"Nationalism within the European Community: Lessons from Scottish and

Catalan Independence Movements"

James Thomas University of San Diego

POLS 596 Capstone M.A. International Relations

May 15, 2015

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 3 SCOTLAND ................................................................................................................................... 6

SLIGHTLY BETTER TOGETHER: SCOTLAND’S CONTEMPLATION OF INDEPENDENCE ................. 6 THE POLITICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WESTMINSTER AND HOLYROOD ................................. 8 AN INDEPENDENT SCOTTISH ECONOMY: IS OIL ENOUGH? ....................................................... 12 ECONOMIC RISK LEADS TO CONTINUED INTEGRATION WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM ......... 17

CATALONIA ............................................................................................................................... 20 CATALUNYA, NOU ESTAT D'EUROPA: CATALONIA’S INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT .................. 20 MADRID NOS ROBA: KEEPING TAX REVENUES IN CATALONIA ................................................ 23 SUPPORT FOR CATALAN INDEPENDENCE BROADENS ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM ...... 26

CATALONIA AND SCOTLAND: A TALE OF TWO NATIONS ......................................... 28 CATALONIA’S UNCERTAIN FUTURE ................................................................................. 31 THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: SECESSION OR DEVOLUTION THROUGHOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OR CONTINUED STRENGTH OF TRADITIONAL STATES? ...................................................................................................................................... 36 WORKS CITED ........................................................................................................................... 38

FIGURES FIGURE 1: POTENTIAL INDEPENDENT STATES IN EUROPE ................................................................................. 5 FIGURE 2: SCOTLAND INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM RESULTS FROM SEPTERMBER 18, 2014 ......................... 7 FIGURE 3: SCOTLAND INDEPENDENCE RESULTS BY COUNCIL ........................................................................ 18 FIGURE 4: WHAT KIND OF POLITICAL ENTITY SHOULD CATALONIA BE WITH RESPECT TO SPAIN? .................. 23 FIGURE 5: RESULTS OF NOVEMBER 9, 2014 CATALONIA INDEPENDENCE VOTE ............................................ 28 FIGURE 6: SUPPORT FOR CATALAN INDEPENDENCE WITH AND WITHOUT EU MEMBERSHIP SUB-DIVIDED BY

SELF-DESCRIBED CATALAN OR SPANISH IDENTITY .............................................................................. 34 FIGURE 7: COMBINED SUPPORT FOR CATALAN INDEPENDENCE WITH AND WITHOUT EU MEMBERSHIP ...... 34

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Introduction

It is an understatement to say that Europe has fundamentally transformed itself

several times since the outset of the twentieth century. Born of innumerable nations with

individually distinct languages, cultures, and traditions separated by geography,

government, and history, conflict has long found a home on the continent. The Great

War of World War I and subsequent Paris Peace Conference of 1919 first divided the

Kingdoms of Old Europe and then cobbled the pieces back together only to be plunged

back into conflict two decades later. After the end of World War II, Europe was

resurrected only to find the Cold War and the Soviet Iron Curtain bisecting the continent

from North to South. Forty years later, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the

Cold War, and subsequent resolution of smaller conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere,

the continent at the turn of the twenty first century seemed more stable than ever before.

At present, the European Union (EU) has expanded to include twenty-eight sovereign

states across the continent with an additional three states included in the European

Economic Area. These governments share a commitment to peace, democracy, and

common principles of human rights and are committed to pursuing economic

interdependence and free trade. Europe has chosen to pursue a collective future to a

degree never before seen among such disparate peoples.

However, the states of modern Europe in many cases remain the same entities that

emerged from the World Wars, with dozens of culturally, linguistically, economically, or

otherwise distinct nations remaining integrated into broader states. The centers of gravity

for many modern European states are generally in the same capitals and with similar

borders to the colonial powers that preceded them and in most cases are not keen on

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granting independence to regional nations of people who would prefer complete

independence. These “stateless nations” may simultaneously crave both the security

provided by participating in broader modern Europe and the independence to be gained

by removing themselves from the larger state that has come to govern each of them.

Indeed, “the members of some of Europe’s stateless nations belong to the more

enthusiastic supporters of European integration in their respective states.”1 In this way,

European integration may aid separatist or independence movements as “the prospect that

a new state could continue to be part of the EU’s common market and seek protection

under its latent security umbrella appeared to reduce the costs and risks of separation.”2

This paper will examine Scotland as a part of the United Kingdom and Catalonia

in Spain particularly. Scotland was chosen largely because Scotland’s recent

independence referendum marks the most successful democratic secession attempt from a

major European nation in the modern era. Although the effort was narrowly defeated, the

lessons from 2014 are applicable to such stateless nations across the continent.

Catalonia, on the other hand, has had support for independence climb markedly in the

past decade and its’ independence movement seems poised to grow beyond the

demonstrations and rhetoric that have become commonplace in Barcelona. Although

separatists there have thus far been unsuccessful in negotiations with the Spanish

government in securing their own independence vote, such democratic self-determination

is the almost identical goal for those constituents in the Spanish region. Many other

European “stateless nations” do exist, including the Basque country and Andalusia in

Spain, Flanders in Belgium, North Cyprus, Sardinia, and Corsica in the Mediterranean

                                                                                                               1 Nagel p. 57 2 Bourne p.95

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among others3. However, no other independence movements have achieved the level of

support enjoyed by citizens of Scotland and Catalonia in recent years, nor have they

demonstrated the political maturity indicating that they are likely to democratically form

their own independent states in the near term.

