Nationalism and Statism in Latvia

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NATIONALISM AND STATISM IN LATVIA:

THE PAST AND CURRENT TRENDS

Ieva Zake

Sociology DepartmentRowan University

Glassboro NJ [email protected]


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INTRODUCTION

Post-Communist Eastern and Central Europe has become an exciting

experimental site for scholars of modern nationalism as they test, adjust and reject old

theories and create new ones to account for nationalisms contradictory nature. One such

complex case has been Latvian nationalism, which during the late 1980s worked as a

liberating force and mobilized the disillusioned Soviet-ruled masses under the call for

ethnic revival and self-assertion. However, once it became an instrument of nation-

building Latvian nationalism spawned such notorious post-Communist legal policies as

the Citizenship Law of 1991, which disenfranchised about a third of Latvias residents on

the grounds that they were not direct descendants of the First Republic (1921-1940), but

rather remnants of the Soviet occupation. Due to this and other policies Latvian

nationalism became known as a classical example of the so-called ethnic nationalism,

where efforts to protect cultural uniqueness generated anti-democratic policies. From this

it was concluded that radical nationalism will not only persist there (Schopflin 1996), but,

faced with the prospects of the European Union, also strengthen.

However, some most recent analyses have pointed out that although in the early

stages ethnic concerns dominated the formation of identity in Latvia, since 2002 it is

possible to see a search for an inclusive national identity that could foster the cohesion

of society across class and ethnic boundaries (Kruk, n.d.). This article builds on such

observations and suggests that the move toward an inclusive identity has some specific

charateristics, namely, an increasing stress on the state as opposed to the ethnicity.

Moreover, Latvian nationalism itself has been changing in the recent years towards de-

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emphasizing the ethnic meaning of the nation and strengthening the belief in the

autonomous state, its ability to control and influence as many aspects of social life as

possible, its redistributive capacity, its ability to control its borders and ensure its

citizens well-being and happiness. In other words, this post-2002 stage in the defining of

Latvian identity and nationalism exhibits a growing importance of statism.

In order to understand these trends it is can be helpful to uncover the already long

and complicated relationship between Latvian nationalism and the ideas of statism.

Scholarly over-emphasis on the ethnic nature of Latvian nationalism has obscured this

aspect, which this article attempts to correct using Rogers Brubakers (2004) theoretical

framework. He suggested drawing a distinction between the so-called state-framed and

counter-state nationalisms thus highlighting the relation between the state, nation and

individual, instead of over-burdening the analytical distinction between ethnic vs. civic

nationalisms. This article applies Brubakers theory by showing how throughout its

history Latvian nationalism has been shifting between statism and nationalism and this

trend continues today as well. Thus Latvian nationalism has not been purely ethnic or

civic, but rather it has been shifting between more specific types of nationalisms.

CATEGORIZING AND ANALYZING NATIONALISMS

The issue of whether we can group nationalisms according to some reliable

characteristics has long bothered scholars in the field as they grappled with the question

of why some nationalisms lead to violence and destruction, while others can serve a

unifying and even democratizing purpose. To explicate this difference, Hans Kohn

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(1955) introduced the categories of ethnic vs. civic or Western vs. Eastern nationalism.

The Western type of nationalism centered on the formation of modern centralized

statehood and usually automatically identified all citizens of the state as members of the

nation understood in political and territorial terms. Kohn suggested that this nationalism

was open, inclusive and civic, and it preconditioned the development and persistence of

stable democratic political systems. The so-called Eastern nationalism however was

problematic and dangerous because it was built on ethnic identities whose borders did not

coincide with those of the states and it aimed at disrupting the existing states. Ethnic

nationalism asserted the primacy of blood-based membership, was exclusionary in

defining who belonged to the nation and usually was invented by intellectuals who

identified nation with cultural uniqueness, peculiarities of native folk traditions, language

and shared (usually traumatic) history. According to Kohn, the states that emerged from

this type of nationalism were less likely to build or sustain democracy.

Some researchers have used this approach to demonstrate that nationalisms do in

fact foundationally differ according to how they define the nation, in the role they grant

to the individual and how they relate to democratic political institutions (Greenfeld 2001;

Ignatieff 1993). This distinction also has been used for studying Eastern and Central

European nationalisms. Some argued that the ethnic nature of anti-Communist

movements will prevent the formation of civic nationalism in the region (Schopflin

1996). Others suggested (Snyder 1993) that ethnic nationalism has flourished in this

region due to the lack of civic principles and perpetual political and social crises. Yet

another group of scholars studied the historical, intellectual and religious origins of these

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nationalisms to explain their ethnic character (Gledhill 2005; Valantiejus 2002; Payton

2006).

Kohns critics (Yack 1999; McCrone 1998) however argued that this theory was

biased against non-Western nationalisms and reflected the Wests self-serving wishful

thinking. They claimed that the supposedly inclusive Western nationalisms were as much

based on exclusions as the vilified Eastern nationalisms (Marx 2003). Moreover, the

Western conceptions of the state and the nation actually were a product of an

evolutionary process from ethnic to civic nationalism, and therefore there was no reason

to believe that the current ethnic nationalisms such as in Eastern Europe could not

gradually evolve into civic ones in their own time (Kuzio 2002). Other critics pointed out

that no nationalism was ever purely civic or ethnic and that Kohns theory could not be

empirically substantiated. They added that civic and ethnic forms of nationalism have

existed side by side in the past (Dobrescu 2003) and continuted to do so today as well

(Hjerm 2003; Shulman 2002a; 2002b). These analyses showed that the crucial factor for

developing democracy was not the predominance of civic over ethnic nationalism, but

rather the balance between the two.

Rogers Brubaker also criticized the civic vs. ethnic nationalism distinction as

analytically confusing and over-burdened (see, for example, 2004: 132-146). In its place,

he first proposed the conception of a nationalist triad 1) nationalisms of the

nationalizing states, 2) nationalisms of ethnic minorities and 3) nationalisms of the

external homelands (1996: 58). These three types of nationalisms had different goals and

techniques and often they preconditioned each other. He suggested that Eastern European

nationalisms were not merely ethnic, but that they were nationalizing, that is, aimed

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at homogenizing their population under the titular nation. They were fueled by a belief

that the state existed solely to protect one ethnicity, which made them anti-democratic.

