Arild Vatn *, Paul O. Vedeld, 2012
NationalgovernancestructuresforREDD+Arild Vatn*,Paul O.
VedeldDepartmentofInternationalEnvironmentandDevelopmentStudies,NorwegianUniversityofLifeSciences,P.O.Box5003,1432Aas,Norway1.IntroductionA
coreissueforthepost-Kyotoclimateregimeconcernshowtoobtainreduceddeforestationandforestdegradation(REDD+).Deforestationtakespresentlyplacemainlyinthetropicsandisanimportantsourceofcarbonemissions(IPCC,2007;vanderWerfetal.,2009).Moreover,REDDisseenbymanyasalowcostclimatemitigationoption(e.g.,Stern,2006).Hence,thereisinterestintheNorthforpayingtheSouthtoreducedeforestationtonextreduceownmitigationcosts.ThisdemandstheestablishmentofinstitutionsbothattheinternationalandnationalleveltogenerateandtransferthenecessarynancialresourcesinwaysrealizingREDD+activities.Thispaperfocusesatthenationalpartofsuchastructure.Morespecicallytheaimistoanalyzeofasetofpotentialnationalgovernancestructures,wherethedegreeofmarketandgovern-mentinvolvementvaries.Itisaresponsetotheacknowledgmentthatin-depthanalysesconcerninggovernanceissuesespeciallyatthenationallevelarelacking(Gregersenetal.,2010;CorberaandSchroeder,2011).
Tocovertherangeofoptionsfrommarketstostate,wehaveselectedfourgenericgovernancestructurestobeevaluated:(a)amarket/projectbasedarchitecture;(b)asystemwithnationalREDD+fundsoutsidenationaladmin-istrations;(c)anationalREDD+fundorganizedunderthenationaladminis-tration;(d)conditionalbudgetsupport.Whiletheobligationsforreductionsofgreen-housegaseswillbesetininternationalnegotiations,thenationalgovernancestructuresforREDD+willinuencewhowillbeinvolvedindeningnationalresponsibilitiesandhowpoliciesonthegroundwillbeformedandimplemented.Reduceddeforestationwillnotonlyinuencegreen-housegasemissions,butalsolivelihoodsformillionsofpeople.IntheREDD+discourse,thereisemphasisonREDDasapotentialtriplewine.g.,Angelsen(2008)andUN-REDD(2012).Addedtoclimatemitigation,itmightalsoreducepovertyandthelossofbiodiversity.REDD+could,however,alsoresultinimpairedlivelihoodsforpeoplealreadyfacingdemandingconditions(e.g.,Ghazouletal.,2010;Vatnetal.,2009).
Certainly,inthiscontext,thestructureofthedecision-makingprocessesincludingwhoisparticipatinganddeciding,willbeofgreatimportance.ThechoiceofgovernancestructureforREDD+ispoliticallydisputed.Acoreissueconcernstheroleofmarketsasopposedtostateadministrations.Thisdebatereectsageneraltrendonhowtodogovernancewhichatpresentemphasizesmoreuseofmarketsbothingeneral(e.g.,PierreandPeters,2000)andinthecaseofforests/REDD(e.g.,CorberaandBrown,2010;OkerekeandDooley,2010).Opportunitiesrelatetolesscentralcontrolandmorelocallygenerated,adaptiveandinnovativesolutions.Opposingviewstothisneo-liberaltrendemphasizethatacontractedstatereducesaccountability,resultsinlossesofGlobalEnvironmentalChange23(2013)422432ARTICLEINFOArticle
history:Received5February2012Received in revised form 22 October
2012Accepted16November2012Keywords:REDD+GovernanceLegitimacyMarketsNationalfundsBudgetsupportTropicalforestsABSTRACTThis
paper analyses a set of generic options for national REDD+
governance structures i.e., (a) a market/project based
architecture; (b) a system with national REDD+ funds outside
existing nationaladministrations; (c) a national REDD+ fund
organized under the present administration; and (d)conditional
budget support. The analysis is based on experiences fromdifferent,
but similar governancestructures e.g., the Clean Development
Mechanism, payments for ecosystem services, environmentaltrust
funds and various forms of budget support. While a solution with a
market/project based structurehas been favored by many, we conclude
that this is the most problematic alternative. Concerning theother
three, the national/local conditions will be of importance for
their functioning. If REDD+ policiesinvolve a large part of a
countys forested area, establishing a good link to the general
forest and othersector policies will be necessary.2012 Elsevier
Ltd. All rights
reserved.*Correspondingauthor.Tel.:+4764965710/41517780;fax:+4764965201.E-mailaddresses:[email protected](A.Vatn),[email protected](P.O.Vedeld).ContentslistsavailableatSciVerseScienceDirectGlobal
Environmental Changej our nalhomepage:www. el sevi er . com/ l ocat
e/ gl
oenvcha0959-3780/$seefrontmatter2012ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.11.005communicationchannelsbetweenthestateanditscitizens,andleadstomorepatchyandunreliableservicedelivery.Morepowertolessaccountablelocalelitesismentioned.Issuesaroundmarketsandfairnessarealsoemphasized(PierreandPeters,2000;OkerekeandDooley,2010).ThechoiceofnationalREDD+structuresmustbeseenandunderstoodinthiswidercontext.AsREDD+isstillatthedrawingtable,ouranalysiswillbebasedonexperiencesfromsimilargovernancestructures.WeutilizeexperienceswiththeCleanDevelopmentMechanism(CDM),paymentsforenvironmentalservices(PES),ConservationTrustFunds(CTF),forestfunds,andgeneralbudgetsupport.TheanalysisalsocallsforadeepeningintospecicitiesofREDD+andhowtheexperiencesobtainedfromtheabovecasescouldtinaREDD+setting.Thepaperhasthefollowingstructure:First,weemphasizesometheoreticalaspectsconcerninggovernanceofreduceddeforestation.Second,wespecifytheoptionswehaveselectedforthenationalREDD+governancestructures.Nextwedenecriteriafortheanalysis.Themainsectionincludestheanalysisofthespeciedgovernancestructuresagainstthecriteriausingdatafromexistingpolicyareasasmentionedabove.Wethendiscusscorendingsandconclude.2.AnalyzinggovernancestructuresforREDD+2.1.GeneralperspectivesGovernanceencompassesboththestructuresandprocessesthatshapesocialpriorities,howconictsareacknowledgedandpossiblyresolved,andhowhumancoordinationisfacilitated.Governanceishencemorethangovernmentasitincludesalsoactorssuchascommunities,businessesandNGOs(seeLemosandAgrawal,2006).Theframingofhumanactionandinteractioniscore,emphasizingpower,involvementandlegitimacy.Gover-nancestructuresorarchitecturescanbeseenasconsistingoftwomaincomponents(Vatn,2011):-Thetypeofactorsinvolved,characterizedbytheircapacitiesandcompetencies,rightsandresponsibilities.-Theinstitutionalstructuresfacilitatingtheinteraction/coordinationbetweentheactors.Bothactortypesandsystemsofinteractionareinstitutionalizedfeatures.Hence,theyarestructuredbyasetofconventions,normsandformalrules(Scott,2008;Vatn,2005).
Thetypeofactorsinvolved,theircapacities,interestsandspecicrolesintheactualgovernancestructureinuencetheoutcome.Thesamegoesforthekindofinteractionsthatisfacilitated.Concerningtheactors,onemaydistinguishbetweenprivate,publicandcommunityorganizations.Certainly,eachcategorycoversawidevarietyofstructures.Nevertheless,eachgroupcarriessomedistinctcharacteristicsregardingdecision-making.Concern-ingtheinteractionbetweentheseactors,wemaytypicallydistinguishbetweenmarketexchange,commandandvariouscooperative/reciprocalarrangements.Wemayfurtherencountersituationswithnorules.Weshouldalsonotethatonendsincreasingemphasisintheliteratureonhybrids,meaningmixedformsoftheaboveactorstructurese.g.,publicprivatepartner-shipsseeLemosandAgrawal(2006)andSikor(2008).Governancestructuresare
differentnotleastconcerningthefollowingaspects:-Rightsandresponsibilities:Thesestructuresdenewhichinterestsareformedandprotected.Theyconcernboththerulesdenedforpolicyformulationandimplementation,andthosedeningaccesstoeconomicresourcese.g.,propertyrights.Theoveralllegitimacyofinstitutionalsystemsisverymuchrelatedtotheproceduresestablishedfordecision-makingandtheimplemen-tationatvariouslevelsofsociety.-Information/knowledge:Productionanddistributionofinforma-tionandknowledgeareessential.Quality,accessandtranspar-encyareimportantsystems-dependentdimensions.Equallyimportantiswhatkindofinformationandknowledgeisacceptedasbasisfordecisionsbythevariousactors.-Transactioncosts:Thisconcernscostsofinteractionsbetweenactorsi.e.,costsofinformationgathering,formulationofgoals,agreementsorcontracts,andcontrolofagreements.Transactioncostsvarybothduetothecharacteristicsofthegoodsinvolvedandthetypeofgovernancestructure(Williamson,1985).Someservicesmaybeeasilyhandledthroughthemarketwhilehighcontractingcostsmayfavorpublicsystems.-Motivation:
Motivationsandinterestformationvaryacrosstypesofactorsandformsofinteractions.Theroleofsocialvs.individualinterestsisimportantaswellaswhatthecontente.g.,self-interestis(MarchandOlsen,1995;Vatn,2009).
