Mysticism and Theravāda Meditation ___________________________________________________________

Milos Hubina

This article is an attempt to analyze Theravāda Buddhist meditation in the light of the

constructivist and perennialists methodological approaches. I am not undertaking to decide

which one is wrong and which is right. Such an attempt would be surely pointless because, as

Jensine Andresen and Robert K.C. Forman pointed out, “both constructivists and perennial

psychologists made some good points” (Andresen, Forman 2002: 8). One of them was the

constructivists´ “plea for recognition of differences”.1 There is never enough caution to be

paid while creating interpretative models. Yet, this awareness of differences should be

accompanied by sense for commonalities.

In the first part of my article I will analyze Robert M. Gimello’s interpretation of

Buddhist vipassanā meditation in general context of mystical experience as presented in his

paper Mysticism and Meditation.2 Gimello's main point here is that Buddhist vipassanā

meditation does not fulfill the common criteria of mystical experience and should be

considered a non-mystical (probably “meta-mystical”, as I understand his view, see bellow)

phenomenon. This issue goes undoubtedly beyond the constructivist-perennialist polemic and

is of wider importance.

Afterwards I will show where the perennialists’ models of explanation vipassanā

experience fall short of precision and become reductionistic.

Briefly, as it is well known the constructivist (Steven Katz, Robert Gimello, Peter

Moore, Frederick Streng and others) methodological approach does not admit that a mystic in

his/her experience could transcend formative cultural concepts which are considered an

integrative part of the experience itself, while the perennialists (William James, Evelyn

Underhill, Joseph Maréchal, William Johnson, James Pratt, Mircea Eliade, W.T. Stace,

Rudolf Otto, Aldous Huxley and others) hold that mystics can escape their own conceptual

backgrounds and, consequently, mystics with different cultural backgrounds can share the

same experience. While in constructivists´ view the conceptual background is informative and

determinative to the experience itself, perennialists find it involved solely in interpretative

1 KATZ 1978: 25 2 GIMELO, R.M. (1978): Mysticism and Meditation, In KATZ, S., (ed.): Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, Oxford University Press 1978.

post-experience works. The experience itself is not necessarily influenced by the cultural

background.

It is important to note, however, that perennialists do not claim that all mystical

experiences are the same. Only that there is a particular state of consciousness (called PCE -

Pure Consciousness Event) in which higher cognitive activities are stopped and so no pre-set

interpretative schemes determine the experience. Besides this “apophatic” experience there is,

undoubtedly, a vast array of visionary or “trophotropic” states. These two basic forms of

alternative experiences have, as Forman understands it, their neuro-physiological basis

consisting of two opposite scales of hypo- and hyper-arousals – trophotropic and ergotrophic

respectively. The former states are stimulated by excitation of para-sympathetic the later by

excitation of sympathetic nervous systems.3

Forman proposes using term mysticism solely for apophatic phenomena.4 He says that

this restriction has an advantage of avoiding mixing together the states with different

phenomenology, exegesis, and metabolic excitation and corresponds to original meaning of

the words mystikos, mysterion etc. which are derived from Greek myo and means “to close”.

Thus it concurs also to Pseudo-Dionysios´ (Areopagite) usage of the term which understands

it as meaning “to close ones´ senses from the distracting multitudeness.” He proposes

distinguishing these apophatic mystical states from kataphatic (ergotropic) “visionary” states.5

Religionists and psychologists have made many attempts to categorize an evasive

realm of alternative states of consciousness or religious experience during the history of

religious studies. One of the basic distinctions has been made between the experience of

numinous and mystical experience. (Cf. R. Otto, N. Smart and others.)

The states and techniques of Buddhist meditative tradition are generally treated as

instantiations of mystical experience. Ninian Smart, for example, argued that while numinous

experience pertains predominantly to prophetic religions such as Judaism, Islam and

Christianity, religious experiences of certain branches of Buddhism (as well as Taoism and

Hinduism) are “mystical”6. Elaborating upon Rudolf Otto’s typology he understands

numinous experience as an encounter with a being wholy other then oneself and altogether

different than anything else. Traditionally, the subjects are not responsible for the occurrence

3 Demonstrating this concept of mysticism Forman adopts Roland Fischer’s concept of alternations of the states of consciousness, published in his article A Cartography of the Ecstatic and Meditative States, In: Science, vol. 174, No. 4012, Nov. 4 See FORMAN 1997: 7. 5 The most elucidative account of Forman’s position can be found in FORMAN 1997: 3- 53. 6 SMART N.: Reasons and Faiths: An Investigation of Religious Discourse, Christian and Non-Christian (London, Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1958). See also SMART 1978: 13.

of the experience, which is in this sense “gratuitous”. The mystical experience, by contrast, is

rather an interior attainment of extraordinary state of mind than a gratuitous encounter with

something “completely other”.

Referring to the both abovementioned conceptions R. Gimello separates Buddhist

meditative experience - more precisely Buddhist vipassanā meditation - from the scale of the

mystical experiences. In his own words: Nevertheless, without wishing to subvert the

intentions of a distinction like Smart’s, indeed in the hope of furthering them, I think it must

be recognized that there is a modicum of impression in the labeling of the most

characteristically Buddhist experience and discourse mystical… However, not all that is not

numinous need to be classified as mystical and it will be shown that there are important

features of Buddhism, especially of its meditation disciplines which seem not to fall neatly

under the mystical rubric. … I would suggest that it is difficult to apply any of the widely

accepted definitions or descriptions of mysticism to Buddhist praxis without the most serious

reservations. … It will, of course, be anticipated that these disparities are not so much

between mystical experience and the Buddhist meditative experience as between mystical

experience and Buddhism’s doctrinaire interpretation thereof. But I wish to argue that it is in

the practice and experience of meditation itself that the distinction between mystical and

meditative experience is evident, not simply in the post- or extra-experiential interpretations

which Buddhists place upon their meditation. (Gimello 1978: 173- 174)

Gimelo's attempt to set Buddhist meditative tradition aside from the rubric of mystical

I understand as an expression of the general constructivist plea for recognition of differences

in dealing with religious experience. However I think that Gimelo in pursuing his aim failed

to see the common patterns and his dealing with vipassanā meditation is methodologically

unsound and factually not always correct.

Buddhist meditative practice consists basically of two fundamental techniques -

concentration (P. samādhi,) or calmness (samatha) sometimes referred to as development of

calmness (samatha-bhāvanā) and awareness or discernment (vipassanā ) called also

development of discernment or wisdom (vipassanā-bhāvanā, paññā-bhāvanā). It is the later

of these two techniques which is the crucial soteric instrument while the former has basically

supportive role and is not exclusively Buddhist meditative practice. Samatha-bhāvanā

consists of eight stages called jhānas (absorptions). The first four are absorptions in the sphere

of form (rūpāyatana); the later four are absorptions in formless realm (arūpāyatana).

Meditator achieves these sates via concentration on a particular object. The tradition

distinguishes forty such objects (kammat.t.hāna; literally: working objects) with selective

efficacy. Not every object is fit for achieving all absorptions. Probably the most universal are

the ten kasinas (specific colored discs) and breathing. These can lead the meditator up to the

all four sublime-material spheres.