The conception of nationalizing states was used to study a number of post-Communist

countries (see, for example, King and Melvin 1998; Arel 1995; Laitin 1998; Cummings

1998; Wilson 1997; Kubicek 1999; Lieven 1999), and it was concluded that indeed these

countries pursued the exclusionary and nationalizing nationalism. Latvia and Estonia

were routinely labeled as nationalizing states thanks to their exclusionary citizenship

laws (Linz and Stepan 1996; Arbatov, Chayes, Chayes and Olson 1997; Pettai 2001;

Gaber 2006). Other Eastern European states were criticized as nationalizing because

they adopted language laws, and policies about the titular nation and its national

historiography (Wilson 1997). Notably, the popular media also became infatuated with

the idea that Eastern European states were permeated with dangerous nationalizing and

ethno-centeric tendencies.1

In this sense, the previous term of ethnic nationalism was

merely replaced with another highly critical concept of nationalizing nationalisms.

Soon the critics of Brubakers theory pointed out that it has often been applied

discriminatorily to the newly independent post-Communist countries, while, for example,

Russia has been spared. An example of such selective approach could be found, for

example, in the writings of Anatol Lieven (2006). Also, ethnic minorities within the new

post-Communist states usually were not interpreted as nationalizing although in reality

1 Ciaus Dobrescu (2003:393) quotes a random sample of this attitude: The disintegration of multiethnic

states and empires, and the accompanying spectacle of archaic tribal wars on the European periphery, havemade Western Europeans wonder whether their pursuit of continental unification might not be a doomed

defiance of historys will (The Revival of Long Dormant Vendettas in the Balkans and Caucasus has

Frightened Onlookers in Western Europe,Boston Globe, 15 June 1991, 18). Similar doomsday predictions

about the threatening revival of radical nationalism together with the conservative right have beenappearing in the Western publications recently too (see, for example, Roger Boyes New Europe, Old

DangersNew Statesman 2 October, 2006, 30-31; Petrou Michael Neo-Neo-NazisMacleans 27

February 2006, 18-19).

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their actions often were similar to those of the titular nations (Kuzio 2001). In response,

Brubaker (2004) modified his analytical approach to suggest a categorization of

nationalisms according to their relation toward the state, that is, between the state-

framed and counter-state understandings of nationhood and forms of nationalism (p.

144). State-framed nationalisms perceived the nation as unified with the state. Counter-

state nationalisms envisioned the nation as distinct from or opposed to the existing states

and saw the state as a mere instrument of the nation. State-framed nationalisms were not

necessarily civic as they could be imbued with ethnic and cultural elements and

interpretations of nationhood, while the counter-state nationalisms did not necessarily

conceive of the nation in ethnocultural terms (p. 145).

The most innovative aspect of this new theoretical suggestion is its

recommendation to study nationalism in relation to statism. This idea effectively links to

Robert Nisbets (1953) conclusion that the belief in the strong centralized state and the

states subsequent growth has been the most important political revolution of modern

history. Nisbet stressed that almost all political ideologies of modern times were

influenced by statism, that is, they all took a particular interest in helping the state seen as

the basic form of political organization that should assume control over as many aspects

of human life as possible. A combination of Nisbet and Brubakers ideas sets a good

foundation for a modified analytical categorization of nationalisms in relation to statist

ideology. Thus, Brubakers state-framed nationalisms can be thought of as dominated by

statist beliefs, while the counter-state nationalisms resist it by emphasizing the cultural

uniqueness of the ethnicity. Moreover, in this framework it is also possible to avoid a

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complete rejection of the ethnic and civic categories, which, if not over-used, are able to

produce good analyses of important differences among nationalisms.

A combined Kohn-Brubaker-Nisbet perspective could help us see the role that

belief in the state has played in determining the mood and content of particular

nationalisms and how ethnic and civic aspects are related to these as well. Approached

this way, nationalism then would not be seen as an isolated phenomenon, but instead it

would be contextualized within modernity and its collectivist, civic and statist ideologies.

Thus, the modern ideas about what is the fundamental basis of the nation could be

organized in a following way to create a classification of nationalisms:

What makes a nation? The state Not the state

The (cultural) ethnicity 1. Ethnic nationalism 3. Anti-state ethnic

nationalism

Not the (cultural) ethnicity 2. Statist nationalism 4. Civic nationalism

Table 1. Types of nationalisms based on the interaction of modern political ideas about

the nation, the state and individual.

Ethnic nationalism (type 1) emphasizes (cultural) ethnicity over the state and sees

the state as an instrument serving the interests of the titular ethnicity. In general, this

nationalism has the characteristics that Kohn noted in his description of ethnic

nationalism and that Brubaker emphasized in his category of nationalizing state

nationalisms. So this nationalism does not reject the importance of the state, but it

prioritizes ethnic belonging over citizenship and expects the state to protect the ethnic

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interests (see, for example, modern German nationalism or post-Communist Eastern

European nationalisms).

Statist nationalism (type 2) is different from ethnic nationalism because it insists

that the powerful and stable state is the primary political value. According to this

nationalism, nation evolves out of identification with the state. This type of nationalism is

more open than the ethnic nationalism because it prioritizes citizenship over ethnicity,

however it does not have the enough respect for individual freedom to make into Kohns

civic type of nationalism. Although statist nationalism does not completely disqualify

ethnicity as an important element of peoples identity, it still emphasizes more the

unifying power of the state (see, for example, Russian or Iranian nationalisms).

Anti-state ethnic nationalism (type 3) promotes pure and exclusively defined

ethnic collective. This nationalism does not believe that the existing (or any) modern state

is able to fully realize the ethnicitys essence and it expects the individual to sacrifice

themselves on behalf of the ethnic collective (see, for example, German Romantic

nationalism or separatist minority nationalisms).

Civic nationalism (type 4) is a rare case of nationalism because it does not built

the conception of the nation either on the ethnicity or the state. Instead it promotes the

principle of individual liberty. This type of nationalism conceives of nation in open and

citizenship-based terms (it has been suggested that the British and American nationalisms

are the best candidates for this category).

This combined analytical framework of the four types of nationalisms can be

especially productive if it is employed in a dynamic manner. It means realizing that the

relation between ethnic, civic and statist elements is flexible and that the four types of

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nationalisms can co-exist and compete with each other. This enables a study of the

changing power balance, shifting ideas, the struggle between ethnic nationalists,

democrats, pro-statists and anti-statists across and within nationalist movements and

ideologies. Furthermore, the dynamic nationalism plus statism approach can be

especially useful in the East and Central European context where it may illuminate the

long and complicated history of the relations between the nation and the state. For

example, the early Eastern and Central European nationalisms were greatly affected by

the heritage of imperial rule, ethnic diversity and unsuccessful modernization, which all

were translated into a conception that the state must belong to the dominant ethnocultural

group (Obradovic 1997). Thus, many nationalists saw the state as the ultimate instrument

for fixing historical and cultural injustices, for providing retribution to those who

believed they were mistreated in the past and for creating a balanced relationship between

diverse ethnic groups. This statist trend was strong also after the break-down of the

USSR when the Central and Eastern European nationalisms pursued an idea that each

nation should have a state in order to liberate itself and create democratic civic society.

