N. Nugent

The Government and Politics of the European Union2010

Chapter 11The European Parliament

Powers and influence

• For long after it was first constituted as the Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, the EP was generally regarded as somewhat ineffectual institution. This reputation is no longer justified.

• The EP is an extremely active legislator. During 2004-9 approved in plenary session a total of 2,924 texts nearly half of which (1,355) were legislative documents.

Ways in which the EP can influence the nature and content of EU legislative output

• Sometimes EP participates in policy discussions with COM at the pre-proposal legislative stage.

• EP can formally adopt its own ideas for suggested legislation. One way is to adopt own initiative reports and other way is under Art.225 TFEU which states that the EP may (acting by a majority) request the COM to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where it considers that EU act is required for implementing the treaties.

• The annual budgetary cycle provides opportunities to exercise legislative influence.

• EP can influence indirectly COM’s annual legislative program. The procedure is: 1) COM adopts its annual work program, which includes all proposals of a legislative nature. 2) The program is considered by appropriate EP committees. 3) A resolution on the program is voted on in an EP plenary session.

• Most importantly, the EP’s views must be sought in connection with important /significant/sensitive legislation, its powers varying according to the legislative procedure applying.

EU’s legislative procedures and the EP• The consultation procedure. EP is asked for an opinion on COM

proposals for legislation. Once the opinion is given the Council may take whatever decision it wishes even if the EP’s opinion is negative. If Council acts prematurely and does not wait for EP to make its views known, the “law” will be ruled invalid by the ECJ.

• The ordinary legislative procedure (prior to the LT known as co-decision procedure). EP is not restricted to advising (like in the consultation procedure) but is a co-decision maker with the Council. The EP thus has the power to veto legislative proposals. Another important difference is that whereas the consultation procedure is a single reading procedure, the ordinary legislative procedure is potentially a three reading procedure.

• The consent procedure. Under this procedure, the EP must consider proposals a single reading.

• Since the LT entered into force, the great majority of legislative proposals fall under the ordinary procedure.

Estimating the effect of EP on the final form of legislative acts

• It is very difficult to estimate the precise effect of EP deliberations on the final form of legislative acts.

• One reason is because a great deal of EP persuading and lobbying is impossible to monitor because it carried out via informal contacts.

• Second, statistical analyses of the extend to which EP amendments are incorporated into final legislation struggle with the following problems:– Distinguishing between amendments that have a political edge

and those that are essentially technical or procedural.– The significance of EP amendments varies according to

circumstances. – How to count when some, but not all, of an amendment is

accepted by the Council.

Estimating the effect of EP on the final form of legislative acts (cont.)

• Even if the precision of such statistical estimations of the EP legislative influence can be questioned, two matters are incontrovertible.

• First, the EP is centrally involved with the COM and the Council in the making of EU legislation.

• Second, EP activity does have a significant impact on the outcome of legislative processes.

• Whilst only a few of legislative proposals are actually blocked by the EP, many proposals are significantly altered.

EP’s weaknesses

• EP does not have full legislative powers. Unlike national parliaments it does not have the final say over what is and what is not to become a law.

• Although the EP usually attempts to deliver opinions as soon as possible, it is not unusual for the Council , before the opinion of the EP has been delivered, to take preliminary decisions or to adopt common positions “in principle” or “pending the opinion of the European Parliament”.

• EP does not have full powers over COM legislation, even though numerically COM legislation makes up most of EU legislation.

EP and the EU budget• Multiannual financial frameworks (MFF). LT increases EP influence

over the contents of MFFs, but not very much. Gives treaty status to MFFs and the power of consent over them to the EP. Actually, we have a formalisation of status quo. Moreover when the consent procedure applies, the norm is m-s governments to negotiate agreements without much reference to EP, and then to make a few concessions to bring the EP aboard.

• Annual budgets. The EP enjoyed from 1970s considerable treaty powers in relation to the EU budget. These powers included

1. the right to propose “modifications” to compulsory expenditure (final decision by the Council);

2. the right to propose “amendments” to non-compulsory expenditures (final decision by the EP);

3. the right of approval or rejection, with the Council over the whole budget.