Intensive concentration on the material object brings about its mental visualization

(nimitta), which replaces material kasina for the object of contemplation. Arising of this

visualization together with occurrence of the five specific mental factors are signs of

achieving the first jhāna.7

The arūpa attainments have their own objects of contemplation. These are: the sphere

of boundless space (ākāsānañcāyatana) which the meditator attains when he stops paying

attention to the nimitta and turns his attention towards the space it had occupied. Similarly,

turning his attention from the space to the infinite consciousness which comprises it, he

reaches the second attainment – the sphere of boundless consciousness (viññān.añcāyatana).

Subsequently after having abandoned the consciousness as a meditation object, the meditator

focuses his attention on nothingness (akiñcaññāyatana) that has left, until finally by

abandoning the sphere of nothingness he focuses his attention and reaches the sphere of

neither perception nor non-perception (nevasaññā-n’asaññāyatana) the last of the mundane

jhānas.8

While samādhi in Gimello's view falls into rubric “mystical experience” the

vipassanā, does not fit to its definitional marks which are as follows:

7 The so called five factors of absorption (jhānanga) are: thought-conception, discursive thinking, rapture, happiness, and concentration (vitakka, vicāra, pīti, sukha, samādhi). Their progressive elimination leads a meditator up to the fourth jhāna in which two of the mental factors of absorption i.e. samādhi and upekkhā (equanimity) which has substituted for sukha are present. Vitakka and vicāra are abandoned at entering the second and pīti the third jhāna. Of course, besides these factors of absorption there are also another mental factors constituting particular state of mind present. 8 The clearest image of Buddhist meditative soteriology we can gain from the authoritative and widely accepted work of Theravāda commentator of 5th century Buddhaghosa and his opus magnum Visuddhimagga (The Path of Purification). The second, less known but not less important work is Vimuttimagga (The Path of Freedom) a text attributed to monk living probably in first century A.D., Upatissa. The Upatissa’s text now preserved only in Chinese translation served probably an inspiration to the author of Visuddhimagga. The path leading toward nibbána is divided into seven stages here (The same division we can find in canonical MN. 24). The first of the stages - The Purification of Morality (sīla-visuddhi)- consists basically in observing 227 rules of monks´ right livelihood and lays down the ethical foundation for meditation. On this moral basis is raised the second stage: The Purification of Mind (citta-visuddhi) which consists of eight samádhi absorptions (jhāna). The remaining five stages are vipassanic ones. Their enumeration runs as follows: Purification of View (dit.t.hi-visuddhi), Purification by Overcoming Doubts (kankhāvitarana-visuddhi) Purification by Knowledge and Vision of What are Path and not-Path (maggāmagga-ñānadassana-visuddhi), Purification by Knowledge and Vision of the Course of Practice (pat.ipadāñānadassana-visuddhi), Purification by Knowledge and Vision (ñānadassana-visuddhi).The last of the purifications represents shift from the mundane (lokiya) to supermundane (lokuttara) states.

A feeling of oneness or unity, variously defined

A strong confidence in a ´reality´ or ´objectivity´ of the experience, i.e. the confidence that it

is somehow revelatory of ´the truth´.

A sense of the final inapplicability to the experience of the ordinary language (the experience

is ineffable).

A cessation of normal intellectual operations (e.g. deduction, discrimination, ratiocination,

speculations, etc.) or substitution for them of some “higher” or qualitatively different mode

of intellect (e.g. intuition).

A sense of coincidence of opposites of various kind (i.e. paradoxicality)

An extraordinary strong affective tone, again of various kinds (e.g. sublime joy, utter serenity,

great fear, incomparable pleasure, etc. – often an unusual combination of such as these)

(Gimello 1978: 178)

As we have already mentioned, the basic constructivist tenet says that culturally

bounded conceptual schemes intervene and determine every (i.e. also mystical) experience.

Then from the constructivist perspective vipassanā (as well as any other mystical experience)

is a kind of “auto-suggestive” technique through which the doctrinally acknowledged

worldview is being implemented into the content of one's unusual experience. (Of course,

besides this controlled one there is also a spontaneous constructive activity of mind involved

in forming any experience.)

The main reason why Gimello is unwilling to label vipassanā “mysticism” lies in the

fact that, as he argues, vipassanā (called in the passage quoted bellow “supramundane

cultivation”) is aimed at discerning the characteristics of all existence – i.e. its transiency

(anicca), insubstantiality (anatta), and uneasiness (dukkha) - as recognized by Buddhist

doctrine.9 This conclusion, however, is rather surprising because Gimello actually does not

9“The supramundane cultivation consists in the review of ´truths´ of Buddhism - suffering, impermanence, insubstantiality – by applying these concepts both to conventional experience and to the rarefied experience of absorptions.” (Gimello 1978: 186)

believe that tilakkhana represents the set of intrinsic characteristics of all things. In his view

the meditator imposes these characteristics to the experience.

Therefore I can not see there any difference between vipassanā technique and any kind

of mysticism as it is understood by constructivists – as a process of imputing doctrinally

acknowledged worldview (conceptual scheme) into a manner of perceiving the world. In this

sense there is no reason to exclude vipassanā from the category of mysticism.

Gimello also criticizes opinion that the experiences of different mystics could be

identical because “the interpretation can be actually ingredient in experience and need not be

only something added to the experience by the reflexive intellect. It may well be, in other

words, that the Christian or Jewish mystic who describes his experience as communion with

God rather then as a realization that God and he are one, does so because the former are the

categories that come immediately to mind, not only after the experience in moments of

judicious reflection, but even in the midst of it. In other words, such categories may well be

the very means by which the intellect participates in and thereby informs the experience.”

(GIMELLO 1978: 176)

Given that, it is difficult to understand why an experience formed by specific

conceptual framework into a form of communion with God (instead of e.g. being an

experience of unification with God) is treated as a mystical experience but an experience

which, again, due to specific conceptual framework involved, is an experience of tilakkhana

should not be regarded a mystical experience.

One could argue that though vipassanic and mystical experiences are “technically” the

same – they both arise as a result of the process of imposing specific conceptual background

to the experience – they actually differ as to their contents. It means that the experience of

tilakkhana does not correspond to the above mentioned criteria of mystical experience. One

could reason that there is no word of a feeling of oneness or unity characteristic to mystical

experience and tilakkhana is clearly defined and verbally articulated while mystical

experience is supposed to be inexpressible.

But this is not a viable way out and evidences go against such an interpretation.10

10 My analysis of the Theravāda vipassanā meditation will be limited here to its presentation in Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga and Upatissa’s Vimuttimagga inasmuch Gimello himself refers to the former (GIMELLO 1978: 196- 197, Note 23.) and the later, as we have already mentioned, covers almost the same area as Visuddhimagga and with all probability served as a pattern or at least an inspiration for it. Only few references will be made also to the text by Dhanit YUPHO: Vipassanā-bhāvanā. Advanced Study, Practical Insight Meditation, Methods for Self-testing and realization of Consequences, which is a guide for the cultivation of vipassanā as taught at Wat Mahathat in Bangkok and which follows the lines of thought presented in Visuddhimagga. On few occasions, I will refer to Bhikkhu’s Bodhi elucidative explication of Theravāda understanding of the concept of wisdom (paññā).

