N IU AR I Africa Research - National Intelligence Universityni-u.edu/research/ARI_Newsletter_Feb_2015.pdfThe National Intelligence University: The Center of Academic Life for the Intelligence

AfricaResearchInitiative

Second Edition — March 2015

UINKNOWLEDGE IS ENLIGHTENMENT

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCEU N I V E R S I T Y

1962

NATIO

NAL

IN

TELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY

scientia est lux lucis

Newsletter of the Africa Research Initiative

Center for Strategic Intelligence ResearchCSIR DirectorMichael Petersen, [email protected],Michael.b.petersen@coe. ic.gov,(202) 231-5004

Africa Research InitiativeARI Chief ResearcherKris Inman, PhDKRISTIE.Inman2@ dodiis.mil,[email protected],(202) 231-5488

ARI Research AssistantPhuong HoangPhuong.hoang@ dodiis.mil,[email protected],(202) 231-6536

The views expressed in this paper are those of the editor and contributors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its components.

Letter from the National Intelligence University President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Symposium Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Data Corner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Islam in Africa Research Centers . . . . . . . 27Select Scholars who Work on Islam in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28John T . Hughes Library Selected Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Research and Research Fellowships at the National Intelligence University’s Center for Strategic Intelligence Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Africa Research Initiative Report . . . . . . . 37

Regional Expertise and Culture Program, Africa Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Issue Highlights

ARI

By Ms. Theresa Whelan, National Intelligence Officer for Africa

As we approach the halfway point in the second decade of the 21st century, the African continent continues to dem-onstrate that it is one of the most dynamic regions on the globe—economically, politically, militarily, and socially . It remains a study in extremely stark contrasts, with some of the highest economic growth rates in the world co-existing with the greatest levels of poverty . Similarly, it boasts greater potential than ever before as a source of natural resources that could be leveraged to benefit people on the continent, yet governance limitations, in both management and span of control, have left the majority of Africans still living without power and/or easy access to water . Some longstanding civil wars and insurgent conflicts have finally been resolved, but new and potentially even more destabi-lizing security threats have emerged as technology enables non-state actors—rebels, terrorists, and criminals alike—to pose serious challenges to the integrity and authority of today’s African states . Although the African independence movement occurred years before the “Arab Spring,” with African states making dramatic, and sometimes violent,

Contributions from:

Dr. Felicitas Becker

Dr. Liazzat J.K. Bonate

Dr. Kristin Doughty

Dr. Ashley E. Leinweber

Dr. Sebastian Elischer

Dr. Alice Kang

Dr. Audra Grant

Islam in Africa

Symposium

Continued on Page 25

ARI Newsletter, March 20152

Letter from the PresidentThe National Intelligence University: The Center of Academic Life for the Intelligence CommunityBy Dr. David R. Ellison, Rear Admiral, United States Navy (Ret.), President, National Intelligence University

This is an exciting time for the National Intelligence University (NIU), as it begins its second half-century with deep roots and a bright future . Established in 1962, the institution has grown in stature and impact over the years, with a mission, curriculum, and student body that have evolved to meet the increasingly complex challenges to the national security of the United States .

Building on more than 50 years of experience delivering rigorous academic programs, NIU today provides career profes-sionals with a rigorous and collaborative joint-learning environment to develop critical thinking and analytical skills, con-duct research on real-world problems, and build trust and mutual understanding that will last a lifetime . Its three degree programs—the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence, the Master of Science and Technology Intelligence, and the Bachelor of Science in Intelligence—are augmented by a growing number of graduate certificates on specialized topics .

In addition to the main campus in Washington, DC, NIU now boasts five academic centers, including the Southern Academic Center in Tampa, Florida, and the European Academic Center at RAF Molesworth in the United Kingdom . The student body has grown to include more than 700 current students from across the U .S . intelligence and national security communities, taught by 149 highly qualified full- and part-time faculty members .

I invite you to explore the National Intelligence University website (www .ni-u .edu) . You will find a broad and rigorous curriculum, as well as a growing research program focused on some of the toughest national security challenges .

One of the most exciting developments in recent years has been the expansion of NIU contributions to the literature of intelligence and scholarly research conducted by the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research (CSIR) . The newslet-ter you are reading now is one of the results of that expansion . It grows out of NIU’s new Africa Research Initiative, an effort to harness NIU’s research capabilities by both conducting research on security issues related to sub-Saharan Africa and reaching out to academic expertise for support with difficult analytic challenges on the continent . This combination of research conducted on behalf of the Intelligence Community with outreach to academia successfully leverages the strengths of both by bringing in important scholarly voices to official discussions on global security .

The research featured in this newsletter also resonates well in the classroom . It exposes students to cutting-edge work conducted by top-flight scholars in academia and the Intelligence Community . Ultimately, research like this will inform policy and analysis, as NIU’s students go on to serve the United States in a wide variety of positions in the military and civilian agencies .

In addition, NIU takes very seriously its mission of contributing its own scholarly research on key regions and issues . NIU faculty members produce, publish, and present a broad and diverse array of research, including work on Africa, the Middle East, Central and South Asia, cyber issues, and science and technology . Much of the research NIU pro-duces has made a positive contribution to intelligence, national security, and policymaking circles .

My vision for NIU is to serve as the center of academic life for the Intelligence Community . In this position, it can encourage, develop, and promote the natural analytic ties between academia and the Intelligence Community . In my experience, IC personnel derive great benefit from the tremendous subject matter expertise found in academia, and promoting ties between the two is in the best interests of the nation as a whole . NIU therefore serves many purposes . It provides a first-class education to U .S . Intelligence Community personnel, fosters and encourages top-flight research on national and global security issues, and forges connections to academia by reaching out to universities around the country and the world . This is indeed an exciting time for the university .

ARI Newsletter, March 2015 3

Symposium ArticlesIslam in AfricaRadical Rhetoric and Real-Life Pragmatism in East African Islam, by Dr . Felicitas Becker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Between Da’wa and Development: Three Transnational Islamic Nongovernmental Organizations in Mozambique, 1980–2010, by Dr . Liazzat J .K . Bonate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Stories of Resistance: Muslims in the Rwandan Genocide, by Dr . Kristin Doughty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Islam in Congo: A Minority’s Journey from Colonial Repression to Post-conflict Organization, by Dr . Ashley E . Leinweber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14The Management of Salafi Activity in Africa: African State Strategies and their Consequences in the Sahel, by Dr . Sebastian Elischer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17The Politics of Women’s Rights in Muslim Countries: An Illustration from Niger, by Dr . Alice Kang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Evolving Sufi Organizations in North Africa, by Dr . Audra Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Radical Rhetoric and Real-Life Pragmatism in East African IslamBy Dr. Felicitas Becker, University Lecturer in African History, Cambridge University, [email protected]

Compared to the drawn-out battle with Al-Shabaab occurring in the Horn of Africa, violent Islamic radi-calism is much less active in East Africa (defined here as Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) . But the attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2013 highlighted the threat of the region getting caught up in Al-Shabaab’s vortex of violence . Nonetheless, while the possibility of an increase in violent religious conflict is real, there is reason to think violence will remain limited .

The position of Islamists and the likelihood of their turning violent must be assessed separately, in politi-cal context, for each country in the region . Moreover, the salience of radical, at times jihadist, rhetoric in East Africa should not be taken too readily as a predictor of events . For reasons of culture and politics, radical

rhetoric is far more widespread than the commitment to violent action . There are strong countervailing forces to violent radicalization in East Africa . Unfortunately, there is no good way of distinguishing armchair radicals from actual ones, and kneejerk reactions against the for-mer would be unhelpful .

The Westgate Mall attack was not the first terror attack in the region . East Africa was put on the map as a theater of Islamist terrorism by the 1998 U .S . Embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi . The attacks killed over 200 people, the vast majority of them Kenyans with no connection to the embassy, and first brought Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to the attention of a wider Western public . In 2010, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the bombing of a bar in Kampala, Uganda, that killed over 70 patrons watching a televised World Cup soccer game . Evidently, international Islamist terrorism is able to use East Africa as a staging ground . But this is hardly surprising, as major terrorist attacks have occurred even in European countries with small Muslim minorities and no chance of major Muslim-Christian confrontations .


Grassroots Muslin Communities: A Different Picture

The activities of these international networks, then, tell us little about the state of grassroots Muslim communi-ties in East Africa . If we consider those, a different and very diverse picture emerges . South Asian Shia minori-ties coexist with predominantly Shafiite African Mus-lims, some of whom are affiliated with Sufi orders, and all of them live side by side with no less diverse Christian communities .1 All governments in the region combine official secularism and commitment to freedom of wor-ship with strong support for organized religion and its role in civil society .2 As Muslims are keenly aware, the upper levels of administration and politics are domi-nated by Christians . Nevertheless, in this multi-religious setting, coexistence, not conflict, is the default .3

The region’s historical Muslim heartland, on the Swahili coast, is divided between a Kenyan north and a Tanza-nian south . Islamic political mobilization proceeded separately in the two countries, reflecting the different concerns and methods of the two political systems . In Kenya, Muslims remain concentrated on the coast, in the Somali northeast, and in enclaves scattered across rural districts and the capital . While Muslim activists claim up to 30 percent of the population, other observers put the numbers between 10 and 20 percent . In keeping with the high degree of politicization of ethnic identities in Kenya, Muslims are closely identified with certain ethnic groups, above all Somali and Swahili, both of which have produced separatist movements in the past .

The separatist movement of the coast had petered out after independence in 1963, and Muslim discontent only took political shape again in the 1990s as the Islamic Party of Kenya . After some communal violence, this party fell prey to a mixture of official repression and internal disor-ganization . Since then, Muslim discontent has flared up in occasional violence, especially around elections, and mostly in the main coastal city, Mombasa . That city was also the site of operations of radical clerics in the recent past, the best known of whom, Aboud Rogo, was assas-sinated in 2012 . In keeping with the violent undercurrent in Kenya’s political culture, such targeted assassinations and the street violence that typically follows them have become regular events in the last few years .

In Tanzania, Muslims make up a higher percentage of the population; their leaders would argue that they are in the majority . Hard information on this point is unob-tainable, but they are certainly at least a third of the population . Except on the Zanzibar Islands, their ethnic affiliations are less important than in Kenya . Over the last decade, the presence of Salafi reformists in Tanzania, which caused a good deal of disquiet among Muslims and Christians since the 1980s, has lost its novelty value . Overall, the incidence of communal violence has actually declined relative to a peak around the year 2000, though 2013 saw a new spike with unrest around a rumored des-ecration of the Quran .

The exception to the relatively calm picture is the Zanzibar archipelago, where the uamsho (awakening) movement of Muslim preachers has inherited the mantle of political opposition from the Islamist Civic United Front party, which has been co-opted into the government . Here, the distinction between “real” Zanzibaris and recent immi-grants has taken on great political importance . Separat-ists demand the dissolution of the union between the islands and the mainland and portray the islands’ Islamic identity as under threat from mainland influence . Pro-tests regularly turn violent, and government repression is heavy handed, with election manipulation, large-scale arrests, “disappearances,” and disregard for the judicial process taking place .

In Uganda, Muslims lack both the numerical strength they have in Tanzania (they form about 12 percent of the population) and the deep historical and cultural roots they have on the Swahili coast . Sidelined since their defeat in a religious civil war in the late 19th century, they are only marginally represented in government and higher education . Association with the discredited regime of Idi Amin and the strong influence of American evangelicals in the country marginalize them further . In recent years, occasional violent confrontations have often focused on conversion from Islam to Christianity .

One factor that unites Muslim radicals across the region is a narrative of Muslim victimhood . Given the very real connections between Christianization and the kind of formal education that facilitates access to higher admin-istrative jobs—and the consequent dominance of Chris-tians in this sphere—Muslims’ sense of disadvantage is in some ways well founded . In a context of widespread,


persistent poverty, access to government resources and influence constitutes a significant privilege . Moreover, the association between Christianity and colonialism enables them to think of Islam as the historical and more authentically African religion . The most elaborate nar-rative of victimhood focuses on Zanzibar, where people with no historical links to its former Omani elite now identify with the bitterness over this elite’s dispossession in the 1964 revolution and the subsequent unification with mainland Tanzania .4

Interpreting Radical Rhetoric

Potential sources of Christian-Muslim conflict, then, are not hard to find . Muslim preachers, whose sermons are traded across the region by DVD and audio tape and made available online in major urban centers, appear to confirm the problem . They are vocal about the disadvan-tages Muslims face, their lack of political scope, and the unwelcome interference by governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations in their community affairs . Occasionally, they appear to defend jihad, and typically they defend a deeply patri-archal vision of society based on the application of their understanding of Sharia law .

But outside observers must be careful to consider how these preachers’ claims are actually understood, used, and lived by their audiences, and how they inform, or fail to inform, their listeners’ actions . There are at least three reasons why it would be a mistake to take these preach-ers too literally . One of them is East Africa’s tradition of hyperbolic political speech . Another is the connection between this radical rhetoric and generational conflict, and a third is the listeners’ pragmatic resignation to liv-ing in an imperfect world .

Speech Traditions

First, colorful and at times threatening political rhetoric has been a feature of politics in the region since before independence . Even Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, known for his relatively low-key, didactic style, described his nation as being “at war” for progress against poverty, ignorance, and illness . During preparations for independence, a sheikh on the Kenyan coast warned his co-religionists, only half-jokingly, that they risked being enslaved and sold by Christians if they did not catch up in formal

education .5 Former Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi contrived to make an elaborate ideology out of nyayoism (nyayo being “footprints” in Swahili), insisting that he would follow in the footprints of his deceased predeces-sor Jomo Kenyatta .

This kind of hyperbolic speech is not meant to be fol-lowed to the letter; its usefulness lies partly in its vague-ness . Sometimes rhetorical consensus is built around commitments that the participants know will not be kept, as the anthropologist Angelique Haugerud has described for the anti-beer-brewing campaigns at the beginning of Moi’s presidency .6 Islamist rhetoric partakes in this political culture, where assertive claims can be used to get heard, claim public space, and assert loyalties, rather than to prescribe action . For outside observers, it can be hard to tell whether this kind of speech will be acted upon .

Generational Conflict

Adding to the difficulty of assessing radical rhetoric is the political salience of generational conflict in East Africa . It encourages a form of youth radicalism that is ultimately self-limiting . Elaborate age-grade systems characterize particularly the pastoralist (nomadic and cattle-keeping) societies of East Africa . But for agricul-tural societies, too, younger men’s desperation to acquire the wherewithal to establish themselves as elders (heads of large households with large fields) has been shown to have fed the Mau Mau violent anti-colonial activism in Kenya .7 Similarly, in the mid-2000s, I found young Mus-lim radicals, lacking land and opportunity to establish themselves as household heads, praising the example of an early companion of the Prophet who killed his own father in battle .8 This did not imply that they were getting ready to murder their parents; it was a way to demonstratively reject paternal authority .

As with many radical causes, for a significant number of adherents, Islamic radicalism is a “phase” that they will outgrow as they find other ways to make lives for themselves . Nevertheless, it is possible that one or two of the perhaps three dozen young radicals that I heard discussing the example of the Prophet’s follower have since taken further steps into the world of Islamist ter-ror . Even the most astute observer is unlikely to have predicted who those one or two would be . This makes preventative action extremely difficult .


Beliefs Tempered by Pragmatism

The third point is perhaps the most important and the most complicated . It is possible to hold certain views quite genuinely but nevertheless not seek to live them . Moreover, this is not just hypocrisy; it is based on the recognition that “this is just not the world we live in .” For example, in Dar es Salaam, two young women worked as housemaids in middle-class households and at the same time strongly endorsed the views of a cleric who insists that women should not work outside their own homes . They were typical rural-urban migrants, very poor and subject to the long hours, harsh discipline, and low pay that characterize domestic employment .