At the same time, it is also possible to detect the presence of the anti-state attitudes in the

Eastern European ethnic nationalisms especially those under various imperial rules. And

throughout this history, the emergence of civic nationalism has remained evasive. Today

the relationship between ethnicity, state and nation continues to be complicated as the

new states are faced with challenges posed by entrance into the European Union and

other trans-national organizations.

In this article the relation between nationalism and statism in Eastern European

nationalisms is studied using the Latvian example. Similar to other Eastern European

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nations, statism played a varied role in Latvian nationalism up until the 1930s, when it

assumed a central place. This article argues that a similar tendency can be noticed today

too. Importantly, nationalism is approached here as an intellectual, political and rhetorical

device that is largely a product of the intelligentsia (especially in Central and Eastern

Europe) and influential political actors. Without suggesting that only the elites are a

noteworthy subject of research, this article is however driven by a conviction that mass

movements and beliefs tend to follow the trends set by intellectual and political elites.

Finally, although it cannot be denied that Latvian nationalism in the past and today

contains a variety of strands, this article focuses on its dominant, most clearly articulated

and influential ideas.

HISTORICAL CHANGES

Latvian nationalism emerged in the mid- to late-nineteenth century and was

characterized by a strong cultural emphasis. It also developed a difficult relationship with

the state. The early Latvian nationalisms authors were active young men who came from

modest peasant origins and obtained higher education in Russian and German universities

thanks to the imperial governments attempts to create a modern nation state with an

educated pro-Russian native middle class (Penrose&May 1991). The unintended

consequence of this process was the spread of nationalist ideas among these aspiring

intellectuals. Influenced by the Slavophiles as well as German nationalists such as

Gottfried Herder, they set out to create cultural and political conceptions with which the

native peasant populations could be shaped into self-aware ethnic groups (see Bucenience

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1995; Zake forthcoming). For example, they diligently worked on perfecting a new

standard Latvian language, translated a variety of foreign texts and books into it,

published newspapers and magazines, organized Song Festivals, theatre performances

and other cultural events (Balodis, 1991: 126-140).

They also asserted the need for the newly self-aware Latvians to become full

members of the Russian state and act as political agents (Hanovs 2000; Kristine Volfarte,

Rigas Latviesu biedriba un latviesu nacionala kustiba no 1868. lidz 1905. gadam.

Diena November 3, 2006, p. 5.). Up to the mid-19th

century the native peasant population

did not have a political existence because all political matters in the Baltic provinces were

attended to by the German nobles. To counter this, the early Latvian nationalists

developed various techniques to increase Latvian participation in the Russian imperial

state. For example, theyr tried to establish Latvians as a voting bloc, they organized

delegations and letters of self-identified Latvians to the Tsar attempting to not only

express their loyalty, but also convey their dissatisfaction with the German nobles as well

as other concerns and needs (Svabe, 1991: 276-277). Thus, the early Latvian nationalism

contained a statist element, which appeared as a belief that full national existence was

inherently linked to building relations with the state power, which allows us to classify it

as an example of ethnic nationalism (type 1). This nationalism based on the assumption

that the ethnicity was the primary element of the nation, but it could not last without the

states recognition. Accordig to this nationalism, a full-fledged ethnicity had to be able to

influence the political process and the matters of the state.

Soon however the Russian imperial authorities grew suspicious and started to

limit Latvian political activities (ibid, p. 359). In response to government censorship and

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forced Russification and conversion to Orthodoxy the Latvian nationalists focused on

strengthening the cultural aspect of Latvianness by, for example, collecting the folklore

and mythology and building Latvian literature. Due to this, the statist element gradually

lost its importance at the end of the 19th

century. Latvian nationalism started to slide

toward the anti-state type of ethnic nationalism (type 3), which unfortunately led to its

stagnation. Meanwhile the minds and hearts of the next generation of Latvian

intellectuals became captured by radical Marxism and Social Democratic ideas. These

Latvians invested their desire for activism and political change in movements that called

for a popular revolt and creation of a classless society. They opposed the existing state

and supported a different kind of state, but without any nationalist elements. These young

Marxists and Social Democrats were statists, not nationalists.

However, the dormant nationalist sentiment reawakened soon after the abortive

revolution of 1905 when some of the Latvian Social Democrats became interested in the

idea of national statehood borrowed from the Austrian Social Democrats, such as Otto

Bauer, and the Swiss federal constitution (Germanis 1992). A minority of nationalists

among Latvian Social Democrats argued that it was possible to have a socialist state that

would also incorporate ethnic liberation. Thus, they proposed a statist type of nationalism

(type 2), but the majority of the Social Democrats rejected such conceptions as

reactionary (Lams, 2003: 29). This disagreement grew into a conflict that again

contrinuted to a slow spread of nationalist ideas among the masses before World War I

(Kreslins, 2000: 59; Janis Penikis, Latvijas isais gadsimts.Diena August 21, 2002, p.

12).

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Some resolution to this ideological uncertainty arrived during World War I, when

a number of influential intellectuals and political activists took refuge from the German

occupation in Russia, mainly Moscow and St. Petersburg (Kreslins, 2000: 60-61). The

idea of independent state became increasingly popular among them. Sharing exiles fate,

feeling nostalgic for their lost homes and growing disappointed with the failing imperial

administration, these Latvians formulated some of their first statements on national

autonomy such as the eight-point declaration regarding Latvias political autonomy

published by the refugee newspaper Dzimtenes Atbalss (The Echo of the Homeland)

in February of 1917 (Germanis 1993; Lams 2003). This nationalist sentiment intensified

and the refugees became convinced that they would be the natural leaders of the potential

future Latvian state. This idea motivated them to engage in enthusiastic, even frantic

political and cultural activism (Egle, 1924: 147). Apart from creating numerous

organizations, publishing, forming elementary and high schools, creating courses in

higher education with an intention to educate the new statesmen of the autonomous

Latvia (Germanis, 1992: 145), the refugees also established political parties and drew

plans of Latvias future political and administrative structure (Egle, 1924: 147). To them,

the new state would have to serve the interests of the Latvian nation, that is, they

promoted ethnic nationalism (type 1).

