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1 Good ID: What’s tech got to do with it? Nairobi Workshop Summary Report The #GoodID initiative is a series of workshops and online engagement for constructive debate and development of new, future-facing ID norms, intended to strengthen standards and tools to build better identification systems that work for everyone. The Good ID workshops, a series of three, are a constructive exercise to advance the digital identity conversation, and part of the #GoodID movement. This is a summary report of the second workshop that does not contain any attributable quotes, because the workshops are held under Chatham House Rule. This workshop was held in Nairobi on April 25, 2019 and follows the flow of the day, with the exception of the commitments participants made at the end of the day (see Annex 3 for the workshop agenda) which are brought up earlier in the report. The workshop focused on technology for Good ID and explored the role of technology characteristics in advancing digital ID systems that uphold transparency, accountability, individual privacy, inclusion, data protection, and user control. The first workshop in the series, held at the Shorenstein Center, Harvard University in February 2019, explored the role of policy for Good ID (workshop report is here). The third workshop, to be held in Bangkok in July 2019, will focus on practices for Good ID exploring the behaviors that support privacy, inclusion, user value, user control, and security. These workshops aim to refresh the conversation around ID in the digital age through a focus on the characteristics that

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Page 1: Nairobi Workshop Summary Report · addressing these issues were (1) learnings from India’s national ID scheme Aadhaar, and (2) ID technologies that strengthen individual control

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Good ID: What’s tech got to do with it?

Nairobi Workshop Summary Report

The #GoodID initiative is a series of workshops and online engagement for constructive debate

and development of new, future-facing ID norms, intended to strengthen standards and tools to

build better identification systems that work for everyone. The Good ID workshops, a series of

three, are a constructive exercise to advance the digital identity conversation, and part of the

#GoodID movement.

This is a summary report of the second workshop that does not contain any attributable quotes,

because the workshops are held under Chatham House Rule. This workshop was held in

Nairobi on April 25, 2019 and follows the flow of the day, with the exception of the commitments

participants made at the end of the day (see Annex 3 for the workshop agenda) which are

brought up earlier in the report. The workshop focused on technology for Good ID and explored

the role of technology characteristics in advancing digital ID systems that uphold transparency,

accountability, individual privacy, inclusion, data protection, and user control.

The first workshop in the series, held at the Shorenstein Center, Harvard University in February

2019, explored the role of policy for Good ID (workshop report is here). The third workshop, to

be held in Bangkok in July 2019, will focus on practices for Good ID — exploring the behaviors

that support privacy, inclusion, user value, user control, and security. These workshops aim to

refresh the conversation around ID in the digital age through a focus on the characteristics that

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make or allow for “good digital IDs,” rather than attempting to establish one foolproof solution or

series of solutions, or even defining what makes a “bad ID.” #GoodID is a conversation to

advance trust-building practices like transparency and accountability, as well as design features

like privacy, inclusion, user value and control, and security. The workshops are part of the Good

ID dialogues, an Omidyar Network initiative for constructive debate and development of new

future-facing ID norms, and co-organized by Caribou Digital and facilitated by Robin Pharaoh.

What is Good ID?

This program of workshops and online conversations helps advance digital identity standards

that empower and safeguard people. To start the discussion in Nairobi, Omidyar Network

introduced its evolving normative framework of Good ID, distinguished by five policy and

technology design features: (1) inclusive, (2) offers user-value, and embedded with (3) privacy,

(4) security, and (5) user control and support by trust-building practices including transparency

and accountability.

In reaction to this prompt—and in the spirit of Hemingway’s six-word novel—, participants wrote

their own definitions of what Good ID would look like in Kenya in 10 words or less. Examples

include:

“Offers me value and keeps me safe.”

“Trusted, secure, and inclusive identity for physical and digital world.”

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“One governed by a civil society approved law(s) and accountable.”

“I exist. I am recognized. I am included.”

On the whole, workshop participants indicated that Good ID should ensure user value and

agency, safeguard user privacy, support portability, be consultative and accountable, and reflect

the complexity of human identity. A full list of participants’ 10-word definitions the sentences

produced can be found in Annex 1.