Willingnesstocooperateasopposedtoactingstrategicallyisthereforeexpectedtovaryacrossgovernancestructures.Takentogethertheseaspectsofagovernancestructureareexpectedtoinuencetheresults(outputs)thatareproduced,theircostsandhowthesearedistributed.Thesearecontentiousissuesandstudyinggovernancestructuresinvolveseveralimportantnormativeques-tions.2.2.ThespecicitiesofREDD+inagovernancecontextREDD+focusesforemostonforestscapacitytostorecarbon.Assuchtheyhavesomechallengingcharacteristics.Beingbiologicalsystems,forestsaresubjecttonaturalvariationsandperturba-tions.Thisimpliesuncertaintyinbothtimeandspace.AstheideaofREDD+istopayonlyforchangesincarbonstocksthatwouldnototherwisehavetakenplace(Angelsen,2008),issuesbothaboutdeningresponsibilityandadditionalityareraised.Finally,leakageisagreatchallengeasreduceddeforestationmaybeoffsetbyincreaseselsewhere(Wunder,2008).Forestsrepresentvasteconomicresources.Theyformlivelihoodsformillionsofpeopledeliveringrewood,timberandnon-timberforestproducts.Theyarealsoveryimportantaslandtoclearforagriculture.ThemainideaofREDD+istocompensateforreducedaccesstotheseresourcesfollowingfromprotectingthecarbon.Whatandwhomtocompensateare
contingentonthe
rightstoland,paymentsystems,transactioncostsandpowerrelations.Thepoorestpeopleinruralareasare
thelandless.Theyoftendependheavilyonforestlivelihoods(Vedeldetal.,2007).
Sincetheydonotowntheland,theymay,however,notreceiveanycompensationforlostlivelihoodoptions.RathertheymaybefurthermarginalizedbyREDD+ascompetitionoverlandincreases.Similarly,theconditionsforagriculture,includingexpansionsintonewlandtofeedagrowingpopulation,maybecomecompletelychanged.Therefore,onemayalsoneedtoestablishprogramstosupportchangesinfarmingpractices,makenewenergysourcesavailableetc.Thishighlightsthemulti-sectorialcharacteristicsofREDD+.ItisalsohopedthatREDD+willincreasebiodiversity.Tropicalforestsareveryrichinbiodiversity.Protectioncouldthereforebeanimportantwaytoreducebiodiversitylosses.However,itisnotgiventhatwherecarbonischeapesttostore,thereisalsomostbiodiversity.REDDwillbeestablishedinquitevaryingsocialandpoliticalcontextsdemandingsensitivitytoexistingnationalandlocalinstitutions.ResearchonPESprojectse.g.,Muradianetal.(2010)andCorberaetal.(2009)emphasizestheroleofexistingpowerrelationsandinstitutions/socialembeddednessforacceptabilityandeffectsofPESprojects.A.Vatn,P.O.Vedeld/GlobalEnvironmentalChange23(2013)422432423Finally,REDD+isexpectedtoattractmuchresources(MeridianInstitute,2009).Itcouldout-competepresentnationalforestryprogramsinmanycountries.Moreover,itmayattractpeoplewithothermotivationsthanreducingcarbonemissionsandensuringco-benets.Theforestsectorisalreadyhauntedbycorruptioninmanyregionse.g.,Smithetal.(2003)andMilledgeetal.(2007).AnanciallylargeREDD+willincreaseopportunitiesformisman-agement.3.OptionsfornationalREDD+governancestructuresAsemphasized,weevaluatefourtypesofnationalgovernancestructuresforREDD+tocoverwhatweenvisionasthemaintypeoptionsavailable(seeFig.1).Themarket/projectbasedsystemforREDD+nancingwillincludebuyersandsellersofcarbonstoredinforests.Buyersaredominantlyexpectedtobermswithemissionreductionresponsibilitiesaccordingtoapost-Kyotoagreement,whilesellersareownersofforests,maybealsoincludingactorswithuserightstoforestresources.Interactionbetweentheseactorswilltaketheformoftrades.ThissystemwouldbequitesimilartothatoftodaysCDM.Thesecondgovernancestructureimpliesestablishingofanationalfundasanintermediarybetweenforestowners/usersandpotentialnanciersofREDD+activities.Whilebeingindependentofthepresentstateadministration,weimaginethattheboardwouldtypicallyincluderepresentativesfromtheprivatesector,civilsocietyandpublicauthorities.Whilethemarketsolutionmayalsoincludeintermediaries,theideabehindthisfundistoestablishanon-commercialactorbeingnationallyresponsibleforREDD+activities.Moreover,resourcesmayinthiscasealsocomefromaninternationalfund.Finally,theindependentnationalfundsmaynotonlymaketradeswithlocalforestowners.Theymayalsohavethecapacitytosupport/runlargerprogramsincooperationwithlocalcommunities.Thelasttwooptionsinvolvethestateandstateadministrationdirectly.Theideabehindafundinthenationalstateadministra-tionistoutilizethecapacitiesandcompetenciesofpresentstateadministrations.Allocationofresourcesis,however,madebyaseparateboardwithREDD+responsibilitiesonly.ThisfundissetupasindependentofordinarybudgetaryprocesseswithaspeciedresponsibilitytoallocatefundstoREDD+.Itreportstothegovernment,butmayincluderepresentativesfromalsocivilsocietyandthebusinesssector.Concerninginteractionrules,thisstructurecouldbeinstitutionalizedtobothusethecapacitiesofstateadministrationstocommand,butalsobeinvolvedindirecttradeswithforestowners/users.Concerningnallybudgetsupport,theideaistoutilizetheexistingstatestructureswithitsparliamentsandministries.ResourcesowfromaninternationalfundtotherespectivestateconditionedonthefulllmentofREDD+activities.Resourcesarethenallocatedtovariousactivities/forestowners/usersrelyingforemostthecommandpowerofthestate.Fig.1alsoincludestheinternationallevel.ThechoiceofanationalREDD+structurewillbeinuencedbytheinternationalfundingsysteminplace.Whilestudyingthisissuewouldgobeyondtheaimofthispaper,wenotethatREDD+resourcesmaybemadeavailablethroughinternationalcarbon(compliance)marketslikethepresentCDMortheymaycomethroughdifferentformsofinternationalfunds.Compliancemarketsi.e.,asystemwhereagentswithreductionresponsibilitiesaccordingtoapost-Kyotoagreementreceivecertiedemissionreductions(CERs)forREDD+paymentsaretypicallythoughttooperatethroughamarket/projectbasedstructure.Itis,however,alsopossibletocombineacompliancebasedsystemwithaninternationalfund.ThisfundthenissuesCERstoactorswithreductioncommitmentsrelativetotheirpayments.Theresourcesofthefundaresubsequentlyusedtopayforreduceddeforestation.Inthisway,resourcesfromtheprivatesectorcanbetransferredeventostatebudgets.Notethatmostanalysese.g.,MeridianInstitute(2009)concludethattomakeREDD+becomenanciallysizeable,somekindofcompliancesystemwillbenecessary.4.EvaluationcriteriaConcerningtheevaluationofthefournationallevelREDD+architectures,wewillfocusontheirlegitimacy.Theliteratureonlegitimacyisquitecomplexemphasizingbothnormativeanddescriptiveelements,bothproceduralandconsequentialaspects.Inouranalysiswehavechosentodenecriteriabothconcerningprocessandexpectedresultsfollowingthenowquitestandarddistinctionintheliteraturebetweeninputandoutputlegitimacy(e.g.,Ba
ckstrand,2006; seealsoScharpf,1999).AccordingtoBa
ckstrand,theformerrelatestotheorganizationandcontentofthepolicyprocess,andsheemphasizesissueslikeresponsibility,participation,accountabilityandtransparency.Thesecondcon-cernsresults/effectiveness.Concerninginputorprocess,itisparticularlyimportanthowdifferentinterestsareincludedinpolicy-formulationandimplementationprocesses,andhowdecision-makersareaccountabletostakeholdersandthewidersociety.Concerningresults,wewillhereuseaversionofthe3Esframeworkeffectiveness,efciencyandequityaspresentedine.g.,Angelsen(2008).WhilegoingbeyondBa
ckstrandatthispoint,wenotethatthisframeworkisfeaturinghighintheREDD+discourseandweuseittolinktheanalysistoasetofspecicissuesraisedinthatcontext.Morespecically,wewillusethefollowingcriteria:1.
Market directed (financial) intermediariesProject basedNational
fundsBudget supportLocal/private projects National
programsInternational funding (international carbon markets, global
fund(s))2. Separate national fund3. Fund in national state
administration4. State budgetsSector
policiesFig.1.OptionsfornationalREDD+fundingarchitecture.ReproducedfromVatnandAngelsen(2009).A.Vatn,P.O.Vedeld/GlobalEnvironmentalChange23(2013)422432
424-Process(input)legitimacy:ConcernstheappropriatenessandacceptabilityofREDD+policyprocessesbothonprincipalgroundsandw.r.t.theinterestsofvariousactorse.g.,nationalauthorities,civilsociety/localcommunities,businessanddonors.Thisconcernsmorespecicallyissueslikeresponsibility,participation/typeofinvolvementatdifferentstagesandlevelsoftheREDD+process,thetransparencyoftheprocessandtheaccountabilityofdecision-makerstowiderconstituencies.-OutputlegitimacyEffectiveness:
Concernshowwellthepolicymeetsitsoverallgoals.Specicaspectsconcernthecapacitytoraisefunds,theabilitytoavoidleakage,andtoensureadditionalityandpermanence.Implicitintheaboveisthecapacitytocoordinateacrosssectorsandlevelsofgovernment.Implicitarealsoissuesconcerningcomplianceandmotivationalaspectse.g.,risksofcorruption.Efciency:Concernstheabilitytoreachgoalsatlowestcosts.Thisinvolvesboththedirectcostofe.g.,reduceddeforestationandthetransactioncostsrelatedtothesystemofdecisionmaking,contracting,paying,monitoring,reportingetc.Capacitytodeliveronco-benets:
FollowingtheREDD+discourse,ouremphasisisonpovertyreduction/equityandbiodiversitypreservation.Rightsissues,transactioncostsandmotivationalissuesarecoreastheyinuencetheuseofREDD+resources.Traditionally,the
literatureonlegitimacyhasfocusedondueprocessemphasizinglegality.Overthe
yearsthe issuesare broadened,includingthe
formofparticipation(e.g.,discursiveness)andfairnessindistributionofpowerandoutcomes(e.g.,Dryzek,2001;Backstrand,2006;PaavolaandAdger,2006;OkerekeandDooley,2010).We
alsonotethatthere
isalinkbetweenprocessandoutputlegitimacyastheprinciplesofandjusticationsforagovernancestructureifappropriate/resonatingwithsocialbeliefsaboutwhatisagoodordertendtoensurevoluntarycompliancedespitethe
factthatresultsmaynegativelyinuencespecic
interests(Scharpf,1999).Inthecaseofoutputlegitimacy,weusecapacitytodeliveronco-benetsinsteadofthestandardequityelementofthe3Es.Thisisbecauseco-benetshasbecomeastandardreferenceintheREDD+literature.Sinceequityconsiderations/povertyalleviationispartofco-benetstogetherwithbiodiversityprotection,wehavechosentousethelatterasourthirdelementofoutputlegitimacytoavoidoverlapintheanalyses.Certainly,onemayarguethattermingequityissuesaco-benetmayimplyarepudiationofthesebenets.ItclearlyshowsthatREDD+hasitsmainfocusoncarbon.Usingthestandardterminologydoes,however,notimplythatweputlessemphasisonthesebenetsinouranalyses.5.EvaluatingtheREDD+governanceoptionsOuranalysisisforemostgeneric.Strengthsandweaknessesofthedifferentoptionswilldependontheparticularsituationineachcountry.Wementionsomeofthemostimportantcontextspecicissues,whileadetailedanalysisofthesecanonlybecoveredincountry-wisestudies.5.1.Amarket/projectbasedarchitectureThemainempiricalbasisforevaluatingamarket/projectbasedarchitectureisdatafromCDMandtosomeextentPESprojects.Market/projectbasedsystemsdrawespeciallyonthecapacityofmarketstodelivercost-effectivesolutions.Aspartofacompliancemarket,itisthoughttoofferstrongmotivationtondlowcostcarbonmitigationsolutions.ItspotentialforattractinglargeresourcestoREDD+hasalsobeenemphasizede.g.,KarousakisandCorfee-Morlot(2007)andSaundersetal.(2008).