However, before continuing, I would like to express my hope that the following

argumentation will not be taken ideologically. The term “mysticism” I (and I am sure R.

Gimello as well) understand as a neutral label which has nothing to do with argumentations

over “reality, value, relevance, higher or lower status, truth etc. of the experience. I am just

following the aim to discern whether certain features usually associated with mystical

experience pertain also to vipassanic phenomenology.

Firstly, the peak of the vipassanic experience – nibbāna “here and now” or a state of

ceasing of perception and feeling (saññāvedayitanirodha) called also attainment of cessation

(nirodhasamāpatti)11 has besides it experiential also ethical and cognitive aspects.

The last two are tantamount to elimination of all fetters binding one to sam.sāra and

understanding of the Four Noble Truths respectively. The Four Noble Truths contain also the

understanding of that there is no Self (atta). “Understanding” here does not mean an

intellectual grasping or memorizing of the doctrine of Not Self (anatta) but its direct

realization or experience. This experiential aspect of the state we will address later. Thus if we

can elimination of ego, i.e. disappearance of subject-object distinction call a form of oneness

or unity, variously defined the first criterion of the Gimello's list of mystical phenomena is

fulfilled. Surely enough, although the motive of not I or not Self is fundamental to Buddhist

soteriology and frequent in Buddhist texts: anatta is one of tilakkhana, upon hearing

Anattalakkhan.a Sutta (The Discourse of Not Self) the second sermon Buddha delivered after

his enlightenment, the listeners immediately attained nibbāna, contemplation of no-self

(anattānupassanā) belongs to eighteen basic kinds of insight-knowledge (mahā-vipassanā)

(cf. VsDM. XXII, 113) etc12., in Ariyapariyesanā Sutta (MN. 26) and Mahasaccaka Sutta

(MN. 36) two suttas which address the event of Siddhattha’s awakening under the bodhi tree

it appears only implicitly. In Mahasaccaka Sutta it is said that the Buddha by his liberating

experience attained knowledge of the taints (āsava) one of which is a taint of ignorance

(avijjāsava). This is not knowing that there is not I. The Buddha's awakening experience

itself was noetically identified with understanding of dependent origination

(pat.iccasamuppāda), which also explains that there is no Self transmigrating from one life-

11 “But that which is experienced in the Nirodhasamāpatti is the state of Nirvān.a, namely, the cessation of all mental activities, which is comparable to that of final Nirvān.a. The final Nirvān.a is called ´Khandha-parinbbān.a´, the complete cessation of the five aggregates and is attained by the Arhat at his death. “ Vajirañān.a 1975: 467. 12 See Vin. i.7-14, or Bhikkhu ÑĀN.AMOLI, Bhikkhu BODHI 1995: 1217- 1218, note 314.

existence to another13. Therefore if this specific truth was gained through vipassanā practice

Gimello's intention to exclude vipassanic states from the rubric mystical on the basis of

absence of noetic moment remains unintelligible.

Secondly, the peak of the meditative vipassanic experience bears a sense of reality

since the meditator is said to see things “as they really are” (yathābhūtam). Seeing things “as

they really are”, is seeing the true, objective state of things. It is not a kind of hallucination –

and that is the second characteristic of mystical experience in Gimello’s list. However, as

explained bellow, this seeing “things as they are” is rather unusual “view”.

Thirdly, though Buddhist doctrine does verbally explain the character of the world (the

concepts of pat.iccasamuppāda, tilakkhana, and suññatā, being probably the fundamental

ones) the very peak of the experience, “seeing things as they really are”, is inexpressible, in

sense that the meditator does not see „objects” with predicable attributes but rather a flux of

impersonal phenomena which appear and disappear with enormous velocity.14

Inexpressibility – as we could have seen - is the third of the Gimello's characteristics. We

have already mentioned that the peak of the experience is called also saññāvedayitanirodha -

or ceasing of perception/conceptualization and feeling, which is an equivalent of cessation of

13 “I considered: ´This Dhamma that I have attained is profound, hard to see and hard to understand, peaceful and sublime, unattainable by mere reasoning, subtle, to be experienced by the wise. But this generation delights in worldliness, takes delight in worldliness, rejoices in worldliness. It is hard for such a generation to see this truth namely, specific conditionality, dependent origination. And it is hard for such a generation to see this truth, namely, the stilling of all formations, the relinquishing of all acquisitions, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, Nibbána.” (MN. 26: 19) 14As Bhikkhu Bodhi has it in his Introduction to the book Abhidhamma Studies. Buddhist Explorations of Consciousness and Time by Nyanaponika Thera: “For wisdom or insight to arise, the meditator must learn to suspend the normal constructive synthesizing activity of mind responsible for waving the reams of immediate sensory data into coherent narrative patterns revolving around persons, entities, and their attributes. Instead, the meditator must adopt a radically phenomenological stance, attending mindfully to each successive occasion of experience exactly as it presents itself in its sheer immediacy. When this technique of “bare attention” is assiduously applied the familiar world of everyday perception dissolves into dynamic stream of impersonal phenomena, flashes of actuality arising and perishing with incredible rapidity. Nyanaponika 1998: xvii. It is clear that in such an experience there is no room for stable immutable persisting Self (atta). Therefore here too we can take Gimello's first characteristic of mystical experience fulfilled. Moreover Theravāda development of mindfulness implies doctrine of momentariness of all phenomena including phenomenon of self-identity. As we can read in Vimuttimagga: “Nothing exists for two moments. Thus all beings sink in the conscious moment. (Citta-kkhana, which according to commentaries is the billionth part of the time occupied by a flash of lightening. See NYANATILOKA 1988: 86, note M.H.) It is taught in Abhidhamma thus: ´In the past conscious moment, one did not live, one is not living, one will not live. In the future conscious moment one did not live, one is not living, one will not live. In the present conscious moment, one did not live, one will not live only one is living. And again it is taught in this stanza: ´Life and personality, sorrow, happiness and all are joined to one thought; quickly the moment passes. By the yet-not-become, nothing is born; by the present one lives. When mind’s shattered, the world dies, so the world's end was taught´. ´” VmTM. Ch. 8, sect. 4, pp. 169-170

normal intellectual operations - the fourth items on the list of characteristics of mystical

experience.

