National SeriesLecture 2Biological

Risks&Threats

Bradford Disarmament Research CentreDivision of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK

Picture Image: Transparent Globe by digitalart - from: http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/

Outline

1. Natural outbreaks of infectious disease

2. Safety risks/accidents

3. Exercise 1

4. Warfare, terrorism and criminal use

5. The unpredictable future of the life sciences

6. Exercise 2

7. References for further reading

Picture Image: Virus by Renjith Krishnan- from: http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/

1. Natural outbreaks of infectious disease

Natural outbreaks of disease

• An infectious disease crisis of global proportions is today threatening the hard-won recent gains in health and life expectancy

• Infectious diseases are now the world's biggest killer of children and young adults

• They account for more than 13 million deaths a year - one in two deaths in developing countries

(World Health Organization, 1999)

Natural outbreaks of disease

Example: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) (1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003)

• Public health impact – 8422 cases; 916 deaths in 37 countries

(WHO 2003)

• Economic impact– 2% economic loss in the East Asian regional GDP in the second quarter of

2003

– Estimate in the case of influenza: 2% = $200 billion in one quarter ($800 billion a year)

(Milan Brahmbhatt, World Bank Lead Economist, 2005)

2. Safety risks/accidents

Picture Image: Medical Icons by digitalart- from: http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/

1. Accidental infection of people or animals, or contamination of the environment outside the

laboratory

2. Laboratory acquired infection (LAI)

3. An agent or toxin could be used to cause harm

4. An agent or toxin could become more virulent

5. An agent or toxin could acquire the ability to infect new species

This figure was re-created based on the original data from Gaudioso (2006)

Risk perceptions of practicing scientistsRisk-ranking by laboratory scientists in 16 Asian countries (developed, emerging and developing economies) of their perceived biosecurity and biosafety threats

Accidental risks (safety) are more

concerning to these scientists than dual-use risks (security).

Laboratory acquired infections (LAI)

• US context– 500,000 laboratory workers are potentially exposed; the most

common cases of LAI involve:• Brucella species, • Shigella species, • Salmonella species, • Mycobacterium tuberculosis, and • Neisseria meningitidis

– Difficult risk assessment for LAI:• “a lack of systematic reporting”• “available data are limited to retrospective and voluntary postal

surveys, anecdotal case reports, and reports about selected outbreaks with specific microorganisms”

(Singh 2009)

Laboratory accidents

Case of Sverdlovsk (“Yekaterinburg” since 1991)

• The accidental release of aerosolised anthrax spores from a military facility in Sverdlovsk, (former) USSR, in 1979

• Resulted in 79 cases of anthrax illness and 68 deaths

• Highlighted safety concerns related to biological warfare programmes

Exercise 1: Is the dual-use issue real?

• Can you identify a historic case of BW development or use? (Including military programmes)

• Consider how this may still pose a risk today;• Discuss why there is a gap in risk-perception about

these issues among life scientists today;• Report to the class.

3. Warfare, Terrorism and Crime

Biological and Toxin Weapons

• Biological weapons “are taken to be those that achieve their intended target effects through the infectivity of disease-causing microorganisms and other such entities, including viruses, infectious nucleic acids and prions.”

(WHO 2004)

• Microorganisms are not the only life forms that can generate toxins. “A Toxin is any toxic substance that can be produced by an animal, plant or microbe. Some toxins can also be produced by molecular biologic techniques (protein toxins) or by chemical synthesis (low molecular weight toxins).