ThiskindofprivatefundingisseenasnecessarytomakeREDD+successful.Finally,itisarguedthatusingmarketsmayreducetheproblemofcorruptionandmismanagementoftenobservedinpublicadmin-istrationsinmanydevelopingcountries.Whilethesearestrongarguments,therearealsochallenges.Letusstartwithlookingatprocessissues.Principally,amarketimpliestradesbetweenforestownersandbuyersofcarboncredits.Whilethecreditsthemselvesmustbeissuedbyanindependentparty,thetradeexcludesparticipationfromactorsotherthanthosetrading.Inthecaseofforeststhereareseveralissuesinvolved.First,rightstoforestsresourcesaretypicallypluralintimeandspaceandoftenhighlycontested.Whilethestatemayoftenowntheforests,localcommunitieshavevariousformsofuserights.Thiscreatesademandingsituationfortradesrequiringfurtherrightsspecica-tionsseeUnruh(2008)andCorberaandBrown(2010).Thesituationmaycreatetemptationstolandgrabstoexcludeespeciallyinformalrightsholdersfromaccesstoland(Nelson,2010;Mustalahtietal.,2012).Moreover,theremaybeinformationasymmetriesinvolvedputtinglocalrightsholdersintheweakerpositioninnegotiationovercompensations/payments.Theobser-vationsmadeaboutso-calledcarboncowboysisanindicationofthechallengesfacedhere.AsemphasizedbyOkerekeandDooley(2010)andThompsonetal.(2011),
protectinginterestsoflocalcommunities/indigenouspeoplethereforedemandsactionbeyondthemarket.Concerningprocesslegitimacy,theroleofferedtothirdpersonsisveryimportant.Forestresourceshavetypicallybothpublicandcommon-poolcharacteristics.Astradersareonlyaccountabletoeachother,thirdpersoninterestsareexcluded.Transparencyisalsoreducedtotheextentthatpartiestothetradecanclaimthatinformationmustbeprotectedforbusinessreasons.Atthesametime,governmentsmaybeinastrongpositioneveninthecaseofmarkettradesasstatesarethedominantformalownersofforestsinthetropics(e.g.,Siryetal.,2009;Lyster,2011).Itis,however,afundamentalquestionwhetherstateinvolvementshouldforemostbeasownerthroughtradingorasapolitical/democraticsystemwithresponsibilityforlanduseplanning.Tothe
extentthatforestsareowned byprivateactors, theimplications for
policyofthe marketmodelareevenmorechallenging. One may askifit is
appropriate tolet internationaltrades over forest landdominatethe
development of anationsforest sector.This questionbecomesmore
serious the largerREDD+ grows.IfREDD+ dominates the forest
sectornancially,the market/projectarchitecture can side-line state
forest sectormanagement.This could inuencethe ability ofthe
stateadministration toimprove transparency,
accountabilityandparticipationin decision-making inways
reducingwiderlegitimacy.Movingtoeffectiveness,itisnotgiventhatacompliancemarketwillattractlargeresourcestodeforestationprojects.TheCDMexperiencesoffersomeinsights.In2009,onlyabout1%ofCDMprojectsinthepipelinewereforestrelated(UNEP,RisoeCentre,2010).
AccordingtoRobledoandMa(2008),thisascribesnotleasttocomplicatedrulesmakingforestprojectsexpensivetoinitiate.NotemoreoverthatCDMonlyincludesafforestationandreforestation.Deforestationwasexcludedduetoverydemandingcontrolandmeasurementproblems.SimilarobservationsaremadeconcerningPESforestcarbonprojects(Corberaetal.,2009).ToensuresufcientresourcestoREDD+throughaCDMlikesystem,onemightthereforehavetomakeREDD+investmentscompulsory,goingsomewhatagainstthelogicofthemarket/projectmodel.Anotherchallengefortheeffectivenessofmarket/projectsolutionconcernsleakage.TheexperiencewithCDMillustratesthis.Tobeviable,monitoringandcontrolschemes(MRV)mustbesetupoutsidetheprojectareasaswell.Ifleakageisobserved,theA.Vatn,P.O.Vedeld/GlobalEnvironmentalChange23(2013)422432425projectbasedsystemwill,however,havenopowerinitselftocorrectforthisasthereisnoarrangementcoordinatingactivitiesonthegroundexceptthepowerofinvolvedstatestodismissprojects.REDD+compliancemarketswilldirectactiontowardbuyingcarboninstandingforests.Curbingdeforestationmay,however,demandactioninothersectors,e.g.,energyandagriculture.TotheextentsuccessfulREDD+actionsdemandcross-sectorengage-ment,apuremarket/projectbasedsolutionhasahandicap.Asimportantisthefactthatmuchdeforestationistheresultofillegalloggingandpoorgovernance.Theseareissuesthatthemarket/projectapproachitselfwillnotbewellsuitedtohandle(e.g.,Saundersetal.,2008).Thislinkstotheissueofcorruption.Willamarket-basedREDD+havethecapacitytoavoid/reducethat?TheliteratureonCDMisnotveryencouraging.Oneproblemisthatbothsellersandbuyerswillgainfromctitioustradesi.e.,reductionsthatshowupmainlyonpaper.Therearethusissuesconcerningadditionalityofprojectsandtheproblemofoverestimatedeffectse.g.,Schneider(2007)andSovacoolandBrown(2009).Concerningefciency,theleveloftransactioncostsiscore.ThesecostsseemtoexplainthelowlevelofforestprojectsunderCDM.Moregenerally,statepaymentsheavilydominatemarkettransactionsinthecaseofPESseeMilderetal.(2010).Highlevelsoftransactioncostsinthecaseofmarketsseemtobeaveryimportantpartoftheexplanation(Vatnetal.,2011).
InthecaseofPES,Wunderetal.(2008)indicatethattransactioncostsareintheorderof30100%comparedtopayments.Studyingagri-environ-mentalprograms,Rrstadetal.(2007)concludethatcomplexityofatransactionvastlyincreasestransactioncosts.Marketsworkwellforstandardizedcommodities.Assoonasonemovestomorespecictradeswithcomplexandoftenidiosyncraticgoodslikeecosystemservices,usingstatepayments/taxesasopposedtomarkettradesmaysimplifytheprocesssubstantiallyseeVatn(2010).Thefactthatpropertyrightsforforestsareoftencontestedstrengthensthisargument.Movingnallytoco-benets,theexperienceswithmarketbasedsolutionsarevaried.Reviewingtheliterature,wemakethefollowingcoreobservations:-CDMhasdeliveredratherweaklyonco-benets.Those
buyingemission reductionsare lookingfor the cheapest
carbonoptions.For co-benets todowellinamarket setting,
thesemustthen bejointlyproducedwiththe cheapcarbon.
