whyshould they work for Barack H. Obama? Plausible explanations include:the Bush strategies were solid but their execution was poor, inadequateresources were devoted to carrying out otherwise sensible policies andplans, and/or necessary operational adjustments were made far too slowly

5 “Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan,” pp. 34-45. Alternatively, in his blog on the ForeignPolicy web site, David Rothkopf has written that a compliant media and Obama’s star power “…hasenabled the administration to take inherited policies and wrap them in Obama-paper with Obama-glit-ter all over it and all of a sudden, the old was repackaged into appearing new.” See: http://rothkopf.for-eignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/08/the_problem_when_the_president_is_the_policy.)

6 See Karen DeYoung, “Afghan Conflict Will Be Reviewed: Obama Sees Troops As Buying Time, NotTurning Tide,” The Washington Post January 13, 2009, p. A-1. Available at: http://www.washington-post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/12/AR2009011203492.html (accessed July 7, 2009).Also, see Barbara Star, “Obama approves Afghanistan troop increase,” CNN.com February 17, 2009,http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/17/obama.troops/index.html (accessed July 7, 2009).

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and thus ceded the initiative to the enemy. Nonetheless, analysts should notmislead themselves into believing that the inauguration of a newCommander-in-Chief who is far more articulate and popular than his pred-ecessor will alone suffice as the change necessary turn the situation inAfghanistan around. Although it is now unpopular to quote former USSecretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the war in Afghanistan will con-tinue to be a “long, hard slog” for quite some time to come.7

The Bush administration’s legacy

One characteristic of the new administration’s approach that is sig-nificantly different from its predecessor is that the Af-Pak strategy hasbeen described in publicly released documents that present a largely coher-ent, integrated concept for US and allied efforts in Afghanistan (andPakistan). Such was not the case for the Bush administration’s efforts inthe region. As Catherine Dale has written, “As of the start of 2009, the U.S.Government had not yet published a formal strategy for Afghanistan, alongthe lines of the November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.”8

Nonetheless, while they are not as comprehensive and complete as the2005 strategy for Iraq discernible outlines of the Bush administration’sapproach to Afghanistan are indeed publicly available. An increasingamount of information was released by the Bush administration overtime—probably coinciding with the administration’s evolution in thinkingabout the problem combined with recognition of the declining security sit-uation—and provided an increasing degree of lucidity.

Initial minimalism with a military focus

According to Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for

7 See Dave Moniz and Tom Squitieri, “After grim Rumsfeld memo, White House supports him,”USA Today October 22, 2003: http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-10-22-defense-memo-usat_x.htm.

8 Dale, ibid, p.9.

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Policy at the time, the Bush administration had determined that in 2001 its“task in Afghanistan was to overthrow the Taliban regime and deny alQaida its safe haven.”9 Feith summarized the initial campaign strategy forAfghanistan as:

• Aiming to out the Taliban regime (not just to hit al Qaeda)• Committing U.S. ground forces• Using the indirect approach of supporting Afghan militias• Relying on precision strikes• Maintaining a small U.S. footprint to avoid problems that the Soviets(and British) had had in Afghanistan10

Feith also wrote that the strategy subsequently shifted: “In 2002, it was tohelp the Afghan interim administration establish its authority.”11

Adding elements of economic development and building Afghan forces

Although the Bush administration had initially opposed the idea ofnation building, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld continued tobe skeptical,12 on April 17, 2002 President Bush gave a speech that manyinterpreted as proposing a “Marshall Plan” for Afghanistan:

Peace – peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistandevelop its own stable government. Peace will beachieved by helping Afghanistan train and develop itsown national army. And peace will be achieved throughan education system for boys and girls, which works.

9 War and Decision (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), p. 139.10 Feith, ibid, pp. 88-89.11 Feith, ibid, p. 139.12 For example, in remarks at the Intrepid Sea-Air-Space Museum in New York City on February 14,2003 he said: “Afghanistan belongs to the Afghans. The objective is not to engage in what somepeople call nationbuilding [sic].” (“Beyond Nation Building,” transcript at:http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=337 (accessed July 7, 2009).

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We’re working hard in Afghanistan. We’re clearing mine-fields. We’re rebuilding roads. We’re improving medicalcare. And we will work to help Afghanistan to develop aneconomy that can feed its people without feeding theworld’s demand for drugs.13

Yet no detailed reconstruction plan was published by the White Houseand the rudimentary elements of a nascent strategy to help provide security,economic development, good governance, and build Afghanistan’s army weresubstantially under-resourced. According to David Rohde and David E.Sanger: “Sixteen months after the president’s 2002 speech, the United StatesAgency for International Development, the government’s main foreign devel-opment arm, had seven full-time staffers and 35 full-time contract staff mem-bers in Afghanistan....Sixty-one agency positions were vacant.”14

In a New Yorker magazine article extremely critical of the Bushadministration’s efforts in Afghanistan, Seymour Hersh depicts contemporaryand former US government officials describing an action-reaction cycle asthe Taliban adjusted tactics in response to the initial US approach of “relianceon massive firepower.” According to then-Deputy Assistant Secretary ofDefense Joseph Collins, the Taliban “began to realize at the end of 2003 thatthe key is not to fight our soldiers but U.N. officials and aid workers.”15

Increased funding

Around the same time, according to Collins, “significant moneybegan to flow” to support Afghan reconstruction and security efforts.

13 Speech at Virginia Military Institute. Transcript available at: http://www.usembassy.it/viewer/arti-cle.asp?article=/file2002_04/alia/A2041813.htm (accessed July 8, 2009).

14 David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a “Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad.” The New YorkTimes, August 12, 2007. Available at:http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/world/asia/12afghan.html (accessed July 7, 2009).

15 “The Other War: why Bush’s Afghanistan problem won’t go away,” The New Yorker April 12, 2004.Available at: http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/04/12/040412fa_fact (accessed 7 July 2009).

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Apparently, this was due to a shift in US strategy. Hersh writes that “InJanuary of 2003, Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, madea fifteen-hour visit to Kabul and announced, ‘We’re clearly moving into adifferent phase, where our priority in Afghanistan is increasingly going tobe stability and reconstruction.’” Hersh also reports that the Bush admin-istration planned to devote additional efforts to “improving security andrebuilding the Afghan National Army.”

In November 2003, Zalmay Khalilzad, an Afghan-American withstrong political connections to the Bush administration, was appointed asthe new US ambassador to Afghanistan. Besides direct access to the toplevels of the US government, he was provided a budget ($2 billion) forreconstruction and other civilian efforts that was twice the size of the pre-vious year’s allocation. In partnership with the US military commander forAfghanistan, Lieutenant General David Barno, Khalilzad began imple-menting a new plan called “accelerating success” that included the expan-sion of Provincial Reconstruction Teams to “build schools, roads, andwells and to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of Afghans.”16

Recognizing Pakistan’s influence on the situation

The Bush administration also began linking conditions in Pakistanwith success in Afghanistan. President Bush met with Pakistan’s PresidentGeneral Pervez Musharraf in Islamabad in early March 2006 to conferabout cooperation in the “war on terror” immediately after meeting withAfghan President Hamid Karzai in Kabul.17 Bush met simultaneously withMusharraf and Karzai at the White House on September 26, 2006 to dis-cuss common efforts to fight terrorism. At this occasion Bush praised thetwo leaders for “working hard together to defeat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.”18

16 Rohde and Sanger, ibid.17 MSNBC.com, “Bush praises Pakistan’s help in terror fight,” March 5, 2006.http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11651039/ (accessed July 9, 2009).

18 Andrew F. Tully, “Afghanistan: Bush, Karzai Agree on Strategy Against Terror.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, September 27, 2006; http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1071654.html (accessed July 9, 2009).

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More troops, more money, more training

Following a trip to Afghanistan, on December 14, 2006 AnthonyCordesman wrote that “The Bush Administration is already consideringmajor increases in military and economic aid and limited increases in USforces.”19 Cordesman reported that in order to produce the desired endstateof a “Moderate, stable, representative Afghanistan,” a major part of USstrategy was development of the Afghan National Army (ANA).20 Hedescribed three “lines of operation” in this respect:

• Establish and Enhance ANA Training Command• Professional/Self Sustaining Afghan National Army (Main Effort)• Sustainment Operations for Afghan National Army

Cordesman’s report included briefing slides illustrating that theabove efforts were supporting four other lines of effort as part of a “Clear,Hold, Build, Engage” strategy:

• Security· Credible Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)· ANSF and Coalition Forces defeat elements of Al Qaeda, Taliban,and other Extremist Groups· Afghan led· Coherent Campaign Plan

• Governance and Justice (Main Effort)· Responsive, representative, and capable governments at all levels· Extend reach of Afghan government· Credible Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)

19 “Winning in Afghanistan: Afghan Force Development,” Center for Strategic and International StudiesReport, December 14, 2006, http://csis.org/publication/winning-afghanistan-2 (accessed July 8, 2009).

20 Confirming the “main effort” identified by Anthony Cordesman in his December 2006 article, in aCongressional Research Service Report, Catherine Dale wrote that the primary goal of the October2008 JCP for Afghanistan was “‘transfer of lead security responsibility’ to the Afghans, whichincludes planning as well as conducting operations” (Dale, ibid, p. 8).

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• Economic Development· Viable Provincial/District level infrastructures· Determine Afghan needs at local level· Flexible approach to reconstruction

• Border Strategy· Develop cross border cooperation with Pakistan Military· Interdict Taliban network· Collaborative operations and planning· Effective, responsible tactical communications

Expanding to a more regional view

During a briefing to the press in Islamabad on January 12, 2007,Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs RichardBoucher said the Bush administration recognized extremist groups operat-ing from Pakistan posed a threat to both Pakistan and Afghanistan.According to a US State Department report, he also said that:

…military force alone is insufficient to secure the borderregion. The true challenge…is not only extending the gov-ernment’s authority to the border regions, but also the ben-efits of government, such as new roads, better schools, asound justice system and business opportunities that wouldprovide area residents alternatives to build better lives.

The United States can support efforts with more reconstruc-tion, more security, more opportunity for people on theAfghan side, and we can support Pakistan’s efforts to providemore opportunities, more economic opportunity in better gov-ernance and more security for people on the Pakistani side.21

21 David McKeeby, “Progress Seen in Security Pakistan-Afghanistan Border,” America.gov January 17,2009. www.america.gov/.../2007/January/20070117164543idybeekcm0.9265406.html (accessed 7 July2009).

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Finally, a clear statement of goals and implementing tasks

A month later, during a speech at the American EnterpriseInstitute in Washington, DC, President Bush outlined the US strategy inAfghanistan. The message to Afghan, he said, was: “We will train you, wewill help you, and we will stand with you as you defend your new democ-racy.”22 This speech was combined with a February 15, 2007 White Housepress release that reported “The Administration recently completed a top-to-bottom review of its Afghanistan strategy.”23 The highlights of the WhiteHouse Fact Sheet included the following statements:

America has a clear goal in Afghanistan. We will help thepeople of Afghanistan defeat the terrorists, and establish astable, moderate, and democratic state that respects therights of its citizens, governs its territory effectively, and isa reliable ally in the war on terror.

The President is asking Congress for $11.8 billion over thenext two years to help President Karzai defeat our commonenemies and help the Afghan people build a free and suc-cessful nation. The President has also ordered an increase inU.S. forces in Afghanistan – by extending the stay of 3,200troops now in the country by four months and by deployinga replacement force that will sustain that increase for theforeseeable future.

The White House Fact Sheet also declared that the US strategy wasfocused on “Several Key Goals,” excerpted below:

22 David McKeeby, “Bush Announces New Plan for Afghanistan: President urges allies to join U.S. inhelping democracy succeed, America.gov February 15, 2007, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-eng-lish/2007/February/20070215155239idybeekcm0.8339807.html#ixzz0KZmCtrGM&D (accessed 7July 2009)

23 “White House Outlines U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: President seeking $11.8 billion over two yearsto assist Afghan government” America.gov February 15, 2007, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/February/20070215115104abretnuh0.7379267.html#ixzz0KZmShbFY&D (accessed7 July 2009)

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1. The United States And Our Allies Will Help President KarzaiIncrease The Size And Capabilities Of The Afghan Security Forces.

2. America Will Work With Our Allies To Strengthen The NATOForce In Afghanistan.

3. The United States And Our Allies Will Help President Karzai ImproveProvincial Governance And Develop Afghanistan’s Rural Economy.

4. The United States And Our Allies Will Help President KarzaiReverse The Increase In Poppy Cultivation That Is Aiding The Taliban

5. The United States And Our Allies Will Help President KarzaiFight Corruption — Particularly In Afghanistan’s Judicial System.

6. The United States Will Help President Musharraf Defeat TheTerrorists And Extremists Operating Inside Pakistan And Work WithAfghanistan And Pakistan To Increase Cooperation In The FightAgainst Terror.

Engage the “Reconcilables”

Perhaps inspired by the perceived success of similar efforts in Iraq, inwhat appears to be its final evolution the Bush administration also approvedthe concept of trying the split away “moderate” members of the Taliban fromhard core extremists. According to MSNBC.com, in September 2007 anAfghanistan government spokesman said that President Karzai and PresidentBush had discussed initiating a Taliban reconciliation process and that Bushexpressed support.24 One year later, General David Petraeus confirmed toreporters that such an approach was “being examined as an option.” USAToday reported that “Petraeus stressed it was premature to discuss strategy butsuggested he will carry over lessons from his playbook in Iraq – including pos-

24 Associated Press, “Taliban vows to ‘never’ negotiate,” September 30, 2007,http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21055255 (accessed July 7, 2009).

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sible outreach to try to bring hostile players into the political process.”25

Cross-border remote missile strikes

According to the New York Times, in July 2008 President Bushapproved US ground raids into Pakistan in order to disrupt extremist infil-tration into Afghanistan. This followed action by the CIA which had “forseveral years fired missiles at militants inside Pakistan from remotely pilot-ed Predator aircraft.”26 (Consistent with a promise during his 2008 presiden-tial campaign, within three days of his inauguration, President Obama con-tinued the missile strikes in Pakistan and approximately one month laterexpanded the scope of such strikes. As reported by Mark Mazzetti andDavid E. Sanger, “The strikes are a sign that President Obama is continu-ing, and in some cases extending, Bush administration policy in usingAmerican spy agencies against terrorism suspects in Pakistan….”27)

The campaign plan for Afghanistan

In November 2008, General McKiernan—the ISAF commander atthe time—released the following unclassified summary to be posted on theSmall Wars Journal website:28

MISSION ISAF conducts operations in partnership with the Government of theIslamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and in coordination withOperation Enduring Freedom, the United Nations Assistance Missionin Afghanistan and the international community in order to assist

25 Kim Gamel, “Petraeus: more than troops needed in Afghanistan,” September 14, 2008,http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-09-14-3357186908_x.htm (accessed July 7, 2009).

26 Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzezet, “Bush Said to Give Orders Allowing Raids in Pakistan,” September11, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/washington/11policy.html (accessed July 9, 2009).

27 CBS News/Associated Press, “Pakistan Strike First on Obama’s Watch,” January 23, 2009,http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/23/terror/main4749317.shtml (accessed July 9, 2009); andMark Mazzeetti and David E. Sanger, “Obama Expands Missile Strikes Inside Pakistan,” The NewYork Times February 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/21/washington/21policy.html(accessed July 9, 2009).

28 http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/isafcampaignplansummary.pdf (accessed 27 May 2008).

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GIRoA to defeat the insurgency, establish a secure environment, extendviable governance, and promote development throughout Afghanistan.

LINES OF OPERATION Security Governance Reconstruction and Development

COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRATED APPROACH Comprehensive: Working concurrently across all three lines ofoperation. Integrated: Operating in a coordinated manner with GIRoA andthe international community.

KEY PLANNING FACTORS Counterinsurgency campaign. Shape, in order to clear in order to hold and build. Prioritize the areas to clear and hold. Establish and maintain freedom of movement. Apply greater effort on the narcotics-insurgency nexus. Identify and engage key Afghan community leaders. Interdict and disrupt insurgent movement to and from sanctuariesin the border region. Build Afghan capability, capacity, and credibility.

The Obama administration takes charge

The war in Afghanistan was a high profile topic on the campaigntrail for Candidate Obama. During a visit to Kabul in July 2008, for exam-ple, he told CBS news: “For at least a year now, I have called for two addi-tional brigades, perhaps three….I think it’s very important that we unifycommand more effectively to coordinate our military activities. But mili-tary alone is not going to be enough.”29

29 “Obama calls situation in Afghanistan ‘urgent’” CNN.com, July 21, 2008,http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/20/obama.afghanistan/ (accessed July 13, 2009).

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The new Obama administration announced February 10, 2009,that Bruce Riedel—described by the Los Angeles Times as “a former CIAofficial and harsh critic of former President Bush’s handling of the conflictin Afghanistan—would chair a White House review of US policy onAfghanistan and Pakistan.30 Part of Riedel’s remit would be to tie togetherthe other high level reviews being conducted by US Government agencies,including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Central Command. However, itwas reported that President Obama was likely to approve a significantincrease in US forces, as previously requested by the Pentagon, prior tocompletion of the strategy review.31

On February 17, 2009, the Pentagon reported that PresidentObama had approved the deployment of 17,000 additional US soldiers andmarines to Afghanistan. According to CNN, a military official said “thegoal is to have enough troops to ‘seize and hold’ territory and maintainbasic security, which hasn’t been possible under current troop levels.”32

Slightly more than one month later on March 27, 2009, joined on the daisby Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense RobertGates, President Obama said: “Today, I am announcing a comprehensive,new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. And this marks the conclusionof a careful policy review, led by Bruce [Riedel], that I ordered as soon asI took office.”33

30 Julian E. Barnes, “Obama team works on overhaul of Afghanistan, Pakistan policy” February 11,2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/11/world/fg-us-afghan11 (accessed July 13, 2009).

31 Karen DeYoung, “Afghan Conflict Will Be Reviewed: Obama Sees Troops As Buying Time, NotTurning Tide,” The Washington Post January 13, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con-tent/article/2009/01/12/AR2009011203492.html.

32 Barbara Starr, CNN.com, February 17, 2009,http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/17/obama.troops/index.html.

33 The White House, “A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” The Blog, March 27, 2009,http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/03/27/A-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/(accessed May 28, 2009.

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Highlights of the Af-Pak Strategy

In his remarks announcing the new strategy, President Obama stated:

“We are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threat-ens the United States, our friends and allies, and the people of Afghanistanand Pakistan who have suffered the most at the hands of violent extrem-ists. So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear andfocused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan andAfghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”34

He further said that:

· “The future of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the futureof its neighbor, Pakistan”

· The people of Pakistan want “an end to terror, access to basicservices, the opportunity to live their dreams, and the securitythat can only come with the rule of law”

· “…we must isolate al Qaeda from the Pakistani people”· The deployment of 17,000 additional troops “will take the fightto the Taliban in the south and the east, and give us a greatercapacity to partner with Afghan security forces and to go afterinsurgents along the border….At the same time, we will shiftthe emphasis of our mission to training and increasing the sizeof Afghan security forces, so that they can eventually take thelead in securing their country”

· A goal of 134,000 ANA and 82,000 police would be met by 2011· The military push must be joined by “a dramatic increase in ourcivilian effort….we need agricultural specialists and educators,engineers and lawyers”

34 The White House, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan”March 27, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/

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· “We cannot turn a blind eye to the corruption that causesAfghans to lose faith in their own leaders. Instead, we will seeka new compact with the Afghanistan government that cracksdown on corrupt behavior, and sets clear benchmarks, clearmetrics for international assistance so that it is used to providefor the needs of the Afghan people”

· “…there will be no peace without reconciliation among formerenemies”

· “And we will continue to support the basic human rights of allAfghans – including women and girls”

· “…we will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold our-selves accountable.” These would include actions to:- Assess efforts to train ASF and progress in combating insurgents- Measure growth of Afghanistan’s economy and illicit nar-cotics production

- Confirm that the right tools and tactics are being used

The president’s speech was accompanied by a White House pressrelease, titled “What’s New in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.”35

It emphasized the following characteristics:

- An Attainable Objective- A Regional Approach- Building Capacity and More Training- Using All Elements of National Power- Bringing new international elements to the effort

Both the speech and the press release also reported that besides the17,000 additional US troops that President Obama had approved inFebruary 2009, another 4,000 would be deployed as trainers for the AfghanNational Army and Police.

The White House press release identified the “core goal” of the

35 White House Press Office, (ibid).

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new strategy as “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safehavens.” As will be discussed further below, this is presented in a mannerthat gives the impression that it sets a lower bar for success compared tothe goals of the previous administration, which explicitly included the pro-motion of democracy.

In addition to the president’s speech and the White House pressrelease, a policy white paper was also published.36 It generally echoed thePresident’s remarks, stating that the US “core goal” is to “disrupt, dismantle,and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their returnto Pakistan or Afghanistan. It also laid out the following five objectives:

• Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistanto degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international ter-ror attacks

• Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government inAfghanistan….

• Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that canlead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight….

• Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutionalgovernment in Pakistan and a vibrant economy….

• Involving the international community to actively assist…

On its second page, however, the white paper describes an “endstate” which is far broader than the “core goal.” It seeks to achieve “theremoval of al Qaeda’s sanctuary, effective democratic government controlin Pakistan, and a self-reliant Afghanistan that will enable a withdrawal ofcombat forces while sustaining our commitment to political and econom-ic development.” Interestingly, the word “democracy” is not used in con-junction with Afghanistan yet supporting elections and improving gover-nance are listed among the important tasks.

36 “White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan andPakistan” http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/afghanistan_pakistan_white_paper_final.pdf

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So, what’s new in the Obama administrations strategy?

Although different in geographic focus, the Obama administra-tion’s new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan is similar in many waysto both the Bush administration’s pre-surge strategy for Iraq published in2005 and the outline of the Bush strategy for Afghanistan that was releasedin 2007.37 When asked by Margaret Warner during an interview on TheNews Hour what was different from the Bush plan, Obama’s envoy to theregion, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, could identify few specifics otherthan being “an integrated policy” with “far more resources.”38

The Obama strategy for Afghanistan-Pakistan and the Bush pre-surge strategy for Iraq look especially similar. Each of them:

• Claimed to be “comprehensive” and stated that defeating terrorists isa vital interest of the United States;

• Recognized that some armed groups might be reconciled to the elect-ed government but others, like al Qaeda, could not be brought into thepeaceful political process and thus would require so-called “kinetic”operations to kill or capture terrorists;

• Recognized the problem of insurgent and terrorist infiltration fromneighboring safe havens;

• Announced plans to enlarge and train the host nation’s army andpolice so they could eventually take responsibility for securing theirown country.

Bush in 2005 and Obama in 2009 both promised to assist, encour-age, and cajole national leaders to develop their economy, improve gover-

37 The Bush administration’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, dated November 30, 2005, can bedownloaded at:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/30/AR2005113000376.html(accessed April 15, 2009)

38 Interview transcript, “Obama Sets Plan to Boost Afghan Stability, Confront Taliban and Al-Qaida,”March 27, 2009, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june09/afghanpak_03-27.html

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nance, and reduce corruption. Each stated they would identify metrics totrack their strategy’s progress and said they would use benchmarks to pressthe respective host nation governments to implement the rule of law andbe responsive to the needs of their populations.

However, in addition to providing more troops and funding the Af-Pak strategy seems to have two “Big Ideas” that present a clear changefrom the Bush strategy for Afghanistan as it had evolved by 2008. First, inthe Obama strategy success in Afghanistan is strongly bound with the sit-uation in Pakistan (thus, an Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy rather thananother Afghanistan strategy). Although the Bush administration belated-ly recognized the influence of the situation in Pakistan upon that inAfghanistan, and the problems generated when the Taliban and otherextremists had a safe haven where they could escape from coalition oper-ations in Afghanistan and regroup, it did not integrate consideration of thetwo states into a single broad strategy. This is an important, major newcontribution to the US and allied strategy in the region.

Second, the new strategy gives the impression of an attempt tolower the bar by setting a more readily achievable goal. Rather than thebroad goal announced by the Bush administration on February 15, 2008 to“help the people of Afghanistan defeat the terrorists, and establish a stable,moderate, and democratic state that respects the rights of its citizens, gov-erns its territory effectively, and is a reliable ally in the War on Terror,”39

the Obama administration distilled the purpose of operations inAfghanistan into the defeat of al Qaeda and elimination its safe havens.

Yet when reading the “fine print,” it becomes clear that the Af-Pakstrategy is consistent with US counterinsurgency doctrine and its execu-tion will require the full range of efforts from providing population secu-rity, building Afghan security force capabilities, promoting economic

39 “White House Outlines U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: President seeking $11.8 billion over two yearsto assist Afghan government”, ibid.

39 “White House Outlines U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: President seeking $11.8 billion over two yearsto assist Afghan government”, ibid.

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development, improving governance, to reducing corruption. Interestingly,the word “democracy” is used only in the context of Pakistan’s govern-ment. However as noted previously, the White Paper implies a democraticAfghanistan by including among its stated objectives “Promoting a morecapable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan.”40 It alsosays that the strategy endeavors to “strengthen the relationship between theAfghan people and their government” and recommends “bolstering thelegitimacy of the Afghan government.” One of the specified tasks is to “doeverything necessary to ensure the security and legitimacy of voter regis-tration, elections, and vote counting.”

The main substantive difference between the goals of the twostrategies in this regard seems to be that the Bush administration stated thatAfghanistan would be a “moderate” democratic state. Instead, the ObamaAf-Pak strategy gives the desired nature of the Afghanistan government asbeing “legitimate” and “a capable, accountable, and effective govern-ment…that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, espe-cially regarding internal security, with limited international support.”Furthermore, in the section regarding reconciliation with “non-ideologi-cally committed insurgents” the Af-Pak strategy says that such efforts“must not become a mechanism for instituting medieval social policiesthat give up the quest for gender equality and human rights.” These char-acteristics seem to imply a moderate government.

Perhaps the Af-Pak strategy is intentionally leaving open a theo-retical possibility that some other form of Afghan government might beable to defeat al Qaeda, quiet the extremists, and adequately serve the peo-ple of Afghanistan. However, it is extremely difficult to imagine anythingother than a moderate democracy being able to achieve the goals of the Af-Pak strategy while simultaneously being sufficiently consistent withNATO member state values to retain the necessary levels of military andeconomic development support.

40 Perhaps the Af-Pak strategy takes Afghan democracy as a given, so it is not necessary to mention itas a goal. If so, this further blurs any difference in the level of ambition between the Bush andObama strategies.

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Strategic and operational implications

The announcement of a “new” strategy may buy some time withdomestic publics, but is unlikely to produce a rapid shift in the situation. Bystating that the “core goal” is to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda,”the Obama strategy gives the impression of lowering the bar from the pre-vious goal of spreading democratic values and thus being easier to achieve.Yet as the preceding analysis shows, implementing the strategy will requirea full-scale counterinsurgency effort that includes providing security for theAfghan population, increased economic development programs, andimproving the quality and effectiveness of the Afghan government at thenational, regional, and local levels. Especially considering the deteriorationof the security situation during the past few years, the new strategy willvery likely require greater levels of US and allied effort rather than less.

Coalition troop levels

In short, the Af-Pak strategy will probably increase demandsupon—and tensions within—NATO instead of representing a solution thatwould reduce stress upon the alliance. Underlying tensions about decision-making and burden sharing remain unresolved, and possibly exacerbated.As was the case with his predecessor, it is likely that Obama will eventu-ally have to recognize that he hasn’t devoted enough resources to achievehis stated goals. Where will these come from?

The initial approval to send another 17,000 troops plus 4,000trainer/advisors is probably only a down payment. The Associated Press report-ed that before being relieved, ISAF commander General David McKiernan toldPresident Obama that another 10,000 troops would be needed but “the WhiteHouse put off that decision until the end of the year.” It also reported that on July16, 2009, US Secretary of Defense Roberts Gates said “I think there will not bea significant increase in troop levels in Afghanistan beyond the 68,000, at leastprobably through the end of the year. Maybe some increase, but not a lot.”41

41 “Defense Secretary Says More Troops May Head to Afghanistan,” July 16, 2009,http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/07/16/defense-secretary-says-troops-head-afghanistan/

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According to the Washington Post, while talking to US militaryleaders in Afghanistan during the last week of June 2009, US NationalSecurity Advisor James L. Jones implied that commanders should notrequest additional forces. Reporter Bob Woodward wrote that Jones hadwarned that “after all those additional troops, 17,000 plus 4,000 more, ifthere were new requests for force now, the president would quite likely have‘a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment.’”42 As Peter Feaver has pointed out, ifWoodward’s article is accurate this incident could be yet another similarityto the Bush administration’s experience in Iraq: some reporters (includingWoodward) have claimed that senior civilians discouraged senior militaryleaders from providing honest professional advice about troop levels byintimating that the president did not want to hear requests for more troops.43

Yet Woodward also wrote:

The question of the force level for Afghanistan, how-ever, is not settled and will probably be hotly debated over thenext year. One senior military officer said privately that theUnited States would have to deploy a force of more than100,000 to execute the counterinsurgency strategy of holdingareas and towns after clearing out the Taliban insurgents. Thatis at least 32,000 more than the 68,000 currently authorized.

American and other coalition force levels are likely to remainproblematic for quite some time. There is no consensus among counterin-surgency experts, yet a frequently cited rule of thumb suggests a ratio of20 security force members per 1,000 in population is needed for successin counterinsurgency. (This figure, however, is hotly disputed.44)

42 As Woodward explains, this is a well-known acronym in the US military meaning “What the [exple-tive]?” See “Key in Afghanistan: Economy, Not Military,” Washington Post July 1, 2009,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/30/AR2009063002811_pf.html

43 “The White House and Woodward,” ForeignPolicy.com Shadow Government Blog, July 1, 2009,http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/01/the_white_house_and_woodward.

44 Although commonly prescribed, this is a disputed figure. See James T. Quinlivan, “Burden ofVictory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations.” RAND Review, Summer 2003 at:http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/burden.html

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Using this rule of thumb, an Iraqi population of approximately 27.5million would require roughly 550,000 security force members to quell aburgeoning insurgency. The “surge” in 2007 appeared to succeed with a farsmaller ratio: approximately 169,000 troops from coalition forces.45

However, the personnel available to conduct operations in Iraq also includ-ed a large portion of the 440,000 members of Iraqi Security Forces (soldiersand police) that had at that time been trained and equipped by Multi-National Force-Iraq. Furthermore, these Iraqi forces were complementedby approximately 92,000 “Sons of Iraq” irregular forces that have beendescribed by the US Department of Defense as “a strategic asset that direct-ly contributed to the 83% reduction in violence in the Baghdad SecurityDistricts since August 2007.”46 Although there were questions about thecapability and reliability of Iraqi regular and irregular security forces (as isthe case with Afghanistan National Security Forces), the total number ofsecurity force members to population probably exceeded 20 per 1,000.

With an Afghan population of almost 32 million, following the 20per 1,000 formula would require approximately 640,000 troops and police.Even if the planned increase of Afghan Security Forces to 216,000 (armyand police) by 2011 is completed on schedule, this total plus approximate-ly 68,000 US and 33,000 non-US coalition troops results in not quite halfthe ratio of total security force members to population that was used toturn the corner on violence in Iraq.

Following his participation in General McChrystal’s “60-dayAssessment,” Anthony Cordesman argued that the US “must deploy a sub-stantial number of additional brigade combat teams and ‘enablers,’” andthat the US should be ready to “deploy 3-6 more brigade combat teamsduring the coming year if required, but constantly monitor the overall

45 US Government Accountability Office, “Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March2009, GAO-09-294SP, p. 42, http://gao.gov/new.items/d09294sp.pdf.

46 US Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, December 2007, pp. 29 and19, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010_Report_to_Congress_Dec_08.pdf. The number ofIraqi Security Forces actually performing duty may have been as little as one-half of the total report-ed as trained due to casualties, absent-without-leave, and other attrition.

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progress in the war and Afghan government actions and cooperation andsupport.” However, he also notes that:

…shape, clear, hold, and build involve new formsof war fighting where force requirements cannot be predict-ed with precision. Past troop-to-task would require far high-er levels of US forces [than] 3-6 more brigade combatteams, but such ratios ignore the impact of technology, newtactics, a civil-military approach to war and the role of civil-ian partners, and the ability to build up major new [AfghanNational Security Forces] reinforcements over the [next]two years. At the same time, force requirements may beincreased by new insurgent tactics and added foreign volun-teers, instability in Pakistan, and the lack of adequate civil-ian partners and capability.47

While theoretically possible, it seems highly unlikely that currentforce levels will prove sufficient in the near term. The need for additionaltroops will place continuing pressure on NATO members to at a minimummaintain the size of their present deployments, if not to increase their con-tributions, to partially offset concerns about a “two tier alliance” and“Americanization of the war.”48

A critical component of the Af-Pak strategy, as was the case withthe Bush administration’s approach, is helping to build capable and reli-able Afghan National Security Forces. The creation of NATO TrainingMission-Afghanistan could prove to be a significant contribution, butresults remain to be seen. Even best case, the creation of sufficiently large

47 “The Afghanistan Campaign: Can We Win?” Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 22, 2009,http://csis.org/files/publication/090722_CanWeAchieveMission.pdf, pp. 21-22.

48 See Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, “Does a Multi-Tier NATO Matter? The Atlantic Alliance and theProcess of Strategic Change,” International AffairsMarch 2009, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publi-cations/ia/download/-/id/2363; and Stephen Castle, “U.S. Gains More Control as It Fights Afghan War,”New York Times June 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/world/asia/12nato.html

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and capable ANSF is many years away.49 General George Casey, the USArmy Chief of Staff, recently said that “training of local police and mili-tary in Afghanistan was at least a couple years behind the pace in Iraq, andit would be months before US deployed enough trainers. A significantexpansion of the Afghan National Army above the 134,000 already envi-sioned in the Af-Pak strategy, perhaps double this number, is under consid-eration.50 However, a recent report by Oxford Analytica argues that a rapid,significant expansion of the Afghan National Army will be problematicdue to a retention rate of only 53% and shortfalls of volunteers, qualifiedofficer candidates, and logistical support capabilities.51

Developing host nation forces able to secure their own populationis perhaps the keystone of US counterinsurgency doctrine—and the Af-Pakstrategy. Yet at this stage of the insurgency, this goal is still presents moreof a challenge than a solution. We remain some distance away from a quan-tity and quality of Afghan forces that would enable the withdrawal of coali-tion forces to begin—that the point where, in the words of President Bushin the context of Iraqi Security Forces, “as they stand up we stand down.”52

As a critical element of its strategy, the Obama administrationmust decide how much and how quickly it can rely upon Afghanistan’sarmy and police forces to secure their own population. An early failing inIraq was a rush to hand security responsibilities over to unreliable andinadequately trained Iraqi security forces in lieu of deploying the neces-sary level of US forces. Blunders such as the creation of the FallujahBrigade, described by Thomas Ricks as having “far more in common withthe insurgents than they ever would with the [US] Marines,” proved to besteps backward instead of the hoped for shortcuts to victory.53

49 See C.J. Chivers, “Erratic Afghan Forces Pose Challenge to U.S. Goals,” New York Times, June 7,2009: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/08/world/asia/08afghan.html?th&emc=th

50 Cordesman, “The Afghanistan Campaign: Can We Win?” p. 11.51 “Afghanistan: Army expansion is no easy option,” Oxford Analytica, March 26, 2009.52 NewsHour interview with Jim Lehrer, December 16, 2005:http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/july-dec05/bush_12-16-05.html

53 Fiasco (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), p. 343.

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Economic development and good governance

Typically conceived as the “civilian” components of counterinsur-gency, these elements are arguably outside NATO’s portfolio. The mostcommon phrase over the past few years about the war in Afghanistan isprobably that it “cannot be won by the military alone.” Yet the paradox isthat while NATO’s leverage over civilian entities is extremely limited, mil-itary success in Afghanistan is inseparably linked to the accomplishmentof non-security objectives such as the delivery of basic services, offeringeconomic opportunity, and achieving the perception that an elected Afghangovernment is a better choice for the population than the Taliban.

Unlike Iraq, the greatest challenge in Afghanistan has been nation-building from the ground up rather than reconstruction and stability. Tensof billions of dollars more in economic development assistance will berequired during at least another decade of armed nation-building. Yet theUS and other NATO members have yet to figure out how to implement aneffective comprehensive approach within single member states (i.e.,“whole-of-government” efforts) much less between ISAF contributors orin concert with key civilian elements of the international community.

Describing this as the problem of “Dealing with a DysfunctionalMix of NATO/ISAF, National, UNAMA, and International CommunityEfforts,” Anthony Cordesman asserts:

NATO/ISAF and the US have sometimes been asserious a threat to themselves as the insurgency and thelimitations of the Afghan government. To win, they mustcreate an effective civil-military effort where civilianpartners – and aid efforts in governance, economics, andrule of law – directly support or complement NATO/ISAFand US efforts to defeat the insurgency and create effec-tive and legitimate levels of governance in the field.54

54 Cordesman, “The Afghanistan Campaign: Can We Win?” p. 19.

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Space limitations preclude repeating much of what has been writ-ten elsewhere regarding the challenges of putting together military andcivilian efforts in stability and counterinsurgency operations.55 However, itis imperative that ISAF develop and incorporate into its organizationalstructure integrated civil-military command teams at every echelon fromthe regional commands to the district level.

The creation of the Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group(ICMAG) in Kabul56 was a very good step in the right direction. However,in addition to such efforts between US forces and the US Embassy inKabul, ISAF headquarters needs better integration with embassies of all themajor force contributing nations, the Europe Union, United NationsAssistance Mission-Afghanistan, and major non-governmental organiza-tions. As the largest force contributor and provider of the ISAF command-ing general, it has perhaps been too easy for the US—especially the StateDepartment and US Agency for International Development—to concen-trate solely on US interagency coordination efforts. Despite, and preciselybecause of, the political hurdles, similar efforts are required to integrate allthe coalition civil-military efforts. Equally, the Afghan government—including its senior military commanders—must be brought into the plan-ning process as full partners.

Although popular with the politicians in Washington, hardly anyexpert on Iraq believes that the Congressional benchmarks57 were positiveon the whole in changing the behavior of the Iraqi government. This obser-vation begs the following questions: How can the US and its allies force ademocratically elected government to change its behavior? Would threats

55 For more discussion on this topic, see Christopher M. Schnaubelt: “The challenge to operationalizinga comprehensive approach,” in Operationalizing a comprehensive approach in semi-permissive envi-ronments, NDC Forum Paper Number 9: http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=79

56 See “Prepared Statement of Ambassador John E. Herbst, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization,Before the Subcomittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,” US House of Representatives, May 19,2009: http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20090519132337.pdf

57 See Council on Foreign Relations, “What are Iraq’s Benchmarks,” March 11, 2008: http://www.cfr.org/pub-lication/13333/

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to withdraw American support be credible and effective? If not, willPresident Obama really be willing to walk away after the investment of somany lives and dollars?

Among the significant problems with the benchmarks establishedfor Iraq were their design by a US Congress with the opposite party inmajority having a view of disciplining the Bush administration as much aspresenting a road map for the success of the Iraqi government. At the timeof writing, the Obama administration has yet to release its benchmarks forAfghanistan (or Pakistan).

However, a better model would be the International Compact withIraq.58 This document was developed as a mutual agreement between theGovernment of Iraq and the International Community. As such, it not onlybrought a broad range of ideas into the mix but also buy-in from Iraqi lead-ers. It was more of an agreement of how to make progress than a mechanismfor administering “carrots and sticks.” Whichever route the Obama adminis-tration chooses to pursue in ensuring aid is effective and properly spent, theAfghan government, NATO, and the International Community should beinvolved in the process of establishing the goals and monitoring progress.

Conclusion

For the most part, the Af-Pak strategy is a continuation of the plansand policies of the Bush administration as they had evolved by the end of2008. Nonetheless, it provides a coherent framework for implementingcounterinsurgency and development efforts to the war in Afghanistan andwill significantly increase the US military and financial resources devotedto carrying out the strategy.

If adequately resourced and properly implemented, the strategy

58 See: International Compact with Iraq official website: http://www.iraqcompact.org/en/

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has a good chance of turning around the security situation in Afghanistanand achieving the goals of the coalition and the elected government ofAfghanistan while supporting the aspirations of the Afghan people.However, it is likely that an even higher troop levels and greater develop-mental aid will be required. Furthermore, successful implementation willrequire much better integration of planning and execution between mili-tary and civilian efforts, national contingents, and the US/NATO and theInternational Community.

For NATO, the Af-Pak strategy will mean more hard work ahead,more tensions over burden sharing and decision making, and a call for atleast the same level of military effort if not even greater force contribu-tions. However, if adequately resourced and wisely executed it also pres-ents a reasonable probability of success in the largest “out-of-area” andcombat mission in NATO’s history.

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CHAPTER TWO

NATO and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Afghanistan

Benjamin Schreer

Can NATO conduct a sustained Counterinsurgency operation?Almost three years after the Atlantic Alliance assumed responsibility forall Afghan territory in October 2006 its troops now confront a complexand increasing insurgency. By July 2009 even northern Afghanistan, whichused to be relatively stable compared to the embattled southern and east-ern parts of the country, had turned into an area of almost daily clashesbetween NATO forces and insurgents. Indeed, that month proved to be themost deadly for NATO troops since the Alliance engaged in the country.1

The ability of the Alliance to adjust to an insurgency challenge has, there-fore, evolved from an academic question into one of the utmost politicalimportance. Should NATO fail in what constitutes arguably its mostimportant out-of-area operation so far, the repercussions could be signifi-cant, given that members might well decide never to engage in such anoperation again. Since it is highly likely that modern insurgencies will bepart of most major stability and support operations involving Westernforces – and thus will be the norm rather than the exception – NATO’s abil-ity to contribute to international stability through the conduct of counterin-surgency operations would be significantly reduced.

Against this background, this paper examines the NATO-ledInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan

1 ‘Bisher höchster Blutzoll der ISAF’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 July 2009, p. 6.

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identifies some of the major lessons for NATO on both the political andthe military level of counterinsurgency operations. This will allow someconclusion to be drawn on NATO’s future prospects in this area. The arti-cle proceeds in three parts. The first part debates the concept of counterin-surgency and describes the evolving challenge for the ISAF operation inAfghanistan. The second part deals with the political and military lessonsfor the Atlantic Alliance in dealing with the insurgency challenge. Theconcluding part provides an outlook on future NATO capability develop-ment for counterinsurgency operations and highlights some potentialstrategic implications should the Atlantic Alliance fail to take on this chal-lenge.

NATO and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: theory…

Simply put, counterinsurgency is ‘all measures to suppress aninsurgency’; it is a form of ‘counter-warfare’ that ‘applies all elements ofnational power against insurrection’.2 It follows that counterinsurgency isa strategy as opposed to a mere tactic at the level of military operations.Following classical counterinsurgency theory, the role to play for NATO inAfghanistan, then, is clear: devise in cooperation with national and inter-national actors a ‘comprehensive approach’ (NATO wording for a strategyinvolving integrated political, military and economic instruments) to sup-port the Afghan government in its struggle against Taliban and allied insur-gent groups, and to ‘win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people’,meaning to convince them that their future lies with a pro-Western regimeand a more liberal society.

In theory, the Alliance is well positioned to take on the Afghaninsurgency. Politically, the ISAF mission represents the will of the largerinternational community to stabilize Afghanistan and to defeat Talibaninsurgents. The operation is legitimized by a United Nation Security

2 David Kilcullen, ‘Counter-insurgency Redux’, Survival 48 (Winter 2006-07) 4, p.112.

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Council resolution. A large number of non-NATO countries as diverse asAustralia, Sweden and Jordan contribute to the ISAF mission. Militarily,NATO is the world’s most potent organization, having at its disposal notonly U.S. forces but also almost the whole of European armies.Economically, NATO countries contribute a significant portion of theworld’s gross domestic product (GDP) to build Afghanistan’s shatteredeconomy.

The Alliance also is not alone in its Afghan undertaking. The UnitedNations (UN), the European Union (EU), the World Bank (WB) and numer-ous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also engaged at the HinduKush. Afghanistan’s important neighbors like Russia, Pakistan, China andIran have no interest in the reassertion of power by the Taliban. Russia, forexample, recently allowed NATO countries to transport supplies through itsterritory in the context of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). Russiahas also granted the U.S. rights to shipping lethal cargo to Afghanistan.Finally, the Afghan government led by President Hamid Karzai and theAfghan population by and large still support NATO’s presence.

…and practice

In principle, then, all the elements of international power to defeatthe Afghan insurgency exist. In practice, however, NATO struggles to makeand execute counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. To be fair, there aresome shortcomings that cannot be blamed on the Atlantic Alliance, sincethey pertain to the role played by domestic and international actors. TheAfghan government has huge difficulties in fighting corruption and adher-ing to principles of ‘good governance’. The focus of international efforts onstrengthening a central Afghan government also seems to conflict with thecountry’s political culture of strong provincial and local entities.

International players like the UN or the EU also have so far failedto provide significant resources; the EU’s mediocre achievement in train-ing Afghan National Police (ANP) is the most prominent example. The

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cultural resistance of many NGOs to working with the military, and thedouble-edged role played by Afghanistan’s neighbors, add to this picture.For example, Afghan insurgents are able to use Pakistani border areas toretreat, recruit and launch operations, in the absence of effective counter-measures by the Pakistani government. NATO as a military alliance can-not succeed in conducting counterinsurgency in Afghanistan on its own,given its lack of civilian capacity and given the important role to be playedby national and international actors. A comprehensive approach is next toimpossible without stronger commitment and increased capabilities on thepart of third-party actors.

The deficits on the side of NATO’s national and international part-ners cannot, however, conceal the fact that many of NATO’s problems indevising and executing counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan arehomegrown. Both on the political and on the military level, the AtlanticAlliance suffers from significant constraints in conducting counterinsur-gency operations.

The political level

NATO historically has no experience in engaging in and prepar-ing for counterinsurgency operations. Force planning within theAlliance did not assume and prepare for a sustained insurgency chal-lenge.3 The Balkan missions in the 1990s were conducted in the doctri-nal context of peacekeeping operations, which differ from counterinsur-gency operations in important aspects. Most prominently, in counterin-surgency there is no peace to ‘keep’; rather it has to be ‘won’ by engag-ing insurgents by political, military and economic means. The kineticaspect of military power in such operations involves constant althoughusually small battles with a dispersed enemy who resorts to all forms ofguerilla warfare. ‘Small wars’ might therefore be a suitable term to cap-

3 Sean Kay and Sahar Khan, ‘NATO and Counter-insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset?’,Contemporary Security Policy 28 (April 2007) 1, p. 163.

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ture the operational reality for many ISAF troops engaged inAfghanistan in 2009.

This changing operational reality is only slowly sinking in withmany European NATO allies; it is the result of an ‘insurgency creep’ whichhas affected more and more provinces of Afghanistan since the Alliancetook over full responsibility for the country in 2006. Taliban forces havegained strength throughout the country.4 Yet most allies signed up for theISAF mission in the first place on a very different set of assumptions.European allies in particular sent forces on the following bottom-line: (1)the engagement was primarily for reasons of political solidarity with theU.S. ally, with NATO evoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty after theSeptember 11 attacks, which posits that an attack on one member shall bedeemed as an attack on all other allies; (2) NATO troops would be mainlyengaged in stability and reconstruction operations, with combat operationsleft to (predominantly) U.S. troops in the framework of Operation EnduringFreedom (OEF); and (3) the Taliban had been defeated by the OEF engage-ment, and thus the objective of stabilizing Afghanistan seemed thereforeachievable at a reasonable cost. Nowhere was the ISAF operation expectedto turn into a fully-fledged counterinsurgency operation.