But not everyone was as excited about a new Latvian state. One of the most

widely distributed publications among the Siberian refugees Brivais Latvis (The Free

Latvian) argued that the state was an aristocratic formation that was foundationally

oppressive (Kreslins 2000: 61). Sometimes, this anti-state ethnic nationalism (type 3)

based on the suspicion toward the state persisted even after the establishment of the

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independent Latvian republic in 1921.2

Nevertheless, most Latvian nationalists at the end

of the WWI believed in the necessity of the state for strengthening Latvians as a nation,

thus, ethnic nationalism (type 1) predominated. Most Latvian nationalists did not oppose

the state, but believed that it had to serve the needs of ethnic Latvians.

The ethnic nationalism remained strong throughout the period of Latvias

parliamentary democracy between 1921 and 1934. Unfortunately, it gradually developed

into a destructive criticism of democracy and the existing state itself was seen as hostile

to the true interests of Latvian ethnicity. Latvian ethnic nationalism thus gradually

evolved into the anti-state ethnic nationalism (type 3) as its proponents grew increasingly

dissatisfied with real-life democratic compromises. Within a few years, they declared

both the Latvian state and its political system a complete failure and called for a non-

democratic state that would regard only the Latvian ethnicity as the highest political

value (Zake 2005a).

Exactly at this point in time, the statist demand for a strong state intensified again.

Its most eloquent expression was a notable book written by a promintent intellectual,

politician and diplomat Mikelis Valters (1933) in which he rejected democracy,

liberalism and market economy as selfish and proposed instead that the state should

ensure that all individual initiatives and efforts were subordinated to the needs of the

state. He asserted that the state should be the decisive political agent and suggested

institutionalizing state supervised forms of cooperation in the economy and politics. He

insisted that such measures were the last hope for making Latvia into a strong state and

2 For example, in 1922 the former refugee Haralds Eldgasts wrote a programmatic article The Active

Nationalism (Latvijas Vestnesis November 7, p. 2) in which he declared that Latvian society must be

aware that it cannot trust official institutions to be able to fulfill the future of our nations culture.

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Latvians into a great nation. The popularity of such views was wide-spread and by the

mid-1930s Latvian nationalism had turned into a statist oriented ideology (type 2).

In May of 1934, Prime-Minister and leader of the influential political party the

Farmers Union, Karlis Ulmanis, together with a few of his supporters, executed a coup.

With the help of a voluntary para-military organizationAizsargi, he arrested a number of

Social Democratic political leaders, declared the parliament defunct and placed himself in

an authoritarian position as the President of Latvia (Silde 1976). His ideology and

policies fit right into the statist nationalism (type 2) that had been already developed by

the nationalist intellectuals and political figures. After the coup, Ulmanis made sure that

the state was seen as the perfect instrument for creating and perfecting Latvians as a

nation. To achieve this, he established a corporatist administrative system with highly

interventionist economic policies. He gradually created state capitalism, where nominally

private property was preserved, while in reality the economy was controlled by the state

and supervised by Ulmanis personally. He dissolved all political parties and forbade any

unregulated public association. He instituted state control over all means of mass media.

Consequently, the state grew more centralized, and the bureaucracy and Ulmanis himself

came to be seen as possessing almost mystical power to be in charge of close to every

aspect of peoples lives. The powerful state and Ulmanis were praised and glorified,

while individuals were expected to adjust their interests and needs to those of the state

and its leader (Balabkins&Aizsilnieks 1975; Straume 1995; Butulis 2001).

Under Ulmanis direction, Latvian nationalism became infused with the idea that

the powerful state and leader carried the key to the national character of the Latvian

people. In other words, the state and its leadership now embodied and framed the nation

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(Zake 2005b). Thus Ulmanis strengthened statist nationalism (type 2), where the state

took precedence over the ethnicity and the loyalty to the state was more important that

ethnic belonging. This ideology dominated until 1940 when Latvia was occupied by the

USSR.

Under both the Nazi occupation during the World War II and the Soviet regime

after the war, Latvian nationalisms statist element declined again. The notion of a

powerful national state appeared not only unattainable but also contrary to the essence of

Latvianness, which was conceived as being opposite to the totalitarian state regimes.

Latvianness was seen as a cultural and spiritual accomplishment that existed in literature,

art, music, folklore and mythology, and could not be framed by state institutions. This

nationalism again displayed anti-state ethnic characteristics (type 3). It changed when

Latvians were faced with the political opportunities of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Then the idea of national statehood appeared to be a viable possibility and the statism

was reawakened. Importantly, however, the conception of the new state as in the early

1920s had to combine such conflicting needs as creating a democratic society,

establishing a free market economy and also protecting Latvian ethnic identity (Larss

Peters Fredens. ParvertibasDiena March 5, 2005, p. 15). Latvian nationalist interests

prevailed and the citizenship legislation, the state language laws, laws regarding minority

education and other policies reflected an emphasis on making the new state to serve and

protect ethnic Latvians. Latvian nationalism promoted a view of the state was an

instrument of the titular nation. Consequently, the state was allowed to regulate and

control individuals lives as long as it fit what Latvian nationalists felt benefited the

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Latvian ethnicity politically, socially and culturally. Thus, the ethnic nationalism (type 1)

dominated up to 1998.

This article is driven by the question of whether the nature of Latvian nationalism

and its relations with statism have changed since 1998. The main source of information

here is a variety of pre-election materials (programs, interviews) of the mainstream

political forces that hold the political power in the current political system.

CONTEMPORARY TRENDS

As noted, the main political cleavages up until 1998 remained concentrated

around the issues of strengthening national independence, de-occupation, relations

between ethnic Latvians and the Russian-speaking population, the state language

legislation, education in minority languages and, of course, the rights of citizenship.

Thus, ethnic nationalism with its often radical aspects was a decisive element of

mainstream politics. These nationalist views were represented by two opposing parties

the pro-Latvian nationalistFor Fatherland and Freedom (TB) vs. the pro-Russian

nationalistPeoples Harmony Party (TSP). TB supported a strictjure sanguinis

definition of citizenship and harsh state language legislation. At some point some of its

politicians even talked about the voluntary deportation of the Russian-speaking

population to Russia. Their main opponents from TSP demanded immediate citizenship

to all residents, two state languages and preservation of Russian-speaking education.

Importantly both political positions perceived the state as an instrument for protecting

particular ethnic interests. And since TB participated in the coalition governments, while

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the pro-Russian nationalists continuously remained in opposition, legislative decisions

and government policies were adopted with the purpose of strengthening the position of

ethnic Latvians.

