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NATIONAL
STOPPING TERRORISTS, BEATING ETA
Zapatero’s stubborn arrogance in disguising deception as a mistake
Javier Zarzalejos, Director of the Constitution and Institutions Unit at FAES
The T-4 terminal at Barajas following the attack by ETA (30 December 2006)
At his end of year press conference, President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero admitted having made a “remarkable mistake” in predicting that twelve months later “we would be in a better situation” regarding ETA. Rodríguez Zapatero’s forecasts are
well-known by now for having a devastating effect on the events they target. In this case, however, acknowledging a mistake, otherwise cruelly borne out at T-4 of Barajas
Airport and at Capbreton, turns out to be just a ploy with a purely tactical aim: that the seemingly virtuous appearance of the gesture enables the government
to avoid giving the explanations which it still owes to the citizens about its performance in the non-existent and deceitful “peace process”.
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18/01/08Nº62
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The issue is not so much whether Rodríguez Zapatero made a mistake, but what exactly his mistake was. The President says nothing about the matter in the lengthy interview he gave to the El Mundo newspaper (13/14 January). Su-ch an enquiry, as the handling of affairs by any Government in all aspects of its policies ought to be a part of public debate under democracy, becomes all the more important, if this is possible, regarding the policy pursued by the Socialist government on ETA. The issue here is not really Rodríguez Zapatero trying to gradually release himself free of this burden, perhaps seeking to evade unplea-sant surprises during the election campaign. Confessing that negotiation talks had continued with ETA once the President had declared them to be ended and Home Secretary broken and over has a name; you cannot call deception a mis-take. Hidden facts must be disclosed and the mistake explained. Because the so-called “peace process”, turned by the socialists into a synonym of political negotiation with ETA-Batasuna, was based precisely on the fact that Rodríguez Zapatero was privy to more information, had better research, and indeed knew more and better than anybody else.
“Confessing that negotiation talks had continued with ETA once the President had declared them
to be ended and Home Secretary broken and over has a name; you cannot call deception
a mistake”
This argument was used to demand blind faith in the government’s strategies, excluding the Partido Popular from any important information which the government claimed it had. Rodríguez Zapatero’s appearance of having inside information convinced many people that they had to turn a blind eye when the Home Secretary confirmed the cease-fire but terrorism hit the streets in the Basque Country and Navarre. Meanwhile ETA kept the cogs of crime greased as businessmen and professionals fell victim to fresh waves of extortion to which the government responded with grotesque digressions about whether the postmarks on blackmail letters were made before or after ETA’s “cease-fire” communiqué.
The display made by people in hoods firing assault rifles (later to be identified as the T-4 killers) was dismissed as mere posing for the internal consumption of the radical gallery. The lying by those who kept holding meetings with Bata-suna in order to give substance to the political negotiation table demanded by ETA was overlooked. Trusting was a requirement because “Zapatero is the man with the information”.
It is due to this superior knowledge of the “peace process” that on a date and in a place as important as 12 October 2006 in the Royal Palace the Pre-sident dared to state that he was prepared to neutralise the Political Parties Act [ley de partidos políticos1] and to look for “solutions” for the leaders of ETA’s political arm if their political party was declared illegal.
1 This Act was agreed on by the Partido Popular and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) in order to avoid political action by ETA and its related parties
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To what cause should one attribute initiatives as ludicrous as involving Par-liament, without prior agreement, in the negotiation with ETA, and taking such folly to the European Parliament, other than the irreplaceable judgement of Rodríguez Zapatero?
Trial and ErrorThe fact is that behind Rodríguez Zapatero’s fake humility there is not even a glimpse of critical examination of what has happened concerning ETA. It is a al-so a fact that, though he still has not identified the motive for his obstinate and arrogant concealment dressed as mistake, Rodríguez Zapatero has again asked the Spanish people to trust him, when such faith is not deserved by such flawed judgment as he has displayed in affairs which are crucial to Spanish society.
Shortly after the breakdown of the so-called “cease-fire”, a well-known socialist drew strength from frailty and, in a memorable article, counted as a positive consequence of the “process” the fact that Rodríguez Zapatero had learned what ETA was really about and so he would not make the same mistakes again.