Many allies were therefore not ready to embrace the concept ofcounterinsurgency when the tide began to turn in 2006. This was not themission they had planned for. Nor was it the one that government in NATOcountries had sold to their publics. The reluctance to acknowledge a resur-gent Afghan insurgency movement was also due to the different opera-tional realities experienced by NATO troops, depending on their area ofresponsibility. In 2006, troops predominantly based in SouthernAfghanistan such as the Americans, the British, the Canadians and theDutch, faced increasing resistance by Taliban insurgents. At that time,areas in the north in particular did not see a rapid increase in violence andattacks on ISAF troops. Allies operating in this area, such as Germany,

4 The International Council on Security and Development, Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance,London 2008.

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assessed the situation rather differently from those fighting in the south.Different operational realities led to problems at the political level. In2006, NATO force commanders’ requests for more troops and a ‘hard-hit-ting reserve’ to use wherever deemed necessary were not met. Warningsthat the security situation in Afghanistan was about to deteriorate failed ‘toproduce serious interest in additional force generation for counterinsur-gency combat operations’.5

Different operational realities were only part of the problemNATO faced in finding a common approach to the growing insurgencychallenge. Even when the security situation increasingly deteriorated inthe rest of Afghanistan, allies such as Germany still resisted U.S. and otherallies’ efforts to introduce the concept of counterinsurgency at the politicallevel of NATO. Different historical, political and societal factors shapeindividual NATO allies’ perceptions of the concept of counterinsurgency.

On the one hand, there is a group of largely Anglo-Saxon allies andpartners such as the U.S., the U.K, Canada and Australia. These countriesdo not contest that ISAF has turned into a counterinsurgency operation.Driven by hard lessons from Iraq, the U.S. military has updated doctrine forcounterinsurgency (FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Field Manual) and hasurged its NATO allies to do the same. British forces have significant expe-rience in ‘imperial policing’ and share many doctrinal strands of counterin-surgency with their American counterparts. Australia traditionally ‘goes towar’ with its U.S. and British allies and also has started to invest more incounterinsurgency capability. Canadian forces were forced to adjust byoperational reality in Southern Afghanistan. So were the Dutch.

On the other end of the spectrum is Germany, a major Europeanally.6 Politically, the German government is still not ready to acknowledgethat ISAF by now is engaged in a ‘small war’ in Afghanistan. Rather, the

5 Kay and Khan, NATO and Counter-insurgency, p. 164.6 On the evolution of recent German NATO policy in general see Benjamin Schreer, ‘A new “pragma-tism”: Germany’s NATO policy’, International Journal, Spring 2009, pp. 383-398.

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mission is termed as ‘post-conflict reconstruction,’ partially at least out offear of an increasingly skeptical German public. Additionally, for variousreasons the strategic level of the German Armed Forces (The Bundeswehr)has not yet made the case for a deeper investment in national counterinsur-gency capability.7 German military doctrine also uses counterinsurgencyas a kinetic tactic for specialized forces and not as a strategy in the Anglo-Saxon sense.8 Germany has used its weight in the Atlantic Alliance to pre-vent the concept of counterinsurgency from gaining credibility at the polit-ical level.

Of the major NATO allies France represents a middle positionbetween the Anglo-Saxon and the German ‘pillars’. French counterinsur-gency theorists such as David Galula have had significant influence oninternational strategic debate. French forces have also faced insurgencymovements in Indochina and Algeria. In both conflicts, they ‘lost’ on thedomestic political front. Judging from French operational conduct and per-sonnel investment in Afghanistan, their political and military plannersseem to have drawn the conclusion from their past experience that Westerndemocratic societies are scarcely able to succeed in such operations.

This conceptual divide among major allies on the very nature of theISAF operation prevents NATO from devising and executing counterinsur-gency strategy in Afghanistan. At the time of writing, allies still did notagree on the central question whether Afghanistan was a counterinsurgencyoperation or a stability and reconstruction mission. In this context, NATO’sdecision-making process based on consensus of all 28 members constitutesa ‘strategic dilemma’9 for its ability to conduct counterinsurgency opera-tions. As mentioned above, individual member states can block the conceptfrom being politically accepted. Instead, the German government in partic-

7 See “NATO and Counterinsurgency: The Case of Germany” by Timo Noetzel and Martin Zapfe else-where in this volume.

8 See in detail Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, ‘Missing Links: The Evolution of GermanCounter-Insurgency Thinking’, RUSI Journal 154 (February 2009) 1; same, ‘Counter-what?Germany and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan’, RUSI Journal 153 (February 2008) 1.

9 Kay and Khan, NATO and Counter-insurgency, p. 164.

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ular has publicly advocated a ‘comprehensive approach’ to the ISAF mis-sion. But this concept is rather vague, means ‘different things to differentpeople’, and for critics of the German position can be perceived as politicalrhetoric to downplay the military component of the operation.

Consensus rule also invites insurgents to get into NATO’s decisionloop by specifically targeting those allies deemed politically weak. Afghaninsurgents have done just that. For example, in the run-up to the Germanparliamentary election in September 2009 they stepped up attacks onGerman troops. In turn, German politicians and some security punditsstarted to discuss the need for an ‘exit-strategy’ for the ISAF mission.Other countries such as the Netherlands have seen similar debates.10 Suchdebates play into the hands of Afghan insurgents, particularly becausemany local elders reason that Western forces will eventually leave thecountry to Taliban control.11

In sum, the Afghan operation so far has demonstrated that theAtlantic Alliance is politically not built for counterinsurgency. There is noconsensus within NATO on Afghanistan and counterinsurgency; in fact, thisissue divides rather than unites allies. This intra-alliance division complicatespolitical cohesion, force generation processes, and mission execution. If his-tory is any guide, defeating the Afghan insurgency will require significantinvestment of people, money and time on part of NATO allies. But electoratesin many NATO countries seem rather unwilling to support such a long-termengagement, particularly if it involves losing a significant number of soldiersand civilians. Time appears to be on the side of Afghan insurgents.

The military level

NATO also has difficulties at the military level adjusting to theAfghan insurgency. Counterinsurgency constitutes a major challenge for

10 ‘Im Profil: Scheidender NATO-Chef in Nöten’, Handelsblatt, 3 February 2009, p. 4.11 Seth G. Jones, ‘Averting Failure in Afghanistan’, Survival 48 (Spring 2006) 1, pp. 111-128.

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NATO’s force structure and planning. Even if planners at SupremeHeadquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) had full political backingfrom NATO Headquarters to prepare for counterinsurgency (which they donot), they would need to face the fact that the Alliance lacks crucial mili-tary capabilities to conduct a sustained counterinsurgency campaign inAfghanistan.

Most European allies do not possess the military hardware forcounterinsurgency. There is a significant shortage of tactical airlift—espe-cially helicopters, specialized infantry, and military assistance units. Thisdeficit also creates problems for the Canadian ally, since its infantry ranksare so stretched that some analysts believe that by 2011 its combat role willhave to end.12 ISAF also lacks units for military and police training, andhighly mobile combat reserves. The fact is that most European allies havealready reached their limits in terms of deployable assets for counterinsur-gency operations. Germany, for example, has a mere 3,500 troops for high-ly mobile combat operations.

NATO’s force structure in general seems to be of limited utility onthe Afghan battlefield. NATO’s defense transformation process in recentyears has focused on reaching ‘full operational capability (FOC) of theNATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF is optimized for initial-entry,high-intensity operations; and many European allies have undertaken sig-nificant investments to meet their force commitments in the NRF cycles.Yet the NRF concept is not of much utility in a counterinsurgency environ-ment; and some commentators have questioned whether ‘transformation’has made NATO troops better prepared for today’s operational chal-lenges.13 Further, the NRF ties up assets that would be useful in a coun-terinsurgency strategy – particularly since countries such as Germany andFrance have for political reasons blocked U.S. efforts to deploy NRF com-ponents to Afghanistan.

12 Lewis Mac Kenzie, ‘We can’t answer the battle cry’, Globeandmail.com, 27 May 2009.13 Mats Berdal and David Ucko, ‘NATO at 60, Survival 51 (April-May 2009) 2, p. 61.

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From the onset of the ISAF operation, force planners struggled withsmall troop numbers which were no match for Afghan geography. In coun-terinsurgency the ability to ‘clear, hold and build’ crucial areas is decisive formission success; an experience felt by U.S. troops in Iraq. This three-stagemodel means not only that troops are able to defeat and drive Afghan insur-gents militarily from an area but also that a long-term presence is combinedwith sustained political and economic build-up. ISAF by and large has notbeen able to conduct such a strategy on account of insufficient troop levelsand inadequate force structure. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)deployed in Afghanistan to facilitate militarily guarded reconstruction aretoo small and too dispersed to have a significant impact on overall stability.Only the U.S. military seems able to transfer successful concepts from Iraq,such as Joint Security Stations (JCCs) or Special Military Liaison Teams(SLMTs) to Afghanistan. For many European allies, sustaining even oneSLMT (an outpost in Afghan provinces to provide stability on the locallevel) is beyond their current capability, particularly with regard to airlift.

In the absence of joint doctrine on counterinsurgency and ade-quate troop numbers to ‘clear, hold, and build’, NATO’s uncontested mili-tary superiority has been of limited utility on the Afghan battlefield.Insurgents suffer heavy losses but are able to refill their ranks quickly.Military superiority has not translated into strategic political and militarycurrency, as ISAF has not been able to build on short-term tactical militarysuccesses. Worse, given their reluctance or inability to resort to risky dis-mounted infantry operations to clear insurgent areas, allies have some-times been quick to call in air strikes causing significant civilian casualties– anathema to any counterinsurgency operation.

In addition, as widely discussed in public debate, most NATOcountries have put their troops under national command arrangements,often with political ‘caveats’ on where and how to operate. This has led toa fierce debate within NATO on ‘Alliance solidarity’ and on ‘unfair’ bur-den sharing.14 As analysts have noted: “Large coalitions with small troop

14 ‘Afghanistan Testing NATO Alliance’, Der Spiegel (online), 17 November 2006.

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concentrations, with restrictions on their rules of engagement, can createconfusion in the military chain of command”.15 Indeed, separate commandarrangements have been developed. The Alliance now faces a major chal-lenge to coordinate the variety of chains of command, given that NATO,U.S. and Afghan forces conduct operations in parallel and through differ-ent command arrangements.16 There is neither ‘unity of command’ (allforces under one chain of command) nor ‘unity of effort’ (all forces pluscivilian actors working in an integrated manner towards common objec-tives) in Afghanistan. ISAF is an array of national troop elements dis-persed all over the country, largely disconnected from other allied compo-nents and operating according to national priorities and national rules ofengagement. In such an environment an effective NATO counterinsur-gency effort cannot materialize.

The U.S. administration of President Barack Obama has reacted toNATO’s military shortcomings in Afghanistan. Washington has more orless called for a division of labor between U.S. and European allies. Theformer would concentrate on counterinsurgency operations, involvingcombat missions and a significant troop increase to ‘clear, hold, andbuild’. The latter would predominantly concentrate on reconstruction andcombat support.17 On the basis of lessons learned from Iraq, in 2009 theU.S. has poured more combat troops into the country and has started amajor military campaign to conduct an ‘Afghan surge’. Unless Europeanallies heavily invest in additional forces and change their rules of engage-ment to allow them to operate alongside U.S. troops, one likely result ofthis development will be an ‘Americanization’ of the Afghan war. Already,coalitions of the willing are conducting counterinsurgency operationsalongside U.S. forces through separate planning processes and commandarrangements. The U.S. military has also built command structures thatsideline those of ISAF.18 To the dismay of some allies such as Germany,

15 Kay and Khan, NATO and Counter-insurgency, p. 164.16 Adam Roberts, ‘Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan’, Survival 51 (February-March 2009) 1, p. 50. 17 Helen Cooper and Thom Shanker, ‘Aides Say Obama’s Aims Elevate War’, New York Times, 27January 2009.

18 Mike Smith and Steven Baxter, ‘US will grab power from British in Afghanistan’, The Times online,11 January 2009.

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U.S. forces apparently also have conducted operations in their areas ofresponsibility without properly informing them beforehand.19 While pru-dent from a military perspective, there is a risk that an ‘Americanization’will further fragment the Atlantic Alliance. In any event, there is no cohe-sive military planning for counterinsurgency within NATO; and theAtlantic Alliance is not able to devise and execute counterinsurgency strat-egy in Afghanistan as a whole.

Conclusions

Today, the Atlantic Alliance faces a sustained Afghan insurgencyfor which it is politically and militarily unprepared. There is no politicalconsensus on investing in counterinsurgency capacity as a precondition forISAF’s success. NATO’s troop levels are too small for a country likeAfghanistan and its forces face significant political as well as militaryrestraints in conducting counterinsurgency strategies. The chances are highthat NATO will fail in this ‘war of political attrition’. To avoid this sce-nario, the Alliance needs to ‘undergo considerably more adaptation if it isto be a strategic actor in counterinsurgency’.20 Is this likely to happen?

Since its foundation more than 60 years ago NATO has displayeda remarkable ability to adjust to changing strategic paradigms. It seemsperfectly reasonable to assume that the Alliance could also transformtowards a capability to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Failure inAfghanistan would not so much be an institutional failure of a militaryalliance of 28 members but rather the result of insufficient political sup-port among its members. Given its political and military resources, NATOcould potentially play a very powerful role in creating Western counterin-surgency capacity; it could be a centre for the military training of coalitionand indigenous forces in COIN capability, it could provide training formultinational and indigenous police and other agencies involved in secu-

19 ‘US-Operation brüskiert Bundeswehr’, Stern online, 22 March 2009.20 Kay and Khan, NATO and Counter-insurgency, p. 178.

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rity sector reform, and it could expand and provide its information-gather-ing and analysis capacity for global counterinsurgency operations.21

Unfortunately, it is unlikely that NATO will become an importantactor in the ‘long war’ of global counterinsurgency. In the final analysis,most allies do not perceive Afghanistan to be an existential mission.Unlike the U.S., which sees the Afghan mission through the prism of itsgrand strategic design of ‘liberal internationalism’ and the potential dam-age to its regional hegemonic role in Central Asia, most European allieshave always viewed the ISAF operation as primarily showing (largely)symbolic solidarity to its American ally. NATO’s disintegration into ‘mul-tiple tiers’ of interests and priorities reinforces the preference among manyEuropean allies to return to a focus on European security, particularly inview of rising uncertainty about Russia.22 German Chancellor AngelaMerkel is among those advocating that NATO should (re)-emphasize theimportance of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.23 Furthermore, somesecurity pundits see a defeat in Afghanistan as not creating long-term insti-tutional damage for the Alliance.24 In this context, it seems reasonable toconclude that NATO allies will not come up with the political will neces-sary to invest significant resources in counterinsurgency capability.Instead, NATO will probably declare a victory of some sort and leaveAfghanistan.

What would such a scenario mean for the future of NATO andcounterinsurgency? Analysts are surely right in their assessment thatdefeat for ISAF will not signify the death knell for the Alliance. However,the inability to conduct a sustained counterinsurgency operation, let aloneto agree on the concept altogether, would probably result in some strategicconsequences for NATO. The most important one is that the Alliance willnot qualify as an instrument of Western security to be used in global coun-

21 Ibid.22 Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, ‘Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic Alliance and theprocess of strategic change’, International Affairs 85 (March 2009) 2, pp. 211-226.

23 ‘Plädoyer Merkels für eine Nato-Strategie’, Neue Züricher Zeitung, 27 March 2009, p. 3.24 Michael Rühle, ’Afghanistan, Deutschland und die NATO’, Sicherheit und Frieden 27 (2009) 1, p. 5.

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terinsurgency campaigns. Afghanistan has demonstrated NATO’s limits inconducting complex stability and support operations involving counterin-surgency.25

As mentioned earlier, most European allies will probably con-clude that ISAF is the exception to and not the norm for NATO’s opera-tions. In the aftermath of Afghanistan, their battle cry will be ‘neveragain’, invoking some analogies to the U.S. military after Vietnam in the1970s. Political support to make counterinsurgency an integral part ofNATO’s mission spectrum will therefore be only half-hearted or not forth-coming at all. In this scenario, the Alliance as a whole will be of limitedutility in conducting global counterinsurgency missions.

Such a development will also increase the trend of ‘coalitions ofthe willing’ within the Alliance. Those allies who accept the concept ofcounterinsurgency to be an integral part of almost any future conflict sce-nario involving Western forces, and who are willing to deploy troops on aglobal scale to secure their interests, will build up their capabilities accord-ingly. And they would not again want other NATO allies’ political andtechnical caveats to put restraints on the operation. They will therefore actoutside NATO’s consensus-based decision-making process. Without apolitical reform which allows for ‘opting out’ of such operations, NATO asan organization might not be called to contribute to such missions.

In any event, only a few NATO allies will probably be able to polit-ically and militarily support global, sustained counterinsurgency opera-tions. Apart from the U.S., only the United Kingdom and France seem ablein the future to contribute significant operational capability to these mis-sions. If politically in a position, smaller European allies will most likelyonly provide Special Forces components to counterinsurgency mission.Predominantly for political reasons, Germany will probably refrain fromsuch undertakings. That makes integrating partners with counterinsur-gency capabilities, such as Australia, even more important to those NATO

25 Berdal and Ucko, NATO at 60, p. 57.

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allies willing to act. Still, Western counterinsurgency capability as a wholewill be fairly limited.

There are no other international organizations in sight for replac-ing NATO. Neither the UN nor the EU has counterinsurgency capabilities;and it is unlikely that they will develop them. The UN is notorious for itsdifficulties in executing its classical peacekeeping capabilities, let aloneobtaining agreement on robust engagements. The EU has only a limitedcombat capability and has demonstrated in Afghanistan that it is also poor-ly suited to conducting police training on a large scale. Even more prob-lematically, the Western concept of stabilizing ‘fragile states’ likeAfghanistan has relied on multinational organizations such as the UN,NATO and the EU. In fact, as mentioned earlier, Western counterinsur-gency strategy critically depends on these actors joining forces. But inpractice this concept has proven to be beset by major problems. Both theUN and the EU will probably study NATO’s problems with counterinsur-gency in Afghanistan very closely.

So will potential foes of Western security. Just as states frequent-ly readjust their military organizations in the light of lessons learned fromconventional campaigns, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Afghancampaign will inspire future enemies of superior Western forces to alsoengage them in a long-term counterinsurgency. As witnessed inAfghanistan, insurgents try to apply successful lessons from the Iraqiinsurgency. While all counterinsurgency to a certain degree is ‘local’, theinability of the world’s most powerful military alliance to face a sustainedinsurgency will surely take a prominent place in future enemies’ textbookson how to engage Western powers. Perceptions will rank high that Westernforces will not intervene if greeted by a complex insurgency movement or,if they nevertheless do, that they can be defeated in the long run. Thus,while NATO’s future existence will not depend on its ability to confront asustained insurgency, its persistent weaknesses in this area might at thesame time decrease the Atlantic Alliance’s credibility as an internationalsecurity actor.

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CHAPTER THREE

Hybrid Adversaries:a Challenge but Unifying Theme for NATO?

Chris Collett

“Securing, stabilizing and promoting democracy is our core business and will continue to be so into the future.”

NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer1

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO’s activities have spread wellbeyond the defense of its members’ sovereign borders as the Alliance hassought to protect them from the consequences of dangerous instability in vitalregions and also to eliminate or contain the violent challenges to the interna-tional system that can spawn from them.

This book is about insurgency and the challenges it poses to NATO. Notleast of these challenges is whether to characterize and approach the currentoperation in Afghanistan as “Counterinsurgency” or “Stabilization andReconstruction”. However, such a distinction can be seen as largely unhelpfulsince success in any one of these endeavors depends entirely on success in theother. Stabilization and Reconstruction are goals commonly (and certainly inAfghanistan) challenged by organized, capable, persistent, adaptive and fero-cious adversaries who must be countered if these goals are to be achieved.Simultaneous rather than sequential success in these diverse but related “pop-ulation battlegrounds”2 is required both today and into the foreseeable future.

1 45th Munich Security Conference, Munich, Germany 7 Feb 2009.2 Col John J McCuen, Hybrid Wars, (Military Review, Mar/Apr 2008).

1 45th Munich Security Conference, Munich, Germany 7 Feb 2009.2 Col John J McCuen, Hybrid Wars, (Military Review, Mar/Apr 2008).

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Attempts at defining or locating the borders of conflicts are increas-ingly difficult and indeed misleading; there is an undoubted process ofblurring the boundaries between operational areas, activities and adver-saries that can only grow as global connectivity and interdependence grow.Already Pashtu insurgents in Afghanistan link to, and sometimes overlapwith, international criminal gangs and terrorist sympathizers who havelong been domiciled in distant nations. Their historical links with thecovert organs of some states are well documented. Similarly, proscribedMiddle Eastern terrorist organizations have long had an active presence inthe tri-border area (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay) of South America3.This view of the “omni- directional” nature of security challenges is con-ceptually bound together by the construct of complex operations involvinghybrid adversaries simultaneously producing diverse and fused threats.

As a recent UK Joint Concept Note states, “We see them (the conflicts inIraq and Afghanistan) as forms of hybrid conflict in many ways typical of whatwe will face in the future”.4 The point is: neatly but restrictively labeling oper-ations is not helpful. Better to focus on the nature of the threat NATO is mostlikely to face wherever and however its forces are deployed. This is potentiallymore far more productive. Allied Command Transformation’s recent MultipleFutures Project is a strategic level view of things to come, looking as far out as2030, but it is as relevant for today’s world and for the tactical and operationallevels when it states: “It is crucial that we build a mutual understanding of thenew and uncertain challenges for which NATO must be prepared to respond”5.

3 Rex Hudson, Terrorist and organized crime groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America,Federal Research Division, Library of Congress July 2003, accessed at:http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/TerrOrgCrime_TBA.pdf 4 July 2009.

4 Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre, The Evolving Character of Conflict: Joint Concept Note01/09, 22 May 2009.

5 “Military Implications point to seven broad focus areas. Five of the focus areas identify potential roleswithin the military realm that NATO could consider emphasizing for 2030: Adapting to the Demands ofHybrid Threats, Operating with Others and Building Institutions, Conflict Management (prevention andresolution) including Consequence Management, Counter Proliferation, and Expeditionary andCombat Capability in Austere Environments. The remaining two focus areas, Strategic Communicationsand Winning the Battle of the Narrative, and Organizational and Force Development Issues, representthe essential enablers associated with the roles its member nations envision for the Alliance.”http://www.act.nato.int/multiplefutures/20090503_MFP_finalrep.pdf, accessed 25 June 2009.

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There are of course, many causes of instability, above all from insur-gencies, but the broadest and most intractable challenge to achievingenduring stability is where there are active insurgents. It therefore makessense to configure and prepare for this – the most challenging and not themost optimistic – variety of stabilization mission. We can also contend thatinsurgents and other lesser or greater (but less likely) adversaries acrossthe world are looking increasingly similar, as knowledge, techniques andcapabilities migrate, seemingly with little or no control by traditional stateor international authorities. If current trends continue, as they are likely todo, we can be confident that such insurgents will also be far more chal-lenging than those that NATO has encountered to date.

Without question the key to successful stabilization, and counterin-surgency within it, is to focus on the population and not the adversary.Providing the people with both security from insurgents’ violence andalso demonstrable benefits from the host nation that outweigh the insur-gents’ promises is what produces enduring success. However, thereremains the fact that “the enemy gets a vote”, and while decisive mili-tary defeat of insurgents is a chimera seldom worth concentrating scarceresources to chase, they cannot be left unmolested and free to act. Theinsurgent enemy may by definition be the militarily much weaker party,but he enjoys certain advantages that can derail the counterinsurgent’sbest efforts to achieve an acceptable stable outcome, undermine vitaldomestic will and ultimately allow him to outlast his conventional oppo-nents. These characteristics are particularly advantageous to an enemywho is bound more by a narrative than a hierarchy and who is highlymotivated, adaptive, decentralized and intricately networked. These areall characteristics we see now and can safely anticipate growing. Thispaper therefore deliberately confines itself to a rather unfashionable, orat least narrow, perspective on insurgency and chooses to focus on theadversary and the threats they produce rather than “the people” who –to repeat– are acknowledged to define both the environment and theprize.

Contemporary and future insurgents and other potential adversaries

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have been called “hybrid” by Frank Hoffman6 and others, and this is a char-acterization increasingly guiding the evolution of the US and British Armies’structure, equipment and – most importantly – thinking, education and train-ing. Although I have drawn heavily from official thinking in the UK, I muststate clearly that those thoughts have not coalesced into an agreed position asyet and what follows is my personal view and not officially sanctioned.

This paper will discuss some aspects of hybrid adversaries with par-ticular focus on their “insurgent” manifestation and give some thoughtsabout what this means for NATO. In it I hope to suggest that achievingconsensus on what the threats from future adversaries will look like isincreasingly possible and will be a significant step to enhancing the soli-darity, interoperability and future development of the Alliance.

Hybrid adversaries

The adjective “hybrid” has surely become over used and lost muchcredibility, having been appended variously to “wars”, “warfare”, “opera-tions”, “scenarios”, “adversaries” and “threats” to cite a probably less thanexhaustive list. Therefore, to be clear for the purposes of this paper, thisparticular author characterizes the challenge for the NATO Alliance and itsmembers as consisting of complex operations opposed by hybrid adver-saries who simultaneously produce diverse and fused threats at tactical,operational and strategic levels. In February this year, a JFCOM hybridwar conference adopted the following definition of a hybrid adversary:

“Any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs some com-bination of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means or activitiesin the operational battle space. Rather than a single entity, a hybrid threat orchallenger may be comprised of a combination of state and non-state actors.”7

6 Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Potomac Institute for PolicyStudies, Dec 2007).

7 Definition adopted in support of U.S. Joint Forces Command hybrid war conference held inWashington, D.C., 24 February, 2009.

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One might add that hybrid adversaries are likely to be highly motivat-ed (for many the conflict will be seen as existential), able, knowledgeableand agile. They may not share our logic or a have a similar political calcu-lus but they will know a great deal about their Western adversaries. Theywill actively seek to enhance that understanding from the tactical throughto national strategic level and will be quick to adapt to avoid or negatestrengths and exploit weaknesses. Furthermore, as Secretary of DefenseGates noted recently, their actions combine the: “lethality of state conflictwith the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare.”8

Other definitions open Pandora’s Box yet wider, citing the simultane-ous and adaptive employment of information, ideological, political, social,civil and economic means9 exploiting shifting alliances with disparategroups to achieve the hybrid adversary’s aims. The key distinction claimedfrom what has gone before is that these elements –types of actor and typesor activity, are fused (albeit perhaps without formal hierarchical orchestra-tion) at the tactical level rather than being simply operational or strategicadjuncts to the main (military) effort within a conflict. However, althoughacademically interesting, the question of whether this represents a newparadigm or not is hardly as relevant as whether this characterization isaccurate and helpful. One element that certainly is “of our age” is that,thanks to globalization and in particular, the reach of global communica-tions, there is a much more direct, swift and significant linkage betweentactical events and strategic consequences. This amplifies and complicatesthe challenge that hybrid adversaries, including insurgents, pose.

Hybrid adversaries seek to create a range of threats in the same timeand space10 to overwhelm and provoke inappropriate responses. They willswitch tack swiftly – they are highly adaptive because of their good accessto information, flat structures, excellent communications and relatively

8 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63717/robert-m-gates/a-balanced-strategy. Accessed 25 June 2009.9 Col Margaret S. Bond, Hybrid War: A New Paradigm for Stability Operations in Failing States,Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 30, 2007.

10 Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre, The Evolving Character of Conflict: Joint Concept Note01/09, 22 May 2009.

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modest requirements. These characteristics need to be met with a range ofrelevant and integrated responses, each of which, ideally, would have suf-ficient depth to be maintained while coping with new adversary moves.Failure to do so risks the prospect of surrendering the initiative to theadversary rather than progressively squeezing him into irrelevance.Perhaps more realistically, given real world resource constraints, a forcemust aspire to achieve sufficient flexibility to switch its own activities inresponse to or to pre-empt enemy moves.

A challenge for NATO is, therefore, to be capable of adapting at apace which matches or exceeds that of its adversaries, thus meeting, or bet-ter yet anticipating, real demands and not those which suit current institu-tional preferences. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a purely protectiveapproach will suffice, and active disruption or distortion of adversaryinformation gathering and communications will have to be considered,despite the difficult and politically sensitive tangle of legal and moralissues that this entails. Developing a common view and understanding offuture adversaries is a necessary step on this path. Institutionalizing andempowering a collective mechanism to gather information on and assessevolving threats would be another.

Without attempting to cover all the elements that characterize ahybrid adversary or list all the threats they may produce, the paper willnow consider some of their associated “ways” and “means”. It will delib-erately avoid the question of “ends”, which I believe remain diverse, andwhich take us back into territory where the debate is wide open and thusless helpful to fostering an agreed way forward for NATO.

Ways – people and time

Current insurgent adversaries have clearly chosen the population astheir battleground, aiming not to defeat counter-insurgent forces head on,but rather to seize the key human terrain and to wear down their opponentsthrough a Fabian strategy of protracted war. Exploitation of time and focus

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on the people are inextricably linked and, if not new in concept, the scope,reach and impact of insurgent adversaries’ actions, made possible by tech-nology and fuelled by globalization, are contemporary features.

People

Influence – the battle of the narrative – matters when people are boththe terrain and the prize being contested. The hybrid insurgent adversary’schoice of tactics is largely driven by the effects they have on the percep-tion, confidence and hence allegiance of their selected population and thewill of their opponents’ populations. They also seek to sway the actions ofwider world spectators. They are concerned to present themselves as right-eous and effective, and their opponents as degenerate and ineffective, andthus gain influence.

Both deeds and communications11 count and they are more frequent-ly than not integrated by hybrid adversaries at very low levels. Attackingsymbolic targets and actions to provoke a disproportionate, hasty andhence ill-aimed response are common related tactics. It is clear thatNATO’s adversaries, whether they are acting according to a concertedgrand design or merely informally aligned, have the means to effectivelyexploit the propaganda opportunities that their tactical actions produce12.Plainly, they have an ever expanding capacity to get their message out tomany audiences, since the spread and diversification of information chan-nels (often with little or no official visibility, let alone control) continuesto be exponential. In this endeavor they are aided by their potentialrecruits, who increasingly have high levels of pertinent skills, as educationlevels improve and the spread of knowledge increases. As well as skill in

11 “Communications” rather than “words”, since it is frequently visual imagery, particularly combinedwith music or raw sound, that is used to great effect.

12 It has of course become routine for sniper or IED attacks to be captured digitally, often on cellphones, and almost instantly distributed as part of an information campaign. It is clearly suspectedif not proven that Afghan insurgents have themselves killed innocent civilians in the wake of coali-tion air attacks in order to stage imagery and produce higher civilian casualty counts. This clearlyhas both a strategic effect and a tactical one as coalition use of air power (often to compensate for asmall ground “footprint”) becomes ever more restricted.

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utilizing information conduits and crafting products, their targetingsophistication is typically high and based on a solid understanding of theiraudiences. This can be derived from a natural cultural affiliation and/orbecause of the openness and exposure of Western civilizations and actors13.Precise targeting of individuals (often through their families) occurstoday14 and can be expected to increase through the exploitation of thesocial networking phenomenon. These general and specific threats havedirect relevance to the protection of a mission and to members of the force.

Perhaps most disturbing is the broader manipulation, further alienationand radicalization of elements of diaspora populations or their children,locally born and bred. Exploiting disaffected members of an opponent’s pop-ulation is not a phenomenon of recent Islamic extremism. As BruceHoffman has pointed out, “political subversion combined with armed actionis a perennial dimension of insurgency”15. It was also a feature of the inter-state Cold War. Counter-subversion, as David Kilcullen reminds us, needs tobe carefully targeted, conducted and explained16 if it is not to be damaging toitself or dangerously exploited by capable and agile adversaries. Again, suchsubversion will be, and indeed today is, directed against both the mission andagainst members of the deployed force, an example of the latter being thepressure being brought to bear on British Muslim soldiers.

Clearly therefore, contesting the influence activities of a hybrid insurgentadversary is far from a military activity alone and other arms of state and

13 The two are often combined, as in Jihadist DVDs that combine culturally rousing music and inspir-ing images with conversely damning ones inadvertently provided by Western forces via news reports,digital images or blogs.

14 This is not a new phenomenon: during the Northern Ireland “troubles” the IRA and its sympathizerscompiled extensive dossiers on individual Army personnel from open sources. Precise targeting isnot only used to attack enemies, of course: precise recruitment is carried out, most obviously, to turnsympathizers into activists, but also – potentially at least – to recruit usefully placed individuals forinformation gathering or as agents of influence.

15 Bruce Hoffman, Islam and the West: Searching for Common Ground – The Terrorist Threat and theCounter Terrorism Effort, RAND Testimony Series CT-263 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,2006), 15.

16 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, (C Hurst& Co (Publishers) Ltd, London, 2009), 253.

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indeed, civil society must be prepared to become involved. NATO as an exten-sive political and military alliance has a role in to play in formulating and ener-gizing such a response. NATO also has to be better at explaining itself.

Time

There is nothing particularly new about protraction and exhaustion astechniques of the weaker party – the so called “Fabian” strategy is after allnamed after a 3rd century BC Roman dictator. It has been followed manytimes since and was cogently expressed by Mao in his 1938 lectures OnProtracted War17 – although the sheer scale of “parallel hierarchies” hesought to achieve is not evident today, nor are we likely to see the progres-sion by insurgents to full conventional operations while NATO allies retainthe will to engage them18.

Insurgents have always surged in activity and withdrawn when gov-ernment forces’ pressure demands it, which greatly aids their longevity.Furthermore, since insurgents have the relatively simpler task of disrupt-ing and promising rather than building and delivering19, they can prolongthe conflict almost indefinitely if left undisrupted. In the words of GeneralSir Rupert Smith, we, on the other hand, “are seeking a condition whichthen must be maintained until agreement on a definitive outcome, whichmay take years or decades”20

This disparity in the view of and impact of time21 is a major challenge

17 http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_09.htm , accessed25 June 2009.

18 South Vietnam, of course, was overrun by a conventional invasion that the US refused to blunt fol-lowing the collapse of its own domestic will.

19 This is not to suggest that some organizations, for example, Hezbollah, cannot be really effective atfilling vacuums which they themselves seek to create, and of course they have the ideal excuse whenthey fall short of expectations.

20 General Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, (Allen Lane,London, 2005).

21 Insurgents typically take the long view because of practical considerations, cultural predispositionand a shrewd analysis of the West’s temperament – Mao, Pashtu, Al Qaeda, and Palestinian militantshave all recognized this.

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for NATO and must be addressed by configuring “whole of government”capabilities (not just militaries) for sustained campaigning to match ouropponent’s persistence. NATO’s forces are mostly voluntarily manned, andwith the possible exception of the US, individually small – conditionswhich make persistence difficult. Rotating responsibility for a missiondeployment is a possibility, but plays against the imperative to achieve cam-paign continuity unless the forces involved are truly interchangeable incapability and approach. This is not the case in today’s complex operationsof choice, and indeed was never truly achieved even in the Cold War era.

Configuring forces to stay the military course is essentially far fromsufficient. The centrality of both time and people factors drive the simul-taneous need to craft and execute a comprehensive approach22 that solvesor at least suitably ameliorates the causes of instability and invalidates theappeal of the adversary. It is essential to make progress as rapidly as pos-sible towards securing the conflict’s strategic centre of gravity, namely thesupport of the indigenous people, while simultaneously protecting our ownkey vulnerability – the support of our own people. NATO’s unity is a majorfactor in both the battle for perceptions and in achieving persistence. As aninternational organization it should look to develop expeditionary politi-cal, governance and economic capabilities in line with its military ones.

Means – terrain, dispersion, targets

Terrain

A skilled insurgent adversary will seek to neutralize NATO’s conven-tional military superiorities by exploiting complex terrain and setting him-self in close proximity to the people. Clearly, both of these factors, espe-cially the latter, pose an intense dilemma for an intervening NATO force.

22 In this paper, the Canadian conceptualization of military full spectrum operations nesting in nation-al Whole of Government Approaches, which in turn nest within a multinational and multi institution-al Comprehensive Approach necessary to remove or ameliorate the causes of violent confrontation,is accepted.

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Some commentators have argued that clever opponents will actively seekto draw “the West” into such inhospitable terrain that they have preparedbeforehand in order to raise the chances of inflicting a local defeat withstrategic consequences23. This drives the imperative for applying mini-mum, precisely discriminated force which is fully integrated into an effec-tively targeted, constructed and delivered information campaign – no smallchallenge in a congested, obscure landscape. The “Sense” or “Find” func-tion is therefore vital, but the technological aspects can be prohibitivelycostly for any one nation, especially when the operational space is largeand persistence vital. There is an estimate that every enemy fighter killedby the IDF in July 06 cost them $2.2m24 – mostly spent on finding them.There is nevertheless a broad range of technical capabilities available toNATO forces but there is a real challenge to improve the integration ofintelligence and to develop the depth of situational understanding (espe-cially of the human terrain) that allows such intelligence to be used to driveeffective action. Gathering and exploiting human intelligence remains asensitive area in coalition operations. However, developing the skills ofcultural, political and economic analysis and the effective integration anddissemination of diverse sources of information is vital and a venture thata multinational organization with wide academic capabilities such asNATO must be engaged in. The NATO Defense College’s new RegionalCooperation Course is an example of the kind of activity that contributesto contextual understanding.

It should not be forgotten that close proximity to the people can alsobe the undoing of the insurgent if those people are won over to the count-er-insurgent side. Perhaps, however, more realistically in the early stages,fissures can be found in organizations25 and between them and elements ofthe local population that can be exploited for high grade intelligence. Thishappened in Northern Ireland and seems to have been the case in the recent

23 Julian Lewis MP, Double I, Double N: A Framework for Counter-Insurgency, First Defence, London,2007.

24 www.haaretz.com25 Kilcullen suggests that there is a preponderance of reconcilable fighters around the truly fanatic thatcould be used to infiltrate and disrupt – as has been done in many previous campaigns.

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Israeli Gaza operation. The people themselves and urban complex terrainmay also not always be as opaque as supposed – sensor and surveillancetechnology moves on, as does the application of sophisticated forensicsand biometric data basing, for example. These, and other novel approach-es which can be politically and legally sensitive, are areas on which NATOwill need to take a collective view, codify and then train to employ.

Dispersion

Adversary dispersion and semi-autonomous action will continue to besignificant challenges for our surveillance, but this is not their only attractionto the hybrid insurgent adversary. Critically, both also enhance the adversary’sability to strike, disrupt and spread their influence. This puts the old conun-drum of whether to concentrate effort (i.e. mass) to achieve effect, economyand force protection, or to spread forces out to occupy ground, into starkfocus. The adversary’s dispersion and amorphous nature means that present-ing a binary choice between investing in precision or mass is particularlydamaging. Counter-insurgents certainly need to disperse to spread securityand hinder the insurgents’ freedom to act, but that can make them vulnerable,which in turn may endanger their sometimes tenuous popular support base. Itcan force a disproportionate reliance on fire power, which in turn plays badlyin the perception battle and can lead directly to resistance growing. There istherefore, a challenge for NATO and its members to generate adequate num-bers of forces to have a sufficiently large footprint and to be capable of sus-tained presence. Niche capabilities provided to a mission by Nations can bevaluable, but only if there is a good doctrinal and technical match betweenthese “plugs” and the “sockets” into which they are to fit. Perhaps even moreof a challenge is that there is a danger that they draw in other allied combatresources if they are not at least capable of self protection – or better, of offer-ing protection to the local population around them26. It will also not be enoughto provide forces but surround them with national caveats that effectively

26 An example of this issue was the Japanese contribution to Iraq: while no doubt valuable for recon-struction and for the political capital it generated, it did necessarily consume a considerable alloca-tion of tactical forces for force protection.

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reduce the ability of the command to spread and maintain security for thepopulation. Numbers count, persistence counts, flexibility counts.

Targets

The hybrid insurgent adversary will also seek alternative means toinflict pain on NATO nations in order to raise the initial cost of interven-tion and subsequent perseverance. The Madrid and London bombings areobvious examples albeit with mixed results. Adversaries understand thedomestic politics of NATO nations and adjust their attacks accordingly.They will attempt to single out apparently less committed countries, par-ticularly when, say, they have an impending election with at least one cred-ible party advocating withdrawal. Assaults on NATO homelands need notbe physical – cyber attacks are already proliferating– and control of theflow of drugs can be used as a political tool as well as source of income.

Adversaries understand the critical nature and inherent vulnerabilityof the non- military participants in a comprehensive approach and willseek to fracture a mission’s cohesion by attacking those softer elements:the civilian component, networks and logistics. In both Iraq andAfghanistan we have already observed the deliberate targeting of interna-tional and non-governmental organizations and individuals involved inreconstruction. We have seen the logistic pipeline into Afghanistanattacked and cyber assaults on our electronic networks. Without any greatstretch of the imagination, we can posit future kinetic attacks coupled withElectro Magnetic Pulse attacks on critical communications, isolating dis-persed detachments and denying them external support, all coordinatedwith a carefully prepared assault in the information realm. The right bal-ance of deterrence, protection, offensive counter-action and risk takingwill be increasingly difficult to strike, but it must be done if we are not tosuffer prohibitively costly effects or to “exhaust” ourselves by trying andfailing to protect everything. NATO needs to develop a common under-standing, approach and capabilities in order that vulnerabilities and seamsin an inherently joint, interagency and multinational effort are minimized.

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Beyond insurgents

This short paper has just skimmed the surface of future threats, andthere are many other characteristics that could be ascribed to hybrid adver-saries: for example, the absence of legal restraint, their rapid, often novel,exploitation of cheap, advanced commercial technology, and their increasingacquisition of highly lethal armaments – perhaps one day to include chemi-cal, biological, radiological or even nuclear weapons. However, it does seemthat an overall characterization of evolving threats is becoming clearer and aconsensus is forming. Such a consensus has wide utility to focus NATO’sdevelopment of its capabilities and approach. Why wide utility?

While there appears to be no prospect of a direct territorial or exis-tential threat of the Warsaw Pact variety emerging in the foreseeablefuture, we can be far less confident that NATO member nations will notface concerted, violent and immensely disruptive aggression from externalactors – non-state, state-sponsored, or even from a state’s covert arms. Thiscould be against elements of national sovereignty including geographicboundaries or against those global commons on which industrial and trad-ing nations depend. It seems likely that any such attack will include formsand elements of activity that will look virtually indistinguishable from theactions engaged in by insurgents. By this is meant the concerted use ofviolent, subversive, “irregular warfare” means to effect a permanentchange in a recognized, legitimate power structure. Indeed, an attack mightbe solely “irregular” (perhaps backed by an implicit threat of convention-al force or weapons of mass destruction), since one could postulate thatthis would be an attractive strategy for an adversary to adopt, if for noother reason than that it would at least horribly complicate a collectiveArticle 5 response. It could also be seen as a means to negate much of theconventional systems which Alliance members have in their forces andcontinue to invest in developing. Such an approach was described some 10years ago by the PLA’s Colonels Qiao and Wang27.

27 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Chao Xian Zhan (Unrestricted Warfare) 1999. Principle of Addition– overload, deceive and exhaust, “omni directionality”.

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Conclusion

Whether the confrontation is with disruptive non-state actors or astate challenging either a NATO member’s sovereignty or the Alliance’scollective interests, the hybrid adversary view suggests that there are uni-versal characteristics the recognition of which would allow NATO todevelop a common approach, set of skills, systems and arsenals of bothphysical and psychological tools. It is certainly not impossible to prevailagainst hybrid adversaries. Work in Israel has already begun to show howthey might be deconstructed to identify vulnerabilities and internal ten-sions28. The challenge to NATO is to now codify this rapidly growing con-sensus view and to find the will in capitals to make the necessary changesto their forces, their wider government agencies and to their Alliance. Thefuture will surely require even more integration of effort than during theCold War era. As the Multiple Futures Project states, this process beginswith “… the building of a shared vision of the future….” Building a sharedview of the threat is a key and achievable element of such a shared vision.

28 Hybrid Conflict Seminar hosted by the IDF in Tel Aviv, November 2008.

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CHAPTER FOUR

The Goldilock Choice:The “Just Right” Balance for Setting Civil-Military

Governance Goals in Post Conflict andCounterinsurgency Operations

Christopher A. Jennings

Introduction

NATO was built for conventional warfare, not counterinsurgency.Counterinsurgency is a discrete form of warfare with its own identifiablecharacteristics, doctrine, strategy and tactics, which are all readily accessi-ble and coherent to NATO military professionals. In counterinsurgencies,however, “getting it” is not enough. These fights require a different mix oforganizational tools, many of which, as outlined in this paper, are housedin the civilian development and diplomatic agencies of NATO memberstates. However, civilian departments are not built to operate in counterin-surgency environments, either.

Standing up legitimate, host-country government structures is acore challenge of counterinsurgency operations. When crafting a gover-nance strategy, civil-military planners must be aware of the opportunitycosts associated with a short-term goal to bring about security and longerterm efforts to consolidate democratic governance norms. In general, thebias of civilian planners is to pursue multi-year, sustainable developmentstrategies, while military planners seek near-term “quick impact” strategies.For counterinsurgency campaigns, the planning orientation of civilians istoo long, while the military is too short. The challenge is getting the balancebetween both orientations “just right”—not unlike the choice of Goldilocksin the British poet Robert Southey’s fable, “The Story of the Three Bears.”

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This paper offers a framework to assist civilian-military campaignplanners in the reconciliation of short-term and long-term tradeoffs indeveloping governance strategies for post-conflict countries. The first sec-tion of this paper reviews the limits of military and civilian equities incounterinsurgency campaigns. The second section offers an operating def-inition of “democratic governance.” The third section outlines an assess-ment framework for setting realistic post-conflict democratic governancegoals, while the fourth and final section applies this framework to presentday Iraq.

Limits of military and civilian equities in counterinsurgencies

Throughout the Cold War, NATO member states raised an interop-erable force structure of land, sea and air assets to assault or defend againstthe attacks of industrialized armies and societies—specifically those of theformer Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. The technological focusof conventional warfare requires a massive organization to manage andmaintain the equipment and logistical demands of armored and artillerydivisions on land, the aircraft-carrier-submarine combination on the sea, andthe fighter-bomber combination in the air, but also (and most important) tofacilitate their orderly and synchronized deployment in battle. The organiz-ing principle behind NATO’s complex of systems is that superior militarytechnology and organization translates to decisive military victory when atwar and, therefore, deters an attack on any member state in the first place.

However, conventional forces are not particularly well suited toquell politically salient insurgent or guerrilla forces. This lesson has beenlearned many times over: the United States in Vietnam during the 1970s,the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s, and the United States andNATO in Iraq and Afghanistan during this decade.