• LT abolished the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure and made for full parity between the EP and Council as the budgetary authorities.

Control and supervision of the executiveDifficulties

• Parliaments are hampered by the executives, which do not welcome the prospect of being investigated and seek to protect themselves behind whatever constitutional, institutional or party political defenses are available.

• They are hampered also by the parliamentarians, who tend not to have the requisite information, the specialist knowledge, or the necessary resources required to properly monitor and challenge executive activity.

• In many policy spheres the COM’s executive role is very limited and consists essentially of attempting to coordinate the work of outside agencies operating at different administrative levels. Such agencies such as national governments are often reluctant to co-operate with EP.

• Problems arise from the blurring of roles between the COM, the Council of Ministers and the European Council. EP access and treaty power are not so strong in relation to the Council of Ministers and the European Council as they are to the COM.

EP and CommissionEP has 8 main supervisory powers and channels at its disposal.

1. The European Council’s proposal of a candidate for COM President must be made taking into account the elections to the EP. The candidate is then “elected” by a majority in the EP, otherwise Council is required to propose another candidate.

2. The Commissioners-designate shall be subject as a body to a vote of consent by the EP.

3. The EP can dismiss the College – but not individual Commissioners – by carrying a motion of censure by a 2/3 majority of the votes, including a majority of all MEPs.

4. The EP shall discuss in open session the annual general report submitted to it by the COM.

EP and Commission (cont.)5. The COM shall submit annually to the EP and to the Council the

accounts of the preceding financial year relating to the implementation of the budget.

6. The remits of EP standing committees are broad enough to allow them to attempt to exercise supervisory functions if they so choose.

7. The EP is empowered to establish temporary committees of inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of the Union law, except where the alleged facts are being examined before a court and while the case is till subject to legal proceedings.

8. Questions can be asked of the COM. These take different forms: written questions, oral questions in question time, and oral questions with debate.

EP and CouncilThe EP is less able to control and supervise the Council of Ministers than it is the Commission for three main reasons:

1. The first arises from the role of the Council as the main meeting place of the m-s governments. To make it responsible to the EP would be to introduce a measure of supranationalism into the EU that is unacceptable.

2. Second, the very nature of the Council (ever-changing composition, rotating presidencies) means that continuity of relation with the EP is difficult to be established.

3. Third, politicians from the Council are often very cautious about being too open with the EP in respect of such sensitive policy areas as the CFSP, the CSDP, and aspects of EMU. This reluctance is partly because decisions in these spheres sometimes need to be made quickly and secret and partly because some m-s favour intergovernmentalism as the prevailing decision-making model.

EP and Council (cont.)• The amount of access the EP gets to the Council depends in

large part on the attitude of the Council Presidency. There are, however, certain set points of contact.

1. The Presidency of the Council appears before EP plenaries at the beginning and end of each six-month term of office.

2. Ministers from the Presidency usually attend the EP committees that deal with their spheres of responsibility at least twice during their countries Presidency.

3. Ministers from the Presidency regularly attend EP plenary sessions and participate in important debates.

4. EP can, through the Presidency, ask questions of the Council.5. In one important respect the EP supervisory position over the

Council is boosted by the LT with it being accorded considerable contact with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

EP and European Council• EP is even weaker in being able to exercise any

supervisory power over the European Council.• European Council is an intergovernmental institution that is

largely outside the framework of the TFEU, it meets for only 6-8 days a year, and the Heads of Government not only have no great wish to be accountable to MEPs but can also ensure that they do not become so.

• In only two sets of circumstances does the European Council come into regular contact with the EP:– First, at the opening session of European Council meetings,

when the EP President is permitted to address the summit to inform it of the views of MEPs on current issues.

– Second, under the post-Lisbon Asrticle 15:6(d) TEU, the President of the European Council shall present a report to the EP after each of the meetings of the European Council.

EP and other bodies• The EP has a number of supervisory powers in relation to other EU

bodies. Some of these bodies are of a quasi-executive nature. • The most prominent of the quasi-executive bodies is the ECB, where

the EP must be consulted on the nominees for the Bank’s President, Vice President and Executive Board members.

