National SeriesLecture 1

IntroductionUkraine

Bradford Disarmament Research CentreDivision of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK

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Outline

1. Where we are in the early 21st century

2. Outline of the following lectures

a) What we should know (learning outcome)

b) What we can do (policy contribution)

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What is “Life Science”?

• “Any field of science that is leading to or has the potential to lead to an enhanced understanding of living organisms, especially human life.”

• E.g. Biology, proteomics, genetic engineering, nanotechnology, aerosol technology, chemistry and mathematics

(National Research Council, 2006: 27)

• Applied in:Public health, Medicine, Agriculture, Energy, Environment and National security studies

Biotechnology: An integral part of national strategy in the 21st Century

Region Annual Worth Share

North America $204 Billion 51%

Europe $102 Billion 25%

Japan $47 Billion 12%

Asia, Africa, Australia $32 Billion 8%

Latin America $17 Billion 4%

A growing market in Biotechnology: the pharmaceutical market (National Research Council, 2006: 85)

• Similar results in number of researchers and the amount of private investment for R&D in the life sciences

• Rapid growth in the Asia-Pacific region

(Ernst&Young 2011, Frost&Sullivan 2010)

Ukraine: Life science outlook

Higher education relevant to biosecurity Biological Sciences:• 25 State or National Universities• 7 Technical Universities• 20 Pedagogical Universities• 1 Food Technology UniversityMedical Sciences (including Pharmacy):• 15 Universities Agrarian Sciences (Veterinary

medicine):• 20 Universities

(Kysil and Komisarenko 2010)

Item

2011 Ranking 442005 Ranking 44Ranking Change 0

2011 Regional Ranking 6 (E. Europe)

2005 Regional Ranking 6 (E. Europe)

Hits in PubMed 52

PubMed Ranking 54

Hit in Espacenet 1,277 Espacenet Ranking 28

Combined Ranking 41

Source: (BWPP 2011)

Global publication ranking

Ukraine: Life science outlook• On November 27, 1918 the constituent General Assembly of the

Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was held and elected the world-famous geologist and geochemist V. I. Vernadsky the President of the Academy.

• The National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine is the highest state-supported research organization, enrolling academicians, corresponding members and foreign members. It integrates all researchers of its institutions and carries out studies in various branches of knowledge, develops scientific fundamentals for technological, socio-economic and cultural advancement of the nation. According to its Statute, the Academy enjoys the rights of self-government in making decisions about its own activities.

• The supreme NAS body is the General Meeting of its members, which as of September 1, 2008 comprised 179 full members (academicians), 339 corresponding members and 109 foreign members.

(NAS 2012)

Why do we care? Should this be an issue for us?

The dual-use nature of science and technology:

– “Every major technology — metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, electronics, nuclear energy — has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes but also for hostile ones.”

– “…Must this also happen with biotechnology, certain to be a dominant technology of the twenty-first century?”

Matthew Meselson: Professor of Molecular Biology at Harvard University(Meselson, 2000: 16)

Hostile Peaceful

Meselson’s Forecast in 2000

Ability• “Our ability to modify fundamental life processes

continues its rapid advance”

• “We will be able not only to devise additional ways to destroy life but will also become able to manipulate it”

Dilemma• “…[This has a] Vast potential for beneficial application

and could have inimical consequences for the course of civilization.”

Meselson’s Forecast in 2000

“At present, we appear to be approaching a crossroads —a time that will test whether biotechnology…”

• It will come to be intensively exploited for hostile purposes, or• Our species will find the collective wisdom to take a different course.

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)

1972

Article I • “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any

circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

• 1. Microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.”

• This applies for not only states but also non-state actors

Science and Security: Dual-Use

The need for a broader conceptualisation of dual-use• Biological agents and toxins can be used for hostile purposes without

weaponization and technology is typically diffused globally for peaceful purposes

• Hostile use can take the form of criminal acts or terrorist acts (non-state level) in parallel to military application (state level),

• The BTWC prohibits the misuse of the life sciences by both states and non-state actors

Ukraine with international regimes

WMD• “Kiev returned all chemical weapons to Russia for elimination, and does not possess

biological weapons. Ukraine is a member of all of the major nonproliferation treaties and regimes.”

BTWC• Signature (10 April 1972); Ratification (26 March 1975)• “Historically involved in Soviet defensive biological warfare (BW) activities, [but on

becoming a member to the BTWC,] Ukraine does not have a BW program and has no intention of establishing one”.

CWC• Signature (13 January 1993); Ratification (16 October 1998)• “Prior to 1991… its territory was used by the Soviet government for chemical weapons

storage and testing.” “Ukraine transferred all of the chemical weapons on its territory to Russia by January 1992. Kiev is a party to the CWC, which it ratified in 1998.”

(Nuclear Threat Initiative 2012)

National Series: Lecture Outline

2. Biosecurity Threats 3. The Web of Prevention

4. National Measures5. Responsibility of Scientists

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• ‘No single focal point’ of threats– Potential actors, material and information, which can be related to dual-

use issues, exist at international, regional, national, local and individual levels.

Unpredictable future of the life sciences

Reviewing threats (Lecture 2)

Manmade threats: warfare, crime and terrorism

Safety/accidental risks at laboratories

Natural outbreaks of infectious disease

To address natural outbreaks of infectious disease• Public health preparedness and response planning

To address safety/accidental risks• Laboratory regulations to safely manage dangerous pathogens and toxins, to

prevent an accidental release into the environment and unauthorized access

To address manmade threats• Strong international arms control agreements with effective national

implementation • Internationally coordinated export controls • Intelligence• Biodefense

To address the unpredictable future of the life sciences• Oversight: Review of security-sensitive science and technology developments• Responsible conduct in research through education

The Web of Prevention (WoP) (Lecture 3)

Web of prevention

Natural threats

Safety risks

Governance of science

Manmade threats

National implementation (Lecture 4)

To National Context

National implementation (Lecture 4)

1 • International agreements

2• Signature and ratification by

states

3• National measures in states• Legislation, regulation, order

or other forms of governance

Worldwide engagement of life scientists with the WoP will:

• Effectively strengthen biosecurity measures by requiring the engagement of practicing scientists

• Prevent unnecessary restriction of scientific freedoms

• Education of, and capacity building among, scientists on biosecurity issues is necessary for successful security

• Uninformed scientists = no effective science policy inputs to the WoP

Engagement of informed life scientists about biosecurity issues is key to successful security

The need for responsible conduct in research(Lecture 5)

Biosecurity: definitive issues

The term “biosecurity” has been conceptualised differently across various scientific and professional disciplines

• Areas: The term has been used in ecology, agriculture, food supply, arms control and public health contexts, with different meanings and conceptualisations

• Policy processes: these overlap with interdisciplinary areas such as biosafety, counter-terrorism, agricultural biosecurity and biodiversity

• Linguistic: In addition to these conceptual complications, “biosecurity” has also experienced linguistic complications

(Fidler and Gostin 2007, Sunshine Project 2003, Barletta 2002)

National Series:WoP = Biosecurity Education = Biosecurity Competency

References

• The references cited in this lecture are viewable in the Notes section of this presentation.