Figure  1:  Potential  Independent  States  in  Europe4  

Although decentralization from central state governments to regionalization has

accelerated, especially in the last part of the twentieth century, these regions raise

interesting questions about the validity of self-determination and secessionism in a

society where violence is no longer a preferable or viable option. In 1970, among

European states only West German and Austria incorporated regional decentralization

into their governments, while three decades later in 2002 Spain, Italy, France, Belgium,

and the United Kingdom had all granted some measure of autonomy to heterogeneous

                                                                                                               3 Walt p. 1 4 University of Andalusia

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regions5. “Secessions never seem plausible, and yet they occur,” reminding us that

countries and borders are not immutable but flexible6. The recent plebiscite debating

independence in Scotland and ongoing independence movement in Catalonia are chosen

specifically to provide insight into the makeup of European peoples and nations, the

political and economic interests and goals of the states that govern them, and the

principles that bind the European Community together. In order to understand the recent

defeat for the independence movement in Scotland and predict future independence

outcomes in Catalonia and elsewhere in Europe, this research will attempt to identify and

explain the economic and political arguments that are and will be the determining factors

in future independence movements. These arguments, both in support of and against

independence, must be understood so that they can be used as variables in order to better

predict the viability of future stateless nations attaining independence or statehood in the

future.

Scotland

Slightly Better Together: Scotland’s Contemplation of Independence

After years of planning, months of spirited campaigning, and days of global

anticipation, the Scottish people voted on September 18, 2014 to remain a part of the

United Kingdom rather than declaring their complete independence as a fully sovereign

nation. In so doing, a majority of over 55 percent of Scots stated their preference for

unity over self-government. On both sides of the issue, Scots were passionate in voicing

                                                                                                               5 Greer p. 4 6 Ozkan p. 52

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their opinions and 84.6 percent of eligible voters participated in the single-issue

referendum. As shown in Figure 2, more than 3.6 million votes were cast, with over two

million votes in favor of continued unification and over 1.6 million in favor of splitting

away from the United Kingdom7. Although the referendum is over and even staunch

secessionists admit that no further vote will be scheduled for at least a number of years,

the issues that divided the electorate remain central to Scottish politics and relevant to

other areas of Europe8. Although political divisions certainly exist between the Scottish

and the remainder of the United Kingdom, an uncertain economic future for an

independent Scotland was to a large degree responsible for preventing the passage of the

momentous referendum. An analysis of the underlying factors for support on both sides

of the campaign provides insight into not only the psyche of the Scottish electorate, but

also potential lessons for other stateless nations eyeing independence and the central

governments seeking to maintain cohesion for their countries.

Figure 2: Scotland Independence Referendum Results from September 18, 20149

                                                                                                               7 "Scottish Independence Referendum: Final Results in Full" 8 Carrell 9 The Guardian

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The Political Differences between Westminster and Holyrood

Conflict between Scotland and England is nothing new, as both nations have

shared their island home for centuries. After more than three centuries of nearly

continuous war, the current iteration of British and Scottish union began in 1707 but has

also been marred by periods of bitter debate10. It is impossible to understand the current

secessionist movement without a healthy respect for the long-standing and at times bitter

disputes between the two nations11. In the modern era, the wild unpopularity of Prime

Minister Margaret Thatcher in Scotland prompted many Scots to dream of an

independent Scotland that would not “forever be denied a government of its choosing in

the U.K.”12 The move towards a referendum on full independence has been slow. Its

infancy was in 1974, when a referendum for “devolution” of certain limited self-

government passed with nearly three quarters of the vote. This was followed in 1999 by

the creation of a Scottish Parliament that has since been responsible for “so-called

devolved matters, such as housing, agriculture, and health” leaving national issues to

Parliament in London13.

Scotland leans generally to the left, as only one of the fifty-nine Scottish

representatives to Parliament in Westminster is Conservative14. In the current era, the

people of Scotland are subject to national legislation produced by a majority conservative

government in London, creating a divide between London and Holyrood that can

certainly be understandable from a political perspective. The Scottish National Party (or

                                                                                                               10 Englehart 11 Freire 12 Englehart 13 ibid. 14 ibid.

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SNP) created an argument for independence largely from these differences in political

beliefs and formed a government that has held the majority in Scottish Parliament since

201115. SNP had previously presided as a minority government since 200716. It is joined

in support for independence by the Scottish Green Party and the Scottish Socialist Party,

all three of which support the “Yes” (or “Yes Scotland”) movement. Therefore, the

proponents of independence are largely centered in political parties that have

constituencies well to the left of center17.

The Yes campaign and SNP are both led by Alex Salmond, a fierce proponent of

independence and politician who has long held office as a Member of Parliament in

London, as a Member of Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh, and as current First Minister

of Scotland. As the public face of the Yes movement, he was instrumental in securing

the agreement with the UK government granting permission for the “Referendum on

Independence for Scotland.” This agreement, signed in October 2012 by Prime Minister

David Cameron, set the wheels in motion for the September 2014 referendum and laid

out stipulations designed to ensure a free and fair measure of the will of Scottish voters18.

The vote was subsequently described by Salmond himself as a “once in a generation”

opportunity for the Scots to secure independence. His preamble to the “Yes” campaign’s

lengthy platform stresses the inherent value of self-determination, in part explaining “I

believe in independence because I believe it will be better for all of us if decisions about

Scotland are taken by the people who care most about Scotland – the people who live and

                                                                                                               15 Freire 16 Gallagher 17 Engelhart 18 “Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government”

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work here”19. The central argument here is that Scotland and her citizens will be better

off living in an independent nation that can form a government that more accurately

reflects the political beliefs of the populace and can react directly to the problems and

concerns that directly affect them.

Salmond and the Yes campaign hold up Scandinavian countries including

Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark as successful examples of small but prosperous

nations that share many political beliefs with those Scots that favor independence.

Conversely, they oppose privatization of government services, cuts to government

investment in infrastructure, and high levels of defense spending. Importantly, high

inequality of wealth and large wage disparities are noted as being indicators that the

United Kingdom at large does not value all citizens equally, a trend that an independent

Scottish government led by SNP promises to reverse20. This message is particularly

popular with the working class, which has traditionally been a bastion of support for the

SNP. The aforementioned Thatcher administration was responsible for privatizing

industry and opposing unions, policies that led to the shrinking of the Scottish workforce

by approximately twenty percent. Bringing up this narrative of her administration plays

to the base of the “Yes” camp, whose supporters are much more likely to view Thatcher’s

removal of government subsidies to industry and anti-union policies that ultimately

predated the decline of Scottish industry21. This constituency chafes at what they

consider the “uneven development” of Scotland when compared with the remainder of

the United Kingdom22.