This apophatic experience is supposed to cause significant personal changes – an issue

we will address later. Here be it anticipated that the shift in personal ethical and cognitive

orientation caused by attainment of wisdom (paññā) is deeply rooted and irreversible. It can

hardly be compared to a personal change which one undergo upon simple getting to know that

Santa Claus does not exists or that the Earth revolves around the Sun instead of being fixed in

the very centre of the Universe. Therefore Gimello’s presenting the vipassanic bare

knowledge as if comparable to acquiring information of any kind and contrasting it to unusual

mystical experience is inadequate. Overwhelming majority of Buddhists know that all things

are anicca, anatta, and dukkha. But it doesn't mean they are all awakened arahants. After all,

every one of us has an empirical experience of the world’s unstable character, however it can

hardly be regarded vipassanic understanding of anicca. Interpreting the peak of vipassanic

experience we should not fail to acknowledge subject-predicate structure of English (and Pāli

and Sanskrit as well) languages and the game which this structure may play with our

understanding. It is not the case that in the state of ceasing of perception/conceptualization

and feeling (saññāvedayitanirodha) the meditator sees that all things have attributes such as

anatta, anicca, dukkha. In the experience of anicca there cannot be any things present

inasmuch as these have dissolved into a flux of ever-changing phenomena. (See note 14.)

Thus the situation is far from that of everyday perception of stable things bearing their

qualities. The basic structure our perception and language hangs on (i.e. subject-predicate

structure) is destroyed, the experience is apophatic. Hence the inexpressibility of the peak

experience comes. Therefore “all things are anicca, anatta and dukkha…” can come later as a

result of the interpretation of the extraordinary rupture in everyday experience and hardly as

an experience itself.

Surely enough, a religious insider has the full right to say that he/she perceives the

three characteristics of the whole existence. Such a claim is absolutely legitimate,

indisputable, respectable and valuable. Inasmuch as he interprets the experience in lines of

particular religious tradition. But the scientific view should strive to find out what it means

when the religious insider says that he sees the basic characteristics of the things. In other

words – scientific explication should follow different “tradition”.

Speaking about “a noetic aspect of an inexpressible experience” may sound

paradoxical (paradoxicality, however, is one of the characteristics Gimello has on his list but I

am not going to make a point of it here) and the relationship between an apophatic experience

and any verbalized doctrine related to it is one of the most puzzling issues. In my view there

are three possible interpretation of it:

1. The apophatic experience may act as a kind of refreshing “reset” of the thinking

stereotypes. It stimulates new “enlightened” associations or re-formatting of habituated

thinking patterns. Indeed, in this respect the experience can be regarded a stimulus for getting

upon a “new knowledge”.

2. The contentless apophatic experience can - as to its form - be similar to the dream-

experience when on dreams he/she have got an eminent idea, has invented beautiful poem or

musical composition but upon trying to get his/her artifact into the focus of his/her partly

“awake consciousness”: to read the poem or analyze the idea, he/she finds out that there is

nothing to remember but a cluster of unintelligible words, letters or any other signs.

3. The apophatic experience can be a result of the process of dissolution of the

ordinary objects of experience into a “rhapsody of percepts” or impersonal phenomena

(dhammas) freed of selecting and synthesizing activities which higher cognitive functions of

the mind usually perform over them.

The third one is apparently the explication which adopts Buddhist Theravāda tradition.

(See note 14.)

However, Gimello this apophatic aspect of vipassanic exercise completely ignores. He

simply states that (s)ome texts speak of a still more refined anoetic transic state

(sam.jñāvedita-nirodha, the extinction of concept and feeling) which is virtually an utter lack

of consciousness and which approaches death. (GIMELLO 1978: 186). But one of those texts

in which the state of saññāvedayitanirodha is explained as the very goal of vipassanic

exercise is also Visuddhimagga, Gimello's point of reference. Therefore his taking no notice

of it is hardly methodologically acceptable. Moreover, he speaks of saññāvedayitanirodha as

if it was a samadhic state, pertaining to worldly attainments, simply following the eight jhāna

without any significant break between them though Visuddhimagga and Vimuttimagga clearly

state that the event occurs only after one has ascended in his meditation from the worldly to

superworldy realm. There is also no room for doubt that this state can rise solely as a result of

vipassanā meditation which Gimello calls “superworldy”: “As though to confirm the

subordination of calming to discernment in Buddhist meditation, the later scholastic

(abhidharma) traditions of Buddhism develop a distinction between the mundane (laukika)

and the supramundane (lokottara) cultivations (bhāvanā). The mundane cultivation is the

practice of the eight absorptions and attainments listed above…. The supramundane practice

consists in the review of the ´truths´ of Buddhism – suffering, impermanence, insubstantiality

– by applying these concepts both to conventional experience and to the rarefied experiences

of absorptions.” (Gimello op cit.: 185- 186) See also note 9 of the present paper.

Inability of the ordinary language to fit to the extraordinary experience led authors of

Theravāda commentarial literature to making clear distinction between ordinary language

(vohāra-vacana) and higher (paramattha) language only capable to convey the content of the

mystical experience. This distinction is based on Sutta distinction between explicit meaning

(nītattha) and implicit meaning (neyyattha).15

Stopping of perception and feeling is in Theravāda exposition equated with a state of

emotional equanimity (upekkhā)16, which is clearly the last of the characteristics mentioned in

the Gimello's list. So the peak of vipassanic experience as described in authoritative

meditative manuals of Theravāda tradition clearly fulfills the criteria Gimello puts on mystical

experience.

Beside this main point, there are also some minor inaccuracies influencing Gimello's

argumentation. One of the most serious is that despite the general constructivist “plea for the

recognition of differences” he speaks about Buddhist meditation in general and quotes

sources as doctrinally, historically, culturally and geographically remote from each other as

Theravadin’s commentarial text Visuddhimagga (written probably in the fifth century),

Chinese translation of Asanga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya (written in the fourth century),

Kumarajīva’s Chinese translation of Vimalakīrtinirdeša (original text written probably in the

second century translated by Kumarajīva in the fifth century) and various Zen Buddhist texts

as if there was not a difference between them in regard of meditation theory and practice. Yet

the contrary is true: there are significant discrepancies in the opinion on meditation not only

between two different traditions but even within one single tradition as well. As Sharf puts it:

“(t)here is simply not public consensus in the contemporary Theravāda community as to the

application of terms that allegedly refers to discrete experiential states. Not surprisingly, the

same is found to be true in Japanese Zen. (Sharf 2002: 279)17

Though it is true as Gimello has it, that in all versions of the stories of Buddha's life

and in all systematic curricula of meditation, it is discernment, or its perfection as insight

(prajňā), which is the proximate cause of enlightenment, not śamatha or samādhi . … The

differences among the various regiments of Buddhist meditation do not put this in question

15 See Nyanatiloka 1988: 235. 16 „However, at a higher-level jhāna, even bliss is supersede by equanimity or tranquility of mind, which might be called the psychologically dominant quality of the enlightened consciousness “ (King 1992: 24) 17 For detailed account see R.H. Sharf (1995), Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience, In: Numen, 42 (3).

(Gimello 1978: 185), opposite to Gimello’s and probably commonly accepted view it was not

always vipassanā meditation which conveyed this soteric knowledge (S. prajñā, P. paññā).