Olsen(2007)andOlsen andFenhann (2008) show thatthisis oftennotthe
case.-Inlinewiththis,CDMfundsdonottendtoowtothepoorestregions.Hence,AfricahasreceivedalowpercentageofCDMinvestments(UNFCCC,2009).Lackofsecurepropertyrights,andcostlytransactionscomparedtolowcarboneffectsgainedpertradeareimportantexplanations(e.g.,LipperandCavatassi,2004,Cosbeyetal.,2005).SimilarobservationsaremadeinthecaseofPES(e.g.,Grieg-Granetal.,2005;Corberaetal.,2007;Muradianetal.,2010).-Venteretal.(2009)pointtowardsimilarissuesforbiodiversityprotection.Therearetrade-offsbetweencheapcarbonandhighlevelsofbiodiversityprotection,whilethechallengesseemclearlysmallerthanforpovertyalleviation.-CDMhasattractedsubstantialresourcesandresearchersemphasizethatithascaughttheattentionofmanyintermediar-iesthatratherareafterthemoney,causingthewideraimsofCDMtobeside-linedtosomeextent(e.g.,LloydandSubbarao,2009)-Thetypeofmarketalsoinuencesmotivationsforcarbontraders.Neeffetal.(2009)documentwillingnesstopayforco-benetsinthevoluntarymarket.WhilebuyersofCDMcreditstendtolookforcheapcarbon,thoseoperatinginvoluntarymarketsaremoreafterconsumertrust.Thisillustrateshowthecomplianceinstitutionitselfmaynarrowthefocusoftraders.Oneshouldnallynotethatthekindofintermediariesinvolvedmaymakeadifferenceconcerningperformance.SomeNGOsgetinvolvedasintermediariesforwiderreasonsthanearningincomefromtrades.Whilewehavefoundnostudiesanalyzingdifferencesbetweentypesofintermediaries,wenotethattheGoldStandardforcarboncreditswasdevelopedbyNGOstostrengthentheemphasisonsustainabledevelopmentinthecaseofCDM(Stenslie,2010).5.2.FundsoutsideexistingnationaladministrationsConservationtrustfunds(CTFs)arethekindofexistingfundsthatcomeclosesttothisstructure.Suchfundshaveexistedsincetheearly1990s,andtherearepresentlyabout50ofthem(SpergelandTa
eb,2008).WhilepredominantlyfoundinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,therearealsoCTFsinAfricaandAsia,andinsomeformerSovietUnionstates.CTFsaredominantlyorganizedtonancebiodiversityprotection.ItshouldbenotedthattheyoftenoperateasintermediariesinPESprojects.We
alsonotethatinanalyzingexperienceswithCTFs,thereareratherfewespeciallyresearchbasedassessmentstorelyon.CTFsoperateatnationallevelsandmanyhavebeenestablishedbyspecialnationallegislation(SpergelandWells,2009).Theyarepublicprivatepartnershipswithboardstypicallyincludingrepresentativesfromcivilsociety,business,academicorganiza-tions,donorsandgovernmentofcials.Non-governmentalrepre-sentativesnormallyhavemajority(GEF,1998).TheliteratureonCTFsindicateshighoverallprocesslegitimacy.Eveniftherehasbeencriticismofdonordominanceespeciallyinnewlyestablishedfunds,CTFsaretypicallyestablishedinratherclosecollaborationbetweendonorsandthehostingstate(Moye,2002).Thewiderepresentationinmostboardshasfurtherstrengthenedlegitimacy.Thesystembuiltforthesefundsemphasizehighleveloftransparency.InmanyCTFstheboardmembersareappointedasindividualstoavoidclosetiestospecicinterests.Thismayprovokeissuesofaccountability,though.Theliteraturedoesnotmentionanysuchcritique,whilewenotethatalsointhecaseofCTFs,environmentaldecision-makingispushedoutofthestandardpoliticalprocess.SpergelandTa
eb(2008)emphasizethatthebusinesssectorissupportiveofCTFswhilethesomewhatlowervisibilityofferedtodonorscomparedtothemarket/projectbasedsystemisnotedasanissue.Concerningeffectiveness,CTFsweresetuptoattractprivatefundstonationalenvironmentalprotectionactivities.AccordingtoSpergelandWells(2009)manynanceministriesinitiallyopposedtheirestablishment,butwerepersuadedtoacceptthesolutionduetoitsabilitytoaccessotherwiseinaccessibleprivatefunds.Despitethis,themainsourceofCTFnancesisstillpublic.AccordingtoSpergelandTa
eb(2008)theycoveralmost75percentofatotalfundingofabout1.5billionUS$forCTFsworldwide(SpergelandWells,2009).TheliteratureemphasizesgreatuncertaintyconcerningtheimpactofCTFactivities.Thefocushasbeenmoreonprocessthanimpact.Baselinedataareoftenlackingandmonitoringofresultsonthegroundisweak(GEF,1998;SpergelandTa
eb,2008).Thisisamajorweakness,butnotanargumentspecicallyagainstCTFs.Thisisaproblemforallsystemsreviewedinthispaper.Moreover,itshouldbepossibletoremediatethisbyincreaseddemandsfromdonors.CTFsfacesomeofthesamerestrictionsasmarket/projectbasedsystemsconcerningcoordinationacrosssectors.SpergelandTa
eb(2008)refertoexceptionsliketheMexicanNatureConservationFundanditscoordinationofactivitieswithofcialMexicanpolicies.Nevertheless,CTFsoperatetoalargeextentthroughA.Vatn,P.O.Vedeld/GlobalEnvironmentalChange23(2013)422432
426fundingprojects.Hence,someoftheproblemsmentionedinrelationtothisissueraisedinSection5.1wouldalsoapplyhere.AreasonforestablishingCTFshasbeentoreducecorruptionandensureindependencefromgovernmentsincreasingdonorcondencethatfundswillbespentefcientlyandavoidredirectionofresourcestoothergovernmentuses(Starke,1995).WhiletheliteratureonCTFsdoesnotmentioncorruptionproblems,weshouldnotethattheemphasisoncorruptionintheCDMliteraturemayfollowfromdifferentgoals,notdifferentsystems.MostCTFsareorientedatfundingbiodiversityprotectionespeciallythroughnationalparks.Nocomplianceissuesareinvolved,nocreditsissued.Hence,therearefewermotivestowardmanipulatingdata.Turningtoefciency,ithasbeenarguedthatCTFsincreasecostsbyestablishinganextramanagementlevelbetweenbuyersandsellersseeBayonetal.(1999).Thisargumentisnotwellsubstantiated.Makingthiskindoftransactionisdemanding,andusingintermediariesseemshardtoavoid.Rather,professionalintermediariescouldreducetransactioncosts(Bayonetal.,1999).HowefcientCTFsareatdoingthatjobisdifculttoassessgivenpresentdata.GEF(1998)documentsthatfundshaveoperatingcostsintherangeof2530%ofthetotalbudget.SpergelandTa
eb(2008)recordsomewhatloweradministrativecostsintheorderof1020%.ThetransactioncostgurespresentedearlierforPESmoregenerallywereabithigher(1550%ifrecalculatedtotheaboveformat).Thedifferencemaybeexplainedbysomeeconomiesofscale.Asimportantisthefactthatthelatteralsoincludestransactioncostsforthelocalorganizationrunningtheprojects.NotemoreoverthatthereisoverlapinthedataasmanyPESprojectsarechanneledthroughCTFs.ArgumentsinfavorofCTFsalsoconcerntheircapacitytoavoidtherigidityofmanystateandlocaladministrations.Inlinewiththis,SpergelandTa
eb
(2008)offerexamplesofverybureaucraticmanagementsystemsife.g.,theCTFiscontrolledbyaministry.Certainly,thepotentialgainofCTFsdependsonthekindofpublicmanagementsysteminthehostcountry.Addedtothatistheissueofpoliticalaccountabilitymentionedabove.Aspreviouslyemphasized,paymentsforenvironmentalser-vicesmaynothaveawell-denedreceiver.Hence,Bayonetal.(1999)emphasizethateffectiveCTFstendtoexpandbeyondtheroleofapurenancialmechanism,engagingininstitutionalcapacitybuildingatthelocallevel.So,creatingnewlocalgovernancestructuresisoftenneededtomakepaymentswork.Turningnallytoco-benets,thereisnotmuchdocumentedexperience.AsCTFsarepredominantlyorientedtowardprotectingbiodiversity,onecouldexpectthemtobebothpositivetoandcapableoftakingbiodiversityissueswellintoaccount.Note,however,thatthedynamicsmaybedifferentwithfocusturningtowardcarbon.Concerningpovertyissues,therehasgenerallybeenconictsbetweenbiodiversityconservationandlivelihoodprotection.Thisconcernsnotleastprotectedareamanagement(e.g.,Vedeld,2002;Huttonetal.,2005).AsCTFsdominantlysupportthenancingofsuchareas(GEF,1998;SpergelandTaeb,2008),theissueislikelyalsoaproblemforthem.SpergelandWells(2009,p.81)pointtowardaspecicaspectofthisstatingthatCTFssometimesstrugglewithgovernmentsthatwanttouseCTFsforpovertyalleviationprojectswhicharenotrelatedtoconservation.Weshouldalsonotethatinmanycases,theCTFshaveamanagementculturewithquitestrongconservationvaluesandcompetences,beinglittleinvolvedincommunitybasedmanage-mentactivities.5.3.ConditionalbudgetsupportAsREDD+maygrowlargeincludingsubstantialforestareasinacountryinvolvingthegovernmentdirectlymayseembothunavoidableandwarranted.Analyzingthisoption,wehavelookedintotheliteratureonbudgetsupportandconditionality.Develop-mentaidintheformofbudgetsupporthasincreasedsubstantiallysincethelate1990s(IDDandAssociates,2006).Itimplieschannelingdonorfundstoapartnercountryusingitsownallocation,procurementandaccountingsystem(KoeberleandStavreski,2006,p.7).Onereasonforthismovewasratherweakresultswithstandardprojectandevenprogramaidsinceitwasfragmentedandweaklycoordinatedwithnationalpoliciesresultinginweaksenseofownership,rentseekingbehaviorandpooroutcomes.Italsorepresentedashiftinthinkingtowardestablishingapartnershipbetweendonor(s)andtherecipientcountry,respond-ingtoacritiqueofoldstyleconditionalityasinthelendingpracticesoftheIMFandtheWorldBank.ItwasrealizedthatgoodpoliciescannotbeboughtasemphasizedbyJosephStiglitz(TheEconomist,1999).Severalargumentsareemphasizedconcerningstrongconditionality(e.g.,Checkel,2000;Killick,1997).First,usingconditionalitywhengoalsofdonorsandtherecipientgovernmentareinconictisnotveryeffective.Second,paymentsareneverthelessoftenmadedespiteconditionsnotbeingfullledasdonorrepresentativeswanttodisbursemoneyalreadyallocated.Thisinuenceswillingnesstocomply.Third,conditionalitytendstoreducetheengagementofthehostcountry.Anownershipproblemiscreated.Finally,conditionalityfaresbadlyinnationalcontextsmarkedbypoororfragmentedpolicyenvironments(Checkel,2000,p.3).Theinterpretationoftheabovendingsvariessubstantiallyacrosstheliterature.WhileauthorslikeKillick(1997)andSvensson(2003)emphasizethatconditionalityisnormallynotformulatedinawaythatisconsistentinincentiveterms,Checkel(2001,p.560)underlinesthattheissueisnotjustaboutincentives,butalsoaboutdevelopingachangedagendawheremutuallearningandthediscoveryofnewpreferencesreplaceunilateralcalculation.Asimplicitintheabove,channelingresourcesthroughthestatebudgetwouldscorehighonprocesslegitimacytotheextentthatthepoliticalsystemisdemocraticallycontrolled,accountableandtransparent.Acoreissueconcernsthecapacityofthepoliticalsystemtoinvolvevariousstakeholders.Therearemanyexamplesofweakinvolvementoflocalcommunities.ThemarginalizationofindigenousgroupshasbeenespeciallyemphasizedinthediscussionoverREDD+e.g.,Lyster(2011).
