Introduction

The development of political geography has largelybeen conditioned by events in Europe and the FirstWorld (Glassner 1996; Taylor 1993). Furthermore,much of the political geographic literature pertainingto the state has reflected American democratic andanti-colonial ideas and ideals (Alexander 1957; DeBlij 1967; Pounds 1963). The complex overlappinggroup identities and dependent inter-state relation-ships, which characterised much of the world priorto the spread of nationalism associated with theAmerican and French revolutions, still dominated theworld political map in 1900, but found little favourin the dominant American political and academicculture (Smith 1994). In consequence, a century latermultiple identities have often been suppressed infavour of a dominant nationalism and inter-staterelationships are dominated by a single form: thatbetween sovereign independent states. Parallel withthis development, ethnic nationalism was widelyreplaced by state driven nationalism as the basis ofthe nation-state, which has been universally acceptedas the basic building block of the state system. Theapplication of American derived ideas and ideals toAfrica in the present century has been of primeimportance to the development of the continent.

The development of the state system in Africa in

the course of the twentieth century has tended toobscure many of the problems which have bedeviledthe people of the continent. The imposition ofEuropean colonial rule beyond the coastal enclaveswas relatively late, and effectively destroyed manyof the structures of the pre-colonial states and soci-eties. As a result, the state pattern that emerged at theend of the colonial period was largely the creationof the colonial powers and underwritten by the inter-national community, but it often bore little relation-ship to African ethnic and political realities (Griffiths1995). However, the inherited pattern of colonialboundaries was upheld by the Organisation ofAfrican Unity and the international community in aneffort to contain the destructive power of ethnicconflict so prevalent in other continents, notably inEurope. This political settlement has survived untilthe present, although it is now under increasingpressure as the revolutionary concepts of democracyand self-determination are reevaluated (Darkoh 1996;Young 1991). In this period of transformationconcepts such as ‘nation-state’, ‘quasi-state’ and ‘col-lapsed state’, have been applied to African states(Davidson 1992, Jackson 1990, Zartman 1995). Allthree terms offer some understanding of the presentstate system. It is a suitable time assess whether thestate pattern of Africa is liable to further substantialmodification with the rise of ethnic nationalisms, or

GeoJournal 43: 91–97. 1997 (September)

Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

‘Nation-states’, ‘quasi-states’, and ‘collapsed-states’ in contemporary Africa

Christopher, A. J., University of Port Elizabeth, Department ofGeography, P.O. Box 1600, Port Elizabeth 6000, South Africa

Received 17 December 1996; accepted 7 May 1997

Abstract: The revival of ethnic identities and the search for historical roots have beensignificant factors in re-shaping the map of the world in the late twentieth century. Multi-ethnic states have come under increasing strain throughout the century and undermining theconcept of the ‘nation-state’. However, the successor states to the colonial empires in Africaexhibit the same strains as the often highly fragile successors to the European continentalempires earlier in the century. The survival of these ‘quasi-states’ has been dependent uponthe support of the international community for over thirty years as a reaction to the era ofcolonialism. Anti-colonialism offers little practical support for states in a post-colonial, post-Cold War era. In some cases the result has been disintegration and the emergence of the‘collapsed state’. The revived political movements aimed at democratisation and self-deter-mination have unleashed forces which may be incompatible with the survival of the currentstate system.

whether a stability similar to that of the Americas hasbeen achieved. Immediately after the major period ofindependence on the continent, Saadia Touval (1963:v) wrote: ‘Africa is a continent rich in nationalismsbut poor in nations’. The same is true today.