                                                                                                               19 Scottish Government 20 Scottish Government 21 Freire 22 Cowley

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Alex Salmond himself is a shrewd politician who cast his “Yes” campaign as one

of optimism and the promise of a bright future for a Scotland standing alone in Europe.

SNP party members “revere him” for standing up for these liberal principles while at the

same time attempting to broaden the base of support for independence by softening

stances on future NATO membership, the future of the pound sterling, and on “the

monarchical union,” or relationship of an independent Scotland with British Royalty23.

This last point is important to note as an indicator that while a Scottish identity certainly

exists and to some extent is a factor in the desire for independence, the Yes campaign has

made strides to distance themselves from references to William Wallace of “Braveheart”

fame and any similar notion suggesting that a newly independent Scotland will harbor

lasting animosity towards their newly separated neighbors to the south24. This middle

course, designed to ensure that the virtues of self-determination are highlighted while

simultaneously ensuring Scots that certain portion of their ties to Britain would remain

following either referendum outcome. No matter what, popular BBC television programs

and other like symbols of Scottish identity that have been intertwined with that of the

United Kingdom are sure to remain.

As the name implies, the “Better Together” campaign, led by prominent Scottish

Labour politician Alastair Darling, stands by the premise that an independent Scotland

will suffer as a result of any proposed separation from the United Kingdom. The

uncertainty surrounding a leap towards independence is daunting and to a large degree

this is the central premise around which the “No” campaign was built. Indeed, on the eve

of the referendum, Darling penned a forcefully worded editorial that argued “The only

                                                                                                               23 ibid. 24 Freire

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question to ask yourself before you go to the polling booth is: Do you know what will

happen if Scotland decides to break away from the United Kingdom? I certainly

don’t.”25 Others sought to pursue a middle ground path between full independence and

continuation of the status quo relationship between London and Edinburgh. United

Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron offered to grant further autonomy to Edinburgh

in a plan termed “Devolution Max,” or what came to be known colloquially as “Devo-

Max” as an offering of compromise designed to keep bolster the “No” campaign and

preserve the union that joins Britain, Scotland, and the other members of the United

Kingdom.26 During the September referendum, the middle class largely shared the

uncertainty around the way forward and both the Labour and Conservative parties argued

that the SNP platform did not provide nearly the specificity of planning or preparations

required to ensure that an eventual transition to an independent Scotland would be

successful for the fledgling state.

An Independent Scottish Economy: Is Oil Enough?

The largest single uncertainty about the economy of an independent Scotland is to

what extent the oil beneath the North Sea will be able to keep the Scottish economy

afloat. It is certainly not the only question, as concerns about future currency, affiliation

with the European Union, and the health of the Scottish shipbuilding and defense industry

continued to be debated until the date of the referendum. But it is oil that has consistently

been a rallying cry for the SNP and their supporters, who have declared, “It’s Scotland’s

                                                                                                               25 Darling 26 Perales-García p.333

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Oil” since the 1970s27. The degree to which the economic prospects of an independent

Scotland were buoyed by the oil industry and whether or not the new country would

enjoy the same relationships with the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe were vital

to the arguments made on both sides of the campaign.

Alex Salmond, has claimed that Scottish “oil revenues could reach $12.7 billion

by 2018” although “these figures are broadly disputed”28. There are many reasons for the

dispute, but certainly the differentiation between areas that would belong in the economic

exclusion zone of an independent Scotland or the United Kingdom is certainly at the

forefront. In accordance with maritime law, the best solution would be a mutual

agreement between the new Scotland and the remaining United Kingdom over a clear

maritime boundary 29 . However, in lieu of that solution a line would be drawn

perpendicular from the nearest points of land to each country in the North Sea or an

international judicial settlement would be required30. Some models reflect the likelihood

that the Scottish share of oil and gas tax revenues from the North Sea could be as high as

ninety percent or as low as eighty percent, with the likelihood of this value climbing

higher if geographic trends between 2007 and 2013 continue31. Around 40 billion barrels

of oil have been extracted from beneath the seabed thus far, and the other widely disputed

variable is the quantity of barrels remaining unrecovered32. One prominent oil industry

expert warned in August 2014 that the Scottish government might have overestimated the

unrecovered oil by approximately sixty percent. Those stressing caution also note that

                                                                                                               27 Brocklehurst 28 Engelhart 29 Zahraa p. 98 30 “Scotland Analysis: Borders and Citizenship” 31 Kemp 32 Evans

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the price of oil is notoriously volatile and reliance on it as a major source of tax revenue

as inherently risky33. One proposed method that Salmond and the Yes campaign have

proposed to mitigate the risk of reliance on oil for tax revenue is investing funds raised

from the taxation of oil and gas into a sovereign wealth fund similar to that of Norway.

Norway began investing in 1990 and now holds approximately £470 billion in its fund,

which is intended as a buffer against the loss of oil as a resource at an indeterminate point

in the future34. From a political perspective, this is viewed by some on the left as a

missed opportunity, as the United Kingdom did not set up such a fund when it began

drilling for oil in the North Sea and would have hundred of millions of pounds saved if

such a fund had been established. Instead, the Thatcher administration used some of the

proceeds to enact tax cuts35. If Scottish reserves are, as government estimates predict,

more than sixty percent of the total reserves of the European Union, this strategy seems

much more viable than the less optimistic predictions of North Sea oil revenue36. If not,

the potential exists for a calamitous cessation of the oil revenues upon which an

independent Scotland would have relied.

Despite pledges to mandate the removal of the United Kingdom’s fleet of

Vanguard class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines from their base at Her

Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde in Faslane, the Yes campaign pledged to maintain an equal

number of personnel employed there following removal of the UK’s nuclear weapons37.

