N OVE MB E R 26, 2014 LYNDA APPLEGATE MICHAEL NORRIS Al

N9-314-080 N O V E M B E R 2 6 , 2 0 1 4

Professors Lynda Applegate and David Bell and Case Researcher Michael Norris (Case Research & Writing Group) prepared this case. It was reviewed and approved before publication by a company designate. Funding for the development of this case was provided by Harvard Business School and not by the company. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. Copyright © 2014 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to www.hbsp.harvard.edu. This publication may not be digitized, photocopied, or otherwise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School.

L Y N D A A P P L E G A T E

D A V I D B E L L

M I C H A E L N O R R I S

Al Islami Foods: Beyond Dubai

Halal is not only a method of slaughtering. Halal encompasses everything that goes into a business. It is a set of embedded values that informs all of our decisions.

— Saleh Abdullah Lootah, Managing Director

In the summer of 2014, Al Islami Foods CEO Marwan Al Garem joined senior executives and board members including two former CEOs, Chairman Saleh Saeed Lootah (OPM 36, ’07), and

Managing Director Saleh Abdullah Lootah (GMP 10, ‘11),a on a tour of the company’s new factory. The facility was under construction near the company’s headquarters in Dubai Investments Park, an industrial zone in southern Dubai, not far from the city’s new airport and the Jebel Ali Sea Port. Upon

its completion in 2015, the new factory would add more than 1,000 tons per month of halalb meat processing capacity. Founded in Dubai in 1981, with a history that could be traced all the way back to 1956, which was old for a company in the region, Al Islami was a major halal food brand in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with 2013 sales of AED 292 million ($80 million) (see Exhibit 1). Only 20% of sales were abroad—in the nearby countries of Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman.

As Al Garem, Saleh Saeed, and Saleh Abdullah donned their hard hats and made the quick walk through the hot desert sun from Al Islami’s headquarters to the under-construction factory nearby, they considered Dubai’s early history and its aggressive growth in the 21st century, and wondered how best to position Al Islami to honor its history and its home city while embracing the global growth opportunities of the future. The company grew with Dubai; Al Islami’s founder had started the first construction company in the Emirate and had also founded Dubai Islamic Bank, the first Islamic bank in the world, in 1975. Over the next 30 years, Dubai became the economic center of the Islamic world—hundreds of banks had large offices in the city, Western media, technology, and other high growth businesses located their Middle Eastern regional headquarters in Dubai, and its port and airport were both among the busiest in the world. After the swift, sharp downturn during the

a Saleh Abdullah Lootah was Saleh Saeed Lootah’s cousin. Throughout the case, they are referred to as Saleh Abdullah and Saleh Saeed.

b In addition to a general code of laws for how to live as a Muslim, the halal rules outlined dietary and meat slaughtering requirements.

314-080 Al Islami Foods: Beyond Dubai

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recession of 2008-2009, Dubai’s economy returned to growth by 2010, growing at a compound annual growth rate of 6.4% from 2010 to 2014. With more than 2 million people, 90% of them expatriates,1

Dubai’s per capita income averaged about $45,000, close to that of France and Germany.2

But with growing Muslim populations around the world, which were expected to top 2.2 billion by 2030,3 many of whom adhered to halal diets, Al Islami’s senior executives saw huge opportunities

for the company to expand globally. It was investing more than AED 100 millionc ($27 million) in this new factory to meet the growing demand for halal products in the Middle Eastern market. “We endeavor to provide halal foods to all of the world’s Muslims and anyone who appreciates the quality, safety, and nutrition that come with real halal. We want to be the Nestlé of halal foods,” Al Garem noted. However, a lack of global halal standards posed a problem to this growth plan. Al Islami’s rigorous halal standards made its products more expensive than other halal meats. Its established brand name in the UAE could attract customers looking for a premium product, but even in neighboring countries like Saudi Arabia, Al Islami had work to do to communicate its premium brand message. The Sheikh of Dubai, as well as the halal certifying agencies in many countries,

supported a plan to create internationally recognized halal standards in 2014,4 but by the middle of the year, official standards had yet to be released. Al Garem, his board, and his executive team refused to compromise on the quality of Al Islami’s products to cut costs, noting, “The biggest asset we have is our brand, and that brand has been built on a reputation for the highest quality halal products.”

A big opportunity for Al Islami to expand the reach of its brand was on Al Garem’s mind as he toured the new factory. Al Islami was in the process of finalizing the details of a joint venture with United Group, a Saudi Arabian food company, to open a halal chicken processing facility near Riyadh, Saudi Arabia’s capital and largest city. As Al Garem explained,

Saudi Arabia is a massive Muslim market. If we can establish our brand in the country, we could reach 28 million new customers. But there are real hurdles to overcome to enter the market. We have had two truckloads of chicken stopped at the Saudi Arabian border in the past while authorities checked to make sure our products were halal compliant. The checks took so long in each case that the product spoiled. We need to have a government-certified halal processing facility in the country if we hope to make any significant sales in Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, other challenges lay ahead at home. The company’s competition in the halal meat business was intensifying in Dubai as major slaughtering operations began offering halal branded products and brand-name competitors were vertically integrating into the slaughterhouse business (see Exhibit 2). Meanwhile, western hypermarkets, like Carrefour, had come to dominate the UAE’s grocery store industry starting in the mid-1990s, which increased the pressure for lower prices.

Halal

Halal, an Islamic term meaning “lawful,” referred to more than just food preparation. As Saleh Abdullah explained,

Halal is a system of values that affects everything in one’s life and one’s business. We cannot mislead or cheat our suppliers. If we did, our products would not be halal. We cannot mistreat our employees—if we did that, our products would not be halal. We

c The dirham (AED), the currency of the UAE, was pegged to the U.S. dollar in 1997; $1.00 was set to equal AED 3.6725.

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must be fair and honest with our customers—or else our products would not be halal. Yes, we ensure that all the meat we sell is slaughtered in a halal manner, but the halal philosophy informs everything our company does.

Concerning dietary laws, halal forbid the consumption of pork, alcohol, blood, carnivorous animals, and any improperly slaughtered meat product. Halal slaughtering had four main rules:

1. The slaughtering had to be done by a Muslim in the name of Allah.

2. The animal could not face undue stress before being slaughtered (i.e., it could not be stunned before slaughtering).

3. A sharp knife had to be used to cut the animal’s throat.

4. The blood had to be drained out of the animal after its throat was cut.

Dozens of halal certifying agencies existed around the world in 2014, with differing interpretations of these rules. One agency might allow mechanized slaughtering if it was overseen by a Muslim, while another would insist that slaughtering had to be done by hand. One agency might allow an animal to be shocked with electricity before being killed, while another would insist that such a practice was not halal. There was no global certifying or labeling standards and no central authority. Many halal consumers felt there was no need for one as more liberal or more conservative Muslims might have their own ideas about halal slaughtering processes.