Colonisation and independence

Many of contemporary Africa’s problems are rootedin the colonial era when the continent was conqueredand apportioned among the European powers. In afew cases the duration of colonial rule was measuredin centuries, in most in decades and in the case ofEthiopia less than a decade. However, the Europeangovernments effectively destroyed most of the pre-colonial political structures and created new statesfor their administrative convenience. In this processthe colonial boundaries divided pre-colonial societiesand polities, resulting in multi-ethnic administrativeunits. Shifts in pattern of colonies were frequent aspolitical and financial priorities changed, a patternwhich was to be frozen in place at independence.Thus Gerteiny (1967: 11) described the creation ofMauritania in 1903 as ‘one more administrativesolution created by France during her colonialventure in West Africa’. This implied no recognitionof ethnicity in the definition of its boundaries, letalone a shared concept of national identity, whichwas the underpinning of the European concept of the‘nation’ within the ‘nation-state’ (Smith 1995). Theresult was a highly legalistic application of thedefinition of the nation as the population whichhappened to live within the boundary fence of theex-colonial state at independence, with the inevitabletensions which this imposed.

Those states which did achieve or retain indepen-dence during the colonial period, did so often at theconvenience of the colonial powers. Even Ethiopiawas not considered to be a fully independent state,when it was admitted to the League of Nations in1923 under special terms which emphasised itsinferior status (Walters 1952). As late as 1941 GreatBritain still expected to obtain some form of protec-torate over the country it had newly conquered fromthe Italians rather than restore its independence(Marcus 1983). In similar vein, Egypt was unilater-ally granted independence in 1922, although theBritish government retained a large measure ofcontrol over the country until after the Second WorldWar (Mansfield 1971).

In the Second World War the influence of theUnited States became dominant in world affairs. Thusthe call to national freedom enunciated in the Anglo-American Atlantic Charter in 1941 was viewed bythe American government as applying to colonialpeoples as well as to those under German militaryoccupation. The complex dependent relationshipsbetween ruler and ruled were to be abolished in

favour of full participatory citizenship for everypeople. President Franklin D. Roosevelt summed upAmerican policy with regard to colonial areas inthese words:

‘I am firmly of the belief that if we are to arriveat a stable peace it must involve the developmentof backward countries . . . I can’t believe that wecan fight a war against fascist slavery, and at thesame time not work to free people all over theworld from a backward colonial policy’ (Kissinger1994: 401).

The pressures for the independence of Africa cametherefore largely from the international community,led by the United States and the Soviet Union andsupported by the various newly independent Asianstates. The colonial powers lost legitimacy and anymoral justification for imposing their rule upon alienpeoples. As a result political independence wasachieved relatively rapidly and with comparativelylittle bloodshed, with the result that the new stateslacked the legitimacy achieved through the successfulprosecution of a defining national struggle. The Warof Independence in Algeria stands out as a notableexception to this statement (Horne 1977). Theexperience of long anti-colonial struggles in theex-Portuguese colonies and Zimbabwe can be viewedin similar vein. The majority of the newly indepen-dent African states thus inherited all the trappingsof national sovereignty in international legitimacy,but with few of the support structures to sustain them,the ‘quasi-states’. The international community antic-ipated that through the provision of diplomatic andfinancial aid, a series of integrated nation-states couldbe created. As Robert Jackson (1990: 26) claimed:

‘at a more fundamental level quasi-states revealthe same egalitarian and democratic values asother twentieth-century enfranchisement and lib-eration movements concerning disadvantagedclass, racial and ethnic minorities. A close parallelin time is the civil rights movement in the UnitedStates which has virtually identical moral imper-atives and some comparable institutional features.Quasi-states are therefore part of a more generalprocess of self-determination which has affecteddomestic as well as international politics in thelatter half of the twentieth century.’