These women gave no indication that holding these jobs weighed on their conscience . The reason they worked, as they put it, was ugumu wa maisha, “the hardship of life .” Given their families’ economic needs, they simply had no alternative . To them, their favorite cleric’s inveigh-ing against women’s work was less about a prohibition than it was about the prospect of not having to work . It evoked the hope for a different, easier life without imply-ing that such a life was actually possible . Similarly, when Muslim preachers invoke the ideal of a perfectly Islamic society, with all the differential rights and strictures such a society would entail for different creeds and genders, most listeners will take them as utopian . The world the preachers depict, then, is something to be striven toward within the limits of the listeners’ possibilities rather than to be realized to the letter . (It should also be noted that the preachers’ views themselves are very diverse, with the majority opposed to violent action and many relatively moderate on issues such as women’s rights .)

Two factors in particular encourage this pragmatic approach to grand religio-political projects . The first is the networked, interdependent character of social life . Ordinary East Africans depend heavily on family, neigh-borhood, and personal networks to smooth over a myriad of smaller and larger economic shocks . These networks often cut across religious boundaries and always demand a great deal of tolerance . Family and other close relation-ships sometimes fall far short of cherished ideals yet have to be handled with great tact and patience . Difficult com-promises are routine in these contexts .9

The second factor is the listeners’ experience with the obsolescence of political utopias . Islamic utopias are but

the latest in a long line of grand political projects that East Africans have encountered since the mid-20th cen-tury . Nationalism and socialism, planned or market-led development, and revivalist Christianity have all offered their own versions of a shining future .10 None of them has quite come to pass, and skepticism of promises of societal transformation has become deeply entrenched . Some observers make much of Africans’ tendency to reason religiously about political problems, but they are as likely to reason soberly and quite realistically .11

Some, particularly among the young, will reject others’ resignation to the imperfections of human society, and they are the ones most likely to turn violent . But it would take very accomplished and very cynical demagoguery to make inter-religious tension win out against the part-dogged, part-enlightened pragmatism that helps most people survive . The potential for this to happen is great-est in the Zanzibar archipelago, where Islamism mixes with separatism and cultural nationalism . Here, the tiny Christian minority would be bound to suffer, but the main line of conflict runs between pro-independence and “unionist” Muslims .

Notes

1 There is no one comprehensive study on contempo-rary East African Islam . For Kenya, see Arye Oded, Islam and Politics in Kenya (Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner, 2000); for Uganda, see Arye Oded, Islam in Uganda (London: Transaction Publishers, 1974); for Tanzania, see August Nimtz, Islam and Politics in East Africa: The Sufi Orders in Tanzania (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), and Felicitas Becker, Becoming Muslim in Mainland Tanzania, 1890–2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) . On Christianity, see Thomas Spear and Isariah Kimambo, East African Expressions of Christianity (Oxford: James Currey, 1999) .2 On Tanzania, see David Westerlund, Ujamaa na dini (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1980), and Frider Ludwig, Church and State in Tanzania (Leiden: Brill, 1999) . On Kenya, see Galia Sabar, Church, State and Society in Kenya: From Mediation to Opposition, 1963–1993 (London: Frank Cass, 2002) . On the region as a whole, see Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle, eds ., Religion and Politics in East Africa: The Period since Independence (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1995) .


3 On Muslim views of their place in the political system, see Roman Loimeier, “Perceptions of Marginalisation,” in Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, ed . Benjamin Soares and Rene Otayek (London: Palgrave, 2007) . On Muslim-Christian coexistence, see Bruce Heilman and Paul Kaiser, “Religion, Identity and Politics in Tanzania,” Third World Quarterly 230 (2002): 691–709 .

4 On this revolution and the violence that accompanied it, see Jonathon Glassman, War of Words, War of Stones: Racial Thought and Violence in Colonial Zanzibar (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011) . On the sense of dispossession, see Loimeier, “Perceptions of Marginalisation,” and Roman Loimeier, Between Social Skills and Marketable Skills: The Politics of Islamic Education in 20th Century Zanzibar (Leiden: Brill, 2009) .

5 Kai Kresse, Philosophising in Mombasa (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) .

6 Angelique Haugerud, The Culture of Politics in Mod-ern Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) .

7 Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa, 2 vols . (Oxford: James Currey, 1993) .

8 Felicitas Becker, “Rural Islamism during the ‘War on Terror’: A Tanzanian Case Study,” African Affairs 105 (2006): 583–603 .

9 On survival in urban Dar es Salaam during structural adjustment, see Aili Mari Tripp, Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy in Tanzania (Berkeley: University of Califor-nia Press, 1997) .

10 From among a sizable literature, see especially Derek Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), and Susan Geiger, TANU Women (Portsmouth, NH: Heine-mann, 1997) .

11 On African views of politics as intrinsically religious, see Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar, Worlds of Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) .

Between Da’wa and Development: Three Transnational Islamic Nongovernmental Organizations in Mozambique, 1980–2010By Dr. Liazzat J.K. Bonate, Assistant Professor, History of Africa, Seoul National University, [email protected]

The expansion and influence of transnational Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Mozambique since the end of the civil war in 1992 have been consider-able . The three most influential such NGOs in Mozam-bique between the 1980s and 2010 have been the Muslim World League (ar-Rabita al-Alami al-Islami, known as Rabita in Mozambique), Africa Muslim Agency (AMA, Lajnat Muslimi Ifriqyia), and the World Islamic Call Society (WICS, Al-Da’wa al Islamiyya) .

Launching of the NGOs

Mozambique experienced a widespread surge of civil society organizations in the 1990s, prompted by the 1987 introduction of the International Monetary Fund/World Bank–sponsored Structural Adjustment Program (known locally as the Economic Recovery Program) to tackle economic decline, the end of civil war in 1992, and espe-cially the first democratic general elections in 1994, when the Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front) government declared development as its political mainstay .1 Although a few NGOs, such as World Vision International (1983), Oxfam International (1984), Medecines Sans Frontieres (1984), and Care International (1986), arrived during the civil war (1976–1992) to address the refugees’ situation and other war-related crises, the number of NGOs in the country in the early 1990s soared to 200 . On the surface, the rise of the Islamic NGOs in Mozambique, as in the rest of Africa, seems to have happened in tandem with that of other civil society organizations, which emerged in response to the poor performance of the post-colonial state and the generalized economic stagnation of the continent in the 1980s .2 While this point might be con-sidered correct to some extent, the three NGOs analyzed here reveal that the political context and the objectives of the Mozambican government were instrumental for the emergence of Rabita, while AMA and WICS surfaced as a result of inter-Muslim competition in the country . At the same time, Rabita appeared before any Christian, and probably any secular, NGO did .


In 1980, the Saudi-based Rabita began negotiating with the Frelimo government for ways to facilitate the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina) for Mozam-bican Muslims .3 At the time, the government was still pursuing a socialist economic model that banned asso-ciations and thus did not allow any form of civil society, including NGOs . In addition, the government actively persecuted all forms of religiosity, be they institutional, personal, or communal, since its adoption of the official Marxist-Leninist ideology in 1977 . The Frelimo’s major concern in 1980 was the raging civil war spearheaded by the Renamo (Mozambican National Resistance) move-ment . The belief that northern Mozambican Muslims were channeling their discontent with the government to Muslim countries, which in turn were aiding resur-gent opposition groups such as Renamo, precipitated Frelimo’s dealings with Rabita . But in order to accom-modate Rabita’s concerns, the Frelimo government had to tackle three problems: there was no nationwide Mus-lim organization through which to channel funds for the hajj, the official policy was still anti-religious, and there were no legal instruments dealing with religious bodies, let alone NGOs .

The Frelimo began by launching a national Islamic umbrella organization . In January 1981, the state officials and a group of Maputo imams inaugurated the Islamic Council of Mozambique and elected Abubacar Ismael “Mangira,” of Indian ancestry, as its co-coordinator (and later its national secretary) .4 A decisive point in his favor was his background as a graduate of the Islamic University of Medina . Local Muslims dubbed Mangira a Wahhabi and viewed him as someone who pursued “purification” of local Islam through conflicts with Sufis, whom he consistently called “ignoramuses” and propo-nents of bid’a (abominable religious innovations) . He unsuccessfully sought to collaborate with the colonial regime but managed to win over the post-independence state officials .

As a way of overcoming the other two problems, the Fre-limo radically changed its policy toward religion in 1982 and let religious organizations operate freely as long as they were registered with the newly established Depart-ment for Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Justice . The expectation was that Mangira’s government-backed Islamic Council would be registered with the Depart-ment for Religious Affairs . However, Muslims who

opposed Mangira’s religio-ideological outlook quickly unveiled and registered their own organization, the Islamic Sunni Congress of Mozambique . The Frelimo, under severe pressure to divert Muslims from support-ing the Renamo by letting them perform the hajj, was not interested in meddling in inter-Muslim squabbling . By the time Mangira went to register his organization, the government had already introduced the Islamic Sunni Congress of Mozambique as the official national Islamic organization to Rabita, which began organizing the hajj through the Islamic Congress .

While Mangira’s Islamic Council eventually became a mouthpiece of Islamism in Mozambique and a central-ized top-down organization disseminating funds from the center in Maputo to the peripheries of the coun-try, the Congress agglomerated a group of associations and confraternities, such as Sufi orders and the Indian Sunni association called Comunidade Moametana, each of which led a quasi-autonomous legal and financial existence (though traditionally the Indian Comunidade offered some material support to African Sufi breth-ren) . Mangira apparently felt let down and subsequently embarked upon a competition with the congress for the patronage of the Frelimo party as well as of the international Islamic organizations . In response to the Congress’s alleged association with Rabita, the Council secured a visit of the Secretary General of the AMA of Kuwait in July 1984, which paved the way for a very inti-mate and long-term cooperation between the AMA and the Council .5

Escalating the rivalry further, the Congress in 1984 established relationships with the Islamic World Fed-eration, World Muslim Congress, and Muslim World Relief, while the Council began collaborating with the Southern African Islamic Youth Conference and the Islamic Development Bank in 1985 and with Al-Azhar and WICS in 1986 .6 It is surprising that WICS was close to the Islamist-oriented Council, despite Muammar Qaddafi’s purported abhorrence of Islamism and sympa-thy to Sufism . It disbursed funds to the Islamic Council to support the hajj and gave scholarships to study at its Tripoli-based Kuliyat al-Da’wa college throughout the late 1980s up until 1993, when its activities in Mozam-bique were stalled due to United Nations sanctions against Libya, according to the NGO’s officers inter-viewed in 2009 . WICS reopened its office in Maputo in


1999 following Qaddafi’s turn to Africa, when he pro-claimed the death of his pan-Arabism and the beginning of his wider involvement in the continent, the move he linked to his particular brand of pan-Africanism .7 This resulted in the rapprochement between the Mozambican government and Libya .

Da’wa and Development

All three NGOs considered here emerged primarily as da’wa (Islamic proselytizing) missionary societies that aimed at explaining principles and teachings of Islam and addressing the welfare of Muslims . Islamic chari-table work is generally considered a form of da’wa “and part of [a] broader struggle to achieve more Islamic (and therefore more just) society .”8 The ideological out-looks of both Rabita and AMA are close to Islamism . As Egbert Harmsen puts it, “In the more conservative Islamist view . . . a truly pious life leads to social harmony . Islam stands for what is good, hence working for better social environment is often perceived first and foremost in Islamic terms .”9

Until 1993, Rabita had an office with only one person, the country representative in Mozambique, and worked through both the Council and the Congress as well as the AMA by organizing and financing the hajj, building mosques and madrasas, distributing free copies of the Qur’an and other Islamic literature, and training Muslim teachers, leaders, imams, and legal experts, who were also sent for education in Islamic institutions, universi-ties, and advanced seminaries in Saudi Arabia . In 1986, the Indian Comunidade Maometana left the Congress and became a separate organization oriented toward Indian Sufi centers and South Africa . Although the Con-gress continued receiving financial support from Rabita, its economic base was considerably weakened .

Meanwhile, the Council and AMA grew ever closer, and in some parts of Mozambique, they were perceived as one and the same organization .10 The predominance of Islamism in these two organizations aggravated internal conflicts among Muslims that had been latent since the colonial period . The ideological discord between Sufis and the Islamists often ended in physical violence, police intervention, and imprisonment of the protagonists of the conflicts . Funerals and related rituals of ziyara (pilgrimage) and dhikr (ritual prayer) were often at the

center of this type of violence to the point that many families were split because of their differences . Another public manifestation of the conflict has been the “Moon Issue,” regarding the exact time to start and end fasting (during the month of Ramadan) . While the Islamists normally begin fasting after the radio or TV announce-ment from Mecca, Sufis uphold the more traditional way of following the movement of the moon .

After the end of the civil war in 1992, both Rabita and AMA focused more on humanitarian actions that were coordinated with the Mozambican government, although the old da’wa campaigns also continued . The main rea-son for this transformation was the economic liberaliza-tion and the Structural Adjustment, but the emergence of both secular and Christian NGOs that became promi-nent and often efficient in emergency relief operations, humanitarian aid, and development projects was also a factor . Along with their developmentalist agenda, some Christian NGOs undertook proselytization in rural and economically disadvantaged communities, including the historically Muslim ones, which alarmed Muslims . In 1993, Rabita stopped collaborating directly with AMA (allegedly because of its corruption) and with the Congress (because of its reliance on Sufis) but continued a close relationship with the Islamic Council . The same year, Rabita signed an agreement with the Mozambican state on emergency relief assistance, whereby the NGO was to donate money and goods—including food and sanitation, medical-surgical instruments, seeds, water supply equipment, and medicine—in emergency and natural disaster situations .11 The other donated goods were to be distributed to commercial establishments to be sold in order to generate funds . The Mozambican government offered tax exemptions and took responsi-bility for organizing the distribution of the donations and for coordinating the relief operations .

AMA’s aid and relief efforts to local populations were small-scale until the late 1990s, when the organization decided that the scope of da’wa should be more compre-hensive and include development projects to raise the standard of living of Africans in general and Muslims in particular . In 1999, the NGO changed its name to Direct Aid International to highlight its focus on humanitarian relief efforts, and in Mozambique it signed an agreement with the government to coordinate related activities .


WICS had similar da’wa visions and activities as Rabita and AMA, despite also disseminating the idiosyncratic thoughts of Colonel Qaddafi (in particular his Green Book) and sending students to study in the Society’s col-lege in Tripoli . In the late 2000s, although the Green Book and other examples of Qaddafi’s works were still present in the library of the NGO, the stress was on learning the Qur’an and the Arabic language . Because of its association with the Islamic Council, WICS in Mozambique was anti-Sufi and generally pro-Salafist . Its local office was staffed with graduates of the Saudi universities, whom the NGO left to define the contents of their proselytizing message .

In 2010, the developmental work of all three NGOs revolved around charitable works for the poor and vul-nerable, which they coordinated with the government of Mozambique and United Nations agencies . To sum up their activities, all three built houses for the poor, opened wells, supported at least one association of people liv-ing with HIV/AIDS and one orphanage, gave a monthly stipend for schooling and basic needs to orphaned chil-dren, provided sewing classes for poor women, built schools, classrooms, and clinics, and contributed to gov-ernment emergency relief operations during disasters . At the request of Muslims, all three NGOs built mosques and madrasas, offered classes on Islam and the Arabic language, distributed free Islamic literature (especially the Qur’an), sponsored children and youth at schools and universities both abroad and in country, and offered small amounts of money to those individuals who came to their offices requesting it . In addition, since 1999 and until the demise of the Qaddafi regime in 2012, WICS combined da’wa with food and medical convoys sent to poor countries, including Mozambique, which included physicians and nurses who provided free medical assis-tance during their stay . It also helped to set up and finance community radio stations .