In predominantly Muslim countries, the government often had a ministry devoted to ensuring halal adherence. In the UAE, the Ministry of Environment & Water had a division that certified slaughterhouses in the country and determined which foreign slaughterhouses could import halal products into the country. Most countries with any sizable Muslim population had several non-governmental certifying agencies, and these agencies were sometimes transparent about their halal slaughtering guidelines, but sometimes they were secretive about their standards. Many certifying agencies around the world used the standards developed by Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM), or Halal Stock of the Philippines, all of which were government agencies in their respective countries. The standards had only minor differences, but a company needed to receive certification from all three to be able to import its halal products to Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, three large Muslim markets.

Some controversy surrounded halal slaughtering in Europe. The Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden all banned slaughtering animals without stunning them beforehand due to concerns over animal welfare, which made halal slaughtering illegal. In addition, some religions either prohibited, or advised against, consuming meat that had been slaughtered in compliance with the halal rules that required meat to be slaughtered in the name of Allah. However, some believed that halal slaughtering produced healthier meat products because, by draining the animal’s blood, it reduced the potential for bacterial contamination.

Al Islami Foods in 2014

In 2014, Al Islami had revenues of more than AED 320 million ($87 million) (refer back to Exhibit

1). Al Islami’s main line of business was frozen whole chickens (65% of revenues), but, until recently, the company had offered more than 150 other food products. Al Islami was one of the few halal branded product companies that did any of its own slaughtering, although most of Al Islami’s slaughtering in 2014 had been outsourced to large Brazilian slaughterhouses (see Exhibit 3).


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Product line The company was in the midst of refocusing its product line on halal chicken products. Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Brent Pearson had been actively working to cut other products. Recent cuts included rice, some seafood products, canned goods, honey, dates, and cheese. Trimming the product line down to focus on chicken allowed the company to build stronger relationships with its biggest suppliers.

Suppliers The company had transitioned away from the Danish chicken suppliers they used in the 1990s as the global poultry slaughterhouse business consolidated in Brazil (see Exhibit 4 for the company’s largest suppliers). As Pearson noted, “Slaughtering without stunning is a minor part of the business for all of our Brazilian suppliers. We have done a good job of educating our suppliers about our ‘Real Halal’ processes, but imposing these processes on suppliers naturally costs us more. We cannot sacrifice quality for lower costs. Our customers will not allow that. So we have to sell at a premium price point while working hard to keep costs down in all other aspects of the business.”

At these Brazilian slaughterhouses, Al Islami’s poultry was killed by hand. Workers were positioned on an assembly line and used sharp knives to cut the chickens’ throats as the chickens were moved along, hung upside-down by their feet from a conveyor belt. Chickens were not stunned before their throats were cut; they moved quite a bit after the cut, which sped up the process of draining their blood. Draining the blood was a required part of halal slaughtering. Knives were changed frequently to keep them sharp, and all of the killing was overseen by an Al Islami inspector who stood a few feet behind the assembly line.

Al Islami’s chicken products were shipped frozen on container ships, a 45-60 day journey from Brazil to Dubai. Middle Eastern consumers preferred to buy frozen meat products; more than 80% of

chicken products sold in the UAE in 2014 were frozen.5 In addition, UAE consumers preferred to buy whole chickens, rather than parts or processed products. Whole chickens made up about 65% of UAE chicken sales in 2014, with chicken parts making up about 25% and processed products such as chicken nuggets making up about 10%. However, since the mid-2000s, the share of chicken parts and

processed products had increased at the expense of whole chickens.6

Warehouse and logistics Pearson and Al Garem had, in 2013, outsourced the company’s

warehouse and distribution operations to the Kuwaiti firm Agility Logistics. Pearson noted, “When I joined the company, the warehouse was very inefficient. Everything was done manually; it was all based on personal knowledge and experience, very little was documented, and we did not have a warehouse management system. We realized that such a system was not scalable, and in fact caused diseconomies, so we had to bite the bullet and outsource.” Al Islami had to undertake a significant project to integrate the warehouse management system utilized by Agility Logistics into its own SAP enterprise platform. This identified many inefficiencies in the company that Al Garem and Pearson were working to correct.

Processing operations Felix Binder, a master butcher from Germany, was the director of

processing operations, putting him in charge of the company’s factory in Dubai and the halal control inspectors that Al Islami had located in their suppliers’ slaughterhouses around the world. Al Islami’s factory, which opened in Dubai in the 1980s, processed 800-900 tons of minced meat, about 100 tons of prepared, packaged sandwiches, about 1,700 tons of burgers, and about the same amount of chicken sausages every year. Whole chickens and chicken parts made up 65% of Al Islami’s sales, processed products accounted for about 10%, and the remaining share was from a wide variety of other items. Binder noted, “We promise our customers that we have our whole supply chain under control to ensure everything is halal and we have to make good on that promise. Our halal inspectors are highly trained and dedicated to their jobs. I am German: I need to have structure and control in


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my life and in my company.” Pearson praised the emphasis on quality that Binder maintained in the factory. “Felix will never compromise on quality.”

Marketing Marketing manager Mustafa Jassem, who joined the company in 2001, lauded the

opportunities that Saleh Abdullah and Saleh Saeed had given him and his marketing staff. “This company encourages continued learning and invests in its people. Employees in my department have gotten the chance to travel around the world to learn best practices and better understand others’ operations techniques. We have been able to use what we have learned in our marketing strategies, giving the Al Islami brand an international appeal.” Because Dubai was such an international city by the 2000s, the company felt that international marketing ideas had helped boost local sales (see Exhibit 5 for some examples of marketing materials). Saleh Abdullah commented that “Our most effective marketing is public relations because in this forum we have more room to explain how Al Islami is different from its competitors in terms of our quality and halal slaughtering process.”

Sales Nisham Mohideen was the director of UAE sales for the company, which made up the vast majority of Al Islami’s business. He joined the company in 2001. Mohideen, born and raised in Dubai, was proud to work for the Lootah family, noting, “This is more than a job. It is a passion for so many of our employees.” Al Islami’s largest customers in 2014 included Carrefour, the Middle Eastern hypermarket LuLu, and smaller regional chains in each Emirate (see Exhibit 6). Processed products and Al Islami branded products typically had higher average sales margins than whole chickens or private-label products (see Exhibit 7).