In the ensuing thirty years, the efforts of theindigenous governing elites were directed towardsmaintaining the state structures and constructingnation-states through the inculcation of a sense ofnationhood in the populaces. This was often under-taken by highly coercive means under one-party andmilitary dictatorships, which ultimately destroyed thecomplex networks of patronage which underpinnedthe system (Bayart 1993). Indeed, the African questto emulate the European concept of the ‘nation-state’has been termed a curse placed upon the continent

92 A. J. Christopher

(Davidson 1992). The Organisation of African Unitywas established in 1963 with a strong mandate toprevent potentially destructive challenges to thestate system and it was able to diffuse the majorityof the conflict situations which followed with thesupport of the international community (Cervenka1977). However, ethnic tensions were consideredinevitable and balkanisation the most likely result butfor this support. In consequence, attempts to createethnic separatist states were ruthlessly suppressed,whether in Biafra in 1967 or Katanga in 1960. Inthe latter case military intervention by the interna-tional community in the form of the United Nationswas required to reimpose the unity of the country.Current secessionist movements, including those inCabinda and the Southern Sudan, have similarly notelicited international support and generally haveincurred outright condemnation. Furthermore, thedetailed configuration of the colonial boundarieswas maintained with the result that many ethnicgroups remained divided after independence. Thisallowed for the Somali irredentist movements to bedefeated in the neighbouring states with Somalipopulations.

If fragmentation was resisted, there was littleattempt to create wider unions or federations. Thosethat were created were generally formed at the timeof independence. A few crossed the former imperialboundary lines and so had to overcome the separatelinguistic and legal legacies of the colonial era. Thusthe British and Italian sectors of Somaliland wereunited at the behest of the pan-Somali movement,which had gained control of both pre-independencegovernments prior to July 1960. The union’s subse-quent effective dissolution has not been so readilyrecognised by the international community, despitethe cooperative administration of the (ex-British)Republic of Somaliland. In similar vein the southernsection of the British Cameroons united with theex-French Cameroun in a federal structure, laterconverted to a union. In contrast the northern sectorof the British Cameroons voted for incorporation intoNigeria, with which it had administratively beenmerged since the First World War. Similarly, after alimited consultation process, Eritrea was federatedwith Ethiopia in 1952, but annexed ten years later,with disastrous results.

The unresolved status of the Moroccan occupationof the former Spanish Sahara in 1975 has remainedone of the most controversial and divisive issues onthe continent (Slowe 1990). The attempt to unite thepreviously separate colonial entities was resisted bymany of the inhabitants of the Western Sahara andthe status of the territory remains to be determinedby an internationally supervised referendum, whichis still pending. It might be added that the majorityof the members of the Organisation of African Unityrejected Morocco’s claim to the Western Sahara asbeing contrary to the spirit of the Charter and recog-

nised the government in exile which controls onlysmall portions of the national territory.

After achieving independence few governmentswere willing to give up their newly won power orterritory. Zanzibar united with Tanganyika to formthe United Republic of Tanzania, after the violentoverthrow of the sultanate on the islands. However,separate administrations have been maintained in thetwo sections of the country. Indeed in 1995 theZanzibari secessionist movement was only narrowlydefeated at the polls. The Federation of Senegambia,between Senegal and Gambia, lasted seven years(1982–1989), but proved to be unsustainable as theleaders of the smaller state were unwilling to sur-render sovereignty and power. The numerous pan-Arab unions, mostly devised by Libya, and earlypan-African unions, mostly devised by Ghana, didnot achieve any permanency. Even the existence ofa joint ruling political party in the Cape Verde Islandsand Guinea-Bissau was inadequate to forge a polit-ical union between the two states once independencehad been achieved.

The issues of continued White rule in the South,apartheid and racially defined separatism in SouthAfrica tended to dominate the continental politicalagenda from the 1960s to the 1990s. The end ofWhite rule in South Africa can not be regarded asdecolonisation as the country had been grantedformal independence under the Statute ofWestminster in 1931. It was portrayed instead as amatter of self-determination for the African majoritywithin a unitary state. In order to prevent thisoccurrence, the South African government devised aprogramme of state partition, based on ethnic parti-tion (Christopher 1994). Four ‘independent’ statesemerged: Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda andCiskei. None received international diplomatic recog-nition as fragmentation on ethnic lines was counterto the principles of the Organisation of African Unity.Government plans failed as a result of the resistanceof the African population to the programme ofpolitical exclusion and international sanctions.Consequently the independence boundary wasreestablished in 1994 and the experiment in imposedethnic partition abandoned and the four ephemeralstates reincorporated. The emergence of a democraticSouth Africa may have unleashed the possibilities forterritorial expansion as originally envisaged by suc-cessive White-controlled governments until the 1960s(Hyam 1972). These were thwarted by internationalresistance to any extension of South African racialsegregationism and apartheid. At the present time theprospects for the survival of the enclave state ofLesotho appear particularly problematical as theoriginal reasons for its continuing separate existencehave been overcome (Lemon 1996).