Why did all three NGOs rely on Islamists for their work? In the case of Rabita and AMA, the answer is perhaps that they both had the Islamist outlook of the Gulf, the Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia and Salafism of Kuwait . But even if they wanted to employ or collaborate with other Muslims, their choices were limited because they are Arab NGOs, so only those who could speak fluently and write in Arabic could deal with their functioning . Second, the concept of da’wa means that those who undertake it must have a certain degree of education and

proficiency in Islamic religious teachings, and most of the people who have a university degree in Islamic stud-ies in Mozambique are graduates of Saudi universities, although there are a small number of graduates of Libyan, Sudanese, and Egyptian Islamic establishments as well . Third, from the Islamic perspective, it is an act of char-ity to hire these graduates because even they have few job opportunities in a country in which Islamic religious education is not widely sought or that does not have a great job market, as Muslims make up only 18 percent of the total population . And finally, the Islamists share the emancipatory and developmentalist view of Islam that is an underlying principle of all three transnational Islamic NGOs discussed here . As Bjørn Olav Utvik argues:

The Islamist interpretation of the social message of Islam is conducive to economic development, and reminiscent of the Protestant ethics that Max Weber saw as propitious to capitalist development of European guiding principle . . . . Mainstream Islamists are pro-modern stressing the need for economic and technological development.12

Notes

1 Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots? (London: James Currey, 1991); International Monetary Fund, “Republic of Mozambique: Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Policy Framework Paper for April 1999–March 2002,” available at <www .imf .org/external/np/pfp/1999/mozam/INDEX .htm>; James Pfeifer, “Civil Society, NGOs, and the Holy Spirit in Mozambique,” Human Organization 63, no . 3 (2004): 359–371 .2 M .A . Mohamed Salih, “Islamic NGOs in Africa: The Promise and Peril of Islamic Voluntarism,” Occasional Paper, Centre of African Studies, University of Copen-hagen, 2002; Holger Weiss, “Reorganizing Social Welfare among Muslims: Islamic Voluntarism and Other Forms of Communal Support in Northern Ghana,” Journal of Religion in Africa (2002): 83–109 .3 Liazzat J .K . Bonate, “Muslim Religious Leadership in Post-Colonial Mozambique,” South African Historical Journal 60, no . 4 (2008): 637–654 . 4 Archives of the Department for Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Justice of Mozambique, Maputo, “Sintese de Encontro com o Conselho Islâmico de Moçambique,” February 28, 1985 .


5 Archives of the Department for Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Justice of Mozambique, Maputo, Conselho Islâmico de Moçambique, “Visita do Secretário Geral de Africa Muslims Committee de Kuwait,” no . 123/SG/84, Maputo, July 30, 1984 .

6 Archives of the Department for Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Justice of Mozambique, Maputo, “Sintese de Encontro o Ministro da Justiça e Elementos do Con-gresso Islâmico,” Maputo, September 9, 1984; “Conselho Islâmico estabeleceu relações com a Southern African Islamic Youth Conference da África do Sul,” 60/SG/85; “Conselho Islâmico fez contactos com o Banco Islâmico de Desenvolvimento,” August 3, 1985, 522/DAR .MJ/985; “Conselho Islâmico de Moçambique tornou-se benefi-ciente de todas as despesas de hajj pagas pela Jamiya al-Da’wa Islamiyya al-Alamiya de Libya,” 142/SG/1986, Maputo, July 28, 1986; “Conselho Islâmico obteve bolsas atraves da sua congenere de Cairo, Egipto, para a Universidade al-Azhar,” 66/SG/86, April 15, 1986; “Conselho Islâmico assinou acordos com Jamiyyar al-Da’wa e a Universidade de Al-Azhar,” 111/SG/86, June 11, 1986 .

7 Asteris Hulaius, “Qadhafi’s Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s,” African Affairs no . 100 (2001): 5–25; Hussein Solomon and Gerrie Swart, “Libya’s Foreign Policy in Flux,” African Affairs no . 104/ 416 (2005): 469–492 .

8 Martin van Bruinessen, “Islamic Development and Islamic Charities,” ISIM Review 20 (Autumn 2007): 5 .

9 Egbert Harmsen, “Between Empowerment and Paternalism,” ISIM Review 20 (Autumn 2007): 11 .

10 Liazzat J . K . Bonate, “L’Agence des musulmans d’Afrique . Les transformations de l’islam à Pemba au Mozambique,” Afrique Contemporaine no . 231 (2009): 63–80 .

11 Acordo Geral de Cooperação para a Ajuda de Emergência entre o Governo da República de Moçam-bique e a Liga Mundial Islâmica, No . 01/MCOOP/ 0987/1993 .

12 Bjørn Olav Utvik, “Development as Divinely Imposed Duty,” ISIM Review 20 (Autumn 2007): 16–17 .

Stories of Resistance: Muslims in the Rwandan GenocideBy Dr. Kristin Doughty, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, University of Rochester, [email protected]

On an afternoon in November 2002, I met with nearly 50 Rwandan men and women in a mosque on the edge of Lake Mugesera in Rwanda’s Eastern Province . Over sev-eral hours, they described to me and my colleague how the genocide had unfolded there 8 years earlier and told us about the acts of heroism at the mosque that punctu-ated the horrific violence . This conversation was part of 2 weeks of interviews we conducted in Rwanda on behalf of the Collaborative for Development Action (now called the CDA Collaborative Learning Projects) . Our work was part of the Steps toward Conflict Prevention Project, which gathered case studies from around the world to comparatively analyze how people in the midst of con-flicts find strategies to avoid or resist violence . During our research in Rwanda, we sought to learn more about a widespread perception that Muslims, who represent approximately 10 percent of the population, had played a disproportionately small role during the genocide . We conducted 20 individual interviews and 4 group inter-views (of 30, 45, 50, and 14 people each) in areas across Rwanda . The interviews were conducted in Kinyarwanda and French, in people’s homes, offices, and mosques . We spoke with men and women, religious leaders, and con-gregants, including both Muslims and non-Muslims .

Our case study has since been published, along with the other case examples and cross-cutting analysis by Mary Anderson and Marshall Wallace, in Opting Out of War: Strategies to Prevent Violent Conflict (Lynne Rienner Press, 2012) . The book analyzes strategies through which 13 communities were able to exempt themselves from participating in surrounding violence, and develops a generalized approach for inventing strategies to prevent conflict . Anderson and Wallace note, for example, the importance of communities anticipating conflict, main-taining services and internal order, and engaging with armed groups . Here, I revisit the stories people told us in describing the actions of Muslims in Rwanda during the genocide . I present these narratives as a deliberate counterpoint to contemporary framings in much of the Western imagination that conflate Islam with violence . These stories, however brief, serve as powerful examples


where Islam is allied with saving lives, creating inclusive solidarity, and eschewing political violence .

The story of the Rwandan genocide is by now well known . When President Juvénal Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 6, 1994, the government responded with an immediate and carefully orchestrated effort to eradi-cate the Tutsi population, along with any of its political opposition, the final step in a desperate attempt to main-tain political and economic power . The Rwandan Patri-otic Front (RPF), which had come to an uneasy truce with the government in late 1993 after 3 years of civil war, broke their ceasefire and took up arms to stop the geno-cide . For several months, normal life was suspended, and violence and fear reigned . Militias and civilians attacked with guns and traditional weapons, killing people indi-vidually and en masse where they sought safety in schools and churches . Hundreds of thousands of people took to the roads on foot in hopes of escaping the chaos, as the RPF and government forces battled for control of the country . Approximately 800,000 people were killed over just a few months . The social fabric was shredded .

The stories people told us in November 2002 were con-sistent with the now-extensive archive and literature (films, books, poems, autobiographies, and trial tran-scripts) about people’s experiences during the genocide, in terms of how periods of horror were punctuated by moments of humanity . What we want to emphasize in the following excerpts is how, for many people, Muslim sacred spaces and forms of identity were crucial to how they found the courage to resist .

In Kibagabaga, they told us: “Kibagabaga Muslims of all ethnic groups refused any kind of division and remained united . Then Muslims and targeted non-Muslims gath-ered in the mosque compound under the Muslims’ leadership . When the Interahamwe [Hutu paramilitary organization] militia tried to grab Tutsis, every time all the people there shouted for them to go away, telling them as one voice that there was no Tutsi, no Hutu, and that they were all the same, simply human beings . Every time that the Interahamwe came, the group strongly resisted . People who managed to escape from different churches also came and joined the mosque group .

“Kibagabaga Hutus used to go looking for food for their protected Tutsis who were not allowed to go or appear

outside . The group which was based at Kibagabaga mosque used to organize rescue operation[s] for their Tutsi neighbors who were attacked by Interahamwe mili-tia from outside, and brought them to join the mosque group . The mosque group, for example, managed to res-cue one girl of their Tutsi neighbor and his cow which was going to be butchered .

“Then came members of the Presidential Guards . They obliged the mosque group to divide itself into Hutus and Tutsis . A man called Hamza was leading the resistance and manning the main gate . He boldly resisted the idea of separation between Hutus and Tutsis . The Presidential Guards pleaded with the Hutus telling them they have nothing to fear . Hamza refused . They sent a bullet in his forehead and started to shoot randomly in the crowd . People died there and those who escaped ran away in different directions . Even after the mosque attack in Kibagabaga, Muslims continued to protect and take care for Tutsis . Even today one can find people who survived thanks to this kind organization .”1

In Rwamagana, they told us: “Rwamagana Muslims tried to protect their quarter, and non-Muslims who managed to take refuge there survived . At Rwamagana, there were actions to fight killings . People attacked and destroyed the residence of an Interahamwe militia who tried to introduce killings in Rwamagana . Once, militiamen came to kill people in Rwamagana’s Islamic quarter and Muslims who were not even of the same ethnic group nor of the same religion as the targeted people organized a defense to protect them . Someone called Ndahiro and his family, for example, were protected by a Mus-lim resistance group, and his children who were about to be thrown in a toilet were rescued . The councilor of Rwikubo sector in Rwamagana launched an appeal to his population that he wanted to see Tutsi bodies all over the place, and Muslims living in that sector organized burial ceremonies for banana trunks, and told him that they had well accomplished the task .”2

In Mabare, they told us: “When the killings began, Mabare Muslims fought them in the spirit of protecting mankind; some of them even lost their lives there and their mosque was destroyed . The Councilor of Mabare Sector helped the brave Muslims such as Saidi Ndangiza who died as a hero sacrificing himself for others . When Mugesera Com-mune residents started killing Tutsi throwing them in


Mugesera Lake, a group of Mabare Muslims immediately took their pirogue and went to pick those not yet dead out of water . They even took Mugesera men’s pirogues using them in that rescue operation and a strong quarrel arouse between the two opposite hills . There were many brave people who were convinced that they should not allow people to be killed .

“Many Tutsis at risk came to Mabare because we were able to protect them, but we still asked ourselves, why were people heading to the mosque and not to the churches? We used to gather all the provisions of food at the mosque . Some ran away and betrayed the group, telling to the opponents what kind of arms the group had and then serious gun attacks began . The members of the resistance group who survived continued to rescue dying people and when they recovered normal life they were directed to safer places . Sensitization for peace contin-ued among the group members appealing them to leave aside killing ideology .”3

Why these Muslims chose to resist and protect others can be analyzed in many complex ways, which hinge in part on what it means to be “Muslim” and what the “Muslim community” is and was, especially under conditions of disaggregation associated with violence . Without con-clusively addressing those questions here, it is impor-tant to note that people repeatedly told us that “we, as Muslims, said that Muslims have no ethnic identity .” This demonstrates that many Muslims found ways to draw on a form of collective identity and moral belonging that circumvented and even negated the violence, and fur-ther, they found ways to proactively promote that defini-tion of belonging to others .

Two key counter-arguments surface repeatedly in rela-tion to these narratives . First, some argue that Muslims have indeed been accused and convicted before Rwanda’s nationwide genocide trials called gacaca . Indeed, dur-ing a year I spent conducting ethnographic research on Rwanda’s gacaca process, there were a handful of trials against people who self-identified as Muslims, some of which resulted in convictions . Rwandan Muslims them-selves recognize this, of course . As many explained to me in 2002, “As we all know, as the Rwandans say, ‘every fam-ily has a deviant child’ . ”4 That individuals with some level of Muslim identification participated in killings does not negate the importance of the courageous acts of resistance

of people who self-identified as Muslims and who drew on that religious identity and doctrine to shape social behavior during the genocide . Further research could delve more deeply into the robustness and constraints of collective solidarity among Muslims in Rwanda .

Second, some have argued that these stories have to be understood as similar to acts of courage by others who were not Muslim and that therefore the role of Islam is negligible . Indeed, there are prevalent stories of people who risked their lives to save people during the genocide, whether highlighted at genocide memorials or remarked upon in gacaca testimony, and those are equally impor-tant to publicize and celebrate . I do not suggest that the acts of resistance above were uniquely possible through Muslim forms of social solidarity . At the same time, it is important to consider that while across the country, churches were sites of massacres, mosques seem not to have been to the same degree . This is likely connected to the historically marginalized position of Muslims as a group in Rwanda, which perhaps meant that the con-flicting parties did not see them as a threat, which in turn perhaps created more space for action, even though eventually, as the examples show, the Presidential Guard arrived with overwhelming force .

Ultimately, I offer these empirical examples as a counter-narrative to the broader global discourse that often con-flates Islam with violence, while naming acts of kindness or humanitarianism as “Christian” or “Western .” By exten-sion, this trend overlooks ways in which people mobilize precisely the discourse of “being Muslim” to justify acts of humanity, at tremendous risks to themselves . We need only look at current media preoccupations in the United States—with Ebola in West Africa and ISIS in the Middle East—and the portrayal of Muslims and Africans within them to recognize the value of underscoring examples in which African people who self-identified as Muslims demonstrated caring, humanity, courage, and resistance amidst some of the 20th century’s worst violence .

Notes

1 Interview with author, November 2002 .2 Ibid .3 Ibid .4 Ibid .


Islam in Congo: A Minority’s Journey from Colonial Repression to Post-conflict OrganizationBy Dr. Ashley E. Leinweber, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Missouri State University, [email protected]

The Muslim minority of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) experienced intense repression and marginalization during the Belgian colonial period (1885–1960), resulting in a detachment from the state and politics that carried over even after Congolese inde-pendence . Surprisingly, since the end of the two Congo wars in 2002, the Muslim minority has become increas-ingly active in civic life through membership in various associations and even the provision of social services . In particular, there has been a concerted effort to establish Islamic public schools throughout the country . This con-temporary increased involvement represents a signifi-cant break from the minority’s historical experiences .

Colonial Repression

The population of the DRC is over 75 million, of which 50 percent are Catholic, 35 percent Protestant, 5 percent Kimbanguist, and 5–10 percent Muslim . Islam arrived in eastern Congo in the pre-colonial period (circa 1860) as Swahili-Arab traders from the east African coast penetrated the interior as far as present-day Maniema Province . They did not have religious conversion as their main goal; rather, they were interested in the vast amount of ivory and slaves that could be obtained in Congo . However, some local communities began to emulate the foreigners, and many adopted the new religion .