(Franz 1997)

BW Characteristics

• There is a wide diversity of potential BTW attacks

• There are a number of ways that biotechnology may be assimilated into weapons, through:

– Different agents (e.g. bacteria, viruses, fungi, toxins, bioregulators)

– Different targets (humans, animal and plants)

– Different scales of application (tactical, strategic)

– Application for different purposes (overt or covert war, assassination, terrorism or criminal activities)

Pre-Scientific “Biowarfare”

• These instances of biological attack all occurred prior to a scientific understanding of the mechanism of disease transmission

• Lack of knowledge of the mechanism precluded a rational design (but not effective activity and results)

• Other examples are reported in the literature

Year Case Disease Delivery means

1340 The Siege of Thun l'Eveque unknown Dead horses & other decaying animals thrown over walls

1364 The Siege of Caffa Plague Cadavers via catapults

1720 The Siege of Reval Plague Plague casualties thrown into city

1763 Fort Pitt Smallpox Blankets and handkerchief given out

Golden Age of Bacteriology

• Over the period 1880 to 1900 the causal relationship between pathogenic organisms and disease was identified

• Virtually every common bacterial disease was identified and studied

– Anthrax (1876)– Glanders (1882)– Brucellosis (1887)– Plague (1894)– Botulinum toxin (1896)– Tularemia (1912)

• Consideration of BW did not attract scientific and military attention until WWI (Germany and France)

Biowarfare during WWI and WWII

• World War I: Germany accused of spreading cholera in Italy and plague in St Petersburg; plus, anti-animal and anti-crop biological warfare

• Inter-War Years: Japan and the USSR began research on biological weapons

• WWII: Collaboration between Great Britain, Canada and the US on research and development of offensive biological warfare programmes alongside the French programme

• These programmes were conducted in the shadow of the Geneva Protocol of 1925

Biowarfare during the Cold War and beyond

Cold-War period• US: from the 1940’s to the 1970’s, increasing numbers of

bioagents were investigated for use• Russia: historically, had the largest programmes• South Africa: Project Coast included assassination aims

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1975)

Post-Cold War• Iraq: Inspected under the UN: UNSCOM • Alleged BW states (by the US Department of State 2005): China,

Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Syria

WMD/Strategic Attacks (i)

• United Nations Study in 1969

Scenarios:– A single bomber using 10tons of BW agent could achieve:

• Area affected 100,000 km2

• Morbidity (illness ) 50%, mortality (deaths) 25%, if no treatment provided

– Area affected if a 1 megaton nuclear bomb was used• 300 km2

– Area affected if 15 tons of nerve agent was used• 60 km2

WMD/Strategic Attacks (ii)

• SIPRI 1973 Study– Scenario: A single bomber with a 5-6 ton bomb load, area over

which 50% casualties would be possible:

• High explosive 0.22 km2

• VX nerve gas 0.75 km2

• 10kt nuclear bomb 30 km2

• Biological agent 0-50 km2 (depending on weather conditions)

WMD/Strategic Attacks (iii)

• Fetter’s 1991 study in the journal International Security

– Scenario: Missile with a throw weight of one tonne attacking a large city with a human density of 30 people per hectare

• 20kt nuclear weapon would kill 40,000

• 300kg Sarin would kill 200 - 3,000

• 30kg anthrax would kill 20,000 - 80,000

WMD/Strategic Attacks (iv)

• US Office of Technology Assessment 1993 report

– Scenario: Attack with a missile delivered on an overcast day or night, with a moderate wind, on a city with 3,000 to 10,000 unprotected people per km2

• 12.5 kt nuclear weapon would destroy 7.8km2 and kill 23,000-80,000 people

• 300kg of Sarin would kill 60-200 people in an area of 0.22km2

• 30kg of anthrax would kill between 30,000 to 100,000 in a cigar shaped plume from the warhead covering 10km2

WMD/Strategic Attacks (v)• US Office of Technology Assessment 1993 report

– Scenario: Attack by a plane releasing 10kg of anthrax along a line on the windward side of a city like Washington DC

• On a clear sunny day with a light breeze, 46km2 would be affected and 130,000 to 460,000 people could die

Picture Image: Mil Mi-24V Hind E by Tim Beach - from: http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/

Assimilation into use now?