• The President of the ECB and the other members of the Executive Board may, at the request of EP or on their own initiative, be heard by the competent committees of the EP.

• Other quasi-executive bodies in which EP has a role in the nomination process include the executive boards of some of the EU agencies such as the European Environment Agency and the European Medicines Agency.

• Beyond quasi-executive bodies, EP has also a role in the appointment and overseeing of certain other EU bodies. Two of them are especially important, the Court of Auditors and the European Ombudsman who is appointed by the EP with the Council having no input at all.

Elections• Until 1979 MEPs were nominated by the national parliaments.• 1979 the first direct elections. • Still, there are differences from one m-s to another regarding

electoral systems, constituency structure, eligibility for election and in the number of citizens MEPs represent.

• For example a MEP from Germany represents about 830,000 citizens whereas a MEP from Malta only 80,000.

• Low voter turnout is another issue that has been much discussed. Turnout has been relatively low and has declined in every election since the first in 1979. Three factors combine to explain it:

a. Since EP elections do not offer any prospect of a change of government or switches in policy, they stimulate little popular interest or political excitement.

b. Election campaigns have little coherence or coordination. European issues have never made much of an impact.

c. Political parties have been reluctant to commit resources to their Euro campaigns; party activists have tended to be uninterested.

The transnational Federations• Very loosely organised transnational federations

grouped around general principles, exist for coordinating propaganda, and electioneering purposes. They are based on affiliation by national parties, from both within and outside the EU.

• The three main federations are:– The Europeans People Party (EPP), whose membership

consists of 74 centre-right parties.– The European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR),

whose membership consists of 56 liberal parties.– The Party of European Socialists (PES), which has 36 full

member parties and ten associate and observer parties. • The federations have not been able to do very much.

The political groups in the EP

• Partisan political activity in the EP is mainly channeled via political groups.

• The principal basis and unifying element of most groups us ideological identification.

• There are also organisational benefits for political group formation and advantages in the conduct of Parliamentary Business that stem from group status.

Political groups in the EP and their seats

• Group of the European People’s Party (EPP) - 265• Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and

Democrats (S&D) - 184• Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for

Europe (ALDE) - 84• Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance

(Greens/EFA) - 55• European Conservatives and Reformists’ Group (ECR) - 54• Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic

Green Left (GUE/NGL) - 35• Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD) - 32• Non-attached (NA) - 27

National parties

• National parties are involved in EP-related activities in three main ways:– Most candidates on EP elections, and virtually all

of those who are elected, are chosen by their national parties.

– EP election campaigns are essentially national election campaigns conducted by national parties.

– In the EP itself national party groups exist within the political groups. This is an obvious potential source of political group disharmony and sometimes creates strains.

Composition• After the 1979 election some 30% of MEPs were holding a

dual mandate (they were also members of their national legislature).

• Dual mandates have the advantage of strengthening links between the EP and national parliaments, but the disadvantage of reducing the amount of time and energy that is available for each post. Reacting to an increasingly accepted view that being a MEP should be a full-time job, a Council Decision in 2002 abolished the dual mandate.

• The turnover of MEPs is certainly higher than in most national parliaments. In 2009 50% MEPs were returnees.

• As in national parliaments, women are under-represented (35% in the 2009 EP).

• In the 2009 elections, amongst those elected were 8 former prime ministers and 1 former president.

The multi-site problem

• The work of the EP is carried out on three sites in three different countries: Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg.

• This situation is clearly unsatisfactory and is a source of grievance and annoyance for most MEPs.

• If the EP had just one base, preferably Brussels, it is likely that EP’s efficiency, influence and visibility would all be increased. However hard lobbying from France and Luxembourg has ensured that such an arrangement will not be easy.

Relative Independence• Compared with most national parliaments the EP

enjoys considerable independence. • A major reason for this independence is the

special institutional setting in which the EP operates.

• A second, and closely related reason is the lack of any clear and consistent identification, of either a positive or negative kind, between the EP and the EU.

• A third reason is that the EP is entitled to adopt its own Rules of Procedures.