There is no mention of vipassanā meditation in the two suttas that describe Buddha's

awakening under the bodhi tree (already mentioned Ariyapariyesanā Sutta /MN. 26/ and

Mahāsaccaka Sutta /MN. 36/). The texts which, to my knowledge, says more about the

technique Siddhattha used just before his awakening is are commentarial Saddhammapakāsinī

and Vissudhimaga. But neither of the two suttas tells us what was the technique which led

Siddhattha toward the final liberation, though M. 36 suggests that just before the final

attainment he passed successively through the four jhānas. (See MN.36, 34- 37)

Vipassanā meditation is absent also in the canonical description of the Buddha's last

moments before his parinibbána though these were in the same way as the moments before

his awakening, accompanied by samādhi events. In both cases the canon depicts the Buddha

progressively passing through successive stages of concentration (jhānas).

The importance of samādhi meditation treated by the later Buddhist tradition

sotericaly secondary can be seen in the fact that it was exactly Siddhattha’s remembrance of

his childhood’s experience of spontaneous entering the samādhi state (jhāna) that took him

away from the way of fruitless asceticism. Development of samādhi was his turning point

towards attainment of the final liberation. (See MN. 36, 31- 32)

Highly useful in this context is Hajime Nakamura’s argumentation18 that older layers

of the Buddhist canon present as the soteric goal those samatha (!!!) attainments which the

later parts ascribed to Siddhattha’s teachers Al.ārā Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, and

which – according to Ariapariyesanā Sutta and Mahāsaccaka Sutta - Sakyamuni utterly

dismissed as mundane (lokiya) states subordinate to attainment of nibbána and other

supermundane (lokuttara) states.19

As Hajime Nakamura puts it:

In the initial stage of Early Buddhism. …

A. (the period represented by the oldest scriptures in the section of the

Pārāyana) as the logical conclusion of the teaching advocating freedom

from clinging, the state of non-existence was a goal and for that purpose

18 Hajime Nakamura 1979: 269- 277. 19 The last two of arūpa absorptions (Sphere of Nothingness and Sphere of Neither Perception nor Non-perception) are the samādhi attainments which in Parāyāna, the oldest section of Suttanipāta - the most ancient Buddhist text - and At.t.hakavagga respectively occur as the very soteric goals advocated by the Buddha. However the traditional Buddhist exposition places them into the sphere of sam.sāra which is to be transcended. The transcendence of the sam.sāric or worldly (lokiya) realm is brought about by vipassanā technique.

meditation was practiced. The Jains also posited this ideal goal. This stage

was known as saññā vimokkha (deliverance from thought)

However, when Buddhism evolved and entered into a second period of Early

Buddhism:

B. (represented by the At.t.haka section) they advanced one step further and

began to consider the ultimate state as neither the existence nor-

nonexistence of thought. This is probably due to the fact that if they were to

advocate views such as ´there is no thought´ or ´nothing exists´ they would

be mistaken as nihilists, which they sought to avoid.

When Buddhism underwent dramatic evolution (in the post-Aśoka period or possible

after the reign of King Nanda), the concepts of the periods A and B were no longer

acceptable to the contemporary people and new ideas became necessary. As a result,

the concept of non-existence was attributed to Ál.ára Káláma and the theory of

thoughtless-thought (the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception, note M.H.)

attributed to Uddaka, son of Rāma, while Buddhism itself set forth new views. This

situation was quite similar to the time when Mahāyāna Buddhism rose as a contrast to

Hīnayāna. In this manner, the development was formalized in the Majjhima Nikāya

and despite the fact that the theories of nonexistence and thoughtless-thought were

originally Buddhist, they were now considered non-Buddhist and applied to the

framework of the four Arūpa Dhātu meditations, placed respectively at the third and

fourth deva heavens of Arūpa Dhātu. (NAKAMURA 1979: 273- 274)

No doubt it is one of the most striking points of Buddhist soteriology because the

development of awareness or vipassanā bhāvanā features in later parts of the Buddhist canon

as condition sine qua non of attaining the final goal (nibbāna). Indeed, the Buddha’s own

spiritual development was unique. It was marked by strong resolution to find the answer on

the question of suffering, long-lasting effort and several radical changes in his meditation

exercise. The most significant of the changes Siddhattha made on his path was a complete

abandonment of asceticism and pain-causing meditative techniques and embracing moderate,

middle-way, style in both his livelihood and meditation-exercise. If we can rely in this point

on the canonical depiction, all this might have left imprints on his final liberating experience.

So it is quite plausible to hypothesize that for certain time of developing Buddhist path there

was an uncertainty about how to convey the teaching and what technique to use to stimulate

the liberating experience in his followers. A canonical accountteach us that in case of the

Buddha’s five co-searchers it was “mere” listening to the Dhamma without specific

meditation technique involved which brought about their enlightenment.

Higher and lower states

In Gimello's view the vipassanic states coming out as results of scrutiny of samādhi

states defined as “mystical” are ipso facto meta-mystical. But such a conclusion is not self-

evident and in my opinion also incorrect. Without making evaluative (higher-lower, pure-

profane) distinction we can be safe concluding that the fact that vipassanā technique uses

samādhi states as its working objects, does not imply that the results of this technique leads

to achievement of states which are inevitably (i.e. with logical necessity) “higher” or “purer”.

Shortly, even though this “higher-lower” distinction is generally taken for granted in Buddhist

texts and is canonically based, it does not mean that it also reflects anything experiential. No

doubt constructivists´ unwillingness to acknowledge the difference between experience and

its interpretation makes them widely open to such an erroneous conclusion.

Sure, the doctrinal presentation of vipassanā as a technique or instrument to work over

the samādhi states made Gimello to see samādhi – vipassanā relation through “upper - lower”

interpretative prism. But this is evaluative religious and not impartial scientific classification,

and as such it should not be accepted unrestrictedly. There is no reason to think that the states

themselves have somehow hierarchical structure.

As for the hierarchy within the realm of samādhi states, I am not quite sure about

phenomenological criteria which would allow for 1. making distinction between them and 2.

claiming their hierarchical arrangement. Indeed, within the sole sequence of rūpa jhānas we

do can find a criterion of sublimity of the states or at least a key to its understanding. We can

understand that e.g. the second jhāna is more sublime then the first jhāna due to absence of

“gross” mental factors vitakka and vicāra in the former and that the third jhāna is even more

sublime because rapture present in the first two jhānas does not occur here, but with the

fourth jhāna the situation takes different course. Starting with the fourth jhāna the mind,

according to texts remains constituted of two factors of absorption (upekkhā, samādhi). What

changes is the object of meditation not the constitution of the mind, expressed in Buddhist

literature by a neat list of constitutive mental factors.

Therefore the sequence of arūpa states subsequent to the fourth jhāna lacks the auto-

phenomenological description of the mind constituents supporting its hierarchical structure.

Then, it is not easy to see, in my opinion, why (if we stick to pure phenomenology) e.g. the

plane of nonexistence (ākiñcaññāyatana) is more sublime then plane of boundless space

(ākāsānañcāyatana) the first of arūpa planes, considered the grossest one. Moreover, how to

distinguish (on phenomenological level) between empty space and nothingness?20 Not

mentioning the fact that “nothingness” in sense of complete annihilation of being is a concept

which Buddhist doctrine does not admit. Admittance of an absolute, complete non-existence

nihil – (asat), would mean adherence to doctrine of annihilation, severely criticized by

Buddhists.