In the early 1890s, the Belgian colonial forces conquered the Swahili-Arabs, expelling them from Congo . The new colonial regime was hostile toward the Muslim community when it appeared active, fearing that the minority could lead a rebellion . In response, the com-munity maintained a low profile so as to avoid reprisals from the administration . However, the growing Mus-lim community increased its proselytizing mission in the 1920s, in part due to increased interaction with the outside Muslim world, particularly the Mulidi move-ment from Tanzania . Qur’anic schools were formed, men went abroad for Islamic instruction, and most

Congolese Muslims embraced the Qadiriyya Sufi order . In response to this new religious mobilization, the colo-nial government blocked Muslim foreigners from enter-ing the colony, destroyed several mosques, and forcibly relocated prominent Muslim leaders to distant locations . However, this stopgap measure by the colonial regime may have had the unintended consequence of spreading Islam to new regions of the colony .

Colonial education was the domain in which the mem-bers of the Muslim community felt the most intense repression . In the Belgian Congo, most education was provided by Christian (primarily Catholic) missionaries, creating conditions for the harassment and expulsion of Muslim children . Harassment included forced conver-sion, beatings, and being forced to eat pork and drink water during Ramadan . In reaction to this, most Mus-lim parents kept their children from attending colonial schools, fearing their conversion to Christianity . As a result, generations of Muslims did not receive an edu-cation or learn to speak the colonial French language . Those who did stay in school were only able to do so by converting to Christianity; in fact, in order to attend sec-ondary school, a formal Christian baptism was required .

The situation of the Muslim minority finally began to improve when Congo gained independence from Bel-gium in 1960 . The 1964 constitution espoused religious freedom, and in March of that year a national Muslim conference was convened in Maniema Province . Despite these signs of progress, some concluded in the early independence period that “Islam . . . remains as quiescent and isolated as it had been during the colonial period .”1

Given the community’s colonial experiences, it was remarkable that Islam survived at all in Congo, but it was able to do so because it “responded to the hostility of the state by indifference and withdrawal .”2 The limited schol-arly work on Islam in Congo prior to 1970 was followed by decades of silence on the topic . However, my work provides evidence of concerted efforts by the Muslim minority to organize and engage with the Congolese state and broader society in the post-conflict period .

Post-War Muslim Mobilization

After gaining independence from Belgium in 1960, the country (known then as Zaire) was a dictatorship led by President Mobutu Sese Seko from 1965 to 1997 . Mobutu’s


hold on power was slipping in the post–Cold War 1990s after unconditional U .S . support for its anti-communist ally waned, and Zaire’s neighbors were increasingly frus-trated by Mobutu’s support for rebel factions that threat-ened their governments . Therefore, Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe formed a coalition to oust Mobutu and backed the rebel movement led by Laurent Kabila . In what is known as the First Congo War (1996–1997), the rebels successfully marched across the country and into the capital in May 1997 .

Laurent Kabila promptly proclaimed himself presi-dent of the country, which he renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo, but he proved to be no better at lead-ing the country than Mobutu had been . Internal and external rebel movements sprang up to compete for con-trol of the state, thus sparking the Second Congo War (1998–2002), also known as “Africa’s World War .” The “civil war” raged on with the country divided into three semi-autonomous territories: the west led by President Kabila with external assistance, the east controlled by the Congolese Rally for Democracy rebels and Rwanda, and portions of the north controlled by the Movement for the Liberation of Congo rebels supported by Uganda . The parties to the war signed the Lusaka Agreement in Zam-bia in 1999, and the following year the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo peacekeeping mission was authorized . Laurent Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and was replaced by his son Joseph Kabila, who then participated in a political transition process . The DRC’s first democratic elections in over 50 years were held in July 2006 and lauded by the international community, who hailed them as a huge victory and the end of the conflict . Nonetheless, the security situation has remained precarious, particularly in the eastern provinces .

The eastern Maniema Province, where the majority of Congolese Muslims reside, has a population of around 1 .8 million . Kindu, the ethnically and religiously diverse provincial capital, has a population of about 250,000, of which Muslims constitute approximately 25 percent . Kasongo is the second largest city in the Maniema Prov-ince and the historical birthplace of Islam in Congo, with Muslims comprising 70 to 80 percent of the population . There are also smaller Muslim populations in all other Congolese provinces . Kisangani, the third largest city in Congo located in the northeastern Orientale Province,

has the most substantial Muslim community outside of Maniema, estimated between 10 and 30 percent of the population . The Congolese capital Kinshasa contains a substantial Muslim community and is headquar-ters to the national Muslim organization, the Commu-nauté Islamique en République Démocratique du Congo (COMICO) .

A plethora of local, regional, national, and international organizations are helping to rebuild Congo by support-ing orphans or those handicapped by war, reintegrating former combatants into society, and caring for victims of sexual violence . Many of these organizations are religious groups . Despite Islam’s quiescence in earlier periods, today one finds a vibrant and organized Muslim com-munity with associations that focus on a wide variety of tasks, both spiritual and community service–oriented .

COMICO, the primary organization of Congolese Mus-lims, began in 1972 at the insistence of President Mobutu as a way of co-opting an important segment of society . Muslim women’s associations affiliated with COMICO have been established recently, including Comité Natio-nale Feminine de COMICO and its affiliate at the pro-vincial level, Comité Provinciale Feminine . Many other national and provincial Muslim women’s associations were active during the wars and remain vibrant in the post-conflict period . The Union des Femmes Musulmanes du Congo has provincial affiliates, and the Kisangani branch was responsible for a wartime Therapeutic Nutri-tional Center . After the wars, Fondation Zam-Zam was established; the Maniema branch runs a private Islamic primary school, providing free education to orphans and offering afternoon literacy courses for women . In Maniema Province, the Collectif des Femmes Musulmanes pour le Développement du Maniema is a compilation of 18 Muslim women’s groups focused on development .

Other Muslim associations focus on activities such as providing healthcare and promoting human rights . Ami Santé is a healthcare association for Kindu residents of any religious background . The Bureau Islamique pour la Défense des Droits Humaines, which has a very active provincial office in Kindu and an affiliate in Kasongo, is a Muslim human rights organization . The U .S . National Endowment for Democracy has helped fund their activ-ities promoting democracy and women’s issues . This list of active Muslim associations is hardly all-inclusive,


but these should be sufficient to highlight the fact that the Congolese Muslim community is no longer margin-alized on the sidelines of society . This is even more appar-ent when looking at the role of the Muslim minority in the provision of education in the post-conflict period .

Islamic Public Schools

The Congolese education system is comprised of public schools run by both the government and religious orga-nizations . In fact, faith-based organizations run schools attended by three-quarters of all primary school chil-dren, and 64 percent of secondary schools are religiously run .3 Religious public schools have formal agreements with the Congolese state stipulating that the state will pay salaries, set the national curriculum, and monitor schools through its inspection bureaucracy, while reli-gious communities provide the daily management of their facilities .

Christian schools have been active in Congo since the colonial era, but Muslims signed an agreement with the Mobutu regime in 1979 to begin operating Islamic pub-lic schools . Prior to 2002, there were very few schools sponsored by the Muslim community, but this has greatly changed since the end of the wars . The Maniema Province, where the majority of Congolese Muslims reside, provides the clearest picture of Muslim mobiliza-tion in public education . The number of Islamic primary schools more than doubled, from 29 to 76, between the academic years 2003–2004 and 2008–2009 . The same trend can be seen with secondary schools during this time period, where the number increased from 19 to 42 . By academic year 2011–2012, the numbers had again escalated to 132 primary and 86 secondary schools .4 This trend is not limited to the Maniema Province but reflects a national phenomenon: there were 368 primary and 142 secondary Islamic schools in the country in academic year 2005–2006, but by 2008–2009, the Muslim community was running about 500 primary and 300 secondary institutions . By 2013, that number had increased by another 200 institutions nationwide .5

These Islamic schools are not madrasas, but public insti-tutions that are open to all children, not only to Muslim students . For example, in Maniema about 50 percent of children in these schools are Muslim, and many teach-ers are also non-Muslim . Each religious public school has the right to teach religion courses along with the

national curriculum . Muslim public primary schools teach two 30-minute religion classes each week . The religious instruction received by primary school students is not rigorous, and the majority of Muslim pupils attend Qur’anic schools to augment their Islamic education . These schools are identical to those run by other reli-gious groups and the Congolese state, with the excep-tion of the content of religion classes . State schools, for their part, give instruction in “civic and moral education” twice a week .

Conclusion

The Congolese Muslim minority has made remarkable strides from the era of colonial repression and necessary quiescence to an active post-conflict role in flourish-ing associations and the provision of public education . Arguments have been made that this has been possible for two primary reasons .6 The first is that a history of intense internal conflicts within the Muslim community (reminiscent of other Sufi-Reformist conflicts on the continent) made mobilization for collective action virtu-ally impossible . However, this impasse has largely been overcome in the post-conflict period, when a reform-oriented leadership with a clear development agenda emerged . The second reason stems from the post-conflict opportunity enabling a partnership between the Muslim minority and the weak Congolese state to provide edu-cation following the existing hybrid model . Overall, not only has Islam in Congo survived decades of repression and marginalization, but also the contemporary Muslim minority has begun to thrive .

Notes

1 Crawford Young, “Chronique Bibliographique: Materials for the Study of Islam in the Congo,” Cahiers Economiques et Sociaux 4, no . 4 (1966): 461–464 .

2 Crawford Young, “The Congo,” in Islam in Africa, ed . James Kritzeck and William H . Lewis (New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold Company, 1969) .

3 Kristof Titeca and Tom De Herdt, “Real Governance Beyond the ‘Failed State’: Negotiating Education in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” African Affairs 110, no . 439 (2011): 213–231; United States Department of State, “Democratic Republic of Congo 2012 Interna-tional Religious Freedom Report,” 2012 .


4 2003–2004 statistics from République Démocratique du Congo Ministère du Plan, “Monographie de la Province du Maniema,” Kinshasa, 2004 . 2008–2009 statistics gathered from Division Provincial d’Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire, et Professionelle, Kindu, DRC, February 2009 . 2011–2012 statistics gathered from the same office in June 2013 .5 Interview with National Coordinator of Islamic schools, Kinshasa, DRC, June 18, 2009; 2013 statistics from interview with National Coordinator of Islamic schools, Kinshasa, July 23, 2013 .6 Ashley E . Leinweber, “The Muslim Minority of the Democratic Republic of Congo: From Historic Margin-alization and Internal Division to Collective Action,” Cahiers d’Etudes africaines LII, no . 206–207 (2012): 517–544; Ashley E . Leinweber, “From Devastation to Mobilization: The Muslim Community’s Involvement in Social Welfare in Post-Conflict DRC,” Review of African Political Economy 40, no . 135 (2013): 98–115 .

The Management of Salafi Activity in Africa: African State Strategies and their Consequences in the SahelBy Dr. Sebastian Elischer, Assistant Professor of Comparative Politics, Leuphana University Lüneburg (as of fall 2015 assistant professor at the University of Florida/Gainesville), [email protected]

Salafism in Africa

In recent years, policymakers have devoted increasing attention to the rise of violent Salafi groups across Africa . Nigeria and Mali are two prominent cases in point . In Nigeria, the Islamist terrorist organization Boko Haram has conducted terrorist attacks against thousands of innocent civilians for many years .1 In 2012, Mali’s north was overrun by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its local offshoots, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa and the Defenders of the Islamic Faith (Ansar Dine) . Despite the military intervention of the French government in early 2013 and the stationing of United Nations troops thereafter, Mali’s north remains a violent theater of conflict .2

The spread of the Salafi ideology is not confined to any world region, yet in Africa, Salafism currently is the fast-est growing branch of Islam .3 Many security analysts

therefore fear that Islamic violence might become even more widespread across the African continent and that the deployment of Western military aid is a question of when rather than if . What is often overlooked, how-ever, is the fact that Salafi activity can take many forms . Historically, Salafi clerics have urged their followers to abstain from political activity and to confine their activi-ties to peaceful missionary activities (purist Salafism) . In other instances, Salafis engage with the political system (political Salafism) . Finally, there are cases where Salafis engage in violent activities (jihadi Salafism) .4 Unfor-tunately, policymakers and commentators rarely pay attention to countries where Salafi communities coex-ist peacefully with other Muslim communities (Sufis) as well as with representatives of the secular nation state . Little is also known about how African governments are dealing with the potential challenge of growing Salafi congregations .5

Which strain of Salafism (purist/political/jihadi) has come to dominate in a variety of African countries? Do African states influence the emergence and the consolidation of any of the three strains, particularly by regulating the access of Salafi communities to their countries’ religious landscape (defined here as access of fundamentalist Muslim communities to Friday prayer mosques, which represent the central institution for religious practice in Muslim societies)? Scholars work-ing on Middle Eastern countries have long acknowl-edged the importance of state control over mosques as one way of directing Islamic activism in a peaceful and apolitical direction .6

Examining the Diversity of Salafism in the Sahel

The Salafi communities in the Sahel countries of Niger and Mali display different trajectories despite sharing important similarities . Both border Algeria and Libya and are thus in close proximity of transnational jihadi influence . They participate in the American-led Pan Sahel Initiative and are equally subjected to Western/American military presence . In the last two and a half decades, they have experienced a turbulent political and economic trajectory; unemployment among young males is very high, and their population growth rates among the highest in the world . Both exhibit a low degree of state capacity (stateness) and porous borders .


In short, Niger and Mali display characteristics that are commonly referred to as key explanatory factors for the emergence of jihadi violence .7

Scholars working on the Middle East increasingly refer to a typology (purist/political/jihadi) when examining the nature of Salafi activity .8 Purists are defined here as Salafi communities who deliberately stay away from the political game and who abstain from violence . Purists engage in educational and missionary activities . Political Salafis are groups who engage with the important politi-cal actors of a country on a regular basis . They either throw their collective support behind an already existing political party or form a political party of their own .9

Jihadi Salafis wish to transform secular society by vio-lent means .

In both Niger and Mali, Salafi communities have cho-sen different modes of engagement with their social and political environment . The case of Mali shows that Salaf-ism can manifest itself differently in the same country .10 A comparative examination of the historical evolution of the interaction between Salafism and the state in Niger and Mali shows how different regulatory frameworks affect the formation of a dominant strain of Salafism .

Niger and Mali: Different State Strategies and Their Consequences

Throughout most of its history and as an indepen-dent state, the Republic of Niger has dedicated serious attention to the question of who gains access to its reli-gious landscape . Following the military coup of Seyni Kountché in 1974, the Nigerien state began propagat-ing a national version of Islam . Accordingly, “Nigerien Islam” derived its legitimacy from local interpretations of the Koran (Sufi Islam) and refrained from political or violent activity . In response to the growing infiltration of Niger’s religious sphere by Libya, the Kountché regime established the Association Islamique du Niger (AIN; the Islamic Association of Niger), a state-led organization dedicated to the promotion of Sufi Islam across Niger’s territory . Under the supervision of the AIN, religious practices became a heavily regulated affair . In order to be eligible to preach in a Friday prayer mosque, Muslim clerics had to undergo several religious tests and receive a prayer license . The AIN was in charge of design-ing these tests and allocating these licenses . If the AIN

found a cleric was acting in breach of the basic principle of the state-sanctioned version of Islam, it banned the cleric from all mosques . By integrating the AIN into the administrative structure of the autocratic secular state at all government levels, the government created a close-knit network of religious supervision . Until the political liberalization process of the early 1990s, Salafi congrega-tions had no legal access to Niger’s religious sphere .