Quality control Parvin Banu, the head of quality, safety, and health, had worked for Al Islami

for 10 years. She started her career in the factory and worked her way up to her current position. Her department was charged with managing the cold chain that kept Al Islami’s perishable products from spoiling, and worked with suppliers to eliminate the possibility of disease outbreaks. She worked with Binder to ensure that all steps of the supply chain from all of Al Islami’s global suppliers maintained halal standards. She noted, “This is a business that treats its employees like members of the family, we work together to promote Islamic principles in the modern world.”

Human resources Shaikha Al Suwaidi, human resources manager, had similarly worked her

way up from a receptionist position in 2004 to her current role. One of a small number of native Emiratis in the company, she felt that Dubai was the perfect place for Al Islami, noting, “Dubai is an international city that is open and accepting of many different cultures. Many people who come to Dubai are exposed to Islamic culture for the first time. Al Islami is a company that welcomes hard working employees from around the world and sells halal products to consumers of all cultures who want the highest quality that you can expect from the Al Islami brand.”

The company employed 330 workers, with most working in the processing factory in Dubai, or as local sales agents (see Exhibit 8). Most of the company’s managers had worked for Al Islami for a decade or more. Al Garem explained, “It took some time to convince the workforce that, if there was a problem, they needed to tell me about it instead of covering it up. I had to warn people that if they told me everything was OK when it wasn’t, they would face consequences.” Pearson attributed some of that attitude to the UAE’s labor market, “Most of our workers are expatriates from the Sub-Continent and/or South Asia, and were worried that, if they lost their job, they would lose their visa. So we had to make sure our employees were not afraid of losing their jobs even if they made a mistake.”


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A Brief History of Dubai and the UAE

Al Garem, Saleh Saeed, and Saleh Abdullah saw parallels between Al Islami’s growth and the growth of Dubai. They credited the Sheikhs of Dubai with making smart decisions that propelled the city to become the major metropolis it was in 2014. The four Maktoum family Sheikhs who ruled Dubai in the 20th and 21st centuries (Sheikhs Saeed, Rashid, Maktoum, and Mohammed), whose family had ruled the Emirate since 1833, provided a sense of political stability in a region known for its coups, revolutions, and popular uprisings.

The Emirate traced its modern history to around 1800, when the British first arrived in the Arabian Gulf (see Exhibit 9 for maps). In the 1820s, the British convinced the Sheikhs of all seven Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Kaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Quwain), to sign

treaties giving the British control of trade in the region in exchange for military protection.7 From then on, the Emirates came to be called the Trucial States, named for the truces that each Emirate signed with Britain.

In 1833, the Maktoum family, in a feud with the ruling al-Nahyan family of Abu Dhabi, came to

Dubai and took over as leaders of the Emirate.8 The Maktoum Sheikhs immediately began working to improve Dubai to overtake its rivals Abu Dhabi and Sharjah. A major victory came in 1894 when Dubai’s Sheikh cut tariffs at its port to lure merchants from Iranian ports with high taxes on the other side of the Gulf. The Sheikh also began a program of offering incentives to attract merchants, giving them free land, import monopolies on certain goods, or a promise to have the Sheikh’s full attention if they needed anything in the future. These incentives successfully lured many Persian and Indian merchants to Dubai in the early 1900s.9

By the 1920s, however, diving for pearls still made up 95% of Dubai’s economy as the warm, shallow Arabian Gulf made for the ideal oyster habitat.10 The 1929 U.S. stock market crash and the global economic depression that followed curtailed pearl demand, and soon thereafter, Japanese researchers invented a method of creating cultured pearls, ensuring that demand for the more expensive natural pearls would not rebound. Dubai’s economy stalled: merchants left town and famines ravaged the region. Local citizens survived by eating the swarms of locusts that periodically

swept the region.11 The Emirate’s government’s little money came mostly from the British, who paid for seaplane landing rights, using Dubai and the other Emirates as a refueling stop on flights to India. In 1937, after oil had been struck in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East, a British company signed

the first oil exploration contract with the Sheikh of Dubai.12 World War II brought a halt to exploration activities, however, and Dubai spent the 1940s struggling to survive.

In 1954, Sheikh Rashid, the son of the ruling Sheikh in Dubai, who had taken over most day-to-day management activities from his father more than a decade earlier, began a project to dredge the

Dubai Creek, the city’s main shipping port, so that it could accommodate larger vessels.13 The money to finance the project came from Kuwait, which was recently rich with oil revenues. In 1958, oil was discovered off the coast of Abu Dhabi, the first oil strike in the Emirates, and exploration activity increased in the region.14 The creek dredging project was completed in 1961, a year after Sheikh Rashid began construction of an airport for the city (despite the protests of neighboring Sharjah, which held the area’s existing airport). That year, electricity, telephones, and paved roads made their debut in Dubai. In 1962, the first bridge—a gift from the Sheikh of Qatar—was built over the creek, connecting the two sides of Dubai. By 1968, widespread running water was available throughout most of Dubai.15


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In 1963, the British company that had signed the 1937 oil agreement in Dubai gave up its search for oil and abandoned its future mineral rights.16 The Sheikh of Dubai put together a local consortium of businesses that, along with the Sheikh’s personal wealth, backed further oil exploration. Oil was finally discovered off the coast of Dubai in 1966, but it was ultimately determined that Dubai had only a small share of the oil in the UAE, about 5%, compared with Abu Dhabi’s 90%.17

In 1968, the British government, detangling itself from its global empire, announced that in 1971 it would stop its military support of the Emirates.18 The Sheikhs of Dubai and Abu Dhabi brought their counterparts from the five other Emirates together and formed the UAE in December 1971. The president of the UAE was the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi; the Sheikh of Dubai served as the vice president and prime minister. Virtually every other government minister came from Abu Dhabi.

Dubai’s Entrepreneurial Ambitions

Flush with revenue from the newfound oil, Dubai went on a building spree. By 1968, Dubai’s

airport had been expanded to accommodate jumbo jets.19 In 1971, construction started on a new port, which could handle the largest ships of the day, and a large dry dock (a port facility that could lift a

ship out of the water for maintenance or repairs).20 In 1978, one of the world’s largest aluminum

smelters (that doubled as a desalination plant) broke ground.21 In 1979, the Dubai World Trade Center, which at its completion was the tallest building in the Middle East, was begun, and in 1980,

an even larger port, called Jebel Ali, began construction.22

The Sheikh anticipated the day when Dubai would become a bustling metropolis, noting to his sons, “I’m building this port now because there will come a time when you won’t be able to afford it.”23 Although the massive infrastructure projects were mostly ridiculed at the time, it was estimated that by 2014, Dubai had made $5 for every $1 that it had invested in infrastructure in the mid-20th century.24 In addition to the infrastructure improvements, the Sheikh ensured that Dubai stayed socially liberal in order to attract the skilled Western expatriates who might want to come live and

work in the city. His motto was “What is good for the merchants is good for Dubai.”25 And he did all he could to attract and retain businesses in Dubai.