The first changes to this political system were brought by the neo-liberal Peoples

Party (TP) in 1998. It articulated a novel political vision according to which ethnic

interests were seen as secondary to those of the state. TP introduced the statist element

into the hitherto predominately ethnic understanding of Latvian nationhood. It

downplayed the political importance of loyalty to Latvianness and instead stressed such

neo-liberal and more universal values as family, morality and state. It emphasized

creating a moral and ordered political and economic environment, where the state has

responsibilities toward families and individuals. For example, TP declared in its program

that it is the obligation of the state to guarantee the rights of children, parents,

grandparents and family (Diena September 23, 1998, p. 2). It mentioned Latvian

identity only once in its program just to indicate that the state will preserve and use

Latvianness to strengthen the states own place among others countries.

Clearly, TP did not see ethnicity alone as the basis of nationhood. This party also

did not believe that the states main mission was to protect ethnicity. Instead, TP

prioritized other forms of political belonging. Most importantly, it promoted a new view

where the state, as the main political agent, existed and acted to ensure the well-being of

the traditional family. The Peoples Party won the election in 1998 with 21.19% of the

vote.

Nevertheless, the nationalist presence remained strong in 1998. In fact, both

Latvian and Russian nationalists gained votes in comparison to the 1995 election (in 1998

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TB received 14.65% up from 11.9%, TSP 14.12% up from mere 5.5%). These

nationalists continued to perpetuate the idea that the state was the instrument of ethnic

protection. In 1998 the TB merged with another long-lasting nationalist movement called

the Latvias National Independence Movement. Together they formed a union called

TB/LNNK. Its program began with an assertion that they were a national conservative

political force that believed in a Latvian Latvia (Diena, September 23, 1998, p. 3). The

program reasserted support for state language laws and promised to control immigration

and declared that only full citizens of Latvia could participate in any elections. TB/LNNK

also stated their commitment to creating an educational system that would teach national

values, patriotism and loyalty to the state. It openly said that their political actions would

serve to protect and develop Latvian ethnic cultural traditions.

Meanwhile, Russian nationalists from TSP continued to demand that Latvia

should become a multicultural state where the cultural and political development of all

ethnic groups was guaranteed by the state. Their intention was to create a society with

numerous ethnic enclaves that all would enjoy the states protection. Thus, their vision

remained similar to that of the Latvian nationalists where focus on the ethnicity was

stronger than emphasis on the states unifying power.

Nevertheless, the parliamentary elections of 1998 already indicated a tendency

where both Latvian and Russian ethnic nationalism (type 1) was gradually pushed to the

margins by the statist nationalism (type 2) of the Peoples Party.3

The recent elections of

2006 showed further strengthening of this trend when TB/LNNK gained only 6.94%, the

Russia nationalistFor the Human Rights in Unified Latvia earned 6.03%, while the two

most statist political forces the Peoples Party and theNew Era gained 19.56% and

3 For a more detailed discussion of the results of 1998 elections and neo-liberalism see Zake 2002.

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16.38% respectively.4

Thus, both Russian and Latvian radical ethnic nationalists received

the smallest number of votes since the establishment of Latvias independence (Aivars

Ozolins, Vienplaksni izlido ara.Diena October 16, 2006, p. 2), while the statists

dominated.5

These changes in the electoral politics deserve attention as they reveal a

deeper change from the focus on ethnicity toward the emphasis on the state that

characterizes Latvian nationalism and political attitudes in general.

The ethnic nationalists of 2006, that is, those who believe in the political

importance of ethnicity, could still be grouped in two wings pro-Latvian vs. pro-

Russian. On the Latvian side, TB/LNNK continued to be the most important nationalist

force. Remaining loyal to its ideological principles, TB/LNNK declared during its pre-

election campaign in 2006 that ethnic non-Latvians would need to undergo careful

4 Altogether, Peoples Party won with 19.56%, the Association of the Farmers and the Green Party received

16.71%, The New Era received 16.38%, the Center of Harmony 14.43%, the First Party together withLatvias Way gained 8.58%. The Association ofFor Fatherland and Freedom and Latvias National

Independence Movement received 6.94% and the association of political forcesFor the Human Rights in

Unified Latvia earned only 6.03%.5 It also has to be noted that since 1991 the Latvian political system was always characterized by a strong

presence of populist solicitors of the protest vote. In 2006 the protest vote appeal was re-shaped andconcentrated not so much on correcting the effects of social and economic inequalities, but focused on

traditional values combined with a call for a stronger state. The two most successful protest vote parties

were The Association of The Farmers Union and the Green Party (ZZS) and a coalition of the First Partyand theLatvias Way (LPP/LC). The appeal of ZZS was based on the popularity of its recently acquired

leader Aivars Lembergs the mayor of the port city Ventspils who received popular credit for making the

city one of the nicest, safest and wealthiest municipalities in the country. The rest of the ZZS candidate list

contained a confusing mixture of political activists, while its program reflected little substance (see, forexample, Asie jautajumi. Intervija ar Induli Emsi. Pilna versija. V-Diena, October 13, 2006). ZZSs pre-

election program gave a sense of a slogan-like attitude with most distinct emphasis put on pleasing

everyone dissatisfied with the current political establishment. When confronted about the vagueness of

their program the leaders of ZZS stated we are not going to push our understanding of the truth upon the

people, but instead we will listen to what they have to say and then change our program according to howsociety perceives it and wants to correct it (Viedoklu sadrusme: bezatbildigi labejie pret iekartas

gazejiem. Indulis Emsis (ZZS) pret Jani Dinevicu (LSDSP). V-Diena, October 13, 2006). LPP/LC, on theother hand, was a right-wing political force aimed at protest voters who wanted a more moral and religious

state. The First Partys leadership contains a number of priests and religious figures. They stressed that the

concept of individual freedom had to be understood in the context of obligations toward God, family and

ones consciousness. One of the strongest selling points of the LPP was its intolerance toward sexualminorities (see, for example, LPP/LC pret TB/LNNK: nodoku atlaidji pret nodoku ieviesjiem. V-diena, October 13, 2006). At the same time, the First Party demonstrated ethnic tolerance and stated that

everyone who was loyal and interested should be able to get Latvian citizenship.

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scrutiny and pass a variety of tests to be accepted to receive citizenship. On the issue of

the naturalization of non-citizens, one of the leaders of TB/LNNK stated: we have to

send a clear signal (to the non-citizens I.Z.). And the signal should be as follows: either

you become loyal Latvian citizens or you do not become citizens at all (LPP/LC pret

TB/LNNK: nodoklu atlaideji pret nodoklu ieviesejiem, V-Diena, October 13, 2006).