Gaining access to Niger’s territory remained a difficult enterprise even after the political liberalization pro-cesses of the early 1990s . Muslim associations intending to build mosques have to register with the ministry of the interior . The registration of associations under for-eign leadership is generally prohibited . Numerous Paki-stani-, Iranian-, and Egyptian-led applicants had their applications denied . In order to receive legal recognition from the state, every applicant association has to pro-vide a reference from the AIN . As a result, only Salafi associations under national leadership who commit themselves to respect the apolitical and peaceful nature of Nigerien Islam can legalize their status . These proce-dures notwithstanding, the 1990s saw local incidences of violence between Salafi and Sufi representatives and a growing politicization of religious officially registered religious actors .

By the early 2000s, it had become obvious that the state had lost its previous capacity to regulate religious activ-ity . The Nigerien state reacted to these developments by dissolving Salafi associations involved in the clashes of the 1990s . The state also created a new religious super-visory body, the Conceil Islamique du Niger (CIN; the Islamic Council of Niger), whose mandate is almost identical to that of the AIN prior to the 1990s . Niger is thus a case where the state has undertaken serious steps to regulate Salafi activity . As a result, purism has emerged as the dominant mode of Salafi engagement .

In stark contrast to Niger, the Malian state never made any serious attempt to regulate access to its religious sphere . After independence, both Salafi and Sufi congre-gations spread across the country . In 1980, the Malian state created the Association Malienne pour l’Unité et le Progrès de l’Islam (AMUPI; Malien Association for Unity and Progress of Islam) . One of the (unofficial) goals of this association was to mediate between Salafi and Sufi clerics . AMUPI neither promoted a national version of


Islam, nor had the mandate or the organizational capac-ity to supervise the religious conduct of its clerics . With financial and personnel support from Saudi Arabia, AMUPI’s Salafi wing soon occupied the most influential positions inside the organization .

After the onset of political liberalization, the Malian state continued to refrain from regulating the religious sphere . In 2002, the government encouraged the forma-tion of the Haut Conseil Islamique (HCI; High Islamic Council) . However, just as its predecessor, the HCI con-stitutes a mere coordination body uniting representa-tives of different Islamic tendencies . The registration of new Muslim associations and their mosques occurs without any meaningful scrutiny of these associations by the state . Over the course of the last two decades, this has led to an unchecked influx of radical preachers from the Middle East and Pakistan into Mali’s north . There is strong evidence linking these groups to the emergence of Ansar Dine and the 2012 security crisis .11 Simultane-ously, political Salafi clerics have begun to dominate the HCI . Under its Salafi leadership, the HCI has emerged as one of Mali’s most powerful political lobby groups . Salafi clerics across the country supported Ibrahim Keita as the 2013 presidential candidate and did not shy away from encouraging his election during Friday prayer sessions . In addition, Salafi clerics managed to occupy very influ-ential positions in numerous state bodies, such as the electoral management board or the newly formed minis-try of religious affairs . Mali is thus a case where the state failed to regulate access to its religious sphere, which has resulted in the spread of jihadi Salafism in the country’s north and political Salafism in the country’s south .

Implications for Future Policymaking

The effects of violent Islamic movements are visible throughout Africa . The development community advo-cates socio-economic solutions for populations that are vulnerable to a potentially violent religious ideology . Although there are good intentions at the heart of such a strategy, the socio-economic output of many African states provides ample evidence that this is a long-term strategy at best . In-depth studies on jihadi groups further show that many of their most influential members come from a very affluent background . Policymakers should not make the mistake of reducing support for Salafism to socio-economic motives .

Security analysts advocate closer military cooperation between states that are vulnerable to Salafi agitation and their Western counterparts . In the Sahel region, the United States of America and France have been particu-larly active in this regard . So far, it seems fair to say that this strategy has been successful . Yet military engagement more often than not represents a reaction to crises that have already escalated . In other words, military engage-ment might be successful, but it always occurs after the outbreak of violent Islamic activity . Evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that long-term Western mili-tary engagement always brings with it the possibility of the further radicalization of Islamic communities .

Ideally, policies designed to counter violent Salafi activity should have a strong civilian and preventive component . The creation of institutional supervisory mechanisms for religious conduct and greater involvement of Afri-can states in running their religious affairs could be an integral part of such an approach . The presence of a regulatory framework governing access to Niger’s reli-gious sphere in conjunction with the willingness of the Nigerien government to counter the potential threat of Salafi violence ensured that Niger did not follow the same tragic trajectory of neighboring Mali or Nigeria . The donor community should try and raise awareness among Muslim recipient nations about the lessons learned from countries such as Niger or other African or Middle Eastern countries where religious supervisory bodies have long been in existence . This could be a first step in a broader strategy of preventing the spread of violent interpretations of the Salafi creed .

Notes

1 Council on Foreign Relations, “Nigeria Security Tracker,” available at <www .cfr .org/nigeria/nigeria- security-tracker/p29483> .2 RFI, Nord Du Mali: Le Retour de La Menace Jihadiste? Available at <www .rfi .fr/emission/20141005-evolution- menace-le-nord-mali> .3 Ousmane Kane, “Moderate Revivalists: Islamic Inroads in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Harvard International Review 29, no . 2 (2007): 64–68 .4 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Move-ment,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no . 1 (2006): 207–239 .


5 The empirical evidence in this article is based on my field research, the goal of which is to trace the histori-cal trajectory of Salafi communities between indepen-dence and today on the basis of archival research, the collection of primary documents, and interviews with state representatives as well as with religious clerics . The German Gerda Henkel Foundation has provided me with the funds to conduct field research in Mali; field research in Niger was financed as part of other research projects I conducted in Niger over the course of the last 4 years .

6 Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001) .

7 Michael Mazarr, Unmodern Men in the Modern World: Radical Islam, Terrorism, and the War on Modernity (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003) .

8 Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement;” Joas Wagemakers, “‘Seceders’ and ‘Postponers’? An Analysis of the ‘Khawarij’ and ‘Murij’a Labels in Polemical Debates Between Quietists and Jihadi-Salafis,” in Contextualizing Jihadi Thought, ed . Jeevan Deol and Zaheer Kazmi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 145–164 .

9 For an example of this operationalization, see Khalil al-Anani and Maszlee Malik, “Pious Way to Politics: The Rise of Political Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt,” Digest of Middle East Studies 22, no . 1 (2013): 57–73 .

10 See also Alex Thurston, “Towards an Islamic Repub-lic of Mali?” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 37, no . 2 (2013): 45–66 .

11 For just one example, see International Crisis Group, Mali: Security, Dialogue and Meaningful Reform (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013) .

The Politics of Women’s Rights in Muslim Countries: An Illustration from NigerBy Dr. Alice Kang, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Ethnic Studies, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, [email protected]

Women’s rights in the family, to political representa-tion, and to reproductive health have been the subject of intense debate in predominantly Muslim countries . In some cases, governments have adopted reforms to make it easier for women to obtain a divorce, affirmative action laws to increase the number of women in politics, and legislation to improve women’s access to contracep-tion . In other cases, governments have remained quiet or seemingly unwilling to adopt women’s rights reform .

What factors influence the passage of women’s rights policies in Muslim-majority countries? This essay exam-ines the influence of three central players at the national level, arguing that the balance of power among them affects the adoption of women’s rights reforms .1 Interna-tional actors and the global context, while also part of the story, operate at the margins of the political process, to paraphrase political scientist Joel Barkan .2 These arguments are germane to democracies and democratiz-ing countries, but they may be used to understand wom-en’s rights politics in authoritarian countries as well . The argument is used to make sense of the lack of family law reform in Niger .

Women’s Activists

Women’s activists are a key player in women’s rights policymaking . When I refer to women’s activists, I mean women in civil society (for example, members of wom-en’s associations) as well as women inside the state (for example, female ministers, bureaucrats, judges, and parliamentarians) . Women’s rights reforms are more likely to be adopted in predominantly Muslim countries when women’s activists in and outside the state mobilize for them .

One main way that women in and outside the state help make women’s rights reform possible is by injecting new issues into public debate . The importance of this work cannot be underestimated . In the absence of women’s


activism, practices that discriminate against women remain relegated to the so-called private realm or are seen as part of the “natural order” or “culture .”

Another main way women’s activists help advance reform is by presenting policy proposals as politically legiti-mate . To use a term developed by Michael Schatzberg, women’s activists are more likely to advance reform if they can construct the proposed change as “thinkable .”3 To help make reform thinkable, women’s activists draw on national symbols, invoke publicly accepted values, and enact rituals with emotional pull .

Despite several decades of research on women’s activ-ism, however, relatively little is known about the resis-tance that women’s activists encounter in their efforts to improve women’s lives through state channels .

Conservative Activists

Conservative activists, defined as activists who seek to promote so-called traditional values, may also influence the passage of women’s rights policy by mounting a cam-paign against the proposed policy . One way that con-servatives can campaign against a women’s rights policy proposal is by putting new issues on the national agenda that activists portray as contradicting or clashing with the demands of women’s activists . For instance, conser-vative Muslim activists may raise the issue of national identity or patriotism in the public sphere . Conservative activists, then, may portray women’s rights policy pro-posals as “foreign” and demeaning to the country .

Further, conservative activists may influence women’s rights policymaking by presenting proposed reforms as unthinkable . To help make reform unthinkable, con-servative activists use the same strategies that women’s activists use: they can draw on national symbols, invoke publicly accepted values, and enact rituals with emo-tional pull .

Veto Players

While many observers of politics in Africa depict the state as run by one or a handful of “big men,” African states are composed of multiple actors, and significant negotiation may take place among them in ways that influence the passage of women’s rights reforms .

In many democracies, entities other than the president have the power to modify and reject proposed laws . Theo-retically, the national parliament is a veto player, an actor whose approval is required to change the status quo .4 In contexts where parliaments have such powers, the back-ing of the president, though important, is not always suf-ficient for the adoption of women’s rights policy .

Focusing on parliament as a veto player is somewhat of an unusual analytic move to make . Previously, schol-ars of African politics expected parliaments to play a minimal role in policymaking . This is because African parliaments typically follow British or French models in which the parliament’s primary function is to debate, question, and affirm government-directed policy . The locus of policymaking lies in the ministries, not in par-liament . “Instead, the action is elsewhere,” as two ana-lysts of Senegal’s National Assembly write, in providing constituency services and seeking out donor fund-ing to help advance their districts’ economic develop-ment .5 Thus, while I do not want to overstate the power of parliament in making women’s rights reforms, I do want to call attention to this branch of government as a potential influencer of women’s rights policy adoption .

When the church and state are fused into one political entity, religious authorities can enjoy formal veto power over the passage of women’s rights policy . At the other extreme, the state can be antagonistically opposed to the church, such that the church has minimal or no veto powers . Most states fall in the middle of the spectrum, with the church acting as an informal veto player . In these contexts, religious authorities are seen as legitimate play-ers on the political field . Their input on policy propos-als may be sought, but constitutionally, the preferences of religious authorities do not have to be respected . The United States and Senegal are examples of such states .

Illustration: Family Law Reform in Niger

In the Republic of Niger, which is more than 95 percent Muslim, the country’s most controversial women’s issue has been family law reform . Since independence, Niger has had a two-track legal system for issues relating to marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance . One track is based on French law . The second track, the default track, is based on “customary law,” in which judge apply the “customs of the parties” with the guidance of


court assessors .6 In practice, if the individuals in the court case are Muslim, judges apply so-called Muslim law or Islamic law . This usage of customary-cum-Islamic law dates, in part, back to French colonial practices .

In the 1960s, legal scholars based in the United King-dom and United States worried that a multiple-track legal system would be bad for nation building, eco-nomic development, and women in newly independent countries and called for the unification of laws into a single-track system . Within this context, Niger’s leaders in and since the 1970s formed committees to draft a new single-track legal system for family law . At one point or another, Oxfam-Quebec, the United Nations Develop-ment Program, the United Nations Childrens’ Fund, and the World Bank have given financial or technical sup-port for family law reform in Niger .

The first point that I want to raise is Nigérien women’s activists in and outside the state helped put the issue of family law reform on the national agenda . Women’s activists in the 1960s and 1970s were particularly con-cerned about women’s rights to child custody, the prac-tice of repudiation (in which men unilaterally divorce their wives), and women’s rights to inheritance . Women’s activists raised the issue of family law reform again in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s .

Yet in spite of repeated demands by women’s activists and the encouragement of international donors, Niger did not overhaul its laws governing marriage, divorce, and inheritance . This leads me to a second point . Conser-vative activists mounted a concerted campaign against family law reform . In the wake of a national debate over the issue of secularism, activists opposed family law reform on the grounds that it was at the same time anti-Muslim and pro-secularist . Making the proposed reform unthinkable, one conservative cleric publicly invoked a curse against three proponents of family law reform in the early 1990s . Later, in 2011, hardliner conservative activists burned a draft family law reform in a public square . These public rituals intimidated women’s activ-ists and policymakers alike into abandoning the family law project .

The third point is that in Niger, the state partially and uneasily relies on religious elites, who themselves have mixed feelings about family law reform . By religious elites,

I refer specifically to the Association Islamique du Niger (AIN), which was created in 1974 by president Seyni Kountché . AIN’s central headquarters in Niamey serve as a quasi-court and civil registry where Nigériens can for-malize a divorce and seek resolution in matters of inheri-tance . Nigérien presidents regularly invite AIN’s leaders to officiate religious-state holidays, and AIN’s leaders give sermons on the state-managed television and radio station . AIN’s position on family law reform has vacil-lated since the 1970s, at times supporting reform and at other times opposing it . When AIN publicly objected to family law reform, the government abandoned attempts to reform .

Sociologist Mounira Charrad has made similar argu-ments about the importance of state and society relations in North Africa’s post-independence family law debates .7 Among Charrad’s cases, Niger most closely resembles Algeria’s post-independence authoritarian state, which formed partial alliances with traditional and religious elites and subsequently struggled for decades to reform its family law . Partial alliances between church and state in democratic Niger resulted in protracted policymak-ing, particularly when conservative activists mobilized against reform .

Conclusion

Women’s rights policymaking in predominantly Mus-lim democracies and democratizing countries will be contested and stalled, but not because the countries are majority-Muslim . Democracies permit both women’s activists and conservative activists to make claims upon the state . In democracies, moreover, parliament may enjoy veto powers and act autonomously of the executive branch . Where religious authorities are seen as legitimate public actors, religious authorities can also influence women’s rights policymaking . Ultimately, international attempts to promote women’s rights operate at the mar-gins of a country’s political process .

Notes

1 I elaborate upon these conditions and provide further evidence for these arguments in my forthcoming book, Bargaining for Women’s Rights: Activism in an Aspiring Muslim Democracy (Minneapolis: University of Minne-sota Press, 2015) .


2 Joel Barkan, “Can Established Democracies Nurture Democracy Abroad? Some Lessons from Africa,” in Democracy’s Victory and Crisis, ed . Axel Hadennius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 371–403 .

3 Michael Schatzberg, Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001) .

4 George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) .

5 Melissa Thomas and Oumar Sissokho, “Liaison Legisla-ture: The Role of the National Assembly in Senegal,” Journal of Modern African Studies 43, no . 1 (2005): 97–117 . See also Staffan Lindberg, “What Accountability Pressures Do MPs in Africa Face and How Do They Respond? Evidence from Ghana,” Journal of Modern African Studies 48, no . 1 (2010): 117–142 .