Indeed, the Scottish Government’s policy document is even optimistic about the eventual

                                                                                                               33 Green 34 Scottish Government p. 300 35 Breiner 36 Scottish Government p. 301 37 ibid. p. 246

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commissioning of ships for the Royal Navy by Scottish shipbuilders38. Another potential

policy put forth is the potential to create jobs centered on the renewable energy industry

rather than defense, citing the commonality of skills between the two industries39.

Critics argue that this plan lacks sufficient specificity to make it a credible argument.

The United Kingdom government also cites the strengths of the Scottish defense industry,

which at present employs approximately 40,000 people and provides support to the whole

of the United Kingdom. Most defense contractors have operations in Scotland and a joint

commission between the UK and Scotland in 2010 concluded that “the defence industry

in Scotland is of considerable breadth and depth” and that “aerospace, defence, and

marine is one of Scotland’s highest value industry sectors”40. The prime customer for

this industry is the UK Ministry of Defence, which purchases both Type 45 destroyers

and Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers along with other equipment from Scottish

shipbuilders. However, the report points out that the United Kingdom has not had

warships built outside of the country since the beginning of the twentieth century, over

one hundred years.41 This assertion casts doubt that such vital national defense work

could be exported even to a newly independent Scotland. The report simply states

“companies based in an independent Scottish state would therefore no longer be eligible

for contracts the continuing UK chose to place or compete domestically for national

security reasons”42. With many competitors in the international market for warships and

demand for merchant vessels dominated by a few key nations, the UK report concludes

                                                                                                               38 ibid. p. 249 39 ibid. p. 246 40 Scotland Analysis: Defence p. 71 41 ibid. p. 73 42 Scotland Analysis: Defence p. 74

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simply “the sustainability of the defence industry in Scotland would therefore be a

considerable concern in the event of a vote in favour of leaving the UK”43.

Importantly, uncertainty surrounding future prospects for Scottish EU accession

and a future currency for an independent Scotland were items of discussion prior to the

referendum. Although the Scottish government planned to continue the use of the pound

sterling following independence, in order to provide “continuity and certainty for

individuals and businesses in Scotland and the rest of the UK,” this was debated south of

the proposed border44. Although the Governor of the Bank of England claimed in the

weeks prior to the referendum that keeping the Pound Sterling as the currency of

Scotland would be “incompatible with sovereignty,” Alex Salmond claimed that he had

as many as three “Plan Bs,” including fixing a Scottish currency to the pound, using the

pound “unilaterally,” and creating a new and distinct currency45. The issue of EU

membership remained unresolved at the time of the vote. Again, the Yes campaign

advertised a policy “that an independent Scotland will continue as a member of the

EU”46. And again, those in opposition to independence sought to cast doubt onto the

ability of a Scottish government to take such action unilaterally without prior negotiation

with EU leadership or member countries. Additionally, there was concern that other

European governments facing secessionist enclaves, including Catalonia, would not lend

support to an independent Scotland for fear of bolstering the case for independence

within their own borders47. Lastly, in the final days of the campaign, large business

interests within Scotland were increasingly vocal about their unease with the prospect of

                                                                                                               43 ibid. p. 77 44 Scottish Government p. 85 45 Green 46 Scottish Government p. 13 47 Green

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a change in government, with even the Royal Bank of Scotland expressing concern about

possible financial consequences48.

Economic Risk Leads to Continued Integration Within the United Kingdom

As noted at the outset, the results of the referendum revealed that over fifty five

percent of the electorate sided with the “Better Together” campaign in favoring continued

unification and limited self-rule within the existing United Kingdom. Only in left leaning

Glasgow and the immediately surrounding urban areas were a majority of “Yes” votes

observed49. An analysis of exit polls on the heels of the referendum revealed that for

“No” voters “the biggest overarching reason for their decision was that ‘the risks of

becoming independent looked too great when it came to things like the currency, EU

membership, the economy, jobs, and prices”50. Voters were not ready to lose access to

the Pound Sterling with a replacement currency uncertain nor were they in favor of

risking membership in the European Union and corresponding access to the economy and

community of Europe. Conversely, as expected, a majority of “Yes” voters cited

“disaffection with Westminster politics” as the largest determinant in a vote for self-

determination51. It is also interesting to note that upon initial analysis, voting regions that

had strong numbers of SNP voters in elections did not support the referendum to the

same extent, meaning that approximately one in five SNP voters voted against

independence52. It is worth noting that younger voters tended to vote in the “Yes” camp,

                                                                                                               48 Shapiro 49 "Scottish Independence Referendum: Final Results in Full" 50 Ashcroft 51 ibid. 52 Kirkup

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with the biggest margin for independence appearing in the 25 to 34 year old

demographic53. However, voting tended to follow socioeconomic lines more than any

other single factor, with predominantly low-income and urban voters sided with the

“Yes” campaign while rural, middle-class, and affluent citizens tended to vote “No”54.

Areas with unemployment over five percent were the only ones that had majorities in the

“Yes” column55. Lastly, older voters concerned with continued access to health care and

government pensions formed a solidly partisan block of “No” voters, cementing the

plebiscites’ defeat56. Socioeconomic considerations were by far the most dominant of the

factors cited by voters in the aftermath of Scotland’s decision to remain a part of the

United Kingdom.

Figure 3: Scotland Independence Results by Council57  

                                                                                                               53 Ashcroft 54 Kirkup 55 Fisher 56 Ashcroft 57 BBC

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The concern that voters demonstrated for the general economic well being of an

independent Scotland reflects on both the SNP or “Yes” and “Better Together or “No”

campaigns. Alex Salmond and his supporters simply did not convince the majority of

Scots that issues such as a plan for a viable independent currency, future European Union

integration and membership, a healthy oil industry, and continued defense industry would

be sufficient to buoy a prosperous and self-sufficient Scotland in future years.