Important organisational positions and bodies

• The President of the EP is elected to office for a 2,5 year term. The President shall direct all the activities of EP and of its bodies.

• The Bureau consists of the President and the EP’s 14 Vice-Presidents and is also elected for a 2,5 term. Bureau deals with various financial and administrative organisational matters.

• To assist it in its duties regarding financial and administrative matters 5 elected Quaestors sit in the Bureau in an advisory capacity.

Important organisational positions and bodies(cont.)

• Organisational matters, other than matters of routine are the responsibility of the Conference of Presidents, which is composed of the EP President and the chairs of the political groups.

• The Conference of Committee Chairs brings together the chairs of EP committees on a monthly basis.

• The Conference of Delegation Chairs brings together the chairs of the EP’s 35 delegations. These delegations are:– Interparliamentary delegations to maintain contact with non EU

countries that are not seeking EU membership.– Joint parliamentary committees to maintain contacts with the

countries that are seeking membership and/or have association agreements with the EU.

– EP delegations to five multilateral assemblies including the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly and the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly .

The committees of the EP• Two main types: • The first and most important are standing or permanent

committees (20 of them in 2009-14 Parliament).• The second are ad hoc committees. Which are established to

investigate specific problems and topics.• MEPs are assigned to the standing committees at the

beginning and half way through each 5-year term. Assignment to ad hoc committees is as required.

• The standing committees perform various duties, such as exploring ideas with the COM, fostering own initiative reports, and discussing developments with the President-in-Office of the Council. The most important task of most of them is to examine COM proposals for legislation.

Proceeding a proposal1. Each proposal is referred to an appropriate committee.2. The responsibility for drawing up the committee’s report is

entrusted to a rapporteur.3. A first draft is produced for consideration.4. The rapporteur acts as the committee’s principal spokesperson

when the report is considered in the plenary.5. Where the ordinary legislative applies, the role and activity of

committees at the 2nd reading stage are similar to those at the 1st reading. They examine the proposal and make recommendations to the plenary.

6. The committee that has dealt with a proposal at the 1st and 2nd readings is not directly concerned with the proceedings if a conciliation committee is convened under the co-decision procedure. However, the EP delegation to a conciliation committee always includes some members of the committee concerned, including the chairperson and the rapporteur.

Factors determining the influence of EP Committees

• The significance of the policy area within the EU system.

• The extent of EU policy development.• The power of the EP within the policy area.• Committee expertise.• Committee chairmanship.• Committee cohesiveness.

Plenary meetings• There are 12 full plenary meetings or part-sessions as they are

officially known each year.• The sessions are held in Strasbourg and last Monday to Thursday.• In addition there are six mini-plenaries held each year. They usually

take up to two half-days and are held in Brussels. • The agenda for plenaries is drafted by the President and the

Conference of Presidents in consultation with the Conference of Committee Chairs and the EP Secretariat.

• Full plenaries have three standard elements: the bread-and-butter business, debates on topical and urgent matters, and question times with the Council and COM.

• There is also a number of other possible agenda items.• Attendance in the chamber is poor, political group leaders and

committee spokespersons dominate the time, the order of speakers and the amount of time they have are pre-arranged, translation problem limits spontaneity (23 languages), and much immediacy is lost by the practice of taking most votes in clusters at allocated voting times rather than at the end of debates.

EP’s own efforts for an increased role• An incrementalist approach, in which the EP has used its existing

powers to the full and done whatever it can to determine how far these powers can be pressed.

• A maximalist approach, directed at achieving fundamental reform of interinstitutional relations, and especially increasing the powers of the Parliament vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers.

• Notwithstanding the increased powers and influence it has secured, the EP is still widely viewed as not being a proper parliament.

• It cannot overthrow a government; its formal legislative powers remain weaker than those of national parliaments; and in some important spheres of EU policy activity – notably EMU and foreign and defense policies – it is largely confined to information-receiving and consultative roles.

• The extent to which there is a “formal powers gap” between EP and national parliaments has greatly narrowed (even more after LT).

• However, when assessing the importance of the EP we should not be restricted to its formal capabilities.