In the 1980s, Sheikh Rashid’s health began to deteriorate and his youngest son began to take more management responsibilities.26 Sheikh Mohammed (who would eventually become the leader of Dubai after his brother, Sheikh Maktoum, died in 2006) focused on turning Dubai into a tourist destination.27 With the help of a former British Airways executive (and despite the protests of the

leading airline in the region, Gulf Air), Sheikh Mohammed started Emirates Airlines in 1985.28 The Sheikh eventually pumped more than $100 million into the fledgling carrier, and by the early 1990s, it

was carrying more than 1.5 million passengers per year.29

In the 1990s and 2000s, Dubai experienced tremendous growth and a new series of megaprojects transformed the city. The sail-shaped seven-star hotel, Burj Al-Arab, completely financed by the

Sheikh, began construction in 1994 and opened in 1999.30 Massive man-made islands in the shape of palm trees along the coast followed in the 2000s—the first of three Palm Island developments began

opening in 2006.31 Major shopping malls and dozens of skyscrapers were also built in this period. The Mall of the Emirates was built with an indoor ski slope, while the Dubai Mall held the world’s largest

aquarium. The Burj Khalifa, the world’s tallest building, opened in 2010 (see Exhibit 10).32 Tourists flocked to see the sparkling new city. By 2007, Emirates Airlines carried more than 20 million

passengers annually;33 in 2008 more than 7 million people stayed overnight in one of Dubai’s hundreds of hotels.34 Hotel occupancy rates were around 80% in 2014.35 Tourism made up more than

25% of the Emirate’s economy by the mid-2000s, while oil only accounted for 3%.36


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Al Islami’s Early History: Dubai Cooperative Society, 1956-1981

In 1956, while workers were dredging the Dubai Creek and drilling the first oil wells in Abu Dhabi, Haj Saeed Bin Ahmed Al Lootah, a personal friend of the Sheikh, founded S.S. Lootah Contracting Company, the first construction company to be launched in Dubai. The construction company helped build much of the early infrastructure that turned the village into a city in the 1960s, ‘70s, and ‘80s. As the business grew along with the city, it expanded into other realms, launching a holding company, S.S. Lootah Group, to oversee his different businesses. Haj Saeed founded the first Islamic bank in the world, Dubai Islamic Bank, in 1975, to cater to the already large and growing Muslim population in Dubai. The S.S. Lootah Group also expanded into the real estate, oil and gas, health care, food, and media industries, filling needs that arose as the city developed.

A Muslim Businessman The founder of the S.S. Lootah Group, Haj Saeed (see Exhibit 11 for a photo), spent some of his formative years as a watch repairman in Saudi Arabia. Relatives believed this made him into the unique, detail-oriented, creative Muslim businessman he was. One explained, “Haj Saeed is not like other businessmen in Dubai: he is an inventor and does things his own way. He is a true Muslim businessman able to integrate Islamic teachings into his business. A businessman who is a Muslim asks first: ‘What is the ROI on that purchase?’ Haj Saeed, a true Muslim who is a businessman, asks first: ‘Is this transaction halal?’”

In the 1970s, soon after the Sheikhs came together to form the UAE, the S.S. Lootah Group entered the grocery business, founding the Dubai Cooperative Society (DCS), which became one of the largest grocery stores in the region. At the time, most shoppers bought fresh goods at the souks, the bustling open air markets near Dubai Creek, and consumer packaged goods were relatively new to the region. Hamid Badawi, an Egyptian expatriate who joined DCS in 1975, just a year after its founding, explained that, in the early days, the office had a single chair, a single desk, and three employees, “so whoever got there first got to sit that day.” In addition to grocery stores, DCS expanded to open its own gas stations, restaurants, butcher shops, and several other lines of business.

In 1981, a scandal erupted when it was discovered that non-halal chicken had been imported to Dubai and sold at several different grocery stores in the city. The chicken was traced back to slaughterhouses in Denmark. When officials from DCS investigated, they realized, in the words of Al Islami chairman Saleh Saeed, “Our suppliers did not know the first thing about halal.” DCS knew it needed to do something drastic to regain its customers’ trust, so the company pulled all chicken from its shelves and refused to sell chicken until it could ensure that it was halal. To give itself a steady supply of guaranteed halal chicken, the Lootah Group decided to start its own halal meat processing company in late 1981. Organized as a subsidiary of DCS, it was called Co-op Islami.

Co-op Islami: 1981-2001

Co-op Islami started its halal meat processing operations, which included chicken, beef, and lamb products, in Dubai in 1981 to ensure that every step of the process was halal. As Dubai’s new port improved to the point where it could draw cargo ships from around the world, and demand began to top the company’s local capacity, Haj Saeed looked to outsource production to a larger slaughterhouse operation. Badawi explained, “We searched all over Europe and the Middle East looking for a slaughterhouse that could accommodate our special, strict halal needs. We were turned down by dozens of companies before we finally found a willing company in Denmark.” Whole chickens or cuts of meat were packaged in Co-op Islami’s branded packaging in the slaughterhouses and shipped to Dubai frozen and ready to sell. Other products, such as chicken sausages, beef


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burgers, or chicken nuggets, which required further processing, were made and packaged in Dubai. In addition to supplying DCS’s stores, Co-op Islami sold its halal products to many other grocery retailers in the region. Co-op Islami branded products were always priced at a premium to other products in their categories, which were typically generic store-label products.

Co-op Islami inserted halal quality control monitors into all of its suppliers’ operations as a condition of doing business. These monitors were full-time, salaried employees paid by Co-op Islami. They received rigorous training and underwent tests to ensure they completely understood Co-op Islami’s halal standards. They were trained in how to alert the suppliers to any non-halal compliance and instructed Co-op Islami to reject shipments that they suspected of noncompliance. They rotated on a six-month schedule to suppliers worldwide to ensure their independence and objectivity.

The company found success with this model, growing from AED 50 million ($13.6 million) in revenue in the early-1980s to more than AED 100 million ($27.2 million) by the early-1990s. Saleh Saeed noted, “Customers in Dubai respected the brand because of our founder’s integrity. The company leveraged that brand recognition for high quality, guaranteed halal preparation, across all of the companies in the group and had sales success.”