“Truth is another victim of the failed process. The truth that was lacking in the denial of the links between the
socialists and Batasuna set up while Zapatero signed the Pact for Freedom”
It is highly debatable whether propitiating and negotiating with ETA in the way that Rodríguez Zapatero has, should be part of the learning curve for a President. It is even more doubtful that he will not make the same mistakes again, if he has the chance to do so after the elections of course. Rodríguez Za-patero has against himself his arrogance, his unstoppable presumptuousness, whether this involves reinventing Spain or negotiating with ETA. For the socialist candidate to presidency, his mistakes are really wise moves with a postponed timing. It is reality that makes mistakes, not him.
In all fairness, a broad survey published by the daily newspaper El Mundo on 6 January revealed that 65% of citizens believe that Rodríguez Zapatero will return to the negotiating table should he gain another term in office. When asked why such a high percentage of Spaniards do not seem believe him when he excludes the possibility of a new negotiation, Rodríguez Zapatero replied: “Because a lot of opinion makers have said this and because they know that I have put a lot of effort into ending the violence”2. It appears that it has not oc-curred to the President that his lack of credibility boils down to the simple fact that the Spaniards have had the suspicion, which was later confirmed, that they have not been told the truth throughout his entire term of office.
Another victim of the failed process is truth. The truth that was lacking in the denial of the links between the socialists and Batasuna set up while Za-
2 El Mundo, 14 January 2008.
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patero signed the Pact for Freedom. The truth that was concealed in negotia-tions where, quite apart from whether or not agreements were finally reached, the issues dealt with meant that the government accepted as valid political interlocutors terrorists and their representatives. The truth that was ignored in this trick-riddled game of solitaire into which the successive verifications of a non-existent “cease-fire” had turned into, such as the government persisted in describing it. The same game of self-deception and concealment which be-came evident with the failure to comply with the terms established under the parliamentary resolution of May 2005 backing talks with ETA, which the gover-nment yet again demanded be read as a blank cheque. We later learned that at the same time as Rodríguez Zapatero was announcing the opening of talks with ETA and presuming that the conditions in the parliamentary resolution we-re being met, ETA’s leaders were ordering the preparation of the terrorist attack on the airport’s T-43.
“Behind Rodríguez Zapatero’s fake humility there is not even a glimpse of critical examination of what
has happened concerning ETA. Though he still has not identified the motive for his obstinate and arrogant
concealment, Rodríguez Zapatero has again asked the Spanish people to trust him, when such faith is not
deserved”
It is precisely because of Rodríguez Zapatero’s stubborn arrogance in sticking to a strategy whose failure was taking its toll, that the government, forced by the circumstances, reluctantly issued a partial and late rectification.
To understand the approach which has been adopted by the government concerning ETA since last June, that is after the breakdown of the cease-fire and the PSOE’s defeat in the local elections, and to get a true idea of the extent of the government’s U-turn in this sphere, one has to distinguish bet-ween the struggle against terrorism, played out by the security forces, and anti-terrorist policy, in the sense drawn under the Pact for Freedom, in other words, as a strategy involving the operational, political and social defeat of ETA and its whole structure. The two are not synonymous.
The counter-terrorism struggle has experienced a revival in the last few mon-ths with significant results. Several situations have come together to render this possible. The essential ones are the effectiveness maintained by the se-curity forces, the ground gained in the struggle against ETA and the political boost given to French cooperation by president Sarkozy, after the confusion generated by the negotiation strategy of the Spanish government.
Late in 2004 French counter-terrorist leaders viewed ETA as having “one knee on the ground and the other one shaking”, according to Gilles Leclair,
3 El País, 10 January 2008.
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head of the Coordination Unit of the counter-terrorist struggle. The discrepan-cies between those in charge at the French Ministry of Home Affairs and the of-ficial evaluation made by their Spanish colleagues came to the fore in Novem-ber 2006 with the testimony of Fréderic Veaux, coordinator of the CID [criminal investigation department] during the Paris trial against members of ETA4.
Working in our favour we can count on the history of professionalism and dedication shown by the State Security Forces, which have again proved to be a reliable guarantee to limit the damage caused by groundless and rec-kless policies in the struggle against ETA.