In the above examples, one of the principal challenges posed byinsurgent forces is their decentralized character. At its lowest levels, theobjectives of the guerilla or insurgent are purely negative—they obstruct

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consolidation of governance and the orderly transition of power from theoccupying foreign military force to the allied host nation government.Insurgent forces generally only arm themselves at a time and place of theirown choosing, and when they strike their aim is not decisive military vic-tory, but political destabilization. They cannot be easily distinguished fromthe surrounding population, making it exceedingly difficult to identify andseparate (or marginalize) spoilers.

As an insurgent or guerilla force evolves into a more mature andcomplex organization – with financial interests, operational and supplylogistics, human resources and territory to manage – it becomes muchmore easy for an outside conventional force to engage it and rack up “mil-itary wins.” However, by this point it is highly likely that domestic politicshas metastasized, leaving a large disaffected population for the insurgentmovement to draw from and overcome even staggeringly disproportionateattrition rates.

At the onset of an insurgency, the counter-insurgent needsintense cultural and political guidance and capabilities to identify andseparate spoilers from the population. Many papers in this volumeaddress strategies to recruit and train host country nationals to providethis guidance and capability—from enhancing intelligence assets orstanding up local security forces to recruiting a national police, militaryand other security forces. These forces are essential to separating theinsurgent from the population, consolidating control of the environment,and ultimately transitioning power from military to civilian control. Butthey are not sufficient.

The loss of the political war makes a war of attrition against aninsurgency extremely difficult to win, even by the most professional andcapable host government security forces. The core challenge of the count-er-insurgent is not merely to stand up a viable host-nation security force,but also to establish enduring state institutions where rival domestic fac-tions can mediate their differences through a political process and main-tain the confidence of the domestic population.

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This sort of mission involves competencies and tasks that promoteinstitution-building and the rule of law; economic development and oppor-tunities; incorporation of indigenous military and police forces into abroader civilian justice sector; internal political accommodation and rec-onciliation; good governance and basic services to the people; strategiccommunications, and more. These competencies, however, are the baili-wick of diplomatic and development personnel traditionally housed incivilian agencies.

Quite simply, counterinsurgency is a challenge for NATO becauseits force structure was not “built” for this sort of mission. Neither were thecivilian diplomatic and development ministries, departments, and countrymissions of NATO’s member states.

Civilian professionals (along with their contract personnel, private-sectorimplementing partners and associated non-government organizations) areaccustomed to operating in truly post-conflict and permissive environ-ments within the cocoon of a peace agreement readily enforceable by apeacekeeping force. Just as NATO needs to adapt to the realities of a coun-terinsurgency framework, so too must civilian counterparts.

A gross oversimplification and generalization, to be sure, butcivilian intervention and development methods are generally structuredaround long-term, sustainable development models, and are less sensitiveto the immediate demands of transitioning responsibility for security andpeace enforcement to a domestic civilian authority. As a consequence,civilian planning rhythms and strategies are less sensitive to the time pres-sures military counterparts face and are more inclined to invest in strate-gies that have a long-term impact, whereas military planning rhythms andstrategies tend to be hypersensitive to time and will err on the side of quickimpact strategies without regard to their long-term sustainability.

In their extreme forms, neither orientation can calibrate a coherentstrategy to stabilize a country in the grips of an insurgency. As a result, thecivilian-military conversation on planning issues tends to be tone deaf to

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the subtle tradeoffs in the promotion of long-term sustainable developmentand concessions to promote near-term stability. Civilian-military plannersrequire a common assessment framework to identify and reconcile thesetradeoffs and the respective priorities of defense, diplomatic and develop-ment agencies.

Following a note on this paper’s operating definition of democracy,the heart of this paper offers such a framework, one that specifically seeksto reconcile long-term democratic governance strategies of donor nationswith short-term transitional governance goals of counterinsurgent forces.

Defining democratic governance

Democracy is a multidimensional concept, not readily reduced toan authoritative and operational definition. This paper’s approach accordswith the analysis of the “Committee on Evaluation of U.S. Agency forInternational Development Democracy Assistance Programs” at the U.S.National Research Council, who was asked by USAID to provide “anoperational definition of democracy and governance that disaggregates theconcept into clearly defined and measurable components”:

[T]here is little consensus over [democracy’s] attributes.Definitions range from minimal—a country must chooseits leaders through contested elections—to maximal—acountry must have universal suffrage, accountable andlimited government, sound and fair justice and extensiveprotection of human rights and political liberties, and eco-nomic and social policies that meet popular needs.1

As an alternative to a robust operational concept of democracy, the

1 Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, National Research Council,Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, at 76(2008).

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committee suggested that USAID disaggregate the various components ofdemocracy and track changes in democratization by looking at changes inthose components, ordered under four sectors: electoral contests, demo-cratic culture, democratic governing structures, and rule of law. The defi-nitional components of each sector are sketched below:

• Electoral Contests. Definitional components generally involve:whether a country holds elections at the national, regional or local lev-els; whether elected officials exercise sovereignty relative to non-elect-ed elites; whether the administration of elections is credible and legiti-mate/free and fair; and a general assessment of the overall quality andnature of election participation, historic election results, and leadershipturnover/transitions of government?• Democratic Governing Structures. Definitional components of demo-cratic governing structures first involve a baseline measure of nationalsovereignty (i.e., whether the state is dominated by outside force or isgenerally free from external interference in internal affairs), then moveson to issues of transparency (i.e., how transparent is the political sys-tem?) and the distribution of sovereignty (i.e., how decentralized ispolitical power and how democratic is politics at national, provincial andlocal levels?) Measuring the representative, responsiveness & empow-erment of popular law making bodies is also relevant, as are relevantchecks and balances on state executors of law. • Democratic Culture. Democratic culture broadly relates to whether cit-izens exercise civil liberties in matters pertaining to politics and whethercivil society is dynamic, independent, and politically active. • Rule of Law. Baseline indicators of rule of law examine whether lawsare written, clear and accessible; whether the judiciary is fair and inde-pendent and is capable and willing to enforce the law against the state orpowerful non-state actors; whether government officials follow the lawand abide by rulings; and whether citizens have access to justice.

This paper is not, therefore, dependent upon a particularized vision of“democratic governance”, but offers a flexible framework to identify andcultivate viable democratic progenitors in post-conflict countries. That

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framework is outlined in the next section and is broadly conceived to bal-ance long-term democracy promotion against near term efforts to promotestability.

Governance strategies in post-conflict operations

Before standing up a governance strategy in a post-conflict coun-try and before committing to a course of interventions, this paper recom-mends an initial and continuously updated thee-step evaluation of the hostcountry’s social and political conditions. By way of overview, these stepsinvolve:

1. Identification of key actors and opportunities for democraticreform (if any). This step involves identification of the key actors thatanimate the competition for influence and power over the apparatus ofthe state, and an overall assessment of the security and political con-straints that inhibit the consolidation of democratic governance.

2. Identification of key institutions. This step involves analysis of thespecific state and non-state institutional arenas where the game ofdomestic politics is played.

3. Reconciliation of tradeoffs between long-term development andshort-term “quick wins.” This step involves reconciliation of recurringtradeoffs between efforts to promote long-term sustainable democraticdevelopment and near-term concessions to promote stability and thehandover of security from military to civilian hands.

What results is not a comprehensive plan of action, but a clear-eyed understanding of competing needs and priorities for advancing bothmilitary and civilian agendas. There is no best response to these tradeoffs,but awareness helps to guide strategic choices and reduce negative conse-quences.

Each conflict presents a unique context. The nuanced politics,resources and capabilities of each country shape the better course of action.However, two general principles underlay each level of analysis above:

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Step 1: Key actors & opportunities Any governance strategy requires a clear-eyed assessment of key

political actors, and appreciation of their interests, resources, alliances,opponents, and strategies. Key political actors include prominent leadersin the government, military, militias, insurgency, business, civil society,religion, criminal networks and other domains that exacerbate conflict orare auxiliary to its resolution. These actors can shape social patterns andinstitutional performance, mobilize people around core grievances, or pro-vide a means to support other key actors.

This complex of interests generally reveals the core governance chal-lenges facing a post- conflict country in transition. Crafting a governance strat-egy to overcome these challenges must control for the following variables4:

1. Competency of indigenous governance structures. 2. Consensus on existential issues of the state.3. Capacity for political maturity through open competition forthe right to govern.

Many of the drivers of conflict will track with one of these vari-ables. In countries emerging from conflict, many if not all of these aspectsof governance will be weak, as reviewed below:

• Competency. Overcoming shortfalls in governance capacity is per-haps the most important and hardest variable to control for in a post-conflict setting. The inability of the indigenous government to provideor otherwise ensure delivery of essential public goods and serviceswill likely foment opposition. The extent and quality of services isgenerally dependent upon the population’s historical service level andforward looking expectations, but generally include basic life sustain-ing needs (water, food, electricity, heath care, shelter), justice for dep-rivations of life and property, and other human services such as trash

4 See Conducting a DG Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development, USAID Document No.PN-ACP-338, November 2000.

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collection or education. In a post-conflict context, governance deficitsare usually extensive and will lag popular opinion. Not all grievanceswill be redressed, and in a post-conflict context, the most importantdetermination is whether the host government is either unable orunwilling to provide services to a significant segment of its territoryor its population. Inequalities (perceived or real) can contribute to apolitical climate where mere rejectionists or would-be spoilers devel-op into a destabilizing force or insurgent progenitor.

• Consensus involves the ability of key actors to agree on fundamentalissues of national identity and citizenship, basic rules of the politicalgame, and governing arrangements. Without consensus on thesenorms the underlying legitimacy is perennially at risk and increasesthe likelihood of renewed conflict.

• Competition. Competition is at the core of democratic process, but ina post-conflict setting can be a recipe for instability. Especially whenthere is low consensus among major population centers, allowingsome groups to succeed while others fail may offer enough of a wedgewithin the population for an insurgency to take root.

Step 2: Identify key institutionsKnowledge of the key political actors and the issues that animate

them are a necessary, but insufficient requisite to develop a baseline under-standing of the constraints that inhibit the consolidation of governance instabilization operations. Development, diplomatic and defense personnelalso need a common understanding of where the game of politics is played,especially the institutional arenas where domestic political actors competefor control. By definition, this is a context specific exercise, but typicallyinvolves an understanding of three key social spheres5:

1. The civil society sphere—encompassing all forms of associationallife such as retail media outlets, business associations, local religiousinstitutions, labor unions, and even sports clubs.

5 See, e.g., Conducting a DG ASSESSMENT: a Framework for Strategy Development, USAIDDocument No. PN-ACP-338, November 2000.

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2. The competitive arena—encompassing non-state associationalgroups instrumental to the balance of power between local andnational government and among the branches of government at alllevels. These include political parties, economic/business cartels,professional associations that aggregate the interests of state officials(e.g., “national governors’ association” or “association of attorneysgeneral” or law enforcement unions), media gatekeepers, tribal gov-ernance or the governing bodies of religious institutions.

3. The formal governance arena—focusing on the authority, trans-parency, accountability, capacity and effectiveness of legislative,judicial and executive offices (including the military) at all levels ofgovernment as well as traditional governance structures. These pri-marily include law making authorities, judicial authorities and sub-sidiary civil and criminal legal authorities.

Knowledge of the key actors who shape social patterns and institutionalperformance is the tough part. Subsequent mapping of their respectivespheres of influence should be a relatively straightforward application. Thechallenge, of course, is doing it in a manner that comprehends state andnon-state structures as a connected system—capturing the internal politicsof key institutions and their power to shape and be shaped by competinginstitutions.

Step 3: reconcile tradeoffsAn appreciation of the players, their objectives, and their power to

shape formal/informal or state/non-state institutions brings realism to set-ting governance goals in a post-conflict setting. The underlying challengeis state stabilization in the short term, while not forsaking sustainabledevelopment in the long term. When crafting a governance strategy, civil-military planners must be aware of the opportunity costs associated with ashort-term goal to bring about security and longer term efforts to consoli-date democratic governance norms. There are many tradeoffs associatedwith building governance structures that are competent, promote consen-sus on the fundamentals of the state, and contain political competition.Some of the more prominent are reviewed below:

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1. Competent governance: meeting needs versus building capacity.As a country emerges from conflict, governance services are necessar-ily going to be weak. The provision of basic humanitarian assistance—food, water, health care—is familiar to conventional war fighting.Kicking food staples off the back of helicopters during war time makesperfect sense, but continuing the practice in peace time distorts theagricultural sector, domestic distribution centers—doing more harmthan good. In a post- conflict setting it is tempting to rely on interna-tional entities to meet the population’s immediate needs and mitigatethe risk of instability. Direct provision of services by internationals(e.g., picking up trash, opening heath clinics, providing electricity,standing up schools, or building transportation infrastructure) may behelpful in the short run—providing an illusion that the new governmentcan meet the population’s needs and, therefore, inflate public supportfor the post-conflict state. This instinct must be tempered. Laying thegroundwork for state institutions to deliver essential services them-selves (though time-consuming and certainly imperfect) strengthensthe legitimacy and effectiveness of the governing structures. Interestsin expediency can weaken post-conflict states, create dependency, andforestall handover from military to civilian control.

2. Consensus: central executive power versus checks and balances.Concentrating power in a strong central executive is a tempting short-term solution to the myriad of service and political issues that a countryemerging from conflict must reconcile. In one respect, a strong execu-tive can push through a reform agenda and forsake a deliberativeprocess in order to expedite forward movement on more immediateproblems: service delivery, standing up an indigenous government, andgetting an occupying force structure out. However, generally only thepopulation and political factions allied to the strong executive and theoutside intervening forces “own” these reforms. Failure to engage rep-resentatives (elected or informal civil society leaders) in consultationsover fundamental issues of the state can create major legitimacy gaps forthe central authority. On the other hand, a government structured by con-sensus, (one that requires inclusion at every step of the domestic policy

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making process) is a recipe for gridlock, where conflict groups useevery issue of concern as a proxy battle for historic grievances.

3. Competition: power sharing versus open elections. The winner-take-all characteristics of a democratic process can marginalizeminorities, foment a sense of exclusion, and incentivize rejection ofthe elected government (A recipe for renewed conflict). Thus, creatingan inclusive process of disadvantaged, excluded groups and conflictgroups in a power-sharing accord is often a centerpiece of post-conflictpeace agreements. As noted above, however, this can be a recipe forparalysis in governance. Even attempts to split the difference and pro-mote power sharing for interim periods risks cementing a conflict pol-itics into nascent domestic political institutions. A related concern isdeciding who occupies essential positions in the post-conflict govern-ment—warlords and other conflict entrepreneurs are essential to keep-ing the peace, and plum political appointments can give them a stakein the new government. However, the professional skills of an effectivewarlord do not necessarily translate to sound public administrationpractices and can inhibit capacity development efforts in the long term.

There are many other common tradeoffs, too many to exhausthere. In lieu of a laundry list of more abstractions, the remainder of thispaper will focus on application of the framework.

Applying the framework

Looking forward to 2009 and beyond, Iraq offers a relativelystraightforward example of how to apply this framework to a countryemerging from conflict.

1. Identify key actors and opportunitiesStarting with the UN-sanctioned, invasion and occupation of

multi-national forces in Iraq (MNF-I)(2003-2004), continuing through theestablishment of a nascent democratic government – but disrupted by

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ongoing internecine and insurgent conflict (2005-2008) – and looking for-ward to from 2009, Iraq seems to have attained a status of relative stabili-ty. Nonetheless, it remains an open question whether this hard won stabil-ity can lead to further development of the fledgling institutions of demo-cratic governance already established.

Presently, Iraq can be looked on as a nation in transition, wheredemocratic gains – e.g. through legitimate and credible elections andevolving organs of representative government – offer the opportunity for acontinuation and deepening of democratization. However, as former MNF-I commander General David Petraeus and others have noted, Iraq’s currentstatus is also “fragile and reversible.” The conditions for continued anddestabilizing insurgency continue to exist.

While Iraq has always been multi-ethnic, multi-religious andmulti-lingual, the historic object of politics has not been to balance andensure the collective welfare of its diverse populace. Instead, the name ofthe game has been domination and control of the country’s naturalresources – oil, water, and land – for the benefit of the few and excludingthe many. The prevailing view has long been that government rules by dis-cipline and force to ensure conformity with the ruling elite’s vision ofsocial order.

Thus, as historically conceived, “political community” hasembraced not the individual citizen but, rather, dominant factions of inter-connected family, clan, and tribal groups, overlaid by ethnic, sectarian andcommercial webs of patronage. The centralized structures of the state –executive, legislative, and judicial organs – are guarantors of the politicalclass’s privileges. Within the political community, trust forms, ebbs and re-forms in accordance with on rules of a transient and often violent powerpolitics. The result is a politics of identity and conflict (Table 1 below fur-ther explicates these political descriptors) that is less bound to traditionthan tied to material interests and pragmatic calculations associated withshifting centers of power.

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Adapted from USAID/OTI Conflict Analysis (2006)

This historical model of Iraqi politics, which preceded and alsoapplied to Saddam’s regime, not surprisingly has largely remained thesame since 2003. The highly centralized administration during Saddam’sdictatorship permeated provincial, district, and sub-district governments,and enabled Saddam’s authoritarian rule. After the fall of Baghdad, MNF-I forces undertook an aggressive and accelerated campaign to dismantlethese systems of repression, and to erect new systems and institutions thatcreate the foundation for an Iraq governed by consent.

The imposition of a representative but divided government left asecurity and governance vacuum, resulting in increased power for estab-lished political parties, most of which are religious in orientation and out-look. In the absence of essential state services, some of these parties havehelped constituents with their basic needs and offered protection by mili-tias or armed groups, thereby displacing and in some cases directly com-

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peting with the state. However, no one group or governing coalition hasbeen able to wrest control of the state apparatus and consolidate its power.Indeed, these parties and the communities they represent are locked in aprotracted struggle over resources – most notably, land and oil – that close-ly tracks Iraq’s long established political patterns.

While the 2007-2008 troop surge weakened insurgent forces,dampened violence and created pockets of stability and security in locali-ties where insurgency once thrived, mere absence of violence should notbe mistaken for lasting stability. Successful counterinsurgency operationsreach into the decades, and are not structured around “military” solutionsimposed from the outside, but through a domestic “political” process driv-en from the inside. Despite gains on the security front, Iraq’s politicsremains unstable—governed by a fractious and violent political culture.The trick to pacifying this culture and stabilizing Iraq’s politics is some-how incentivizing Iraq’s rival factions to resolve their differences and pur-sue their political interests within the parameters of law while respectingthe authority of state institutions.

So while Iraq’s politics is still coherently understood through acounterinsurgency lens, democracy and governance programs become theprimarily tools for (1) consolidating the security gains made over the pasttwo and a half years by resolving conflict through domestic governinginstitutions, (2) loosening insurgent/extremist grips on Iraqi society by dis-crediting their tactics as illegitimate in the eyes of the population, and (3)achieving a durable peace among Iraq’s factions.

Even though there has been a sharp decline in politically motivat-ed violence since 2008, increasing demand for technocratic governance,and a lessening of sectarian infighting, it remains an open questionwhether these promising developments have altered the long-standing pat-terns of political behavior.

However, in contrast to the 2005 provincial elections, participationin the January 2009 cycle was extensive and unconstrained, with no signif-

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icant voter boycotts and overwhelming voter sentiment for non-sectarianand technically competent political leadership. Reports from electionmonitors indicate the elections were administered competently and safely.For these reasons, in addition to the important fact that Iraqis have beenenthusiastic about elections, the latter appear to be a viable, ongoing toolof democratization and political maturation through peaceful competition.

Changes in the political landscape in 2008 and the provincial elec-tions of 2009 are encouraging signs of a potential break in Iraq’s historicalpolitical trend lines, suggesting an opportunity for peacefully resolving thedifficult resource and power sharing issues outlined above. While it is too early to know whether these changes will hold through thenational elections in January 2010 and usher in a more pragmatic, techno-cratic, and responsive political class, they do provide a basis for planning.The most significant changes include:

• The decline in public support for religious parties, and a concurrendemand for technocratic and competent political leadership in govern-ment;• A shifting politics, where sectarian identity is less predictive of politicalsupport;• The reemergence and ascendancy of secular political parties;• Participation of former Sunni insurgents and tribal elements in the elec-toral process, and a durable ceasefire among Shia militias;• Increasing assertions of Iraqi sovereignty and declining influence of for-eign powers in Iraq’s internal affairs.

The point of this assessment is not to indentify “a plan” as such, but toindentify positive political and social vectors that an outside or interven-ing force can support and encourage through diplomatic and developmen-tal mechanisms. But the question remains: intervene where?

2. Identify key institutions A comprehensive mapping of Iraq civil society, competitive com-

munities and formal governance structures is beyond the scope of this

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paper. The figure below provides a glimpse into this exercise. It maps theintersection of Iraq’s national, provincial and local governing institutions.It also identifies, to the right, significant non-state actors who compete forinfluence over the state apparatus.

The goal here is not only to identify the relevant institutions, butalso to understand how they integrate as a system.

Abstracting from the political analysis in step one, the promisinginstitutional arenas for political change and advancement of democraticreforms include:• Elections – Particularly in the immediate aftermath of the January2009 provincial council elections, Iraqis seem enthusiastic about elec-tions and political parties view them as important gateways topower. Accordingly, the prospect of their becoming a fixture of Iraqipolitical development offers a promising toehold for democratic con-solidation, as long as losing factions respect the outcomes and facili-tate the attendant transitions of power.

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• Strengthened Representation – The current political climate opensopportunities to encourage a shift towards a more technocratic, issue-based politics by enabling newly elected politicians at the national,provincial, district and sub-district levels to work to:· functionally integrate political parties within and between represen-tational institutions;· support cross-sectarian/ethnic coalitions and develop communica-tion plans and media strategies for them to foster the idea that Iraqis,regardless of their sectarian or ethnic background, can participatefully in a unified democratic state;· facilitate a national debate on the issues of power sharing andresources distribution; and· leverage the trend toward technocratic government by expanding theinfluence of professional organizations over sectarian and tribalgroups in the political process.

• Executive Transparency – the current political environment is con-ducive to assisting constitutionally designated executive authorities,e.g., the Presidency Council, Council of Ministers and the PrimeMinister’s office, in developing transparent policies, procedures andregulations to facilitate law making, enforcement of laws, and an openbudget process.

3. Reconcile tradeoffsLooking toward 2012, Iraq is a nation in transition, where gains in

security and self-government offer many opportunities to deepen Iraq’ssovereignty, self-reliance and democratic maturity more generally. Whilethe MNF-I troop surge weakened insurgent forces, dampened violence andcreated pockets of stability and security in localities where insurgencyonce thrived, mere absence of violence should not be mistaken for stabili-ty. Conditions are ripe to substantially lower the presence of internationalforces, and international troops are bound by treaty obligations to uncon-ditional withdrawal by 2012. But the mission is not yet accomplished.Successful counterinsurgency campaigns are not structured around “mili-tary” solutions imposed from the outside, but through a domestic “politi-

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cal” process driven from the inside. The end of occupation does not endthe counterinsurgency campaign—it merely indigenizes it.

After six years of engagement, the political will of donor countriesfor maintaining a robust civilian assistance effort to support Iraq’s politi-cal process is waning—especially when Iraq has considerable resources ofits own. And in a context of rapidly diminishing resources, foreign assis-tance programmers will have to reconcile which programs to continue,which to pass off, and which to end. Most important will be what values(development, diplomatic, or security) will drive those considerations.That question, like most, boils down to a budget fight.

According to the U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq, theUnited States has committed $52.27 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq.Approximately 90% of these funds are appropriated through four majorfunds: the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF)—$20.86 billion;the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)—$18.04 billion; the EconomicSupport Fund (ESF)—$4.18 billion; and the Commander’s EmergencyResponse Program (CERP)—$3.63 billion. SIGR accounting as of June30, 2009, shows that “more than $42.59 billion had been obligated fromthese four major funds, and $38.49 billion had been expended. Nearly$3.54 billion remains available to be obligated, and $8.22 billion is unex-pended. The preponderance of unexpended U.S. funds is in the ISFF,which supports Iraq’s military and police forces.”6

In the same time period, the Government of Iraq has contributed$71.01 billion to their own reconstruction and non-U.S. internationalsources have contributed $17 billion.7 Iraq provides more funding than theUnited States and all other international sources combined, and that sharewill increase precipitously between now, 2012 and the out years of inter-national military withdrawal.

6 SIGR Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to Congress, July 30, 2009 7 Id.

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For the long run, the name of the game is leveraging Iraq’s annualcapital budget to ensure that governing structures prioritize the rightinvestments for Iraq’s sustainable development. The short-term game—and the one that is defined in terms of the annual foreign assistance budg-et cycle and two year election cycles—is to prioritize the administrative actof facilitating the logistical burdens of the military drawdown and the“right sizing” of a civilian diplomatic effort.

A retail itemization of tradeoffs associated with various political,governance, economic, rule of law, security, diplomatic, or other programlines is beyond the scope of this paper, but the smart money is on ensuringthat a long-term technical assistance and capacity development effort isprovided to Iraq’s primary budget decision makers, executors and benefi-ciaries. Those include: (1) representative bodies responsible for setting andvetting budgetary priorities (the national parliament, Prime Minister andhis cabinet, the President, provincial councils, governors, local governingbodies), (2) executive line ministries responsible for formulating and exe-cuting budgets at the national, provincial and local levels (e.g. theMinistries of Finance, Planning, Electricity, Water, and Public Works), and(3) civil society organs who can aggregate the interests of population cen-ters and petition government in prioritizing population needs (e.g., non-government organization, community groups, tribal leadership, etc).

Conclusion

NATO is not a development agency, nor should it become one.NATO’s prospective work in post conflict, reconstruction and, if need be,counterinsurgency environments will be dependent upon “joined up” workwith civilian counterparts, who have their own shortcomings in conflictenvironments. The assessment framework advanced by this paper merelyoffers civilian-military campaign planners a common method for indenti-fying and reconciling competing diplomatic, defense and development pri-orities in post conflict environments. The process, ideally, will also bring asense of realism to governance goals for nations emerging from conflict.

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CHAPTER FIVE

Measuring Counterinsurgency EffectivenessEasier Said than Done

Kirk A. Johnson

“In the end, victory comes, in largemeasure, by convincing the populacethat their life will be better under the[Host Nation] government than underan insurgent regime.”

Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, 2006, p. 1-25

Introduction

“Winning the hearts and minds” is the common mantra of counterin-surgency campaigns; the extent to which the population supports local andnational government structures while rejecting insurgents or other anti-govern-ment forces is a mark of success. Naturally, assessing when (and if) this situa-tion arises is fraught with difficulty. It is not surprising that the U.S. Army’sCounterinsurgency manual concedes, “Progress can be hard to measure.”1

Nevertheless, measuring progress—or lack thereof—is criticallyimportant, not only for the military commanders engaged in ongoing con-flict, but also for civilians working in counterinsurgency environments andpolicymakers deciding on future staffing and other civil-military require-

1 U.S. Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, December 2006, p. x,available at http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf

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ments. Without both quantitative and qualitative metrics, assessments onprogress—and therefore future policy decisions—are reduced to mererhetoric and conjecture.

The purpose of this paper is to describe appropriate counterinsur-gency metrics that can be used to support evaluation and decision makingby senior military and civilian leaders on a strategic level. Much of thispaper will focus on the Iraq experience while keeping in mind that allinsurgencies and counterinsurgency campaigns will differ.Counterinsurgency metrics should focus on three overall topics:

1. Population Security2. “Hearts and Minds”3. Measures of Normalcy

As noted above, collecting these important measures is often dif-ficult and, more importantly, cannot be done wholly by the civil-militaryorganizations engaged in counterinsurgency. Coalition/allied civil-militaryactors must rely on a wide variety of sources for metrics, including thosefrom the Host Nation government, international organizations, and othernon-governmental organizations (NGOs). Without question, these third-party reports will be of inconsistent quality; nevertheless, they are neces-sary in order to gain a fuller picture of the operating environment.

The final section of this paper will focus on who conducts theassessments. Both civilian and military organizations need to have full-time,dedicated staffs whose job it is to plan and assess the ongoing counterinsur-gency effort. While the military has a long tradition of planning, civilianagencies often lack this capability. Both military and civilian organizationsneed to have this capability in order to fully track the situation on the ground.

Population security

Without question, the first and most important aim of counterin-

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surgency is to protect the population. Assessment measures should there-fore focus on the extent to which the population is secure in itself and itsneighborhoods. On the most basic of levels, assessing population securitywould be concerned with quantifying civilian casualties, incidents ofthreats/intimidation, and perceptions of safety/security in the area of oper-ation.

Outside of the abstract, quantification becomes more difficult.Collecting even basic civilian casualty data can be difficult. Chief amongthe questions involved is what to collect and how to collect it. In peace-time, civilians are hurt and killed for any number of reasons: criminalactions, accidents, and any number of health-related reasons. During waror insurgency, civilians are the victims of targeted or random violencefrom insurgents, as well as by criminal actions, accidents, etc. Attemptingto parse these components can sometimes be an impossible endeavor.

Coalition military leaders in Iraq, starting in 2006, focused almostexclusively on civilian deaths due to sectarian violence.2 In theory, this hassome allure because of the sectarian nature of the conflict, accelerated bythe February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque of Samarra. The mili-tary defined sectarian attacks as violent acts by one ethnic or religiousgroup against another or violent acts perceived to have been targeted inthat way. Thus, the cross-ethnic dimension of this definition is the indica-tive factor. Shia-on-Shia or Sunni-on-Sunni violence would not likely beconsidered sectarian in nature because the violence does not cross fromSunni-to-Shia or vice versa. Therefore, sectarian violence metrics onlyhave meaning in mixed areas of Iraq, such as in Baghdad.

The U.S. Department of Defense used this measure of sectarianviolence/civilian deaths in order to gauge population security in Iraq.Since 2005, the DoD has reported this measure of population security in

2 Although ideally one would like a broader measure of civilian casualties to include those killed andwounded, attaining reliable statistics on civilians wounded in such security incidents is much more dif-ficult and prone to error as compared to civilian deaths. Thus, civilian deaths became the initial—although not sole—indicator used for population security.

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its Congressionally-mandated report, “Measuring Stability and Security inIraq,” also known as the Section 9010 report.3 In 2006, the DoD startedusing “sectarian incidents” (and the related casualties) as one of the keymeasures of population security as well, given the evolving nature of theconflict.

This limited measure of population security, however, opened theDoD up to criticism. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)specifically criticized the Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) on thispoint, noting that “[M]easuring such violence requires understanding theperpetrator’s intent, which may not be known.”4 While the GAO uses thiscontention to argue that it is unknown whether sectarian violence haddecreased (which it certainly had by the time that report was issued inSeptember 2007), the basic criticism of the categorization of sectarian vio-lence has some validity.

In addition, the method of data collection used in much of 2006had its own issues. MNF-I relied on its own units in the field to providedata on civilian deaths, rather than attempting to utilize/rationalize datacollected by official Iraqi sources, such as the Ministry of Health, IraqiSecurity Forces reports, and the municipal morgues. By the end of 2006,civilian-targeted violence was characterized by retribution killings andkidnappings (commonly followed by execution-style killings), wherebybodies were often dumped into ditches or gullies and found later. In thesecases, local residents would generally call Iraqi officials to collect the bod-ies, rather than Coalition Forces. Without military “eyes on” the scene toinvestigate, such incidents would not be included in the database.Therefore, MNF-I data would be subject to a systematic underreporting ofthese incidents.

3 It is sometimes dubbed the “Section 9010” report because that is the section of the Department ofDefense Appropriations Act of 2006 that mandated the reports. They may be found athttp://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/Iraq_Reports/index.html.4 Government Accountability Office, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Iraq: IraqiGovernment Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Reconstruction Benchmarks,” GAO-07-1195, September 2007, pg. 51.

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Recognizing this deficiency—and responding to pressures for betterdata coverage—MNF-I began to use more Iraqi Host Nation data to supple-ment their own understanding of civilian death statistics.5 Starting in late 2007,the DoD began to report/compare the two sources of data in their Congressionalreporting. One chart in the December 2007 “Measuring Stability and Securityin Iraq” report6 shows that MNF-I data augmented by Iraqi Host Nation civil-ian death information was sometimes as much as twice as high as MNF-I dataalone. In July 2006, for example, MNF-I data estimated that about 1,250 civil-ians were killed that month, yet when augmented with Iraqi data the estimatewas about 2,700 (see Figure 1). It is little wonder, then, that analysts haveincreasingly compared data from many sources—including Host Nationoffices—to develop a fuller picture of the situation on the ground.7

Figure 1Iraq Civilian Deaths, January 2006 to April 2009. Reprinted from Anthony Cordesman,“Iraq: Trends in Violence and Civilian Casualties 2005-2009”, Center for Strategic andInternational Studies Burke Chair in Strategy Report, May 5, 2009, Figure 8.

5 MNF-I also used this as an opportunity to train the Iraqis on better data collection techniques.6 DoD, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 14, 2007, pg. 18, athttp://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/FINAL-SecDef%20Signed-20071214.pdf.7 See, for example, Anthony Cordesman, “Iraq: Trends in Violence and Civilian Casualties 2005-2009”, Center for Strategic and International Studies Burke Chair in Strategy Report, May 5, 2009, athttp://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090504_iraq_patterns_in_violence.pdf.

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Some may argue that the actual levels or point estimates of thesecivilian casualties are not important; rather, policymakers should be moreconcerned with trends and changes over time. This argument has somemerit. While it is important to know the extent of the civilian death prob-lem, it is at least equally important to know whether or not the problem isgetting better, staying the same, or getting worse. The difficulty, though,comes when different datasets show differing trends, which happened at acritical time just before the early 2007 “Surge” took place. BetweenNovember and December 2006, MNF-I data showed about a 20 percentdrop in civilian deaths, while augmented Iraqi Host Nation data showedabout a 15 percent increase (see Figure 1 above).8 Given the debates occur-ring at that time regarding the wisdom of increasing troop levels, the dataset used does make a difference. If military leaders and civilian policymak-ers had solely relied on MNF-I data for decision-making on early 2007strategy, the situation today could easily be very different from what itturned out to be.9

Civilian casualty data are not the only ones useful for evaluatingpopulation security in a counterinsurgency. Standard measures of “securi-ty incidents,” broadly defined as direct or indirect attacks on military andcivilian personnel or property, can be useful and the DoD routinely usessuch a measure in its quarterly report.10 While this presentation lacks asense of the severity of the discrete incidents (i.e. a single attack that caus-es a single casualty is given the same weight as a single mass casualtyattack that kills dozens), such data, coupled with one or more casualtymeasures, can give a reasonably detailed picture of population security.

Nonetheless, any violence data collected during war or insurgencyis subject to uncertainty and error, much like any other data. Military plan-

8 Ibid. 9 As an aside, it is worthwhile to underscore that in Iraq, the differences between Coalition Forces andthe combined Coalition Forces/Host Nation reports have narrowed considerably in recent months. Partof this is due to the change in the nature of the war post-surge, and part to improved reporting fromthe Government of Iraq. 10 See, for example, DoD, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 25, 2009, pg. 19, athttp://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Measuring_Stability_and_Security_in_Iraq_March_2009.pdf

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ners and ORSA (Operations Research/Systems Analysis) staff often col-lect civilian casualty data without communicating the level of confidencethat they themselves have with the data. Therefore, it can be interpreted byoutside readers as absolute truth, much in the way military casualty dataare treated. In reality, civilian violence data are susceptible to a great dealof uncertainty, especially given the manner in which the data are collect-ed. When released, such civilian data should include appropriate caveats.Even if the caveats are subjective (e.g. “very confident” or “somewhatconfident,” etc.), this would provide the reader more information about thedata than is currently communicated. Although not foolproof, it can helpguard against “garbage” data from being regarded as gospel.11

“Hearts and minds”

A central tenet of counterinsurgency is winning the “hearts andminds” of the populace while bolstering the legitimacy of the Host Nationgovernment. As noted above, if the populace believes life will be betterunder the legitimate government as opposed to an insurgent regime, itwould be a key determinant victory for coalition/allied forces. This is, ofcourse, easy to conceptualize in the abstract, but can be very difficult toascertain as a practical matter. While there are a number of other indica-tors that signal a populace more receptive of the legitimate governmentwhile turning against violence (see below), one of the primary ways toassess public opinion is through polling. Indeed, in early 2007 formerMNF-I Commanding General George W. Casey, Jr. testified before the USSenate Armed Services Committee and observed, “We think it is importantto turn the population against violence in general, and we measure that,their feeling on that, through polls.12

11 Bing West, “Garbage, Lies, and Uncertainties,” Marine Corps Gazette, May 2009, at http://small-warsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/238-west.pdf

12 General George W. Casey, Jr., “Nomination of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, for Reappointment tothe Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, United States Army,” Senate Armed Services Committee,February 1, 2007, S.Hrg. 110-370, pg. 209 at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_senate_hearings&docid=f:42309.pdf. In the same hearing, he also notedthat the people’s confidence in Iraqi Security Forces to provide security is measured through polls.

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The Counterinsurgency field manual discusses these issues ofpolling, and suggests that “critical information” needed both on tacticaland strategic levels focuses around the level of popular support for theinsurgency as compared to the legitimate government.13 While this can begarnered through human intelligence sources, other atmospherics, andopen source reporting, these can be biased and otherwise unreliable attimes. Broad-based or targeted-area polling can supplement these othersources to help validate or refute what is perceived by military leaders andcivilian policymakers.

Polling, however, is not a panacea. Public opinion surveys in con-flict areas are not only subject to the usual issues of sampling error, but areprone to a wide array of practical and statistical difficulties. Although thepurpose of this paper does not include describing the ideal public opinionsurvey in a conflict zone, there are a variety of issues to consider whenevaluating the usefulness of such polling data:

1. Military and civilian leaders should look to outside groups to conductpolling, whenever possible. While military units in the field can andshould ask the local populace for their opinions on their local or nation-al leaders, the information gleaned from these encounters can be sus-pect, depending on the power relationship dynamics from the encounter.In some cases (perhaps in many cases), the local resident will tell mili-tary personnel something very different from what they would say to aprofessional survey interviewer, who is usually a local national. Theextent to which reputable polling organizations are conducting thesesurveys via generally accepted standards will determine to a greater orlesser degree the accuracy of the data.

2. Much like other sources of data, surveys taken multiple times have moreusefulness than single “snapshot” polls. Winning “hearts and minds” isoften a slow process that is measured over the course of months, if not

13 U.S. Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, December 2006, p. 3-16, available at http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf

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years. While nearly any (reliable) information can be useful, looking attrends is more useful to determine whether an indicator is rising, falling,or staying constant.

One example is illustrative here: ABC News, in conjunction with threeinternational television stations, commissioned a series of polls on Iraqiperceptions on a number of topics.14 Many questions, where appropriateand applicable, are repeated verbatim. Because of that, opinions onimportant issues can be compared over time. For example, one key indi-cator is confidence in the Iraqi government. Over time, the public’s con-fidence in government has fluctuated (see Table 1).

Table 1Survey Question: How much confidence do you have in the nationalgovernment of Iraq?

Mar 08 (%) Aug 07 (%) Feb 07 (%)Great deal of confidence 17 11 18 Quite a lot of confidence 31 28 31 Not very much confidence 26 31 27None at all 25 30 24Refused/Don’t Know 1 - -

Source: ABC News Poll Conducted by D3 Systems/KA Research, Ltd.Sampling Margin of Error ± 2.5 percent

Here, confidence in the Government of Iraq (GOI) waned somewhatbetween February and August 2007, with the two top categories (“Greatdeal” and “Quite a lot of confidence”) dropping from 49 percent to 39percent. Then, confidence returned to 48 percent by March 2008.Although the actual numbers are somewhat lower, this trend is also seenwhen respondents are asked about the confidence they have in PrimeMinister Nouri al-Maliki himself (see Table 2).

14 D3 Systems (Vienna, VA) and KA Research Ltd. (Istanbul, Turkey), Iraq Poll, available athttp://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/poll/2008/0308opinion.pdf

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Table 2Survey Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way NouriKamel al-Maliki is handling his job as prime minister?

Mar 08 (%) Aug 07 (%) Feb 07 (%)Approve 40 33 43Disapprove 58 66 57Refused/Don’t Know 2 1 -

Source: ABC News Poll Conducted by D3 Systems/KA Research, Ltd. Sampling Margin of Error ± 2.5 percent

Besides political questions, these polls can be useful inquantifying/assessing a broad array of other subjective opinions. Oneissue in particular is optimism for the future, as compared to the subjec-tive assessment of the current situation. In Iraq, analysts found thatIraqis were far more optimistic about the future, defined as a year fromthe survey date, as compared to the current situation. Such optimismand hope for the future, where it exists, can be leveraged into supportfor the legitimate government that is trying to build a better future local-ly. Other important measures include perceptions of security inside oroutside of one’s neighborhood, and intercommunity relations. As previ-ously stated, however, polling is not a panacea and there are a numberof related issues to consider.

3. Opinions can vary significantly across locations and/or ethno-sectar-ian/religious groups. Consider the geographic composition of Iraq.While a quarter of Iraq lives in and around the urban center ofBaghdad, sizable populations live in smaller urban areas, tribal vil-lages, or Bedouin communities. By its very nature, then, Iraq is not amonolith. Opinion can and does vary by these geographic characteris-tics. While the above information, for example, regarding PrimeMinister Maliki’s approval ratings (Table 2 above) is interesting andinformative on an overall level, it is less useful for local or provincialuses.

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Poll responses differ by ethno-sectarian/religious group as well.Different communities often have varying views on a wide range ofsubjects. Obtaining separate results for Kurdish, Shia, and Sunni pop-ulations would paint a better picture of opinions than simply pollingIraqis at large.15

Take security perceptions, for example. The DoD described in its June2007 quarterly report some results of a nationwide poll taken in Aprilof that year.16 One question asked respondents to agree or disagreewith the following statement: “I feel safe and secure in my neighbor-hood.” While most Iraqis in the Kurdish areas and in most of the Shia-dominated south agreed with that statement, there was far less agree-ment in the Sunni provinces just north and west of Baghdad. Eventhough 77 percent of Iraqis nationwide agreed with the statement, thedistribution of answers clearly varies by geography and the variationsmay have important implications for policy and strategy.

4. No matter how good the polling methodology is, quality control isalways an issue when there is distance between the organization com-missioning the poll and the interviewers themselves. Polls in coun-terinsurgency environments are already difficult to field because of thesecurity situation. In addition, there is little way to check that qualitycontrol protocols are being followed as the survey methodology woulddictate. Such checks are not possible for polls where there is such afirewall between the polling company and the organization that com-missioned the poll.

By way of example, the ABC News poll above was not actually con-ducted by the news organization itself. Rather, the interviews wereconducted through an Iraqi questionnaire form using Iraqi interview

15 For more on this, see Kirk A. Johnson, Ph.D., “A Baghdad Statistician’s Perspective on the Positivesand Negatives of Polling in Iraq”, Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1615, September 13, 2007, athttp://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm1615.cfm

16 DoD, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 7, 2007, pg. 26, athttp://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010-Final-20070608.pdf

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teams. On one hand, this partially remediates the problem of respon-dents telling interviewers what they think they want to hear (seeabove), but on the other hand, basic validity checks of the resultingpolling data cannot be undertaken. In the United States, a good surveymethodology would allow for the commissioning organization to con-tact households to verify that someone actually contacted the intervie-wee. In a conflict environment, the poll often becomes a “black box”whereby the organization commissioning the poll must trust theresults without verification. At least one organization, theInternational Republican Institute, cancelled a polling contract in Iraqin 2006 because (in part) of a lack of trust and problems with the inter-nal validity of polling results.

5. Response rates for polls become more important in dangerous areas.The purpose of polling is to get a representative sample of opinionfrom a broad cross section of the population. If a large proportion ofthe population refuses to be surveyed for one reason or another, thiscan substantially affect the reliability of poll results. The ABC Newspoll again is illustrative. Roughly 2,200 Iraqis were surveyed for themid-2007 poll, which itself is a reasonable number of people to surveyin a standard poll; however, the polling company had to contact manymore households than that in order to get to that 2,200. According tothe methodological note, there was a response rate of only about 60percent on the poll.17 Therefore, nearly 1,500 households that werecontacted did not participate.

It is impossible to tell how the 60 percent who participated with thepoll are similar or different to the 40 percent who did not participate.For example, are the 60 percent more likely to complain about the sit-uation in Iraq? Are they more likely to be Shia (or conversely, Sunni)?Were non-responders adequately replaced by individuals with similarcharacteristics? Again, it is impossible to tell. This introduces error

17 ABC News, “Iraq Poll: Note on Methodology,” September 10, 2007, athttp://abcnews.go.com/print?id=3571535.

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into the results that usually cannot be adequately fixed via data analy-sis, especially when data are from unstable areas such as Iraq. In addi-tion, this error is not included in the sampling margin of error calcu-lations (reported as plus/minus 2.5% in the above ABC poll); there-fore, these calculations may yield a false sense of certainty regardingthe accuracy of the results.

6. A larger poll does not necessarily yield a better poll. Many surveycompanies will note—correctly—that the larger the sample taken for apoll, the smaller the margin of error. Other things being equal, a larg-er sample will be more precise than a smaller one. A poll of 100 peo-ple has a sampling error/margin of error rate of 10 percentage pointsin either direction. A survey of 1000 has a margin of error of about 3.2percentage points.

What is missing, however, is a good sense of the nonsampling errorpresent in the survey. Even in a peaceful and stable environment, allsamples are subject to errors when respondents fail to respond truth-fully to survey interviewers for any number of reasons. Also, surveyscan be subject to coding errors in data entry, nonresponse bias (notedabove), and all manner of measurement errors.18

The effects of nonsampling error on a poll are notoriously difficult tomeasure. Given the challenges of operating in a conflict environment,civil/military leaders need to be cognizant of these difficulties. Justbecause a 10,000 household survey claims to have a margin of error of1 percentage point does not mean that total survey error is that low. Asnoted above, if nonresponse is a particular problem for a survey, thiswill introduce substantial error that is not included in the standardmargin of error calculation. Therefore, the margin of error calculationmay give a false sense of precision.

18 For example, in answer to a question such as “How many hours of electricity did you receive lastmonth?” the respondent might “measure” his/her response incorrectly by telling the interviewer howmany hours were received, say, yesterday.

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Good survey methodology anywhere requires a wide range ofimportant steps be undertaken by the organization conducting the poll. Thepurpose, again, of this paper is not to discuss polling in general, but ratherthe issues of polling in a conflict zone. The Roper Center for Public OpinionResearch at the University of Connecticut has an excellent primer on basicsurvey methodology for those interested in further reading on the subject.19

Measures of normalcy

While polling has a significant place in counterinsurgency met-rics, it cannot produce all of the information needed by civil and militaryleaders to ascertain progress in a society. Important social and economicmeasures are also necessary to gauge improvement in a society, or lackthereof. The development of indigenous capacity to evaluate these socialand economic indicators is also important to the extent that Host Nationgovernments can collect and disseminate accurate (and publically avail-able) information about their own country that will not only provide time-ly information to themselves, civilian, and military leaders, but also bol-ster their legitimacy in the process.