Taking action for #GoodID

Digital ID was a salient topic in Kenya at the time of the workshop; on April 2, the government

introduced the National Integrated Identity Management System (NIIMS), popularly referred to

as Huduma Namba, meaning “government service number”. Discussions throughout the day

weres both passionate and substantive, reflecting personal experience, insight, and knowledge.

At the end of the workshop, participants translated these discussions into personal, concrete

commitments to advance #GoodID. Building on the day’s conversations, participants reflected

on their own roles to identify the actions they could take to accelerate the Good ID movement

across Kenya.

In the words of one participant: “..building a movement. That’s what this is.” And of another:

“Success would be to start the conversation, not to end it here.”

Others committed to increasing awareness of good ID and the #GoodID movement through

their networks and to influence specific institutions and policymakers. There was also a strong

commitment to “localize” concepts and ideas, such as the commitment “to help develop a local

understanding of ‘digital ID’.”

The various commitments were made in the form of public pledges to the group. A full list of the

pledges can be found in Annex 2.

Mapping digital ID systems in Kenya and

exploring the technology advantages and trade-

offs

The workshop continued by considering the digital identity systems and related technologies

present in Kenya, exploring benefits and trade-offs. To frame the discussion as encompassing

diverse categories of identity systems,1 three speakers presented examples of self-asserted

(Smile Identity), de facto (mobile phone numbers—GSMA), and issued identities (national

identity—Huduma Namba).

1 See here for Omidyar Networks perspective on digital identity and three types of identity systems.

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Conversation starter: self-asserted ID

In contrast to the means of identity provided by external parties, in the digital era we also create

our own identities or personas, choosing how to portray ourselves and the claims we make, in

the digital world. Self-asserted identity is a broad and somewhat fluid category that includes

self-sovereign, self-managed, and self-attested identities—all of which are used to describe an

ID that people themselves assert or create. Examples of the self-asserted digital identities

discussed include social media platforms like Twitter, digital avatars, identity management

platforms such as Smile Identity, and digital wallets enabling services such as blockchain-based

identity services for refugees. There was also discussion about identification through platforms,

such as SWVL (an Egyptian app similar to Uber, used for ride sharing in Kenya). The benefits of

self-asserted identity management through a service, such as Smile Identity, were ease of use

and authentication without credentials. Trade-offs were that the system doesn’t always work, it

makes individuals always identifiable, and individuals’ ability to revoke the credential is limited.

The discussion of these three identities—issued, de facto, and self-asserted—prompted

recognition of the diversity of identification systems and the implications of each. At a structural

level, participants raised concerns about the ability of smaller, emerging economies to negotiate

and bargain with large, multinational firms like Facebook, and others. At an individual level,

there was a sense from participants that “once you give your phone number [to do a

transaction], it’s like the wild west” with no protections or privacy. In both cases, participants

raised concerns about systems’ and users’ increasing reliance on de facto IDs.

Conversation starter: de facto ID

De facto identities or attributes are also created for us when we engage in the digital economy,

and these can be used to identify us, either through our own self-assertions or through the

assessments of third-party algorithms (see Footnote 1). Examples of de facto identification that

participants referenced included mobile phone records, mobile betting accounts such as

SportPesa, mobile money services such as M-Pesa, identification through biometric data points

such as UnifyID and DiscoveryHealth, and credit score providers such as Branch, Tala, and

Pezesha. Participants detailed several benefits, including the value of finance and credit access

enabled through analysis of mobile usage behavior. Trade-offs included privacy invasion

through targeted advertising and surveillance and the rise of associated bad outcomes such as

increased gambling and/or debt. Further, as one participant put it: “they don’t always work, and

when there are errors, you can always be identified but you can’t opt-out.”

Conversation starter: Issued ID

There are both public sector and private sector identity providers. However, participants focused

on examples of state issued identity, including the national ID, passport, alien card, refugee

card, birth certificate, death certificate, National Social Security Fund (NSSF) card, National

Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) card, employer ID, marriage certificate, Kenya Revenue

Authority (KRA) pin, drivers licence, National Education Management Information System

(NEMIS), and voter ID card.