Conversely, the “Better Together” side cast sufficient doubt on the notion that an

independent Scotland could simultaneously leverage existing relationships with the

remainder of the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe to propel their industry forward

under a newly independent government. Nationalist rhetoric and sentiment, although

certainly present, was not central to the reasoned and rational debate over whether or not

the Scottish people would be better off as an independent country. Similarly, political

divisions and historical differences provided ancillary reasoning rather than direct causal

influence on the results of the referendum. Although no future referendum is on the

horizon in Scotland, the Generalitat, or government of Catalonia, would be wise to

ensure that their detailed plans for economic success as well as relations with the

surviving Spanish Government and the larger European Community are clearly

communicated, and thorough. This reassurance will likely be vital to ensuring that the

electorate believes that any future newly distinct Catalan economy is ready to stand and

prosper on its own in Europe.

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Catalonia

Catalunya, nou estat d'Europa: Catalonia’s Independence Movement

Nominally, Catalonia is a territory in the northeastern corner of Spain with a

population of approximately seven and a half million people. Nestled adjacent to both

the Mediterranean Sea and the French border, it is a region with limited regional

autonomy from the Spanish government and a long and complex historical relationship

with Madrid58. The region has its own identity distinct from the rest of Spain through

language, culture, and history. The Catalan language specifically is distinct from

Spanish, sharing Latin and Romantic origins with many of the other Mediterranean

languages including French, Italian, and Spanish. It is also spoken in Valencia, the

province just to the south of Catalonia, where the language is known as Valencian. “The

Catalan language is undoubtedly a fundamental unifying force behind Catalan national

identity.”59 Beyond the language, the Catalan identity has long been tied not only to

Spain but to the rest of Europe as well. With Catalonia occupying a space both

geographically and culturally linking Spain and the Iberian Peninsula with the

Mediterranean and the rest of Europe, “most Catalans still pride themselves on

possessing a high grade of Europeanness.”60 This trait “has always been one of the

distinctive marks of Catalanism,” and this identity is vital to understanding the current

independence movement.61

                                                                                                               58 “Catalonia Profile” BBC 59 Nogué p.122 60 Nagel p.61 61 ibid. p.61

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The history of Catalan and Spanish political integration can be traced back all the

way to the mid-1400s, when Queen Isabel of Castille married Ferdinand of Aragon in

1469. Castille had its capital at Toledo near modern day Madrid, while the kingdom of

Aragon was located in present-day Catalonia including Barcelona62. Catalonia then

briefly enjoyed independence from the mid-1600s through 1714, when the War of

Spanish Succession established Spain as “a unitary State”63. Catalonia again briefly

broke away from Spain before the Spanish Civil War and Franco regime once again

brought the Catalans under the rule of Madrid. The Franco regime’s stance towards

Catalonia after the Spanish Civil War was characterized by “an absolute repression of

Catalan culture”64. Following the democratization of Spain beginning after Franco’s

death, Catalonia and the Basque region in northwestern Spain were granted limited

autonomy in the 1978 Spanish Constitution65.

Catalan culture has been resurgent in this timeframe, with long repressed

linguistic, cultural, and athletic facets of collective consciousness able to once again

flourish freely. The Catalan language serves as one of two official languages of the

region along with Spanish and is spoken nearly universally by native Catalans, although

immigrants from elsewhere in Spain do not speak it to the same degree. The Modernisme

architectural style of the famed and ingenious Catalan architect Antoní Gaudi graces the

streets of Barcelona, where more than seventy percent of Catalan citizens live66. The

Modernisme movement initially served as a nucleus around which elite and influential

Catalans could coalesce, having a “great influence on all scientific, artistic, intellectual

                                                                                                               62 Catalonia Votes 63 ibid. 64 Nogué p. 121 65 ibid. p. 120 66 ibid. p. 121

  22

and also political fields”67. Lastly, no discussion of Catalan identity would be complete

without a mention of Futbol Club Barcelona or “Barça,” which during the repression of

the Franco regime served as one of the only surviving symbols of Catalan culture.

Indeed, the club’s motto “Mes que un club” or “More than a club” implies that the team’s

role in Catalan culture is much more than purely peripheral entertainment. The team’s

colors, crest, and jersey, are reminiscent of the Senyera Estelada, or flag of the

independence movement that has become ubiquitous in the region. Indeed, this is an

example that “one of the most potent aspects of sport is the high degree of identification

it may generate”68. The Senyera Estalada, Barça jerseys, and other images or themes

that bring supporters together do not define the Catalan national identity, but they do

provide common “uniting symbols” for those supporting independence69.

Although the Catalan independence movement has long been in the public

consciousness, the past decade has seen a marked expansion of support for Catalan

independence (See Figure 4). As recently as 2005, less than fifteen percent of the

population was in favor of independence but support has risen sharply in recent years70.

There are a number of reasons for this uptick in support, but several of them are

economic in nature and either found their origins during the economic downturn that

began in 2007 or were exacerbated by that event. Others are political, as support for

independence has broadened across political parties to include a much more diverse

swath of the Catalan electorate. This combination of factors has lent support to the

independence movement and pushed it to the forefront of Catalan consciousness in 2015.

                                                                                                               67 Nogué p. 124 68 Juncà Pujol p. 243 69 ibid. p. 243 70 Griffiths p. 48

  23

Figure 4: What kind of political entity should Catalonia be with respect to Spain?71

Madrid Nos Roba: Keeping Tax Revenues in Catalonia

Economically, the worldwide economic slowdown after 2007 had the indirect

effect of increasing support for Catalan independence. First, as was common to many

areas of the world, spending in construction declined, which had a disproportionate effect

on metropolitan Barcelona. Second, declining employment in the service sector hurt the

Catalan middle class and over 14,000 small and medium-sized businesses closed in 2009

alone72. “Between 2006 and 2011 unemployment in Catalonia soared from 7.5 percent to

23.6 percent. Severe cuts have occurred in the public sector while income inequality has

accentuated during the economic crisis”73. “Blame for the cuts that have ravaged the

                                                                                                               71 Griffiths p. 48 72 Dowling p. 224 73 ibid. p. 229

  24

Catalan public-health service, hitherto one of the best in Europe, is placed squarely on”

the majority party in Madrid74. Catalan “rauxa,” or rage, “crosses class borders from the

workers in small manufacturing plants on the outskirts of town to the shopkeeping

botiguers in the center.”75 Unemployment disproportionately affected young people, who

quickly rallied to the cause of independence, becoming one of the most ardent and vocal

demographics in favor of a Catalan state76. Additionally, there has even been an increase

in support for Catalonia amongst native Spanish speaking immigrants to Catalonia who

are more likely to have low incomes and be most at risk economically given the recent

slowdown although independence is still well below fifty percent support in this

demographic77. These factors combined to lead to a mounting distrust of political elites

in Madrid, with an independence narrative gaining credence as a solution to this

economic downturn78.