Thus, they continued to see citizenship not as an agreement between the state and an

individual, but as a contract between ethnic Latvianness and the individual.

Unsurprisingly, TB/LNNK also called for adoption of a Repatriation Law that would

encourage and regulate the emigration of non-Latvians. In response to the concerns that

such a policy could have a negative effect on an already tight labor market, TB/LNNK

quipped that their proposal would mainly apply to the elderly and pensioners anyway (see

Asie jautajumi. Intervija ar Robertu Zili. Pilna versija. V-Diena, October 13, 2006).

Such an answer showed that the Repatriation Law was intended mainly as a symbolic

statement about the need to purify the ethnic nation from unwelcome non-Latvian

influences.

Furthermore, already in the opening of its pre-election campaign of 2006,

TB/LNNK declared: the protection of Latvians interests is our most important task.6

To accomplish this, TB/LNNK proposed revamping citizenship legislation by halting the

current process of naturalization, significantly limiting the number of those eligible for

citizenship, carefully reviewing language skills of candidates, simplifying the procedure

for taking citizenship rights away as well as helping those who are not interested in

integrating into Latvian society to emigrate. TB/LNNK also insisted on instituting

6 This and all other quotes from the 2006 pre-election programs come from the website

http://www.vdiena.lv/lat/politics, which is an off-shoot site of the largest daily newspaperDiena dedicated

primarily to the pre- and post-election issues.

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Latvian as the only language of instruction in minority schools. The rest of the program

was dedicated to very particular social and economic policies, which indicated that the

central ideologicalfeature of this program was the emphasis on reinstating the ethnic

meaning of Latvian nation.

Clearly, TB/LNNK continued to be very concerned with ethnic issues in 2006. Its

representatives stated that the presence of Russian sources of mass media (especially

cable television) was a threat to democracy in Latvia (Ka mazinat homofobiju Latvija,

vai vajag mainit piketu pieteiksanas kartibu un vai demokratija musu valsti ir apdraudeta?

To jautajam politikiem un ekspertiem. Atbildes lasiet seit. V- Diena, September 7,

2006). TB/LNNK also expressed strict opposition to immigration into Latvia from non-

European Union countries and instead proposed that the state should force local

employers to pay higher salaries to stop the loss of labor force (see, for example,

LPP/LC pret TB/LNNK: nodoklu atlaideji pret nodoklu ieviesejiem. V-Diena , October

13, 2006).7

In all respects, the position of the TB/LNNK remained faithful to its ethnic

nationalism, that is, the perception of the state as an instrument for ensuring the ethnic

meaning of the nation.

A similar approach to the state continued to characterize the pro-Russian ethnic

nationalism represented by the political coalitionFor Human Rights in Unified Latvia

(PCTVL). This political group grew out of TSP s parliamentary faction and took over

TSPs issues and 15-year old ideology. In 2006 PCTVL continued to propagate the

conception of Latvia as a society of two ethnic enclaves, thus focusing on ethnic

differences and going against the idea of integration. Although PCTVL claimed to be

7 Although complete data is still unavailable, it has been estimated that close to 200 000 Latvians have

sought employment in European countries (mainly Ireland and the UK) in the last five years. For a country

of about 2.5 million people such a loss of labor force is a major economic and demographic concern.

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interested in the human rights of all, undoubtedly its priority was the defense of Russian

speakers, who were seen as embodying the essence of all oppression in Latvia. For

example, when faced with a possible law that would limit the rights of homosexuals,

representatives of PCTVL in the parliament abstained from the vote and later admitted

that such issues were not really their priority (see Asie jautajumi. Intervija ar Jakovu

Plineru. Pilna versija. V-Diena, October 13, 2006). PCTVLs ideology concentrated on

citizenship, protection of Russian as the second state language and preserving state-

funded education in Russian.

Moreover, PCTVL consistently avoided giving a clear answer to the question of

whether Latvia was occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940 or not. It has been able to

provide only vague statements to the effect that some historical tragedy took place and

the question itself was too complicated (see, for example, PCTVL, Saskanas centrs: mes

neesam kaskigi. V-Diena, October 13, 2006). Interestingly also, PCTVL was the only

mainstream political party that declared in its pre-election program that Latvia should not

participate in any military actions outside of Europe. PCTVL argued against the presence

of Latvian soldiers in Iraq and demanded negotiations about decreasing Latvias financial

and man-power contribution to NATO. In sum, since the core of PCTVLs ideology

remained Russian ethnic nationalist, it also viewed most other issues through a prism of

ethnic conflict, the need to protect, preserve and shield ones ethnic group.

However, as noted earlier, the elections of 2006 revealed some notable changes in

the balance of ideologies. Among such important changes was the appearance and

success of a different pro-Russian political force The Center of Harmony (SC). It

formed after yet another split last year, this time inside of PCTVL itself. SC declared that

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their goal was to decrease the radical demands on behalf of Russian speakers and instead

stress the creation of a unified and tolerant model of society. One of the major steps in

this direction was SCs willingness to admit that the ethnic conflict was not solely the

fault of ethnic Latvians, but that the Russian speaking population was at least partially to

blame, too (see Asie jautajumi. Intervija ar Jani Urbanovicu. Pilna versija. V-Diena,

October 13, 2006). Such an understanding of ethnic problems had never appeared in pro-

Russian political discourse before. To strengthen this position, SC also noted in its

program that it stood in firm opposition against any sort of nationalist radicalism either

Russian or Latvian. SCs leader Janis Urbanovics suggested that instead of demanding

that Russians learn the Latvian language, Latvians must create conditions where Russians

would voluntarily become bi-lingual. He emphasized the need to prevent extremist

hysteria and whining about oppression on either side of the ethnic split. In other words,

SC advocated social integration that was based on mutual respect and ethnic co-

existence. Consequently, SC did not demand the status of second state language for

Russian, but instead asked for the legal position of a minority language. With this, they

agreed that Russian speakers would have only some, not all, education in Russian, that

they would also willingly learn the state language Latvian and that Latvians would be

encouraged to learn Russian, too. Furthermore, SC proposed that such an arrangement

would not be justified by the need to protect ethnic Russians (as PCTVL claims), but

simply because it would be to everyones benefit to know both languages.

Another novel element introduced by SC was the discussion of promoting Latvian

patriotism among the new generation. SCs pre-election program actually stated that such

feelings would be a crucial step toward an integrated society. SC also declared that

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although it was important to them that the Russian speaking population be represented in

politics and economic and social life, they also considered the interests of a unified and

stable state to be a priority over narrow ethnic agendas. Therefore SC consciously tried to

expand the meaning of individuals rights to include such diverse issues as the rights of

renters living in recently privatized buildings, minorities affected by educational reform

or non-citizens who were not allowed to participate in municipal elections. SC insisted

that the meaning of freedom had to be disconnected from ethnic issues and instead

asserted that it was the lack of social protection that threatened democracy and liberty.