Thereare,moreover,reasonstofearthatREDD+mayturntherecenttrendtowarddecentralizationofforestmanagement;e.g.,Phelpsetal.(2010).Theywarnagainstre-centralizationbecauseofeconomiesofscaleinMRV,coordinationneedsandstandardizationissues.Involve-mentofcommunitiesandmarginalizedpeopleisbothimportantforREDD+legitimacyandagreatchallengeforstateadministra-tionsinmanydevelopingcountries(e.g.,Colfer,2011).Transparencymaybeanissueasmoneyisnowpaidthroughnationalbudgetsanditwillnotbeeasytofollowitsspecicuse.Ifthemoneyispaidconditionallyonthebasisofperformancei.e.,levelofreduceddeforestationonecouldarguethatthereisnoproblem.Itistheamountofcarbonstored,nothowitisaccomplishedthatmatters.Thisassumesthatdonorsignoretheprocessofestablishingreductionsandwhogetscompensatede.g.,co-benets.Astheconditionalityliteratureshows,theseissuescouldbefraughtwithproblems.Thequestionofaccount-abilityisequallyimportant.Thegovernmentmaycomeinakindofsqueeze.Itsbasicaccountabilityistowarditsconstituencies.Ontheotherhand,inthecaseofREDD+,accountabilityiswiththebuyersofstoredcarbon.Movingtoeffectiveness,weobserveseveralissues.Concerningraisingfunds,onemayarguethatbudgetsupportworkswellonlywhenforeignstatesarebuyers.Thisconclusionis,however,A.Vatn,P.O.Vedeld/GlobalEnvironmentalChange23(2013)422432427dependentontheinternationalarchitecturechosen.Ifprivatebusinessesreceivecertiedemissionreductions(CERs)whenpayingintoaninternationalfund,thereshouldbenodifferencecomparedtoamarket/projectsystem.Concerningleakage,asolutionwithbudgetsupporthas,atleastintheory,thecapacitytooutperformthetwopreviouslydiscussedsystems.Thestateshouldhavethebestcapacitytoestablishnationallevelmonitoringaswellasthepowertoensurethatactioninonelocalityisnotcounteredbyincreaseddeforestationatotherlocations.Onemustnotethatthecapacityofstatestoensurenecessarycontrolvariesconsiderably.Itcannotbetakenforgrantedthattheadministrationiscapableorevenwillingtoestablishandrunthenecessaryprogramswell.Ensuringadditionalityisstronglylinkedtotransparencyandaccountability.AnargumentbehindusingCTFswasnotleasttoavoidmoneybeingdivertedtootherissues(SpergelandTa
eb,2008).Hence,forbudgetsupporttoperformwell,itmightbenecessarytodenequitestrictperformancebasedconditionalities.Asstrongconditionalitymightreducethecooperativewillofthehostcountry,theremightbeanunavoidabletrade-offhere.Concerningsectorcoordination,wenotethatbudgetarysupporthasthecapacitytooutperformproject-basedandCTF-basedsystems.Certainly,mostgovernmentsstrugglewithsectorcoordination.Despitethis,beingpartofthesameadministrationopensupopportunitiesthatclearlygobeyondthatofthepuremarket/projectsolutionorseparatefunds.Concerningefciency,budgetarysupporthastheadvantageofusingexistingsystems.NonewstructuresneedtobeestablishedseealsoKoeberleandStavreski(2006)andLawsonetal.(2005).ThefactthatpublicagentsstronglydominateasintermediariesinPESprogramsisanindirectsupporttotheconclusionthatusingpublicsystemshelpskeepingtransactioncostsdowncf.earlierdiscussion.However,inmanycountries,thelocaladministrationsareweaklydeveloped,andREDD+woulddemandfurtherimprovements.Wealsonotethatbureaucraticrulesmayhampertheefciencyofpublicadministrations.Certainly,thelevelofrigidityvariesacrossadministrationsandacrosscountries.Hence,theimportanceofthisargumentiscontextual.InmanycountrieswhereREDD+maybeinstituted,stateadministrationsareoftenplaguedwithcorruptionandpoormanagement.ItmaystillbearguedthatREDD+shouldbeusedtostrengthenpublicadministrationatvariouslevelssimplybecauseforestrymanagementisapublicresponsibility.Thishasbothtodowiththenecessaryaccountabilitytothepublicandthefactthatstrengtheningthenationalsystemscanhavelongrunpositiveeffectsonthepoliticalsystem.Turningnallytoco-benets,theargumentinfavorofbudgetsupportconcernsthepossibilitytomakestronglinkstopresentpoliciesonpovertyalleviationandbiodiversitypreservation.BothissuesareimportantforgovernmentsinmanypotentialREDD+hostingcountries.Oneshouldneverthelessobservethatthereisnoguaranteethatsuchawidersetofgoalswillbetakenintoaccount.Nationalbiodiversityprogramsareoftenaccusedfornottakingtheinterestsofruralpoorseriously(e.g.,Huttonetal.,2005).Theinterestsofindigenouspeoplesareoftenleftunaccounted,sometimesevenopposed.Policiestoreducepovertyhaveoftenbeencriticizedforbeingineffectivee.g.,Hulme(2010)andChronicPovertyResearchCentre(n.y.).Certainly,intheseareas,successwilldependheavilyontheengagementandwillofthegovernmentinthespeciccountries.Itisespeciallyheretheissueofconditionalityisparticularlysensitive.5.4.FundsinsidethenationaladministrationOurinterestinthisalternativeconcernswhetherafundinsidethenationaladministrationcouldcounteractweaknesseswithstandardbudgetsupportwhilestillmaintainimportantgains?Heretheliteratureonso-calledforestfundsprovidesthemostrelevantinsights.Thesefundshaveahistorygoingbacktothe1920s(Fontaine,1961).Theyareofvaryingformatsspanningfromquiteautonomousfunds,viafundsthatarerunbyaspecicpublicagency,tofundsbeingjustaseparateaccountinthebudgetofaministry.Inourcontext,forestfundsthatarerunbyseparateboardsoragenciesareofgreatestinterest.Theyarestillpublickeptwithinthenationaladministrationbuthavevariousdegreesofautonomy.AccordingtoRosenbaumandLindsay(2001)eventhisclassofforestfundsmayhaveverydifferentgovernancestructures.Somearerunbyaspecialagencyplacedwithinaministrye.g.,theBolivianFONOBOSQUElocalizedasaseparateentityundertheMinistryofSustainableDevelopmentandEnvironment.Othershavegreaterlegalautonomylikeapublicagency,trustorgovernmentownedcorporation.TheCostaRicanFONAFIFOtsthisdescriptionbeingatrustfundgrantedrelativeautonomywithaboardofdirectorsconstitutedbythreerepresentativesfromthepublicsectorandtwofromtheprivate(FONAFIFO,2011).
Inthesecases,thegovernmentappointstheboard/administration,formulatesstatutesandsecuresitsnances,butdoesnotengageindecisionsconcerningtheuseofthemoney.AsFONAFIFOillustrates,boardsmayincludenon-governmentalrepresentatives.Separateauditingisnormallyused,whilethestandardstateauditingauthoritiesmaysometimesbeinvolved.AnexampleofthelatteristheSouthAfricanNationalForestRecreationandAccessTrust.Adominantobjectiveofforestfundsisreforestationandafforestationbothonprivateandpubliclands(RosenbaumandLindsay,2001).Thefundsmaysupportadministrativeactivities.Therearealsoseveralcaseswherethefundsareusedtonanceordinarypublicforestadministrations.Purchaseoflandforpublicobjectivesisalsoobservedasanaimforforestfunds.Therearelittlesystematicevaluationsofthefunctioningofforestfunds.SomeelementsarefoundinRosenbaumandLindsay(2001)andinLandell-Mills(1999).ButasRosenbaumandLindsayemphasize,theirevaluationsaremainlytobeseenashypotheses.Basedonthesesourcesandonourownmoregeneralassessments,wemaystilloffersomeinsights.Inthecaseofprocesslegitimacy,thepotentialinvolvementofactorsoutsidethepublicadministratione.g.,representativesofNGOsmaybeseenasacrucialfactorensuringwiderparticipationindecision-makingandaccesstoinformation.Theuseofseparateaccountsalsoincreasestransparency.Atthesametime,thelevelofindependenceestablishedmayreduceaccountability.Thisargu-mentcarriesweightconcerningtherelationtothestandardpoliticalsystemministriesandtheparliament.Ontheotherhand,totheextentthattheboardincludescivilsocietyrepresentatives,anewchanneltothewidersocietyisopened.Hence,theliteratureemphasizesthatthepotentialforincreasedaccountabilityandtransparencydependontherulesgoverningtheoperationofthefundsandtowhatextentcivilsocietyisincludedintheboard.Lookingateffectiveness,theliteratureemphasizesthepositiveeffectofforestfundsonlong-termplanning.Theforestsectorpresupposessuchmanagementperspectivesandthefundsolutionrespondstothisbymovingdecisionsawayfromannualbudgetaryprocesses(Fontaine,1961;Landell-Mills,1999;RosenbaumandLindsay,2001).Certainly,thisispositiveforREDD+notleastfortheissueofpermanence.Itisalsoarguedthatanautonomousorsemi-autonomousfundensuresreducedlevelsofcorruptionbyincreasingtransparency.Theliteratureis,however,somewhatcontradictoryonthispoint.Afteremphasizingwaysseparatefundsmaycounteractcorruption,RosenbaumandLindsay(2001,p.17)mentionthatinanenvironmenttoleratingcorruptionkeepingA.Vatn,P.O.Vedeld/GlobalEnvironmentalChange23(2013)422432
428moneyoutsidethenormal. ..