More importantly, the disparities between Catalonia and the rest of Spain became

increasingly apparent during lean economic times. Between 2000 and 2007, Spain grew

economically but Catalan gross domestic product fell 4.5 percent during the same time

period79. As Catalonia’s rate of growth slowed below that of Spain’s, “deficits became

apparent in Catalan transportation infrastructure in spite of its continued industrial

importance in Spain”80. Lastly, since the 1980s Catalans have perceived that Spanish

funding for their region has paled in comparison to others, particularly in the areas of

health and education. The rhetoric used by opposition groups includes slogans such as                                                                                                                74 Robinson p. 23 75 ibid. p. 24 76 Davies 77 Davies 78 Dowling p. 225 79 ibid. p. 228 80 ibid. p. 228

  25

“Madrid nos roba” or “Madrid robs us,” and those in favor of independence maintain that

the flow of tax revenue out of Catalonia to other regions within Spain disproportionately

harms the Catalan region81. According to one 2012 study, due to their wealth compared

with other regions Catalans contributed 118.6 percent of the national average in tax

revenue 82 . However, they kept only 99.5 percent of the national average after

redistribution of federal spending by Madrid. Alternatively, Extremadura is a region

bordering Portugal in the southwest of Spain that collected only 77.6 percent of the

national average in taxes but received 111.8 percent of funds after redistribution83. The

simple amount of tax deficit between what Catalonia contributes to the Spanish

government and receives in return is a figure that is heavily debated but is likely

somewhere between 8.5 billion Euros as calculated by the Spanish government, and 16

billion Euros as estimated by some outside groups84. Princeton economist and native

Catalan Germa Bel estimates the excess in revenue above a system that adhered to “basic

ethical principles” to be more than 5 billion Euros or approximately 3.6 percent of

Catalan GDP annually85. This equates to between five and eight percent of annual

Catalan gross domestic product86. Put another way, this argument has been articulated,

“Spain imposes taxes at a European level an, in exchange, it obliges us to live with

infrastructures at a Latin-American level”87 . While it is unclear whether or not

independence would provide enhanced economic health for the region, the notion that an

                                                                                                               81 Mount p. 3 82 ibid. p. 4 83 ibid. p. 4 84 Ozkan p. 54 85 Robinson p.24 86 Griffiths, et. al. p. 51 87 Ozkan p. 54

  26

independent Catalonia would be economically stronger has become a dominant theme in

the rhetoric for that position.

Support for Catalan Independence Broadens Across the Political Spectrum

Apart from economic concerns, shifts in political opinion are also partially

responsible for the marked increase in support for independence. The Esquerra

Republicana de Catalunya (translated Republican Left of Catalonia), or ERC, is a left-

wing socialist party that has historically been the standard bearer for Catalan

independence. However, in the last eight years, support for independence has broadened

across the political spectrum to include other more moderate parties including the

Convergència i Unió (translated Convergence and Union), or CiU and Convergència

Democràtica de Catalunya (translated Democratic Convergence of Catalonia), or CDC.

At present, CDC is the largest political party in the region and its’ leader, Artur Mas,

serves as Catalan Prime Minister88. In 2010 elections specifically, CiU was pressured by

ERC and others to its political left and “obliged to vary its political discourse and adopt,

although ambiguously at first, the sovereigntist arguments as their own.”89 Outside of

political parties, the Assemblea Nacional Catalana, or ANC has taken up independence as

its cause and organized a series of larger and larger pro-independence demonstrations

consisting of hundreds of thousands of Catalans marching through the streets of

Barcelona. This organization also sponsors meetings and conferences around the world

dedicated to building awareness and support for the Catalan cause outside of Spain90.

This broadening of support, particularly the rise of ANC outside the traditional

                                                                                                               88 Dowling p. 224 89 Perales-García p.332 90 ibid. p. 227

  27

boundaries of existing political parties, is a major factor allowing the independence

movement to flourish in recent years.

In Catalan elections held in November of 2012, political parties favoring

independence garnered almost eighty percent of votes cast and won 107 out of 135

parliamentary seats. The following year, in December of 2013, the Government of

Catalonia and constituent political parties agreed to hold an independence referendum

without the support of the Spanish government91. On November 9, 2014, the nonbinding

referendum was held in Catalonia with just two questions asked. The first was “Do you

want Catalonia to become a state?” and the second was “In case of affirmative answer, do

you want this state to become independent?”92. Although denounced and boycotted by

groups opposed to independence, 2.3 million of an estimated 5.4 million voters took part

in the ballot, which was not recognized by the Spanish government and derided as “a

sterile and useless sham.” The Spanish Justice minister continued, “the government

considers this to be a day of political propaganda organized by pro-independence forces

and devoid of any kind of democratic validity”93. Over eighty percent of respondents

replied “Yes” to both questions, indicating that an absolute majority of eligible Catalan

voters had endorsed the desire to become a nation independent from Spain94 (See Figure

5). A further eleven percent of voters responded that they favored a Catalan state, but

within the existing framework of Spain and not necessarily completely independent from

the government in Madrid95. The future of the movement remains uncertain with the

Spanish government steadfastly refusing to entertain the concept of a binding

                                                                                                               91 Generalitat de Catalunya 92 Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia 93 BBC 94 Generalitat de Catalunya 95 ibid.

  28

independence referendum and pro-independence groups continuing to rally support in

Spain, Europe, and around the world.

