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Where firewalls fit in the corporate landscape

Myles firewalls

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Page 1: Myles firewalls

Where firewalls fit in the corporate landscape

Page 2: Myles firewalls

Firewall topics

• Why firewall?• What is a firewall?• What is the perfect firewall?• What types of firewall are there?• How do I defeat these firewalls?• How should I deploy firewalls?• What is good firewall architecture?• Firewall trends.

Page 3: Myles firewalls

What are the risks?

• Theft or disclosure of internal data• Unauthorized access to internal hosts• Interception or alteration of data• Vandalism & denial of service• Wasted employee time• Bad publicity, public embarassment, and law suits

Page 4: Myles firewalls

What needs to be secured?

• Crown jewels: patent work, source code, market analysis; information assets

• Any way into your network

• Any way out of your network

• Information about your network

Page 5: Myles firewalls

Why do I need a firewall?

• Peer pressure.

• One firewall is simpler to administer than many hosts.

• It’s easier to be security conscientious with a firewall.

Page 6: Myles firewalls

What is a firewall?

• As many machines as it takes to:– be the sole connection between inside and

outside.– test all traffic against consistent rules.– pass traffic that meets those rules.– contain the effects of a compromised system.

Page 7: Myles firewalls

Firewall components

• All of the machines in the firewall– are immune to penetration or compromise.– retain enough information to recreate their

actions.

Page 8: Myles firewalls

The Perfect firewall

• Lets you do your business

• Works with existing security measures

• has the security “margin of error” that your company needs.

Page 9: Myles firewalls

The security continuum

• Ease of use vs. degree of security

• Cheap, secure, feature packed, easy to administer? Choose three.

• Default deny or default accept

Easy to use Secure

Page 10: Myles firewalls

Policy for the firewall

– Who gets to do what via the Internet?– What Internet usage is not allowed?– Who makes sure the policy works and is being

complied with? – When can changes be made to policy/rules?– What will be done with the logs?– Will we cooperate with law enforcement?

Page 11: Myles firewalls

What you firewall matters more than which firewall you use.

• Internal security policy should show what systems need to be guarded.

• How you deploy your firewall determines what the firewall protects.

• The kind of firewall is how much insurance you’re buying.

Page 12: Myles firewalls

How to defeat firewalls

• Take over the firewall.

• Get packets through the firewall.

• Get the information without going through the firewall.

Page 13: Myles firewalls

A partial list of back doors.

• personal modems• vendor modems• partner networks• home networks• loose cannon experts

• employee hacking • reusable passwords• viruses• “helpful” employees• off-site backup &

hosting

Page 14: Myles firewalls

Even perfect firewalls can’t fix:

• Tunneled traffic.

• Holes, e.g. telnet, opened in the firewall.

• WWW browser attacks / malicious Internet servers.

Page 15: Myles firewalls

Priorities in hacking through a firewall

• Collect information.

• Look for weaknesses behind the firewall.

• Try to get packets through the firewall.

• Attack the firewall itself.

• Subvert connections through the firewall.

Page 16: Myles firewalls

Information often leaked through firewalls

• DNS host information

• network configuration

• e-mail header information

• intranet web pages on the Internet

Page 17: Myles firewalls

“Ground-floor windows”

• mail servers

• web Servers

• old buggy daemons

• account theft

• vulnerable web browsers

Page 18: Myles firewalls

Attacking the firewall

• Does this firewall pass packets when it’s crashed?

• Is any software running on the firewall?

Page 19: Myles firewalls

A fieldtrip through an IP packet

• Important fields are:– source, destination, ports, TCP status

. . TOS . . .. . . SRC DEST opt SPORT DPORT

DATA

SEQ# ACK#

..ACK,URG,SYN ….

Page 20: Myles firewalls

Types of firewall

• Packet filters

• Proxy gateways

• Network Address Translation (NAT)

• Intrusion Detection

• Logging

Page 21: Myles firewalls

Packet filters

• How Packet filters work– Read the header and filter by whether fields

match specific rules. – SYN flags allow the router to tell if connection

is new or ongoing.