governmentbudgetingprocessmayincreasetheopportunitiesforcorruption.Undoubtedly,localconditions,thesystemforadministeringandauditingfundsallplaycrucialrolesindeterminingtheeffectivenessofthisgovernancestructure.Concerningleakageandtosomeextentcross-sectorcoordina-tion,thefundsolutionshouldhavemanycapacitiessimilartothesystemwithbudgetarysupport.We
donothavedatatoassessthis,anditcouldaswellbearguedthatanationalfundwouldbeinabetterpositiontoforcecooperationthroughitsautonomyandcapacitytospecifythisasaconditionforawardingresourcestosectorministries.Regardingefciency,thereareagainsomesimilaritiestobudgetsupport.Ifthefundisorganizedinsuchawaythatitcanutilizealreadyexistingpublicadministrationstoputactionsinplace,nonewsystemsneedtobesetup.Nevertheless,problemsmayappearinthenecessaryprocessofcoordination,makingthissolutionweakerthanthatofbudgetarysupport.Ontheotherhand,thesystemwithnationalfundscouldmakeiteasiertoshort-cutseverallevelsofpublicadministrationsthroughestablishingdirectrelationstothelocallevelwhereREDD+actionstakeplace.Finally,nationalfundscanalsobeinstitutedinawayfreeingtheadministrationfromrigidbureaucraticrulesseealsoRosenbaumandLindsay(2001).Concerninglastlyco-benets,thecapacityofnationalfundscomesclosetothatofbudgetsupport.Itcouldbearguedthatthefundmodelmakesiteasiertoinstitutespecicliabilityfortakingonwiderresponsibilitiesi.e.,responsibilityforbiodiversityprotectionandpovertyalleviation.Participationfromcivilsocietycouldmoreoverbeusedtocountertendenciestooverridecommunityinterest/interestsofindigenouspeoples.Certainly,thisdependsonthepoliticalwilloftheauthoritiessettingupthisstructure.Theinternationalcommunitymayconsiderdeningconditionsonthisimportantpointasabasisforofferingpayments.Beforeweclosethissection,wealsowanttomentiontheresultsofanin-depthassessmentoftheIndonesianreforestationfund(Barretal.,2010).Whiletheaboveanalysisofthefundssolutionisratherpositive,theiranalysisisquitecritical,especiallyoftheSuhartoperiod,showinghowasubstantialpartofthemoneyavailablewasdivertedawayfromthepurposeofreforestation.Largesumsevenendedupinprivateaccountsbelongingtopublicofcials.TheIndonesiancaseillustratessomeimportantcautionsabouthowtoorganizeREDD+.RosenbaumandLindsay(2001)classifytheIndonesianfundasanaccountingdeviceonly.Itwasnotadministeredbyaseparateboard,butbyaministry.Hence,theIndonesiancasesayslessaboutthepotentialoffundsandmoreaboutthekindofcautionsnecessaryincorruptenvironments.6.DiscussionandconclusionREDD+maybecomeanimportantinitiativeforfutureclimatepolicy.Thechallengesare,however,great.EspeciallythebeliefthatREDD+istobecomeatriplewinisdemandingtorealize.Thewayitwillbeorganizedwillhavedecisiveimpactsonitscapacitytodeliverreducedcarbonemissions,improvedlocallivelihoodsandbiodiversityprotection.Amongthealternativegovernancestructuresanalyzedinthispaper,noonecomesforwardasclearlybestseealsosummaryinTable1.WhatstandoutarethemanychallengesthatorganizingREDD+atthenationallevelwillface.Itshouldalsobenotedthatthechoiceofsolutionwillhavetodependonthelocalcontextsineachcaseespeciallythepoliticalculture,whichpresentinstitutionsareinplace,andtherelativeimportanceofREDD+intheactualcountry.Somemoregeneralconclusionsmaystillbeemphasized.Accordingtoouranalysisthemarket/projectbasedsystemseemstobetheweakestalternativeforanationalREDD+architecture.Itsmainappealliesinitscapacitytoattractprivatefunding.Asemphasized,creatingREDD+resourcesthroughaninternationalfundofferingCERs,willmaketheothersolutionsequallystronginthisrespect.Thepotentialtondcost-effectiveREDD+optionsisalsoanargumentforthissolution.Itdoes,however,notTable1ComparingREDD+governancestructures.SystemCriteriaProjects/marketbasedsystemSeparatenationalfundsFundsinstateadministrationsBudgetarysupportProcesslegitimacyVoluntaryparticipation.Informationasymmetries.Democraticdecit;thirdpersonexclusion.Issuesconcerningtransparencyandaccountability.Potentialforparticipationfromawidesetofactors.IssuesconcerningaccountabilityespeciallyifREDD+growslarge.Goodontransparency.Potentialforparticipationfromawidesetofactorswhilesomewhatlowerthanforseparatefunds.Goodontransparency.Someaccountabilityissues.Goodonaccountabilityhowever,regimedependent.Challengesconcerninglocalparticipation.Issuesconcerningtransparency.Outputlegitimacy:EffectivenessStrongattractionofprivatefunding,butREDD+mayhaveproblemswithcompetingforthesefunds.Weakonleakage,additionality,permanenceandcoordinationacrosssectors.VulnerabletocorruptionGoodattractionoffundingbestfrompublic.Mediumstrongonleakage.Fairlygoodonpermanence.Issuesonadditionality.Ratherweakonsectorcoordination.SomewhatvulnerabletocorruptionAttractionofprivatefundingdependsoninternationalregime.Ratherstrongonleakageandpermanence.Issuesonadditionality.Fairlygoodonsectorcoordination.SomewhatvulnerabletocorruptionAttractionofprivatefundingdependsoninternationalregime.Ratherstrongonleakage.Issuesonadditionality.Issuesconcerningpermanence.Ratherstrongonsectorcoordination.Vulnerableto
corruptionOutputlegitimacy:EfciencyCost-efcientREDD+investments.Relativehightransactioncostlevels.FairlygoodcapacitytokeeptransactioncostsdownGoodpotentialtokeeptransactioncostsdown.IssuesconcerninglowcostREDD+optionsGoodpotentialtokeeptransactioncostsdown,butdependsonadministrativestructure.May
notensuremostlowcostREDD+optionsOutputlegitimacy:Capacitytodeliverco-benetsExpectedtobeweakonpovertyalleviation.WeakalsoonbiodiversityprotectionifinconictwithcheapcarbonmitigationoptionsHascapacitytodeliverco-benets,butdemandsspecialcontrolandattentioninstatutes.Relativestrongcapacitytodeliveronco-benets,butdemandsspecialcontrolandattentioninstatutes.Relativestrongcapacitytodeliveronco-benets,butdemandsspecialcontrolandattentioninagreements.A.
Vatn,P.O.Vedeld/GlobalEnvironmentalChange23(2013)422432429compensatefortheweaknessesfoundconcerningaccountability,leakage,permanence,co-ordinationacrosssectors,transactioncosts,andtheexpectedweakdeliveryofco-benets.Inrelationtothis,oneshouldnotethegeneraltrendtowardincreaseduseofmarketsinareasthatearlierwerethoughtofaspublicresponsibilitiescf.theneoliberalgovernancetrendmentionedearlier.Thisideologicalorientationhasinuencedmajordonors,likeIMF,theWorldBank,andmostUNorganiza-tions.We
believethatitisespeciallyimportanttorethinkthecapacitiesofthissolutionnotleastinaREDD+context(seealsoBa
ckstrandandLo
vbrand,2006).Concerningtheotherthreeoptions,localconditionsareofgreatimportancewhenchoosing.Wendthattheargumentsforfundsinthestateadministrationandbudgetarysupportarequitestrongcomparedtothatofseparatenationalfundsregardingdimensionslikeaccountability/democraticprocesses,coordinationacrosssectors,capacitytoavoidleakage,co-benetsandmaybealsotransactioncosts.Wendtheissueofaccountability/democraticprocessesthemostimportant.IfREDD+becomeslargei.e.,muchlandisinvolveditseemsproblematictoestablishasystemforcombatingdeforestationandforestdegradationthatisseparatedfromstatedecision-makingandadministrativebodies.Notealsothatinmanyoftheactualcountries,forestsaredominantlyownedbythestate.Concerningleakage,noneoftheproposedsystemscanavoidleakageacrossnationalborders.Thisisanissuethathastobetreatedatinternationallevels.Themainargumentforfundsoutsidethestateadministrationcomparedtonationalfundsandbudgetsupportistheabilitytoattractvoluntaryprivatefunding,thecapacitytosetupsystemsthatdonotdependonrigidbureaucraticrulesofstateadminis-trations,andthepotentialtohandlecorruptionbetter.Certainly,incountrieswherecorruptionisverypronouncedinthestateadministration,thelatterisimportant.Similarly,inasituationwitharigidbureaucracy,usingthepresentadministrationmaynotresultinreducedtransactioncostscomparedtoseparatefundseventhoughaparalleldistributionsystemmustbedeveloped.Inrelationtoboththeabovearguments,awell-designedREDD+programoffersanopportunitytocombatcorruptionandtrimmingstatebureaucracy.Whichargumentisthestrongestwilldependonthespecicsituation,notleastthewillingnessofthepresentgovernmenttoengageinadministrativereforms.Turningtobudgetarysupportvs.fundsinthestateadminis-tration,theargumentsfortheformeraremainlyrelatedtoaccountability/democraticprocessesandcapacitytocoordinateacrosssectors.Thefundsolutionseemstoofferbetterpossibilitiestoincreasetransparency,ensurepermanenceandcombatcorrup-tionwhenimportant.Itmayalsolikeseparatefundsinvolverepresentativesfromcivilsocietyandbeorganizedtoavoidsomeofthe(necessary)rigiditiesforstandardstateadministrations.Finally,itmaybeeasierforexternaldonorstoformulatestrongerconditionsifthefundsolutionisusedcomparedtopayingviastatebudgets.REDD+isademandingpoliticalendeavor.Independentofthemainarchitecturechosen,therewillbesubstantialneedsforcapacityandcompetencebuilding.Thisconcernsparticipatorysystems,necessarylocalinstitutionsincludingtheclaricationofpropertyrights,establishingprinciplesfordistributionoffunds,andthedevelopmentofvarioustechnicalcompetenciesnotleastinMRV.Therearefurthergreatchallengesconcerningtheinvolvementoflocalcommunities.Whileforestsaredominantlystateowned,theyaretoalargeextentusedandmanagedbylocalcommunities.Overthelast23decennia,forestmanagementindevelopingcountrieshasfollowedatrendofdecentralization.ThereisarealisticdangerthatREDD+mayturnsthistide.Hence,strongfocusonthewaylocalstakeholdersareempoweredandincludedintheREDD+processisnecessary.InthisliesalsoafearthatREDD+canbecomedetrimentaltothepoorestruralpopulation.Noneofthediscussedsolutionsinthispaperwillautomaticallyguardagainstsuchoutcomes.Astrong,separateandenduringfocusonthisproblemiswarranted.Similarly,allthesystemsdiscussedabovearevulnerabletocorruption.REDD+maybringinvastamountsofmoneytodevelopingcountries.Thismayattractorganizationsandindivid-ualsthatareafterthemoneyratherthansupportingtheREDD+idea.Again,astrongfocusiswarranted.GiventheamountofresourcesinREDD+,itcould,however,beusedtohelpturnthetide.REDD+wouldrepresentresourcestoamagnitudethatactuallymightmakegovernancereformsine.g.,forestadminis-trationspossible.Atpresent,countriesareintheearlystagesofestablishingREDD+structures.ThemainamountofresourcesisgoingintonancingREDD+pilotsatthelocalleveloftenrunbyNGOsandinmanyinstancesquiteseparatedfromnationalREDD+processes.Ourresearchine.g.,Tanzaniaindicatesthatatthelocallevelactorstypicallyexpectfuturepaymentstocomefromthemarket.ThisseemstoreecttheinternationalREDD+discourseespeciallyintheearlierstages.Lookingatwhatisnowhappeningatthenationallevel,theroleofthestateismuchmorepronouncede.g.,developmentsinBrazil,IndonesiaandTanzania.ThisishighlyunderstandablegiventhepotentialscaleofREDDanditsseriousmacro-levelpoliticalimpactsonlanduse.Themainobservationis,however,thelackofafocusedandmoreprincipaldebateaboutstrengthsandweaknessesofdifferentnationalarchitecturesevenintheinternationalREDD+negotia-tions.Itisurgentthattheinternationalcommunitytakesonsuchadiscussion.Thisisnecessarybothfortheabilitytomakewisechoicesconcerningtheinternationalstructuresasframingthechoicesatnationallevelsandforsupportingcountriesintheirindividualdecisions.AcknowledgementsTheworkbehindthispaperispartlynancedtheprojectPovertyandsustainabledevelopmentimpactsofREDDarchitec-ture;Optionsforequity,growthandtheenvironment,fundedbytheNorwegianAgencyforDevelopmentCooperation.TheprojectisundertakenincooperationwiththeInternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopment.TheauthorswouldalsoliketothankArildAngelsenforcommentstoadraftofthepaper.Theusualdisclaimersapply.ReferencesAngelsen,A.(Ed.),2008.MovingAheadwithREDD:Issues,OptionsandImplica-tions.CIFOR,Bogor,Indonesia.Barr,C.,Dermawan,A.,Purnomo,H.,Komarudin,H.,2010.FinancialGovernanceandIndonesiasReforestationFundduringtheSoehartoandpost-Soehartoperiods,19892009.APoliticalEconomicAnalysisofLessonsforREDD+.OccasionalPaper52.CIFOR,Bogor,Indonesia.Bayon,R.,Deere,C.,Norris,R.,Smith,S.E.,1999.EnvironmentalFunds:LessonsLearnedandFutureProspects.http://economics.iucn.org(issues-20-01).Ba
ckstrand,K.,2006.Multi-stakeholderpartnershipsforsustainabledevelopment.Rethinkinglegitimacy,accountabilityandeffectiveness.EuropeanEnvironment16(5),290306.Ba
ckstrand,K.,Lo
vbrand,E.,2006.Plantingtreestomitigateclimatechange:contesteddiscoursesofecologicalmodernization,greengovernmentalityandcivicenvironmentalism.GlobalEnvironmentalPolitics6(1),5075.Checkel,J.T.,2000.ComplianceandConditionality.ARENAWorkingPapersWP
00/18.UniversityofOslo,Oslo.Checkel,J.T.,2001.Why
comply?SociallearningandEuropeanidentitychange.InternationalOrganization55(3),533588.Colfer,C.J.P.,2011.Marginalizedforestpeoplesperceptionsofthelegitimacyofgovernance:anexploration.WorldDevelopment39(12),21472164.Corbera,E.,Brown,K.,2010.Offsettingbenets?Analyzingaccesstoforestcarbon.EnvironmentandPlanningA42,17391761.Corbera,E.,Schroeder,H.,2011.GoverningandimplementingREDD+.Environmen-talScience&Policy14(2),8999.A.Vatn,P.O.Vedeld/GlobalEnvironmentalChange23(2013)422432
430Corbera,E.,Kosoy,N., Martinez-Tuna,M.,2007. Equityimplications
ofmarket-ing ecosystemservices inprotectedareasand
ruralcommunities: casestudiesfromMeso-America. Global
EnvironmentalChange17,365380.Corbera,E.,Soberanis,C.G.,Brown,K.,2009.Institutionaldimensionsofpaymentsforecosystemservices:ananalysisofMexicoscarbonforestryprogramme.EcologicalEconomics68,743761.Cosbey,A.,Parry,J.-E.,Browne,J.,Babu,Y.D.,Bhandari,P.,Drexhage,J.,Murphy,D.,2005.RealizingtheDevelopmentDividend:MakingtheCDMWorkforDevel-opingCountries.InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment,Winnipeg.ChronicPovertyResearchCentre,n.y.TheChronicPovertyReport20082009.EscapingPovertyTraps.TheChronicPovertyResearchCentre,UniversityofManchester,UK.Dryzek,J.,2001.Legitimacyandeconomyindeliberativedemocracy.PoliticalTheory29(5),651669.FONAFIFO,2011.FondonacionaldeFinanciamentoForestalFONAFIFO.In:http://www.fonafo.com/english.html(viewed20.12.11).Fontaine,R.G.,1961.Nationalforestryfunds.Unasylva15(4)non-paginated.http://www.fao.org/docrep/x5401e/x5401e04.htm.Ghazoul,J.,Butler,R.A.,Mateo-Vega,J.,Koh,L.P.,2010.REDD:areckoningofenvironmentanddevelopmentimplications.TrendsinEcologyandEvolution25(7),396402.GEF,1998.GEFEvaluationofExperiencewithConservationTrustFunds.GEFCouncil,Washington,DC.Grieg-Gran,M.,Porras,I.T.,Wunder,S.,2005.Howcanmarketmechanismsforforestenvironmentalserviceshelpthepoor?PreliminarylessonsfromLatinAmerica.WorldDevelopment33,15111527.Gregersen,H.,Lakany,H.E.,Karsenty,A.,White,A.,2010.DoestheOpportunityCostApproachIndicatetheRealCostofREDD+?RightsandRealitiesofPayingforREDD+.RightsandResourcesInitiative,Washington,DC.Hulme,D.,2010.GlobalPovertyHowGlobalGovernanceisFailingthePoor2010.Routledge,London.Hutton,J.M.,Adams,W.M.,Murombedzi,J.C.,2005.Backtothebarriers?Changingnarrativesinbiodiversityconservation.ForumforDevelopmentStudies2,341370.IDDandAssociates,2006.EvaluationofGeneralBudgetSupport:SynthesisReport.InternationalDevelopmentdepartment,UniversityofBirmingham,Birming-ham,UK.IPCC,2007.ClimateChange2007:Impacts,AdaptationandVulnerability.SummaryforPolicymakers.IPCCAR4.Karousakis,K.,Corfee-Morlot,J.,2007.FinancingMechanismstoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestation:IssuesinDesignandImplementation.OECD/IEA,Paris.Killick,T.,1997.Principals,agentsandthefailingsofconditionality.JournalofInternationalDevelopment9(4),483495.Koeberle,S.,Stavreski,Z.,2006.Budgetsupport:conceptsandissues.In:Koeberle,S.,
Stavreski,Z.,Walliser,J.(Eds.),BudgetSupportasMoreEffectiveAid?RecentExperiencesandEmergingLessons.TheWorldBank,Washington,DC.Landell-Mills,N.,1999.FinancingSustainableForestry:AReviewofInternationalExperience.,In:http://cameroun-foret.com/fr/system/les/18_61_63.pdf.Lawson,A.,Booth,D.,Msuya,M.,Wangwe,S.,Williamson,T.,2005.DoesGeneralBudgetSupportWork?EvidencefromTanzania.OverseasDevelopmentInsti-tute,London.Lemos,M.C.,Agrawal,A.,2006.Environmentalgovernance.AnnualReviewofEnvironmentalResources31,297325.Lloyd,B.,Subbarao,S.,2009.DevelopmentchallengesundertheCleanDevelopmentMechanism(CDM).Canrenewableenergyinitiativesbeputinplacebeforepeakoil?EnergyPolicy37(1),237245.Lipper,L.,Cavatassi,R.,2004.Landusechange,povertyandcarbonsequestration.EnvironmentalManagement33(S1),374387.Lyster,R.,2011.REDD+,transparency,participationandresourcerights:theroleoflaw.EnvironmentalScience&Policy14,118126.March,J.G.,Olsen,J.P.,1995.DemocraticGovernance.TheFreePress,NewYork.MeridianInstitute,2009.ReducingEmissionsfromDeforestationandForestDeg-radation(REDD):AnOptionsAssessmentReport.PreparedfortheGovernmentofNorway,byAngelsen,A.,Brown,S.,Loisel,C.,Peskett,L.,Streck,C.,Zarin,D.http://www.REDD-OAR.org/links/REDD-OAR_en.pdf.Milder,J.C.,Scherr,S.J.,Bracer,C.,2010.Trendsandfuturepotentialofpaymentforecosystemservicestoalleviateruralpovertyindevelopingcountries.EcologyandSociety15(2),4.,In:http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss2/art4/.Milledge,S.,Gelvas,I.,Ahrends,A.,2007.Forestry,GovernanceandNationalDevelopment:LessonsLearnedfromaLoggingBoominSouthernTanzania.TRAFFICEast/SouthernAfricaOfceDaresSalaam,Tanzania.Moye,M.,2002.InnovativeMechanismstomanageEnvironmentalExpendituresinAfrica,AsiaandLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(LAC).WWF
CentreforConservationFinance.ConferencePaperOECD,Paris.Muradian,R.,Corbera,E.,Pascual,U.,Kosoy,N.,May,P.H.,2010.Reconcilingtheoryandpractice:analternativeconceptualframeworkforunderstandingpaymentsforenvironmentalservices.EcologicalEconomics69,12021208.Mustalahti,I.,Bolin,A.,Boyd,E.,Paavola,J.,2012.CanREDD+reconcilelocalprioritiesandneedswithglobalmitigationbenets?LessonsfromAngaiForest,Tanzania.EcologyandSociety17(1),16.Neeff,T.,Ashford,L.,Calvert,J.,Davey,C.,Durbin,J.,Ebeling,J.,Herrera,T.,Janson-Smith,T.,Lazo,B.,Mountain,R.,OKeeffe,S.,Panl,S.,Thorburn,N.,Tuite,C.,Wheeland,M.,
Young,S.,2009.TheForestCarbonOffsettingSurvey2009.,In:http://www.ecosecurities.com/Registered/ECOForestrySurvey2009.pdf.Nelson,
F.(Ed.),
2010.CommunityRights,Conservation&ContestedLand.ThePolitics
ofNaturalResource GovernanceinAfrica.