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Kenya’s national ID was described by one participant in generational terms—first as a system of

control by colonial powers, then as a travel document in a post-colonial state, and finally as a

digital national identity system linked to the widespread adoption of M-Pesa and the broader

digital era. The discussant suggested that national digital IDs are necessary to increase

financial inclusion and because “we can’t miss the 4th industrial revolution.”

The benefits that participants identified were ease of access (national ID and driver's licenses),

trust in the system (for drivers licenses), and universal coverage and access. Reflecting current

debates about Kenya’s Huduma Namba, participants responded that the new system had been

“snuck in,” with some saying that “the government is not trustworthy” and that it “has more value

for government than for people.” The trade-offs were seen largely as “the possibility of data

mining, risk of surveillance, misuse of data, [and] high possibility of hacking.” Participants also

highlighted the lack of transparency over how data was used, particularly the fear of data

misuse by senior officials and frontline bureaucrats.

Building Good ID technologies

In the afternoon—building on the mapping of identity systems, technologies and their benefits

and trade-offs—participants focused on specific technologies, described Good ID scenarios,

and identified concrete steps required to improve the digital identification ecosystem in Kenya.

Participants divided into small groups to work through four categories of identity technology

spanning the three types of identity systems that had emerged from the morning’s discussion.

They identified the current state of each technology as well as steps that could be taken to

realize a Good ID scenario and mitigate a negative scenario. The four categories of technology

were: (1) centralized database technologies, using Kenyan government issued ID as case

studies, (2) mobile-based technologies, (3) decentralized ledger technologies, (4) and biometric

technologies.

Reviewing and improving centralized database technologies

Participants described how the centralized database technologies used in Kenya could be

improved through the use of decentralized cloud technologies, greater standardization of

technologies and systems, and increased public awareness of and transparency in how such

systems are used.

The main institutions using centralized ID technologies in Kenya today, according to this

group of participants, include the Integrated Population Registration Services (IPRS), the

Integrated Election and Boundary Commission (IEBC), the National Education Management

Information System (NEMIS), mobile operators, the financial services sector, credit reference

bureaus (CRBs), and individual citizens in accessing these systems. Participants described the

current state of databases in Kenya as being decentralized and isolated, and pointed out that

there was “a lack of education, too much corruption, and bad regulation.” These databases were

also viewed as being often discriminatory, error prone, and hard to fix.

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The main elements missing, thus preventing Good ID in Kenya, included data protection

rights and laws, public education and public participation in decisions, standardization of all

registration laws, and confidence in lawmakers. Two innovations identified as being helpful in

addressing these issues were (1) learnings from India’s national ID scheme Aadhaar, and (2) ID

technologies that strengthen individual control over data, such as digital credential wallets like

DigiLocker. Beyond these, there was a general sense of a need for “more political will to secure

data, [and] social norms/education.”

Good issued identity systems in Kenya, according to participants, would be characterized by

new laws supporting these systems in upholding privacy, inclusion, transparency, security, and

user control. Digital identity infrastructure would receive greater investment and there would be

stronger political will for data protection. There would be a wider public understanding of what

good digital identity systems look like, and demand for this to be upheld. An alternative

scenario, in which principles of Good ID are not upheld, would lead to greater centralization,

either absent or not upheld data protections, increased marginalization, and the use of digital ID

systems as security regimes.

Reviewing and improving mobile technologies

The mobile technologies in use in Kenya today, according to the participants in this small group,

included mobile money services, geo-location services, and messaging services. Central to the

use of mobile technologies in identification systems were multi-factor verification and the use of

mobile numbers as an identifier. Participants identified mobile financial services as the primary

users of these technologies.

The current status of mobile technologies in Kenya was described by participants as

providing a default digital identity, with some, though not all, phone numbers already linked to

national identities. Participants expressed concern about who was accessing their data,

including the national government—with one saying “I am concerned that intelligence and

government is listening, but government just says it’s regulated and ‘we do it only for security

purposes’.”