This idea was summarized in their slogan: freedom means being free from poverty.

Additionally, in its pre-election program SC called for a responsible, just and

effective state, which invests in each person, guarantees social security and supports

honest private business. Numerous times it stressed the role of the state in ensuring the

principles of social justice and equality. SC also supported enlisting the state to make

naturalization more accessible. Importantly, SCs program contained no discussion of

two-enclave (Latvian and Russian) society, there was no talk about protecting the

Russian language, no discussion about an automatic granting of the citizenship rights to

all residents and no demand for education in Russian. Although SCs leaders such as Nils

Usakovs described it as a Russian-oriented political force (PCTVL, Saskanas centrs:

mes neesam kaskigi. V-Diena, October 13, 2006), its ideological position appeared to be

considerably moderate and non-ethnic.8

In fact, its views formed a link between the

8 It has to be noted however that some political observers have been able to trace connections between the

SC and Putins government in Russia (see for example, Aivars Ozolins Saskanas Centrs Kalvisa

valdibas sabiedrotais V-Diena, November 20, 2006). Apparently, Putins government was very critical ofthe failures of the previous pro-Russian political forces and manufactured SC as a new type of Russian

party in Latvia and now keeps it under strict control. Thus, there are notable concerns that SC is just an

instrument of Russias foreign policy.

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growing statism in Latvian politics (discussed further) and ethnic nationalism inherited

from the first decade of independence.

To understand the importance of SCs position it is useful to compare it to the

PCTVL. For example, in an interviewwith the newspaperDiena the leaders of the two

parties were asked to talk about policies aimed atdecreasing anti-Semitism, racism and

homophobia in Latvia. One of the leaders of PCVTL Vladimir Buzayev stated that it was

necessary to rid Latvia of Russophobia, to cancel all legal restrictions on citizenship,

education and native language usage. Thus, PCTVL again presented Russian-speakers as

the ultimate victims of intolerance and discrimination, while Boris Cilevich from SC

articulated a more flexible position. He asserted that it was important to eradicate all

forms of discrimination following the directives of the European Union, it was crucial to

strengthen the inter-cultural education and stop the flirtation of the political elite and

intelligentsia with nationalism. This response did not convey a call for a radical, pro-

Russian change, but instead attempted to articulate a model that combined

multiculturalism, inter-cultural socialization with tolerance using the EU as a guide.

Although such an approach had its internal contradictions, it was notably more concerned

with creating an integrated state as opposed to a segregated two-community society.

The emergence of SC and their electoral success indicated that important

transformations were affecting the pro-Russian political forces. Similar changes had

started already in the Latvian-oriented politics in 1998 and became even more distinct in

2006. Specifically, the idea of the Latvian nation was reinterpreted in less ethnic and

increasingly more statist terms. In the elections of 2006, the statist political position of

the Latvian-oriented political forces was represented again by the leaders of the current

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government The Peoples Party (TP) and by the political party The New Era (JL). As

noted earlier, together these two Latvian statist parties received close to 36% of the vote.

In its pre-election rhetoric, TP continued the trends it had set in 1998 and

introduced a number of new ones. As before, TP insisted that they were a party of

pragmatists and realists committed to hard work and making difficult decisions. It

continued to emphasize its ability to be a leading force and to take charge of the situation.

Or, as stated by its leader and current Prime Minister Aigars Kalvitis: the most

important thing to us is to work hard. We are a party of those who get things done.

And the people who vote for us are just like that (Asie jautajumi. Intervija ar Aigaru

Kalviti. Pilna versija. V-Diena, October 13, 2006). Also, in the past TP advertised the

business skills of its leading figures and argued that if they had been successful with their

private companies, they would be effective leaders of the state. Recently, however their

ideology shifted toward an idea that TP offers the best, strong-willed and principled

state managers regardless of their private business capabilities. In other words, now

they approached the state as the ultimate form of business that had to be led by a

particular type of successful administrators experts.

As before, in this context of a pro-active and managerial approach to politics TP

discussed ethnic conflict very little. In the past, TP suggested that the most important

national value was independence itself. In 2006 this theme took on an even stronger

emphasis and TP replaced any discussions about ethnic issues with a distinct statism. The

pre-election program declared that their main goal was enlarging the competency and

capacities of the state administration, especially with regard to distributing the financial

resources received from the European Union. Moreover, TP asserted that almost every

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aspect of social life, for example, salaries, pensions, the condition of schools and

hospitals, culture and foreign policy all depended on which candidates were elected to the

parliament and how competent they were as politicians. TP also declared the well-being

of the people, and stable and predictable state development can be guaranteed only by

making long-term political plans. In another place, TPs program stated that the

cooperation between state institutions and private initiatives would be the most effective

way to increase Latvias competitiveness.

Thus, in 1998 TP started to replace concerns with ethnic relations, de-occupation

and giving power to Latvians with promotion of an inclusive identity that was largely

based on the values of family and the state. By 2006 their ideology had graduated to a

full scale statism, where the state had become a value within itself. Although TP had

initially presented itself as a neo-liberal force, its ideology did not promote the idea of a

self-efficient individual and thus did not develop into a civic nationalism. Instead TP

concentrated on strengthening Latvias state, expanding its powers and competitiveness,

that is, making the state into a strong agent both domestically and internationally. This

state was conceived in inclusive and non-ethnic terms, but mainly because now it was

thought of not as a national state, but as a care-taking state (therefore, for example, the

pre-election program opened with promises about increased salaries for state employees,

raised pensions, social guarantees, state support for education and science, etc.). Thus, by

2006 TP had helped to transform the dominant ethnic nationalism (type 1) into statist

nationalism (type 2).

A similar ideology was promoted by The New Era (JL), which first appeared in

2001 and won that election under the leadership of one of the former top state

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administrators the head of Latvias Central Bank, and later businessman, Einars Repse.

The self-assigned political mission of JL was to revise the political practices of the

dominant parties and to reveal their corruption. JLs political innovation was stressing the

problems related to the formation of the new post-Communist elites and how they had

privatized the state. This way, JL re-focused the publics attention away from ethnic

conflicts and de-occupation, toward concerns over the impact of the ten years of

independence, democracy and market economy. In many ways, JL used the ideological

path prepared by TP.