• Packet filters come in dumb, standard, specialized, and stateful models

Page 22: Myles firewalls

Standard packet filter

– allows connections as long as the ports are OK– denies new inbound connections, using the

SYN flag– Examples: Cisco & other routers, Karlbridge,

Unix hosts, steelhead.

Page 23: Myles firewalls

Packet filter weaknesses

– It’s easy to botch the rules.– Good logging is hard.– Stealth scanning works well.– Packet fragments, IP options, and source

routing work by default.– Routers usually can’t do authentication of end

points.

Page 24: Myles firewalls

Stateful packet filters

– SPFs track the last few minutes of network activity. If a packet doesn’t fit in, they drop it.

– Stronger inspection engines can search for information inside the packet’s data.

– SPFs have to collect and assemble packets in order to have enough data.

– Examples: Firewall One, ON Technologies, SeattleLabs, ipfilter

Page 25: Myles firewalls

Weaknesses in SPF

– All the flaws of standard filtering can still apply.

– Default setups are sometimes insecure. – The packet that leaves the remote site is the

same packet that arrives at the client. – Data inside an allowed connection can be

destructive.– Traditionally SPFs have poor logging.

Page 26: Myles firewalls

Proxy firewalls

• Proxy firewalls pass data between two separate connections, one on each side of the firewall.– Proxies should not route packets between

interfaces.

• Types: circuit level proxy, application proxy, store and forward proxy.

Page 27: Myles firewalls

General proxy weaknesses

• The host is now involved, and accessible to attack.– The host must be hardened.

• State is being kept by the IP stack.

• Spoofing IP & DNS still works if authentication isn’t used.

• Higher latency & lower throughput.

Page 28: Myles firewalls

Circuit level proxy

– Client asks FW for document. FW connects to remote site. FW transfers all information between the two connections.

– Tends to have better logging than packet filters – Data passed inside the circuit could be

dangerous.– Examples: Socks, Cycom Labyrinth

Page 29: Myles firewalls

Application proxy

– FW transfers only acceptable information between the two connections.

– The proxy can understand the protocol and filter the data within.

– Examples: TIS Gauntlet and FWTK, Raptor, Secure Computing

Page 30: Myles firewalls

Application proxy weaknesses

• Some proxies on an “application proxy” firewall may not be application aware.

• Proxies have to be written securely.

Page 31: Myles firewalls

Store and forward , or caching, proxies

– Client asks firewall for document; the firewall downloads the document, saves it to disk, and provides the document to the client. The firewall may cache the document.

– Can do data filtering. – Examples: Microsoft, Netscape, CERN, Squid

proxies; SMTP mail

Page 32: Myles firewalls

Weaknesses of store & forward proxies

– Store and forward proxies tend to be big new programs. Making them your primary connection to the internet is dangerous.

– These applications don’t protect the underlying operating system at all.

– Caching proxies can require more administrator time and hardware.

Page 33: Myles firewalls

Network Address Translation (NAT)

– NAT changes the ip addresses in a packet, so that the address of the client inside never shows up on the internet.

– Examples: Cisco PIX, Linux Masquerading, Firewall One, ipfilter

Page 34: Myles firewalls

Types of NAT

• Many IPs inside to many static IPs outside

• Many IPs inside to many random IPs outside

• Many IPs inside to one IP address outside

• Transparent diversion of connections

Page 35: Myles firewalls

Weaknesses of NAT

• Source routing & other router holes

• Can be stupid about complex protocols – ICMP, IP options, FTP, fragments

• Can give out a lot of information about your network.

• May need a lot of horsepower

Page 36: Myles firewalls

Intrusion detection

– Watches ethernet or router for trigger events, then tries to interrupt connections. Logs synopsis of all events.