Challenges to mobile technologies enabling Good ID in Kenya, according to participants,

included a lack of clarity about where identity actually lies (on the SIM or on the phone?) with

resulting policy and governance confusion. Participants also discussed connectivity and access

barriers, as well as the need for stronger regulations: “clear rules that everyone is aware of and

what it means for them.” There was also discussion around accountability for institutions

through greater transparency and protection for individuals through greater use of encryption

technologies. This was seen to be especially so in a context in which, according to some

participants, many popular apps seem to be no more than surveillance tools, logging users

movements for app publishers benefits. A concrete (and illustrative) proposal was for a

transparency application, that would inform you every time your data was accessed, and by

whom.

The group discussed how mobile technologies could enable Good ID in the form of a

government-backed digital identity that enabled individuals to deny or allow access to their data

on a need-to-know basis. This scenario also included limits on the amount of data collected in

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order to avoid a “Big Brother” surveillance state—and a private sector that proactively positioned

itself around privacy protection, with one participant saying “look at Apple, that proactively

positions [itself] on privacy.”

Reviewing and improving decentralized ledger technologies

Decentralized ledger technologies (DLTs) use independent computers to record, share, and

synchronize transactions in their respective electronic ledgers (instead of keeping data

centralized as in a traditional ledger).2 As identified by participants, the DLT’s present in Kenya

included consensus algorithms, verifiable claims, digital identifiers (DIDs), and digital signatures

(encryption). The main issues participants pointed to with these technologies is that, because

they are so new, most people do not know the technologies’ benefits and challenges. There was

also general recognition that discussions about decentralized technologies focused more on the

complex, underlying technologies than on the need to provide simple, comprehensible models

to potential users and stakeholders.

The use of decentralized technologies in Kenya was recognized by participants as “being in

its infancy.” Two examples of decentralized technologies in Kenya discussed were UTU

Technologies and BitPesa. UTU Technologies provide a trust platform to increase confidence in

service providers, from home help to e-commerce platforms. BitPesa is a digital foreign

exchange and payment platform that uses blockchain technologies. Participants suggested that

the critical, but currently missing, elements necessary to increase the adoption of decentralized

technologies in Kenya were (1) appeal and arbitration processes, (2) a compelling articulation of

economic incentives for decentralized data, and (3) credentials.

The current status of decentralized technologies in Kenya, according to participants in this

small group, was described as one in which siloed, proprietary systems are only applied as a

single part of digital pilots. A Good ID scenario was described as one in which an open-

standards-based architecture enables wider interoperability between systems. To achieve this,

actors need to focus on building “a functioning ecosystem, not just a firm.” More specifically,

there is a need to focus on education around the potential for decentralized technologies,

articulation of the economic incentives, engagement with the wider stakeholder community, and

state support, which together would lead to a wider functioning ecosystem at scale. Without

these steps, there was a sense that “a donor-funded pilot would be followed by a donor-funded

pilot followed by a venture capital-funded pilot,” would inevitably lead to proprietary systems that

will never reach scale.

Reviewing and improving biometric technologies

Participants identified fingerprint, face, iris, voice, DNA, and gait-based biometrics as the main

biometric technologies in Kenya. The central problems with these technologies, according to

this group, were that they were not reliable, they cannot be revoked, requiring network access

could limit utility, and device limitations could lead (inadvertantly) to discrimination.

2 See the World Bank for definition here

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The participants’ suggestions for improvement included modular products with incremental

improvements (since the cheapest “off-the-shelf” solutions were often designed for the majority

at the expense of minority needs); systems that draw on multiple alternative identifiers to

increase reliability; partnership with mobile network operators to increase the quality of access,

as well as building systems that work offline and do not rely on smartphones; tokenization of

identity to limit data distribution; and, finally, careful selection of vendors to ensure that systems

are built on technologies that enable Good ID–while avoiding vendors, systems, and

technologies that enabled unauthorized data sharing and access.