6 Republic of Niger, Law No . 62–11, March 16, 1962 .

7 Mounira Charrad, States and Women’s Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001) .

Evolving Sufi Organizations in North AfricaBy Dr. Audra Grant, Researcher, National Opinion Research Center (NORC), University of Chicago, [email protected]

Sufi orders began as informal groups and expanded throughout the 12th century into large-scale organiza-tions based on a personalized piety and spiritual growth . Individual orders, also known as tariqas (or the “way”), provided a means of social integration and identity that went beyond the boundaries of pre-modern states . Commonly held assumptions maintain that Sufi orders remain relegated to the spiritual and that they are, for the most part, apolitical . Still, others would primarily see Sufi orders as reactive when thrust into the political milieu . Either view overlooks the role of Sufi institutions’ evolution as strategic actors in the political arena with their own constellation of interests .

Indeed, numerous contemporary examples and dynamics challenge the conception of Sufi orders as merely reactive intermediaries on the political landscape . As Werenfels

highlights, Sufi orders play multidimensional roles in North African politics that reveal enhanced power vis-à-vis the state .1 During the Arab Spring, Morocco’s influen-tial Boutshishiyya order participated in pro-referendum marches, while in Tunisia, Sufi brotherhoods protested the desecration of Sufi shrines by Salafists .2 North African political elites have sought the support of Sufi brotherhoods to reinforce regime credentials, and broth-erhoods have also been used to manage disputes among domestic groups . Equally important, Sufi brotherhoods have been employed to bolster the electoral fortunes of incumbent powers . In both Algeria and Tunisia, presi-dents Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali looked to Sufi orders to rally voter support in contests that ended in victories for both .

Examples of Sufi Resistance

The longer history of North Africa, however, also pro-vides illustrative examples of how Sufism has served as a basis for development of political activism . While local rulers and institutions in North Africa were dismantled under the yoke of the external control of Ottomans and Europeans, Sufi orders survived domination to mature into centers of resistance . Three examples are Algeria, Libya, and Sudan, where Sufi orders engaged in resistance movements through adoption of non-accomodationist positions that reflected a variety of strategies .

As historians explain, major orders in Algeria such as the Daqarniyya and the Tajiniyya resisted oppressive Otto-man control and formed cooperative alliances with the French in an effort to thwart Turkish rule and ensure their survival . During the 19th century, when Algerians faced the same domination from the French, Sufi orders such as the Qadiriyya, led by Abd al-Qadir, took up arms in 1832 against the French from western Algeria and eventually created a state (albeit a short-lived one) based on tribes and brotherhoods, as Qadiriyya resis-tance lasted until al-Qadir’s defeat in 1847 .3 In 1871, the Rahmaniyya order, prominent in eastern Algeria, also rebelled against the French . The order was divided into a number of autonomous branches, each embracing its own strategy of dealing with French occupation . One branch supported the rebellion by engaging in direct confrontation with the French, while another branch indirectly backed rebellion from afar in Tunisia .4


In Morocco, the strategically influential Tijaniyya order was drawn to the monarchy . The localization of Moroc-co’s Tijaniyya hindered the development of effective political opposition to the Europeans . Facing competi-tion from the sultans, who relegated Sufi leaders to their local center of gravity, the Tijaniyya strategically cooper-ated with the French to prevent encroachment of the sul-tans .5 Elsewhere, in Libya, the Sanussiyya order mounted formidable resistance against Italians following the 1911 invasion and later was the foundation for the Kingdom of Libya . In Sudan, the Mahdis established a caliphate during their rebellion against Egypt and their British allies . Therefore, colonial administration was confronted by well-mobilized orders defined by internal bonds that transcended existing authority .6 Such activism in the form of the resistance described did not stem from Sufist ideology, but rather from the purpose of survival amid penetration from external colonial forces .

Post-independence, authoritarianism pushed Sufi and civil society institutions to the background in North Africa . Sufism has also had to compete with other Islamist orientations that have attempted to shape the religious space . Current politics in North Africa have seen an evolution of the political role of Sufi orders, how-ever . They have interacted with Maghrebi politics in ways that underscore their centrality as strategic actors with their own constellation of interests that, on the one hand, demonstrate their utility to states, and on the other, reveal brotherhoods’ attempts to maximize their own interests .

Sufism Today

In 2002, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI appointed Ahmed Taoufiq of the Boutshishiyya order as minister of Islamic affairs . Before accepting the position, Taoufiq allegedly consulted with the order’s leader for consent, an action consistent with the preeminent position Sufi leaders enjoy in the “master-disciple” relationship . While consultation was a nod to a cornerstone of Sufi tradition, it was also politically astute, for rejection of the king’s offer for lack of permission from the order’s leader would be heresy .7

Mohammed VI, in addition, has publicly stressed Sufi tradition to young Moroccan cohorts, praising the role of Sufi orders in the kingdom for being a spiritual and moral compass for society and for their role in culturally defin-ing the kingdom .8 Sufi-state interactions have also been

used to strategically shape Morocco’s position vis-à-vis its regional rival, Algeria . In 2002, the king appointed the Kittani and Tijani orders’ leadership . In one sweeping move, the king employed rewards to demonstrate monar-chal control over Sufi institutions, manage competition between orders, and use the same patronage to contain Algeria’s efforts to exert influence over the Tijani order . To put Morocco’s imprint on transnational Sufism, the king hosted the 2009 World Sufi Forum, again meeting Alge-rian efforts to influence regional and transnational Sufism . The king authorized the Islamic ministry to hold the forum every 2 years and annually in the kingdom .9 These approaches by Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerian leader-ship reflect an array of strategies aimed to diminish the influence of political Islam to head off serious challenges to their respective regimes, control the religious and polit-ical space, and influence transnational Sufi Islam . Orders, however, can also exert their own influence in politics .

Algeria’s Bouteflika has relied on Sufi brotherhoods throughout his presidency as a bulwark against militant Islam and for electoral support . Yet Algeria’s Qadiriyya brotherhood, which has supported Bouteflika, boldly warned that their endorsement of him — or any other politician for that matter — should not be taken for granted, for the group would withhold its support from those that run afoul of the order .10 Morocco’s Boutshishi-yya came out strongly in support of the “Yes” campaign in the 2011 referendum, organizing “We love our king” celebrations, in major examples of a new assertiveness in Sufi activism, power, and visibility . Following Arab Spring marches in Morocco, leadership urged voters to support a new constitution, which limited executive powers of the king . The campaign came against the back-drop of calls for a boycott of the referendum . Morocco’s Sufi orders have also expanded their political networks to the palace political elites, and Sufi orders in all three North Africa countries have broadened their networks with and outreach to orders to other countries, the latter effort especially aided by media and technology .11

A Useful Partnership

Are Sufi organizations agents for political change and transformation? While it is clear that Sufi orders do not neatly ascribe to typologies of private/quietist or activist, organizational structure may make Sufi orders conduits for political activity . Sufi orders have strong connections to their communities, particularly at the local level, and


their functions go beyond their immediate members . Besides being a source of learning, they are important sources of identity for segments of the population . It is through loyalty to the sheikh—confirmed through the student-teacher relationship—and thus to the brother-hood that attachments to ethnic, regional, or local identi-ties can be formed, which can contribute to a mobilizing capacity that can be augmented by the ability of sheikhs to command support of subordinate members . Thus, for North African leaders, Sufi brotherhoods can be an important resource for political maneuvering, and orders alternatively can use rewards from the state to boost their position . This reality speaks to a new dynamism in rela-tions between Sufi orders and the North African states .

Notes1 Isabelle Werenfels, “Beyond Authoritarianism Upgrad-ing: The Re-emergence of Sufi Orders in Maghrebi Politics,” The Journal of North African Studies 19 (June 2014): 275–295 .2 Ibid ., 278 .

3 See John Obert Voll, Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994) and Raphael Danziger, Abd Qadir and the Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation (New York: African Publishers, 1977) .4 Carl W . Ernst, The Shambala Guide to Sufism (New York and London: Shambala, 1997) .5 Voll, 102–103 .6 Ernst .7 Abdelilah Bouasria, “The Second Coming of Morocco’s Commander of the Faithful: Mohammed VI and Morocco’s Religious Policy,” in Contemporary Morocco: State Politics and Society under Mohammed VI, ed . Bruce Maddy Weisman and Daniel Zisenwine (Routledge: New York, 2013) .8 Ibid ., 48 .9 Ibid ., 49 .10 Werenfels, 287 .11 Ernst, 220 .

Remarks by Ms. Theresa Whelan(Continued from Cover Page)

shifts throughout the 1990s from post-colonial Cold War era autocratic and dictatorial governments toward democratic ones, the “teenage years” of these democra-cies are proving to be volatile and fragile in many cases . Meanwhile, the continent’s growing youth bulge creates unprecedented and increasing opportunities to connect with others beyond their home village or town through the Internet and, more importantly, mobile telephony, but the majority of these young people have no access to formal education and, consequently, little ability to make sense of the global cacophony on their own .

To complicate matters further, all of these dynamics are taking place in societies that remain heavily influenced, if not defined, by their ethnic, tribal, clan, and religious identities much more than their national identities . Consequently, in order to analyze the complex political,

economic, and security developments on the continent, it is critical to understand the nature of these various sub-national identities, how they influence people and how that influence might be changing, as well as how these identities may or may not conform to our current assumptions about them . In this context, the series of articles collected in this month’s Africa Research Initia-tive Newsletter provides intelligence analysts and policy-makers alike with a variety of perspectives on the nature and influence of one of the more powerful defining iden-tities in Africa: Islam . The works of these distinguished scholars/authors, examining topics ranging from wom-en’s rights in Muslim countries to Muslim behavior during the Rwanda genocide to the potential for radical-ization of Muslims on the Swahili coast, will no doubt help our efforts to better understand this fundamental element of the African milieu .

ARI Newsletter, March 20152626 ARI Newsletter, March 2015

Data Corner

24.4

38.6

85

80

17.6

17.9

10

12.2

0

0

0

9094

50

20

50

20 15

94

Not SpecifiedMajority

9096.6

98

17.3

53.160.5

60

94.8

100

100

1.8

1.61.8

1.62.5

11.1

12.1

10

13

35

7

33.9100

(—)

99

99.199

<1.4

<1

0

0

1.5

0

<1.4

<2.7

<1<6.2

>99

MALI

NIGER

LIBYA

ALGERIA

EGYPT

MOROCCO

MAURITANIA

TOGOCENTRAL AFRICAN

REPUBLIC

DEMOCRATICREPUBLIC OFTHE CONGO

CÔTED’IVOIRESIERRA LEONE

SOUTH AFRICA

SWAZILAND

SEYCHELLES

ILEMITRIANGLE

SOMALIA

REUNION(FRANCE)

ZANZIBAR(TANZANIA)

MAURITIUS

LESOTHO

MALAWI COMOROS

ASCENSION(U.K.)

SAINT HELENA(U.K.)

TRISTAN DA CUNHA

(U.K.)

RWANDA

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

KENYA

TANZANIA

BOTSWANANAMIBIA

GUINEA-BISSAUBURKINA FASO

CABO VERDE

WESTERNSAHARA

CABINDA(ANGOLA)

REPUBLICOF THECONGO

SUDAN

SOUTHSUDAN

ETHIOPIA

DJIBOUTI

CHADERITREA

BENINNIGERIA

CAMEROON

GHANA

GUINEA

LIBERIA

GAMBIASENEGAL

TUNISIA

GABONSAO TOME& PRINCIPE

ANGOLA

ZAMBIA

UGANDA

BURUNDI

MOZAMBIQUE

MADAGASCARZIMBABWESouth Atlantic Ocean

North Atlantic Ocean Mediterranean Sea

Indian Ocean

MozambiqueChannel

Red Sea

Gulf Of Aden

Arabian Sea

Percent of African Population who Identify

as Muslim by Country

50–100

20–50

1–20

Less than 1

Source: CIA World Factbook, 2014

Percent of African Population who Identify as Muslim, 2014

26

ARI Newsletter, March 2015 27ARI Newsletter, March 2015 27

Islam in Africa Research CentersResearch Center: Available at:Georgetown University, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs

http://berkleycenter .georgetown .edu/essays/algeria-colonization-and-independence

Rice University, The Boniuk Institute http://boniuk .rice .edu/home .aspx

International Center for Law and Religion Studies http://www .iclrs .org/

Leiden University, African Studies Centre http://www .ascleiden .nl/

Northwestern University, Department of Religious Studies, Islam

http://www .religion .northwestern .edu/graduate/ areas-of-study/islam .html

Pew Research Center, Christianity and Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa

http://www .pewresearch .org/daily-number/christianity-and-islam-in-sub-saharan-africa/

School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, Centre of Islamic Studies (CIS)

http://www .soas .ac .uk/islamicstudies/

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Islam in Africa

http://csis .org/event/islam-africa-trends-and-policy-implications

University of Florida, Center for African Studies, Islam in Africa Working Group

http://africa .ufl .edu/research-training/working-groups/islam-in-africa/

University of Cape Town, Centre for Contemporary Islam

http://www .cci .uct .ac .za/

University of Cape Town, Institute for Comparative Religion in Southern Africa (ICRSA)

http://www .religion .uct .ac .za/religion/institutes/icrsa

Harvard University, Prince Al-Waleed Bin Talal Islamic Studies Program

http://www .islamicstudies .harvard .edu/

Dartmouth College, The John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding

http://dickey .dartmouth .edu/

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, African Studies Center

http://africa .unc .edu/

University of South Africa, Research Institute for Theology and Religion

http://www .unisa .ac .za/ Default .asp?Cmd=ViewContent&ContentID=11132

London Metropolitan University, Centre for the Study of Religion, Conflict, and Cooperation

http://www .londonmet .ac .uk/faculties/ faculty-of-social-sciences-and-humanities/research/csrcc/

University of Oxford, Oxford Center for Islamic Studies

http://www .oxcis .ac .uk/


Select Scholars who Work on Islam in AfricaName Title Specialty Region/Country Institution Faculty WebsiteAbbink, Jan Senior Researcher Ethiopia, Somalia,

Northeast AfricaHorn of Africa, Ethiopia

African Studies Centre, Leiden University

http://www.ascleiden.nl/organization/people/jan-abbink

An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed

Professor of Law Islam and human rights Emory University http://aannaim.law.emory.edu/

Asumah, Seth Professor of Political Science

Africana studies SUNY Cortland http://www2.cortland.edu/departments/political-science/faculty-staff-detail.dot?fsid= 320481

Badran, Margot Senior Scholar Islamic feminism, human rights, democracy, MENA

MENA Wilson Center http://www.wilsoncenter.org/staff/margot-badran

Becker, Felicitas University Lecturer African history Tanzania University of Cambridge

http://www.hist.cam.ac.uk/directory/[email protected]

Bernal, Victoria Associate Professor African studies, Islam, war, migration, and diaspora

Sudan, Tanzania, Eritrea

University of California, Irvine

http://www.anthropology.uci.edu/anthr_bios/vbernal

Bonate, Liazzat Assistant Professor History of Africa Mozambique

Bratton, Michael Professor of Political Science and African Studies

Founder, former executive director, senior advisor to Afrobarometer

Michigan State University

https://www.msu.edu/~mbratton/

Bremer, Kristin Professor of Political Science

Kutztown University of Pennsylvania

https://www.kutztown.edu/acad/polsci/info/faculty.html

Brenner, Louis Emeritus Professor SOAS, University of London

https://www.soas.ac.uk/staff/staff36140.php

Clarence-Smith, William G.