– Can log suspicious sessions for playback– Tend to be very good at recognizing attacks,

fair at anticipating them – Products: Abirnet, ISS Real Secure,

SecureNetPro, Haystack Netstalker

Page 37: Myles firewalls

Weaknesses of intrusion detection

– Can only stop tcp connections– Sometimes stops things too late– Can trigger alarms too easily – Doesn’t work on switched networks

Page 38: Myles firewalls

Logging

• Pros: – Very cheap– Solves most behavioral problems – Logfiles are crucial for legal recourse

• Cons:– Very programmer or administrator intensive– Doesn’t prevent damage – needs a stable environment to be useful

Page 39: Myles firewalls

Types of logging

• program logging

• syslog /NT event log

• sniffers– Argus, Network General, HP Openview,

TCPdump

• router debug mode– A very good tool for tracking across your

network

Page 40: Myles firewalls

Commercial Logging

• Logging almost all commercial firewall packages stinks– No tripwires– No pattern recognition– No smart/expert distillation– No way to change firewall behavior based on log

information– No good way to integrate log files from multiple

machines

Page 41: Myles firewalls

Firewall Tools

• All types of firewall are useful sometimes.

• The more compartments on the firewall, the greater the odds of security.

• Belt & suspenders

Page 42: Myles firewalls

Firewall topology

• Webserver placement

• RAS server placement

• Partner network placement

• Internal information protection (intranet firewalling)

Page 43: Myles firewalls

Firewall deployment checklist

• Have list of what needs to be protected.

• Have all of the networks configured for the firewall

• All rules are in place

• Logging is on.

Page 44: Myles firewalls

What steps are left?

• What is the firewall allowing access to?– Internal machines receiving data had better be

secure.– If these services can’t be secured, what do you

have to lose?

Page 45: Myles firewalls

Last checks

• Day 0 Backups made?

• Are there any gaps between our stated policy and the rules the firewall is enforcing?

Page 46: Myles firewalls

Auditing

• A firewall works when an audit finds no deviations from policy.

• Scanning tools are good for auditing conformance to policy, not so good for auditing security.

Page 47: Myles firewalls

Sample configurations

• Good configurations should:– limit Denial of Service.– minimize complexity for inside users.– be auditable.– allow outside to connect to specific resources.

Page 48: Myles firewalls

Minimal restriction, good security

• Stateful packet filter, dmz, packet filter, intrusion detection.

S Inside

Page 49: Myles firewalls

The Multimedia Nightmare

• secure multimedia & database content to provided to multiple Internet destinations.

• Web server is acting as authentication & security for access to the Finance server.

Proxy

CACHE

Inside

Page 50: Myles firewalls

Firewalls in multiple locations

– Identical proxies on both sides.

VPN over internal LAN

Page 51: Myles firewalls

Low end, good security, for low threat environments

• Packet filter, “Sacrificial Goat” web server, Application Firewall, bastion host running logging & Store & Forward proxies

Store & Forward

Inside

Page 52: Myles firewalls

High end firewalls

• ATM switching firewalls

• Round robin gateways– Don’t work with transparent proxies

• High availability

Page 53: Myles firewalls

Firewall Trends

– “Toaster” firewalls– Call-outs / co-processing firewalls – VPNs– Dumb protocols– LAN equipment & protocols showing up on the

Internet– Over-hyped content filtering

Page 54: Myles firewalls

More Firewall Trends

– blurring between packet filters & application proxies

– more services running on the firewall– High availability, fail-over and hot swap ability– GUI’s– Statistics for managers

Page 55: Myles firewalls

Firewall trends & “religious” issues.

• Underlying OS for firewalls – Any firewall OS should have little in common

with the retail versions.

• Firewall certification– Buy your own copy of ISS and “certify”

firewalls yourself.

Page 56: Myles firewalls

Source vs. Shrink-wrap

• Low end shrinkwrap solutions

• The importance of source – Can you afford 1.5 programmer/administrators?– Are you willing to have a non-employee doing

your security? (Whose priorities win?)

Page 57: Myles firewalls

Downside of firewalls

• single point of failure

• difficult to integrate into a mesh network

• highlights flaws in network architecture

• can focus politics on the firewall administrator

Page 58: Myles firewalls

Interesting firewall products

– Checkpoint Firewall-1 http://www.checkpoint.com

– SecureNetPro http://www.mimestar.com

– IP Filter http://coombs.anu.edu.au/~avalon/ip-filter.html

– Seattle Labs http://www.sealabs.com

– Karlnet Karlbridge http://www.karlnet.com

– V-One inc http://www.v-one.com

– ISS Realsecure http://www.iss.net