The U.S. Army field manual Counterinsurgency describes a num-ber of progress indicators that can and should be collected and disseminat-ed by the Host Nation government.20 Chief among them are the level of eco-nomic activity, such as agriculture, construction, public utilities, new busi-ness start-ups, tax revenue, imports/exports, inflation, andemployment/unemployment levels. Governments collect such informationvia both administrative data (e.g. tariffs collected at the border, tax revenuegenerated by source, business licenses generated, electricity megawatthours produced), but also broad survey data (e.g. price surveys for inflation,labor surveys for employment/unemployment rates, agricultural use sur-

19 See “Polling 101,” Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, athttp://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/education/polling_fundamentals.html

20 U.S. Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, December 2006, p. 5-28, available at http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf

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veys from a sample of farms). In Iraq, much of this kind of data comes froma GOI office called the Central Organization of Statistics and InformationTechnology (COSIT). In many respects, it resembles other centralized dataoffices in Western countries—in particular, Statistics Canada.

The Iraq experience was unique in that there was a history of datacollection from the former regime and an underlying bureaucracy thatcould be re-engaged to collect survey and administrative data.21 Othercounterinsurgency environments may not be so fortunate. Until adequateHost Nation capacity is created, leaders can and should enlist the help ofinternational organizations to collect baseline data. Bringing in HostNation government statisticians into the process will, naturally, present atraining opportunity to build up indigenous capacity.

Many international organizations have conducted these kinds ofeconomic and social surveys in Iraq. For example, the Iraq LivingConditions Survey of 2004 was a joint project of COSIT, the Norwegian-based Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, and the UnitedNations Development Program.22 Its purpose was to generate a compre-hensive social, economic, and housing assessment in Iraq one year afterthe fall of Baghdad. More recently, the World Bank helped underwrite the2007 Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey.23

The problem with these surveys is that they tend to be ad hoc orotherwise irregular. Therefore, they do not give a good sense of the trendsoccurring in the country, which is important for reasons noted above. Also,these highly professional survey efforts typically have a long lag time frominterview phase to finished product—at times, several months. The addi-tional data processing and post-survey adjustments yield an improved and

21 It should be noted that some COSIT officials fled around the time of the fall of Baghdad, as did otherIraqi government agencies. There were enough remaining to reconstitute the organization later.

22 The Iraq Living Conditions Survey Tabulation Report is available athttp://cosit.gov.iq/english/pdf/english_tabulation.pdf

23 The Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey’s Technical Report is available athttp://cosit.gov.iq/english/pdf/2008/ihses_part1.pdf. The data annexes are available athttp://cosit.gov.iq/english/cosit_surveys.php

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more reliable final product (as compared to standard polling), but thiscomes at the expense of timeliness.

This is not meant to be a criticism of comprehensive surveys versuscontemporary polling. Both types of surveys have different purposes. Large-scale national surveys are meant to provide information on the status ofmajor social and economic indicators that do not often change substantiallyover time. Public opinion, usually measured in quick-turnaround polls, oftendoes change sharply and quickly. The Iraq Living Conditions Survey and theIraq Household Socio-Economic Survey measure concepts such as literacyrates, educational attainment, unemployment, housing adequacy, and otherimportant macro indicators. The results of these large-scale surveys informpolicy as to what will, in the long-term, need to be “fixed” in society andwhere. In comparison, public opinion surveys help analysts ascertain whatpeople are thinking about the issues of the day, which change frequently.

Other measures of normalcy are less objective and quantifiable, andcan only be estimated via observations and gathering “atmospheric” informa-tion from local contacts. One of the measures of insurgent control is the inabil-ity of local populations to travel in and out of a given area. The fact that localresidents are on the road and able to conduct commerce or otherwise travel forpersonal or religious reasons is a key indicator of progress and stability.

In addition, personal observations will sometimes come inadvance of “hard data” on normalcy. If local military or civilian staff seean increase of people out of their homes and in the markets, parks, andother public places, this information may precede confidence measures on,say, security or the economy gleaned from polling data. Although thesedata are, by definition, subjective, such information is useful for the pur-poses of comparison with more quantitative information.

Civil/Military assessment offices

No discussion of assessments in counterinsurgency would be com-

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plete without a note about the offices and personnel tasked with collectingand analyzing data. The military has a long history of planning, assess-ments and ongoing analysis via various “J5” departments (“5” being thedesignation for the strategy, plans, and assessments offices in a standardmilitary organization). For the State Department, the planning and policyanalysis process almost always takes place in Washington, far from wherethe counterinsurgency is taking place.

That changed in 2006, when the Joint Strategic Planning andAssessment office (JSPA) was established and staffed at U.S. EmbassyBaghdad. While nowhere near as large as its MNF-I counterpart, theStrategy, Plans and Assessment office (now simply dubbed the Combined-Joint 5, or CJ5, office), its staff included national security, political, rule oflaw, economics and assessments officers. As of this writing, there is nosimilar State Department office at Embassy Kabul although some capabil-ities exist in the political-military section. Such capability is greatly need-ed, considering the recent deterioration in the situation in Afghanistan.24 Ifthe State Department cannot staff such an office, military commandersshould consider ways to enhance civilian analysis capabilities—perhapseven by adding civilian support from one of the public policy researchorganizations that contracts with the Federal government.

Counterinsurgency assessment offices—on both a military andcivilian side—need to be staffed by individuals who not only can analyzestatistics, but also know something about polling and survey methodology.While the military’s Operations Research and Systems Analysis (ORSA)officers are typically very good at analyzing data, they do not always havea background on survey sampling methodology necessary to identifymany of the potential issues raised above. While these officers will not beconducting polls themselves, even a small background in survey method-ology can help towards recognizing some of the issues raised above.

24 It should be noted that as of mid-2009, JSPA at Embassy Baghdad is drawing down and will even-tually be decommissioned, given the change in the overall U.S. mission in Iraq.

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The importance of the capabilities these offices can bring to coun-terinsurgency is substantial. During high-intensity combat operations, themilitary conducts “Battle Damage Assessment” (BDA), a process of con-tinual measurement at many staff levels of how the enemy has degraded thecapabilities of the force marshaled against it. Counterinsurgency needs sim-ilar ongoing assessment. In many regards, assessment in counterinsurgencyis more difficult than BDA, given that many outcomes discussed above arefar less tangible than the number of tanks or planes destroyed in combat.

Conclusions and implications for NATO in Afghanistan

Civil/military counterinsurgency assessments are obviously a veryimportant—and sometimes neglected—part of the planning process. Whileimportant metrics of population security, winning “hearts and minds,” andmeasures of normalcy are applicable to virtually any counterinsurgency cam-paign, depending upon the situation some issues will be more important thanothers. Although Afghanistan has not been discussed here, a comparisonbetween the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences is warranted. In Afghanistan,a large part of the counterinsurgency campaign is concerned with theopium/poppies problem and transitioning Afghan farmers to other, legitimate,cash crops. In Iraq, on the other hand, the drug trade is not a pressing prob-lem. As noted elsewhere,25 not all counterinsurgencies are the same, and lead-ers must tailor the assessment process to fit their particular situation.

Therefore, the assessment process must be flexible to coincide withthe evolving nature of the conflict. As Counterinsurgency notes,“Assessment…design can be viewed as a perpetual design-learn-redesignactivity.”26 Even if thoughtful and well-planned, assessment metrics can andshould change as time passes. In late 2006, for example, measures of pop-

25 See, for example, Christopher Schnaubelt, Ph.D., “Lessons from Iraq: New White House Must FaceCost of Afghan Fight” Defense News, February 8, 2009, athttp://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3938404

26 U.S. Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, December 2006, p. 4-6,available at http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf

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ulation security and safety were key concerns for civilian and military lead-ers in Iraq, as there was an average number of 100 civilian deaths every day.By early 2009, a time when population security was far better,27 measuresof normalcy and government legitimacy have risen in importance.

In many ways, gathering data and information in Afghanistan—par-ticularly via polls—will be far more complicated than in Iraq, for at least twoimportant reasons. First, Iraq had a number of educated, mostly university-based, survey statisticians who could be contracted to conduct pollingthroughout the country. Given Afghanistan’s relative lack of higher education,finding sufficient numbers of staff qualified for polling may be a substantialchallenge. Second, Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain makes polling difficultin certain areas of the country. The former issue makes international pollingexpertise all the more important, although there will still be a reasonablysteep learning curve for the dozens of survey interviewers who would beneeded to staff any significant polling effort. In terms of the second issue,polling managers will need to weigh the value of having nationwide coveragein Afghanistan against the cost of interviewing relatively small populations.Some surveys solve this problem by only polling major population areas. Ifsuch an operational decision is made in Afghanistan, the results should benoted as such. In short, neither of these issues is insurmountable, but they doinsert complications into the gathering of important data and information.

In closing, Albert Einstein reportedly had a sign in his office oncethat read, “Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everythingthat can be counted counts.” While data and quantitative metrics can be ofgreat aid for civil/military planning and analysis on both tactical andstrategic levels, they are not a universal remedy and cannot give insightinto all that is important in a counterinsurgency environment. Only arobust mix of qualitative and quantitative data, atmospherics, and discus-sions with key leaders and local residents alike can adequately describe theoperating environment necessary for planning and policy.

27 Robert H. Reid, “Iraq is Doing Better, But the Future is Still Shaky” Associated Press, March 18,2009, at http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2009/03/iraq_is_doing_better_but_futur.html

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CHAPTER SIX

The Trap of Doctrine:The Perils of Evolution in the Face of Revolution

Alexander Alderson

The paper’s focus is counterinsurgency; “Those military, paramil-itary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions taken by theGovernment to defeat insurgency.”1 It will concentrate in particular on howthe British approach to small wars and insurgencies has evolved inresponse to often very revolutionary threats. The central argument it willdevelop is that British doctrine is the product of an evolutionary processwhich is logical and secure when held up against the many different typesof threat the Army has faced, sensible in terms of the size and capability ofBritish armed forces at the time, and relevant at the time to the defencepolicy of the day. It will examine the apparently intractable problem of pro-ducing doctrine for future operations from an essentially rearward-lookingperspective, and it will look at the issue of ‘for whom is the doctrine writ-ten?’

The publication of the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine inDecember 2006 prompted an upsurge in interest in what had been, untilthe post-invasion insurgencies gripped Iraq, a niche field of study, bothmilitary and academic. Field Manual 3-24 was the subject of much heatedcriticism before and after its publication. Edward Luttwak, Jeffery Record,Steven Metz and Steven Biddle raised concerns about its approach, the

1 Army Code 71749, Army Field Manual, Vol. 1 Combined Arms Operations, Part 10 CounterInsurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines), London: Prepared under the directionof the Chief of the General Staff, July 2001, p. A-2. Henceforth referred to as Counter InsurgencyOperations.

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cultural challenges it might pose the U.S. military, the relevance of theMaoist model which it appeared to address and its inapplicability to warsof identity rather than wars of ideology.2 Others, in particular Ralph Petersand Gian Gentile, remain stronger critics still, accusing the authors of FM3-24 of being politically correct, poor students of history and of threaten-ing the U.S. Army’s future warfighting capability by focussing on coun-terinsurgency.3 Whether all the criticisms were valid or not, the fact thatthey were raised highlights doctrine’s perennial problem: is the approach itputs forward relevant to the problem the armed forces face?

The purpose of this short paper is to examine what appears to bean intractable problem and to suggest ways to overcome it. The problem isthat doctrine is generally the product of an evolutionary process, yet thethreats it is intended to counter are revolutionary in purpose and character.Three assumptions need to be made before looking at the problem.

First, doctrine and strategy are not synonymous. Doctrine providesthe common baseline of understanding, and strategy is the translation ofnational policy into objectives to which national resources are allocated:what Art Lykke describes as the Ends-Ways-Means paradigm:

Strategy is all about how (way or concept) leadership will use thepower (means or resources) available to the state to exercise con-trol over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve

2 Edward Luttwak, “Dead End,” Harper’s Magazine, February 2007 pp. 33-42; Jeffrey Record, TheAmerican Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency, Cato Institute PolicyAnalysis Paper No. 577, 1 September 2006; Steven Metz, Rethinking Insurgency, Carlisle Barracks,PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2007; Stephen Biddle, “SeeingBaghdad, Thinking Saigon”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006.

3 Ralph Peters, “Politically Correct War: U.S. Military Leaders Deny Reality”, New York Post, 18October 2006, “In Praise of Attrition”, Parameters, Summer 2004, pp. 24-32, and “Progress and Peril,New Counterinsurgency Manual Cheats on the History Exam”, Armed Forces Journal International,144, February 2007; Lt. Col. Gian P. Gentile, “Eating Soup with a Spoon: Missing from the newCOIN manual’s pages is the imperative to fight”, Armed Forces Journal, September 2007; “The dog-mas of war: A rigid counterinsurgency doctrine obscures Iraq’s realities”, Armed Forces Journal,December 2007, and “Our COIN Doctrine Removes the Enemy from the Essence of War”, ArmedForces Journal, January 2008; “The Selective Use of History in the Development of AmericanCounterinsurgency Doctrine”, Army History, Summer 2009, pp. 21-35.

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objectives (ends) that support state interests. Strategy providesdirection for the coercive or persuasive use of this power toachieve specified objectives.4

Second, doctrine has three often conflicting functions:

a. It provides a military philosophy, capturing the enduringthemes of military experience on which an approach or amilitary method can be built;

b. It provides practical guidance, serving the needs of thepresent-day army by presenting best practice and layingout an approach relevant to likely threats and situations;

c. It has a predictive element, taking account of foreseeablefuture developments either in the operational environmentor in changes to an army’s equipment inventory or itsorganizations.

The third assumption is that to be useful, doctrine has to be read,understood, and applied appropriately to the problem faced as ‘the law isin the circumstances.’5 The British Army defined doctrine as “what istaught.”6 If the doctrine is not taught, and not understood, does an armytherefore have a doctrine?

No matter how rational doctrine may have appeared to be on theday it was published, and no matter how hard the doctrine writers may haveworked to capture best practice or the latest compelling theory, just aboutevery time it has been put into practice, some re-adjustment has beenrequired. There have been exceptions. In the Oman between 1970 and

4 Harry R. Yarger, “Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War College StrategyModel”, in U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume I: Theory of War andStrategy, 3rdEdition, Revised and Expanded, J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., ed., Carlisle Barracks, PA:Strategic Studies Institute, 2008, p. 43.

5 Remark attributed to US industrialist, Mary Parker Follett, quoted in John Kiszely, “The British Armyand Approaches to Warfare since 1945”, in Brian Holden Reid, ed., Military Power: Land Warfare inTheory and Practice, London: Routledge, May 1997, p. 202.

6 BMD, p.3.

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1976, the Special Air Service used British doctrine as it was taught, adjust-ed it to fit the circumstances and the result was a very successful cam-paign. Indeed, until the Staff College at Camberley merged in 1997 to formthe Joint Services Command and Staff College, the Oman, not Malaya,was proclaimed to be the textbook campaign. As Maj. Gen. Tony Jeapes,an Oman veteran, observed,

The Dhofar War was a classic of its type, in which everyprinciple of counterinsurgency operations built up over theprevious fifty years in campaigns around the world by theBritish and other armies, often by trial and error, wasemployed. It was probably only the third campaign afterGreece in the 1940s and Malaya in the 1950 and early1960s to be won against a Communist armed insurrection.7

In the majority of cases, however, they were described – smallwars, imperial policing, internal security, counter revolutionary warfare orcounterinsurgency – much more doctrine needed much more adjustmentthan might have been expected. Indeed, in some cases, for example Malayaand Kenya, totally new doctrine had to be written to meet the challenge ofthe day. Not surprisingly, given the effectiveness of pamphlets that result-ed (The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOM)8 and AHandbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations9), British doctrine formalized therole and importance of theatre-specific publications, coming to see themas “a vital supplement to doctrine ... [to] impart both understanding andinstruction concerning probable or existing operations ... within the the-atre.”10

7 Major General Tony Jeapes, SAS Secret War, London: William Kimber, 1980, republishedHarperCollins, 2000, pp. 11-12.

8 Director of Operations Malaya, The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, 1952, repub-lished with amendments1954 and 1958.

9 General Headquarters, East Africa, A Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations, Nairobi: TheGovernment Printer, 1954.

10 Army Code No 71451, Design for Military Operations - The British Military Doctrine, London:Prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff, 1989, Chapter 1.

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Trial and error helped to shape an approach which John Nagl characterizesas learning and adaptation.11 The British Military Administration inMalaya took two years from the start of the Emergency in 1948 to estab-lish a jungle warfare school, three years just to come up with an effectivecomprehensive campaign plan – The Briggs Plan – and four years to pro-duce doctrine for counterinsurgency in the form of ATOM. In NorthernIreland in 1969, the British Army got off to another poor start, as RodThornton highlights,12 but it did recognize almost straight away that its pre-vious experience, its training, and the techniques given in the pamphletsdid not cover the situation. Riot control with bayonets fixed, and buglessounding the warning for the crowd to disperse were simply not right forsoldiers on British streets. So the Army adjusted its tactics and madeadjustments in many other areas – organization, intelligence and surveil-lance, equipment, counter-IED, heliborne operations – with the result thatNorthern Ireland became part of the Army’s psyche: junior leadership,manoeuvre, surveillance, ‘hearts and minds,’ just as Iraq and Afghanistanwill become for the Army of today.

The problem is that doctrine, however well founded, is, to use JohnNagl’s expression, the trailing indicator of change.13 If the philosophicalovertakes the practical, and doctrine is too backward-looking, it should notbe too much of a surprise when the gap between theory and reality catch-es the practitioner out. What is it about doctrine that creates such prob-lems? Why is it that when doctrine is taken into the field we find it doesnot fit the problem we face? It is not as though these problems are new.Gen. George Erskine said in The Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations,a derivative of ATOM:

11 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya andVietnam, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, September 2005 (Second Edition).

12 Rod Thornton, “Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Months of the BritishArmy’s Deployment to Northern Ireland - August 1969 to March 1972”, Journal of Strategic Studies,Vol. 31, No. 1, February 2007, pp. 73-107.

13 Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, remarks at the US Army Soldier Heritage Center and Military HistoryInstitute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 19 October 2005.

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No one can forecast what future situation British forcesmay have to face at home or abroad. While each newthreat arises in its own context to present a fresh set ofproblems, there are certain operational principles thatremain valid for countering any type of insurgency... Theway in which these fundamentals are applied would haveto be adjusted to suit the particular circumstances, but it isapposite to note that the experience gained by the BritishArmy from previous counterinsurgency campaigns shouldnot be forgotten or overlooked when considering COIN...This is much more a book of ideas than a book of rules.14

Erskine’s point is still valid today. There has always been a need toadjust the doctrine in line with practice and that generally takes time.Clearly, in the interests of operational effectiveness, the sooner that learningand adaption process starts the better. A line also should be drawn betweentactics – what the soldier on the ground has to do – and the principles behindthe campaign of which the soldier is a part. Nevertheless, however much wetry to ameliorate matters, the root cause of the problem remains: how cansomething that is rooted in the past be useful in the future?

One answer may be to keep doctrine general. That is, after all, howBritish doctrine started out. Its very first doctrine, Field ServiceRegulations,15 published in 1909 by the newly-formed General Staff – Col.Douglas Haig was their proponent – laid out general principles for the con-duct of war. As Hew Strachan notes, when it came to small wars, or‘Warfare in Uncivilized Countries,’ the emphasis was on modifying, not onreplacing, the principles of warfare. Oddly, despite the considerable cam-paign experience of all those involved in writing it – South Africa, India,Afghanistan – it could only offer self-reliance, vigilance, judgement anddiscipline, as pre-requisites for what it described as “overcoming the diffi-

14 General Headquarters, East Africa, A Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations, Nairobi: TheGovernment Printer, 1954, foreword.

15 General Staff, War Office, Field Service Regulations Part I: Operations and Part II: Organizationand Administration, London: HMSO, 1909. Hereafter FSR.

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culties inherent in savage warfare.”16 Those old regulations may have beenwritten one hundred years ago but their author recognized an absolute con-stant: the need to adapt to the circumstances: “unless officers and men are... capable of adapting their action to unexpected conditions, and of beat-ing the enemy at his own tactics the campaign will be needlessly long andcostly.”17

It would be wrong to think that Field Service Regulations were theArmy’s only doctrine. A hundred years ago, rather like today, it had hun-dreds of training pamphlets and it was those, and books such as CharlesCallwell’s Small Wars, that kept the young officers primed; plus, of course,like today, their experience. As Ian Beckett highlights, FSR were not thesole source of information in these specialist areas. FrancisYounghusband’s Indian Frontier Warfare (1898), C. Miller Maguire’sStrategy and Tactics in Mountain Ranges (1904), the Indian Army’sFrontier Warfare (1900, later expanded in 1906 to include bush fighting),W. C. G. Heneker’s Bush Warfare (1904) and W. D. Bird’s Some Principlesof Frontier Mountain Warfare (1909) contained the collected lessons fromthe campaigns at the end of the nineteenth century and provided an exten-sive informal doctrine for operations against irregular enemies. It was tothese publications that officers turned for detailed guidance and could bal-ance internal and external ‘doctrinal’ influences.18

Looking back through British doctrine four important changes canbe identified, each being a response to things that had happened not nec-essarily as the result of identifying likely future developments. The firstsignificant change to British doctrine came immediately after the FirstWorld War and the establishment of the principle of minimum force. Thepost-war gloom and economic depression threatened widespread civilunrest. The Russian Revolution reverberated around Europe and the

16 FSR Part I, 1909, p. 171.17 Ibid. p. 171 Emphasis added.18 Ian F. W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, Guerrillas and their Opponentssince 1750, Oxford: Routledge, 2001, pp. 35-36.

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Army’s response was to clarify its role in domestic disorder in a little booktitled Duties in Aid of the Civil Power.19 The driving force behind it was theneed to make sure soldiers knew what they could and could not do in thelight of Gen. Dyer’s at actions at Amritsar in India as well as the rebellionin Ireland, 1919-1921.20 Whether Dyer was in the spirit or the letter of thelaw to shoot on protestors was not the point. The Hunter Commissionwhich investigated said he was wrong and the Government response wasunequivocal:

The principles which have consistently governed the policyof His Majesty’s Government in directing the nature, andthe methods employed in the course, of military operationsagainst a foreign enemy, may be broadly stated as theemployment of no more force and destruction of life than isnecessary for the purpose of forcing the enemy to subduehimself to the Military Commander’s will. This principlehas governed their policy still more rigidly when militaryaction against enemy non-combatants is concerned; a for-tiori it is, and His Majesty’s Government are determinedthat it shall remain, the primary factor of policy whenevercircumstances unfortunately necessitate the suppression ofcivil disorder by military force within the British Empire.21

The British philosophy for the use of force in wars among the people hasnot changed: minimum force applies. What is noteworthy about its impo-sition was not the decision but what prompted it. Although it may make

19 War Office Code 1093, Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, London: The War Office, 1923. Reprintedwith amendments in 1937 and 1945.

20 On 13 April 1919, General Dyer ordered soldiers to open fire on some 10,000 unarmed men, womenand children who were protesting in Amritsar in the Punjab. 400 were killed and over 1,200 wound-ed. The massacre resulted in martial law being imposed; Dyer was relieved of command and mil-lions of moderate Indians became nationalists. It marked the turning point in Indian nationalist pol-itics. Dyer thought his actions would create the right impression and thought it his duty to keep fir-ing until the crowd dispersed.

21 National Archive, CAB/24/105, Indian Disturbances. Conclusions of the Indian DisordersCommittee, 6 May 1920, p. 2.

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perfect sense in terms of not antagonizing the population among whichmilitary operations take place, ‘just war theory’ and Human Rights legis-lation, the government’s decision had nothing to do with the threat a sol-dier faced. In fact, it was the reverse: the policy said that, almost irrespec-tive of the threat soldiers faced, they could only use the force needed tobring the situation under control and no more. The principle of minimumforce was quite clearly a response to what happened, not what was likelyto happen in the future.

As it transpired, Minimum Force served the Army of the inter-waryears very well, as Hew Strachan and Rod Thornton note.22 It was such animportant factor that Gen. Charles Gwynn, a redoubtable former comman-dant at the Staff College, Camberley, and a notable author, made it theunderpinning principle of his book Imperial Policing, published in 1934.23

And it is in Imperial Policing, and its official counterpart Notes onImperial Policing,24 that it is possible to get a feel of what had beenrequired of the Army and to see a clear division in thinking. On the onehand the Army had doctrine for suppressing unlawful assemblies and riotsat home. On the other, and much more likely, there was doctrine for restor-ing law and order in the dominions and empire. The domestic doctrine –Ireland excepted – was there just in case.

For campaigns in foreign fields, the doctrine for imperial policingwas rooted in the absolute belief that the forces of law and order wouldprevail, and that any uprising would be dealt with firmly, indeed even puni-tively. Here the doctrine is telling. Although it has all the key themes thatwe currently regard as important – for example, the concern for the rule oflaw, minimum force, co-operating with the local police, the need for goodintelligence – the doctrine offers no clue, or even shows any interest in whytribes might revolt, or why widespread civil disorder might occur. Nor did

22 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p.169; RodThornton, “Historical Origins of the British Army’s Counterinsurgency and CounterterroristTechniques” in Theodor H Winkler, et. al., eds., Combating Terrorism and Its Implications for theSecurity Sector, Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, June 2005, pp. 26-44, p. 16.

23 Major General Sir Charles W. Gwynn, Imperial Policing, London: Macmillan, 1934.24 War Office Manual 1307, Notes on Imperial Policing, London: HMSO, 1934.

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it give any impression that those reading the doctrine would have any inter-est in the underlying causes either, whatever such underlying causes mightbe: religious, racial, ethnic, nationalist or separatist. All these tensionsexisted when the doctrine was written but the underlying message itoffered was that right would prevail and that wrong-doers would be defeat-ed, then and for the foreseeable future. Against such an assumption, therewas no need to think about adaptation, learning or development.

All this had to change after the Second World War, which servedas a catalyst to ferment many of the underlying problems that the doctrineignored and which Gwynn’s Imperial Policing recounts.25 In Malaya, forexample, the Communist Party, which was the insurgency from 1947, hadbeen fomenting trouble since the 1920s. In Palestine, the Arab revolt in1936 spawned the Jewish self-defence militias which then fought theBritish administration after the war. The seeds of discontent were therewell before the post-war rise of anti-colonial communism and revolution;those on the ground may have spotted them; but those writing doctrine didnot. Doctrine in the inter-war years served the notion of returning the sit-uation to the status quo ante.

The second important change came in 1949 with the publication ofImperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power.26With communist rev-olutions sparking around the world, doctrine now included a detailed assess-ment of the threat and the acknowledgement that insurgency and revolutionwere politically motivated. To counter such politically-motivated threats, itwas at last recognized that this needed a political solution. Doctrine writersresponded, lifting their sights from the tactics of riot control or punitive raidsto put forward a much more sophisticated approach. This required very closeco-ordination between the civil authorities and the security forces, police-ledintelligence operations, and an increased emphasis on psychological warfareand counter-propaganda. All this should sound very familiar because it was

25 Gwynn’s campaigns included the Punjab, Waziristan, Peshawar, Cyprus, and Palestine.26 War Office Code 8439, Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, London: The WarOffice, 1949.

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the essence of an approach which has yet to be challenged as a method orfully implemented. The doctrine of 1949 drew together for the first time allthe threads of counterinsurgency that we recognize today: a co-ordinatedcross-government, unified plan; sound, integrated intelligence; tactical adapt-ability; recognition of the psychological dimension; and the need to securethe population and isolate the insurgent.

The question doctrine does not answer is why should that model ofpolitically-led counterinsurgency work elsewhere? Here is the doctrine’s signif-icant weakness: the strengths of the plan developed in Malaya by Briggs, gal-vanized by Gen. Templer, and espoused by Sir Robert Thompson may havebeen self-evident in the context of Malaya but those strengths could only berealized if a future civil administration could recognize both the strengths andthe fact that the doctrinal model fitted new circumstances. Generations of Armyofficers were taught the value of the Briggs/Templer/Thompson model at StaffCollege, but why should politicians or civil servants, who are not familiar withthe notion of ‘doctrine’, either know about, or still less resort to an approachrecognized by the Army as best practice and fixed in time in history?

The third major change was for doctrine to crystallize the princi-ple of ‘Separating Insurgents from Their Support.’ This appeared in the1960s in Keeping the Peace.27 A government’s first move had to bring thepopulation back under its control and given effective security. This wouldisolate the enemy from the rest of the community by disrupting all his con-tacts, and allow the security forces to maintain a continual attack on theperiphery of the enemy organization to eliminate the rank and file and toopen up opportunities for deeper penetration. With this in place, the nextimportant step would be to use an information campaign to “drive a wedgebetween enemy elements and the people and to develop resistance to thepolitical ideologies of the former.”28 But most importantly it would help toincrease the people’s confidence in the government.

27 War Office Code 9800, Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power), Part 1-Doctrine,London: The War Office, 1963.

28 Keeping the Peace, 1963, Part 1, p. 66.

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The fourth change was to take account of the whole political-socio-economic problem posed by revolutionary warfare. In 1969, theArmy published Counter Revolutionary Operations.29 For good reason thisis an exemplar of the ‘trailing indicator of change’ argument. The princi-pal issue was its inclusion of the tactics used in Aden – that bloody andpoisonous campaign which ended in 1967 – and to enshrine them as bestpractice. Some would make the argument that the wrong lessons fromAden were dropped in; it said nothing about supporting the Aden ArmedPolice in terms of intelligence, and, despite the Aden references, overallthat 1969 manual smelled too much of the jungle for some commanders.It is here that we find the references to troops fixing bayonets and advanc-ing on demonstrators, and the use of buglers and banners to order crowdsto disperse.30

The drawbacks of mass arrests, tear gas and armoured cars to dealwith widespread rioting quickly became apparent. On 5 December 1969,Lt. Gen. Sir Ian Freeland, GOC Northern Ireland, held a working group toexamine and discuss the very considerable problems that crowd control,escalation of force, the gap between CS gas and opening fire and publicrelations posed in Northern Ireland. Interestingly, in terms of understand-ing doctrine and the application of best practice, the study period agreedthat “winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ [was] as vital as winning the tactical bat-tle.”31 The real doctrinal progress was, however, the realization that the aimof counter-revolutionary operations was not purely a matter of soldierskilling insurgents.” Although it does not hint at just how difficult thatmight be, it asserted that counter-revolutionary operations must first con-tain and then eradicate the insurgent movement and its subversive supportorganization, after which they had to “rectify any political and socialwrongs.”32 The inference is clear and fundamental to the notion of a polit-

29 Army Code No 70516 (Parts 1 and 2), Land Operations Vol. III, Counter-Revolutionary Operations- Part 1 General Principles, and Part 2 – Procedures and Techniques, London: by Command of theDefence Council, 1969. Henceforth Counter-Revolutionary Operations

30 Ibid.31 Minutes of a Study Period held by Lt. Gen. Sir Ian Freeland, KCB, DSO, GOC Northern Ireland, 5Dec 69, Upavon: TDRC, 00456, p. 33.

32 Counter-Revolutionary Operations, 1969, Part 1, p. 41.

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ical rather than a military solution: successful counterinsurgency now nolonger meant returning to the status quo ante. Political change was a pre-requisite for successful resolution of the problem, and some form ofaccommodation would have to be reached between the protagonists.

Doctrine in 1969 established a much more broad-based approach tomilitary operations, and, following on from Sir Robert Thompson’s think-ing, introduced principles for government action: “The outstanding lessonfrom past revolutionary wars is that no single programme – political, mili-tary, psychological, social or economic – is sufficient by itself to counter adetermined revolutionary movement.”33 So the first requirement was for anational plan: passing emergency legislation to support the campaign;implementing political, social and economic measures to “gain popularsupport and counter or surpass anything offered by the insurgents;” settingup an effective organization to co-ordinate civil, police and military actionat all levels; establishing an integrated, national intelligence service, build-ing up the police and armed forces; and imposing whatever control meas-ures were necessary “to isolate the insurgents from popular support.”

Here the Army’s position gets drawn back into the difficult prob-lem identified about the Briggs/Templer/Thompson model; that it wasreally doctrine for a government response written by soldiers and pub-lished in Army doctrine. It may have been taught at Camberley, with policeand civil servants involved, but it was doctrine for the whole of govern-ment being advocated for and developed by the Army. In fact the doctrinepublished in the 1990s actually makes the point: “There has never been apurely military solution to revolution: political, social, economic and mil-itary measures all have a part to play in restoring the position of the civilauthorities. Furthermore, the military contribution although important isonly one element in the government’s reaction to the crisis.”34 And GeneralSir Frank Kitson recognized the point as well:

33 Ibid, p. 41.34 Counter-Revolutionary Operations, 1977, p. 37.

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The problem is more difficult because so many of the peo-ple who will be most influential in determining success orfailure are not in the armed forces at all. They are the politi-cians, civil servants, local government officials and police...[and] that may be in someone else’s country. It is difficult tosee how they can be prepared in advance to exercise theresponsibilities that will be thrust upon them...Service officers must be taught how to fit together a cam-paign of civil and operational measures: they must knowwhat is needed in terms of intelligence, and the law, and ofmoulding public opinion. Finally, they must be prepared topass their knowledge on when the need arises and go on agi-tating for suitable action until all concerned are aware ofwhat is required of them – or more probably until they aresacked for being a nuisance.35

The Briggs/Templer/Thompson model is about a politically-led,whole of government approach of which the military contribution is onepart. Military doctrine may address the needs of the military planner andthe military practitioner; however, all contributing parties should be famil-iar with the tenets of counterinsurgency if practice is to match the theory.The issue of political primacy and co-ordinated government machinery arecentral to effective counterinsurgency, certainly if concepts such as theComprehensive Approach are to have any campaign effect at all. LordAshdown has spoken of the need for such co-ordination in the context ofAfghanistan:

First we have to agree a strategy. Even the wrong one wouldbe better than what we have at present, which is none.Second we have to give whoever it is in charge of the inter-national effort the authority to bash heads together and co-

35 Lt. Gen. Sir Frank Kitson, Practical Aspects of Counter Insurgency, Kermit Roosevelt Lecture deliv-ered May 1981, Upavon: Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell: Annex A to DCinC 8109 dated 11 Jun81. Emphasis added.

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ordinate action, especially when it comes to internationalaid. Third, we have to link military action with our politicalaims. Lastly, we have to have priorities, and the ability toconcentrate on them.36

Gen. Sir Frank Kitson also offered a suggestion on how this mightbe achieved in a multinational setting in 1972. He asserted that the under-lying principle in such cases was that the ally’s needs should “always takesecond place to the host country.” In other words the sovereignty of thehost nation had to be respected and reinforced. He also provided fiveguidelines for the relationship between ally and the host government. First,“no arrangement will work unless that host country itself has a properlyordered system for prosecuting the war.” Kitson alludes to theBriggs/Templer/Thompson model. Next, the ally should be able to co-ordi-nate its aid through one individual who could represent it on the host coun-try’s supreme council to help formulate overall policy. Third, the ally need-ed to be represented at every level of government, “but always subordinateto the host country and in an advisory capacity.” Fourth, the key was fullco-operation between the host country and the ally and full integration ofthe full range of civil and military efforts. Finally, and specifically withcoalition operations in mind, Kitson identified that allied efforts must mir-ror all four guidelines and that “the various contingents must have a com-mon understanding of the problem.”37 The complex co-ordination, commu-nication and consultation necessary to achieve Kitson’s guidelines are onlyhinted at. Although no British doctrine writer subsequently developedKitson’s framework, it is evident that these remain relevant today.

So how can this process of evolution be summarized? In theorythe doctrine writer should take enduring principles and current best prac-tices, set them against the threats faced, and then write doctrine to dealwith them. The point is that all doctrine writers would reasonably claim

36 Rt Hon Paddy Ashdown, “After Iraq and Afghanistan- shall we ever intervene again?” The HandsLecture, delivered at Mansfield College, Oxford, 4 November 2008. Accessed at http://www.mans-field.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/Documents/pdf/Hands%20lecture%204%20Nov%202008.pdf37 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, p. 61.

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that is what they did. In this sense, the evolutionary process has served itsmilitary audience reasonably generally. It has produced a sound philoso-phy for counterinsurgency. It recognizes the political and psychologicaldimensions of the problem; the fact that there is no purely military solu-tion to it; and that security operations require excellent intelligence, judi-cious use of force, and effective communications with those in the theatreof operations, regional and international audiences, and those at home.

The challenge is to reduce the time lag by which doctrine trails thechanges that emerge in current campaigns, and to provide a framework ofprinciples that is robust enough to absorb change so that it remains rele-vant. The latest British principles for counterinsurgency provide such aframework: recognize the political dimension; employ co-ordinated gov-ernment action; develop and maintain an understanding of the cultural,social, and political situation, not just the military; secure the population;gain and secure popular support; operate in accordance with the law anduse minimum force, to integrate intelligence; and learn and adapt. Whilethese are all products of the evolutionary approach, despite inevitable cam-paign set-backs here and there, they proved their worth.

However, the principles are not the real issue. The important stepnow is to address the weakness that is inherent when the military is safe-guarding doctrine that is fundamentally about a political solution. The pres-ent trap of doctrine is not so much its evolutionary development, or the gen-erally rear-facing approach. Rather it is that the generally held doctrinalapproach of a broad-based, politically-led whole of government response toinsurgency is espoused largely by the military. In the period of withdrawalfrom empire, British colonial administrations could call on civil servantswho themselves had served in the armed forces. The world has moved onand today’s challenge is to institutionalize a whole of government approach,if necessary with doctrine, that not just the military espouse but the politicaland interagency communities understand and support as well.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

NATO and Counterinsurgency:The Case of Germany

Timo Noetzel and Martin Zapfe

In Afghanistan the NATO-led International Security AssistanceForce (ISAF) is challenged by an insurgency that is continuously growingin strength. By now it is evident that the operational core challenge forISAF in all of Afghanistan is to counter the insurgency. Germany has com-mand responsibility for operations in northern Afghanistan. The evidentoperational dynamic is putting pressure on the countries’ political leaders.Yet, there is deep reluctance to admit that efforts to keep the insurgency atarms length have failed and that by now even that part of Afghanistan forwhich Germany has had responsibility for the last few years is beingshaped by increasing insurgency activities.

However, if NATO is to fight a successful counterinsurgency cam-paign in Afghanistan it is crucial that the United States and its Europeanallies find consensus over strategy and operational focus. For NATO’s coun-terinsurgency effort in Afghanistan to be successful key European memberstates such as Germany will have to embrace the challenge presented by theinsurgency in Afghanistan. If European NATO members fail to rally aroundthe counterinsurgency challenge in Afghanistan it would result in anAmericanization of the war in Afghanistan and, subsequently, in a long-term weakening of NATO. Not least for this reason, Germany’s position oncounterinsurgency in Afghanistan is of great relevance to the alliance.

The article proceeds in three broad steps. First, the use of Germanforces in NATO operations since 1990, leading up to counterinsurgency in

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Afghanistan, will be discussed. Second, the strategic and operationalframeworks shaping the German (in)-ability to implement counterinsur-gency-practices in Afghanistan will be analyzed. Finally, the influence ofthe existing strategic and operational frameworks on operational practicein the context of ISAF will be discussed.

The article finds that Germany is likely to give up its insistence onconducting a stability operation in Afghanistan due to operational theatrechallenges in Afghanistan. However, this change in attitude from bottom-up and resulting reforms will be hampered by political factors that are, ifnot unique to Germany, then at least exceptionally influential in shapingand constraining German thinking on small wars.

The Cold War and post-Cold War legacy

Throughout the Cold War, the Bundeswehr, even more than otherWestern armies, was structured, equipped and trained solely for the pur-pose of defending Western Europe against invading troops of the WarsawPact. It was heavily armored and mechanized to provide forces for the inte-grated operational command of NATO. The army was structured for thepurpose of delaying, outmaneuvering and eventually overpowering aSoviet tank assault force on the battlefield. Naturally, this went along witha conventional strategic and operational mindset, drawing lessons fromWorld War II, the Korean War or the Yom-Kippur-War that could serve asexamples for the kind of operational challenges to be expected.

Since the end of the Cold War the Bundeswehr was first deployedin the context of an unarmed humanitarian assistance mission in Cambodiain 1992. This was followed by the deployment of a logistical support unitarmed only for self-defense to Somalia in 1993 as part of a UN peacekeep-ing force.1 In 1994 a Federal Constitutional Court ruling declared German

1 See Richard Connaughton: Military Intervention and Peacekeeping. The Reality,Hampshire/Burlington 2001, p. 117.

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participation in multinational military operations legal. Since then theBundeswehr has been active in missions in the Balkans under a range ofdifferent mandates with Bundeswehr soldiers deployed under classicpeacekeeping mandates as neutral forces meant to separate hostile fac-tions. The German participation in the Kosovo air campaign to stopSerbian atrocities provides the only exception to this. The followingground force move under the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mandate into theprovince was then nearly unopposed and thus in accordance with theGerman operational paradigm that its forces were being deployed as neu-tral enforcers of UN-mandates.2

The Afghanistan-operation

This paradigm slowly began to crumble with the German willingnessto join the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan beginning inWinter 2001/2002. Germany sent Special Operations Forces to fight againstthe Taliban and al-Qaida in combat roles. Subsequently, Germany becameone of the largest troop contributors to the subsequently initiated ISAF-Operation. The German army provides the third-largest contingent, taking theNATO command located in the country’s northern region (RC-North).3 Inaccordance with the paradigm that its forces act as neutral mandate enforcersthe official view in German politics always has been and remains so thatGerman troops in Afghanistan only conduct a stabilisation and reconstructionoperation as part of the UN-mandated efforts to re-build Afghanistan. Theassumption in Germany remains principally that the Bundeswehr continuesto support civilian development efforts in Afghanistan.4

The conduct of offensive operations was to remain a task forNATO allies assigned to conduct operations in other parts of Afghanistan.

2 See Timo Noetzel/Martin Zapfe: Aufstandsbekämpfung als Auftrag. Planungsstrukturen für den ISAF-Einsatz, Study of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs 13, May 2008, p. 7.

3 See http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf (accessed on June 30, 2009), p. 2.4 See The German Federal Government: Das Afghanistan-Konzept der Bundesregierung, September2008, p. 9.

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Since the heartlands of the insurgency are in the south and east of thecountry this approach was feasible at first. Northern Afghanistan remainedcomparably stable and the threat potential to ISAF soldiers was low whencompared to the rest of the country. The Bundeswehr was conducting low-intensity operations only. With the deterioration of the security situationsince 2007 this has changed. As a result, German forces have been part ofcomplex and frequently offensive military operations of some variety.

However, neither at the strategic nor at the operational level has theBundeswehr been structurally prepared for the conduct of operations to count-er an insurgency movement. The core reason for this is that insurgencies con-stitute challenges that may not be defeated by posing a neutral force posture.

Generally speaking, an insurgency constitutes an armed rebellionagainst a political order. The strategic aim of the rebellion is to coerce theindigenous population to shift sides. The long-term goals can range frommaintaining state-free uncontrolled local spaces to overthrowing a nation-al government by way of subversion and armed conflict.5 The range of tac-tics used can include propaganda, riots, kidnappings, guerrilla warfare,and attacks on infrastructure such as roads or water supplies, but also con-ventional operations known from regular warfare. By now all of these canbe observed as features of the conflict in Afghanistan. Inevitably, strategic aim of counterinsurgent forces has to be to prevent thedefeat of the challenged political order. Therefore, he has to concentrate onmaintaining the existing government’s power and legitimacy judged by thestandards of the indigenous population. This is the strategic and opera-tional challenge for Germany and NATO in the context of ISAF.

For the last two years German ISAF forces have faced a generaldownward trend in security6 due to increasingly organized and aggressiveinsurgent activity. Instability has been growing and the number of direct

5 This definition is based on the corresponding paragraph in United States Government InteragencyCounterinsurgency Initiative: U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, January 2009, p. 2.

6 See Wachsende Gefahr im Norden Afghanistans. Auch zivile Helfer werden immer öfter Ziel vonAnschlägen, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 21, 2008.

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attacks has increased sharply. Insurgent forces in northern Afghanistanhave intensified their attacks on ISAF in both quantity and sophistication,increasingly relying on complex, multi-phased ambushes that combineimprovised explosive devices, small arms and rocket propelled grenades.7

The growth of violence in the north is a development that is under-mining the German consensus about the country’s participation in ISAF.The gap between the German politics about ISAF in both Brussels andBerlin on the one hand, and daily operationals routines and challengesGerman commanders are facing in the conflict theatre on the other hand, isgrowing day by day.8 To acknowledge the deteriorating situation in the con-flict theatre would contradict the politics of the last few years: the politicalmessage has been that the low-profile and indirect approach adopted byGerman forces in northern Afghanistan had prevented the manifestation ofa credible insurgency movement. To now admit a deterioration of the secu-rity situation due to continuously growing insurgent activity would carrythe message of failure. It would require recognition of the failure of a par-ticular politico-military strategy concerning post-conflict stabilisation.

Regardless of political rhetoric in Berlin, on the ground Germancommanders reacted to the deteriorating security situation in northernAfghanistan by applying a range of measures aimed at enhancing Germancombat effectiveness. For the last two years, paratrooper units trained forcounter-guerilla warfare have been deployed on a permanent basis tostrengthen the garrisons in Kunduz and Mazar-e-Sharif. At the same time,Special Operations Forces9 have been conducting special reconnaissanceoperations and, more recently, direct action operations aiming at insurgentleaders as well.10 Parallel to this development, the Ministry of Defense’s

7 See Angriff auf Bundeswehr war militärisch geplant, in: Der Spiegel, April 30, 2009.8 See Timo Noetzel/Benjamin Schreer: Missing Links: The Evolution of German Counter-InsurgencyThinking, in: RUSI Journal 154, February 2009 1, pp.16-22, p. 17f.

9 The German Special Operations Forces include the German Army’s Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK)and the German Navy’s Kampfschwimmer, see: Timo Noetzel/Benjamin Schreer: Spezialkräfte derBundeswehr. Strukturerfordernisse für den Auslandseinsatz, Study of the German Institute forInternational and Security Affairs 26, September 2007, p. 13.

10 See KSK-Soldaten setzen Taliban-Führer fest, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 8, 2009.

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doctrinal branches have initiated the drafting of an initial basic field man-ual for counterinsurgency. Thus, military leaders have begun to accept thechallenges originating from the insurgency and have adopted counter-measures both in the field and at ministerial desks. However, neither interms of institutional strategy-making capabilities, force structure nor,indeed, the state of doctrine is Germany prepared to conduct counterinsur-gency operations. These factors are inhibiting a more flexible pattern ofoperational conduct.

Institutional strategy-making capability for counterinsurgency

Institutional strategy-making capability manifests itself at two lev-els. First, it is about military command and control capacities to lead expe-ditionary operations. Secondly, its dimension extends beyond the militarydimension of operations and into government’s capacity to execute a‘whole of government’ approach. In the context of counterinsurgencyoperations this dimension is particularly crucial because of the vital impor-tance of a comprehensive strategy to counter an insurgency successfully.For this to happen it is necessary to better integrate military and non-mil-itary government bureaucracies and instruments for the purposes of oper-ational planning. Germany vehemently stresses the need for NATO tostrengthen its comprehensive approach to military operations. The Germanconcept of Vernetzte Sicherheit11 or ‘networked security’ constitutes theGerman version of the comprehensive approach. Yet, this consensus onnetworked security does not extend beyond political rhetoric. Institutionalreform efforts have not been initiated.12

11 Networked Security („Vernetzte Sicherheit“) is the German equivalent to NATO’s-“comprehensiveapproach”, see Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: Weißbuch 2006 zur SicherheitspolitikDeutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr, p. 25.