Figure 5: Results of November 9, 2014 Catalonia Independence Vote96

Catalonia and Scotland: A Tale of Two Nations Although there are substantial commonalities between the nationalist movements

within Scotland and Catalonia and the two nations are “often presented as easily

comparable middle-sized stateless nations,” there are also significant differences between

the two regions that warrant analysis as Catalans continue to move forward in pursuit of a

binding plebiscite similar to that of Scotland.97 Each movement had facets of regional

economic opportunity as well as nationalistic and political themes providing narratives

explaining voting trends and giving insight into future prospects for statehood. Both of

the electorates listed economic independence from the respective central government as a

leading justification for secession. In Scotland’s case, that was the ability to pursue the

bounty of North Sea oil without sharing the profits with London while in Catalonia it is

the desire for Catalans to set aside the burden of a perceived unjust tax deficit that directs

                                                                                                               96 Generalitat de Catalunya 97 Greer p. 15

  29

revenue away from the wealthy state towards other regions of Spain. Historical, political,

and cultural factors provided amplifying rationales for support, including the presence of

a culture and history distinct from that of Spain or Britain and correspondingly separate

regional identity, especially with respect to language in Catalonia. However, apart from

economic concerns the common trend between the Scottish and Catalan movements is the

belief that the central government did not have the best interests of those citizens at heart

while governing. Culturally, this regionalization is driven from grassroots “social and

political forces rather than imposed by the state” and reflects a frustration with the status

quo of governance in the region.98 This disillusionment is particularly apparent in young

people suffering the effects of the economic downturn, raising the question of whether

future attempts at Scottish independence will have better chances for success as changing

demographics provide more favorable conditions should another referendum occur.

The biggest difference between the referendums and ongoing independence

movements in Scotland and Catalonia is the endorsement of the Scottish vote for self-

determination by the government of the United Kingdom, which is opposite to the fervent

opposition of any comparable officially recognized or binding Catalan referendum. The

U.K. government recognized the Scottish National Party’s 2011 victory in Scottish

Parliament after just such an independence vote was their main campaign promise and

the 2012 Edinburgh agreement granted the legal framework for the referendum. It is

worth noting that the Conservative party in the U.K. was in power at the time of the

agreement and that at the time their adversaries in the Labour party had enjoyed nearly

universal support from Scotland for a generation. An independent Scotland would have

reduced the influence of the Labour party in Westminster permanently, potentially                                                                                                                98 Greer p. 15

  30

allowing a Conservative majority to govern from a greatly strengthened position. The

campaign for Scottish independence also was successful in making the referendum much

closer than most analysts initially believed. Although the loss of any North Sea oil

revenues from the Scottish would reduce the gross domestic product of the U.K., this

reduction would pale in comparison to the loss of Catalan tax revenues as well as

economic contribution to the Spanish economy. Correspondingly, the Spanish

government, already governing a state weakened economically, has stanchly opposed any

independence vote in that region and refused to recognize the results.

Politically, the supporters for Scottish independence were focused around

Glasgow and were largely working class or poorer portions of the population. By

contrast, Catalan independence enjoys support across a larger socioeconomic swath of the

population including the middle class99. Other differences include the presence of a more

clearly defined Catalan identity centered on language around which citizens can rally that

is much pervasive in society than the Scottish equivalent. While those speaking Scots,

Gaelic, or other traditionally Scottish dialects totals only approximately thirty percent of

the population, a majority of at least seventy five percent of Catalans speak the language

and as one of two official languages it is ubiquitous in Catalan society, providing a much

more accessible symbol or reminder of nationalism around which to rally support for

independence100. As a result of this cultural identity and the aforementioned economic

arguments, Catalan independence holds a strong position at present and statistics from

November of 2014 indicate that a binding referendum would garner support from a large

number of Catalan citizens, making its passage certainly possible. As the Catalan

                                                                                                               99 Maxwell p. 15 100 Nogué p. 121

  31

campaign for an independent state continues, the central factor that differentiates it from

the failed attempt in Scotland is unequivocal opposition from Madrid. Since it is clear

that Catalans do not want to be excluded from the European Union, lose access to the

Euro as their currency, or harm trade with either Spain or other neighbors, in order to

achieve independence they must find a different path allowing for peaceful secession

from Spain and seamless transition to an independent state that maintains integration with

modern Europe.

Catalonia’s Uncertain Future

At present, the Generalitat of Catalonia remains locked in a stalemate with the

government of Spain with each adopting “intransigent positions” regarding future Catalan

independence101. Spain has steadfastly maintained that the referendum was “illegal” and

that Catalonia will remain a part of Spain102. As a violent conflict between the two

democratic sides remains extremely unlikely, Catalonia’s options are limited. As in the

case of Scotland, if Catalans were to unilaterally secede following an independence

referendum that is not sanctioned or recognized by the Spanish government, the European

Union would have to make a determination about whether or not Catalonia would be

granted membership. This scenario has been the subject of much debate in recent years,

but there is just one argument at the crux of the discussion, whether a “seceded territory

ceases to be an EU member and therefore has to apply for accession according to Article

49 of the EU treaty”103. If so, this would require the unanimous agreement of all current

                                                                                                               101 Nogué p. 121 102 BBC 103 Ozkan p. 55

  32

EU members including Spain as well as a lengthy application process before eventual

admission to the EU. This is the currently endorsed stance of the European

Commission104. This legal interpretation is controversial because of the belief that it also

includes political considerations as governments that make up the backbone of the EU

have little or no interest in policies that could promote secession. An alternative

interpretation of unilateral declaration of Catalan independence holds that EU’s Article 48

would apply, meaning that a newly independent state would be treated as a portion of an

older state with redrawn borders, thus granting full and immediate EU membership rather

than requiring a full application process. Problematically for Catalonia, either scenario

would require a unanimous vote from all EU members, meaning that Spain would retain de

facto control over whether or not Catalonia would be able to continue as a member of the