If any, it is exactly neurophysiologic or psychological quantitative processing of

experimental data and inter-disciplinary analysis of mystical experiences, advocated by

perennialists, which could suggest a “hierarchical” arrangement of the states. Sure enough, a

non-quantitative way to presuppose hierarchical structure of the states can be maintained by

taking some states as a prerequisite for the others. But though some canonical and

commentarial passages suggest such a relation, another does not support it. 21

Besides, Mahasaccaka Sutta teaches us that Siddhattha recalled his childhood

experience and subsequently took up samādhi training after his ascetic period and split with

Al.ārā Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta who taught “higher” arūpa samādhic states.22

Therefore Siddhattha and his two teachers were able to attain these states without having

attained the lower jhānas before! In my understanding there is not a way to reconcile this fact

with the general claim of hierarchical structure of samādhi states. Moreover, the texts related

to the Siddhattha’s liberating experience mention neither arūpa jhānas nor

saññavedayitanirodha. Therefore Friedrich Heller proposes that the higher jhānas be “Yogic

20 For the commentarial explanation of the arūpa attainments see VmTM. Ch. 8, sect. 2; VsDM, Ch. 10. Though there can be seen some logical structure behind the hierarchical depiction of the arūpa states I am not sure about its claimed experiential correlation. At least our ordinary concepts of empty space and nothingness does not allow for postulating any distinction between them on phenomenological basis. 21 W. King observes that apart from canonical passages mentioning four subtle-material jhānas „(t)here is also another, less numerous set of passages that describe or allude to the formless meditations apart from the four jhānas , whose attainment supposedly makes possible the attainment of the formless meditations and also apart from nirodha-samāpatti, whose attainment the formless meditations make possible. Finally, a third set of passages portrays the joining of the four jhānic attainments and the four formless meditationsin a continuous series of states climaxing in nirodha-samāpatti.“ (King 1992: 15) 22 “´But by this racking practice of austerities I have not attained any superhuman states, any distinction in knowledge and vision worthy of the noble ones. Could there be another path to enlightenment? ´ I considered: ´I recall that when my father the Sakyan was occupied, while I was sitting in the cool shade of a rose-apple tree, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, I entered upon and abided in the first jhāna, which is accompanied by applied and sustained thought with rapture and pleasure born of seclusion. Could there be another path to enlightenment? ´ MN. 26: 30- 31

superimposition” upon the “four original” Buddhist jhānas.23 Thus we can not take the

succession of the states immutable and the traditional structure as represented in VsDM. and

VmTM. invariable.

As for the distinction between particular vipassanic attainments listed as a sequence of

five purifications starting with the Purification of View (dit.t.hi-visuddhi) up to the seventh

purification - Purification by Knowledge and Vision (ñānadassana-visuddhi) (See note 8.)

they are stages of “understandings” the particular aspects of the doctrine. On the first of them

(The Purification of View) the meditator gets aware of the fact that all existence consists of

two basic categories of phenomena – nāma and rūpa, i.e. mental and material (or form)

behind which there is no any Self (atta) lurking. By the following he “understands” their

mutual conditioning while the next purification (Purification by Knowledge and Vision of

What are Path and not-Path (maggāmagga-ñānadassana-visuddhi)) leads him to realize what

is and what is not the right path towards nibbāna. On the subsequent stage the meditator

experiences nine specific phenomena (nine insights) such as awareness of terror,

contemplation of aversion or desire for deliverance etc. These particular understandings – as it

is presented in VmTM. and VsDM. - raise either in consequence of application of particular

doctrinal tenets into experienced events or mental contemplation of the three characteristics of

whole existence. All purifications however, serve as a springboard to the four specific flashes

of unusual suprerworldy experiences which occur on the seventh stage. These convert a man

progressively to four types of noble person. The last flash brings the experience of nirodha-

samāpatti (saññavedayitanirodha) and the state of arahatship. The main distinguishing marks

between these flashes of consciousness consist in their post-experiential effects – i.e.

particular personal changes. See bellow.

If there is a fundamental substantival distinction between samādhi and vipassanā

practice as Gimello on the basis of Buddhist texts stresses then samādhic arūpa states can not

bring about liberating experience of understanding the Four Noble Truths, tilakkhana and

pat.iccasamuppāda. These according to the Buddhist doctrine are attainable exclusively via

vipassanā method. And as we have already mentioned, one of the most striking things about

Buddhist soteriology is that there is no word of vipassanā in the suttas which describe events

under the bodhi tree. If however vipassanā meditation originated later as an instrument of

making the character of reality revealed by the Buddha accessible also to his followers the

23 F. HEILER, Die Buddhistische Versenkung, Munich: Reinhardt. N/A. Quoted in King 1996: 15

vipassanic experiential content must have been present somehow in samādhic states (and it is

important to note: not only in one specific samādhi state but in a series of states) and the strict

demarcation between vipassanā and samādhi is a result of the later doctrinal development of

Buddhism.

Upatissa’s Vimuttimagga and Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga were clearly written

from the standpoint of already established doctrine and determined expectations on the results

of the meditative exercise. But this probably was not a situation of early Buddhism.

Perennialists

Though, as I have tried to show, Buddhist meditation can be treated as an instance of

mystical experience, the variety of its phenomenological expression escapes the rather narrow

definition of mystical experience as a state of consciousness deprived of phenomenological

attributes and content, (PCE)24 presented by Forman. Also his identification of mysticism

with solely trophotropic states is rather reductionistic.25

Exclusion of the visionary states – even though it helps to clean the area somehow –

provides us with a rather inadequate picture of meditative experience. It strips apophatic

experience of its genuine context. Buddhist meditative experience is not a homogenous event

24 “In sum, the PCE may be defined as a wakeful but contentless (non-intentional) experience. “ (FORMAN 1998: 90). 25 See Forman 1997: 7. In his What Does Mysticism Have to Teach Us about the Consciousness R. Forman nevertheless offers a specification of his understanding of mystical experience. In this account he expands the category of “mystical” from pure enstatic transic states to Dualistic Mystical States and Unitive Mystical States. His explanation of these two states runs as follows: “The first is an experience of a permanent interior stillness, even while engaged in thought and activity — one remains aware of one’s own awareness while simultaneously remaining conscious of thoughts, sensations and actions. Because of its phenomenological dualism — a heightened cognizance of awareness itself plus a consciousness of thoughts and objects — I call it the dualistic mystical state (DMS). The second shift is described as a perceived unity of one’s own awareness per se with the objects around one, an immediate sense of a quasi-physical unity between self, objects and other people. States akin to this have been called ‘extrovertive-’ or sometimes ‘nature-’ mysticism; but I prefer to call it the unitive mystical state, UMS. ... Now, as I understand them, advanced mystical experiences result from the combination of regular PCEs plus a minimization of the relative intensity of emotions and thoughts. That is, over time one decreases the compulsive or intense cathexis of all of one’s desires. The de-intensifying of emotional attachments means that, over the years, one’s attention is progressively available to sense its own quiet interior character more and more fully, until eventually one is able to effortlessly maintain a subtle cognizance of one’s own awareness simultaneously with thinking about and responding to the world: a reduction in the relative intensity of all of one’s thoughts and desires.“ (FORMAN 1998: 186) But if Dualistic Mystical State is to be included within the scope of mystical experiences and only apophatic states are to be called mystical than it does not conform with what Jensine Andresen and Robert K.C. Forman say on apophatic-kataphatic distinction in their foreword to their book: “In our diagram we have separated two distinct kind of religious experience, non-dualistic and dualistic, roughly apophatic and kataphatic forms of spirituality.” (ANDRESEN, FORMAN 2002: 12).

describable as “contentless mind” nor does the succession of alternative states of

consciousness leading to the final state of saññāvedayitanirodha consist of a strand of clearly

determined blocks without any significant ruptures, overlapping or short excursions to the

opposite ergotropic (i.e. kataphatic) realm. Though the states situated on ergotrophic and

trophotropic scales have opposite characteristics, exegesis and metabolic excitation, as one

moves along one of the continua he/she takes sporadic side-steps into the opposite continuum.