12 It should be noted that even NATO members which are fully imbued with counterinsurgency doc-trine and define their operations in Afghanistan as such, e.g. the U.S. and U.K, have difficulty imple-ment whole-of-government efforts. See Christopher M. Schnaubelt: “The challenge to operational-izing a comprehensive approach,” in Operationalizing a comprehensive approach in semi-permissiveenvironments, NDC Forum Paper Number 9:http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=79 (accessed on July 18, 2009).

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Neither has there been a sustained and structural effort at enhancing thefirst dimension of institutional strategy-making capability: during the ColdWar the Bundeswehr was developed into a territorial defense force firmlyintegrated into NATO. Therefore the German Ministry of Defense did nothave its own national command and control apparatus at strategic andoperational levels. If the Warsaw Pact would have attacked, operationalcontrol over the Bundeswehr would have immediately been handed over tothe integrated command and control structure of NATO. In the wake of the continuous increase of participation in multinationalmilitary operations beyond NATO-territory since the end of the Cold War,the Bundeswehr built a decentralized command structure to lead the indi-vidual services, i.e. army, navy and air force, in deployments. The resultwas a fragmented military command structure enhancing the inherentdynamic of institutional rivalry between the services. A fragmented struc-ture can also be found at the level of inter-ministerial co-operation. Theboundaries of authority among those ministries that have some stake inoperations such as the one in Afghanistan are hard to overcome, thusresulting in unending institutional rivalry and a permanent lack of co-oper-ation regarding civilian contributions to military operations. The GermanGovernment thus lacks a strategic decision-making centre to integratepolicies and to formulate strategy. Authority over the making of strategy isdiffuse. Institutional space for strategic decision-making is absent and thedevelopment of an interministerial whole-of-government approach to mil-itary operations remains an illusion.

Whilst at the interministerial level institutional reforms remainillusionary for the time being, at the intra-ministerial level of the GermanMinistry of Defense there has been at least some development. The estab-lishment of the Joint Commitment Staff13 in 2008 directly addresses theissue of the fragmentation of ministerial strategy-making capabilities ofthe German Ministry of Defense. Its establishment is a direct reaction tothe recognition that institutional capabilities for operations such as thosein Afghanistan were lacking. The staff unit comprises nearly all opera-

13 Einsatzführungsstab.

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tionally relevant units of the Ministry of Defense under direct control ofthe Generalinspekteur. Overarching aim of this institutional reform was toimprove decision-making procedures between the leadership of theMinistry of Defense, Civilian Ministries and Parliament; thus, the aim wasto improve inter-agency coordination in Bundeswehr operations and toweaken the boundaries of authority among the different ministries con-cerned with the Afghanistan-operation. For this purpose the JointCommitment Staff combines civil and military capacities for militaryoperations.

The reform was intensely contested within the Ministry ofDefense and constitutes a crucial step towards developing capacities foroperations with a wide operational spectrum such as counterinsurgency,but the lack of interministerial reform to enhance interagency co-operationremains a greatly inhibiting factor for the conduct of counterinsurgency inAfghanistan.

Force structure for counterinsurgency

With the introduction of new Defense Policy Guidelines by thegovernment of then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in 2003 the governmentdeclared its ambition to prepare the Bundeswehr for expeditionary opera-tions.14 Derived from the Defense Policy Guidelines, the Konzeption derBundeswehr was a new conceptual document developed in 2004. Its mainpurpose was to translate the Defense Policy Guidelines into transforma-tional force planning. A tier-based force structure consisting of ‘interven-tion forces’, ‘stabilisation forces’ and general ‘support forces’ was intro-duced. The aim was to provide mission-oriented categories of forces tocover the entire operation spectrum from low-intensity stability & recon-struction missions to high-intensity combat operations. Those forcesassigned to the intervention forces were to consist of 35,000 soldiers andmeant to provide the German contribution to the EU Battlegroups and theNATO Response Force. Forces assigned to the stabilisation forces would

14 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, Berlin, May 2003.

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be employed in low to medium intensity conflicts for longer periods oftime. The stabilisation forces would consist of 70,000 soldiers. Operationalcapabilities for counterinsurgency operations thus should be expected tocome from the stabilisation forces.

However, the boundaries between the categories are fluent, and inoperational reality soldiers of both the intervention and the stabilisationcategories serve in Afghanistan. Finally, a 137,500 support forces were toprovide force enablers, logistics and other joint capabilities for opera-tions.15 The force structure outlined in the Konzeption der Bundeswehr wasto be implemented by 2010.16

It is a national political prerogative that the Bundeswehr is only toparticipate in multinational military operations. For this reason the armyleadership can confine itself to provide contingents structured andequipped for operational scenarios without having the need to establish“one size fits all” armed forces.

Despite this generally mission-oriented force posture, what hasbeen lacking is the development of specific capabilities for complex oper-ational spectrums, specifically in the realm of stabilisation operations. Forinstance, the development of specific capabilities for counterinsurgencyoperations has remained a neglected aspect of force structure reform. Asthe ISAF-mission makes evident, the German army is critically short ofcapabilities that are essential to the successful conduct of counterinsur-gency operations. For instance, highly trained combat infantry in the armyhas been cut down to only 17 operational light and mechanized infantrybattalions since the end of the Cold War.17 Security Force Assistance units

15 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: Konzeption der Bundeswehr, Berlin, August 2004.16 See Konzeption der Bundeswehr, p. 27; Timo Noetzel/Benjamin Schreer: All the Way? The evolutionof German military Power, in: International Affairs 84 (2), March 2008. pp. 211-221.

17 The infantry of the German army consists of 1 battalion of light infantry, one battalion-sized regi-ment of airmobile infantry, 4 battalions of paratroopers, 3 battalions of mountain infantry plus 8 bat-talions of mechanized infantry. While the latter are technically part of the armored forces, they areemployed primarily in their infantry role. In addition, the air force provides 2 and the navy 1 lightinfantry battalion in security roles.

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have become crucial capabilities; however, in practice they are created ad-hoc from various units. Capabilities to provide commanders with politicaland cultural advice do exist but have not yet been developed structurally.Furthermore, the force structure is hampered by the demands of compulso-ry conscription. Current force planning fits 37,300 draftees into an overallforce of about 250,000.18 Since the majority of regular draftees cannot besent out-of-area, the deployment of whole battalions, regiments and brigadesprovides huge difficulties, even though draftees are not expected to serve indeployable combat units Despite the fact that draftees can volunteer toextend their compulsory service in order to participate in out-of-area mis-sions, the “hybrid” force structure of the Bundeswehr, combining compulso-ry and voluntary elements, hinders the sustained deployment of well-trainedtroops that would be ideal for counterinsurgency environments.

Additionally, the Bundeswehr also lacks vital technological platformssuch as tactical air mobility, close-air support assets and unmanned sur-veillance capabilities. Bureaucratic resistance against providing resourcesfor counterinsurgency capability is evident. The result is that Germandefense planning remains focussed on large military platforms for conven-tional warfare.

Doctrine for counterinsurgency

German forces deployed in the context of ISAF are demandingdoctrinal innovation. The relevant core army document when analyzingdoctrine for the Afghan operation still is the basic Army Field ManualTruppenführung von Landstreitkräften. The field manual touches uponaspects of small wars without addressing involved issues of counterinsur-gency explicitly. It states that field commanders need to be prepared tocope with sudden changes in the intensity of conflict and the concomitanceof symmetric and asymmetric threats within a narrow area of operations.19

18 See Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: Weißbuch 2006, p. 145.19 See HDV 100-100 Truppenführung von Landstreitkräften, No. 12010-12014.

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The need for forces to cover a wide operational spectrum and to be pre-pared for both combat and – simultaneously – close co-operation withcivilian governmental and nongovernmental organizations is stressed.However, despite the adoption of operational paradigms such as the“Three-Block-War”20 concept, the manual’s greatest weakness remain itsroots in operational scenarios of the Balkan wars, from Bosnia to Kosovo:the tactical leader is presented with a range of potential tactical proceduresto adopt – namely offense, defense, delay, and stabilisation - that are to beapplied according to the relevant context without elaborating what the con-sequences would be.21 In effect, this is a “Balkan-centric” framework ofdoctrine.

Considering the relative stability of the Balkans theatre and cultur-al similarities between intervening force and the indigenous population,the result is an inherent danger of leaving forces unprepared for the cur-rent mission in Afghanistan and future deployments ahead. Indeed, themanual does not provide an overarching paradigm that advises Germantheatre commanders on how to operate within a scenario other than onedominated by stabilisation. It does not discuss the character of differentmanifestations of irregular warfare and small wars in depth, but restrictsitself to a discussion of tactical phenomena like operations against irregu-lar forces22 or convoy-security.

Equally deficient is the December 2005 document,‘Einsatzkonzept Operationen gegen Irreguläre Kräfte’, which deals withoperations against irregular forces and which remains of relevance toGerman Army thinking. The core issue here is that according to this doc-ument, in German army thinking, operations against irregular forcesresemble an equivalent to the concept of counterinsurgency. However,there is a consequent focus upon the kinetic part of military operations andan evident disregard for the non-kinetic dimension. To underline this, oper-

20 See Charles C. Krulak: The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War, in: MarinesMagazine, January 1999.

21 See HDV 100-100, No. 12011.22 Operationen gegen Irreguläre Kräfte.

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ations against irregular forces are assigned exclusively to the paratrooperbrigades that are specialising on irregular warfare.

Thus, German doctrine presents parts of the puzzle but fails to putthem together to form a whole picture. As a result, crucial aspects and ele-ments of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency that are discussed sepa-rately are not conceptually integrated. What is lacking is a comprehensiveassessment of the situations theatre commanders could potentially face ina counterinsurgency conflict environment, something which would enablethem to formulate an adequate commander’s intent. Overall, German doc-trine still breathes the spirit of stabilisation operations that are – generallyspeaking – less complex than counterinsurgency scenarios.

Parts of the military leadership of the Bundeswehr have acknowl-edged that there is a conceptual gap in doctrine. In 2008, work was initiat-ed on a new basic doctrine for counterinsurgency operations, with the pur-pose of initiating debate on the issues involved. The overarching aim ofthis effort was to draw conclusions concerning the capabilities the servic-es would require for such an operational spectrum. As of June 2009, thedraft of this document is still in the ministerial process of approval.

The document Konzeptionelle Grundvorstellungen zurWahrnehmung militärischer Aufgaben im Rahmen von Counterinsurgency(KGv counterinsurgency)”23 is largely based on the respective NATO doc-trine.24 The document acknowledges that counterinsurgency operationsshould be expected to constitute a crucial part of the Bundeswehr’s futureoperational spectrum. To give reasons for this, it discusses characteristics,dynamics and functions of known insurgencies and, by dint of that, drawsconclusions for the counterinsurgent. Thus, it aims at providing the tacti-cal leader with an understanding of the challenges he potentially faces. Itfollows Allied and U.S. doctrine in placing the population at the heart ofevery strategic, operational and tactical effort,25 but focuses exclusively on

23 ”Conceptional Basic Thoughts Concerning military Efforts in the Framework of Counterinsurgency”.24 See AJP 3.4.4 for Counterinsurgency.25 See KGv Counterinsurgency, p. 10.

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kinetic means, largely leaving aside non-kinetic means. Not least this isdue to the fact that civilian ministries did not participate in the process ofdrafting the manual combined with strong opposition amongst Germanpoliticians against the Bundeswehr performing genuine “civilian tasks”.The overall tendency is to officially stress the crucial importance of civil-ian means within military operations while at the same time civilian effortswithin the context of military efforts become under-resourced and intera-gency conceptual thinking remains tightly constrained.

To structure the military options available to the tactical leader, thedocument distinguishes between efforts to build a secure environment,efforts to enforce an operational aim, efforts to neutralize a threat, and sup-porting efforts.26 Within these four fields of military action, theBundeswehr has to be prepared to take defensive, offensive and supportive(for example humanitarian) action. Under the category of efforts to sup-port operations the paramount factors listed are: military intelligence, theshaping of the information environment and civil-military cooperation toimplement the comprehensive approach jointly with civil actors. Hence,interministerial cooperation with various governmental actors such as theForeign Ministry and the Ministry for International Development isstressed as crucial.

Once approved, the document will constitute a first and importantstep towards giving the Bundeswehr a conceptual understanding of chal-lenges provided by counterinsurgency scenarios and introducing appropri-ate terms for doctrinal and conceptual debate. The second major contribu-tion will be the identification of necessary capabilities the armed forceswill have to build to confront these challenges. As it is, German doctrinestill lacks a realistic and overarching conceptual discussion of the poten-tial operational spectrum of warfare, from peacetime operations to high-intensity warfare. Thus, as it is, overall German doctrine still differs fun-damentally from the counterinsurgency doctrines of allies. These stress the

26 Ibid., p. 14.

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crucial role of population security, the political nature of operations, andassume that all force elements engaged in the theatre of operations shouldoperate under the framework of a strategic approach guided by counterin-surgency principles. Such an approach stands in sharp contrast to currentGerman army thinking as discussed.

In summary, it can be said that the framework provided by strat-egy-making capabilities, force structure, and doctrine is aligned in amanner that prevents German armed forces from conducting counterin-surgency operations effectively. Recent reforms in a range of fields areindicating a willingness to tackle this issue, but for the time being theexisting framework will greatly impact upon strategic and operationalthought. This has great influence on German operational conduct in thecontext of ISAF; a lack of integrated lines of operation, low risk toler-ance and a generally defensive mindset of operational leaders are keyfactors constraining operational thought.

The lack of integrated lines of operation

The state of German doctrinal thinking, including doctrine underdevelopment, hints at a difficulty doctrine poses for the making ofGerman strategy. Doctrinal thinking constrains itself to issues concerningthe use of force in the framework of counterinsurgency operations.Indeed, both the development of non-kinetic capabilities and the integra-tion of civilian and military capabilities at the strategic level remainunderdeveloped. This is due to the development of doctrine being anentirely intra-ministerial process, and first and foremost, a lack of inter-est by civilian ministries in getting involved in issues at the strategic level.What results is a startling discrepancy between German political rhetoricand operational conduct. Civilian ministries refrain from engaging onoperational issues regarding the Afghanistan conflict. ISAF is an opera-tion that is led and conducted by the German military. The concept of“networked security” so persistently advocated by German politics asproviding the key to a successful conduct of the Afghanistan operationdoes not in fact extend much beyond rhetoric.

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The division of military and civilian spheres of strategic and opera-tional thinking had not been problematic throughout the Balkan wars. Inthese kinds of operational scenarios the military could concentrate on secur-ing a permissive environment so that civilian ministries could initiate andguide reconstruction efforts. However, such an approach remains illusionaryin the context of a counterinsurgency operation since such an operationrequires civilian and military efforts to be conducted simultaneously ratherthan sequentially, and to be integrated rather than coordinated. German civil-ian governmental actors lack the personnel and capabilities to operate in hos-tile environments. Thus, they are basically incapable of contributing effec-tively to counterinsurgency operations which in effect are “contested nation-building”27operations in which the provision of basic public services in theface of pressure from insurgents is paramount. With regard to the deteriorat-ing security situation in ISAF Regional Command-North, it is unlikely thatcontributions by civilian actors will increase. De facto, the Bundeswehr isleading this operation in the face of declining civilian contributions to theoperations, naturally emphasizing the security-related line of operation.

Low risk tolerance

Post-Cold War Germany has become accustomed to its armedforces contributing to military operations without having to suffer a signif-icant number of combat fatalities. However, even forthcoming Germandoctrine admits that forces deployed for counterinsurgency purposes willhave to reduce standards of force protection and accept risks for deployedunits in order to be able to achieve a certain level of population protection.Neither German politics nor the German public have been prepared for thisover the last few years. This is in part due to the ongoing insistence byGerman policy makers to view the ISAF-mission through a stability andreconstruction prism: a pattern of operational conduct that is associated inGermany with low-risks for deployed soldiers.

27 See John Frewen: Contested Nation-Building: The Challenge of Countering Insurgency inAfghanistan in 2007, in: Australian Army Journal, Vol. V/1, Autumn 2008, pp. 19-37.

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As a result of this, encounters with insurgent forces in Afghanistanare nervously observed by parliament, government and the wider public.These factors lead to a strict and paramount risk-averseness and no-casu-alty-policy which regularly hampers operational flexibility, turns Germanforces into armored and thus road-bound units and limits operational pres-ence beyond bases. However, only by taking an offensive mindset andforce posture will the deployed forces be able to continuously maintain sit-uational awareness and to regain the initiative.

Defensive operational mindset

Counterinsurgency operations generally require restraint in theapplication of lethal force and an emphasis on a highly discriminate man-agement of violence by the counterinsurgent. Civilian victims amongst thepopulation the counterinsurgent is intended to protect directly underminesupport in the local population as well as in the home country of the inter-vening force.

However, to protect the population a constant presence, aggressivepatrolling, and a proactive operational scheme are, inter alia, paramount.A defensive mindset with a focus on force protection risks alienating thecounterinsurgent from the population because such an approach isolatesthe population from the intervening forces and permits easier access byinsurgents. Furthermore, a population-centric approach has, depending onthe overall situation, to be supplemented with discriminate offensiveaction against identified leaders and members of the insurgency. InGermany, such operations would belong to the operational spectrum ofSpecial Operations Forces, Long-Range-Reconnaissance elements andsupporting paratrooper units of the airborne brigades.

In recent years an offensive force posture, however, has been ham-pered principally by a defensive mindset that derives from the above-men-tioned focus on force protection, but also from political considerations.Until summer 2009, German soldiers in Afghanistan were allowed to use

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lethal force only very restrictively. They were unable to act preemptivelyor to stop an individual from escaping custody by use of force. The defen-sive mindset has been established also as a derivative of the post-Cold Warstabilisation operations Germany has participated in, in which multina-tional forces principally had to remain neutral. In classic stabilisation oper-ations, force presence alone has a sufficient impact on the overall mission.However, in counterinsurgency operations, in the interest of enduring suc-cess, the paramount issue of protecting the population has to be supple-mented by the ability to discriminately use force. Against the backgroundof operational challenges, the pressure of German field commanders hasresulted in operational improvements from bottom-up. In mid-2009,German Rules of Engagement have been adjusted to the new operationalrealities, allowing the Bundeswehr to act offensively before an insurgentattack unfolds and to execute the mission.28

Operational conduct: the case of Harekate Yolo II

Over the last two years the security situation in northernAfghanistan has deteriorated continuously. Beginning with a suicide attackon German soldiers in Kunduz in May 2007 attacks have increased inquantity as well as quality.29

When Taliban-related insurgents massed in the north-western provinces ofFaryab and Badghis, the German ISAF Regional Commander-North,Brigadier General Dieter Warnecke, launched Operation Harekate Yolo II.The operations’ aim was to reinforce military control over the area so thatreconstruction programmes could be initiated in the interest of long-termstability. With this aim the operation marked a crucial change in ISAF’spattern of operational conduct from patrols that focused on gathering intel-

28 See Neue Regeln erlauben Deutschen offensiveres Vorgehen, in: Der Spiegel Online,http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,634338,00.html (accessed on July 8, 2009).

29 See Northwestern Afghanistan: Badghis province seeks security, revitalization, in: The Long WarJournal, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/northwestern_afghani.php (accessed onJune 30, 2009).

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ligence and enhancing the security of ISAF’s bases in the north towardscounterinsurgency “clear, hold and build”30 operations.

In the RC-North region, criminal groups with linkages to theinsurgency had attacked Afghan National Security Forces repeatedly,resulting in heavy casualties amongst them. For months indigenous peoplewere exposed to terror perpetrated by those groups. The Afghan govern-ment was unable to provide security. Sections of the so called ‘Ring Road’,which is a lifeline for the Afghan business sector and increasingly of rele-vance to ISAF logistics and supply lines, came under the control of thosegroups. Intended to destroy and disperse insurgents and re-establish gov-ernment control, the operation was the first large-scale ground offensiveunder German command since World War II. Supported by German forceenablers such as logistics, reconnaissance and medical evacuation units,the main combat element was provided by the Norwegian Quick ReactionForce.31 Harekate Yolo II was a success in that it succeeded in weakeningthe insurgency militarily. This success would have allowed RC-North toinitiate civilian reconstruction programs in these areas.

The operation succeeded in dispersing insurgents, but failed in thetwo succeeding phases. Harekate Yolo II was cut short due to politicalnervousness that it would become too large-scale in its strategic and oper-ational dimensions. Strategic support for economic reconstruction effortsand a quick infusion of development aid did not materialise; this despitethe operation commander setting out ambitious and unambiguous targets.The goal was to defeat insurgents militarily and then to provide security sothat civilian reconstruction programs could be applied. However, politicaland strategic support for the operation never materialised. Civilianresources remained unavailable and tight operational restrictions wereimposed. Effective interagency coordination in the context of HarekateYolo II remained an illusion; this being a result not only of the absence of

30 Thomas X. Hammes: Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks, in: Military Review, July-August2006, pp. 18-26, p. 24.

31 See NATO bittet Berlin um Eingreiftruppe in Nordafghanistan, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,January 30, 2008.

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effective coordination mechanisms between military and civilian actors inthe field but also of an unwillingness on the part of government bureau-cracy at the strategic level to recognize the changing nature of conflict.32

In addition, political and strategic leaders neglected the commu-nicative dimension of the operation. It was passed over in astonishingsilence by the Federal Government, including the Ministry of Defense,about the reason for it, its aim and its achievements. Quite the reverse,politicians and defense leaders resorted to downplaying its significance.

As an overall result of all these deficiencies, the operation failedto prevent the insurgents from reasserting their influence in the long term.Forces were withdrawn from north-western Afghanistan with the end ofcombat operations in 2007. In the wake of this the insurgency reassertedcontrol over the area.

This fact notwithstanding, Harekate Yolo II marked the beginningof a new phase in Germany’s involvement in ISAF. Afghanistan hasbecome a “hybrid warfare”33 scenario, in which enemy forces use a varietyof tactical means within the same area of operations, combining an “asym-metric” approach relying on improvised explosive devices of varyingsophistication, roadside bombs and suicide attacks with conventional bat-tles and proficiently coordinated ambushes. In the face of such challenges,the strategic and operational mindset of stabilisation operations becomesuseless. Furthermore, it would be even dangerous to cling on to it, as itwould inherently provide ground for an underestimation of the enemy andcontinued overemphasis on a neutral force posture relying on deterrentpresence alone.

32 See Timo Noetzel/Benjamin Schreer: Counter- What? Germany and Counter-Insurgency inAfghanistan, in: RUSI Journal 153, February 2008 1, pp. 42-46, p. 45.

33 Frank G. Hoffman: Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict,in: Institute for National Strategic Studies: Strategic Forum, No. 240, April 2009, p. 5.

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Bottom-up planning: the case of Kunduz

More successful than top-down approaches out of the political andmilitary bureaucracy have been efforts to introduce elements of counterin-surgency by piecemeal from bottom up. Such elements have been intro-duced reactively due to the deterioration of the security in Kunduzprovince, which is in the centre of northern Afghanistan. As the rest of thenorth the area is shaped by a non-Pashtun population, thus there is notmuch breeding ground for the insurgency. However, there are small vil-lages at the fringes of the city itself populated by the main tribe support-ing the insurgency in Afghanistan. These have a tradition of being Talibanstrongholds34 and provide sanctuaries for the organisation of attacks onISAF forces. The German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team Kunduz hasfaced repeated rocket attacks for the last eighteen months and patrols havebeen ambushed with the German army suffering combat fatalities throughsuicide attacks, roadside bombs and enemy fire.

German military leaders have reacted to the deteriorating securitysituation by strengthening capabilities, addressing all lines of operations.Capabilities to conduct patrols and to support Afghan security forces car-rying out house searches have been strengthened. In particular, SpecialOperations Forces have been inserted into the area for special reconnais-sance purposes against the insurgency network. Simultaneously, para-trooper units were sent to strengthen the combat capabilities of the Kunduzgarrison. In addition to troop enforcements, a range of structural measureswere implemented to rearrange force posture and thus to regain momen-tum. A broader force presence concept in the province with some “combatoutposts” in the wider vicinity of Kunduz garrison was designed to providethe ground for a sustained counterinsurgency effort. This change of forceposture was identified as necessary in order to enhance force presenceamongst the Afghan population and to provide ground for more effectiveSecurity Force Assistance efforts to build up Afghan security forces; in

34 See A Nation Challenged: Stronghold; Taliban Foes say Kunduz is Theirs, in: The New York Times,November 26, 2001.

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addition, a focus on non-kinetic instruments was perceived as crucial aswell.

Thus, a different concept of force presence that would move unitsout of the garrisons and strengthen force presence amongst the indigenouspopulation constituted the basis for the operation. Conceptually, this con-stituted a crucial step because it meant that military commanders werewilling to assume risk and reduce the high levels of force protection aswell as stringent medical and logistical standards for deployed forces inorder to gain more presence amongst the contested population. This wasseen as necessary in particular in order to enable theatre commanders todispatch patrols to districts threatened by the insurgency. The overnightpresence of infantry units in these districts was meant to demonstrate thatISAF forces are there to protect the indigenous population against nighttime insurgency activities, which, for instance, often resulted in the fearedTaliban “night letters”35.

Efforts to strengthen capabilities for the build-up of Afghan secu-rity forces have been driven by the same motivation. More recently,German forces have bumped up their efforts through combined operationsand patrols with Afghan forces to build-up Afghan security forces. Forceintegration as an instrument to strengthen indigenous capabilities was acompletely novel concept for an army such as the Bundeswehr that has nei-ther experience with nor capabilities for Security Force Assistance efforts.However, within the context of the ISAF operation it has become more andmore significant as an operational instrument. The introduction of struc-tured meetings by ISAF representatives with local leaders, so called “key-leader engagements”, certainly was the most innovative factor. To haveeffective meetings requires detailed planning and a suitable supportiveapparatus to provide intelligence on the “human terrain”36 and deduceguidance that has not yet been provided within the structures of the mili-

35 Thomas H. Johnson: The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters), in:Small Wars and Insurgencies, Volume 18/3, September 2007, pp. 317-344.

36 Fred Renzi: Networks: Terra Incognita and the Case for Ethnografic Intelligence, in: MilitaryReview, September-October 2006, pp. 16-23, p. 16.

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tary leadership of the operational contingents. In the same context, thechanging approach towards the use of military patrols was motivated bythe increasing valuation of non-kinetic activities. Patrols increasingly aremeant to contribute to development efforts. Tasked to identify possibledevelopment projects for so called Provincial Development Fund projects,i.e civil-military funds for on-site projects controlled by various ministrieswith German representatives and Afghan bodies deciding jointly on the useof the funds, the use of patrols indicated a change in operational thinkingand a willingness to reform. The initiation of key-leader engagements,Provincial Development Funds and changes in the purpose of patrols pro-vide evidence of the recognition that non-kinetic capabilities can be crucial.

Conclusion

Operational experiences of the German armed forces in northernAfghanistan make evident that the Bundeswehr is no longer conductingonly stability and reconstruction operations, but has been confronted atleast since 2007 with a determined, organized insurgency capable ofinflicting serious casualties on German troops and determined to challengethe existing Afghan political order. Still, soldiers are fighting in an opera-tional environment that is markedly different from what has been political-ly anticipated. This critically hampers the Bundeswehr’s response.However, as operational experiences of the last two years show, the pictureis nuanced and complex. Because of these experiences, debate within theGerman strategic community has started about the ability of Germanforces to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

At the strategic level German politics have maintained the viewthat the operational focus is on stability and reconstruction and not oncounterinsurgency. While artificial at first glance, the distinction has hadgreat strategic, practical and policy relevance for the German conduct ofoperations in Afghanistan and is of significant relevance to NATO’s abili-ty to agree on a joint counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan. If a key

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European ally like Germany remains unwilling to politically acknowledgethe challenge presented by the insurgency in Afghanistan and the necessi-ty for the alliance to counter it as whole, NATO will remain unable to makethe strategy that the situation demands.

The deteriorating security situation of the last few years has forcedGerman operational commanders to adopt measures that practically leadthem to cross the “counterinsurgency versus stability-operations” nexus onthe ground. However, efforts are hampered by a narrow institutional, doc-trinal and force posture focus that is shaping German strategic thinking; aframework based on the oversimplifying dichotomy of stabilisation opera-tions as opposed to more obvious war efforts. This also greatly impacts onGerman operational thought and conduct in the context of ISAF. However,ongoing efforts to improve institutional strategy-making capability anddevelop adequate doctrine for counterinsurgency are crucial indicators ofa willingness to learn and adapt, at least in some parts of the armed forces.For various reasons, Germany is to this date unable to formulate and exe-cute a truly comprehensive approach acknowledging the challenge of con-tested nation building – and not just nation building. Thus, adaptation tothe operational challenges of small wars in general and progress in theAfghanistan operation in particular will be gradual.

In the short term, Allies will need to accept the limitations of Germanresources and capabilities as well as an inadequate strategic mindsetregarding the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Yet, operationalpressure on the ground generating bottom-up innovation presents the mostlikely mechanism to initiate change in German politics regarding coun-terinsurgency.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

Local Security Forces:Lessons for NATO in Afghanistan

Daniel Marston

“COIN is labour-intensive, and the recruitment of auxiliaries is oftenessential to enable an overstretched army and police to focus on offen-

sive operations against the insurgents.”

General Sir Frank Kitson1

As the focus on operations in Afghanistan intensifies, Coalitionforces are examining what is needed to conduct an effective campaign.One idea that is receiving considerable attention is the establishment oflocal security forces to supplement the role of the Afghan National Army(ANA). The crucial question is: what kind of local security force? Shouldit be a “tribal” militia raised from the local elders; a more formal, tribally-based militia raised with support from the Afghan government and led andcommanded by Coalition forces and raised with coalition funds; or a trib-ally-based militia that is raised by the ANA? Whatever the answer, we needto be careful and slow in developing this force, to make sure there is prop-er Afghan government and local buy-in with the program and that it issomehow linked to the overall strategy of clear, hold, build. Accordingly,this article delves into selected case studies of local security forces and thesystems created to raise them.

1 General Sir Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, (London: Faber & Faber, 1977) pp. 294-5.

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Locally raised irregular forces have been a “force multiplier” inCOIN operations throughout history. As Drs G. Hughes and C. Tripodirecently noted, “success [in COIN] depends upon the mobilization of localsupport for the government against the insurgency. . . .[A] common featureinvolves the counter-insurgent’s attempts to enlist indigenous participation,either from surrogate actors or from an array of auxiliaries.”2 This has beenparticularly true for forces raised to deal with a frontier or border region.They provide HUMINT to military and political masters, and the hostnation provides the local population with jobs and esprit de corps. Onecould make the argument that without them, at least initially the host nationwill most likely fail in its mission to prevail, on the basis that it will not havesufficient regular security forces to protect normal civil and civic life.

Some practitioners feel that the ANA’s current ethnic makeup isnot sufficiently representative of the Pashtuns in RC East and South. OneCanadian officer’s impressions are that: “It appears that the support of theANA by Pashtuns, at least in terms of their willingness to join the army, isnot being formally monitored. . . . It stands to reason that the overall legit-imacy of the ANA is doubted by the Pashtuns, whose support for one sideof the campaign or the other is deemed by some to be key to long term suc-cess. It appears that the design of the ANA is not seen as legitimate orviable by the Pashtuns. . . . One must question the initial analysis anddesign process upon which the ANA is built.”3

Major General Jeapes4, a British officer and veteran of Dhofarwho helped to raise the Firqa, provides a concise summation of the chal-lenges and benefits of local forces:

2 See Geraint Hughes and Christian Tripodi’s ‘Anatomy of a surrogate: historical precedents and impli-cations for contemporary counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism’, Small Wars and Insurgencies,Vol 20, No. 1 March 2009, for more of an overview of other case studies; p. 22, as well as WillClegg’s ‘Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency Warfare’, in the forthcoming volume of SecurityChallenges.

3 Interview with a Canadian officer, 2009.4 Major General Tony Jeapes’ excellent book, SAS: Secret War, or earlier published title SAS: OperationOman, (London: William Kimber, 1980) should be required reading for any future team of officersand NCOs serving with irregulars in Afghanistan or beyond.

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It takes a great deal of patience, understanding and tol-erance to deal with irregulars. Given those qualities, andtreated with fair and reasonable firmness, irregulars canbecome an invaluable adjunct to a regular army. TheFirqats provided information on the ground, the people,and the enemy which could not have been obtained inany other way. . . . The Firqats’ understanding of groundand their speed of manoeuvre were both superior to SAF[Sultan of Oman Armed Forces] troops’, but when itcame to straight military tactics the SAF’s disciplinetold every time. The two forces were complementary;neither could have won the war alone.6

It is essential that the Coalition learns to understand the tribal andcultural network7 of the Pashtun community, particularly their potential inter-est in this sort of formation, which is likely to be motivated at least in part bythe possibility of economic gain and infrastructure investment in their areas.Raising the Firqa in Dhofar (1970-1976), and the Frontier Corps (1919-1947) and Guides, later the Punjab Irregular Force (1846-1886) on the North-West Frontier, each presented issues with tribal structures, specifically howbest to recruit and create formations along or against tribal structures.8 Weneed to understand these lessons intimately. We need to make sure that weprovide properly prepared training teams that will work hand and hand withthe local imams and tribal leaders to set out planning and training for theseforces. Units such as the UK’s 22 Special Air Service Regiment, Special BoatService, Special Forces Support Group (1 PARA), US Army Special Forces(3rd Special Forces Group)9, United States Marine Corps Special Operations

6 Jeapes, p. 231.7 Without it, how can western efforts be appropriately targeted to help build effective governance?8 The British officers who served in Guides and Frontier Corps were fluent in local languages, sinceserving in the Indian Army required fluency in both Urdu and any relevant local language such asPashtu. The officers and NCOs who served in the Firqa were also expected to have at least a basiclanguage proficiency in the local Dhofari language.

9 The US Special Forces had some success in the Vietnam War raising local security forces, as embod-ied in the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) and the Mobile Strike Forces (MIKE Force).There was one major issue of legitimacy and formal integration with the South Vietnamese govern-ment and security apparatus that we will need to avoid in Afghanistan.

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Advisor Group, US Navy SEALS, Australia’s Special Air ServiceRegiment, 4 Royal Australian Regiment (2 CDO), Special OperationsTask Group, Canadian Special Operations Regiment, or properlytrained American, British, Canadian and Australian officers andNCOs with an interest in this sort of role could be the answer to someof these issues.10

The use of US/UK and NATO special forces (SF) personnel wouldbe an important force enabler in the start-up phases of these forces. Whilethis has been a traditional role for US/UK SF over the last fifty years, thelast eight years and the role of “direct action” have muddied the waters abit in this mission. Many SF officers and NCOs feel that the raising andmentoring of these forces should be the primary mission of the SF com-munity, but they feel that there has been a push at the strategic planninglevel to use SF in “direct action” roles only.11

The Coalition will need to avoid some aspects of the Sons of Iraqapproach—which means Afghan buy-in, a slow building phase, and over-watch by the correct people to lead and train the forces. We need to be arisk-taking organization: accept that there may be setbacks (such asmutinies), and be ready to reform the system to deal with the changingenvironment. The historical vignettes below (Firqa, Frontier Corps,Guides and Punjab Irregular Force) document mistakes made, as well asmutinies. People learned and adapted organizations accordingly. There arelessons for the present from as far back as the efforts of the British on theNorth-West Frontier region of India in the 1850s to the more recent Firqain the 1970s. Militaries have been too quick to dismiss lessons from theBritish Imperial age, not realizing that many of the fundamental themesthat existed then are still relevant today.

10 If this role was taken seriously by the various NATO militaries, there are major personnel and pro-motion systems that would have to be dealt with to enable the selection, training and education ofthese officers and NCOs. This is one reason why many see US/UK/NATO SF personnel as a keyenabler as the training mission for local forces.

11 Interviews and conversations with US and UK SF personnel, 2006-2009.

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History provides numerous examples of both success and fail-ure in a study of locally raised forces.12 The essay will focus on theGuides and the Punjab Frontier Force, the Frontier Corps of the oldNorth-West Frontier region of present-day Pakistan and the triballybased Firqa from the Dhofar War.13 The essay will not discuss policiesor strategies developed for the North-West Frontier region or theDhofar campaign, but instead concentrate on the specific methodsemployed in raising and training local forces in the relevant regions.Such methods and systems are still relevant today, but would of courserequire some modif ication for the changing environments inAfghanistan and Pakistan.

12 The Regional and Popular Forces, MIKE Forces, CIDG program in the Vietnam War; Frontier Corpsin the Northwest Frontier; Firqa in the Dhofar campaign; Harkis in the Algerian War; Kikuyu HomeGuard in Kenya; and now the Sons of Iraq, to name a few. The lessons from Vietnam warrant theirown article.

13 The British Army’s counterinsurgency campaign in the southern Dhofar region of Oman is general-ly considered one of the most successful COIN operations of its kind of the twentieth century. TheBritish were successful working within an Islamic and Arab environment because they paid attentionto both the negative and positive lessons of previous campaigns. While British commanders mayhave led operations at times, they were still answerable to the Omani civilian leadership and hadalways to be aware of not looking at the operational environment through the prism of a ‘westerner’.The goals set by both the military and civilian leadership were tangible and worked out within therestrictive confines of a small military and limited civilian apparatus that had to be properly built upand supported over time. The military and civilian commanders understood that the war was for thesupport of the Dhofaris; listened closely to their grievances and demands; and met the challenges asthey arose. They did not set out to fundamentally change the indigenous society. See John Akehurst,We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman, 1965-1975 (Wilton, Salisbury, Wiltshire: M. Russell, 1982);Calvin Allen and W. Lynn Rigsbee, Oman Under the Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970-1996 (London: Frank Cass, 1998); Ian Gardiner, In the Service to the Sultan (Barnsley, UK: Pen &Sword, 2006); Tony Jeapes, SAS: Operation Oman, (London: William Kimber Publishing, 1980) formore in-depth discussion of the campaign.

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The Guides and the Punjab Irregular Force14 (1846-1886)

The formation of the Guides in the 1840s and the Punjab IrregularForce (Piffers) in the 1850s are key examples of British attempts to createviable security forces recruited from local populations as part of a largerstrategy to pacify a difficult region. The Guides and Piffers were createdto “police” the Pashtun tribal belt on the North-West Frontier. The templateused to create these forces, and the standards established as part of theirformation, were replicated in many other theatres, by many other com-manders, with varying levels of success.

A few British officers are familiar with the Guides and the Piffers,and their more traditional role within the Indian Army during the laternineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but their original formation anddirectives were quite different. Both forces were raised initially as“Irregulars,” and for the first few years dressed no differently than theirPashtun brethren. They were part of the civil administration, and com-manded by the lieutenant governor of the Punjab until 1886. They servedas guardians of the tribal regions, and carried out punitive raids. During theBritish presence on the frontier, the Guides and Piffers came to be knownas the experts in mountain warfare and dealing with the local Pashtun trib-al politics.15

In 1846, Sir Henry Lawrence outlined the roles that these forceswere intended to fulfill. He also stipulated that no Sikhs were to be recruit-ed initially, only Pashtuns, on account of ethnic tensions in the borderregions. He had other requirements for the Guides as well:

It was to contain trustworthy men, who could, at amoment’s notice, act as guides to troops in the field;

14 See Charles Allen, Soldier Sahibs (London: John Murray, 2000); G. J. Younghusband, Story of theGuides London: Macmillan, 1911), T. R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development ofFrontier Warfare (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), for further details.

15 During the same period, the US Army experimented with the formation of similar units as part of theIndian Wars in the American West. See Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Armyand the Indian, 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973), Chapter 3 for an in-depthexploration of attempts to pacify a region and the involvement of local auxiliaries in such an effort.

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men capable, too, of collecting trustworthy intelli-gence beyond, as well as within, our borders; and, inaddition to all this, men, ready to give and take hardblows, whether on the frontier or in a wider field.16

The Guides and Piffers recruited men and NCOs; the British recruit-ed native officers, predominantly from the Pashtun belt. Often they accept-ed men they suspected of being involved in lashkars (Pashtun raiding or warparties), both before and after their military service. This is a paradox thatrecurs in similar operations throughout history, up to the present: manymembers of the Guides and Piffers were former “enemies” who joined thecorps for a variety of reasons, including esprit de corps, money, and status.

British officers were seconded to the Guides and Piffers from theEast India Company initially, and later from the British Indian Army. Theofficers selected often had an interest in understanding the Pashtun waysor the Pakhtunwali code, or had fought Pashtuns previously and respectedthem as an enemy. Some British officers also sought service with theseforces because they were interested in more independence than they couldexpect in the “line regiments.” There were fewer European officers in theIrregulars, which gave British officers authority over larger numbers oftroops, greater autonomy, and more opportunities for advancement. Ofnecessity, the structure of these formations also meant that the concept of“Mission Command” was being put into practice well before the Germansand the Americans came up with the terminology.

The attached appendix includes extracts from “Frontier Thoughtsand Frontier Requirements”17 written by General Sir Henry Lumsden, theoriginal commander of the Guides, and a commander of the Piffers as well.His observations will be of interest to commanders contemplating theorganization of irregular auxiliaries for future operations.

16 Younghusband, p.6 .17 General Sir Peter Lumsden, Lumsden of the Guides, (London: John Murray, 1899), Appendix A, p.291.

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The Frontier Corps (1921-1947)18

The Frontier Corps (Scouts) had its beginnings at the end of the1800s in a group of tribal militias established by the British authorities topolice the “Pashtun” Tribal Territory, chiefly Waziristan.19 This area, whichwas distinct from the six districts of the North-West Frontier Province, wasin need of a force to serve as aids to the civil power. The Guides and thePiffers had been brought under the chain of command of the Indian Army,and thus had lost some of their autonomous ability and responsibility inthe region. The present-day Pakistan Frontier Corps is a shell of its formerself, because of neglect and the tensions on its northern and eastern fron-tiers with India.20

Within the Tribal Territory there were no taxes and no Indian PenalCode, and six British Political Agents (PAs)21 were responsible for keepingthe peace. In the early twentieth century, Lord Curzon, as Viceroy of India,tried to bring together the various militias under the command of a single

18 See Charles Chenevix Trench, Frontier Scouts (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985), Colonel H.R.C.Pettigrew, Frontier Scouts, (Selsey: privately published, n.d.) John Prendergast, Prender’s Progress(London: Cassell, 1979), General Sir Andrew Skeen, Passing it On (Aldershot: Gale and Polden,1934), John Masters, Bugles and a Tiger (London: Michael Joseph, 1956), and the official historiesOperations on the North-West Frontier of India, 1921-1935 and 1935-1937, for further details of spe-cific operations.

19 Waziristan has plagued and continues to plague both the Pakistan and Afghan governments, owingto the tribal makeup of the region. As stated in a report from 1921, “The character [Waziris andMahsuds], organisation and institutes have made them independent and strongly democratic, somuch so that even their own Maliks have little real control over the unruly spirits. Any man may riseby courage and wisdom to position of Malik, but many who have attempted in undue assumption ofauthority have been assassinated. It is these characteristics which make these tribes so much moredifficult to deal with and control from those which have acknowledged leaders and elders. Thus thedemocratic character of the tribes, especially the Mahsuds, has the disadvantage, from our point ofview, that these jirgas have little restraining influence over the more lawless elements and can there-fore not be said to be truly representative of tribal opinion, in other words a jirga can as a rule pro-duce no reliable guarantee that the terms accepted by them will be carried out.” British Library IndiaOffice Papers L/Mil/17/13/123 Waziristan and Lessons last 60 Years 1921.

20 The post-1947 period in Pakistan was marked by tension and war with India. Hence, many of the keysystems in terms of recruitment and officering of the Frontier Corps were allowed to lapse. It is onlyrecently that the Pakistan government has been willing to discuss the need for reform of the present-day Frontier Corps. However, its recent history means that reform is likely to be more complicatedthan simply improving weapons and communications.

21 District Officers.

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HQ, creating the Frontier Corps. Another significant reason was that

…the presence of the regular forces in Waziristan it isgenerally accepted, constitutes an irritant to the tribes andprovokes rather than ameliorates trouble. The fact thatthey are an occupying force militates against thetribesman notion of independence and that they are non-Pathan makes it difficult for them to appreciate the Pathanmind and can cause quite [an] upset [and] on [the] part ofthe troops incidents of considerable gravity.22

The Pashtun militias created in the region functioned with varyinglevels of success in the period leading up the Third Afghan War, 1919. Thisconflict highlighted some of the problems that the militias presented to theBritish authorities; in particular, some militiamen sided with their cross-border Pashtun brethren from Afghanistan, and attacked British and Indianoutposts along the frontier.

After the war’s end, the British authorities set out to reform theScouts organization into an effective force that they could rely upon to policethe region. A number of Frontier Corps units were reformed and re-raisedduring this period, including the South Waziristan Scouts, the Tochi Scouts,the Kurram Militia, and the Zhob Militia. The reform efforts includedimproving the selection of British officers, the organization of the tribalmake-up in the platoons and wings, and the gradual embodiment of espritde corps through battle with the militias’ Pashtun brethren. All of these even-tually combined to make the Scouts a sought-after posting for British andIndian commissioned officers and a force respected by the local Pashtuns.23

The Scouts were not soldiers in the normal sense. They were aforce under the control of civilians, the PAs of the Indian Political Service.

22 British Library India Office Papers L/Mil/17/3/46, Report of the Frontier Committee 1945.23 Something that has clearly been missing in the present-day version of the Frontier Corps in Pakistan. Itis not seen as a good posting by seconded Pakistan officers. Interviews with the Pakistan Army in 2000.

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(This is still true today in Pakistan, since they fall under the command ofthe Ministry of the Interior.) However, as with the selection of the officersfor the Frontier Corps, many have questioned the selection of the present-day PAs in Pakistan. The British PA relied upon the Scouts to supply himwith the means to provide security, maintain peace throughout the area,intelligence and work with the local Jirgas. They were a light infantryforce, commanded by seconded British and Indian commissioned officersfrom the Indian Army.24 They were organized along similar lines to the mil-itary: platoon and wings were among the main organizational terms. All ofthe recruits and, later, some of the commissioned officers were Pashtun.The main units of the British and Indian armies were placed outside thetribal region, except for Razmak, so as not to aggravate the situation bytheir presence, and to allow the Scouts and the PA the authority to main-tain order. One Scout officer described the force thus:

The Frontier Corps is a specialized force that deals in thefirst instance with the troublesome Pathan tribes along theNW Frontier. The soldiers are recruited entirely fromPathans. They therefore both understand the locals andtheir ways as well as being more acceptable to them thanthe regular soldiers from the British and Indian armies.25

The role of the Scouts was further elaborated in a major FrontierReport of 1945 that highlighted some key points:

In the Scouts and Militias the political authorities havetheir most effective weapon in the maintenance of law andorder. They are highly trained, lightly equipped and verymobile troops, officered from the Indian Army or second-ment and unit for unit are considerably cheaper to main-tain than the Regular Army. They are an embryo police

24 The chain of command went through the PA since ‘they were his sword’ with the tribes.25 British Library India Office Papers, Mss Eur 236 Major John Auret, Tochi Scouts.