Earthscan,London.Okereke,C.,Dooley,K.,2010.PrinciplesofJusticeinproposalsandpolicyapproachestoavoiddeforestation:towardsapost-Kyotoclimateagreement.GlobalEnvironmentalChange20,8295.Olsen,K.H.,2007.Thecleandevelopmentmechanismscontributiontosustainabledevelopment:areviewoftheliterature.ClimateChange84(1),5973.Olsen,K.H.,Fenhann,J.,2008.Sustainabledevelopmentbenetsofcleandevelop-mentmechanismprojects.Anewmethodologyforsustainabilityassessmentbasedontextanalysisoftheprojectdesigndocumentssubmittedforvalidation.EnergyPolicy36(8),28192830.Paavola,J.,Adger,W.N.,2006.Fairadaptationtoclimatechange.EcologicalEco-nomics56,594609.Pierre,J.,Peters,B.G.,2000.Governance,PoliticsandtheState.Macmillan,London.Phelps,J.,Webb,E.L.,Agrawal,A.,2010.DoesREDD+threatentorecentralizeforestgovernance?Science328,312313.Robledo,C.,Ma,W.O.,2008.Why
therearesofewforestryprojectsunderthecleandevelopmentmechanism?ITTOTropicalForestUpdate18(3),35.Rosenbaum,K.L.,Lindsay,J.M.,2001.AnOverviewofNationalForestFunds:CurrentApproachesandFutureOpportunities.FAO,Rome.Rrstad,P.K.,Vatn,A.,Kvakkestad,V.,2007.Why
dotransactioncostsofagriculturalpoliciesvary?AgriculturalEconomics36,111.Saunders,J.,Ebeling,J.,Nussbaum,R.,2008.ReducedEmissionsfromDeforestationandForestDegradationLessonsfromaForestGovernancePerspective.Proforest,Oxford.,In:http://www.proforest.net/publication-objects/RED-D%20and%20Governance.pdf.Scharpf,F.,1999.GoverninginEurope.EffectiveandDemocratic?OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford.Schneider,L.,2007.IstheCDMFulllingItsEnvironmentalandSustainableDevel-opmentObjectives?AnEvaluationoftheCDMandOptionsforImprovement.ReportpreparedforWWF,Berlin.,In:http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/622/2007-162-en.pdf.Scott,W.R.,2008.InstitutionsandOrganizations:IdeasandInterests.SagePub-lications,ThousandOaks,CA.Sikor,T.(Ed.),2008.PublicandPrivateinNaturalResourceGovernance.AFalseDichotomy?Earthscan,London.Siry,J.,Cubbage,F.W.,Newman,D.H.,2009.Globalforestownership:implicationsforforestproduction,management,andprotection.PaperpresentedattheXIIIWorldForestryCongressBuenosAires,Argentina,1823October2009.http://www.cfm2009.org/es/programapost/resumenes/uploads/global_forest_ow-nership_FD.pdf.Smith,J.,Obidzinski,K.,Subarudi,Suramenggala,I.,2003.Illegallogging,collusivecorruptionandfragmentedgovernmentsinKalimantan,Indonesia.Interna-tionalForestReview5,293302.Sovacool,B.K.,Brown,M.A.,2009.Scalingthepolicyresponsetoclimatechange.PolicyandSociety27,317328.Spergel,B.,Taeb,P.,2008.RapidReviewofConservationTrustFunds.ConservationFinanceAlliance,2ndedition.Spergel,B.,Wells,M.,
2009.ConservationtrustfundsasamodelforREDD+nationalnancing.In:Angelsen,A.(Ed.),RealisingREDD+:NationalStrategyandPolicyOptions.CIFOR,Bogor,Indonesia,pp.7584.Starke,L.,1995.EnvironmentalFunds:TheFirstFiveYears(CommissionedbyUNDP/GEFfortheInteragencyPlanningGrouponEnvironmentalFunds).InteragencyPlanningGroup,NewYork.Stenslie,E.,2010.Theroleofcarbonoffsetsinreducingemissionsandcontributingtowardssustainabledevelopment.CanREDDasamarketbasedcarbonoffsetmechanismgeneratecarbonemissionreductionprojectswithbiodiversityandlivelihoodbenets?MasterThesis.DepartmentofInternationalEnvironmentandDevelopmentStudies,NorwegianUniversityofLifeSciences.Stern,N.,2006.SternReviewontheEconomicsofClimateChange.ExecutiveSummaryHMTreasury,London.Svensson,J.,2003.Why
conditionalaiddoesnotworkandwhatcanbedoneaboutit?JournalofDevelopmentEconomics70,381402.TheEconomist,1999.ThebumpyrideofJoeStiglitz.TheEconomist353(8150),125(anonymous).Thompson,M.C.,Buaruah,M.,
Carr,E.R.,2011.SeeingREDD+asaprojectofenvironmentalgovernance.EnvironmentalScienceandPolicy14(2),100110.UNEP,RisoeCentre,2010.CDMProjectsbyType.In:http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-type.htm(accessed12.06.10).UNFCCC,2009.CDMProjectsLocation.Map.In:http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/MapApp/index.html(accessed13.07.10).UNREDD,2012.AboutREDD+.In:http://www.un-redd.org/aboutredd/tabid/582/default.aspx(accessed09.08.12).Unruh,J.D.,2008.CarbonsequestrationinAfrica:thelandtenureproblem.GlobalEnvironmentalChange18,700707.vanderWerf,G.R.,Morton,D.C.,DeFries,R.S.,Olivier,J.G.J.,Kasibhatla,P.S.,Jackson,R.B.,Collatz,G.J.,Randerson,J.T.,2009.CO2
emissionsfromforestloss.NatureGeoscience2,737738.Vatn,A.,2005.InstitutionsandtheEnvironment.EdwardElgar,Cheltenham.Vatn,A.,2009.Cooperativebehaviorandinstitutions.JournalofSocio-Economics38,188196.Vatn,A.,2010.Aninstitutionalanalysisofpaymentsforenvironmentalservices.EcologicalEconomics69,12451252.Vatn,A.,2011.Environmentalgovernance
aconceptualization. In:Kjosavik,D.,Vedeld, P.(Eds.), ThePolitical
Economy of
EnvironmentA.Vatn,P.O.Vedeld/GlobalEnvironmentalChange23(2013)422432431and
DevelopmentinaGlobalized World. Exploring the Frontiers.
TapirAcademic Press,Trondheim,
pp.131152.Vatn,A.,Angelsen,A.,2009.OptionsforanationalREDD+architecture.In:Angelsen,A.(Ed.),RealisingREDD+:NationalStrategyandPolicyOptions.CIFOR,Bogor,Indonesia,pp.5774.Vatn,A.,Vedeld,P.,Petursson,J.G.,Stenslie,E.,2009.TheREDDDirection.ThePotentialforReducedCarbonEmissions,BiodiversityProtectionandIncreasedDevelopment.ADeskStudywithSpecialFocusontheSituationinUgandaandTanzania.NoragricReportno51.NorwegianUniversityofLifeSciences.Vatn,A.,Barton,D.N.,Lindhjem,H.,Movik,S.,Ring,I.,Santos,R.,2011.CanMarketsProtectBiodiversity.AnEvaluationofFinancialMechanisms.NoragricReportNo.60.NorwegianUniversityofLifeSciences.Vedeld,P.,2002.TheProcessofInstitution-BuildingtoFacilitateLocalBiodiversityManagement.NORAGRICWorkingPaperNo.26.NLH.Vedeld,P.,Angelsen,A.,Bojo
,
J.,Sjaastad,E.,KobugabeBerg,G.,2007.Forestenvironmentalincomesandtheruralpoor.ForestPolicyandEconomics9(7),869879.Venter,O.,Laurance,W.F.,Iwamura,T.,Wilson,K.A.,Fuller,R.A.,Possingham,H.P.,2009.Harnessingcarbonpaymentstoprotectbiodiversity.Science326,1368.Williamson,O.E.,1985.TheEconomicInstitutionsofCapitalism.FreePress,NewYork.Wunder,S.,2008.Howtodealwithleakage?In:Angelsen,A.(Ed.),MovingAheadwithREDD:Issues,OptionsandImplications.CIFOR,Bogor,Indonesia,pp.6576.Wunder,S.,Engel,S.,Pagiola,S.,2008.Takingstock:acomparativeanalysisofpaymentsforenvironmentalservicesprogramsindevelopedanddevelopingcountries.EcologicalEconomics65(4),834852.A.
Vatn,P.O.Vedeld/GlobalEnvironmentalChange23(2013)422432 432