The main use of biometric technologies in Kenya, according to the participants in this group,

was access control—for example in workplaces, gyms, immigration, smartphone authentication,

accessing credit services, and, more recently, the use of voice to authenticate with Safaricom.

Key steps to mitigate harmful uses of these technologies included: limiting biometric data

collection, limiting to specific use cases, and tailoring international standards to the Kenyan

context. The participants also recommended strengthening data localization to limit

unauthorized data access and the development of low-tech alternatives to biometrics, enabling

the provision of the same services through means that protect privacy.

The current status of biometric use in Kenya was described as being primarily in national

security and for economic growth, but this was accompanied by a lack of knowledge among the

public of their options and routes to protect their identity and their rights. A Good ID scenario

was described as being one in which there are greater opportunities for self-asserted identity

with biometrics, increased use of multi-factor authentication, efforts towards data minimization

and auditing of both data use and algorithms. Critical steps to achieve this include strengthening

data protection laws and designing tech that provides new solutions while meeting individual

needs and demands. Without these efforts, a dystopian scenario could arise in which there is

increased surveillance, identity theft, the accumulation of geopolitical power by non-Africans,

and exploitation from data mining. At present the current technological trajectory is at risk of (1)

excluding solutions from, and market share for, Africans and (2) amplifying existing cultural and

social tensions, according to participants.

Miscellaneous themes and related discussions

Certain themes emerged during discussions throughout the workshop in relation to the specific

roles of different stakeholders in the development of digital ID (national and other forms) in

Kenya.

Trust in, and transparency of, data-driven companies in Kenya. On the positive side, data

driven companies, especially those using local technology, are seen as vibrant and

entrepreneurial, and local technology companies, in particular, are viewed as a source of pride.

This entrepreneurial sector was also regarded as a panacea to government inaction and

intractability, as well as a necessary part of the conversation around changing norms in Kenya

going forward. GDPR compliance was also seen to be driving some level of accountability, and

prompting a pause for thought at the leadership level of data-driven companies. On the negative

side, participants cited concerns about the possible exploitation of weak data-protection laws

and potential for the leveraging of personal data without consent (e.g., Swivl, Tala, etc.). The

participants also expressed concerns about data management, specifically the storing of

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personal data without due care and the export of data value outside of Kenya (i.e., loss of

economic value and sovereignty).

Trust in, and transparency of, government in Kenya. Government was often described as

either not providing adequate or appropriate channels for civil society institutions and residents

to engage in the development of the Kenyan national ID. The Kenyan government was also

described as having immovable vested interests when it comes to ID and data regulation/law.

Asas one participant stated, “the Haduma Namba may now be ‘too big to fail’.” These interests

were generally believed to reflect the interests of the majority, perhaps blind to the potential for

problems caused by ignoring the plight of the minority. There was also a widespread sense of

the government as corruptible, with particular suspicion around the maintenance of poor data

protection laws. There was also a general sense of lax attitudes toward the sharing of

government data, which is allowing data-aggregation and wealth generation by private sector

interests.

Despite these concerns, government was seen as critical to the success of Good ID and as a

necessary player in the conversation around good data more generally. Indeed, government

was seen as leading on ID (in the sense that it is clearly committed to the development of a

national digital ID), putting it perhaps in the same bracket as India and Estonia in terms of

shaping the international debate around digital ID. And yet it is not seen as being a leader when

it comes to thinking about the longer-term implications of data and identity technologies.

The level of influence that civil society can have in Kenya. There was a sense that the

space for civil society to be heard in national conversations was declining. Although the third

sector is eager to contribute to the national conversation around data, and ID, as a mediator

between the population and government, participants felt third sector actors often lack sufficient

knowledge and/or tools to effectively represent the populace on this issue.