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force of the tribal territories. Their duties include themaintenance of political control within the agencies, theprevention of raiding, safe guarding communications,protection of the country from both internal strife andexternal aggression, either alone or in conjunction withregular armed force. Their particular genius is that theyare recruited entirely from the Pathans and have advan-tages in local knowledge of the country and ready associ-ation with the people and possess an organisation welladapted to local requirements.26

During more peaceful times, the Scouts carried out frequentgashts.27 When there were larger-scale Pashtun uprisings, Indian andBritish army units were brought in for punitive expeditions to restorepeace. The Scouts provided the “main forces,” a light infantry force thatwas often better suited to dealing with frontier warfare, as well as usefulintelligence on the enemy’s intentions.

One of the most perplexing aspects of this Scouts force, as well aswith Pashtuns recruited for the Indian Army, was that the Pashtuns whoserved were from the same communities that were later on the receivingend of punitive action from the British authorities. Many people have triedto assess the reasons for this. Money was one inducement for recruits, butnot the driving force. Loyalty was not one of the key inducements either,as New Delhi was a faraway place and meant nothing to people along thefrontier (as Kabul means little to people today). Many historians and prac-titioners have pointed to izzat or nang (honor) as the primary incentive;this was also true for recruits to the old Indian Army. Veterans returned totheir villages with tales of gashts and fighting, inspiring envy and desireamong the young men listening. Following their arrival, many recruitstook as their primary loyalty the British and Pashtun officers who com-manded them; this was not allegiance to a central government, but to their

26 British Library India Office Papers L/Mil/17/3/46, Report of the Frontier Committee 1945.27 This term could be used to refer to a “patrol” or as a verb, e.g. to ghast for 25 miles.

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organization, esprit de corps. As one officer noted: “The discipline of theFrontier Corps appealed to the Pathan soldiers. It was hard and arbitrary,that is to say decisions were given with finality and authority but notfinicky. . . . But officers took endless trouble to get the real truth so thetroops had great confidence in fair dealing. . . . Genuine mistakes may begenerally forgiven but judgments made insincerely or with indifferencecause serious resentment amongst Pathans.”28

At the end of their term of service, men who had served were wel-comed back into their communities; their service was considered honor-able, partially because of the financial benefits to not only the serviceman,but also to his family and village. Recruits came from the tribes on bothsides of the Durand Line, as well as from the Pashtun tribes in the “settled”North-West Frontier province. The organization of the tribes varied fromone area to another. The commander of the South Waziristan Scouts in the1920s decided to maintain “tribal [companies].” However, wishing toavoid the mutinies of the Third Afghan War, the garrisons stationed at eachoutpost drew from various companies, from different tribes. The Britishauthorities believed that keeping the units heterogeneous would minimizethe threat of tribal bonding turning towards mutiny.

The recruitment of British and, later, Indian officers for the Scoutswas a key aspect of the reform. Many of the British officers who joinedfrom the 1920s through independence in 1947 did so for a variety of rea-sons. Some of the most important included the desire to see active dutyalong the frontier, and a strong liking for Pashtuns. As one Scout officernoted: “Why serve on the Frontier with a regular regiment, sitting in campbehind barbed wire, and never moving out except on regular piqueting rou-tine, when, instead, you can have the freedom of Scout life.”29 Officers hadmuch more freedom of command than in the Indian Army generally. Forexample, there were 14 British officers in the South Waziristan Scouts(SWS), who commanded more than 2700 Pashtuns. The SWS were divid-

28 British Library India Office Papers, Mss Eur 236 Major John Auret, Tochi Scouts.29 Trench, Frontier Scouts, p. 54.

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ed into a Corps HQ commanded by a Major (within the Indian Army thiswould be a colonel or brigadier); three wings (battalions) commanded bya Captain; the companies were commanded by a Subedar (Pashtun offi-cer), and the platoons by a Jemadar (Pashtun officer).

British officers were seconded to the Scouts for three to five years,and the rate of pay was considerably higher than in the regular IndianArmy. As the 1945 Frontier Report stated: “[The o]fficer cadre of theScouts and Militia [has] maintained a reasonably high standard in the past.Hitherto officers have been seconded from the Indian Army for periods offour to five years. Many often return to undertake a second tour of duty. ThePathan is especially responsive to good officering and the standard shouldbe maintained in the future.”30 Competition for an assignment in the Scoutsincreased in step with the role, performance, and visibility of the Scouts inthe 1920s and 1930s. An officer wishing to join needed to have a first-classreport from his regiment and some ability to speak Pushtu, a big part of thereason why many Scout officers came from the Piffers and other Pashtuncompanies from within the Indian Army.

A British officer who wished to be selected could meet these firstrequirements, but in order to gain final acceptance he was asked to visita Scout HQ and to spend time with a Scout formation, where he was vet-ted by the unit’s British and Pashtun officers. Many failed this last levelof selection. British officers were likely to be stationed along the Frontierwith their men for months upon months, without seeing or communicat-ing with other British officers or women. A great deal of responsibilityrested on their shoulders. They were not permitted to be married duringtheir first three-year tour. After completing a tour, officers would returnto their old regiments, where they would pass along their knowledge andexperience. Some officers would return to the Frontier Corps for a secondor third tour. Service with the Scouts was seen as a benefit, not a hin-drance to promotion.

30 British Library India Office Papers L/Mil/17/3/46, Report of the Frontier Committee 1945.

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Native or Pashtun officers (who were not commissioned) were thebackbone of the Scouts, as they were in the Indian Army. Their role is bestdescribed in the following extract:

All were men of immense experience and awesomeauthority, particularly in their own tribal platoons [with]whom they almost had a paternal relationship. They hadgained their commissions after not less than twelve years’service in the ranks. They knew inside and out the inter-nal economy of the corps; they knew exactly how to con-trol a gasht, place a piquet, conduct a difficult withdraw-al. They knew in dealing with tribesmen when to be tough,when to be flexible, when to be genial and when to bluff.Many were illiterate and intended to remain so. . . . [T]heywould cheerfully take orders from British officersyounger and less experienced than themselves. . . . But theBritish officer would be very unwise, both in problems ofman management and in the field, if he did not ask advice.. . . Race, language and cultural differences implied a cer-tain separation between British officers and Pathan offi-cers, but there was no feeling of social superiority on onehand and inferiority on the other. . . . Pathan society isessentially democratic, and this was reflected in the veryclose relations between British officers and Pathans whenthey were together in a small post for weeks on end.31

Firqa (1970-1976)32

The Firqa were a tribal levy that was created during the success-ful Dhofar campaign in Oman (1970-1976) to fight in the Jebel region.

31 Trench, Frontier Scouts, pp. 60-1.32 See Major General Jeapes, SAS: Secret War for a very detailed discussion of the initial issues of rais-ing a locally recruited force to be used as irregulars.

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The commanders, drawing on previous experience, understood that locallyraised and properly led auxiliaries or irregulars were key for success in termsof their ability to gather human intelligence (HUMINT), serve as a forcemultiplier, and hold cleared areas. As stated by a senior British officer in1972, “Firqats are central to the overall success of the campaign in Dhofar.”33

Dr Geraint Hughes has recently written: “with their local knowledge andtheir ability to fight the adoo on their own terms the firqat forces played animportant role in implementing the ‘clear and hold’ strategy that the Sultan’sArmed Forces (SAF) conducted from 1971 onwards to recapture the jebel.”34

However, as with all irregular forces, there were growing pains forthe British and Omani authorities. They were raising a force that manyBritish and Omanis initially did not trust, on account of the fact that theywere ethnically different from the SAF, who tended to be Arab andBaluchi. The Firqa were recruited from the Dhofari tribes. Another issuewas that many within the Firqa were “turned terrs” or Surrendered EnemyPersonnel (SEP). This has always been a key ingredient in successfulcounter-insurgencies.35 The first Firqa raised was a learning process. Thepersonnel were drawn from a variety of tribes and in the end the experi-ment failed due to a mutiny. As stated in 1971:

Firqa Salahadin—this was the first firqat that recruitedfrom many tribes and this caused issues as the tribes didnot want to fight together. Sixty men discharged from theFirqat and will serve in another firqat with the sametribe…. [F]uture firqats are to be recruited from one tribe.36

This outcome naturally raised questions about the Firqa’s role, butone British officer addressed these concerns as follows: “Far too manypeople condemn them [Firqa] out of hand without considering the good

33 General Graham papers, St Antony’s College, Oxford University, Middle East Centre (MEC), 9 Jan 1972.34 Geraint Hughes, “The Counter-Insurgency War in Dhofar, Oman,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol32, No 2, April 2009, pp. 283-4. The “adoo” were a guerilla movement in Oman.

35 There is one notable exception: the SEPs who formed the successful Rhodesian Selous Scouts. 36 General Graham papers, MEC, 27 April 1971.

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work they have done already and the important part they have yet to playin the campaign.”37

The British advisory mission provided some of the best of theBritish Army as four or five training teams for the Firqa, chiefly drawnfrom 22 SAS. The units were named British Army Training Teams(BATTs). The training teams also served in the field in battle with theFirqa, and provided other support in terms of medical, engineering andother non-military aspects, organized as Civil Action Teams (CATs). TheSAS teams had to learn quite a bit about the Dhofari character and tribalstructures as they started to recruit. The following excerpt highlights thesteep learning curve that took place during the initial stages:

It was my first experience of that Dhofari forthrightnesswhich in the early days was to cause some frictionbetween BATT and the firqats. In due course BATT cameto understand the Dhofari attitude, and the firqats came torealise that BATT were not a God-given goldmine to beexploited at every opportunity, but in the early days therewere misunderstandings. . . . The Dhofari tribal system,for all its faults, is possibly one of the finest examples oftrue democracy known to man. . . . Tribal leaders areelected on merit because of their personal virtues.Hereditary and class are meaningless; and even whenelected, the leader is by no means paramount; he mustconsult on everything he does and all major decisions arearrived at collectively after each man who wishes to do sohas had his say. . . . It took the SAS some time to under-stand this and Sultan of Oman Army Officers [manyBritish] never understood it. A disciplined tribal unit is acontradiction in terms. Discipline, in the military sensethat this is understood by a regular army, cannot possiblybe achieved when everyone in the army thinks he has just

37 Major RC Nightingale papers, Directorate of Intelligence, Oman, MEC, 15 July 1972.

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as much right to decide what is to be done as his leaders,and if he dislikes their decision feels free to take no partin the outcome. . . In the early days it was hard. BATT hadto try to build up the trust of the firqats and this could onlybe done by personal contact and immense patience. . . .Later . . . the trust between firqat and BATT had beenforged by fire. . The BATT commander was an adviser. Itwas a curious and often frustrating position to be inbecause he could advise but he had no executive authori-ty; he had to persuade the man with power to issue theorder. The advantage, however, was that whilst a person inan appointment of authority had defined limits to his workand tended to concentrate his mind upon the problemsfacing him within those limits, an adviser could lookacross the board and identify problems from outsidewhich an insider, because of his many other worries,might not always see.38

As the COIN strategy developed in Dhofar, many key enablerscame to the fore. The SAF was expanded slowly and carefully in terms ofBritish seconded and contracted officers as well as an Omani officer andNCO corps. The Dhofar reconstruction efforts were streamlined and bet-ter people were brought in to help facilitate the systems. The Firqa wereslowly expanded in regions that had been cleared and now were beingraised for the clear, hold and build phase. They were fully integrated intothe SAF command structure. The SAF and Firqa strategy is succinctly laidout in an excerpt:

A SAF operation in strength supported by a Firqat securesa position of the Firqat’s choice which dominated its trib-al area. Military engineers build a track to the positiongiving road access, followed by an airstrip if possible. A

38 Jeapes, pp. 51-8.

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drill is brought down the track followed by a Civil ActionTeam [who set up a] shop, school, clinic and mosque. SAFthins out to a minimum to provide security. Water ispumped to the surface and into distribution systems pre-pared by military engineers to offer storage points forhumans and troughs for animals. Civilians come in frommiles around to talk to the Firqat, SAF and Governmentrepresentatives. They are told that enemy activity in thisarea will result in the water being cut off. Civilians moveout in surrounding areas and tell the enemy not to inter-fere with what is obviously a good thing [they also provid-ed intelligence]. Enemy, very dependent on the civilians,stops all aggressive action and either goes elsewhere orhides. Tribal area is secure. All SAF are withdrawn.39

More and more Firqa were created as the clearance of the Jebelproceeded, from the east to the central area and to the west. More and moreSEPs came in from the insurgent ranks and joined the Firqa. As the wardeveloped, a specific command structure was created for the Firqa and les-sons learned were disseminated throughout the system. More and morewithin the SAF and the Omani government started to trust the Firqa as thewar progressed.

Over time and with the correct mentoring and support, many ofthe earlier issues dissipated and the mission became secure. By the end ofthe war, there were more than 3000 in the ranks. British officers in the SAFdescribed their impact thus: “Six reasons for success in Dhofar: 1. Firqats2. SAF occupation of Sarfait 3. Defence of Mirbat 4. Occupation of thedefensive positions on the Jebel 5. Iranian Army reinforcements 6. Humanintelligence.”40

39 Jebel Regiment, General Graham Papers, MEC, 31 September 197240 Lt Colonel Charles Chipworth Papers, Northern Frontier Regiment, MEC, 3 December 1978. Thereare many other reports within the General Graham papers highlighting the key role that the Firqaplayed in the pacification of the Jebel.

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Conclusion

As these case studies demonstrate, common themes recur throughthe history of local forces. The following internal report from the Dhofarcampaign dealing with the Firqa highlights some of these, particularlywhat is needed from the advisory mission:

It must be fully understood that it is not possible to cre-ate an instant army which will be successful. Time mustbe spent in selection and recruitment and care must betaken in establishing an adequate standard of recruit. . . .The most important factor in selecting an irregularindigenous force is to establish their true motive forfighting and to use this as bait as much as possible. In thisway a force will be created using its own motivationwhich will hold it together and keep it going in difficulttimes. . . . The aim must be to select a force of men whohave their own motivation for fighting—not necessarilyin tune with the aims and motivations of the advisors. . .. Advisors must be suitable for the task: not all goodinstructors are capable of teaching irregulars. . . . Theymust be patient enough to spend hours talking out theirproblems large and small.41

Locally recruited security forces have been an integral part ofCOIN over the last 150 years. Debates have always occurred about whichkind of local security forces is best for which situation. In an ethnicallydiverse environment such as Afghanistan, local security forces are criticalto help hold cleared areas for a variety of reasons: their knowledge of localtensions that may exist; economic benefits that their involvement may pro-vide to the community; and their own emotional investment in the espritde corps and honor of being part of such a force.

41 General Graham papers, MEC, “BATT Notes on Raising and Training of Irregular Forces in Dhofar,”July 1971.

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If we proceed with a strategy for the development of local Pashtunforces, we need to do it carefully,42 with Afghan buy-in at the village, dis-trict, provincial, and national levels. We need to provide a comprehensiveplan that demonstrates real understanding of local and tribal issues. Weneed to provide outstanding officers and NCOs to help raise, train, andlead these forces into action in their given area of responsibility. This maymean, during the initial stages, the use of officers and NCOs from theUS/UK/NATO SF community. As a British officer noted from his time inthe Dhofar campaign:

…the officers whom Britain sent to Oman, both contract-ed and regular, were highly trained volunteers. Most hadthe necessary commitment to stick it out and those whodidn’t left pretty soon. . . . The patience and tolerance tolive harmoniously in an unfamiliar culture; the fortitude tobe content with less than comfortable circumstances forprolonged periods; an understanding of and sympathy fora foreign history and religion; a willingness to learn a newlanguage; the flexibility, imagination and humility neces-sary to climb into the head of the people who live by avery different set of assumptions; none of these are to befound automatically in our modern developed Euro-Atlantic culture. These attributes, and the attitudes theyimply, often have to be taught in addition to purely mili-tary skills.43

42 We need to avoid the rapid expansion of territorial or local security forces that sometimes becomesan issue. The Regional and Popular Forces in Vietnam were raised too quickly, without proper sup-port, and did not succeed in their efforts to protect the local population. It was not until the refocuson the advising and training of these forces with the Civil Operations and RevolutionaryDevelopment program that they began to receive the correct levels of support. While their effortsproduced mixed results in the post-Tet period, they generally performed beyond expectations ofmany US and Vietnamese officials.

43 Ian Gardiner, In Service of the Sultan, (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2007), p. 174.

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Appendix

“Frontier Thoughts and Frontier Requirements (1856)”44

“It is difficult for any European officer, no matter of what experi-ence, to pick out the caste of recruit by looking at or conversing with himfor a short time. It is almost impossible, on the other hand, for a recruit todeceive a native of his own faith.”

Native Officers: “The selection of good commissioned officers isthe essence of success in a new corps, for good officers always make goodmen; the converse is equally true, and a bad native officer will by his badexample play the mischief, not only with his own company, but with possi-bly with half the regiment. Honesty and openness of character are far moreessential than smartness and good looks. . . . [A] habit of command begetsself reliance, which is the sheet-anchor of an officer in the hour of trial. . .. [C]ultivate the most intimate intercourse with your native officers, studyeach individual’s character and weaknesses, talk with them familiarly on allsubjects, teach them to be perfectly at home in your presence and encour-age them to relate to you all ordinary occurrences. . . . [T]hese quiet con-versations are the very essence of a knowledge of your corps.”

Non-commissioned Grades: “Be exceedingly particular in yourpromotion to the NCO grades, and your selection for the higher ranks willbe comparatively easy. Here, again, do all you can to make a havildar andnaick feel his individual responsibility, and, when possible, punish theNCO in preference to the erring sepoy. . . . [P]eriodical examinations of thenative commissioned and the NCOs, the CO or second in command, tendto keep up smartness in these grades, and keep you informed of the mer-its of individuals.”

Drill and Discipline: “One of the greatest mistakes is to fancy thatthe high-bred Irregular soldier will not stand drill and discipline, whereas

44 General Sir Peter Lumsden, Lumsden of the Guides, (London: John Murray, 1899), Appendix A, p. 291.

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in fact no man is prouder of both when he has mastered them. The mostexacting drill instructor you can find will always be your Pathan, Afridi[also Pathan] or Persian. The tender point of these men is not in the amountof work taken out of them while absolutely with the regiment, but in theamount of leave they get and the notice that their European officers takeof them. So long as a liberal allowance of the former is permitted, and themen know their officers, you may drill and work your corps as much asyou please. Never allow a man to overstay his leave by a minute under anypretext short of a medical certificate, and when one does forget himselfstop all future leave for an indefinite period. This is the severest punish-ment you can give a Pathan or Sikh, and will engender habits of punctual-ity in these fellows unattainable by any other way.”

Religion and Prejudices: “Respect the religion and prejudices ofevery sect, and establish as a rule that each may do as it pleases in privatein its own lines, but that no one is to interfere with his neighbour in wordor deed. Punish severely all attempts at proselytizing, invariably turningout a renegade from his creed. . . . Never for an instant permit religious dis-cussions, not even between European officers and the men; the former arenot here for missionary purposes, and should not be allowed to trespass onthe functions of the clergy.”

British Officers: “All the young European officers attached to theregiment should be made to study the religious prejudices of each sect, notfor the purpose of turning Hindoo or Mahomedan themselves, but to knowexactly what each do without prejudice to his caste. . . . I would give myEuropean officers under me almost as much power as I myself possess;they can always consult me when in doubt. The more power they possessthe greater will be their influence over their men. If a mistake is made youcan put it right quietly on the spot, and by giving each officer his ‘swing’you see how far he has imbibed and understood the principles on whichyou work the regiment. . . . It is the worst of all plans to concentrate powerexclusively in yourself as CO, though it is pleasing to find yourself themainspring of so large a machine; but you should recollect that you mayany day be removed, and all should be so arranged in the corps that the

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work will go on as smoothly as ever without you. I need not tell you to bekind, considerate, and sociable with all so long as they do their duty, butstand humbug from no one. Any officer who understands his trade knowshow to let this be felt without having to show that he does so, and ordersonce given European or Native must alike obey, and carelessness orslovenly performance of duty be equally noted in both instances. If ayoung ‘rip’ won’t take a hint, it is not worth while disturbing the harmonyof your little circle by constant bickerings, but he must be told either tomend his ways or to return for correction to that great mill of discipline forofficers—the line regiment.”

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CHAPTER NINE

“To Free the Oppressed”NATO Special Forces in Future Operations

Kalev I. Sepp

Any surmise that special forces units of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization might, after the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, be again com-mitted to fight in counterinsurgencies, raises the question of the meaning ofthat sort of operation. If – as in Iraq – counterinsurgency means a campaignthat will cost two trillion dollars, engage 150,000 troops and see the deaths ofsome five thousand of those soldiers, and last for at least six years with anindeterminate end, then only the United States can do it, and only once in ageneration.1 But what if an armed insurgency in an allied country could besuppressed at a cost to the intervening power of “only” about one billion dol-lars a year in military and economic aid, a commitment of less than one hun-dred troops at any given time, while suffering less than two dozen fatalitiesover twelve years – simultaneously democratizing the besieged country,building governmental capacity to enforce rule of law, and establishing elect-ed civilian control over a reformed military that protected rather thanoppressed the citizenry? Such was the remarkable accomplishment of theUnited States intervention in the Salvadoran Civil War, 1979-1991, and thekey military component in this successful campaign was special forces.2

1 Terry Kelly of RAND made this prescient observation at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy,June 4, 2009. Chris Schnaubelt of the NATO Defense College led the conference where such issueswere raised and discussed, and inspired the ideas presented in this paper.

2 For brevity and readability, the term “special forces” will be used throughout this paper to refer col-lectively to all nations’ and services’ elite combat and counterterrorist units, rather than the longerterm “special operations forces” or its U.S. military acronym, “SOF,” unless specifically cited as U.S.Army Special Forces or distinct units.

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This successful counterinsurgency notwithstanding, the questionremains: under what conditions would NATO countries commit them-selves to engage in such operations overseas in a non-NATO country, to sup-port Rule of Law in the world? It is in the national interest of all law-abid-ing countries in the world to be able to fight insurgencies. If the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization is indeed dedicated to the international rule oflaw and international stability, its governments and armed forces must beable to conduct counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability opera-tions. Special forces are particularly well-suited to engage in these missions.

The involvement of conventional forces in counterinsurgency oper-ations today in Iraq and Afghanistan does not obviate the original decisionto create special forces. This choice was based on the experiences of special-ized Allied teams aiding guerrillas fighting against German and Japaneseoccupation troops across Europe and Asia. Allied leaders came to learn thatcarefully selected personnel, who were older, more intelligent, moreresilient, physically tougher and more independent than the greater body ofsoldiers and officers, were the most successful at training, advising, andoften leading indigenous peoples in irregular warfare. This is still true.

What has changed is the scale and scope of the terrorist threat to glob-al stability now confronting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This oftenamorphous threat drives the question: what factors will affect the shape, capac-ity and modes of operation of the NATO armed forces in future wars, likecounterinsurgencies? This is not a choice of “one war form over the other;”that is, of counterinsurgency over conventional warfare.3 NATO nations cannotignore the rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, or smaller states armed withweapons of mass destruction. NATO was originally formed to be able to fighta large-scale conventional war. For almost half a century, it was organized,manned, equipped, trained, and in particular, educated to that singular end.4

3 Speech by the author to NATO Parliamentary Assembly and U.S. Congressional RepresentativesPentagon Conference, January 28, 2008.

4 As of 2009, at the NATO Defense College, where senior military and civilian officials attend a grad-uate-level course in Alliance operations, there are no counterinsurgency courses in the curriculum.The German armed forces officer schools do not teach this type of warfare at all.

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NATO’s special forces, however, can be useful across the entire spectrumof conflict.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed his view of theinternational security situation in a speech shortly after his appointment:

The real challenges we have seen emerge since the end ofthe Cold War – from Somalia to the Balkans, Iraq,Afghanistan, and elsewhere – make clear we in defenseneed to change our priorities to be better able to deal withthe prevalence of what is called ‘asymmetric warfare.’ …[I]t is hard to conceive of any country challenging theUnited States directly in conventional military terms – atleast for some years to come. Indeed, history shows us thatsmaller, irregular forces – insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists– have for centuries found ways to harass and frustratelarger, regular armies and sow chaos. We can expect thatasymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contempo-rary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fun-damentally political in nature, and require the applicationof all elements of national power. Success will be less amatter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shap-ing behavior – of friends, adversaries, and most impor-tantly, the people in between.5

Despite Secretary Gates’ views on the importance of counterinsur-gency, a debate has fired inside the United States defense establishment,described by the Wall Street Journal as “This-War-itis vs. Next-War-itis.”Mr. Gates has publicly stated that ‘next-war’ proponents are shortchangingcurrent needs in Iraq and Afghanistan for advanced weapons which maynever be needed.

Opponents of Mr. Gates say the Defense Secretary is taking ashortsighted position, and will leave the United States and its allies unpre-

5 Robert Gates, speech at AUSA Convention, Washington, D.C., October 10, 2006.

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pared for future threats. Mr. Gates is aware of this, and with the support ofthe newly-elected President Barack Obama is seeking a reasonable balancebetween these two types of warfare. In this case, “balance” means the pro-posed apportionment of 80% of the defense budget for conventionalforces, and 20% for irregular warfare operations – up from approximately10% now.

In any regard, it is more likely that any given country wouldengage in foreign military operations if small numbers of special forcescould be committed, rather than large numbers of conventional troops.Why a small-numbers special-forces approach to counterinsurgency?Commitment of a nation’s youth – nineteen-year-old soldiers – is under-stood to be necessary for wars of national survival, and similar vitalnational interests, but not necessarily for lesser conflicts. Special forces,on the other hand, are better trained and more experienced professionals:older, long-serving volunteers, who clearly understand the risks of theirchosen line of work. Putting them at risk for less than vital national inter-ests is acceptable. Success is more likely precisely because of who they are– elite special forces, who are more survivable, better able to train foreignarmies and to teach and enforce respect for human rights. With small num-bers, allied countries can be engaged and influential, but not irretrievablycommitted. Aid and advisers can be readily withdrawn if conditionsrequire it. Long-term engagement, necessary in counterinsurgency, is pos-sible because a handful of advisers are inexpensive and sustainable yearafter year. Also, with small numbers, the supported nation shouldn’t feelthat the advisers are running their units, or their war. Thus, in counterin-surgency wars, “less may be more” because greater reliance upon, andaccountability of, the host nation is a necessity of the situation; “owner-ship” of the effort cannot easily be handed over to or assumed by the inter-vening forces.

The future of counterinsurgency

In considering future counterinsurgency operations, it is useful to

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understand how the United States envisions warfare over the next twodecades. This understanding can inform allied armed forces on how theycan integrate themselves, in a complementary fashion, into military cam-paigns with the United States, particularly with regard to the emergingconcept of irregular warfare. One distinct aspect of current counterinsur-gency operations is that very few countries attempt counterinsurgency uni-laterally. The United Nations should be involved, at least for the politicalviability gained, and it is likely that other international organizations andalliances will participate in such conflicts as they arise. The United Statesmay well be an ally of any nation in a counterinsurgency effort, as thenations’ interests and strategic goals, especially as regards internationalstability, are closely aligned. In this, special forces play a key role.

Much of this concept is in response to the threat of IrregularWarfare.6 Now, and for decades to come, the United States, NATO and theirinternational partners must contend with a number of serious challenges:— Terrorism with a global reach;— Rogue regimes that provide support to terrorists and seek to acquireweapons of mass destruction;— Threats emerging in and emanating from fragile states and poorly gov-erned areas; and— New manifestations of ethnic, tribal, and sectarian conflict.Many of these threats come from countries with which neither the UnitedStates nor any NATO countries are at war. The responses they demandextend well beyond the traditional domain of any single governmentagency or department.

Irregular warfare includes a variety of operations and activities toprevent and respond to these particular challenges. These missionsinclude, but are not limited to, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare,foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. In thecontext of irregular warfare, these missions involve establishing — orreestablishing — order in a fragile nation, or a collapsed state.

6 From a speech by the author to the National Defense Industrial Association, Washington, D.C.,February 14, 2008.

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Irregular warfare operations may occur independently of, or incombination with, traditional warfare campaigns. Many of the capabilitiesrequired to execute them are resident in some parts of the U.S. armedforces, but not with sufficient capacity to meet expected demand. Thus,allies are critical. In some cases, the United States and allied militariesneed to develop new capabilities to address these emerging challenges.

Irregular warfare strategy

These irregular threats require an Irregular Warfare strategy. Theold strategic paradigm held by the United States was to be able to win twoconventional wars, or traditional wars, simultaneously, or almost simulta-neously. The new strategic paradigm being considered is that the UnitedStates is now in a protracted irregular war. The 2006 U.S. Department ofDefense Quadrennial Defense Review document (QDR) recognized anddescribed irregular war, and also directed that the U.S. armed forces muststill be ready to conduct conventional campaigns.

But irregular war is still war; it is a major commitment. So, inaddition to traditional or conventional warfare, the new strategy envisionsthree campaigns in the context of irregular war. These are support to alarge-scale counterinsurgency, support to large-scale unconventional war-fare, and steady-state warfare.

The first campaign is support to a large-scale counterinsurgency.In large-scale irregular warfare like this, integration of special forces withconventional forces is essential. This special and conventional force com-bination is, finally, working very well right now in the U.S. forces in Iraq.The conventional forces employed in these campaigns — these surges —may not always be American or other foreign forces because, ultimately,local forces must defeat insurgencies.The second campaign is a surge to support unconventional warfare.

Unconventional warfare is conducted against a hostile state, an

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occupying army, or a transnational terrorist group. In a large-scale coun-terinsurgency, special forces usually support the conventional forces asthey do in Iraq. That is the current practice. However, in unconventionalwarfare, conventional forces will almost always support special forces.Unconventional warfare requires partners and surrogates. It necessitateslow-visibility operations, with some direct action and clandestine opera-tions capabilities. An unconventional warfare campaign can drive somespecial forces capability requirements. An example is infiltration andexfiltration into and from denied areas.

It is likely that the United States and its NATO allies will face —and should plan to face — a formidable set of potential enemies. Theselikely opponents will have very strict border and internal controls, and willbe equipped with biometrics, anti-access technologies, and first-class, full-spectrum anti-aircraft systems. Special forces will need particular skills tosurvive in these denied areas. They will also have to maintain contingencylanguages, possibly such as Farsi and Chinese.

The third campaign, steady-state warfare, is how the United Stateswants to win the Long War against transnational terrorists. The steady-state effort will require a global network of special forces in greater num-bers than ever before. They will work with the national intelligence agen-cies, imbedded in the partner or allied forces who will support the UnitedStates in this effort. The operational core of this counterterrorist effort willbe special and conventional forces, as well as Intelligence services, pluspartners and allies. The U.S. military will seek to achieve the right mix offorward-stationed and rotational forces.

This will require both indirect and clandestine capabilities, whichthe United States will accomplish primarily via a combination of intelli-gence work and by-with-and-through approaches with allies. Intelligencedrives the find-fix-fight-finish cycle against the terrorists, and more per-sonnel are needed to do intelligence-related work. The implication of allthis is the requirement to build a global counterterrorist network.

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What sort of contingencies might occur in which it would be suit-able for NATO special forces to engage? One possible scenario might be acrisis following an internal collapse of the existing government in a semi-industrialized country. A compounding difficulty could be the impoverish-ment and underdeveloped condition of large parts of the country, callingfor humanitarian assistance on the scale of major disaster relief. Anydeployment would have to occur with appropriate legal accords, and pos-sibly under the direction of the United Nations.In this scenario, special forces troops– this includes civic action and psy-chological operations units – could deploy quickly in order to:

— secure military arsenals, and nuclear facilities if they exist;— maintain order and establish stability;— obtain the cooperation of, coordinate with, and possibly pro-vide advisors or command and control of the remnant militaryunits of the collapsed state; 7

— prevent looting;8

— de-mine minefields;— protect the national economic infrastructure, resources, andcultural and historic sites;

— provide humanitarian assistance to the population;— stop any exodus of refugees;— reestablish communications, power, and water supplies; and— eliminate fanatics who intend to wage guerrilla warfare tobring back the old dictatorship.9

Rapid action by professional units is the key. It is best to stop an insur-gency before it starts. NATO special forces units can conduct almost all ofthese missions, but equipment must be procured and activities instituted toenable these campaigns.

7 Chris Schnaubelt of the NATO Defense College suggested this important task, considering the prob-lematic results of disbanding the Iraqi Army in 2003. Letter to author, August 2, 2009.

8 At the United Nations Command Special Operations Forces in Korea Conference in June 16-18,2009, the employment of special forces in a collapsed state to prevent looting was considered animperative, in order to prevent looting on the scale of what occurred in Baghdad, Iraq, in 2003, in theabsence of security forces immediately following the fall of the Saddam regime.

9 Russ Howard, Brig. Gen. (ret’d.), U.S. Army, developed this detailed list of possible necessary actionsas a recommended response option to a collapse of the North Korean regime. Interview with author,Seoul, Korea, June 17, 2009.

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Counterterrorism vs. counterinsurgency

Direct Action missions, also called raids and strikes, are a neces-sary part of any larger campaign to suppress terrorism, crime and insur-gency, but cannot be the sole or even principal effort. Many special oper-ations units were originally formed specifically to conduct counterterror-ism missions – that is, Direct Action. When deployed to Iraq andAfghanistan, it is only reasonable to expect they would do what they knowbest how to do.

In Afghanistan, special operations units have been conductingdirect action missions since 2002, but the Taliban insurgency has contin-ued to grow. A senior U.S. military officer in Afghanistan reported inMarch 2009, “I thought we could decapitate the insurgency. I was wrong.We’ve gone through twenty-two [high value targets] in this province, but[the insurgents] nominate someone new to take over the leadership veryfast. The duration of our success is not more than three to four weeksbefore the insurgents have a new leader, and often that person is youngerand more brutal. Even if someone killed [the head of the PakistaniTaliban], someone else will simply take over.”10 Commando raids andstrikes must be conducted in the context, and subordinate to, a completecounterinsurgency campaign. The summary directive of “Clear, Hold,Build” must dominate military planning, with the emphasis on building ahost nation’s government structure and raising its security forces.

The role of technology

Technology will significantly support these three campaigns.Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, or ISR, technologies andplatforms are the top priority for the counterterrorism fight, and will benecessary in all three campaigns. ISR platforms, notably armed Predatorand Reaper unmanned aircraft carrying precision-guided munitions, have

10 Max Boot, Fred Kagan and Kim Kagan, “Yes, We Can,” The Weekly Standard, March 23, 2009.

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powerfully assisted special operations and unconventional warfare, such asduring the 2001 expedition to Afghanistan to overthrow the Talibanregime. The U.S. Department of Defense had initially under-invested inISR platforms. A concerted building program is underway to meet thepressing demand from field commanders. The U.S. must also replace loss-es – almost a third of the unmanned aerial fleet has been lost over time,mostly as a result of crashes. Because of these shortages, the DefenseDepartment must centrally manage its assets, platform by platform, andalmost minute by minute. Eventually, the allied forces will need a varietyof ISR platforms. Models similar to current versions will operate in per-missive environments. Advanced platforms must be “penetrating models,”capable of surviving in high-threat air defense environments, to conductspecial missions and to support special forces in denied areas.11

The demand for aerial ISR platforms in current counterinsurgencyoperations around the world is enormous, and often unsatisfied. Manyallied countries do not have specialized ISR aircraft, like the U.S. Navy’sP-3 Orion or the fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles. However, all that isrequired to conduct effective airborne ISR is a sensor system, an aircraftto carry it, and a secure radio. Countries without purpose-built ISR aircraftcan attain a near-term capability sufficient for some irregular warfareapplications by mounting an advanced targeting pod to a fighter or patrolaircraft. With some additional training, an allied pilot – who alreadyspeaks English, the international aviation language – could provide someISR support for special forces ground units.

Other manned aircraft can be valuable as well. Bombers, able tocarry large loads of precision-guided munitions, can be very useful in bothconventional and irregular conflict. Gunships have definitively proventheir worth in Vietnam, El Salvador, Colombia, Iraq and Afghanistan.However, four-engine gunships carrying multiple guns and cannon areexpensive, hard to maintain, and limited in number. It would be better tohave a larger number of twin-engine fixed-wing gunships, mounting a sin-

11 Speech by the author to Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, March 11, 2008.

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gle gun and carrying small-diameter guided bombs. Of course, for preci-sion close air support, small turboprop attack aircraft are useful.

Air-ground integration is critical in special operations.12 In Iraq andAfghanistan, NATO and Coalition special forces air-ground integrationworks well because U.S. Special Operations Forces work directly with inter-national special forces ground teams, acting as liaison to U.S. special avia-tion aircraft. Expanding this liaison capability would be limited only by theavailability of U.S. special forces personnel who could be attached to alliedunits. English-speaking allied special forces, trained in tactical air control,would be a viable augmentation to coordinating the air-ground effort.

An expansion of joint aviation training and exercises wouldimprove special forces employment options. The “Coalition SpecialOperations Forces Subject Matter Expert Exchange Program,” based atHurlburt Field in Florida, allows allied special forces personnel to trainwith U.S. special aviation platforms, such as the MC-130 Talon and theAC-130 Spectre. This program could include more personnel, and empha-size tactical skills such as convoy escort, infiltration and exfiltration,strike, and intra-theater mobility operations.

In the same way, U.S. special operations air planners should alsobe educated in allied air capabilities and procedures by attending trainingand exercises abroad, in those partner countries. This would make U.S.planners aware of what allied special forces, both ground and air, can andcan’t do before discovering this during actual operations.

Aerial refueling is a high-priority training requirement for U.S.pilots and crews, but given the demand for refueling aircraft in the theatersof war overseas, stateside aircrews only gain limited proficiency in thisskill. Even KC-135s and KC-10s, the mainstay tankers for the U.S. AirForce, are not available in sufficient numbers in theater for all the requests

12 David Jesurun, Major, U.S. Air Force, e-mail to author, May 20, 2009. Major Jesurun’s extensiveexperience as a U.S. Air Force special operations pilot in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan providedthe basis for this series of insights and recommendations for improvement.

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to support special forces fixed-wing aircraft.

To alleviate this training shortfall, allied aerial refuelers could par-ticipate in the refueling exercises in the United States. U.S. receiver aircraftcrews train in accordance with the procedures in NATO standard refuelingpublication ATP-56.This would also give the visiting aircrews experience in refueling fixed-wing special operations aircraft, in addition to fighters and bombers. Themutual confidence and increased capability gained from such combinedtraining would also be valuable in integrating allied refueling aircraft intospecial operations worldwide.

To take advantage of the increased capacity and capability in aeri-al refueling that would accrue from this training, all aerial refueling aircraftin the theater of operations should be combined under a single command.This would allow the U.S. refuelers to concentrate on supporting specialaviation helicopters, which is almost a solely American requirement.

In the same way, all allied air mobility aircraft should be combinedinto a single fleet when deployed. Most allied air forces have smaller tur-boprop cargo aircraft, well-suited for tactical intra-theater missions, likeC-160s and G222s. This could relieve the U.S. Air Force from having touse long-range strategic inter-theater lifters, particularly its C-130s and C-17s, and from tactical missions, like moving small special forces unitsinside the area of operations. Also, U.S. special operations aviation aircraftcould perform more of the missions for which they are uniquely equipped,particularly night-time helicopter aerial refueling.

The nature of a particular conflict – the size of the area of opera-tions, of the population, of the enemy forces, of the number of allied spe-cial forces available – may require conventional forces to augment specialforces. National immediate reaction forces, like the NATO ResponseForce, may not necessarily be the appropriate unit for this effort. Thesekinds of units are primarily intended to provide humanitarian assistance ina disaster, stabilize short-of-war situations, and conduct direct action mis-

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sions. They are usually not organized or trained for counterinsurgencyoperations in the way that many special forces units are. The very require-ments necessary to produce elite units ensure there will never be enoughspecial operations forces to meet the worldwide demand.

A possible solution for this shortfall in the quality and quantity ofpersonnel to engage in counterinsurgencies is to create what the U.S. mil-itary calls “SOF-like” forces from the body of conventional troops avail-able in land armies. (“SOF-like” means units or personnel with capabili-ties “like Special Operations Forces”). There are several ways to achievethis additional capability. It is unrealistic to attempt to make a 19-year-oldinfantryman into a “SOF-like” soldier. In the near term, the fastest way tocreate “SOF-like” forces is to put conventional units under the commandof special forces officers and sergeants. At a small-unit level, this has pro-duced excellent results in the U.S. joint Military Transition Teams formedfrom individual volunteers to train Iraqi and Afghani security forces. Thecommanders of the advisory program at Fort Riley, Kansas, where theseteams are organized and trained, have stated that the teams led by U.S.Army Special Forces officers were the most cohesive, effective and confi-dent. Another method to create “SOF-like” forces is to use special forcesheadquarters to direct operations using conventional forces.

In the long term, the best solution is to focus on making an offi-cer corps more “SOF-like.” This breed of officer would be:

— more politically aware, through graduate civil schooling;— fluent in a language of an at-risk country or region; and— able to think beyond the “manager of violence” self-image —not just a warrior, but a warrior-diplomat.

For example, instead of habitually assigning officers to internal headquar-ters and staffs, the defense ministries should post more officers toembassies, other government agencies, and overseas exchanges.

As part of this enhancement, these officer corps should educate anddevelop special forces and counterinsurgency strategic planners. The variousarmed forces could begin by grooming select special forces officers to per-

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form in strategist roles, to shape Irregular Warfare and counterinsurgencystrategies for their respective countries. Their management should includeassignments to conventional force commands, as members of primary staffs,and duty as leaders in special and conventional units. Conversely, conven-tional force officers could be exposed to special units and operations earlyin their careers. As an example, U.S. Army Special Forces officers arerequired to attend conventional forces “captains’ courses” after they are cho-sen for special forces. This conventional training is essential for these spe-cial forces officers; corresponding schooling in special operations for somenumber of conventional officers must likewise be beneficial.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of deployable specialforces soldiers is their ability to speak other languages. Among the NATOnations in Europe, there are a variety of languages spoken in every coun-try, and the rank and file of the NATO armies are familiar with these. Foroverseas “out-of-area” deployment, however, many other languages arenecessary, to be able to engage with the local population, security forces,government officials, and even the enemy. Language skills make any sol-dier more “SOF-like.”

Contingency languages

Much of any success that might accrue to NATO troops deployed“out of area” to fight an insurgency will depend on their skill in personalcommunication with the indigenous peoples – that is, at speaking the locallanguage. In military interventions when this has been the positive case,the counterinsurgent held a marked advantage.

Hiring interpreters is a “quick fix,” but not the optimal solution.Local interpreters often have uncertain backgrounds and loyalties. Somemay be from different local ethnic groups, and may be attacked by theirethnic rivals. In any regard, the ability of an officer or sergeant to speakdirectly with members of the local population is essential in order to estab-lish rapport and intelligence sources quickly, rather than having to speak

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through a hired native of uncertain linguistic skill and allegiance.

The large number of at-risk regions and countries that might requireNATO intervention presents a great number of indigenous languages anddialects. Officers and long-term soldiers in special operations units shouldbecome multi-lingual, particularly in these contingency languages. Theirspecific linguistic capabilities should derive from the counterinsurgencyassessments and subsequent nation-by-nation requirements that result.

Some taskings for language proficiency may be readily aligned toregions where various NATO nations have longstanding relationships.Others will require schooling in arcane tribal languages. Even if only a sin-gle person in a military expedition is able to converse in the native dialect,it may be enough to make the best kind of difference. The axiom is trueenough: “Learning a language is the way to learn a culture.”

Training and advising

Training and advising foreign armies is a central special forcesskill. The emerging thrust of the new strategy in the Afghanistan coun-terinsurgency will be a much increased dedication of personnel to the mis-sion of training and advising Afghan security forces. Similarly, in the Iraqcounterinsurgency, the new administration has announced plans to with-draw U.S. combat forces, but leave a large residual force of advisers andtrainers. The U.S. forces are finally taking the advice of their own SpecialForces commanders from the Vietnam War. They fought alongsideMontagnard, Nung and Khmer tribesmen, as well as South Vietnamese,and took the chief lesson of the Vietnam War to be “teach them to fight fortheir own country – don’t do it for them.”

Intelligence

When Lt. Gen. Sir Gerald Templer arrived in Malaya in 1951 totake over as the combined civil-military leader of the fight against the

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communist insurgency there, his dramatic first words to his staff were“This is an intelligence war.” The British leaders in the three years of theEmergency up to that point had not seized on this critical understanding.Much the same could be said for the U.S.-led effort in Iraq for the firstthree years of the occupation, as ground force commanders wrestled withenemies whose objectives, methods, culture, languages and motivationsthey did not understand.

One American unit was positioned to overcome these shortfallsmuch more quickly than the rest of the U.S. forces: the U.S. SpecialOperations Command. But even they discovered the need for more andbetter intelligence to find the enemy more precisely and rapidly, particu-larly insurgent, terrorist and criminal leaders who came to be labeled“High-Value Targets” and operated not just inside Iraq, but throughout theMiddle East and, in fact, around the world.

Their solution to this difficult targeting task was the IntelligenceFusion Cell, in direct support of the primary Special Operations combatunit, in Iraq itself. The membership included all U.S. Government agenciesand departments with intelligence capabilities. In any given cell, therewere capable representatives from the Defense and Central IntelligenceAgencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Departments of theTreasury, Homeland Security, and Justice, the National GeospatialIntelligence and National Security Agencies, the NationalCounterterrorism Center, the U.S. Central and European Commands,unmanned surveillance aircraft units, and from the special units in combatthemselves, among others.13

The chief of any given intelligence fusion cell is not an intelli-gence officer. Instead, he is a former special unit commander, usually asenior major or new lieutenant colonel, marked for promotion and highercommand, who has intimate knowledge of exactly what the special unitsneed to conduct their operations. The individual military members of a cell

13 Chris Fussell, Lt. Cmdr, U.S. Navy, interview with the author, Monterey, California, April 27, 2009.

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are usually company-grade officers, such as experienced lieutenants andmid-grade sergeants. The civilian members are of comparable rank andalready have one or two tours of duty in the overseas conflict zones.

The members’ rank is less important than their personalities – ofnecessity, aggressive and engaging, with a keen, quick mind. Most impor-tantly, they need two things: the confidence of their superior, which allowsthem to speak for their superior, and direct access to their superior, whennecessary, at any time of the day or night. The Intelligence Fusion Cells,although led by Special Operations officers and most closely associatedwith special units, work for anyone in the theater of operations. They willprepare and hand off target packets to any unit commander who makes asuitable request.

Trust is the most important element in “fusing” intelligence – eachcomponent of the intelligence community must freely offer up its share ofinformation. To accomplish this, the location of a Fusion Cell is well for-ward in the zone of action, in the immediate vicinity of the unit operations.It has been discovered that this has the effect of building trust among themembers. Certain intelligence agencies, with a reputation for always want-ing information, but never for sharing any of theirs, become highly coop-erative in these circumstances. It is human nature to bond with one’s com-rades-in-arms. This sharing of intelligence must extend to all allies. As dif-ficult as it seems, there must be no “keeping secrets” from allies in com-bat.