Professor of the Economic History of Asia and Africa

Islam and slavery, Asia and Africa

SOAS, University of London

https://www.soas.ac.uk/cas/members/history/

Darboe, Momodou Professor of Sociology Shepherd University http://www.shepherd.edu/employees/faculty/sociology.html

Dowd, Robert Assistant Professor African politics, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, religion, democracy, and development

Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria University of Notre Dame

http://politicalscience.nd.edu/faculty/faculty-list/rev-robert-dowd-c-s-c/

Erlich, Haggai Professor Emeritus Middle Eastern and African History

Ethiopia, Eritrea, MENA Tel Aviv University http://humanities.tau.ac.il/segel/erlich/

Fisher, Humphrey Emeritus Professor of History

Islam in tropical Africa, religious history of pre-colonial Africa

Sahel, Sudan belt, Ghana


https://www.soas.ac.uk/cas/members/religions/

Fluehr-Lobban, Carolyn Emeritus Professor Anthropology Rhode Island College


Name Title Specialty Region/Country Institution Faculty WebsiteGlover, John Professor of History West Africa, Islam, and

European ImperialismWest Africa, Senegal University of Redlands http://www.redlands.edu/

academics/college-of-arts-sciences/undergraduate-studies/ history/2291.aspx

Gomez, Michael A. Professor of History, Middle Eastern, and Islamic Studies

Islam, slavery, social and cultural formation

New York University http://history.fas.nyu.edu/object/michaelgomez

Hanson, John Associate Professor Religious imagination and social initiatives of Muslims in West Africa

West Africa, Ghana, Senegal, Mali

Indiana University, Bloomington

http://www.indiana.edu/ ~histweb/faculty/ Display.php?Faculty_ID=12

Haustein, Jörg Lecturer in Religions in Africa

History of Islam in colonial East Africa

East Africa SOAS, University of London

https://www.soas.ac.uk/cas/members/religions/

Haynes, Jeffrey Director for the Centre for the Study of Religion, Conflict, and Cooperation

Religion and international relations; religion and politics; democracy and democratization; development studies; comparative politics and globalization

MENA London Metropolitan University

http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/faculties/faculty-of-social-sciences-and-humanities/people/surnames-d-to-j/jeff-haynes/

Henry, Clement Professor Emeritus MENA MENA University of Texas at Austin

http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/government/faculty/henrycm

Iddrisu, Abdulai Professor African history, history of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa, and gender and colonialism

Sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana

St. Olaf College http://wp.stolaf.edu/ africa-americas/faculty/

Jhazbhay, Iqbal Professor Religious studies, Arabic South Africa, Somalia, MENA

University of South Africa

http://www.unisa.ac.za/ default.asp?Cmd=ViewContent& ContentID=24283

Kane, Ousmane Professor of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations

Intellectual history of Islam in Africa

Harvard http://nelc.fas.harvard.edu/people/ousmane-kane

Kang, Alice Assistant Professor Political science Niger University of Nebraska Lincoln

http://ethnicstudies.unl.edu/fac-akang

Kelly, Chau Assistant Professor African history Tanzania, East Africa University of North Florida

http://www.unf.edu/bio/N00813788/

Kresse, Kai Associate Professor East Africa and the Swahili coast

East Africa, Swahili coast

Columbia University http://www.columbia.edu/cu/mesaas/faculty/directory/ kresse.html

Laremont, Ricardo Rene Professor of Political Science and Sociology

Comparative politics, Islamic law, Islamic politics, conflict resolution

North Africa, Sahel Binghamton University, SUNY

http://www.binghamton.edu/political-science/faculty/ricardo-rene-laremont.html

LeBlanc, Marie-Nathalie Professor of Sociology Africa, religion University of Quebec and Montreal

https://sociologie.uqam.ca/departement/personnel/professeurs/ficheProfesseur.html? mId=oS5uHmT%252b2ug_


Name Title Specialty Region/Country Institution Faculty WebsiteLee, Rebekah Lecturer in History Islam and Christianity in

southern AfricaSouth Africa, Southern Africa


https://www.soas.ac.uk/cas/members/history/

Leichtman, Mara A. Assistant Professor Religion, politics, conversion to Shi’a Islam

West Africa, MENA Michigan State University

http://muslimstudies.isp.msu.edu/people/faculty/leichtman.htm

Limb, Peter Associate Professor History, South Africa, Africa

South Africa Michigan State University

history.msu.edu/people/faculty/peter-limb/

Lubeck, Paul Senior Research Professor Nigeria Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies

http://www.sais-jhu.edu/paul-lubeck

Menkhaus, Kenneth Professor Politics of the Horn of Africa

Horn of Africa, Somalia Davidson College http://www.davidson.edu/academics/political-science/faculty/kenneth-menkhaus

Miles, William F.S. Professor International develop-ment, West Africa, religion and politics

West Africa Northeastern University

http://www.northeastern.edu/polisci/people/full-time-faculty/william-f-s-miles/

Morier-Genoud, Eric Lecturer African history Mozambique Queen’s University Belfast

http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofHistoryandAnthropology/Staff/AcademicStaff/DrEricMorier-Genoud/

Muhammad, Akbar Associate Professor Africa, Islam Binghamton University, SUNY

http://www2.binghamton.edu/history/people/faculty/akbar.html

Nyang, Sulayman S. Professor Political science and public administration; West Africa; Islam; political party development

West Africa Howard University http://www.gs.howard.edu/gradprograms/african_studies/nyang.htm

Ostebo, Terje Assistant Professor Islam in Africa, contemporary Islamic reform, Ethiopia, Horn of Africa

Ethiopia, Horn of Africa University of Florida http://religion.ufl.edu/faculty/core/terje-ostebo/

Paden, John Professor Nigeria George Mason University

http://provost.gmu.edu/robinson/about/john-paden/

Pargeter, Alison Senior Research Associate MENA University of Cambridge

Petry, Carl Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani Chair in Middle East Studies and Charles Deering McCormick Professor of Teaching Excellence

Islamic world and North Africa

MENA Northwestern University

http://www.history.northwestern.edu/people/petry.html

Rahman, Fatima Z. Assistant Professor Politics of MENA, Islam and politics

MENA Lake Forest College http://www.lakeforest.edu/academics/faculty/rahman/ index.php

Reese, Scott Associate Professor Islamic Africa Northern Arizona University

http://nau.edu/CAL/History/Faculty-Staff/Reese/


Name Title Specialty Region/Country Institution Faculty WebsiteRobinson, David Emeritus Professor

of HistoryAfrican societies and Islam

West Africa, French colonies

Michigan State University

http://muslimstudies.isp.msu.edu/people/faculty/robinson.htm

Robinson, Pearl Associate Professor of Political Science

African politics, culture, and life

Tufts University http://ase.tufts.edu/polsci/faculty/robinson/

Searcy, Kim Associate Professor of African Studies and Islamic Studies

Islam, Islam in East Africa, African history, slavery in Muslim Africa

Sudan Loyola University http://luc.edu/history/people/facultyandstaffdirectory/ kimsearcy.shtml

Seck, Mamarame Assistant Professor African linguistics, Sufi Islam in West Africa

West Africa, Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

http://africa.unc.edu/faculty/faculty_main.asp

Seesemann, Rudiger Assistant Professor Islam in sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa, Senegal, Sudan, Kenya

Northwestern University

www.religion.northwestern.edu/faculty/seesemann.html

Shams, Faraidoon Associate Professor Africa and Middle East, Islam, political theory

Howard University http://www.gs.howard.edu/gradprograms/african_studies/shams.htm

Soares, Benjamin Senior Researcher Islam and Muslim societies in Africa

Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan

African Studies Centre, Leiden University

http://www.ascleiden.nl/organization/people/ benjamin-soares

Stith, Charles Adjunct Professor Political and economic development of sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa Boston University www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/academics/faculty/alphabetical/stith/

Svensson, Isak Associate Professor International mediation; nonviolent conflict; religion and conflict

Uppsala University http://www.pcr.uu.se/about/staff/svensson_i/

Tayob, Abdulkader Professor Islamic studies, religion, public life

South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Zanzibar, Nigeria

University of Cape Town

http://www.religion.uct.ac.za/religion/staff/academicstaff/abdulkadertayob

Trumbull IV, George R. Associate Professor of History

Islam in Africa, Islamic African in a global perspective

North Africa Dartmouth http://www.dartmouth.edu/ ~african/faculty/

Villalon, Leonardo A. Professor of Political Science

Senegal, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Chad

University of Florida http://africa.ufl.edu/villalon/

Vinson, Laura Thaut Assistant Professor Ethnic and religious conflict/civil war, African politics

Nigeria Oklahoma State University

http://polsci.okstate.edu/people/faculty

Waltz, Susan E. Professor Public policy, Maghreb, human rights

North Africa, Maghreb University of Michigan http://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/susan-waltz

Willis, Michael University Research Lecturer

Politics, modern history, and international relations of the Maghreb

Maghreb University of Oxford http://www.orinst.ox.ac.uk/staff/iw/mwillis.html

Wright, Zachary Assistant Professor in residence

History and religion, Sufism, Islamic knowledge transmission in West Africa

West Africa, MENA Northwestern University in Qatar

http://www.qatar.northwestern.edu/about/our-people/faculty/wright-zachary.html


John T. Hughes Library Selected BibliographyStarting Points for Islam in AfricaBadru, Pade and Brigid Maa Sackey, eds. Islam in Africa South of the Sahara: Essays in Gender Relations and Political Reform. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2013.Although subtitled Gender Relations and Political Reform, this book provides a wider understanding of Islam in Africa . Part 1 is a four-chapter explanation of the history of Islam in Africa and a general overview of Islam in Africa . Part 4 provides a similar treatment of political considerations of Islam in Africa, including discussion of Islam versus Islamism in South Africa .

Islam in Africa Series. New York: Brill Academic, 2003–Present.Currently at an impressive 16 volumes, Brill’s Islam in Africa series highlights scholarly research on many aspects of Islam in Africa . Primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa, the series covers both historical and cur-rent issues in social, religious, philosophical, and political topics . Titles of note include:

■■ Bang, Ann K . Islamic Sufi Networks in the Western Indian Ocean (c. 1880–1940) . Volume 16, 2014 .

■■ Chesworth, John A . and Franz Kogelmann . Shari’a in Africa Today . Volume 15, 2013 .

■■ Kobo, Ousman Murzik . Unveiling Modernity in Twentieth-Century West African Islamic Reforms . Volume 14, 2012 .

■■ Cantone, Cleo . Making and Remaking Mosques in Senegal . Volume 13, 2012 .

■■ Ostebo, Terje . Localising Salafism . Volume 12, 2011 .

Levtzion, Nehemia and Randall L. Pouwels, eds. The History of Islam in Africa. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000.Levtzion and Pouwels provide a very thorough treat-ment of the topic within a single volume . Spanning 14

centuries of history, the book details both background information and nuances of Islam in Africa . In 4 parts and 24 chapters, the book covers the history of Islam in Africa across geographies, time, and thematic topics . As an edited volume, the book also provides a glance at the work of commonly cited scholars .

Loimeier, Roman. Muslim Societies in Africa: A Historical Anthropology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.Loimeier provides an overview of Muslim societies in Africa within the context of African history and the history of Islam . The book brings together a wealth of scholarship on the topic and provides a very balanced look at Muslim societies, while also reaching a level of nuanced analysis of historical, social, economic, and political developments .

Soares, Benjamin and Rene Otayek, eds. Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.Soares and Otayek provide a much-needed contempo-rary and interdisciplinary approach to the current role of Islam in Africa . The book’s emphasis on politics and its role among Muslims in Africa makes the content relevant for many researchers and analysts and separates the book from religious and historical publications . Case studies range from regional topics within Africa to country-level case studies from various nations .

Further Reading on Islam in Africaal-Bili, Uthman Sayyid Ahmad Ismail . Some Aspects of

Islam in Africa . Reading, GBR: Ithaca Press, 2007 .

Bang, Anne K . Sufis and Scholars of the Sea: Family Networks in East Africa, 1860–1925 . London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003 .

Batran, Aziz A . Islam and Revolution in Africa. Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1984 .


Bennett, Norman R . A History of the Arab State of Zanzibar . London: Methuen, 1978 .

Buggenhagen, Beth A . Muslim Families in Global Senegal: Money Takes Care of Shame . Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012 .

Curtis, Edward E . The Call of Bilal: Islam in the African Diaspora . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014 .

De Waal, Alexander . Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa . Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004 .

Diouf, Mamadou . Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis in Senegal . New York: Columbia University Press, 2013 .

Diouf, Mamadou and Mara A . Leichtman . New Perspectives on Islam in Senegal: Conversion, Migration, Wealth, Power, and Femininity . New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009 .

Entelis, John P . Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa . Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997 .

Erlikh, Hagai . Islam and Christianity in the Horn of Africa: Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan . Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010 .

Evers Rosander, Eva and David Westerlund, eds . African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters Between Sufis and Islamists . Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997 .

Henretta, Sean . Islam and Social Change in French West Africa: History of an Emancipatory Community . New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009 .

Hunwick, John O . and Basil Davidson . West Africa, Islam, and the Arab World: Studies in Honor of Basil Davidson . Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006 .

Levtzion, Nehemia . Islam in Africa and the Middle East: Studies on Conversion and Renewal . Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007 .

Miles, William F .S . Political Islam in West Africa: State-Society Relations Transformed . Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007 .

Paden, John N . Muslim Civic Cultures and Conflict Resolution: The Challenge of Democratic Federalism

in Nigeria . Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005 .

Quinn, Charlotte A . and Frederick Quinn . Pride, Faith, and Fear: Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa . New York: Oxford University Press, 2003 .

Rabasa, Angel . Radical Islam in East Africa . Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009 .

Robinson, David . Muslim Societies in African History . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 .

Rothman, Norman C . Islam in Africa and Europe: Selected Case Studies . New York: Nova Publishers, 2014 .

Schlee, Gunther . Islam and Ethnicity in Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia . Oxford: James Currey, 2012 .

Schulz, Dorothea E . Muslims and New Media in West Africa: Pathways to God . Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011 .

Spadola, Emilio . Calls of Islam: Sufis, Islamists, and Mass Mediation in Urban Morocco . Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014 .

Trimingham, John Spencer . A History of Islam in West Africa . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985 .

Ware, Rudolph T . The Walking Qur’an: Islamic Education, Embodied Knowledge, and History in West Africa . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014 .

Villalón, Leonardo Alfonso . Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens in Fatick . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 .

Volpi, Frederic . Transnational Islam and Regional Security: Cooperation and Diversity Between Europe and North Africa . New York: Routledge, 2008 .

Recent Articles on Islam in AfricaAbdullah, Zain . “Transnationalism and the Politics

of Belonging: African Muslim Circuits in Western Spaces .” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 32, no . 4 (2012): 427 .

Adua, Sulaiman Sheu . “Africa and Africans in the History of Islam .” Academic Research International 2, no . 3 (May 2012): 657–660 .


Asekhauno, Anthony Afe and Matthew A . Izibili . “Islam and Culture: Two Epistemic Catalysts for Moral Dilemmas in the African Democratic Experiment .” Matatu, no . 40 (2012): 257, 273, 490–491 .

Bamidele, Oluwaseun . “Is There Space in Between? Religion and Armed Conflict in African States .” African Security Review 23, no . 1 (March 2014): 34–52 .

Corman, Steven R . and Steven Hitchcock . “Media Use and Source Trust among Muslims in Seven Countries: Results of a Large Random Sample Survey .” Journal of Strategic Security 6, no . 4 (Winter 2013): 25–43 .

Haron, Muhammed . “Southern Africa’s Dar Ul-’Ulums: Institutions of Social Change for the Common Good?” Studies in Philosophy and Education 33, no . 3 (May 2014): 251–266 .

Jaye, Thomas and Abiodun Alao . “Islamic Radicalisation and Violence in Liberia .” Conflict, Security & Development 13, no . 2 (2013): 191 .

Kaarsholm, Preben . “Zanzibaris or Amakhuma? Sufi Networks in South Africa, Mozambique, and the Indian Ocean .” Journal of African History 55, no . 2 (July 2014): 191–210 .