By the mid-1990s, however, the market in the UAE had begun to change. Western brands and hypermarkets had started to enter the region to cater to the rapidly growing population of Western expatriates; the first hypermarketd in Dubai was the French chain Carrefour, in 1995.37 “These types of stores were new and different in Dubai,” Saleh Saeed explained, “They aggressively cut prices while maintaining high and consistent quality, and drove many traditional grocery retailers out of the market.” In addition, halal food competitors from outside the UAE had begun to enter the market; by 1997, DCS had stagnated, and the company was in crisis.

Haj Saeed and other members of the board believed that DCS needed new leadership that could react to the new opportunities that Dubai, as a growing global city, offered. In 1997 they recruited Saleh Saeed, Haj Saeed’s son, a Dubai Islamic Bank executive, for the turnaround. He refocused DCS on its only successful business, Co-op Islami’s halal foods operation, closing down its grocery stores, gas stations, butcher shops, restaurants, and other lines of business. He explained, “It was very hard to convince employees we were going to grow as we were firing people every day.”

Coming from the financial industry left Saleh Saeed feeling ill-equipped to run a food company. He attended programs at Harvard Business School and elsewhere to learn more about the food industry and studied all aspects of Co-op Islami’s business operations. Within a few months, he had a strategy. “I decided that we needed to focus our resources on the consumer end,” he recalled. “We needed to build the brand to be everything the consumer needed. Food markets are fragmented, regional, and often government supported, so investing upstream on the farm side of the business seemed risky. By investing on the brand side and outsourcing as much as possible behind that, as long as we could continue to ensure the quality of our halal products, we would have more control over our success.”

The company entered a rebranding process with the understanding that a lot of work lay ahead, as Saleh Saeed explained, “The end consumers saw the brand as old fashioned—something for their parents or grandparents. Our employees were unhappy and demoralized because the company had changed so much over such a short period of time. And our customers, the retailers and

d A hypermarket was a large store, typically 20,000 square meters (220,000 square feet) in size, that sold groceries, clothing, electronics, and a wide range of other products, often at lower prices than stores dedicated to just one product category.


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hypermarkets, were unhappy because our operations did not work quite like many of the global brands they were now dealing with.”

In 1998, Saleh Saeed’s cousin, Saleh Abdullah, joined the business. Saleh Saeed noted, “Saleh Abdullah said he would take the job at Co-op Islami only if he could leave at two o’clock in the afternoon every day as his brothers, who worked in the government, did. I said yes, as long as he got his work done. Within a few weeks he became so enthralled with the business that he was routinely the first to arrive in the morning and the last to leave at night.” Saleh Saeed and Saleh Abdullah together took up the three challenges of rebranding the company for consumers, employees, and customers.

Consumers The company began surveying consumers and convening focus groups to better understand what they thought of Co-op Islami’s products, which included a wide range of items, of which the best-sellers were mainly frozen chicken products. When asked to personify the brand, consumers often likened it to an old, ugly man. “We did not want our brand to be like that man!” explained Saleh Abdullah. The company began changing how it communicated with consumers, adding educational content, high quality photographs of the food, and a brighter, more fun color scheme to packaging. Through a Brazilian chicken supplier, the company was introduced to a French marketing agency called Team Creative, which consulted on the rebranding exercise (refer back to Exhibit 5 for packaging and marketing materials).

Employees To revitalize employee morale, Saleh Abdullah and Saleh Saeed started to host regular “leadership meetings”—informal question and answer sessions where employees were encouraged to bring suggestions for improving communication and company culture. After experiencing some Harvard Business School case discussions in programs at Harvard, Saleh Saeed brought cases to the company and started regular “work out days” where he would teach a case to any employees who wanted to learn. These proved immensely popular among employees; one noted, “Our company became a college for the employees.” Finally, Saleh Saeed and Saleh Abdullah inaugurated a program that allowed managers to trade jobs with front-line employees for a few days. One human resources manager explained, “I switched jobs with a delivery driver. I wore his uniform; he taught me how to make the deliveries, how to handle our products correctly. It was an experience that taught me about how we directly interact with our customers.”

Customers These job-trading days directly contributed to fixing some of Co-op Islami’s issues with its customers, the hypermarkets and grocery stores of the UAE. By interacting first hand with customers, the company’s managers started to think about consumer-facing programs to spur sales. For example, the director of sales learned that if his salesperson arrived at a particular grocery store at 7:00 am each morning, he could always close the sale, but if he arrived at 8:00 am, it was too late; a competitor had already gotten there and sold them chicken. Small changes led to some sales increases.

Co-op Islami entered the new millennium on the upswing. Sales, which hit a low in 1997 below AED 40 million ($10.9 million), grew 100% from 2001 to 2007, hitting AED 200 million ($54.5 million). In 2001, the company took the next step in its rebranding and renamed itself Al Islami Foods.

Al Islami Foods: 2001-2014

Saleh Abdullah took over as CEO in 2002 and Saleh Saeed became managing director of the board. To push the company to achieve the quality levels that he believed possible, Saleh Abdullah proposed that the company compete for the prestigious Dubai Quality Award (DQA).


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The DQA was developed by the Dubai Department of Economic Development at the request of Sheikh Mohammed in 1994. The award considered applicants based on nine criteria: leadership, policy and strategy, human resources, partnerships and resources, processes, customer results, consumer perceptions, societal impact, and key performance results. The award was meant to recognize businesses and institutions that were working to achieve best practices and continuous improvement. Competition was intense; dozens of companies in Dubai applied for the award each year. After initial applications were reviewed, the awards committee conducted in-person inspections and interviews before a final determination was made. If a company did not win the award, it had to wait two years before applying again. Virtually no company won the award on its first attempt. Many of the past winners were subsidiaries of large multinationals such as Xerox, Marriott Hotels, FedEx, and Citi Bank. “The board said that we should apply for a less competitive award before we attempted the DQA,” Saleh Abdullah recalled, “but I said ‘no, this will be a learning experience for the company whether we win or lose.’ Either way we will improve the company, and that is the spirit of the DQA.” Al Islami began preparing for its DQA submission as early as 2001. Saleh Abdullah circulated winning submissions from past years within the company. He explained,

Reading through the old submissions got everyone talking in the language of the DQA-using terms like “key performance indicators” and “best practices.” We set up a scoring system in all parts of the company and employees instantly became motivated to improve their scores. We were working towards a common goal; it continued the morale improvement that had begun in the late-1990s. When it came time to write the application, we got input from all over the company.