So, from a stumbling start in 2003 in Iraq, the U.S. military hasdeveloped a highly useful and efficient solution to one of its major intelli-gence challenges, in the form of the Intelligence Fusion Cell. In counterin-surgency, fusion is necessary because there is more than one enemy, andthere is more than one war, as government and allied forces contend withcriminals, terrorists, insurgents and foreign interventionists. TheIntelligence Fusion Cell is also a metaphor for how all departments andagencies of a government must work together to achieve success.

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Future issue

Several issues related to the employment of NATO special forcesare emerging and deserve close attention:

- The NATO leadership should consider supporting the creation ofregional multi-national standing headquarters to plan and direct combinedspecial operations in a given region. NATO has at Mons, Belgium, theNATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Center that conductscourses to train NATO officers to serve on special forces task group staffs.The Center, which will soon be renamed a NATO “Headquarters,” also hasa separate state-of-the art communications system providing direct con-nectivity with the national special forces headquarters of every country inNATO (it is technologically more advanced, in fact, than much of the exist-ing NATO signal equipment). Similarly, the United Nation Command inKorea has the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task ForceHeadquarters to plan and coordinate special forces operations in the eventof a crisis or war on the Korean Peninsula.

- It would aid the NATO governments and their defense establish-ments if they could reach an agreement as to who and what constitute “thethreats” to the NATO and partner countries, collectively and individually.

- Similarly, NATO planners should establish how InformationOperations will support special forces; or, following the example of severalterrorist entities, how special forces might support Information Operations.Many NATO and partner nations have sophisticated PsychologicalOperations capabilities and experienced units, with similar doctrinalapproaches, which ought to allow integration into allied operations overseas.

- U.S. commanders in the overseas conflict zones report that someNATO special units are over-reliant on U.S. logistical support. Thisdetracts from the contribution an allied unit might otherwise offer.Logistics is not a “niche” capability for just a few countries to bear respon-sibility. Some degree of self-sufficiency is a necessary capability for all

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special forces to permit the maximum possible flexibility in employment.This is most important to the national governments in deciding to committheir special forces in either allied or unilateral operations overseas.

- U.S. special forces experience in Iraq and Afghanistan hasrevealed the need for increased human intelligence capacity and capabili-ties in overseas contingency operations, particularly counterinsurgency.Dennis C. Blair, the new U.S. administration’s director of national intelli-gence, said the United States still lacked intelligence about the powerstructures inside Afghanistan and other basic information necessary for acounterinsurgency campaign.14

- The political and military leadership of NATO must sort out andagree on definitions of key terms, especially counterinsurgency, countert-errorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics and foreign internaldefense operations. This is not an academic exercise; it is necessary toensure unity of effort. They should not be distracted by new terms and“buzzwords” for long-established and familiar activities. 15

- To explore these issues fully and usefully, NATO special forcescommanders and staffs, and their civilian superiors, should conduct a con-tinuing series of “futures games” – not just exercises, which are for train-ing, but to look ten and twenty years into the future in order to define like-ly problems and situations; to determine requirements; and to test process-es, organizations, and possible solutions. These seminar-style games mustengage all the relevant players – political and governmental leaders, allies,international organizations, etc. The objective is not to predict the future,but to help design special forces units with the flexibility and resilience todeal with an unpredictable future.16

14 David Maxwell, letter to author, May 9, 2009.15 For example, military officers at doctrinal conferences often note that terms like “hybrid wars” and“complex operations” are redundant, as all wars are “hybrid,” and all military operations, particular-ly special operations, are “complex.” Nonetheless, these may still be useful to help non-specialistsunfamiliar with military activities to grasp their intricacies.

16 Alexander Alderson, Colonel, British Army, proposed this objective at the NATO Defense Collegein Rome, Italy, June 4, 2009.

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Summary

As simple as this guiding principle seems, the United States, andhence its NATO allies and partners, should support a counterinsurgencycampaign in a given country rather than conduct or lead it.17 The doctrinalfoundation for this perspective is in the official American definition of aForeign Internal Defense campaign, or FID: “Participation by civilian andmilitary agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken byanother government [author’s emphasis] or other designated organizationto free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insur-gency.”18

NATO member governments must reconcile the moral and practi-cal standard of avoiding undue belligerence with the obligation of theNATO states to assist in suppressing crime and violence that threatendeveloping nations, particularly nascent democracies. Timo Noetzel andBenjamin Schreer note that Germany, with one of the largest economies inthe world and a large, sophisticated, professional defense establishment,has chosen to cast its engagement in Afghanistan not as a counterinsur-gency mission, but as a “stability and reconstruction operation.” By way ofexplaining their deviation from the NATO-designated mission, Germanofficials offer that “. . . unlike many of its allies, the Federal Republicnever engaged in a ‘small war.’ Germany lacks historical memory of suchconflicts which could inform current debate.”19

This lack of a “small wars” expeditionary tradition since 1918 is arguablyto the Germans’ benefit. They will, for want of such martial conditioning,be much less likely to over-commit troops, resources and political capitalto a developing crisis, avoiding the American tendency some have criti-cized as: “if it’s worth doing, it’s worth overdoing.” Nonetheless, theGerman government and people believe in the value of a peaceful and sta-ble world order, from which they and other nations will benefit. This sta-

17 David Maxwell, Col., U.S. Army, letter to author, May 9, 2009.18 Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, December 17, 2003.19 NATO Defense College, “Counterinsurgency Workshop” background paper, May 2009.

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bility must be enforced, and that will occasionally require more force thancan be brought to bear by law enforcement agencies. Careful and limitedintervention by military forces is achievable, and can make the best kindof difference in many crisis situations. To imagine that these militaryforces can simply provide logistical support or base security and therebyavoid battle, and thus casualties, is not realistic. The military strategist andauthor David Kilcullen notes, “The distinction between combat and non-combat forces in a counterinsurgency environment is largely theoretical.”20

In contemplating the design and employment of NATO specialforces to conduct counterinsurgency operations, it is vital that the NATOallies do not become myopic and over-focus on this particular brand ofconflict, as this could result in the creation of vulnerabilities to otherthreats. RAND Corporation senior analyst, former defense deputy assis-tant secretary, and Iraq veteran Celeste Ward cautions, “The question is notwhether counterinsurgency works, but where, when, and to what ends it iswise to commit U.S. power and resources.”21 This warning extends toNATO as well: it should not see all limited wars as counterinsurgencies,and should not remake all armed forces, including special operations units,overly-optimized to combat insurgencies. NATO’s special forces are in thebest political and military position to provide both the sufficient answer,and the better option, to respond to the conflicts of the new century.

20 Carlos Lozada, “A Conversation with David Kilcullen,” Washington Post, March 22, 2009, p. B2.21 Celeste Ward, “Countering the Military’s Latest Fad,” Washington Post, May 17, 2009.

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CHAPTER TEN

NATO Should Take the Lead in Police Training

Alex Crowther

Introduction

Part of the NATO slice of a comprehensive approach should be toembrace the lead for police training. The United States is not culturally ortemperamentally suited for training local police forces. NATO, on theother hand, has 28 different members, many of whom have organizationsthat are well suited for this task. This potential asset is only partially uti-lized. National arguments over the propriety of participation in counterin-surgency (COIN) operations as well as competition between NATO andthe EU have prevented the full utilization of these police training assets.

That police are hugely important in COIN situations is almost uni-versally accepted. Police forces are the front line in a COIN situation,especially in urban settings. Local police know the area they are operatingin and are often capable of identifying the presence of insurgents or otherpeople whose presence is a signal. When theorists talk of force ratios,1 thepolice often make up the majority of those force ratios. The police providelocal security to the population and represent the daily presence of the gov-ernment in the eyes of much of the population. Non-corrupt police can bea powerful legitimator of governments. On the other hand, incompetent orcorrupt police can be a daily signal to the population of the lack of capac-ity or caring of their government and can detract from the legitimacy of the

1 Typically defined as 20 security force personnel for every 1,000 members of the population.However, studies propose a number ranging from 10 to 40.

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government. A well-trained police force is one of the main pillars ofCOIN.

Police forces have several functions in the 21st century. Norman LaChariteand Joan Wolfgang identify their tasks in a counterinsurgency environmentas normal police operations (investigation, detection, detention, and intel-ligence collection); the maintenance of discipline and proper conduct;actions to clear an area of insurgent forces and to secure that area in orderto prevent the return of the insurgents; the provision of intelligence, searchand seizure or raid operations, manning checkpoints and roadblocks, anda population and resources control programs2. Police forces in many coun-tries that are having emergencies (conflict, natural disaster, etc) are oftenchallenged by the scale of the emergency and need assistance from the out-side. As the United States is called upon to assist countries that are facedwith these challenges, it would be very nice for the United States to be ableto assist with police training. Yet it presently does not have the capabilityto effectively do so.

If a country is suffering from an insurgency, police forces are usu-ally overwhelmed or part of the problem. In such cases, an outside forceusually has to develop a new police force or retrain an existing policeforce. In both instances, someone needs to be in charge of the effort.NATO provides an organization that is fully capable of training policeforces while the United States, unfortunately, does not.

The United States was very competent at training police forces inthe 1960s, training police in their home nation and at an internationalpolice academy near Washington DC. By the early 1970s they had trainedover 10,000 police from a variety of countries. Owing to human rightsissues with the police in the Republic of Vietnam and some LatinAmerican countries, the United States Congress passed Section 112 of theForeign Assistance Act in December 1973. This legislation banned the use

2 Norman A. LaCharite and Joan Rodman Wolfgang, Police Role Of Internal Security Forces InInternal Defense, May 1972, American Institutes For Research, p 14.

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of foreign assistance funding for foreign police training. In December 1974they passed Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, replacing Section112, which prohibited USG elements from training foreign police. In spiteof this prohibition, there is a waiver procedure. There are differing opinionson how well the waiver procedure works. Several RAND analysts state thatSection 660 “provides exceptions and the possibilities for exemptions(which are usually granted)”.3 Indeed these exemptions are available for:

assistance provided to reconstitute civilian police authority andcapability in the post-conflict restoration of host nation infrastruc-ture for the purposes of supporting a nation emerging from insta-bility, and the provision of professional public safety training, toinclude training in internationally recognized standards of humanrights, the rule of law, anti-corruption, and the promotion of civil-ian police roles that support democracy4.

Walter Ladwig provides a different point of view when he says that:

Congress has authorized several exemptions that allow policeassistance in certain narrowly defined areas. The result is a systemthat is more chaotic and lacking in clear guidance than at any timeunder the Office of Public Safety. At present, the Departments ofJustice, State, Treasury, Transportation, and Defense all conductsome form of foreign police training. None of these programs arecentrally coordinated, and no agency has been assigned a lead rolefor foreign law enforcement assistance5.

Although there is a waiver for Section 660, the upshot of the leg-islation has been to virtually disable the police training capability of the

3 Terrence K. Kelly, Seth G. Jones, James E. Barnett II, Keith Crane, Robert C. Davis, Carl Jensen. AStability Police Force for the United States: Justification and Options for Creating U.S. CapabilitiesRAND, 2009, p 74.

4 Title 22 USC Section 2240 (b) (6)5 Walter C. Ladwig III, Comparative Strategy Training Foreign Police: A Missing Aspect of U.S.Security Assistance to Counterinsurgency, Merton College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UnitedKingdom, 1 July 2007.

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United States Government (USG). Since the early 1970s, the USG hasretained a small-scale training capability. The Bureau of InternationalNarcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) at the State Department has thelead for international police training. The Department of Justice also hasthe International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program(ICITAP), which trains criminal investigators. Although these programsconsist of professionals who perform their mission very well, they areoverwhelmed by the need to provide wholesale training to an entire policeforce for a country. In order to supplement their capabilities, the US mil-itary has stepped into the arena in places like Iraq, where the IraqAdvisory Group was training Ministry of the Interior forces in conjunc-tion with the Multi National Security Training Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). The police forces in Iraq were so bad in late 2007 (four years into theconflict) that Gen James Jones recommended that they disband the Iraqipolice forces.

Although the efforts of both the IAG and MNSTC-I have bornefruit by the middle of 2009, this is clearly not the optimal solution.Additionally, when the US military seeks to train police, they tend to useMilitary Police. Although this seems like a good idea, in practice it hashad some negative repercussions. The host nation police end up trained asmilitary police, not as beat cops. This can be a very good thing when theneed is for a national police force that has a paramilitary capability. Thishas manifested itself in Iraq, where the Iraqi National Police (recentlyrenamed the Federal Police) are organized in battalions and brigades andare in the fight. They are competent fighters and very highly thought ofby the US military. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the IraqiPolice. Although they have come a long way since the days when GeneralJones recommended their dissolution, they remain the weak link.Although having a high end military police capability is a good idea anda force multiplier, having beat cops on every street corner is the long-termrequirement. Additionally, the kinetic-centric approach of the US militaryto COIN operations provides a lower priority to police training and oper-ations. In the end, as an Italian Carabinieri commander noted to theRAND analysts: “Military forces do not have the expertise to conduct

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most law enforcement tasks. They do not routinely perform law enforce-ment missions, and generally lack a law enforcement mindset.”6

In addition to a dearth of police training capability and a US mil-itary training approach that minimizes police work, there is a US nationalbias against strong police forces. There is no national police force such asthe Carabinieri or the Gendarmerie, nor is there any serious proposal tocreate one in a federal republic that prefers to maintain power at the state(provincial equivalent) level. Even though there are tens of thousands ofpolice spread throughout the United States, the country has trouble gener-ating civilian police (CIVPOL) capabilities to deploy overseas. As theRAND analysts mentioned previously state:

But the United States has a mixed track record in establishing secu-rity. One reason is its federal structure of law enforcement: theUnited States has no federal high-end policing capacity that canhelp establish law and order by going on patrols, conducting crimi-nal investigations, engaging in crowd and riot control, and perform-ing other policing tasks. In the United States, policing functions aregenerally carried out at the state and local levels, with only limitedlaw enforcement powers granted to the federal government. Forexample, agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) investigate sus-pected violations of federal law and lack jurisdiction over state andlocal matters. Limits to federal power are constitutionally rooted inthe Tenth Amendment and have been recognized, especially in thepolicing arena, since the earliest days of the country.7

Why NATO?

NATO should take the lead in forming host nation police forcesinto a set of functioning organizations. NATO itself and the NATO coun-

6 Kelly et al, p 22.7 Kelly et al, pp 15-16.

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tries have demonstrated the capability to deploy CIVPOL capabilities andtrain police at both the local and national level. NATO is seeking ways toparticipate in global operations against the forces of instability. Althoughsome of their military forces are limited by national caveats and politicalissues at home, these caveats and perceived weaknesses tend to center onthe deployment of combat forces to participate in offensive operations.Police forces that are limited to training missions and whose security isprovided for are less of a political issue. Additionally, many NATO coun-tries have local, provincial and national police forces who can train theirpartner nation counterparts. NATO forces are already providing policetraining as part of NATO Training Missions in countries like Afghanistanand Iraq.

One could ask that, if the European Union already does policetraining, why should NATO seek to do so as well? The major difference isthat EUPOL operates in a permissive environment but lacks the capabilityto do police training in high risk environments. Although only militaryforces should be operating in a non-permissive environment, with appro-priate training and preparation, NATO police forces could operate in asemi-permissive environment—as the situation is currently in almost all ofIraq and most of Afghanistan.

Any training that NATO provides should be sustainable and scalable, andmust also be culturally appropriate. It should train local, provincial andnational level police. It should perform this training in the host nation. Thistraining should include running an academy for new police recruits, spe-cialized training, provision of embedded advisors and mentors to policeunits, and integrated with other efforts like those of INL and ICITAP.NATO police training should also address corruption and teach adminis-tration capabilities to ensure that host nation police forces are self-sustain-ing in the long term.

Any training regime needs to start with a good, solid analysis ofneeds and the situation. Historical examples of such analysis include theWoerner Report, which provided the conceptual framework for US actions

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in El Salvador, and the ICITAP report prepared for the Commander ofCombined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) at the beginning of the occupationof Iraq. Since NATO has a plethora of planners and access to police advice,this should not be an impossible task.

The proposed training should be sustainable and scalable.Unfortunately, some development agencies—whether oriented on securityor not—tend to build large-scale very expensive programs that overwhelmthe partner nation and may only be sustained with regular resourcing fromdonor nations. Programs delivered by NATO should be able to scale up ordown, depending on the changing needs of the partner nation, and shouldbe financially and logistically sustainable in the long term as part of aholistic law enforcement capability. Training high-end very capable inves-tigators in a country with no forensic capabilities, for example, can be awaste of training and time unless donor countries are willing to buildforensics labs, resource them in the short term, and build a sustainmentcapability. MNSTC-I is currently building seven forensics labs in Iraq asan effort in this direction. This may work in Iraq, which has a national lawenforcement infrastructure to build upon and a regular funding stream dueto oil revenues, yet equivalent efforts might be unsustainable elsewherebecause of the lack of an educated work force and inadequate long termresourcing.

The proposed NATO training should be culturally appropriate.Several writers have noted that the United States tends to have trouble pro-viding trainers who are culturally aware and sensitive. The other NATOcountries should be able to provide trainers who are from a multiculturalmilieu, who speak other languages, and who have day-to-day experiencewith other religions and cultures. Such backgrounds should help to avoidpreconceived notions and facilitate development of a culturally appropri-ate program of instruction.

Even with cultural nous, NATO police trainers and advisors wouldthemselves need appropriate training before deploying. Although manyEuropeans speak other languages and have been exposed to other cultures,

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a beat cop from a developed country cannot simply be moved to the mid-dle of nowhere in another country/culture. NATO should develop an in-house capability designed to prepare police trainers for deployment toother countries. This would allow the organization to smooth over any dif-ferences that might be present as a result of country-specific origins ofpolice trainers. It also would allow NATO to provide a uniformly preparedtrainer. This approach would manifest itself in the quality of the training aswell as a common approach, providing for common training of all hostnation police forces regardless of the country of origin of the trainer.Additionally, additional threat awareness and mitigation training must beprovided to any CIVPOL trainers who are deploying into a semi-permis-sive environment. Although this type of environment is challenging, prop-er training, equipping and employment will go a long way to mitigate thelack of security.

This proposed NATO capability should be able to train local,provincial and national level police. One of the strengths of bringing inpolice trainers from NATO countries is that different European countrieshave different approaches to policing, which enables different countries toprovide different levels of training. As an example, some European coun-tries have national-level police who perform paramilitary operations athome. The RAND analysts identified key examples which include theFrench Gendarmerie, Italian Carabinieri, Spanish Guardia Civil, DutchKoninklijke Marechaussée, and Portuguese Guarda NacionalRepublicana. They also identified another type of force that includes“high-end units from international organizations” such as NATO’sMultinational Specialized Units (MSUs), the European Union’s IntegratedPolice Units, and the European Gendarmerie Force.8 These forces are per-fect for training national-level paramilitary forces in the host nation.Indeed, the Carabinieri are currently training the Federal Police in Iraq andthe National Police in Afghanistan. The European countries in NATO alsohave police forces operating at the provincial level and the local level who

8 Kelly et al, p 17

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can deploy to train, advise and mentor their peers in host nations that arechallenged by insurgents.

An important aspect of this proposal is that the training should beperformed in the host nation instead of an out-of-country location. Thiswill require a modicum of political will on the part of the donor countries,as their forces will have to deploy into areas that are not the most secure.Yet this approach is desirable for several reasons. First, it shows the part-ner nation forces that police can survive and thrive in a challenging envi-ronment. Training local forces outside the country sets a bad example.Second, it allows for full cultural immersion on the part of the trainers. Byliving with their trainees, they get the most out of the event and becomemuch better trainers because of their deeper understanding of the hostnation environment. Finally, and perhaps most important for the donornations, it is the most cost effective method. It is very expensive to trans-port and support students outside their own country. Such costs led to thedemise of the NATO training program in Jordan, as the training proved tobe just too expensive for the number of police officers they trained.

This proposed NATO training capability should also include run-ning one or more police academies inside the host nation. Rather than justproviding technical training, this approach also allows NATO to shape thehost nation forces. By immersing the trainees in a carefully controlledatmosphere, NATO can not only provide basic and specialized training; itcan also present examples to the trainees and concentrate on the conceptu-al work required to address underlying cultural issues that are inimical tonational development, such as corruption, and often prove to be de-legiti-mators. While the training should be an adjunct to programs conductedinside the host nation, NATO countries should also be prepared to invitepromising host nation trainees to their academies in Europe, where cadetscan be exposed to different societies and see European norms in action intheir home environment.

Training efforts should also provide embedded advisors and men-tors from the strategic to the tactical level, from the Ministry of the Interior

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and the headquarters of the national police to provincial level units, andfrom provincial command centers or fusion centers to local police units.Although this presence is extremely important for the success of the mis-sion, it is vital to note that this makes security for the trainers and mentorsa critical issue.

The NATO training program should be able to integrate with otherinternational and regional efforts like those of INL and ICITAP. Theinvolvement of regional organizations helps to provide legitimacy to thetraining mission, while the integration of other international efforts allowsaccess to resources. NATO should consider a national-level presence thatis designed to either integrate with other players, or preferably take thelead in integrating the efforts of others into the NATO-led effort. Thiswould allow other actors to bring limited resources to the table withouthaving to worry about their ability to provide overhead or to expendresources in integrating efforts.

One very important aspect of any police training program is theability to teach administration capabilities. Any NATO training effortshould be a holistic one that addresses requirements such as maintenance,planning and monitoring of operations, budgeting, procurement and pro-gramming to ensure that police forces are self-sustaining in the long term.The developed countries tend to have very functional administrative capa-bilities that act as force multipliers for their security services. No one canperform a mounted patrol with a vehicle that is non-functional because oflack of fuel, repair parts or mechanics. Everyone who has worked in chal-lenging environments has seen host nation organizations that are not ascapable as they could be, owing to a lack of administrative capabilitywhich was largely ignored because it was perceived to be unimportant.Teaching these administrative capabilities ensures that the host nation canmaintain their capabilities after the eventual departure of the assistingforces.

Any proposed NATO mission requires a strong strategic commu-nications program within contributing member states, internationally, and

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in the host nation. These efforts are easy to misunderstand and can bemanipulated by our global and local opponents. At both the local and glob-al level, the enemy will twist facts and use pernicious lies to discreditNATO efforts. The local population will wonder what it is that NATO isteaching their police. Certain international actors may vilify NATO fortraining security forces that are accused of violating human rights.Furthermore, the domestic population may wonder why their police arestuck on the other side of the world training other police instead of provid-ing security at home. A robust strategic communications capability canaddress all of these audiences and provide an accurate picture of where thepolice trainers are, what they are doing, and why this is important to boththe host nation and NATO member states. Otherwise, the NATO trainingmission risks ceding the narrative to the enemy.

The advantages of a training mission executed by NATO includeits ability to attract security specialists who have experience applicable tothe host nations. As one example, the Iraqis seek to learn from the UKexperience in Northern Ireland as they try to reconcile disparate sectariangroups. Having police trainers who have experience in Northern Irelandpresent at an Iraqi police academy has the potential to be a huge additionto the learning experience for the Iraqi police. Police forces from otherNATO countries will also bring applicable experiences with them.

In the end, the most important issue may be the political will toperform the mission. NATO has demonstrated that it can deploy forcesoverseas to address certain challenges. However, not all countries in theAlliance share the same vision of NATO’s role and how to achieve its pur-pose. Developing an extensive police training capacity would be an expen-sive project, and one in which security is problematic and the ability toplan and execute in the long term is at a premium. All of these issuesrequire the political leaders of the NATO countries to take the lead andconvince their citizens and legislatures that this is a worthwhile project.

Expense is a major issue for NATO countries, especially duringthe current global economic crisis. However, the case could be made that

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a small investment in security in countries where insurgencies rage, wheregovernments are challenged, or where large amounts of territory lie out-side of government control, is cheaper in the long run than allowing insur-gencies to succeed or allowing criminal and terrorist groups space toorganize more attacks on the United States and Europe.

The length of these projects is also daunting. Politicians tend tofocus on projects that will manifest themselves during their current termin office. Successfully training a police force for a country takes years, ifnot a decade or more. And as mentioned above, politicians must also beable to convince their legislatures and constituents that this is a worthwhileproject that they should support. The politicians must then continue to sup-port this project with resources and strategic communications so that theircountry will have the political will to continue it to fruition.

The biggest political concern is likely to be the security of thetrainers. Many politicians feel that their citizens will not tolerate casualtiesin far-off lands. As a consequence, they impose national caveats on thetypes of operations that their forces are allowed to perform. Many of thesecaveats revolve around offensive action. As police training is not an offen-sive action, it should be easier for politicians and their constituents to tol-erate. When done properly, however, police training eventually involvesplacing police mentors and advisors in dangerous positions. The enemyoften targets police forces, especially in small villages and hamlets that arelocated far from timely assistance. Although this is difficult to deal with,in order to succeed in the long term, these isolated areas also need to beprotected and police forces need to operate there.

As part of the larger police training program, NATO should devel-op a special course designed to train police to survive in a counterinsur-gency environment. It should also equip these police mentors appropriate-ly if they are deploying to a semi-permissive environment. In addition, theoverall police training plan should identify when and where police mentorsand advisors are deployed to dangerous areas. The plan should allow forthe defense of isolated locations, provide for reaction forces and medical

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evacuation in case of emergencies. These actions taken together can miti-gate many of the dangers of serving in these locations; however, we shouldnot fool ourselves into thinking that we can plan away all danger. NATOleaders need to be honest and explain the fact that some police trainersmay be injured during their deployment. Only by being totally honest willthe populations of contributing nations support such opportunities.

Conclusion

There is a very strong need for police training around the worldtoday. There are countries that are beset by insurgencies, countries that arechallenged by criminal organizations, and countries where the writ of thegovernment does not hold sway over the entire land. All of these placescould use better and larger police forces. These police forces will needtraining and mentoring. The United States, already overstretched with twosimultaneous wars and numerous other deployments, and having institu-tional, legal and cultural biases against training police forces, is not theoptimum solution alone for meeting this requirement. The 28 nations thatmake up NATO make the Alliance as a whole an ideal source of policetraining. This training would be less expensive and less offensive than mil-itary operations. It is more easily explained to domestic audiences. NATOcountries have police forces that already do this type of training, and haveexpansive police forces at home that are available to provide this training.They have the experience and cultural nous that would make them superbpolice trainers just about anywhere. All that is lacking is for the NATOcountries to grasp this opportunity and make themselves into the premierpolice trainers in the world.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

Fixing Foreign Assistance for Counterinsurgency

Terrence Kelly, Larry Crandall and Laurel Miller

Introduction

Why study the effectiveness of foreign assistance in counterinsur-gency?1 Simply put, because efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have demon-strated significant shortcomings in the U.S. government’s ability to effec-tively conceive and deliver foreign assistance under these circumstances.2

What changes are needed to improve U.S. capabilities to design and imple-ment foreign assistance programs that contribute to meeting the goals ofcounterinsurgency? In order to answer this question, we first address howthe objectives of and challenges to foreign assistance in counterinsurgencydiffer from those in “normal” development circumstances. Next, we lookat what changes are needed in order to improve delivery of foreign assis-tance in counterinsurgency. We frame our discussion around four majorand inter-related topics – authorities, resources, practices and organiza-tions. We look at the challenges of designing and delivering foreign assis-tance in contested areas holistically, as real solutions require all relevantagencies and systems within those agencies to work together, and requireadjustments in how work is conducted both in the field and in Washington– in both the executive and legislative branches of government. We alsoexamine the need to work better with host nations. We conclude with rec-ommendations for changes. Some of these would require statutory changes

1 For a functional definition and reference on foreign assistance, see United States Department of Stateand U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Foreign Assistance Reference Guide, 2005. Asof January 23, 2009: http://rmportal.net/library/VIII/highlevel_faaguide/view.

2 The literature on these shortcomings is vast, and will not be reviewed in depth here.

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and/or reorganization of government agencies. Others would only requirenew or modified approaches or attitudinal changes, such as improvingworking arrangements with host governments by recognizing the centrali-ty of their roles.

How does the U.S. government provide foreign assistance?

Foreign assistance is provided through a collection of programsfunded by annual appropriations and authorized by the Foreign AssistanceAct.3 These authorities are generally found in Title 22 U.S. Code. Fundstend to be appropriated and sometimes earmarked for specific programs inspecific countries. There are exceptions, some of which will be addressedin the following discussion, but, importantly, in most cases funding cannotbe moved from one program/country pairing to another – or even from oneproject to another within a country when urgent new needs arise – withoutcongressional notification and acquiescence.4 Furthermore, even whenthey can be made, such changes can create real bureaucratic challengesamong agencies and posts and consume considerable time.

With the exception of military assistance (Title 22 programsbroadly overseen by the Department of State but executed by the DefenseDepartment), the principal agencies for the delivery of foreign assistanceare the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and certainfunctional bureaus of the Department of State.5 These entities design andmanage programs, but for the most part do not conduct programs them-

3 Under normal circumstances, foreign assistance funding is provided by the Commerce, State, andJustice subcommittees of the Senate and House appropriations committees, as part of the annualappropriations cycle. However, for Iraq and Afghanistan most funds come through supplementalappropriations that are “off-budget” and so not broken down as separate bills under the jurisdictionof the respective appropriations subcommittees, though they still play major roles in the legislativeprocess.

4 Upon notification, Congress has 15 legislative days within which to object; if there is no objection,the notified action may proceed.

5 These include the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau and the Population, Refugeesand Migration Bureau.

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selves. Rather, they employ program managers who oversee contracts withand grants to private companies and non-governmental organizations.Other funds are administered by special agencies and offices establishedfor this purpose.6

In the most general sense, this system works more or less as intended whenthere is sufficient time to identify long-term development needs, coordi-nate approaches, design programs, publish requests for proposals, obtainand review contract and grant proposals, and execute programs. Programaccountability is achieved by defining and documenting program objec-tives, performance metrics, and reporting requirements. There are excep-tions to this need to plan ahead of time and execute as planned. Emergencyhumanitarian assistance, which works on a contingency basis, is a notableexample. However, in these cases additional flexibility in planning andexecution is usually provided by the Congress, such as the indefinite fis-cal year availability of Migration and Refugee Assistance funds, or the“notwithstanding” authority recurrently given to USAID’s Office ofTransition Initiatives.

The opportunity to plan and resource efforts well in advance is almostnever available in counterinsurgency. In these cases, needs arise quicklyand often are unforeseen, and the delivery of assistance should be flexibleenough to meet changing needs and conditions on the ground.7 This leadsus to our next consideration.

How does foreign assistance in counterinsurgency differ from foreignassistance in “normal” circumstances?

Three major factors that differentiate providing foreign assistancein counterinsurgency and in “normal” circumstances: the purpose of pro-

6 For examples, see U.S. Foreign Assistance Guidelines, January, 2005, p.17-18. 7 In some circumstances, particularly for extended counterinsurgency operations, developing multi-year assistance strategies also will be important in order to address needs such as capacity buildingand security force training.

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viding assistance, the need for flexibility, and the effect of violence onassistance programs. In “normal” circumstances there is no significantviolent opposition to the host nation’s government or to U.S. assistanceefforts, and each element of foreign assistance is designed to fill a speci-fied need. For example, development assistance (DA) is designed to pro-vide “ ... sustained support of the people of developing countries in theirefforts to acquire the knowledge and resources essential to developmentand to build the economic, political, and social institutions which willimprove the quality of their lives.”8 DA programs usually are administeredby USAID, in principle without much oversight from or connectivity toother elements of the U.S. presence in a country.9 The principal – and oftensole – purpose of these efforts is self-evident: i.e., improvements in agri-culture, education or governance that will lead to economic growth andother positive social benefits.

In counterinsurgency the principal purpose of foreign assistance is to helpthe host nation’s government stabilize the political and security situation inthe country. This translates in practical terms into such programs as creat-ing jobs, transitioning combatants out of militant formations, and promot-ing security sector and justice system reforms. These are types of pro-grams that can help the host nation improve its political and governanceeffectiveness, legitimacy and reach – in reality and in the public’s percep-tion – and decrease the appeal of the violent opposition. This in turn helpsthe government suppress violent actors.

These objectives imply that determining what foreign assistance efforts should beundertaken must be part of a larger plan that integrates all civilian and militaryefforts and reflects larger and more overt political considerations. Specifically,such foreign assistance efforts must be linked to U.S. diplomatic efforts and tomilitary efforts to address the security situation. The three Ds – Diplomacy,Development and Defense – must be part of a single unified effort to succeed.

8 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), Chapters 1 and 10 of Part I, as quoted in the U.S.Foreign Assistance Guide. This is the authorizing statute for development assistance.

9 The reality varies; some U.S. ambassadors engage actively in shaping USAID projects and strategiesin their countries.

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Though the primary providers of foreign assistance may not differ in “nor-mal” and counterinsurgency environments, the demands and constraintsplaced on these providers will. In some cases, authorities may be insuffi-cient for an agency to perform a needed mission in contested circum-stances. For example, USAID is often the best-equipped agency to managethe reintegration component of disarmament, demobilization, and reinte-gration (DDR) programs, but sometimes is blocked by current statutoryand regulatory restrictions.10 In addition, the capacity limitations of U.S.agencies in some cases leave them unable to meet the resource require-ments or time constraints common in counterinsurgency environments.With regard to resource constraints, security sector reform, for example,often requires capacity development in security-related agencies, yetUSAID — the principal U.S. government agency with the technical skillsand experience in developing bureaucratic capacity, has not been the pri-mary actor in doing this in either Iraq or Afghanistan. As a final example,State International Narcotic and Law Enforcement (INL) is the lead entityfor police training, yet lacks the capacity and skills to do so in violent cir-cumstances, while U.S. law enforcement agencies are denied the opportu-nity to lead because of the structure of the U.S bureaucracy.

Policy makers responsible for foreign assistance emphasize fiscal account-ability and formal assessments of progress. While these requirements maybe manageable in normal circumstances, counterinsurgency oftendemands more flexibility in spending and execution than these require-ments permit.11 For example, contracts with firm deliverable criteria anddates are expected in normal circumstances, but can be unhelpful in high-

10 Author’s personal experience developing DDR policies and programs in Iraq for the CPA in 2004.Many of the “R” programs in DDR are natural fits for USAID; however, some “DD” programs arenormally outside of USAID’s portfolio. USAID can usually conduct reintegration programs oncecombatants have been demobilized, and can even assist in disarming under some circumstances,according to interviews with USAID legal staff. According to a former State Department official inIraq, however, vocational training for former combatants was funded by the Defense Departmentbecause of USAID resistance on legal grounds.

11 According to a former State Department official in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for IraqReconstruction (SIGIR) repeatedly criticized efforts to change the focus and use of IraqReconstruction Fund monies to respond to changing circumstances, and both SIGIR and theGovernment Accountability Office insisted on clear strategies and mileposts.

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ly dynamic situations. These differences are discussed further below.

The third major difference between the delivery of foreign assistance innormal and counterinsurgency situations is the presence of violent actorswho may threaten those delivering assistance. If diplomats and develop-ment experts must travel in armed convoys wearing helmets and flak vests,then they are greatly restricted in what they can do and how they can do it.Yet, it is often in exactly these circumstances that their efforts are mostimportant. For example, if winning the allegiance of the population is crit-ical to defeating an insurgency, then, once some minimal level of securityis established, the population’s other basic needs and expectations must bemet. In order to be most effective, efforts to do this must be undertakenbefore an area is perfectly safe, as explored below.

Organizations, authorities, resources and practices

As explained above, in counterinsurgency environments – just asin “normal” circumstances – civilian agencies ought to perform those for-eign assistance functions that are inherently civilian in nature, and shouldbe properly designed, managed and resourced to perform the requiredtasks and, importantly, work more collaboratively. If civilian foreign assis-tance providers need to deliver foreign assistance more effectively, thenwhat authorities, resources, practices, and organizations are needed in thefield and in Washington to succeed? We explore these questions in the fol-lowing sections.

Authorities and funding mechanisms

Authorities for foreign assistance are not structured for counterin-surgency. The Foreign Assistance Act and Foreign Operations appropria-tions bills do not provide the flexibility or agility needed to create, fund,and operate programs that must be put in place on short notice or thatrequire changes in the middle of program execution in contested areas. Weidentify three categories of issues concerning authorities and funding

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channels that should be addressed in order to make the provision of for-eign assistance during counterinsurgency operations more agile than itcurrently is.

First, it can be difficult to make funds available quickly when acounterinsurgency operation arises. Foreign assistance funds are author-ized and appropriated for specific purposes and countries according to abudget process that takes from several months (if a supplemental appropri-ation is used) to more than a year (for the regular appropriations process).Funds then allocated by an agency for a particular program in a particularcountry cannot be moved to another program or country without notifyingand providing Congress an opportunity to block the transfer – a processthat can be lengthy, depending on whether members of Congress raise con-cerns, does not guarantee a positive outcome, and taxes limited staff.

Second, the expenditure of foreign assistance funds is subject tocertain legal restrictions and limitations.12 These include prohibitions onaid to countries that fit into certain categories – e.g., major drug produc-ers, countries that expropriate the property of U.S. citizens, and sponsorsof terrorism; a bar on aid to certain named countries – e.g., Cuba; andrestrictions on what aid can be used for – e.g. assistance to police. In prac-tice, such restrictions can be circumvented through waivers (which can betime-consuming to obtain) or use of “notwithstanding” authority providedin legislation,13 or apply to countries (such as Cuba) that would not be pro-vided aid in any event for policy reasons. In addition, in some cases pro-hibitions apply only to assistance to a government, leaving open the oppor-tunity to provide aid directly to the people of a country or through NGOs.

12 See Center for Strategic & International Studies, “A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts toStrengthen Fragile States,” pp. 19-26, 61-65 (March 2008).

13 Congress often grants “notwithstanding” authority. It can be provided for discrete efforts and as ablanket authority for organizations with missions for which it is deemed appropriate (e.g., the Officeof Transition Initiatives at USAID). For a list of examples of “notwithstanding” authorities, seeCenter for Strategic & International Studies, “A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to StrengthenFragile States,” p. 60 (March 2008). Such authority is seldom used, however, because of the risk thatcongressional appropriators will effectively penalize its use.

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The two most significant limitations from the perspective of counterinsur-gency operations are (1) the prohibition on use of economic aid to supportmilitary objectives (an essential tool of counterinsurgency); and (2) therestriction on using foreign aid for training foreign police.14 The latter hasbeen almost entirely eroded through the legislation of multiple exceptions,including very broad exceptions for “community-based” policing assis-tance and post-conflict assistance. But eliminating the restriction altogeth-er could help clear the way for improving U.S. capacity to build policeforces that can assume responsibility for security in counterinsurgencyenvironments, as this would remove any remaining ambiguities.

Third, the multiplicity of foreign assistance accounts, and the mul-tiple agencies and offices that manage programs under those accounts, cre-ate a bureaucratic tangle of legislative provisions, regulations and respon-sible officials. In counterinsurgency, navigating that tangle in order to puttogether rapidly a coherent package of foreign assistance for a country orregion takes on special urgency. Consequently, for these circumstances,authority over foreign assistance program planning and funding allocation,and responsibility for negotiation and consultation with legislators shouldbe concentrated and located with the civilian and military decision-makerswho are responsible for the counterinsurgency operation. Consolidation ofauthority over how the foreign assistance dollars are spent would help min-imize bureaucratic obstacles and delays, and would ensure that the assis-tance strategy is directly tied to the diplomatic and military strategy forreducing violence and promoting political stability.

Special authority of the type that could address all three categoriesof issues for counterinsurgency is provided by the Support for EastEuropean Democracy (SEED) Act15 and the Freedom Support Act (FSA).16

The SEED Act, for central and eastern Europe, and the FSA, for countriesof the former Soviet Union, provide the State Department with a consoli-dated channel of significant funds together with relative bureaucratic flex-

14 Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act.15 SEED Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-179).16 FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-511).

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ibility for assistance programs for the relevant countries. The assistanceCoordinator created by this legislation, a Washington-based senior StateDepartment official, is authorized to:

1. move funds between programs and countries and acrossagency budgets with relatively minimal Congressional over-sight (notifications are still required) and with or without theconcurrence of the Chiefs of Mission in the affected coun-tries;

2. provide assistance “notwithstanding” other provisions oflaw;

3. set region-wide funding priorities; and 4. act as the authoritative Executive Branch representative tothe Congress with respect to the funds and programs underthe Coordinator’s authority.

Adopting a SEED/FSA type of approach to foreign assistance forcounterinsurgency operations could require legislation creating a newfunding account and designating the responsible decision-maker for allo-cating funds under the account. The legislation could provide that such aperson be located either in Washington or in the field, at the President’sdiscretion, depending on the circumstances. The account could be madeavailable for use in any country, upon presidential determination of theneed to access the account, based on criteria specified in the legislation.Provision could be made for shifting funds to the new account from othersonce a counterinsurgency operation arises,17 so that funds can be madequickly available pending a supplemental or regular appropriation. TheStafford Act, which provides authorities and funding for reaction todomestic disasters upon presidential declaration of an emergency, offers anexample of the type of authority needed to quickly ramp a foreign assis-tance program during a counterinsurgency operation.18 This act specifies

17 Current legislation already contains some provisions for transferring funds among accounts for con-tingencies.

18 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-288, as amended,42 U.S.C. 5121-5207 (Public Law 100-707).

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types of actions that may be taken, the agencies responsible for theseactions, and reporting requirements to the Congress. It also provides fundsimmediately upon invocation.19 A similar set of authorities would positionthe executive branch to react quickly and decisively at the beginning of acounterinsurgency operation.

Resources

Resources fall into two major categories – fiscal and human.Fiscal resources are intimately tied to authorities and organizations, andhave been addressed above. One issue not yet addressed is whether theamount of funds requested by the President and provided by the Congressfor foreign assistance and the organizations that provide assistance is ade-quate. While this paper cannot explore this issue generally, it is worth not-ing that for Iraq a strong argument can be made that the assistance fundsprovided were more than adequate but not well spent.20 That said, fundingfor U.S. efforts in Iraq has been hugely imbalanced: according to one sen-ior State Department official, ninety-eight percent of funds provided forIraq went at one time to the military and only two percent to all otherefforts, despite consistent statements about the importance of the politicaland economic issues at hand.21

A separate fiscal resources issue concerns funding of efforts toexpand and improve the capacity of existing organizations (e.g., USAID)to provide foreign assistance. Such efforts are underway, but funding hasnot met policy goals as of this writing. Further, new organizations such asthe State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization(S/CRS) have been created but not funded to meet requirements. Perhapsmost notably, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has on multiple occa-sions called for greater funding for development and the organizations that

19 Contingency funding for humanitarian emergencies provides a further possible model.20 See the many SIGIR reports for details of problematic spending.21 Author discussion in 2006 with Bradford Higgins, who would later become Assistant Secretary ofState for Resource Management, Chief Financial Officer.

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conduct it, as this would relieve the Defense Department of these tasks, butthe call has not been fully heeded.

Human resources can be viewed from two angles – quantity and quality.We note that the number of people required to deliver foreign assistance isan issue that is currently under debate. The paucity of FSOs (in USAID inparticular) compared with the enhanced requirements posed by Iraq andAfghanistan, and the issue of whether USAID needs government person-nel to deliver foreign assistance rather than program managers who con-tract for its delivery, are issues frequently raised.22 ProvincialReconstruction Teams provide a good example. PRTs can be seen as an adhoc effort to create the capabilities existent in USAID in 1970 – an indi-cator that the U.S. government does need some ability to do more with itsown personnel, as contractors cannot be expected to operate in dangerouscircumstances in the absence of exorbitant compensation (e.g. liabilityissues are significant).23 This paper will not render a judgment on theproper government/contractor mix for the delivery of foreign assistance,other than to observe that the need for more government employees –FSOs, civil servants or temporary hires – to do this work is indicated byrecent experience. An analysis that looks at requirements and costs overrecent history and takes into consideration mid-term projections of needsis required to address this issue.

The quality of personnel needed is also important. As noted above,the failure of the CPA was due in part to the dearth of qualified personnelit was able to field.24 The leadership qualities and other skills required ofthose responsible for foreign assistance in counterinsurgency include notonly the technical expertise needed for delivering foreign assistance undernormal conditions but also an understanding of what is required and the

22 The shortfall in FSOs in USAID has been recognized, and authority for additional hiring provided.However, at the time of this writing, the funds to pay for this increase have not been provided.

23 See Terrence Kelly, “PRT Lessons from Iraq” in Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach inSemi-permissive Environments, NATO Defense College, Christopher Schnaubelt, ed., 2009.

24 See, among many things, Terrence Kelly et al., Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing:Developing U.S. Civilian Personnel Capabilities, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2008.

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physical and mental ability to lead and work in dangerous situations. Thenormal promotion systems in civilian organizations do not explicitly con-sider these additional characteristics, nor are the assignment systems atState and USAID aimed at identifying the people best suited for counterin-surgency and quickly deploying them – involuntarily if need be – to theseplaces. According to one senior FSO interviewed for this work who hashad considerable experience over a long career in dangerous places, suc-cess in these circumstances requires people who are willing and able toassess and take reasonable risks. These observations indicate that the systems that hire and promote civil-ians who work in dangerous places are not attuned to these needs, andthere are not enough civilian government employees to do the work. Without adjustments that:

• identify and fund proper staffing levels;• identify and promote leaders and technicians capable of oper-ating effectively in counterinsurgency;• efficiently tap into civilian expertise, perhaps through use ofinnovative approaches such as a civilian reserve corps,25 and• identify and assign the proper people where they are neededin counterinsurgency,

effective foreign assistance will not be delivered. Note that without thiselement, better authorities, sufficient resources, good practices and well-designed organizations will not suffice. People are central to success incounterinsurgency.

Oversight

The Duke of Wellington once asked, in response to an admoni-tion from London to better account for his supplies and equipment, for

25 The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction is develop-ing such a corps. Even if fully realized, however, the corps will not fully resolve either the quantityor quality problems identified here.

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guidance on whether he should train clerks or fight Napoleon, as hecould not do both. As this anecdote indicates, oversight of resources isan area in which peacetime rules can hinder success in counterinsur-gency. Put simply, during conflicts the machinery needed for properlyassessing programs and accounting for resources may either be impos-sible to employ — because of the potential for violence, the dynamicnature of the situation, or time and personnel constraints — or may notwork well, because of the limited availability of data.26 However, gov-ernment officials still bear responsibility for proper use of taxpayers’money. There exists a tension between effectiveness and accountabili-ty in counterinsurgency that is more powerful than in normal develop-ment conditions and needs to be addressed by reviewing statutory andregulatory oversight authorities. This task is critical. If to succeed aperson must put his or her career on the line and possibly even skirt thelaw, in addition to possibly risking his or her life, then the enterprise isin jeopardy.

In the conduct of this study, we interviewed many current andformer foreign assistance practitioners and scholars. All with whom wediscussed this issue recognized this tension, but none had concrete rec-ommendations for how to address it. Several indicated that there is suf-ficient leeway in current laws and regulations to create “work-arounds”and get special permissions, and that the key is leaders focused onaccomplishing the task at hand and willing to roll up their sleeves andwork hard to make efforts succeed. We believe that the responsibility forcrafting programs that will work should not depend on leaders in thefield coming up with imaginative ways to work around the rules, butrather a set of rules that would permit this to happen in a natural way.More work is needed to identify the specific changes to statute and reg-ulation required to do this.