Three types of new utility of chemical (some are bio-chemical) agents in modern conflicts:

• Nature of conflict: As a consequence of wider changes in the nature of warfare, rather as the shift from ‘massive retaliation’ to the ‘limited war’ doctrine… especially in Third World settings...new settings may attract new responses

• New life science technology: If a new molecule is discovered that exerts novel disabling effects on the human body at low dosages, attempts to weaponize it may well ensue

• New form of weapons? The emerging role of chemical weapons may expand, not in the hands of terrorists or other new war aggressors, but for purposes of counterterrorism. (e.g. the Moscow theatre siege 2002)

(Robinson 2008, Geissler 1986, Pearson et al 2007, Kelle et al 2006, Kadlec and Zelicoff 1999, Geoghegan and Tong 2006)

Age of Terrorism?

Terrorism is not new: before 2001.....• Terrorist, criminal and state-sponsored

assassination incidents from 1900 to 1999 (in the USA and outside):

– CBRN 415 cases– 151 terrorist cases

• 33 involving biological agents

(Tucker, 1999)

Bio/chemical incidents and hoaxes (1960-1998)278 cases in total

(Tucker, 1999)

Aum Shinrikyo in Japan: Sarin, Anthrax, Botulinum toxin

Policy implication of bio-terrorism:Case of US Anthrax incidents in 2001

Low probability but high intensity– A total of 22 individuals contracted either cutaneous

anthrax in which the disease enters the body through the skin(11 cases) or inhalational anthrax in which it enters through the lungs (11 cases), and 5 died (all from inhalational anthrax).

Policy implication in biodefense– Civilian biodefense cost $6 million in 2001, but

approximately $8.01 billion in federal funding for 2009– Bringing the total funding for civilian biodefense to $49.66

billion from FY2001 to FY2009

4. Unpredictable future of the life sciences

US National Research CouncilFink Committee Report 2004

Biotechnology Research In An Age of Terrorism

Security sensitive research: Difficult to predict but still possible

7 categories of research are of concern. Those that:

1. demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective.

2. confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents.

3. enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent.

4. increase transmissibility of a pathogen.

5. alter the host range of a pathogen.

6. enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities.

7. enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin.

Accumulation of research

1. Research about the anthrax genome (Read et al., 2003)

2. Research about the SARS genome (Marra et al., 2003)

3. Receptor of anthrax toxin (Santelli et al., 2004)

4. Gene synthesis, synthetic biology (Ball, 2004; Breaker, 2004)

5. Reconstitution of 1918 Spanish flu viruses (Taubenberger et al., 2005; Tumpey et al., 2005)

6. Botulinum toxin and the food supply (Wein and Liu, 2005)

7. Genetic changes of Listeria, altering the host range of a pathogen (Wollert et al., 2007)

8. Complete chemical synthesis, assembly, and cloning of a Mycoplasma genitalium genome (Gibson, et al., 2008)

in Science, Nature, PNAS, etc… and some are beyond the scope of the Fink report

= are these should be research area of concern? or are these just normal research for scientists, shouldn’t be worried? (Shinomiya, 2010)

Beyond physical protection: information security

How to create a virus from scratch (Chemical synthesis of polio virus in 2002)

Information On …

Traditional regulation …Are these measures still effective?

– Physical protection of pathogens/toxins (labs)– Securities measures at laboratories (guards, gates)– Regulations (international screening of commercially

available DNA order): initiatives are taking place by governments and industry but are underdeveloped

Polio Genome and DNA segment are available online No need for:• natural template• access to original virusAvailable from internet

Wimmer (2006)

Tucker (2010)

US National Research CouncilLemon-Relman Committee Report 2006

Focusing exclusively on traditional biowarfare agents is “dangerously narrow”…

Petro et al (2003)

Advanced biological agents

Genetically modified traditional agents/biochemical agents

Traditional agents

Threat

1940’s to 1999 (pre-genome era) 2003 to 2020 (Genomic era)

Time

Exercise 2

Biological weapons in the 21st Century?

• Having considered the historic illustration of state level BW programmes and the impact of bioterrorism, consider how recent advances in the life sciences could be applied for hostile purposes in our time. Discuss with your group (10 min)

• What kind of scenarios could potentially occur?

• Report back to the class.

List of references

The references cited in this lecture are viewable in the Notes section of this presentation.