Legal engineeringThere are blemishes in the counter-terrorist struggle which are traceable to the experiments made in this term of office by Rodríguez Zapatero’s government. These include the disconcerting turns in decisions regarding the scope of the illegalisation of ETA’s political structure, the behaviour exhibited by the public prosecutor’s office, whose inexplicable actions have been reproached by the adjudicating courts themselves, or the surreal legal and procedural engineering engaged in to annul half of the ANV’s list of candidates, thereby consciously preventing the application of the Political Parties Act.
“The ruling by the Supreme Court on proceedings No.18/98 has confirmed that the struggle against
ETA is a struggle against a criminal enterprise with many ramifications”
Fortunately, the courts have paid no heed to those who have asked, more or less obscurely, for application of the law with all that this entails, to be muted. The ruling by the Supreme Court in proceedings No. 18/98 has served to con-firm that the struggle against ETA is a struggle against a criminal enterprise with many ramifications operating through political, social, economic, interna-tional and financial action. All these are united under one same aim, one same discipline, carrying out ETA’s strategy of violence under different guises.
What the ruling established has nothing to do with the dim statement made by the secretary-general of the Basque socialists, Patxi López, who, upon being asked in the Gara newspaper whether he believed that those tried in case No. 18/98 belonged to ETA, replied: “I personally do not think so, but we spent a term of office under Aznar where practically the whole of the Basque Country was under suspicion”5.
The statements made by López do not need any comment to gauge the political and moral delirium arrived at by those who thought that by slandering Aznar, questioning the Supreme Court, or boasting about their nationalism they would win the indulgence of murderers for their strategy.
4 El Correo, 12 April 2007.
5 Gara, 13 November 2005..
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Police struggle, yes; defeat policy, noWhile the counter-terrorist struggle is reactivated – what other alternative is there? – the government remains with its counter-terrorist policies firmly ancho-red to the same elements which have defined it throughout this term in office: breach of consensus, keeping alive hopes of negotiations with ETA, and ETA’s restoring of the institutional presence lost through the outlawing of Batasuna by means of their vehicle parties (PCTV and ANV).
If we begin by examining the state of consensus we only have to remember Rodríguez Zapatero’s declarations at his last press conference in 2007 to con-firm that the socialists’ current strategy leaves the future of a state agreement on counter-terrorist policy doomed as unnecessary and dispensable, should he become President again.
Once accepted that the leading party among the opposition is dispensable when it comes to defining counter-terrorist policy, the latter is not only subject to the government’s interests of the moment. It is also mortgaged to the de-mands of the parties comprising the majority which keeps it in power. The net result is clear: to endorse its failed negotiation with ETA-Batasuna, since May 2005 the government has replaced the backing of at least 312 Members of Parliament with 202.
“Zapatero says that if he were to speak with ETA again, ‘there would have to be absolute, irrefutable, credible
and total proof over a long time that violence had been abandoned’. Why does he then refuse to withdraw the parliamentary resolution enabling negotiation without
these conditions?”
This explains the fact that the government has repeatedly refused to repeal the parliamentary resolution of 17 May 2005 which approved the negotiation with ETA, granted that it described very inconclusive conditions couched in deliberately ambiguous terms. The President’s most recent statements leave the arguments, already banal in themselves, used by socialist spokespersons to refuse to withdraw the resolution devoid of any consistency whatsoever. Moreover, in the interview mentioned Rodríguez Zapatero says that if he were to speak with ETA again, ‘there would have to be absolute, irrefutable, credible and total proof over a long time that there had been such an abandonment of vio-lence”. Very well, if that is Rodríguez Zapatero’s position, why has he refused to withdraw the parliamentary resolution enabling negotiation without these conditions? The pretended emphasis adds little, because ETA’s cease-fire was absolute, irrefutable, credible, total and long-lasting in the eyes of the govern-ment, indeed it believed it so as to have no doubt that precisely because such conditions were in place, we were in a “peace process”.