This happens not only at the peak of the both scales of the states as the Fischer’s diagram and

Forman in his Mysticism, Constructivism, and Forgetting (FORMAN 1997: 3- 53) present it

but also on the lower stages of hyper- and hypo- arousals.

Newberg and d’Aquili correctly pointed out that “(t)he ergotropic and trophotropic

systems have often been described as ´antagonistic´ to each other, but they can be

complementary to each other under certain conditions. ” (Newberg and d’Aquili 2002: 255)

In addition to Hypertrophotropic and Hyperergotropic states when respective systems are

exceptionally high the authors recognize three additional states: Hypertrophotropic State with

Ergotropic Eruption, Hyperergotropic State with Trophotropic Eruption which are states of

“hyperactivation of one system with spillover into excitation of the other system” and also a

state of maximal stimulation of both the ergotropic and trophotropic systems. (Newberg and

d’Aquili 2002: 255- 256)

They also remark that “it is difficult to test such a hypothesis due to the difficulty of

isolating these experiences”. (Newberg and d’Aquili 2002: 256)

If we take a closer look on the process of vipassanā-bhāvanā as described in

Vimuttimagga, Visuddhimagga or the texts based on them we will find that the practice leads

to various states which clearly show intermingling of kataphatic and apophatic phenomena.

One of the most noticeable are so called The Ten Imperfections of Insight (vipassanūkkilesa)

appearing at the stage which Buddhist tradition calls Purification by Knowledge and Vision of

What is Path and not-Path (Maggāmagga-ñān.adassana-visuddhi). The list of them runs as

follows:

1. illumination (obhāsa)

2. knowledge (ñāna)

3. rapturous happiness (pīti)

4. tranquility (passaddhi)

5. happiness (sukha)

6. resolution (adhimokkha)

7. exertion (paggaha)

8. mindfulness (upat.t.hāna)

9. equanimity (upekkhā)

10. attachment (nikanti)

We can see that among the vipassanā inducted phenomena there are present also

effulgence of light, knowledge, tranquility, happiness and equanimity that is to say those

phenomena which Gimello has on his list. And some of them (i.e. pīti, sukha) are even the

ones having been abandoned on “lower” samādhi stages. (See note 7.)

Moreover the effulgence of light is not the only hallucinative or visionary experience a

vipassanic meditator passes through. Theravāda meditative manuals frequently speak on

visions of buddhas, a skeleton or ghosts etc. occurring at certain point of vipassanic

practice.26 In Thailand for example such visions as a number in the sky may sometimes be

interpreted as divinatory experiences revealing the lucky lottery numbers etc.

Besides, visions of light occur during the practice of vipassanā training even on lower

stages of attainments i.e. before the stage of the ten defilements.

Visualizations actually form an important part of samādhi exercise as well.

Achievement of the first jhāna is characterized by occurrence of the abovementioned five

factors of absorption (jhānanga; see note 7) as well as so called acquired sign (uggaha-

nimitta) which is a vivid mental replica of material object of contemplation. Biography of

Achan Mun by Achan Mahā Boowa speaks of a vision of Thus the context of any particular

meditative state which is actually set in an interplay, overlapping and sequential arrangement

of various mental events deserves close attention.

Though the analysis of a particular states of vipassanic attainments as described in

Vimuttimagga and Visuddhimagga is of high importance and for the due treatment needs

room which exceeds this study, I think we are at least safe now concluding that a vipassanā

practitioner experiences phenomena of mystical (in Gimello's sense) as well as visionary (in

Forman's sense) kind. This should be duly acknowledged instead of cramming empirical

evidence into Procrustean bed of favorite theories.

26 “Sometimes during the Sitting Meditation with closed eyes, he or she sees his or her skeleton sit with crossed legs, black and eminent, like a figure in a dark space. ” (YUPHO 1988: 81) “For instance while the meditator is performing the Insight Meditation with closed eyes, the conditions appearing reveal that his or her body becomes rotten and gradually inflated until it swells like a bloating corpse … For many times it appears that the meditator’s body gradually bloats at the abdomen, body, arms, back of the hands, insteps, legs, faces, especially the cheek flesh.” (YUPHO 1988: 86) For further descriptions see YUPHO op. cit, p. 40.

As for the vipassanūkkilesa an important point here is that some of these phenomena,

though called “imperfections”, are in Buddhist milieu highly praised sotericaly valuable

states: knowledge, resolution/awareness, assurance, and equanimity. They are rendered

imperfections because they are taken by a meditator to be the path and fruition of the

meditation and thus “he takes what is not the path to be the path and what is not fruition to be

fruition, the course of his insight is interrupted. He drops his basic meditation subject and sits

just enjoying the attachment.” (VsDM. XX, 123)

Thus they become a basis for defiling attachment:

And here illumination, etc., are called imperfections because they are the basis for

imperfection, not because they are (kammically) unprofitable. But attachment is both an

imperfection and the basis for imperfection. (VsDM. XX, 124)

Thus not the phenomena themselves but their interpretation and approach

(attachment) to them are undesirable.

Now, if we were to ask for a criterion which would allow us to presume in this variety

of phenomena single liberating experience common to whole Buddhist Theravāda tradition, it

should be looked for not in the realm of techniques or specific states of consciousness

attainable by them but probably in personal (emotional, cognitive, and axiological) changes

the state cause.27 Actually some of the techniques used by contemporary Theravāda masters

seem to be in discordance even with the very Buddhist canon. For example, though Buddha

deprecated any meditative technique that causes pain28 and during ānāpānasati (a meditation

based on observing in-and-out-breathing) one should breathe normally, the technique of

famous Burmese master Sunlun Sayadaw presupposes an intense painstaking breathing

causing intensive bodily pain which subsequently becomes an object of inspecting awareness.