‘Nation-states’, ‘quasi-states’, and ‘collapsed-states’ in contemporary Africa 93

Stability and instability

The long period of relative stability of politicalboundaries may now be ended. The close of the ColdWar has dismantled the international balance ofpower exposed Africa to many of the tensions whichexist elsewhere, not least the mobilisation of ethnicpower. The end of colonialism and the end of Whiterule in the southern sector of the continent in the1990s has focused attention upon the cohesion ofmany multi-ethnic African states and the aspirationsheld by minority groups (Mikesell and Murphy1991). At one extreme secessionism is still rife, withattempts to create separate states. However, theleaders of most minority groups still seek somepolitical accommodation within the existing statesystem, through local autonomy or power sharingarrangements.

The successful war of secession of Eritrea fromEthiopia raises the question of the continued stabilityof other states (Gurdon 1994). The independence ofEritrea represented the reestablishment of a colonialboundary and the grant of independence denied to theformer Italian colony in 1952 and so was not takenas a challenge to the entire state structure of thecontinent. Somaliland, Western Sahara and Zanzibarappear as other areas where the resurrection ofcolonial and pre-colonial structures stress the existingorder but could be interpreted within the Organisationof African Unity’s guidelines. Elections or referendahave been proposed as solutions to all theseproblems, but the issues of voter eligibility, intimi-dation and fraud have raised questions over thevalidity of the results or projected results.

Question marks hover over the long-term viabilityof states such as South Africa, Nigeria and Zaire,where ethnic tensions are always capable of beingexacerbated by political leaders as a result of deteri-orating economic conditions among certain sectionsof the population. Some recognition of the force ofethnicity and the relevance of pre-colonial historywill be essential to avoid the twentieth centurysecessionist problems which continue to besetEurope. Indeed, it has been suggested that thesecurity afforded by a constitutional right to secedemay be sufficient to hold states together (Buchanan1991). Protracted secessionist movements havecharacterised many African states in the post-inde-pendence era and their full development may only bepossible once the binding elements of anti-colo-nialism have faded (Mayall and Simpson 1992).

A recent phenomenon in Africa has been theemergence of the ‘collapsed state’, where the centraladministration and often most of the local adminis-trations have disintegrated and no effective ‘national’government is functioning (Zartman 1995). Fewstates collapsed at independence, despite their weakpolitical structures. The former Belgian Congo(Zaire) was a rare exception and was revived as a

result of international cooperation and internalcoercion. The recent disintegration of some govern-ments and civil societies have usually followed theremoval of the constraints of the ‘strong’ centraliseddictatorships which were prevalent on the continent.The networks of power, influence and patronagewhich provided the means of maintaining a unifiedsociety broke down, disintegrating into smaller andmore localised networks (Bayart 1993).