In 2006 Einars Repse self-confidently asserted that his party had changed the

political culture by bringing in new political attitudes, creating new foundations for the

state budget and the management of the states financial resources (Asie jautajumi.

Intervija ar Einaru Repsi. Pilna versija. V-Diena, October 13, 2006). Repse insisted that

the most important characteristic of JLs politicians was their commitment to a fair

administration of the state, opposition to the so-called theft of the state by the dominant

parties and private use of the money intended for common projects, that is, corruption.

Criticizing other parties, especially TP, Repse noted how they had let the financial

matters of the state fall into a populistic and incompetent free-flow, while his party was

determined to put the states financial resources into complete order by redistributing

them to deserving groups and carefully planning their use. Thus, JL emerged as a

decisively statist force for which honest management of the state, its finances and

redistributative programs formed the core political value and goal.

In its 2006 pre-election program JL elaborated this position stating that its role

was to take care of the people, the salaries, jobs, social needs. We will take care of

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the elderly, the disabled and other protected groups. Our goal is to renew the societys

faith in the power of laws, justice and courts without which a person cannot feel safe in

their country. We will pay a lot of attention to ensuring personal safety legal, economic

and social. With this rhetoric of safety and protection JL propagated the idea of a care-

taking state, which naturally also meant increasing the states regulative powers.

Interestingly, although such political forces as JL and TP insisted on being right-wing

conservatives and portrayed the Social Democrats as their opponents, they both employed

a statist approach. The only difference was that the Social Democrats used statism to

acquire social equality, while JL and TP employed statism to strengthen Latvia as an

independent country.

Therefore they did not define the state and nation in ethnic terms. For example,

another leading figure of JL, Sandra Kalniete, stated that the party saw the state as an

instrument for both preserving the Latvian language and culture and for strengthening

ethnic tolerance and integration. She also noted that state officials and politicians had an

especially important mission as law-abiding role models when it came to nurturing

tolerance (Ka mazinat homofobiju Latvija, vai vajag mainit piketu pieteiksanas kartibu

un vai demokratija musu valsti ir apdraudeta? To jautajam politiiem un ekspertiem.

Atbildes lasiet seit. V-Diena, September 7, 2006). Thus, similarly to TP, JL believed in

creating an integrated society where the state officials take the leading role.

Although due to personal disagreements TP and JL rejected the possibility of

creating a coalition government, they had notable ideological similarities. TP presented

itself as people of action, while JL described itself as assertive decision makers. TP

emphasized its ability to manage the state and reach fast results, while JL highlighted its

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professional politicians-experts (see, JL pret TP: lemt spejigie pret ricibas

cilvekiem. V-Diena, October 13, 2006). They both had dedicated themselves to the

strengthening of states powers and abilities to influence economic and social processes,

developing the states capacities in dealing with corruption and re-distributing the

financial resources granted by the European Union. While in principle both adamantly

promised to decrease state bureaucracy, they both also approached the state as the main

agent in bringing about any change at all. To them, gaining control over the state was the

best way to accomplish anything.

In sum, the decline of the ethnic nationalism of radicals such as TB/LNNK and

PCTVL and the success such statist nationalists as TP and JL in the Parliamentary

elections of 2006 was not only a change in power balance, but also an ideological

transformation. Now the state administration, its ability to distribute outside resources

(mainly EU money), and its capability to regulate social and economic processes has

taken precedence over ethnic protectionism. Beliefs of an ethnic nationhood have lost

ground to a more open, state-based understanding of the nation.9

Interestingly, similar tendencies have been noted in non-political and private

discourses. For example, a study of the postings on the popular web forum Delfi

regarding the athletes from Latvia in the 2004 Olympic Games showed that both self-

identified Latvians and Russians were actively seeking new ways of defining

Latvianness. Their strategies included downplaying in-born ethnicity and emphasizing

9 The described tendencies are mainly related to political ideas and ideologies. When it comes down to the

political realities of, for example, creating a coalition government and making all of the coalition members

happy, things are different. For example, when the newly elected Parliament started to work on thecreation of its committees and hand out their chairmanships such radical Latvian nationalist as Aivars

Tabuns from TB/LNNK was selected to lead the important Committee on Citizenship and Naturalization.

What this article wants to point out however is the general ideological shifts.

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such criteria as individual achievement, how proud one made their compatriots, how well

one knew the Latvian language and whether one was a citizen (Kruk 2004). The

presented evidence pointed out the decline in purely ethnic understanding of who was a

Latvian and showed some early signs of an open-ended understanding of the national

belonging. Another study showed that exclusively ethnic discourse has moved to a

symbolic position as in, for example, the political speeches of the current President of

Latvia Vaira Vike-Freiberga (Kruk 2006).

CONCLUSION

Nationalismper se is not disappearing in the post-Communist contexts such as

Latvian. However, it is moving away from an emphasis on ethnicity, toward the

celebration of the strong state, which is seen as the basis for a unifying sense of

nationhood that could be acceptable to all ethnic groups. It is important to note that these

changes, at least in the case of Latvia, could be tied to its entrance into the European

Union. A majority of Latvias population favored it and considered the EU membership

as a guarantee to Latvias independent and safe future. Once this goal was reached, the

new task was to benefit from this as much as possible. Here the state emerged as a

powerful agent it was expected to be an equal partner with the rest of the EU members,

to redistribute the goodies from the EU, to represent and defend the interests of

Latvias residents in relations with the EU and to fulfill the obligations and

responsibilities toward the EU. Thus it appears that the new EU member states have been

encouraged to become stronger, administratively more elaborate and assertive (consider,

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for example, all the new offices that have been created to maintain the relationships with

the EU). Entrance into the EU spurred not so much ethnic separatism, as the growth of

domestic statism in which, notably, the individual as the fundamental value remains

absent.

In terms of the theoretical implications, it is notable that although we see the

decline of ethnic nationalism, civic nationalism is not entering in its place. Instead,

nationalism is becoming increasingly statist. Thus, Kohns categorization of ethnic vs.

civic is too simplistic and therefore overburdened (Brubaker 2004). Although not all

of it needs to be rejected, it has to be combined with Burbakers notions of counter-state

vs. state-framed. This enables us to account for the importance of nationalisms changing

attitude toward the state. And it helps to connect these varying attitudes to the overall

political situation. In the past, a similar growth of statism culminated in an authoritarian

regime in Latvia. Todays statist nationalism does not appear to search for a strong state

leader, but it does reflect societys desire to maintain stability, predictability and national

autonomy. And this is hoped to be accomplished not by limiting the state and its various

powers, but by actually increasing them.

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Documents

Nationalism and Statism in Latvia