As Sharf puts it “On closer inspection, however, we find that scriptures upon which

the vipassana revival is based (primarily the two Satipatthana-suttas and the Visuddhimagga)

are often ambiguous or inconsistent, and contemporary vipassana teachers are frequently at

odds with each other over the interpretation of key terms. … All contemporary Theravāda

meditation masters accept the canonical categories outlined above (that of samatha/samādhi

27 It, however, is not to say that there are no specific states demonstrating classificatory significant characteristics, as we could have seen above. 28 MN. 36: 18- 25.

and vipassanā, note M.H.). But curiously, despite the fact that these masters have ´tasted the

fruits´ of practice, there is little if any consensus among them as to the application of these

key terms. On contrary the designation of particular techniques and the identification of the

meditative experience that result from them are subjects of continued and often acrimonious

debate. More often than not the categories are used polemically to disparage the teachings of

rival teachers. Since all agree that vipassana leads to liberation while samatha does not,

samatha is used to designate the techniques and experiences promoted one's own competitors,

while vipassana is reserved for one's own teachings.” (Sharf 2002: 278- 279)

Yet this multitudeness of meditative traditions is not without a universal pattern which

as we have said consists mainly in a meditation’s efficacy.

Even samādhi with its lower soteric efficacy attributed to by Theravāda tradition is a

means to suppress the unwholesome phenomena. Thus, we can say with Sharf, that the value

of meditation taken over the Theravāda Buddhist tradition does consist in its capacity to

eradicate or suppress these phenomena which are in Buddhist Theravāda literature variously

called taints (āsavas), fetters (sam.yojana) or roots (mūla) of unwholesome attitudes. (Sharf

2002: 272) The most frequent enumeration of taints (āsavas) found in the Sutta Pitaka lists 1.

sensual desire /kāmāsava/, 2. desire for eternal existence /bhāvāsava/, and 3. ignorance

/avijjāsava/. The later parts of canon (DN. 16) and para-canonical literature add the fourth –

dit.t.hāsava, a taint of wrong view. As Nyanatiloka points out “the state of Arahatship is

frequently called āsvakkhaya, the destruction of the cancers.” (NYANATILOKA 1988: 54)

The canon also recognizes ten fetters (sam.yojana) which binds one to the circle of

sam.sāra. Vipassanā meditation serves as a unique means to achievement of the four

successive ´noble attainments´ (ariya-phala) which progressively eradicate the fetters and

consequently convert a practitioner to a particular noble person (ariya-puggala) until reaching

of the final goal.

The first of the Noble persons, Sotāpanna, is freed from personality-belief (sakkāya-

dit.t.hi), skeptical doubt (vicikicchā), clinging to mere rules and rituals (sīlabbata parāmāsa);

The second one, Sakadāgāmi, eliminates grosser forms of sensuous craving (kāma-rāga) and

ill-will (vyāpāda) whose Anāgāmī eradicates the utterly and Arahant is one who is freed of all

fetters including the last five ones, i.e. craving for fine-material existence (rāpa-rāga),

craving for immaterial existence (arāpa-rāga), conceit (māna), restlessness (uddhacca) and

ignorance (avijjā). (See AN. IX, 67, 68, X, 13; D. 33, VmTM Ch. 12, sect. 2, etc.)

Though arahantship is generally accepted as elimination of all the ten fetters its

achievement is in the contemporary Theravāda tradition not always connected with attainment

of the state of saññāvedayitanirodha as Visuddhimagga and Vimuttimagga describe it. For

example the tradition of so called “dynamic” vipassanā meditation, the main Thai protagonist

being Loo-ang Poor Teean (1911-1988) who is said to have reached the end of suffering in

the eight month of 1957, strongly opposes to the necessity of any transic achievements. And

as we have already seen there is no mention of such a special state in the two important suttas

(MN. 26 and MN. 36). However the main aim of even this practice is defined as eradication

of the three mūlas. Interesting point might be that though elimination of all the three roots is

unequivocally stated as attainment of the final goal, of the three especially anger or ill-will

occurs, according to my findings, as the most frequent motivation for setting for to the path of

the liberation among followers of Loo-ang Poor Teean, monks and laymen. Persisting

presence of anger –erupting unexpectedly from its latent state where it was temporarily

expelled to- appeared during my field work as a recurrent motive to made practitioners to

abandon their previous training and search for a new teacher.

Conclusion

Not only mysticism and meditation treated “as such” are rather blurring concepts.

There is a strong need to distinguish also between various meditative traditions and further

between various meditative branches within them.

As for the Buddhist contemplative practices, before attempting for any generalizations

we should make clear if we are going to talk about Buddhist scriptural or living tradition. And

within both of them further specifications are needed to determine if we are to deal with

canonical or e.g. commentarial literature or texts based on both, on one of them or if we are to

talk about an independent sprout. As we could have seen these might differ in important

aspects. Superficial correspondence of basic categories can comprise rich phenomenological

variety.

As for the living tradition the approach of the masters to the scriptural prescriptions is

an important issue. There are schools which put strong emphasis on study of Abhidhamma

literature before taking up and during the course of the meditation while in the same time

there are masters who discourage an adept to read any book after having started with the

practice. However these are only the basic points.

Gimello's interpretation though rightly intended on paying respect to vipassanic

specifics within the context of mystical experience failed to acknowledge the variety of

Buddhist meditative tradition as well as the commonalities of vipassanā and “mystical

experience” as this is generally defined.

Though Gimello himself warns against simplifications he also clearly failed to

concede that despite apparent similarity in employed categories there is no unanimity in their

interpretation and to talk about Buddhist meditation “as such” is rather tricky business. But if

we take such authoritative texts as Visuddhimagga or Vimuttimagga as a representatives of

meditation as understood by scriptural Theravada Buddhist tradition we can not but admit that

the goal of vipassanic technique is a transic (or better enstatic) state of stopping all

emotionality and perception, equivalent to PCE as perennialists understand it. This is regarded

tantamount to acquiring paññā or liberating wisdom as well as to elimination of all emotional

defilements. But based on the mentioned texts we can also conclude that vipassanic technique

consists in learning of seeing the world through the doctrinally approved prism, which is the

point stressed by constructivists.

To offer the more complex picture we must stress that in contemporary Theravāda

(especially Thai and Burmese) tradition there is plenitude of teachers who teach development

of awareness of all bodily sensations, emotions and ideas so that these converts from

subjective impulsions for bodily and mental activity to mere objects of attentions. They are,

as if to say, replaced from subjective to objective side of the world. Such a technique does not

require, at least not explicitly, attributing of Buddhist doctrinal categories such as khandha,

dhātu etc. to the experienced reality.

As for the perennialists, there is an important point of not getting locked in the idea of

culture-specific private languages of the mystics describing their experience in their approach.

Yet, any perennial or cross-cultural model should take into consideration

phenomenological variety of religious experiences. Vipassanā meditation as described in the

two authoritative meditation manuals visibly shows penetration of apophatic and kataphatic

phenomena. Actually, and it is an important point, this closeness of the both opposite types of

alternations of consciousness appears not only in literature based on Visuddhimagga and

Vimuttimagga but also on the rather independent meditation practices such as already

mentioned dynamic meditation. This offers rich comparative material for perennial analysis.

Not unimportant in this respect is the issue of the impact of meditation on the personal

changes.

In any case all these, an also the other, investigations of the realm of Buddhist

meditation invite for both the recognition of differences as well as the sense for

commonalities.

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