EU105. Both CiU and ERC “appeared to pursue internationalization with the goal of co-

opting European actors, principally through appeals to European legal principles, as

intermediaries between Spanish and Catalan authorities.”106 This strategy was met with

limited success and, although Catalan participation in Brussels and in concert with other

nationalist enclaves including Scotland continues, it has become “clear that EU authorities

and heads of state and government in Europe and beyond were unwilling to play such a

role.”107 Further, the Spanish government has sternly admonished those few nations,

including Latvia and Lithuania, who have publicly supported Catalan independence.108 As

a result, third party states have become “a considerable constraint for secession movements

because European leaders refused to reassure voters that membership of the EU, an

                                                                                                               104 ibid. p. 55 105 ibid. p. 56 106 Bourne p. 103 107 ibid. p. 103 108 ibid. p. 104

  33

organization posited by pro-independence campaigners as central to future prosperity,

would be timely and favourable.”109

As noted in the Scotland study, certainty about currency, trade, and general economic

security are likely prerequisites for any successful independence referendum and unsettled

questions about how Catalonia would function without access to the Euro or neighboring

EU member trading partners is likely to dissuade voters from voting for independence to

some extent. As noted in Figure 6, support for independence in Catalonia varies

significantly depending on whether or not EU membership for the newly formed state is

guaranteed. Those who identify themselves as only Catalan or only Spanish have roughly

equal support for an independent Catalan state regardless of whether or not that newly

formed entity would be a member of the European Union. The bulk of Catalan society

(over 59 percent) considers they to be “More Catalan than Spanish” (23.5 percent) or “As

Catalan as Spanish” (35.9 percent). A further minority (8.9 percent) considers themselves

to be “More Spanish than Catalan.” Among all of these groups, the support for an

independent Catalan state jumps between ten and fifteen percent when the hypothetical

future state is granted EU membership. Combining the two data sets (as shown in Figure

7) results in an estimate that ensuring that a future Catalan state is granted EU membership

translates into a boost in support for independence of over 8 percent of the entire Catalan

population. As the recent Scotland referendum indicates, this margin is likely to be at least

significant if not decisive in any future Catalan independence vote and as such EU

membership is likely to be at the very least a determining factor in the independence

campaign and most likely the single most important.

                                                                                                               109 ibid. p. 114

  34

Figure 6: Support for Catalan Independence with and without EU Membership Sub-Divided by Self-Described Catalan or Spanish Identity110

 

Figure 7: Combined Support for Catalan Independence With and Without EU Membership111

                                                                                                               110 Sallés; Muro 111 Sallés; Muro

  35

The Catalan government does have other options rather than unilateral secession, which

would leave the Spanish government in dire financial straits and potentially plunge the

Eurozone into continuing fiscal uncertainty. The prospect for nineteen percent of the

Spanish GDP departing abruptly would be potentially catastrophic for the Madrid

government and could “rekindle the flames” surrounding the future of the Euro. This gives

Catalonia a bargaining position with the Spanish government and potentially a negotiated

solution for the binding independence referendum publicly supported by Arturo Mas112.

Indeed, one research study analyzing the Catalan independence debate through the lens of

game theory suggests that the most mutually beneficial solution would be the Spanish

government accommodating Catalan independence and withdrawing their veto for

European Union accession in return for Catalonia assuming a percentage of the Spanish

national debt in order to ensure that the former state remains financially stable throughout

the peaceful breakup of the two countries. Alternatively, Catalonia could lobby for and

eventual accept a greater degree of autonomy and fiscal independence within the existing

Spanish state, an offer akin to “Devolution Max” that has thus far not come to fruition.113

Either of these two outcomes is preferable to both sides, preserving trade between the two

states as well as the rest of the European Community, ensuring that both the Spanish

government and the Euro remain financially solvent and integral to Europe, and granting

Catalans both the greater degree of financial independence and democratic self-

determinism that they have increasingly craved in recent years. However, the potential

exists for both sides to drive for a harder bargain rather than accept the game theory model

of mutually beneficial equilibrium, in which case the worst case would be threatened

                                                                                                               112 Robinson p. 23 113 Griffiths, et. al. p. 57

  36

solvency of the Euro due to doubts surrounding the financial stability of the Spanish state

following a unilateral, if peaceful, secession by Catalonia. Thankfully, the likelihood of

this outcome is low due to the fact that it would also jeopardize Catalan membership in the

European Community, relations with its largest trading partner in Spain, and subsequent

business and financial interests in Barcelona and Catalonia dependent upon those

relationships.

The Future of Europe: Secession or devolution throughout the European Community or Continued Strength of Traditional States? An analysis of the lessons learned during the Scottish independence referendum

as well as the current situation faced by Catalonia indicate that the cohesiveness of the

European community at present is stronger in some cases than the state boundaries that

bind individual regions or cultures together. The juxtaposition that regional and

European identity may be valued more highly than state boundaries is demonstrated by

the Catalan position that the prospect of installing border checkpoints in an independent

Catalonia that falls outside the borders of the Schengen Zone is abhorrent despite the

widespread popularity of the independence movement from Spain.114 It is clear that

although Catalans crave a greater degree of financial independence and democratic self-

determinism than they possess at present, they also are unwilling to accept the economic

and social penalties of wholly withdrawing from greater Europe. As demonstrated in the

recent case of Scotland’s failed referendum on independence, “the admission of the new

                                                                                                               114 Bourne p. 107

  37

state as a member to the European Union will be decisive.”115 Because of the high risks

associated with unilateral secession, the Spanish government’s unwavering opposition to

any independence or legal referendum, and the uncertainty surrounding EU membership

under either Article 48 or Article 49 for a newly independent Catalonia, a guarantee or

offer of EU membership is exceedingly unlikely for Catalonia prior to independence.

Therefore, the most likely outcome for the Catalonia independence movement in the

near-term will revolve around continued lobbying efforts for the Generalitat both in

Brussels and throughout Europe to increase long-term acceptance and support for an

eventual Catalonian state, negotiations aimed at increased financial independence for the

regional government or an alternative similar to Scottish “Devo-Max,” and a persistent

resurgence of Catalan culture highlighting the differences between Spanish and Catalan

that is pervasive throughout the region.

                                                                                                               115 Oskam p. 59

  38

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