Level of participation in the conversation by ordinary residents. There was a sense among

some participants that the general public are ambivalent about the exploitation of personal data

and lack awareness of the issues that surround digital identity. The point was also made that the

history of identity in Kenya suggests that it is not acceptable for the population to be unaware of

what is happening because the consequences could be profound. Consequently, greater digital

ID and data literacy is essential. Indeed, there were many rumors and questions about digital ID

in Kenya that people indicated were influencing adoption and perceptions about these systems

and technologies. These questions included: Why do they need to be digital? Does this

credential replace all of the cards I have in my wallet? Who is funding this project? The court

said digital ID can't be mandatory yet, but I am being told it's a requirement for several

services—which is true? Is this a de facto census?

Future scenarios: There was some disagreement over whether the government (and national

ID) is a necessary issuer or can/will be bypassed by rapid data agglomeration in the private

sector. The convenience argument for universal or interoperable ID was represented as

particularly strong in Kenya due to the tangible inconvenience of the current state of

identification in the country. Future scenarios mentioned during the day included:

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● De facto identities consolidated around, say, mobile phone numbers, might solve the

perceived ID problem in Kenya (more swiftly than a universal Haduma number),

especially given the extant M-Pesa spine.

● The Haduma number could catalyze the emergence of a ubiquitous mobile-driven

identity by consolidating government datasets and making them available to, say,

Safaricom.

● The regulatory stance towards data could change in such a way that it radically alters

the ability of the mobile network operators to collect and use strong identity data. The

national ID would then emerges as the strongest form of identity.

The Way Forward: Good ID in Kenya

At the end of the day, participants shared what might have been missing from our discussion

and whether other issues, discussions, or stakeholders should be included going forward.

Participants identified the following:

Defining Good: Participants emphasized the need for further clarity and understanding around

what “good” looks like in practice, around complex technologies, and what each might mean to

the “underserved.” Key to this was an urgent need to create a clear value proposition for Good

ID in Kenya and a larger pool of ethically-focused Kenyan ID providers.

A holistic” approach: There was a sense that the Good ID conversation would benefit

conversations outside of its immediate application to the Huduma Namba as well as a need to

balance discussions of technology with discussions of sociology, politics, and power: “The issue

of ID needs a hybrid approach.” There was also recognition of the need to consider complex

emerging technologies—for example new/unique identities arising from artificial intelligence (AI):

“Ethical AI and ethical machine decision making, then, is perhaps another layer on top of Good

ID?”

An inclusive approach: participants emphasized the need to include a wider diversity of

stakeholders, particularly the youth and grassroots organizations, in collaborative forums that

also include bankers, government, civil society, researchers, and technologists. Additionally,

there were questions about how to take these conversations both to the people making

decisions for Kenyans (i.e., government) and to residents themselves. One participant asked, in

relation to the future development of identification technologies, “Are we sitting ducks?”,

reflecting a widespread sense of the need for individuals to exercise greater control over the

technologies on which digital futures will be built. This question, highlighting the importance of

individuals obtaining both value and protection from systems commonly designed by the state

and large businesses, animated the full spectrum of commitments that participants made to

activate and grow the Good ID movement in Kenya:

Other commitments made by participants:

- Continuous ongoing research into the “appropriate use” of ID

- Looking for ways to ask hard questions and promote similar discussions with new and

different stakeholders

- Use my platforms and those at my disposal to stimulate conversations around Good ID

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- Secure the participation of my organization in the development and implementation of

Good ID strategy for Kenya

- To educate myself and others on the technologies discussed today and their

implications/effects, impacts, and improvements

- To help educate the public about digital identity through social media and word of mouth

- Learn from people who are setting the ID destination and share that learning with others

- Share ideas and perspectives from this group with the African Union, UNECA, World

Bank, Smart Africa, and others to inform the continent’s digital ID/digital economy

strategy, including building in the participants’ perspectives to capacity building training

for ID issuers

- On a personal level, to understand the Huduma number and attend the next session,

and to include the perspectives of young people

- To help develop a local understanding of “digital ID”