Leichtman, Mara A . “Shi’i Islamic Cosmopolitanism and the Transformation of Religious Authority in Senegal .” Contemporary Islam 8, no . 3 (September 2014): 261–283 .

LeSage, Andre . “The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania: Domestic Islamist Militancy and Regional Threats .” Strategic Forum, no . 288 (September 2014): 1–15 .

Manglos, Nicolette D . and Alexander A . Weinreb . “Religion and Interest in Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa .” Social Forces 92, no . 1 (September 2013): 195 .

Soares, Benjamin . “The Historiography of Islam in West Africa: An Anthropologist’s View .” Journal of African History 55, no . 1 (March 2014): 27–36 .

Solomon, Hussein . “Combating Islamist Radicalisation in South Africa .” African Security Review 23, no . 1 (March 2014): 17–33 .

Sonko, Karamo N .M . “Islam in Africa South of the Sahara .” African Studies Quarterly 14, no . 4 (September 2014): 80–81 .

Triaud, Jean-Louis . “Giving a Name to Islam South of the Sahara .” Journal of African History 55, no . 1 (March 2014): 3–15 .

Villalón, Leonardo Alfonso . “Between Democracy and Militancy: Islam in Africa .” Current History 111, no . 745 (May 2012): 187–193 .

Wright, Zachary Valentine . “Islam and Decolonization in Africa: The Political Engagement of a West African Muslim Community .” International Journal of African Historical Studies 46, no . 2 (2013): 205–227 .

Current Events, Magazines, and Research JournalsInformation on conflict studies and on Africa is pub-lished in a wide variety of academic journals . For assis-tance in locating additional journals, newspapers, and research materials on the region, contact the John T . Hughes Library .

African Affairs Journal

Africa Confidential

The Africa Report

Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial & Technical Series

Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social & Cultural Series

African Studies Review

Africa Today

BBC Focus on Africa

Jeune Afrique

Journal of Contemporary African Studies

Journal of East African Studies

New African


Center for Strategic Intelligence Research

Research and Research Fellowships at the National Intelligence University’s Center for Strategic Intelligence ResearchBy Dr. Michael B. Petersen, Director, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, National Intelligence University, [email protected]

Hello, and thanks for reading the second edition of the National Intelligence University’s Africa Research Initia-tive Newsletter, published by the university’s Center for Strategic Intelligence Research (CSIR) . At CSIR, we run a number of research programs that are designed to put the best of scholarly research on various international security issues into the hands of Intelligence Commu-nity and policymaking leadership . The Africa Research Initiative is only one of these programs .

Our research center also manages the Office of the Direc-tor of National Intelligence Exceptional Analyst and National Intelligence University Research Fellowships . These competitive fellowships are open to qualified U .S . Intelligence Community and Defense Department personnel who are seeking to spend a year conducting sophisticated strategic intelligence research on topics of national security interest . They provide research fund-ing, workspace, and hands-on scholarly research design and methods guidance to the fellows . Applicants do not need to hold a Ph .D . to apply, but our expectation is that the research will be the equivalent in sophistication to a dissertation or post-doctoral work and will adhere to the highest standards of scholarly research . Successful projects may be briefed to senior Intelligence Commu-nity personnel and may be eligible for publication by the National Intelligence Press .

The 2014/2015 academic year’s research fellows have embarked on a series of exciting and important studies . Readers of this newsletter may be especially interested in

work by Dr . Nicholas Parker, a political scientist at the U .S . Army . Dr . Parker’s project, “Freshwater Stress and Violent Conflict: A Mixed-Methods Approach to Under-standing Causal Pathways,” investigates how different manifestations of freshwater stress relate to and influence organized violent conflict in parts of sub-Saharan Africa . This work will be completed by October 2015 .

But Dr . Parker’s work is not the only research happen-ing in these fellowship programs that may be of interest to readers of this newsletter . Dr . Jennifer Davis, a fac-ulty member at the National Intelligence University, is adopting a mixed methods approach to investigate the dynamics of child soldier recruitment and use global, geographic, and cultural patterns of child soldiering and decisions by state and nonstate actors to utilize them and to cease their use .

Much of the research in these programs is extraor-dinarily timely . Dr . Michael Dennis, another politi-cal scientist at the U .S . Army, is developing his work on “Chechen Refugees and the Politics of Violence” by building on 3 years of field research and exploring what drives Chechen refugees and members of the Chechen diaspora to support political violence in Syria, Iraq, Rus-sia, and elsewhere . Ms . Katrina Elledge, a senior analyst at the Europe Analytic Center in the United Kingdom, is examining the impact of social media in the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and exploring how dissident use of social media may compel regime change elsewhere . These well-timed studies promise to add much to our scholarly and policy-level understand-ing of two of the most significant international security issues faced by the United States today .


Center for Strategic Intelligence Research

But the fellowship projects also move beyond specific area studies to examine larger issues as well. Dr. Ryan Baird, a political scientist in the Joint Warfare Analysis Center in Dahlgren, Virginia, is developing a project entitled “The Primacy of Governance Infrastructure in Democratic Consolidation and Anticipating State Fail-ure.” His research is developing a theory on the necessity of governance for democratic resiliency in new and/or fragile democracies and ultimately on the role of gover-nance in democratic consolidation. Finally, Commander Rodd Ricklefs of the United States Coast Guard is inves-tigating the history of an organization called the Border

Intelligence Fusion Section and using this case as a way to better understand how and why joint intelligence organizations develop, evolve, succeed, or fail.

In short, these fellowships are intended to develop sophisticated, cutting-edge scholarly research among some of the most highly qualified personnel in the U.S. Intelligence Community and Department of Defense. The goal is to contribute to both scholarly and official discourse on national and international security issues and to strengthen the natural ties between both of these important communities.


Africa Research Initiative ReportBy Dr. Kris Inman, Chief Africa Researcher, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, National Intelligence University, [email protected]

Overview

The Africa Research Initiative (ARI) began in April 2013 . Housed in the Office of Research at the National Intelli-gence University (NIU), the ARI responds to Intelligence Community (IC) agencies’ strategic research needs per-taining to sub-Saharan Africa . ARI’s primary intent is to address second- and third-tier priorities that are impor-tant to the IC and national security interests but that the IC is unable to address due to resource constraints . The ARI networks with analytic cadres and leadership to develop collaborative and/or independent scholarly research projects using existing areas of knowledge and expertise . It does not conduct bench research, which may be misconstrued as collection operations, nor does it conduct finished intelligence analysis .

Current Research Efforts

The ARI is currently conducting several research projects, the first of which is an ongoing inquiry of political succes-sion in Africa . The succession of the top political leader remains a source of potentially deadly conflict in many countries on the continent . Even in countries that at one time were consolidating democracies—such as Mali—struggles over legitimacy and power within the political system can destabilize the country and plunge it into vio-lence and chaos . In some cases, leadership change results in a regime change; in other cases, it causes the state to fail (for example, Somalia after the ouster of Mohamed Siad Barre) . In still other cases, successions have no effect on stability or legitimacy, and the country carries on with the status quo . With nearly half of the countries on the conti-nent holding elections for the top political office in 2014 and 2015,1 it is important to understand how leadership

change affects the political system and stability . This proj-ect will include field research in 2015 .

The second project under way at the ARI, a study of Islam on the Swahili Coast, is being conducted to gain more insight into the potential for Islamic radicalization in East Africa . While al-Shabaab remains an endemic threat in the Horn of Africa, little is known about the sus-ceptibility of Swahili Muslims to support al-Shabaab . The project aims to compare Swahili Muslims’ experiences in Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique and will include field research to Tanzania and Mozambique in 2015 .

Third, the ARI conducts an ongoing State of Research in Africa series of meta-studies (also known as “stud-ies of studies,” or meta-syntheses) about major topics in African studies . The first meta-study was conducted on “Technology in Africa” and found that technology in Africa has a variety of influences on African life . This is the first meta-study to critically and comprehensively review the state of research on information and commu-nications technology (ICT) in Africa, as well as identify knowledge gaps for future research . Through a system-atic search and evaluation of all peer-reviewed research published until June 2014, this research identified a total of 62 studies that fit the inclusion criteria . These stud-ies examine the role of mobile technology, the Internet, and social media in conflict, politics, society, econom-ics, and health on the continent . A thematic analysis of the studies reveals three key findings on the patterns of ICT usage and research coverage in sub-Saharan Africa . First, users have harnessed and exploited ICTs for both constructive and destructive aims . Second, the research concentrates on mobile telephony: while 23 studies fea-ture more than one ICT, 45 examine cell phones, 26 focus on the Internet, and 22 feature social media . This reflects usage trends across the continent, where mobile phones enjoy the highest penetration rate of all ICTs . Yet the studies only examine the use of features offered


by both basic phones and smartphones—namely, tex-ting and voice calling—and do not specify the extent of smartphone usage—for example, accessing the Internet or social media—in the research . Third, the research also focuses on 24 countries—particularly Kenya, Nige-ria, South Africa, and Uganda—and does not provide insight into the state of ICTs in all sub-Saharan coun-tries . Seventeen studies discuss Kenya alone, only one mentions Mali and Senegal, while none feature the remaining sub-Saharan countries such as Angola and Ghana . The conclusion of the meta-study is that addi-tional research is necessary in order to better under-stand the potential role of ICTs in shaping security, stability, political reforms, and socio-economic devel-opment throughout the entire continent .

Finally, we commissioned two studies over the last year . The first, in response to the Chibok kidnappings in northern Nigeria, focused on human trafficking in Nigeria and how viewing the kidnappings through the human trafficking lens is more appropriate and more pertinent to finding a solution than viewing them through a counter-terrorism lens . The second study, by a civil service member in South Sudan, discusses events

and narratives on the ground and lends a far richer framework for understanding the conflict than what is available through other open sources, such as interna-tional media covering the conflict .

Other Activities

Beyond research endeavors, the ARI has been actively engaged in speaking engagements and conferences around the government and academic Africanist com-munities . Dr . Inman provided the introductory session at the Africa Regional Expertise and Culture (REC) Team’s Nigeria workshop, and she presented research on the domestic security roles of the Nigerian military on one of the workshop panels . In October, she chaired the socio-cultural panel at the From the Podium informa-tion exchange on Ebola, an event co-sponsored by the National Intelligence Council, the National Intelligence University, U .S . Agency for International Development, and State Department Intelligence and Research Bureau . She also attended the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association and the African Studies Association, where she presented research on the effects of remittances on political participation in Africa . She is currently working with Ms . Brittany Bland, the Africa advisor at the REC Team, to organize the upcoming seminar on the 2015 African elections .

Get Involved

Work in the IC and have strategic research questions about Africa? The ARI is here to assist . Contact Dr . Inman at [email protected] with your question . If the ARI is unable to conduct the research in-house, we may be able to help commission a study through our vast academic network . Want to hold an event about Africa? We can connect you with the REC Team and NIU’s Office of Research to help facilitate your request .

Note

1 Algeria, Botswana, the Central African Republic, Comoros, Egypt, Guinea Bissau, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Tunisia, and South Africa held elections for Head of State in 2014 . Burkina Faso, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Sudan, Tanzania, and Togo are scheduled to hold elections for Head of State in 2015 .


By Ms. Brittany Bland, Africa Advisor, Regional Expertise and Culture Team, Brittany.bland@ dodiis.mil

The Regional Expertise and Culture (REC) Team is in the Directorate of Mission Services within the Academy of Defense Intelligence (ADI) at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) . The REC Team is responsible for offering regional and cultural knowledge acquisition opportu-nities to the DIA workforce and throughout the Intel-ligence Community (IC) . The team’s objective is to foster a more culturally fluent workforce through a variety of educational and training initiatives .

The REC Team develops and executes professional development training for U .S . Intelligence profession-als at DIA and throughout the IC . The team focuses on creating a DIA workforce possessing advanced foreign language proficiency, in-depth regional and cultural knowledge of a country and region, and cross-cultural competence to support enduring and expeditionary or contingency operations of the Department of Defense’s global mission . While regional expertise and culture training covers a broad range of topics, they fall pri-marily into four categories: Culture, Governance, Econ-omy, and Security . The REC Team is divided by region (Africa, Middle East, the Americas, Asia Pacific, and Europe/Eurasia) to better develop custom programs based on each region’s priorities . A major initiative of the program is to develop regional seminars that provide multiple perspectives on a particular topic .

On 15–16 January 2013, the Africa and Asia Pacific REC Programs collaborated on a joint seminar to address common misconceptions about Islam across the globe . The seminar, entitled “The Tenth Parallel: Future Flash-point or Alarmist Fallacy?” discussed the ideology and

belief system of Muslims outside the Middle East and also analyzed Muslim-Christian relations in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia . The seminar was inspired by Eliza Griswold’s book, The Tenth Parallel: Dispatches from the Fault Line between Christianity and Islam (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), which has chapters dedicated to Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines . The seminar, however, focused only on Nigeria, Ethiopia, Malaysia, and Indonesia . Ethiopia, which was not a chapter in Griswold’s book, was chosen because of its deep historical roots of Muslim-Christian relations, dating back to the Axumite Kingdom . Ethiopia today still represents a potential fault-line for conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, nestled between neighboring Sudan and South Sudan and Somalia to the east .

The seminar was designed to provide an in-depth exam-ination of the role of religious narratives in conflicts, how religion can escalate conflict, the different practices of Islam in Africa and Southeast Asia, and Muslim-Christian relations . It featured a variety of subject mat-ter experts, each providing unique insight into the topic . The seminar included a discussion on the intersection between religion and conflict, focusing on the way reli-gion is mobilized for political purposes during religious conflict . This was followed by a presentation on current religious trends in Africa . These two modules estab-lished the framework for the rest of the seminar, which focused on the four country case studies . History was an important component of each of the case studies, with each speaker taking the time to explain the impact that specific historical events, legacies, and perceptions have on Muslim-Christian relations today . This seminar was not meant to be a single event but rather a starting point for future education and training events focused on reli-gion in Africa . The current FY15 schedule of events for Africa is still under development . Please check out our

Regional Expertise and Culture Program, Africa Report


Regional Topics

blog on JWICS for more information on upcoming semi-nars and other regional expertise and culture resources.

Islam Related Events:

Africa and Asia Geostrategic Intelligence Seminar: “The Tenth Parallel: Future Flashpoint or Alarmist Fallacy?”

Middle East Geostrategic Intelligence Seminar: “Appeal of the Islamic State”

Africa FY15 Schedule of Events

Month Region/Topic

March Africa Seminar : Trade, Investment, and Energy Outlook

Africa Seminar : Elections in sub-Saharan Africa

April Africa Seminar : Multi-National Organizations (RECs, ECOWAS, African Union)

East Africa Seminar : Ethiopia/Eritrea

May Africa Seminar : Islam in Africa

June Africa Seminar : Demographics, Urbanization, and Youth Bulge

Africa Seminar : Military Structures in African States

July Africa Seminar : Foreign Actors (Turkey, Brazil, and India)

East Africa Seminar : Kenya

August Africa Seminar : Illicit Trafficking and Security

North Africa Seminar : Democratization Prospects Post–Arab Spring

September West Africa Seminar : Sahel Stability and Security Outlook

Central Africa Seminar : Sudan/South Sudan Border Tensions

AFPAK Foundation Course: “Introduction to Islam Module”

AFPAK Hands Course: “Islamic Ideology Module”

Documents

N IU AR I Africa Research - National Intelligence Universityni-u.edu/research/ARI_Newsletter_Feb_2015.pdfThe National Intelligence University: The Center of Academic Life for the Intelligence