In some countries all semblance of a unified gov-ernment has disappeared, as in Somalia, with therival clan leaders vying for power, even within theconfines of the capital, Mogadishu. In others a recog-nised central government is in effective control ofonly limited parts of the country, as in Angola, SierraLeone and Liberia. In the latter case what constitutesthe central government is dependent upon the inter-pretation of the regional peace keeping force, whichis attempting to mediate between the warringfactions. Occasionally the national leader providedthe only focus of patronage and influence in othercountries such as Zaire, leaving a highly fragmentedand often ineffective administration dependent uponthe skills of the ruling clique to maintain the facadeof national unity. One of the features of suchsituations has been the re-emergence of pre-colonialpatterns of societies which were riven by theimposition of international boundaries, but now areunited in their remoteness from governmental control(Raison 1993; Richards 1996). In this respect inter-national boundaries as depicted on the map do notreflect the reality on the ground. Whether such col-lapsed states constitute a stage in the process towardsa significant redefinition of state boundaries, or onlya temporary phase in a ‘national’ history is as yetunclear. The experience of Uganda after sufferingmilitary dictatorship, the collapse of civil society,foreign invasion and civil war appears to suggest thatresurrection is possible. This was made possiblethrough the political accommodation of regionalethnic interests within the revived governmentalstructures (Mamdani 1996).

Seemingly intractable ethnic conflicts, such asthose in Rwanda and Burundi, continue to underminethe stability of neighbouring countries as the statesystem remains remarkably interdependent. InRwanda and Burundi the conflict between the Tutsiand Hutu ethnic groups, which share the same geo-graphical state space, yet are capable of inflictingsevere atrocities, including attempted genocide, uponone another suggests that the ethnic conflictsassociated with Europe have an continuing Africandimension. However, whereas the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been labelled as a ‘national’struggle, yet that in Rwanda has been condemned as‘tribal’ (Mayers, Klak and Koehl 1996). Thissuggests a dual standard is applied to secessionismand nation building in Europe and Africa. Indeedendemic civil war still afflicts several states so that

94 A. J. Christopher

the map of Africa does not reflect the situation inreality. The Angolan civil war has been protracted bythe deep ethnic rivalries between the Mbundu andOvimbundu groups. Although the leaders of bothseek control of the entire state, the question may beraised as to whether partition or a high degree ofautonomy would result in a more peaceful and pros-perous future for both rather than the continuedenforced unification (Gurr and Harff 1994).

The application of the concept of national self-determination to Africa will have to be re-examinedas the pre-colonial ethnic groupings begin to reassertthemselves with continued moves towards greaterdemocratisation (Decalo 1992; Wiseman 1992).Multi-party elections in some cases have beendescribed as little more than the conduct of ‘ethniccensuses’, indicating the continuing fragility of civilsociety (Horowitz 1985). The prospects for renewedethnic mobilisation are therefore present within moststates experimenting with multi-party democracy.Self-determination in Africa may therefore result inthe need to explore parallels with developments ineastern Europe where a large number of formerminority ethnic groups have either gained nationalindependence or increased autonomy in the 1990sin the wake of the process of liberalisation anddemocratisation.

In a highly significant development, the new(1993) Ethiopian constitution offers a legal mecha-nism for the secession of the ethnically definedprovinces (Abbink 1995). Such an eventuality isdesigned to be exercised as a last resort only if polit-ical compromise is impossible. The original conceptfollows the principles laid down in the former SovietUnion constitution designed to overcome thenegative aspects of nationalism in the construction ofa new society. The Ethiopian precedent may be theforerunner of other constitutional measures seekingto accommodate the problems associated with theimposition of the European derived concept of thenation-state upon the African continent. The basicphilosophy behind the move is to defuse conflict andemphasise the advantages of voluntary nationalassociation as opposed to the enforced incorporationand suppression of ethnic identity under the previous,highly centralised, imperial and republican regimes.Indeed, the drawing of new regional boundaries forlocal government, which has often accompanieddemocratisation, has also opened up the possibilityof creating sub-national governments capable ofdemanding higher degrees of self-determination evenindependence. As at the end of the colonial era, whenthe presence of functioning administrations offeredan organisational basis for the post-colonial state, sothe establishment of functioning provinces with ameasure of autonomy may offer the basis for futureself-determination. This was clearly the case in thesecession of Biafra (the former Eastern Province ofNigeria). The repetition of such an eventuality was

subsequently countered by the periodic redrawing ofthe Nigerian provincial boundaries has been tominimise the possibilities of provinces acting as focifor ethnic secessionism by fragmenting the largerethnic communities (Williams 1994). In contrast, thenew Ethiopian provinces are designed to encouragecontinued association and the survival of the state.This promises to offer the possibility of the recogni-tion of multiple identities within the one ‘nation’.