Al Islami won the DQA in 2003 (see Exhibit 12 for a photo and Exhibit 13 for a sample from Al Islami’s submission). Noted Saleh Abdullah, “The sense of pride and celebration after we won the award lasted for more than two years.” By 2008, Al Islami was among the top 50 best known brands in the UAE (a list dominated by globally well-known brands like Google and Toyota).38

In 2012, Saleh Abdullah moved to the board and Marwan Al Garem was hired as CEO. Al Garem had previously worked for several other companies in the S.S. Lootah Group, and before that had worked for PepsiCo in Saudi Arabia, and Beiersdorf, a German personal care products company, in Dubai, where he met Saleh Saeed. He also met Australian financial professional Brent Pearson at this time, and when Al Garem was hired as CEO of Al Islami, he brought Pearson on as CFO.

Al Islami’s Approach to the Global Halal Market

The Global Halal Foods Market in 2014

The world’s 1.5 billion Muslims spent more than $1 trillion on halal foods in 2013.39 This population was young and growing fast (see Exhibit 14). The halal foods market was growing at 6.9% per year, making up more than 10% of global food sales in 2014.40 Some analysts predicted the

global value of the halal food market to hit $10 trillion by 2030.41

Malaysia, whose population was more than 60% Muslim, exported nearly $10 billion worth of

halal food products in 2013, making it the largest halal exporter in the world.42 Global halal trade was much lower than global trade in, for example, koshere products. For every one halal product available in an American grocery store in 2013, there were 86 different kosher products. Al Islami reported that

e Kosher referred to Jewish dietary laws that were similar in many ways to halal laws.


12

U.S. Muslims spent about $16 billion on kosher products annually because similar halal products were not available.

The Global Poultry Processing Industry in 2014

More than half of the world’s poultry production came from the U.S., China, and Brazil in 2014. Those three countries, plus the countries of the European Union, accounted for almost 60% of global

chicken consumption.43 Worldwide, more than 58 billion chickens were slaughtered for human

consumption annually.44 Further processing could be as simple as plucking, cleaning, and packaging for sale as a whole chicken, or as complicated as producing breaded chicken nuggets. Only a small percent of poultry products were exported worldwide; in most countries domestic supply matched demand. Of the 6%-10% of global poultry production that was exported annually, the vast majority

was fresh chilled products rather than the frozen products that made up most of Al Islami’s sales.45

The market was dominated by large global processors. The largest was Brazil’s JBS, which processed 1.9 billion chickens annually, followed by the Brazilian BRF and the American Tyson, which each processed 1.8 billion chickens annually.46 Processors typically owned the slaughterhouses and factories and were supplied by a wide range of poultry farms (refer back to Exhibit 3). Minimally processed products (whole packaged chickens, or cuts such as breasts or drumsticks) were a commodity product with prices set by global markets.

The poultry market was expected to grow at a rate of about 2% between 2014 and 2022.47 Recent trends in the market had increased the demand in Western nations for free-range and/or organic products because consumers believed that improved living conditions and feedstocks, and reduced use of antibiotics led to a higher quality chicken product. While Al Islami executives reported that these trends had not yet come to the UAE, some believed that these consumers would be open to trying halal products for the same reasons. “Quality is the focus of our brand, and as a result, we can deliver better products to consumers who are interested in quality. Our halal certification is a mark of quality,” explained Al Garem.

Al Islami’s Next Steps

Al Islami’s management knew that expanding beyond the UAE while maintaining their premium price point and the quality level their customers had come to expect would be a big challenge. Although their UAE customers might know their history of holding true to the principles of halal through tough times, and their legacy of growth along with Dubai, new customers in other countries would not. In Saudi Arabia, for example, everything sold in the grocery store had to be halal. Al Garem noted, “We cannot say that our products are any more halal than anyone else’s products. We could be using very different quality control processes, yet at the end of the day both products are simply labeled halal.”

The joint venture with United Group would make Al Islami’s products available to millions of Saudi Arabians, but it would be another major investment on top of the new factory in Dubai. Al Islami had to commit AED 50 million ($13.6 million) to build the factory in Saudi Arabia, AED 7 million ($1.9 million) per year to fund its operations, and expected to budget AED 3 million ($800,000) annually for marketing its chicken products in Saudi Arabia. The facility would quadruple Al Islami’s total chicken processing capacity. Although the factory would be flexible, Al Islami predicted that its output would be divided between chicken pieces (25% of output), processed chicken products such as chicken nuggets (65% of output), and other products (10% of output). While the demand for chicken in Saudi Arabia was growing steadily, if consumers were not willing to pay a


13

premium for the real halal guarantee offered by Al Islami’s brand (refer back to Exhibit 7), Al Garem felt that the investment would never pay off.

At the same time, competition was heating up in the UAE. The global chicken slaughterhouse business was consolidating in Brazil, and some at Al Islami feared they would soon face a monopoly from their chicken suppliers, which, as Saleh Abdullah explained, “Would make it very difficult for us to continue to produce real halal chicken at competitive prices.” In 2013, Pearson explained that Al Islami’s biggest competitor had flooded the market with chicken products (refer back to Exhibit 3), “They were selling their chicken for below our cost of production, trying to drive us out of the market. We simply could not compete on price. Even if we had tried, it would have just done harm to our brand. Our sales suffered, but ultimately our customer loyalty has pulled us through so far.” There was conversation at Al Islami of vertically integrating into the slaughterhouse business to protect the company from the threat of supplier consolidation.

Al Garem and his management team knew that Al Islami had to act to position the company to become the Nestlé of halal foods for the massive global halal market (see Exhibit 15 for Al Islami’s strategy and refer back to Exhibit 14 for data on the halal market opportunity), but they still had questions on the best strategy. Saleh Abdullah explained,

The first question we ask ourselves is where should we look for growth opportunities? Should we focus on Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia where most of the food is somewhat halal, but not necessarily real halal as our products are? The barriers to entry for us in these countries might be lower. Or we could go to Europe or the U.S. where it is much harder to find halal products and the demand for halal foods is high. If we have to make a large investment either way, does it make more sense to try to become the first mover in a Western nation? Our second question is, should we do it alone or look for a major partner?

Given his questions about whether to enter the U.S. or Europe, Al Garem wondered, “Was the joint venture in Saudi Arabia still the best path forward in the short term? If so, how should Al Islami market itself in that country? If not, what market should the company target?”

Returning from the factory tour, Al Garem took a phone call from Ahmad Hajj (OPM 27, ’99), CEO of United Group. Hajj asked, was Al Garem prepared to commit to the joint venture?