Saying that there are no prospects of negotiation with ETA is not expressing a political opinion. At most it conveys an analysis. Prospects are created and ended. If the significant factor is whether there are any prospects or there are
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none any longer, we are going down the wrong path bearing in mind the ease with which ETA builds up hopes and how quickly their falseness is forgotten.
ETA’s electoral symbolsIn this context one can get a good idea of how the government is tackling the illegalisation of ETA’s electoral symbols. This is another point where the government’s view of ETA’s weakening fails, as this term of office is ending with ETA having a major institutional presence via its vehicle parties; the Communist Party of the Basque Homelands in the Basque Parliament and Basque Nationalist Action in the municipal and territorial spheres.
It seems to be taken for granted that the government will promote the illega-lisation of Basque Nationalist Action (ANV) by resorting to the procedure which executed the sentence for the illegalisation of Batasuna, due to ANV being a mere deceitful succession of an already dissolved party. Irrespective of the le-gal engineering which the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the State Legal Service may come up with, certain observations can be made in this regard.
“It is hard to maintain that only now evidence of a connection between ETA and ANV is emerging, when half of the candidacies from this party – all of those which
were challenged – were annulled for being tainted by ETA”
Firstly the illegalisation or, as the case may be, the suspension of the ac-tivities of these parties under criminal process, were it to happen, will not re-establish the previous situation. This is not a “nothing has happened here” situation. It has happened. The Communist Party of the Basque Homelands (PCTV-EHAK) will hold onto its nine seats in the Basque Parliament until the end of the regional government’s term in office, Basque Nationalist Action (ANV) will have 442 people in local office in the Basque Country and Navarre, even if they are illegalised or suspended as successors of Batasuna. This is a situation which substantially differs, and is obviously much worse, than that of four years ago.
Secondly, proposing the dissolution of a party a few weeks away from the elections when that same party was able to stand for municipal and regional parliamentary elections only a few months ago, requires an in-depth explana-tion of the new elements of evidence which seem to have surfaced to enable now something which the government said was impossible to do seven months ago. It is hard to maintain that only now is evidence emerging of a connection between ETA and ANV, when half of the candidacies from this party – all those which were challenged – were annulled for being tainted by ETA. In the case of PCTV-EHAK, we only have to remember the existence of a report presented by the Guardia Civil in 2005 with more than evidential value of the links between this party and ETA-Batasuna; likewise, the lawsuit submitted by the Association for Victims of Terrorism in May of that same year which was given leave to ap-peal by the Audiencia Nacional Magistrate Grande-Marlaska and was rejected by the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
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FAES Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales (Foundation for Analysis and Social Studies) does not necessarily share the opinions expressed in the texts it publishes. © FAES Fundación para el Análisis and los Estudios Sociales and the authors.
Legal Deposit No.: M-42391-2004
Bearing in mind the proceedings, the guarantees that have to be satisfied and the appeals available to ANV, it cannot be assured that a res judicata jud-gement will be passed on its illegalisation within any useful time-frame. The government cannot pass the urgency over to the Special Court of the Supreme Court of Justice when it displayed no urgency itself and moreover consider its responsibilities as ended.
The introduction of opportunity calculation into the government’s actions to illegalise or suspend these parties undermines the credibility of the rule of law both within and outwardly. It is particularly serious that the performance of the Public Prosecutor’s Office is persistently shrouded in shadiness. In this situa-tion accusing others of “employing devious electoralist methods” is cynical sarcasm.
“Beating ETA does not just consist of rounding up its gunmen. Anti-terrorist policy must combat terror in all of
its expressions”
We have been aware for some time that beating ETA does not just consist of rounding up its gunmen. What is more, a misguided policy can cast overboard the most brilliant of counter-crime efforts. The crux of the matter is standing up to a criminal reality which clings to the social and political fabric using an array of instruments with which terror aspires to survive and subject citizens to. Counter-terrorist policy as a shared and stable State strategy must rise to the need to combat terror in all of its forms and to eradicate its hopes of obtai-ning a political value, to strengthen democratic and constitutional debate, and to make the law work as a guarantee of the freedom of everyone. The course taken and events have to change a great deal to restore this goal, which can be none other than victory without conditions or reservations by democracy and the rule of law over its enemies.
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