26 Collecting data in conflict situations is not only difficult, but the veracity of the data is hard toensure; author’s personal experience.

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Practices

Many U.S. capability shortfalls in providing foreign assistance areself-inflicted and stem from harmful practices. Here, we address threeprincipal questions:

• Should Washington direct actions in the field? • How much information is too much? • How can risk management be more helpful?

Furthermore, successful practices are often not captured and institutional-ized. Good practices need to be identified and institutionalized, and badones memorialized and eradicated.

Should Washington direct actions in the field?

Washington’s role is to set policy, provide resources and to performtasks that cannot easily be done in the field (e.g. coordinating with a host ofinternational organizations and NGOs), and the role of leaders in the fieldis to provide advice to policy makers, execute policy and spend resources inwell-crafted operations and programs. The right balance between authorityin the field and in the capital will be unique to each situation, but there aresome general rules of thumb. In particular, a balance must be struck betweeninformation demands from Washington and time constraints in the field.Washington wants to know as much as possible about how things are tran-spiring in the field, and often tries to direct operations from afar. This resultsin Washington levying tremendous requirements for gathering, arrangingand reporting information, and officials not in touch with the current situa-tion and indigenous players calling the shots. Decisions made by officialsnot in touch with the current situation can be quite damaging to U.S. inter-ests. An example from U.S. experiences in Afghanistan during the 1980sillustrates this well, and shows that this phenomenon, though made moreprevalent by information technology, is not new.

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A certain Mullah Malang was in complete control of all opium produc-tion in southern Afghanistan, the sales proceeds of which he used to buyweapons and support troops to fight the Soviets. He wanted to meet theAmbassador to discuss a deal that would have the U.S. repair the hydro-elec-tric facility at Kajakai Dam in the Helmand Valley as well as other assistancein exchange for ceasing opium production in that area. USAID arranged ameeting with him and the Embassy narcotics officer. The USAID MissionDirector told him that the United States would give him resources now paid forby narcotics revenues if he would shut down production. He agreed. USAIDWashington was informed of the arrangement.

After the growing season, the U.S. Mission carried out a triple inspec-tion – DEA, USAID and the CIA all verified his compliance by differentmethods.

When it became apparent that USAID would have to follow throughwith support to an erstwhile narco-trafficker, a Washington-based high-levelUSAID official cancelled the deal at the eleventh hour after the U.S. Missionhad started giving him what he needed to remain politically credible with hismujahideen and narco-trafficking cohorts. Left with no choice, the Mission ter-minated assistance. Mullah Malang’s enemies soon learned of this and mur-dered him, literally cutting him in half with four blazing AK-47s on a busy streetduring daylight hours in Peshawar. The lesson was not lost on many Afghans.

Opium production immediately began anew. This story lives on insouthern Afghanistan and contributes to today’s reality that Afghanistan is nowthe largest illicit opium producer in the world, the proceeds of which helps fundIslamist extremists.27

Clear and useful practices are needed in defining the respective roles ofWashington and officials in the field, and discipline should be exercised infollowing these guidelines to make sure that the best outcome is achieved.The President should instruct his principal Washington advisors to focus on

27 Interviews with, and emails from, Ambassador Robert Oakley, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan at thetime of this event; Larry Crandall, the USAID Mission Director, and his Narcotics officer, PhyllisOakley, later to become Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research at State.

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such roles as policy formulation, international coordination and the provisionof resources, and insist that the key leaders at post and in the field be permit-ted to discharge their responsibilities without undue meddling fromWashington. He should also insist that key leaders at post or in the field doso effectively, and relieve them if they are unable to achieve results.

How much information (for Washington) is too much?

Policy makers in Washington need current information to assessprogress in counterinsurgency so that they can develop policy, coordinate andprovide resources. However, information requirements need to recognize thesize and capabilities of deployed staffs. This problem is particularly acutewhen civilian and military staffs are both deployed on an operation, owing tothe much larger, more capable and formal military staffs. When military andcivilian leadership in country and Washington demand data of deployed per-sonnel, civilian staffs often cannot service these requests, or can only do soby devoting a disproportionate amount of time and effort to data collectionand reporting to the detriment of the tasks they are charged to perform.

Military staffs are more capable, not only because of their size and char-acter, but also because of their access to data, which is facilitated bygreater access to the country and its people – as a result of the military’sability to operate in violent areas. Furthermore, military staffs and opera-tors are distinct – for example, staffs do not conduct kinetic operationsduring the day and perform staff work at night. Civilian staffs, on the otherhand, are often exactly the same people who conduct engagements withhost nation personnel during the day. Large demands on the staff precludethem from conducting these engagements.28 In some circumstances,advantages could be achieved by combining staffs. This discrepancy existsin Washington as well, where DoD staffs are large and formal, and civilianagency staffs smaller and less well-resourced. How to get the most fromall staffs is an area for further investigation.

28 Author observations, Iraq, 2006-2007.

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This underscores a point made earlier: the President should ensure that hisprincipal advisors stay focused on policy and resource issues, and not onrunning efforts in country from Washington. Doing so would limit theinformation needs of those in Washington and relieve those in country ofunnecessary reporting requirements (e.g., on programmatic or operationallevel details). If valid information requirements – i.e. those needed for pol-icy formulation or resource allocation – cannot be met with existing staffs,then staff resources should be increased.

How can risk management be more helpful?

Risk management in civilian organizations during counterinsur-gency is the responsibility of the Ambassador, the Regional SecurityOfficer (RSO) at the U.S. Embassy, and the State Department’s Bureau ofDiplomatic Security (DS). Without reasonable security procedures, civil-ian officials responsible for planning and supervising the delivery of for-eign assistance cannot work safely – or at all.

Our interviews raised two bedrock issues that need to be addressed:

• What is the risk to be managed?• How should an organization take responsibility for risk?

Currently, according to some of our interviewees, the currentapproach to risk is one that focuses primarily on risk to people and loca-tions. However, the system must also consider risk to the overall mis-sion. According to one senior State Department official, this is becausediplomatic security personnel are evaluated according to whether theykeep their charges safe, not whether the overall diplomatic mission suc-ceeds.29 Without factoring in risk to the overall mission, the approach isone of risk avoidance, not risk management. In places where risk avoid-

29 Interview with David Kilcullen, former Counterinsurgency advisor to former Secretary Rice,October 2008.

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ance is the approach, the task of factoring in risk to the mission withother risks falls to individual FSOs or other civilian personnel. In par-ticular, one senior State official we talked to indicated that many seekto work around the restrictions placed on them by the RSO, and so theyindividually assume the entire burden of risk management – in the formof personal risks that they may not be well placed to judge, as well asrisks to their careers should they be caught violating policy.

While this study did not include the kind of data collection thatwould be needed to substantiate or refute these assessments on the part ofsenior officials, these statements ring true because of the authors’ experi-ences. Experiences in less violent dangerous operations, such as those inthe Balkans in the 1990s until today, have not suffered from these same fail-ures.30 However, operations in more violent places indicate clear character-istics that diplomatic security needs to have in order to facilitate the foreignassistance mission. First, the approach to risk needs to consider and balancerisk to people, facilities and the mission. A “no casualties” policy can beachieved by never deploying diplomatic and developmental officers inharm’s way. Second, risk management must be distributed across the organ-ization, not concentrated in individuals. This can only be achieved by a riskmanagement policy that takes into consideration the diplomatic and devel-opmental missions. Third, the Ambassador must be involved in risk man-agement, as he or she is best placed to balance risk to people and facilitieswith risk to the overall mission.31 And lastly, the State Department shouldhave a career officer with a diplomatic rather than security background aseither the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security or his or her princi-pal deputy, to better ensure a holistic approach.32

30 The operations in the Balkans involved not a single casualty, military or civilian. Civilian govern-ment employees were able to travel throughout Bosnia and Kosovo freely almost from the day ofNATO’s arrival, and the military was never called upon to do essentially civilian tasks, other thansome public order functions in the opening weeks before the civilian police missions were fullystaffed. Neither was there any resistance in Haiti, Germany or Japan. (Email exchange withAmbassador James Dobbins, February 2009)

31 Such an approach was implemented by Ambassador Ryan Crocker (author interviews with RSO per-sonnel, Baghdad, October 2008).

32 David Kilcullen, October 2008.

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Organization

In this section we review the way the civilian providers of foreignassistance are organized in Washington and typically organized in thefield during counterinsurgency, and identify the issues that hamper thedelivery of foreign assistance in these circumstances. We address thequestion, “What changes in organization in Washington and the fieldwould improve delivery of foreign assistance in counterinsurgency?” Weconclude that greater unity of effort in both Washington and the fieldwould yield significant advances in the contribution that foreign assis-tance makes to U.S. foreign policy goals. We present some thoughts onhow this could be done, but make no firm conclusions on a best approach.Further analysis that pulls together the many efforts that are consideringthis issue would be helpful.

The executive branch – in Washington

Organization in Washington can be viewed as having three princi-pal inter-related functions – the development of policy, international coor-dination, and the provision of resources. Foreign assistance (other thanpurely humanitarian aid) at its best is a set of strategic plans and a suite ofprograms that translates foreign policy goals into effects abroad that pro-mote U.S. interests. The U.S. government is principally designed for peacetime conditions, andmany civilian agencies are not equipped to operate in and contribute toresolving conflicts. In the Executive Branch in Washington, there is noorganizational structure that brings all civilian (to say nothing of the mili-tary) players together under one manager, apart from the President. Eachagency has its own structures, goals and incentives, which often clash.They are not designed to facilitate counterinsurgency or unity of effort.Further, these structures and incentives are hard to change for a counterin-surgency when in the rest of the world they are operating on a peacetimebasis. For example, the Department of State is organized and staffed fornormal diplomatic missions. To staff major efforts such as in Iraq in the

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early period, it must move Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) out of existingpositions. Importantly, the civilian side of government, with rare excep-tions, has no “float” of personnel waiting to deploy. Unlike the military,which is organized to deploy to wherever emergencies crop up, almost allcivilian employees are always “deployed” in existing jobs.33 FSOs serve incounterinsurgency in accordance with their desire to do so, as facilitatedby the peacetime bidding system. Furthermore, FSO incentive systemshave historically been structured largely for peacetime, and officers whogo “out of cone” or normal jobs can be perceived as non-traditional offi-cers (though this may be changing, because of the large percentage of offi-cers who have now served in Iraq or Afghanistan).34

It should come as no surprise that civilian organizations across allagencies that participate in counterinsurgency do not automatically workwell together. It took 40 years after World War II to reorganize theDepartment of War and the Department of the Navy into one organization– the Defense Department (the National Security Act of 1947) – and createthe incentive systems needed to force the services to work well together (theGoldwater-Nichols Act of 1986). These efforts came about as the result ofthe recognition that distinct organizations will follow their own interests,and that to change this strong incentive systems were needed to force jointbehavior. Furthermore, it took Congress rather than the Executive Branchto do this. There is no reason to believe that things are different in the civil-ian elements of government – the organizations and incentive structures arenot in place to create effective joint civilian efforts.35 Without changesdesigned for the tasks envisioned, true unified efforts remain unlikely.

33 This is particularly true for civilians with specialized expertise who are not employed in a foreignaffairs or national security agency.

34 According to many Foreign Service Officers, service in Iraq or Afghanistan does not provideenhanced career benefits, despite the physical risks, though the validity of this complaint is difficultto verify. Such service does come with enhanced financial compensation.

35 Robert Komer’s Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S. – GVN Performancein Vietnam, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1972, is still relevant. Kelly’s impressionsfrom almost two years in Iraq indicate that the shortcomings in structure and incentives highlightedin this important document are still quite damaging to U.S. efforts today. Crandall’s experience inIraq and Afghanistan (post-1975) also corroborates this point.

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The principal deliverers of foreign assistance, excluding militaryassistance, are the State Department and USAID. Within these agencies,control of planning, programs and funding varies depending on the type offunding. In general, control of funds implies control of programs. Therecipients of funding - implementing partners outside of government aswell as semi-autonomous actors who receive earmarked funding – areresponsible for program development, hiring contractors and overseeingprogram execution. This means that the line of control for programs runsfrom parent agencies in Washington to program managers who may or maynot be in country. To bridge potential and real gaps in coordination betweenthe State Department and USAID, Secretary Rice created the position of theDirector of U.S. Foreign Assistance, dual-hatted as the USAIDAdministrator. Unfortunately, this process of foreign assistance coordina-tion has focused primarily on budgeting and has not resulted in the mar-riage of policy, planning and programming as was originally hoped.36

Policy in the State Department – particularly that regarding a givencountry or region – is principally the domain of the regional bureaus (whichoversee the U.S. embassies in foreign countries), the Under Secretary forPolitical Affairs, and the Secretary and her or his key advisors. WhileAmbassadors work ultimately for the President and the Secretary of State, asa practical matter they generally take direction from the regional bureaus.37

If they are career foreign service officers, they usually have spent largeparts of their career in these same bureaus. While ambassadors haveresponsibility for foreign assistance programs within their individualcountries,38 foreign assistance design and implementation is the purview of

36 Interviews with current and former State and USAID officials, September and October, 2008.37 Iraq and Afghanistan have at times been exceptions. During the Bush Administration, the NationalSecurity Council directly managed Iraq policy. In the current Administration, a special envoy out-side of the bureau structure manages Afghanistan policy.

38 An ambassador cannot compel USAID to fund any project to which it objects, but no assistance proj-ect in a particular country can be carried out without the ambassador’s approval. That said, in manypeacetime and some conflict environments, chiefs of mission choose to exercise their authority overassistance programs lightly or are subject to political or bureaucratic pressures to agree to particularprojects. In conflict environments, such pressures have tended to be much reduced, and presently inIraq and Afghanistan former ambassadors have been appointed as deputies to the chiefs of missionto oversee all non-military assistance programs.

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USAID and the functional bureaus at State. Therefore overall responsibil-ity for policy and diplomatic relations, on the one hand, and foreign assis-tance, on the other, are separate.

Further splitting program responsibility from foreign policy, Congress hasearmarked some funds so that neither State nor USAID have much controlover how they are spent. A prime example of this practice is the fundingprovided to the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the InternationalRepublican Institute (IRI) for democracy related programs. These pro-grams run with little programmatic control by the U.S. government,including embassies.

One result of these arrangements that (1) split policy and programmanagement responsibility and authority, and (2) provide stringent ruleson how money may be used and moved, is that foreign assistance fundingand programs, once appropriated and launched, tend to be very inflexibleunless special authorities exist. Furthermore, because of the dynamicnature of conflict areas, foreign assistance that is funded through normalchannels may not be responsive enough to keep up with changes in policyand priorities. The SEED and the Freedom Support Acts provide examplesof such special authorities.

To rectify some of these problems, the principal civilian elements of coun-terinsurgency – diplomacy and development – must work better together.This is hindered by the different agendas and incentives that exist in theState Department and USAID. Suggestions on how to do this range fromlegislative proposals that would unify diplomacy and development, similarto the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols act,39 tomore modest proposals such as the creation of S/CRS.

39 This approach was supported by, for example, a majority of the HELP Commission members. SeeBeyond Assistance: The HELP Commission Report on Foreign Assistance Reform, December 2007,pp. 7-8. Other viable options aimed at achieving the same objectives are outlined in the report. Seealso the Project for National Security Reform for further analysis of this problem,www.pnsr.org/web/page/682/sectionid/579/pagelevel/2/interior.asp.

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The executive branch post, and its interactions with Washington

The Chief of Mission is almost always the senior U.S. official incountry. He or she chairs the country team and formally oversees theactions of its members, but in practice oversight is shared with the coun-try team members’ home agencies. For example, just as diplomatic andprogram managing agencies are often separate in Washington, they areusually separate in country. The USAID Mission Director works under theauthority of the Chief of Mission, but receives program funding and sup-port (e.g. legal, contracting) from USAID in Washington. Program over-sight is often more strongly linked to Washington than to the CoM. Withrespect to incentives, the Ambassador typically rates the USAID MissionDirector, but the senior political person in the oversight bureau at USAIDpens the review. For this reason, promotion and job selection are influ-enced as much or more by USAID Washington’s impressions of theMission Director’s performance as by the Ambassador’s impressions. TheChief of Mission has even less control over some other members of thecountry team. Though not the focus of this report, military personnel whoprovide the military assistance element of foreign assistance and theDefense Attaché – all part of the Country Team and in theory under thedirection of the Ambassador – are much more firmly attached to their mil-itary chains of command, where they are rated, then to the U.S. Mission.40

It is worth noting that the military operates under a differentmodel, which has significant advantages over the country team model inthat it is able in general to achieve true unity of command. In particular,there are clearly defined “command and control” relationships that causemilitary units to work together and make clear what is expected. In mostcases, all personnel are rated by members of the command, and receivetheir funding and support from it (though there are important exceptions).41

In particular, there are clearly defined “command and control” relation-

40 See Kelly et al., Security Assistance Organizations in the Country Team: Options for Success, SantaMonica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, forthcoming in 2009.

41 For example, in Iraq and Afghanistan the special operations forces fighting global terrorism are out-side of the local commander’s command and control.

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ships that cause military units to work together and make clear what isexpected.

Although foreign assistance is something that the civilian side ofthe U.S. government in theory controls, in counterinsurgency similar pro-grams are often run by the military – e.g. through the use of theCommander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), which have oftenbeen spent without regard to the foreign assistance strategies developed bythe U.S. Mission. Moreover, civilians require military cooperation to deliv-er foreign assistance, for security and other considerations. Such overlapsand linkages have led to calls for “unity of effort” among civilian and mil-itary actors so that their work is complementary and geared to a single setof goals.42 Unfortunately, “unity of effort” is often a euphemism for thefact that it is too difficult to put one person – civilian or military – incharge of the overall effort. Significant disagreements on crucial elementsof successful efforts such as goals, conceptual approaches, operations andinvestments significantly harm U.S. efforts.43 For example, CERP tends tofocus on security goals and force protection, which tend to be short-termin nature, whereas foreign assistance may ignore valid security concerns infavor of development, which is long-term in nature. These differences inapproach can lead to efforts that are at cross-purposes.

Yet there are at least two, and arguably three, successful examplesin U.S. history in which the United States did in fact place military andcivilians under one leader. The first was in the Philippines (1900 – 1910),where President McKinley appointed William Howard Taft GovernorGeneral with authority over the substantial military presence. A differentmodel was used in Vietnam in the Civil Operations and RevolutionaryDevelopment Support program (CORDS), initiated in 1967, which operat-ed as part of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) underthe command of a civilian Deputy Commander of MACV, with MACV –

42 Joint Campaign Plans in Iraq have been produced since Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey pub-lished the first jointly developed plan in April 2006. Unfortunately, they do not assure unity of effort.

43 Kelly’s experiences in 2004 and 2006-2007 as a member of the CPA and later Embassy Baghdadstaffs, and in August and October 2008 when conducting an assessment of the PRT effort in Iraq.

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for this purpose – subordinate to the ambassador.44 In CORDS, the inte-gration of military and civilian personnel extended from Robert Komerand later William Colby, all the way down to the district level.Significantly, it was a joint U.S.-Government of Vietnam program as well.Furthermore, the British counterinsurgency history provides similar suc-cesses, most notably during the Malayan Emergency.45 Lastly, during the“Soviet era” in Afghanistan from 1979-89, covert and overt programs werewell managed by Embassy Islamabad through close coordination amongUSAID, the intelligence community (US and Pakistani) and the resistanceforces as well as other actors like the Saudis, UAE and UK. Effectivearrangements in this case depended mostly on local and highly flexiblebureaucratic fixes and good interpersonal relationships, and not onWashington-based “coordinators.” So-called “special envoys to the resist-ance” were appointed and made field trips, but their contributions andinfluence were negligible on field operations and, some would argue, onpolicy making in Washington as well. However, no large military unitswere present.

For completeness, one must note that bifurcated arrangementshave worked in the past. Most notable is the Ambassador Crocker-GeneralPetraeus team in Iraq. Yet in the same conflict, disastrous results haveoccurred with other dual-leader arrangements. One might conclude thattraditional methods can work given the right personalities, but it would bebetter to design less personality-dependent arrangements. To the extentthat this is true, organizational arrangements that do more to ensure unityof effort seem promising. However, senior U.S. leaders, including thePresident, should insist upon teamwork between their civilian and military

44 This may be the only time in which civilians “commanded” military forces. Though Vietnam iswidely believed to have been a failure at all levels, CORDS did in fact largely succeed in pacifyingSouth Vietnam after 1968. An important element of CORDS’ success was the interweaving of civil-ian and military authorities and capabilities, rather than a subordination of one to the other.

45 For a detailed look at how that effort was organized, see Robert Komer, The Malayan Emergency inRetrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, RAND Corporation, 1972. Foran exposition of the British principals, see Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency:Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam.

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subordinates and put people in place who will work in that manner; noorganizational arrangement can fully replace such an approach.

Finally, there are significant challenges in the connection betweenWashington and the field, discussed previously.The discussion above illustrates the fact that the country team is a usefulorganizational construct that aims to provide a coordination mechanismand achieve unity of effort on the civilian side at post, but one that fallsshort of what the military would call unity of command. The Chief ofMission has great influence over the representatives of the different agen-cies resident in country, but often does not directly affect their budgets,programs, or personnel (short of sending personnel home), unless specialauthority is granted.

We look next at an organizational structure that has been used when suchspecial authorities are provided – the Coordinator for SEED/FSA. Theauthorities provided by this model would be useful in solving many of theforeign assistance challenges that Chiefs of Mission currently face incounterinsurgency, but there are questions as to how this model should betranslated to counterinsurgency operation environments that might havevery different political and geographic contexts.

First, should such authority be vested in a Chief of Mission or aWashington authority, such as the SEED/FSA Coordinator? If a coun-terinsurgency operation is limited to one country, then a strong argumentexists for establishing no new organization, but rather providing the Chiefof Mission concerned with appropriate authorities.

However, one of the key tasks of the SEED/FSA Coordinator isinteracting with the Congress, and a Chief of Mission involved in a coun-terinsurgency situation would not be able to do this him- or herself.Further, moving funds across agency budgets would require frequent inter-action with Washington agencies. These two facts alone would argue for atleast a senior deputy in Washington. However, if a counterinsurgency sit-uation spanned multiple countries, there would be a stronger argument for

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a Washington-based – or perhaps regional-based – coordinator and associ-ated organization.46

Second, are the Coordinator’s authorities sufficient? The Coordinator isnot an equivalent to a regional ambassador, meaning that the countryambassadors and other key actors do not work for the Coordinator. If thismodel were adopted for a counterinsurgency in a single country, this wouldnot be an issue. He or she would control funds and programs, but not per-sonnel or organizations. This means that if an organizational structure forcounterinsurgency based on the SEED/FSA model were adopted withoutproviding authority over personnel and organizations operating in theregion of the counterinsurgency, the person with the overall responsibilitywould only have programmatic control, not operational control. Thiswould be a serious shortcoming.

Finally, does the SEED/FSA resource allocation approach makesense for counterinsurgency? In the current model, the Congress allocatesfunds to USAID and relies on the Coordinator to reallocate them to otheragencies as needed. This approach sets the conditions for conflict betweenUSAID and the Coordinator.

One additional shortcoming of the Coordinator model, particularly at theoutset of counterinsurgency, is that while it provides flexibility and a consol-idated channel of funding, it does not permit the immediate access to fundsthat could be needed at the onset of U.S. involvement in a counterinsurgency,unless provisions for doing so were provided by legislation. One way to pro-vide this would be to permit funds to be moved from other accounts into anoperational account for the impending operation. This is essentially how theDefense Department funds its initial efforts, by moving funds between exist-ing accounts until a supplemental appropriation is approved. Alternately, afunding source that could be accessed prior to country- or region-specific

46 The Obama Administration has chosen to use high visibility special envoys forAfghanistan/Pakistan/India, West Bank/Gaza and other conflicted areas. It is not yet clear how theseefforts will be structured with respect to the issues raised in this paper.

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legislation, with appropriate Congressional oversight, would be useful. Asnoted earlier, a model for such a fund is provided by the Stafford Act – leg-islation that provides funding and spending authority to agencies chargedwith response to domestic emergencies. These authorities are triggered andfunding made available upon Presidential declaration of an emergency, andthere are reporting requirements to ensure the Congress has oversight.Having well-defined triggers for such a declaration would likely make thismore palatable for the Congress.

In sum, the Coordinator model provides precedent and good insightsinto how authorities could be changed, but the legislation is not sufficient forcounterinsurgency and the organizational implications are not clear. Indeed,different circumstances could call for different arrangements. A standingstatutory arrangement that could be invoked by the President, withCongressional oversight and approval, that provides initial funding, relieffrom country, program and agency specific funding restrictions, and gives thePresident the flexibility to decide if the “Coordinator-like” executive wouldbe in Washington or at post, would be tremendously helpful. This could bebuilt into an approach based on the SEED/FSA model, or created as a sepa-rate funding source. This implies that the authority of the Chief of Mission incounterinsurgency should be strengthened. He or she, or a regionalCoordinator in case of a situation that encompasses more than one nation, orwhen the President decides this is desirable, should have authorities over allfunding and programs similar to the SEED/FSA Coordinator, and over per-sonnel responsible for foreign assistance similar to that exercised by a mili-tary commander over all personnel in his or her area of operations.

The Congress

The Congress’ ability to react quickly and appropriately with legis-lation that provides needed authorities and funding for, as well as to conductproper oversight during, emergency situations is critical to success.However, its structure of committees and subcommittees makes coordina-tion and notification burdensome and reaction slow. When one considers the

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full set of functions required to effectively conduct counterinsurgency, theactors involved in them and the oversight committees and appropriation sub-committees that must be involved, the complexity is immense. Besides theArmed Services Committees and Defense Appropriations Committees ofthe Senate and the House of Representatives, and Foreign Relations/AffairsCommittees and Commerce, State, Justice appropriations subcommittees,oversight and appropriations bodies for several other departments are impli-cated (e.g., Intelligence, Treasury, Energy, Commerce, and Agriculture, toname some of the more central). Just as unity of effort is important in theExecutive Branch, so too is it in the Congress.

One recommendation offered during our interviews was to estab-lish a joint committee to provide one point of contact for oversight and fis-cal issues. Doing so would help the executive branch significantly, particu-larly if created in conjunction with granting SEED/FSA Coordinator-likeauthorities to the executive overseeing the civilian effort.47 For Afghanistanduring the Soviet era, there was a joint Senate/House bipartisan Committeefor Afghanistan that worked well in terms of addressing interagency policydisputes, establishing resource levels, and garnering public support.

Conclusions and recommendations

The United States could enhance its ability to deliver foreign assis-tance in counterinsurgency by making some changes in authorities, resourcesand oversight, practices, and organization. The Executive Branch alone couldundertake some of these, while others require cooperation with the Congress.

Changes in authorities fall into three main categories. First, SEED/FSA pre-fer authorities that would provide greater flexibility to the senior executiveoverseeing a counterinsurgency, and permit him or her to move funds acrossbudget categories and between agency budgets. This flexibility would pro-

47 This suggestion was provided by a senior civilian in the Defense Department.

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vide the ability for the U.S. government to react to unexpected events and onshorter timelines than normal foreign assistance rules provide. Second, at theprogram level, “notwithstanding” authority would provide greater tacticalflexibility in program design and execution. Finally, a standing authoritysimilar to the Stafford Act for international counterinsurgency would permitthe U.S. government to react quickly to new problems as they arise, whileproviding the Congress a reasonable degree of oversight.

Resource considerations fall into two categories – fiscal andhuman. The fiscal resources available to civilian agencies have been muchsmaller than those available to military commanders to perform essentiallycivilian tasks. While this study produced no specific estimates of whatfunding is required for success, the Executive and Legislative Branchesmust cooperate to provide adequate funding if foreign assistance is to besuccessful in contested situations. Furthermore, simply providing resourcesis not sufficient; properly overseeing their use is a critical task and rules fordoing so require revision if the U.S. government is to succeed in counterin-surgency. A tension exists in these operations between peacetime account-ing rules and the exigencies of a counterinsurgency situation. Providingleaders with greater flexibility would provide greater likelihood of success.

Human resource shortfalls are perhaps more important than fiscalones. Directly related to fiscal resources is the ability of the government tohire enough people to provide effective foreign assistance in counterinsur-gency, but numbers are not enough. Quality is equally important, and thesystems that hire and promote civilians who work in dangerous places arenot attuned to these needs. Without adjustments that

• identify and fund proper staffing levels;• identify and promote leaders and technicians capable of oper-ating effectively in counterinsurgency; and• identify and assign the proper people where they are neededin counterinsurgency,

effective foreign assistance will not be delivered. People are central to suc-cess in counterinsurgency.

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Unhelpful practices also have a negative effect on success in counterinsur-gency. Three categories of changes would help significantly. First,Washington should rely on leaders in the field to run operations while theyconcentrate on providing policy guidance and resources. Doing otherwisecan result in those who are not most familiar with the situation directingactions without a thorough understanding of the implications. Further,servicing Washington decision makers acting in the place of the leaders onthe ground places a significant demand for information on those in thefield, often distracting from their ability to do their jobs. This is the secondpractice that requires re-examination. However, information demands thatpermit an assessment of overall success and resource needs in keepingwith the role of policy makers are justifiable, and must be met. Staffsshould be large enough to support this. Finally, risk practices shouldaccount not only for risks to personnel and facilities, but also to the mis-sion. Such practices are just now gaining traction in Iraq, and need to beinstitutionalized and shared broadly.

Some major and some less drastic organizational reforms wouldmake the provision of foreign assistance in counterinsurgency more effec-tive and efficient. First, goals and incentive structures across organizationsparticipating in such efforts need to be aligned. So long as the major civil-ian providers of foreign assistance in counterinsurgency have differentvisions of what needs to be done in a country and incentive structures thatmake meeting agency goals more important than the success of the overallendeavor, unity of effort will be impossible to achieve. The same could besaid for military-civilian efforts. Ideas such as legislation that would unifydiplomacy and development, similar to the National Security Act of 1947and the Goldwater-Nichols Act, should be on the table for consideration.

Placing one person in charge of all aspects of counterinsurgencywould help resolve organizational problems. Relying solely on the author-ity of a “responsible executive” – the Chief of Mission, CommandingGeneral or a Regional Coordinator in case of a situation that encompassesmore than one nation or when the President decides this is desirable – incounterinsurgency is insufficient. This will not be easy. For example, plac-

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ing all aspects of an effort under a military commander, for the simple rea-son that this is where most of the assets reside, might not make sense,given the preeminence of political considerations in many such circum-stances. On the other hand, preserving the chain of command from theground commander through the Secretary of Defense to the President is alegal requirement that cannot easily be waived, making civilian leadershipproblematic. However, solutions have been successfully implemented inthe past, as noted above.

Finally, Congress must consider how it organizes itself to supportand oversee the Executive Branch during counterinsurgency. A structurethat provides the Congress with adequate ability to oversee the ExecutiveBranch’s efforts, but that minimizes the number of committees and sub-committees that must be informed of and approve actions, would signifi-cantly simplify efforts. A joint committee formed to oversee all aspects ofcounterinsurgency is one way to meet this need.

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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Alexander AldersonVisiting Fellow and Infantry officer, Colonel Alderson was com-

missioned from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in April 1984, andhas since served in a wide range of Armoured, Mechanized and LightInfantry appointments in Germany, the Middle East, Northern Ireland, andAfrica. He served on operations in the 1991 Gulf War, Northern Ireland,Bosnia, and, most recently, Iraq, where he was Chief of Campaign Plansfor General Petraeus in Headquarters Multinational Force Iraq.

A graduate of the Army Staff College, Camberley, and the JointServices Command and Staff College, Shrivenham, Colonel Alderson hasheld a variety of staff appointments principally in the operational field.After commanding 1st Battalion The Highlanders, Colonel Alderson waspromoted to Colonel in 2004 to run the Army’s Mission Support Group,before establishing the Land Warfare Development Group to develop theArmy’s doctrine and its experimental programme. He has instructed at theRoyal Military Academy Sandhurst, and at the Joint Services Commandand Staff College, where he specialised in Campaign Planning, andCounterinsurgency.

In 2007, he led the team that rewrote British Counterinsurgencydoctrine. He is currently researching a Ministry of Defence-sponsoredPhD, examining the impact of contemporary campaigns on the Britishapproach to COIN.

Chris CollettColonel Warfare Development, Land Warfare Development

Group, Land Warfare Centre.Responsible for the capture and dissemination of lessons from operations.Responsible for Army experimentation and research. Responsible for thedevelopment and promulgation of Land Tactical Doctrine.

Col Chris Collett joined the Army from university (where he readpsychology) in 1983 and was commissioned into the Army Air Corps(AAC). After a six month attachment to the GREEN HOWARDS com-

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manding a platoon in the Mechanised Infantry role he completed his ArmyPilot’s Course and joined 4 Regt AAC in Germany as a reconnaissanceFlight Commander flying Gazelles. After 2 years there he became the sec-ond in command of 657 Sqn which was then an independent squadronassigned to the fledgling 24 Airmobile Bde. This appointment subsequent-ly migrated to become the operations officer of 9 Regt AAC as it formedto support air mobility in the context of the NATO Multinational Division(Centre). Two years at the Royal Military College of Science and the ArmyStaff College followed and led to 2 years in the Ministry of Defence’sOperational Requirements organisation dealing with procurement of heli-copter equipments.

After this appointment he moved back to regimental duty com-manding 652 Sqn, 1 Regt AAC based in Germany but including 6months in Bosnia as part of IFOR. Col Collett then spent a year in J3 atPJHQ largely dealing with the Balkans before taking up his SO1appointment back at the Ministry of Defence as a member of theDirectorate of Force Development part of the Strategy Directorate. Whilehere he was responsible for the “Evolution of Warfare” project andamong other force development issues including the formation of the EUmilitary force. During this time he undertook his Masters in BusinessAdministration.

Command of 1 Regt AAC back in Germany followed duringwhich the Regiment provided support Op TELIC and numerous overseastraining deployments in the Light Utility role. Leaving 1 Regt AAC onpromotion, Col Collett then spent 3 years as Commandant of the Schoolof Army Aviation which included a 6 month operational deployment asColonel Training and commander of the international mentoring team atthe Iraqi Military Academy Baghdad. Most recently, Col Collett was theUK’s International Fellow at the US Army War College where he gainedhis Masters in Strategic Studies before taking up the appointment ofColonel Warfare Development.

Col Collett is married to Jenny and has 2 children. His interestsare travel, skiing, scuba diving and all aspects of military history.

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Larry CrandallLarry Crandall has more than 30 years in developing and manag-

ing large and politically complex development programs in sensitive areasthroughout the world, including lengthy assignments in the former SovietUnion, Haiti, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Vietnam and Bangladesh and Iraq.For the latter,=2 0his Program Management Office office supervised the$18 billion reconstruction program. Mr. Crandall joined the ProjectManagement Office from his position as Vice President for InternationalPrograms with the RONCO Consulting Corporation. While in that posi-tion, he led a U.S. Army-sponsored study to determine best practices forthe Demilitarization, Demobilization and Reintegration of Iraqi SecurityForces into civil society. He previously held numerous senior positionswith USAID. He served as Executive Director of the U.S.-AsiaEnvironmental Partnership, an organization that introduced U.S. cleanenvironmental technology suppliers to potential Asian business partners.

Mr. Crandall was the USAID Mission Director in Port-au-Prince, Haiti from 1994 to 1997. He orchestrated the redesign of assistanceprograms and managed the successful political transition program whichculminated in the first constitutional power transfer in Haitian history.Prior to that, he served as the Deputy Assistant Administrator of the NewlyIndependent States Task Force for the former Soviet Union from 1991 to1994. He generated innovative programs for a multi-billion dollar assis-tance program for the fifteen newly independent republics.

Mr. Crandall was the Mission Director for USAID Afghanistanresident in Islamabad, Pakistan from 1985 to 1990. He first led a combinedState Department/USAID strategy team to develop a cross-border human-itarian assistance strategy which included interagency support to theInterim Afghan Government in exile in Peshawar. He then led=2 0theUSAID effort which contributed to the departure of Soviet Troops fromAfghanistan.

Mr. Crandall served three years in Vietnam as a field “lan-guage” officer, Provincial Military Advisory Team Leader and directed thenational Political Attitude Analysis Survey in his final year at MAC/Vheadquarters. Mr. Crandall has received numerous awards during his

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career including the Distinguished Presidential Award, the MeritoriousPresidential Award, the Distinguished and Superior Unit Citations forheading multi-year missions in Afghanistan and Haiti, Superior HonorAwards and Language Incentive Awards. Mr. Crandall was selected for twoone year sabbaticals at the Senior Seminar on International Relations con-ducted by the Foreign Service Institute of the State Department and theNational War College at Ft. Mc Nair.

Alex CrowtherCol. Glenn Alexander Crowther was born in Washington DC. He

spent his childhood living in New England, Ethiopia, Brazil, Bolivia, andIndonesia where his father worked as a civil engineer.

Col. Crowther served 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord,California, United Nations Command Security Force – Joint Security Area– Pan Mun Jom and the Cheju-do Training Center in Korea. He also servedin a variety of positions in US Army South and US Southern Command inPanama and Miami. He served two tours at the Pentagon working as aStrategic Plans & Policies Officer on the Department of the Army Staffand as a Politico-Military Officer at the Joint Staff J-5 (Strategic Plans &Policies Directorate). He also served as Principal Advisor for HostageAffairs to US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan C. Crocker.

Col. Crowther is assigned as a Research Professor of NationalSecurity Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War CollegeCarlisle Barracks, PA. He is currently deployed as the Interagency Advisorfor the commander of Multi National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I). He alsoserves as the MNC-I Deputy Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD).

Col. Crowther has a Bachelor of Arts degree in InternationalRelations from Tufts University, a Master of Science degree inInternational Relations from Troy State University, and a Ph.D. inInternational Development from Tulane University.

Col. Crowther is married to the former Marie ElizabethToothman-Lim from the Panama Canal Zone. Their children are Laura,Geoffrey and Elizabeth.

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Christopher A. JenningsChristopher A. Jennings is a “democracy and governance” con-

sultant based in Washington DC, specializing in parliamentary develop-ment, legislative process, constitutional law and election monitoring.Between 2006 and 2008, he served two tours in Iraq under the auspices ofthe U.S. State Department—first, as an embedded advisor to Iraq’sNational Parliament under a grant administered by State’s Bureau ofDemocracy, Human Rights and Labor; and second, as a political affairsand governance advisor to Ambassador Ryan Crocker in the Joint StrategicPlanning and Assessment office at the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad. InWashington DC, Christopher has served as a political appointee to the U.S.Commission on Civil Rights during President Bush’s first and secondterms; as a legal analyst and consultant to the Republican NationalCommittee during the 2002, 2004 and 2008 election cycles; and as non-partisan legislative staff attorney in the United States Congress during the106th and 107th Sessions.

Kirk JohnsonKirk A. Johnson is currently the Senior Economic Adviser at

Provincial Reconstruction Team, Muthanna, Iraq. As a representative fromthe U.S. Department of State, he is part of a 15 person team of civilianswho are working to build the capacity of local and provincial governmentofficials, directly administer small reconstruction projects, and overseeU.S. taxpayer dollars spent in the province.Previously, he was also the Director for Strategic Projects and StrategicPlanning for the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction(SIGIR). He was part of a management team that oversaw the productionof the book Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Story.

Prior to that, he was Deputy Director for Assessments in the JointStrategic Planning and Assessment office at U.S. Embassy Baghdad,where he was responsible for analyzing the quantitative and qualitativemetrics associated with the ongoing counterinsurgency campaign for theU.S. Ambassador and other senior American officials.

Dr. Johnson has also held positions at the Washington, D.C.-based

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Heritage Foundation, a non-profit research organization, the U.S. CensusBureau, and was an adjunct professor of public policy at George MasonUniversity, where he taught quantitative methods.

Dr. Johnson earned his Ph.D. in public policy from George MasonUniversity, holds a master’s degree in applied economics from theUniversity of North Texas, and has a bachelor’s degree in economics fromCalifornia State University, Sacramento.

Terrence KellyDr Terrence Kelly is a Senior Researcher with the RAND

Corporation, where his primary research areas are national and homelandsecurity policy. From February 2006 to April 2007, he served as theDirector of the Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment Office for the U.S.Mission in Baghdad. In 2004, he was the Director for Militia Transition andReintegration Programs for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq.

He served as the Senior National Security Officer in the WhiteHouse Office of Science and Technology Policy, held many Army fieldand staff positions, was a White House Fellow and served as the Chief ofStaff of the National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office.

He is currently an Adjunct Professor of Security Policy andManagement at Carnegie Mellon University’s Heinz College of PublicPolicy and Management, and he has held faculty positions in West Point’sSystem Engineering Department and the Mathematical SciencesDepartment (visiting) at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, from which hereceived a Ph.D. in Mathematics and an M.S. in Computer and SystemsEngineering.

He is a 1982 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Pointand holds a Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

Daniel MarstonDr Daniel Marston holds the Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair of

Counterinsurgency at the US Army Command and General Staff College.He is also a Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at

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the Australian National University, the Changing Character of WarProgram at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of the Royal HistoricalSociety. He has also served as a Visiting Fellow at the Multi-NationalForces Iraq COIN Center for Excellence in Taji, Iraq on four occasions. Hehas focused on the topic of how armies learn and reform as a central themein his academic research. His first book, Phoenix from the Ashes, an in-depth examination of how the British/Indian Army turned defeat into vic-tory in the Burma campaign of the Second World War, won the TemplerMedal Book Prize in 2003.

His most recent work, co-edited with Carter Malkasian,Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, was published in 2008 and is nowbeing revised as a second edition. He has lectured widely on the principlesand historical practices of counterinsurgency to units and formations of theAmerican, Australian, British and Canadian armed forces in and out oftheatre, as well as serving as an adviser for all of the above. Dr Marston iscurrently engaged in research into the lessons of counterinsurgency for theAustralian and British armies from the 1960s to the present. Dr Marston isa graduate of McGill and Oxford universities.

Laurel MillerLaurel Miller is a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation.

She has been an adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University and asenior expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where she focused on constitu-tional issues and rule of law development in countries emerging from con-flict, and international justice issues.

During previous government service she focused on conflict reso-lution and post-conflict stabilization, including as Senior Advisor to theU.S. special envoy for the Balkans, Senior Advisor to the AssistantSecretary of State for European Affairs, and Deputy to the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues. She was involved in peace negotiations inMacedonia, Kosovo, and Bosnia. Miller also served as Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. Miller received theState Department’s Superior Honor Award three times. She was anInternational Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, practiced

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law with the firm of Covington & Burling in Washington and Brussels,and clerked for a federal judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.Miller received her J.D. from the University of Chicago Law School,where she was an editor of the Law Review, and her A.B. from PrincetonUniversity’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.

Timo NoetzelDr. Timo Noetzel is a Research Group Leader at the Centre of

Excellence at Konstanz University. He is also a Fellow of the Stiftung NeueVerantwortung, Berlin and Senior Policy Advisor to the Chairman of theMunich Security Conference. Previously, he has been a TransatlanticPostdoctoral Fellow at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlinand at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House. Between2003 and 2006 he worked as a parliamentary aide in the German Bundestag.Over the last few years he has been a political advisor to the German army atISAF Regional Command North (Autumn 2007), HQ ISAF (Summer 2009)and Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum (Autumn 2009).He received his BA (Hons) in European Politics from the Queen’s University,Belfast and his MPhil and DPhil in Politics from St Antony’s College,Oxford. He is also a graduate of the Federal College for Security Studies,Berlin. One of his recent publications (co-authored with Thomas Rid) is,Germany’s Options in Afghanistan’, Survival, October/November 2009.

Benjamin SchreerDr Benjamin Schreer is the Deputy Director of the Aspen Institute

Germany. Prior to his appointment, he was a research fellow in theresearch unit “Atlantic and European Security” at the German Institute forInternational and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik,SWP) in Berlin (2003-2008), and co-leader of a research group in theCentre of Excellence at Constance University (2008-2009). He receivedhis doctoral degree in Political Science from Kiel. Dr. Schreer has pub-lished widely on international security and defense policy issues, includ-ing the issue of Germany and counterinsurgency.

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Kalev SeppDr Kalev I. Sepp is presently Senior Lecturer in Defense Analysis

at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.Until January 2009, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary

of Defense for Special Operations Capabilities.Dr Sepp was responsible for the Department of Defense global

counterterrorism portfolio. This included policy oversight of all specialoperations world-wide, and formulation of the Department’s global coun-terterrorism strategy. He received his appointment in July 2007.

A former U.S. Army Special Forces officer, he earned his Ph.D. inAmerican Diplomatic History at Harvard University, and his CombatInfantryman Badge in the Salvadoran Civil War. His unit assignmentsincluded the 82d Airborne Division, the 2d Ranger Battalion, the 11th

Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 2d Infantry Division, among others.He was also an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

He served as an analyst and strategist in Iraq and Afghanistan, andas an expert member of the Baker-Hamilton Bipartisan Commission onIraq, a.k.a. the Iraq Study Group. For his service in Iraq and the Pentagon,he has been awarded the Department of the Navy Superior Civilian ServiceMedal, the Department of Defense Medal for the Global War on Terrorism,and the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service.

Dr Sepp also graduated from the U.S. Army Command andGeneral Staff College with a Master’s degree in Military Art and Science.

Christopher M. Schnaubelt Dr Chris M. Schnaubelt holds the Transformation Chair at the

NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy.Prior to coming to the NDC, he worked for the US Department of

State as the Deputy Director for National Security Affairs, Joint StrategicPlanning and Assessment Office, in the US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq. Heserved as the embassy’s lead for writing the 2006 Joint Campaign ActionPlan and the 2007-09 Joint Campaign Plan in coordination with HQ Multi-National Force-Iraq and was also a co-director of the Joint StrategicAssessment Team. In recognition of his accomplishments, General David

Petraeus presented the Commander’s Award for Public Service to Dr.Schnaubelt.

Dr. Schnaubelt has published numerous articles on security issuesand interagency and civil-military operations; the most recent are“Whither the RMA?” in the Autumn 2007 issue of Parameters, NDCResearch Paper 40 “What NATO can learn from “the surge” in Iraq,” andan Op-Ed in the International Herald Tribune on “Lessons of Iraq.”

Martin ZapfeMartin Zapfe is Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence at

Konstanz University. From 2003-2008, he studied Political Science, PublicLaw and Islamic Studies in Bonn, in which fields he holds an M.A. In hisdoctoral thesis, he explores the relationship between strategic culture andthe capability of different NATO-members to implement a national com-prehensive approach in Afghanistan. He is an Associate of the “StiftungNeue Verantwortung” in Berlin for the years 2009/2010, focusing onBundeswehr transformation.

Before, Martin Zapfe worked as an intern in the German Institutefor International and Security Affairs of the “Stiftung Wissenschaft undPolitik” (SWP) in Berlin and the German Bundestag. His main fields ofresearch include the transformation of the German armed forces and sce-narios of irregular warfare, including counterinsurgency. He is a FirstLieutenant and platoon leader in the Bundeswehr light infantry reserve.

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Contributors:

Alexander AldersonChris CollettLarry CrandallAlex CrowtherChristopher A. JenningsKirk A. JohnsonTerrence KellyDaniel MarstonLaurel MillerTimo NoetzelChristopher M. SchnaubeltBenjamin SchreerKalev I. SeppMartin Zapfe