314-080 -14-

Exhibit 1 Al Islami Foods Abbreviated Financials, 2001-2013 (In Millions of AED)

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Revenue 101.10 98.05 107.02 134.59 150.94 149.84 204.77 255.45 269.89 304.84 273.87 270.25 292.89 Gross margin 21.38% 24.31% 26.76% 23.86% 17.87% 20.43% 22.69% 25.10% 26.10% 24.58% 24.77% 25.76% 19.39% Operating margin -0.29% 1.37% 6.64% 1.38% -3.79% -5.40% -4.59% 1.15% -1.50% -4.69% -1.11% 5.08% -1.60% Total non-operating income

b 2.39 2.49 0.36 2.72 9.88 12.99 10.71 23.42 10.86 27.09 (18.77) (4.51) 11.71

Net profit margin 2.07% 3.91% 6.85% 3.26% 2.56% 3.20% 0.56% 10.26% 2.31% 4.04% -8.13% 3.19% 2.26% Cash and equivalents 4.22 1.47 3.32 2.22 2.62 2.40 2.59 18.83 17.13 11.21 2.32 15.71 17.07 Working capital 13.19 20.05 20.29 13.58 7.76 3.97 13.76 22.24 1.73 (11.97) (8.17) 7.86 6.32 Quick ratio 1.25 1.79 1.37 0.85 0.69 0.82 0.90 0.86 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.76 0.68

Source: Company documents.

Note: AED 3.6725 = $1.00

b Non-operating income mainly referred to sales of investments, including properties and shares of Dubai Islamic Bank.


15

Exhibit 2a Al Islami Foods Largest Competitors, 2014

Sadia

The largest poultry brand in the UAE was Sadia, a Brazilian company owned by BRF, the tenth-largest food company in the world. Sadia controlled about 40% of the UAE poultry market. The company was involved in the entire poultry value chain.

Seara

Seara, another large Brazilian poultry company, controlled about 25% of the UAE poultry market. Seara was a division of the Brazilian JBS, the largest food company in the world. The company was involved in the entire poultry value chain.

Tyson

The American company Tyson controlled about 12% of the UAE market, making it the third largest brand in the country. Tyson’s products were exported to the UAE from its production facilities in Central and South America. The company was involved in the entire poultry value chain.

Al Watania

Al Watania, a Saudi Arabian brand, controlled about 3% of the UAE market. The company’s entire value chain—from the egg to the ready-for-sale chicken—took place in Saudi Arabia.

Americana

Americana Group, a Kuwaiti company, was a competitor only in the processed chicken products market. Americana controlled about 25% of this market, giving it about 2% of the overall market. Americana’s operations were concentrated in the processing and distribution portions of the value chain.

Source: Casewriter adapted from IMES Consulting, “The Poultry Market in the UAE, 2012,” www.imesconsulting.com, accessed November 2014.

Exhibit 2b Average Retail Prices of Frozen Chicken Products in the UAE, 2011

Brand (Location) Product Weight Average Price (AED)

Sadia (Brazil) Whole chicken 1.0 kg 11.80

Wings 0.9 kg 18.75

Doux (France) Whole chicken 1.0 kg 11.75

Wings 1.0 kg 13.49

Americana (Kuwait) Chicken burger 1.0 kg 20.25

Chicken franks 0.4 kg 5.25

Al Islami (UAE) Whole chicken 1.3 kg 19.50

Wings 0.9 kg 24.75

Chicken burger 0.4 kg 16.95

Chicken franks 0.4 kg 6.90


Note: AED 3.6725 = $1.00


16

Exhibit 3 Poultry Value Chain

Source: Adapted from United States International Trade Commission Office of Industries, “Poultry Industry and Trade Summary,” http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/Poultry[1].pdf, accessed October 2014.

(slaughterhouses)


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Exhibit 4 Al Islami Foods Largest Suppliers, 2013

Supplier Location Products

Seara Alimentos Brazil Chicken, Processed Meats

Averama Frangos de Qualidade Brazil Chicken

Clarebout Potatoes Belgium Potatoes

Farm Frites The Netherlands Potatoes

M.K. Overseas India Beef

Viscofan Spain Artificial Sausage Casings

Amroon Foods India Beef, Mutton

Hot ‘n’ Fresh Pastry Factory UAE Breaded Products

Gulf Seafood UAE Shrimp, Tuna, Calamari

Hardwicks Meat Works Australia Beef, Lamb

Gulf Printing and Publishing UAE Packaging Materials


Exhibit 5a Progression of Al Islami’s Logo, 1980s-Present

1980s-1990s:

2000s:

1990s-2000s: 2000s-Present:



18

Exhibit 5b Al Islami Packaging Materials


Exhibit 5c Al Islami Advertisements



19

Exhibit 6a Al Islami Foods Largest Customers, 2013

1. Carrefour 2. Sharjah Coop 3. Union Coop Dubai 4. LuLu Abu Dhabi 5. Abu Dhabi Cooperative Society 6. Al Ain Cooperative Society 7. LuLu Dubai 8. Al Safeer Hypermarkets 9. Mohebi Logistics (A retail stocking outsource company) 10. Arabian Oasis Food Company 11. Baniyas Cooperative Society Abu Dhabi 12. LuLu Al Ain


Exhibit 6b Share of Grocery Sales in the UAE by Type of Retailer, 2011

Category Share of Sales

Supermarkets/hypermarkets 52%

Large grocery stores 19%

Small grocery stores 15%

Mini-markets 14%


Exhibit 7 Selected Products’ Profit Margins, 2013

Product Margin Al Islami brand whole chicken 50%-60%

Private label whole chicken 10%-15%

Al Islami chicken breast 50%-60%

Al Islami chicken nuggets 150%

Al Islami ground beef 140%

Al Islami minced mutton 90%

Al Islami french fries 60%

Al Islami beef burger 140%



20

Exhibit 8 Al Islami Foods Employee Mix, 2013

Department Employees Factory 62

Finance 10

Human Resources 5

International Sales 4

Information Technology 5

Legal 1

Marketing 6

Administration 7

Procurement 9

Quality 9

Research & Development 1

Real Estate 1

Sales 123

Warehouse 81

Executive 4

Food Technology Administration 2

Total: 330


314-080 -21-

Exhibit 9a Map of the UAE

Source: “United Arab Emirates,” CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ae.html, accessed June 2014.


22

Exhibit 9b Map of the Arabian Gulf Region

Source: “Regional and World Maps,” CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/refmaps.html, accessed June 2014.


23

Exhibit 10 Images of Dubai

A partial view of Dubai’s skyline in January 2008 with the Burj Al-Arab on the left and the still under construction Burj Khalifa on the right.

An aerial view of the Palm Jumeirah from the International Space Station, 2005.