In South Africa the new provincial dispensationappears to have followed some aspects of theEthiopian pattern, with secessionist possibilities inthe most populous province inhabited by the Zulunation and another with a non-African majority(Christopher 1995). However, this approach has beenadvanced as a means of returning to the recognitionthat within a ‘nation’, people often have multipleidentities, which need not be the source of conflict.The South African Deputy Minister of Arts, Culture,Science and Technology, Brigitte Mabandla (1996:25) has suggested that:

‘Building this national consciousness and recog-nising ethnic identities are not mutually exclusiveactivities. Having a Zulu, Afrikaner, Jewish orMalay identity need not undermine our sense ofbeing South African. The role we have set our-selves is to develop a complex, inclusive and non-prescriptive notion of what constitutes the nationalculture’.

However, the proposed new constitution for theprovince of KwaZulu-Natal, which provides thatresidents be required to ‘defend the territory ofthe province’, has been condemned by the Constitu-tional Court as ‘plainly intended to legitimise seces-sion’ (Rickard, 1996: 4).

Economic integration in Africa is proceedingslowly. Continental or regional political unityremains an ideal rather than a reality (Esedebe 1994).The Economic Community of West African Statesand the Southern African Development Communityare the two most significant and developed entities(Gibb 1995). The former has already assumed amilitary capability through the intervention inLiberia, while the latter is proving to be increasinglya forum for South African advancement. In thisrespect parallels with the developments in westernEurope are instructive. There are significant impli-cations for the erosion of the nation-state as previ-ously laboriously constructed, both from ‘above’ butalso from ‘below’ (Kolinsky 1984). Small national-ities, previously subsumed in larger entities, may beoffered an environment where the economic costs ofseparation are greatly reduced and the whole issue ofidentity can be reassessed within the security of amulti-state union (Smith 1995).

‘Nation-states’, ‘quasi-states’, and ‘collapsed-states’ in contemporary Africa 95

Comment

In examining the development of states, nations andnationalities in Africa, issues revolving around thediffering international moralities applied to politicalconflict and state formation also need to beaddressed. The basic concept of the quasi-statesuggests the intervention of the international com-munity in the processes involved in the establishmentand the continued maintenance of the African statesystem. The imposition of one-party and militarydictatorships, which this frequently involved, wastolerated as part of the process of nation-building.Furthermore, the imposition of the European basedconcept of the nation-state upon the continent atindependence required a long period of consolida-tion, which was achieved through the continuedinternational understanding not to disturb the terri-torial integrity of the new states.

The period of relative quiescence on the Africanstate map is at an end, as the effects of the events of1991 and 1992 in Europe and the collapse of theinternational order which brought the present Africanstate system into being have their impact. A greatmany issues remain unresolved, which have a directimpact upon the future of the continent. The col-lapsed state is one result where the internal andinternational support systems become inadequate tosupport the state structure. The most problematic isthe development of the multi-ethnic ‘quasi-state’undergoing the process of democratisation. Self-determination may result in significant changes in thepolitical map of Africa as sub-national regionalgovernments are elected and act as rivals to thecentralised powers of the internationally recognisedstates. The democratic alternatives may be secessionor the recognition of the more complex intra-staterelationships and multiple personal identities, whichcharacterised the multi-national empires of a centuryago. Both courses present major problems for thepeoples involved as few governments are willing tosurrender power or allow their territories to be par-titioned. However, as in Europe, where the emer-gence of strong supra-national organisations hasenabled sub-national groupings to stake their claimto national recognition, regional economic integra-tion will allow suppressed minorities to raisedemands for greater political participation. The fullimpact of the application of the concept of self-determination in Africa is still to come.

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