- Contribute to the Good ID movement by offering diverse views and influencing policy

and tech that promotes a more inclusive, open, and transparent ID

- To host more data locally or with ethical hosts internationally

- To educate the public as to why this matters and to combat tech solutions to tech

problems

- Participate, plan, and moderate conversations on Good ID locally

- Convene a series of Good ID sessions with policymakers, regulators, and solutions-

providers

- To build, proof, and preach Good ID technologies

- Help to articulate what interoperability looks like

- To engage decision-makers in industry and government to learn more about Good ID

and to educate the public through media

- To become an informed, eloquent advocate for Good ID

- Write (about Good ID)

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Annex 1: Defining the Good Kenyan ID System

- “It should be inclusive, private, and well-secured”

- “It really IS my ID”

- “Future-proofed to protect and empower people in the long run”

- “It’s my ID, and it’s secured within a consultative legal mandate”

- “Owned by me, used by everyone, with my permission. Yay!!”

- “Trusted, secure, and inclusive identity for physical and digital world”

- “Without bias, used well, and secured”

- “One governed by a civil society approved law(s) and accountable.”

- “Inclusive, secure, and enhances user privacy”

- “Easily accessible, secure, universal, digital, and eliminates redundancies”

- “A simple, functional and universally-accepted ID”

- “Recognition, agency, benefit, protection for me, everyone, generations to come.”

- “Functional, easy to use and acquire, secure, versatile, and accessible. “

- “The flow of the river impacts everyone”

- “Data is secure and consent-based use of data”

- “Inclusive, secure, accessible, easy to get, and data-protected.”

- “A system designed by Kenyans to meet all Kenyans’ needs and rights”

- “I exist. I am recognized. I am included.”

- “Universally acceptable, and consolidates all important information.“

- “A reliable, accessible, secure, versatile, system”

- “An ID that can be used when and where a person wants”

- “Offers me value and keeps me safe”

- “Weightless, secure, and ability to authenticate”

- “A convenient, inclusive system that provides value in a secure environment”

- “Functional, universal, easy to use and acquire, secure. I give permission.”

- “My life. My information. My rights. My benefit. My choice.’

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Annex 2: Pledges

- Continuous ongoing research into Good ID

- Looking for ways to ask hard questions and promote similar discussions with new and

different stakeholders

- Use my platforms and those at my disposal to stimulate conversations around Good ID

- Secure the participation of my organization in the development and implementation of

Good ID strategy for Kenya

- To educate myself and others on the technologies discussed today and their

implications/effects and impacts and improvements

- To help educate the public about digital identity through social media and word of mouth

- Learn from people who are setting the ID destination and share that learning with others

- Share ideas, perspectives with African Union, UNECA, World Bank, Smart Africa to

inform their Pan-African digital ID / digital economy strategy, including capacity building

for issuers.

- On a personal level, to understand the Huduma Namba and to attend the next session,

and to include the perspectives of young people.

- To help develop a local understanding of “digital ID”

- Contribute to the Good ID movement by offering diverse views and influencing policy

and tech that promotes a more inclusive, open, and transparent ID

- To host more data locally, or with ethical hosts internationally

- To educate the public as to why this matters and to combat tech solutions to tech

problems

- Participate, plan, and moderate conversations on Good ID locally

- Convene a series of Good ID sessions with policymakers, regulators, and solutions-

providers

- To build, proof, and preach Good ID technologies

- Help to articulate what interoperability looks like

- I pledge to support more meetings among this group

- I commit to engage decision-makers in industry and government to learn more about

Good ID and to educate the public through media

- To become an informed, eloquent advocate for Good ID

- Write (about Good ID)

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Annex 3: Agenda

09:00 Arrival and Registration

● Introductions and framing Good ID

Morning Session - 1:

● The role of technology in a digital identity ecosystem

● The status of Digital ID and case studies in Kenya, East Africa, and across the continent

Morning Session - 2:

● The emerging perspectives on the risks and opportunities of digital identity technology

● Tensions and trade-offs in different stakeholders' goals

● The innovations needed to achieve Good ID

12:30 Lunch Afternoon Session - 1:

● Prototyping Good ID technologies and designing for the future Afternoon Session - 2:

● The path forward, together, toward Good ID 15:20 Reflections and close