Source: Skyline picture: Wikimedia Commons, “Dubai Skyline on 10 January 2008,” http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dubai_Skyline_on_10_January_2008.jpg, accessed September 2014; Palm Jumeirah picture: Wikimedia Commons, “Palm Island Resort,” http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Palm_Island_Resort.jpg, accessed September 2014.


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Exhibit 11 Haj Saeed Bin Ahmed Al Lootah

Sheikh Mohammed on left, Haj Saeed on right.


Exhibit 12 Saleh Saeed Lootah and Saleh Abdullah Lootah Receive the 2003 Dubai Quality Award from Sheikh Mohammed

From left to right: Sheikh Mohammed, Al Islami Managing Director Saleh Saeed Lootah, Al Islami

CEO Saleh Abdullah Lootah.



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Exhibit 13 Al Islami’s DQA Submission Material

The Excellence Model is a rubric used to judge DQA submissions.

This chart shows how Al Islami built its DQA Submission around the Excellence Model rubric.



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Exhibit 14a Growth of the Global Muslim Population, 2010-2030 (in billions)

Source: Casewriter from Pew Research, “The Future of the Global Muslim Population,” January 27, 2011, http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-muslim-population/, accessed October 2014.

Exhibit 14b Muslims as a Percent of Various Countries’ Populations in 2010 and 2030

2010 2030

Country Population Percent

Muslim

Population Percent

Muslim

France 63 million 8% 69 million 10%

Italy 60 million 3% 61 million 5%

Sweden 9 million 5% 10 million 10%

U.K. 62 million 5% 68 million 8%

U.S. 312 million 1% 362 million 2%

Canada 34 million 3% 40 million 7%

Malaysia 28 million 61% 36 million 65%

India 1.2 billion 15% 1.4 billion 16%

Philippines 93 million 5% 127 million 6%

China 1.3 billion 2% 1.4 billion 2%

Nigeria 159 million 48% 273 million 52%

Ghana 24 million 16% 35 million 18%

Saudi Arabia 27 million 97% 35 million 97%

Source: Casewriter from Pew Research, “The Future of the Global Muslim Population,” January 27, 2011, http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-muslim-population/, accessed October 2014.

1.1 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2

4.24.8

5.35.8

6.1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

Non-Muslims

Muslims

314-080 -27-

Exhibit 15 Visualizing Al Islami’s Growth Strategy



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Endnotes

1 HSBC Commercial Banking, “Doing Business in the UAE,” January 2013, www.hsbc.ae, accessed June 2014.

2 Shaimaa Fayed, “Arab unrest puts focus on UAE’s Northern Emirates,” Reuters, July 6, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/06/us-emirates-northern-idUSTRE7652Y020110706, accessed October 2014.

3 Pew Research, “The Future of the Global Muslim Population,” January 27, 2011, http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-muslim-population/, accessed October 2014.

4 Gulfood, “Halal World Food Exhibition to Propel Dubai’s Islamic Economy Capital Vision,” http://www.gulfood.com/Content/HALAL-WORLD-FOOD-EXHIBITION-TO-PROPEL-DUBAIS-ISLAMIC-ECONOMY-CAPITAL-VISION, accessed October 2014.

5 IMES Consulting, “The Poultry Market in the UAE, 2012,” www.imesconsulting.com, accessed November 2014.

6 IMES Consulting, “The Poultry Market in the UAE, 2012,” www.imesconsulting.com, accessed November 2014.

7 Jim Krane, City of Gold, MacMillan, London, 2009, p. 17.

8 Krane, 2009, p. 18.

9 Krane, 2009, p. 22.

10 Krane, 2009, p. 27.

11 Krane, 2009, p. 28.

12 Krane, 2009, p. 36.

13 Krane, 2009, p. 69.

14 Krane, 2009, p. 58.

15 Krane, 2009, p. 67.

16 Krane, 2009, p. 75.

17 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “United Arab Emirates,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=tc, accessed October 2014.

18 Krane, 2009, p. 82.

19 Krane, 2009, p. 73.

20 Krane, 2009, p. 77.

21 Krane, 2009, p. 78.

22 Krane, 2009, p. 79.

23 Krane, 2009, p. 79.

24 Krane, 2009, p. 80.

25 Krane, 2009, p. 75.

26 Krane, 2009, p. 104.

27 Krane, 2009, p. 104.

28 Krane, 2009, p. 107.

29 Krane, 2009, p. 108.

30 Krane, 2009, p. 115.

31 Krane, 2009, p. 123.


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32 Krane, 2009, p. 131.

33 Krane, 2009, p. 109.

34 Krane, 2009, p. 117.

35 Krane, 2009, p. 117.

36 Krane, 2009, p. 50.

37 SIS International Research, “Analysis of Carrefour’s Dubai Market Entry,” February 2, 2009, http://thoughtleadership.sismarketresearch.com/middle-east-journal/2009/2/2/analysis-of-carrefours-dubai-market-entry.html, accessed October 2014.

38 AMEinfo, “Al Islami Foods voted super brand for second time,” January 25, 2010, http://ameinfo.com/blog/company-news/a/al-islami-foods-(co-op-islami)/al-islami-foods-voted-super-brand-for-second-time/, accessed November 2014.

39 Eliot Beer, “Global Halal Market to Hit $1.6tn by 2018,” Food Navigator, August 13, 2014, http://www.foodnavigator.com/content/view/print/953449, accessed October 2014.

40 Eliot Beer, “Global Halal Market to Hit $1.6tn by 2018,” Food Navigator, August 13, 2014, http://www.foodnavigator.com/content/view/print/953449, accessed October 2014.

41 Gulfood, “Halal World Food Exhibition to Propel Dubai’s Islamic Economy Capital Vision,” http://www.gulfood.com/Content/HALAL-WORLD-FOOD-EXHIBITION-TO-PROPEL-DUBAIS-ISLAMIC-ECONOMY-CAPITAL-VISION, accessed October 2014.

42 Aya Batrawy, “Demand grows for halal food as industry evolves,” Associated Press, March 13, 2014, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/demand-grows-halal-food-industry-155110151.html, accessed October 2014.

43 International Poultry Council, “Chicken Meat Consumption for Top Chicken Producing Countries,” http://www.internationalpoultrycouncil.org/industry/industry.cfm, accessed October 2014.

44 Heinrich Böll Foundation, “The Meat Atlas,” January 2014, http://www.foeeurope.org/meat-atlas, accessed September 2014.

45 Watt Ag, “Poultry Trends 2013,” www.wattnet.net, accessed September 2014.



Documents

N OVE MB E R 26, 2014 LYNDA APPLEGATE MICHAEL NORRIS Al