Myanmar in 2007 by Robert H. Taylor

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Southeast Asian Affairs 2008

MYANMAR IN 2007Growing Pressure for Change butthe Regime Remains Obdurate

Robert H. Taylor

As Myanmar entered its twentieth year of direct military rule, the State Peace

and Development Council (SPDC) once more spurned its critics and opponents

at home and abroad. Facing in September the largest organized anti-government

demonstrations in nearly two decades, ensconced in their new capital, Naypyitaw,

the generals appeared outwardly unperturbed by the huge pressure generated.

Perhaps anticipating minor protests in August by political activists following

draconian petrol and gas price increases, the regime appeared initially unprepared

for the much larger protests by Buddhist monks who took to the streets of Yangonand other cities to protest at rising food prices and the general decrepitude of

the urban life, as well as continued military rule. At the conclusion of the first

step, the National Convention, in the regimes lengthy seven-step road map to

a new power-sharing constitutional order, many inside and outside Myanmar

thought an opportunity had arisen to weaken the armys grip and open political

options anew. A role was sought for the National League for Democracy (NLD)

General-Secretary Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in the future political order, as well

as consideration of federalist demands by some ethnic minority leaders, plus a

reduction in the power of the army as foreseen in the principles agreed at the

constitutional convention. However, at years end, the closure implied by the

completion of the National Convention remained unaltered and the power of the

ruling generals appeared undiminished.

From January onwards, Myanmar was increasingly in the worlds news.

Foreign politicians and civil servants who had largely ignored two decades of

ROBERT H. TAYLOR is Associate Senior Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

Si

Reproduced from Southeast Asian Affairs 2008edited by Daljit Singh and Tin Maung MaungThan (Singapore: Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, 2008). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is

not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian

Studies. Individual articles are available at < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg>
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248 Robert H. Taylor

political stasis, except for perfunctory remarks and repetitious resolutions of

condemnation, sought to make the countrys fate an international issue. Seeking

the fame that would come to the politician given credit for freeing Daw Aung

San Suu Kyi and establishing a democratic regime in Myanmar, they, however,

had little new to say or offer.1 For those who have long followed developments

centring on Southeast Asias major problem country, it had a sense of dj vu

despite claims that everything had changed and the status quo was not an option.

Inside the country, very little seemed to change in 2007, despite the increasing

anger of many people, for the reality of military rule under army rules remained

firmly in place. No one had yet found a way to break the stasis that had made

Myanmar the Westsbte noire

and its people among the poorest of SoutheastAsia. The countrys unalterable geography and natural resources, allied with its

fractious political history, provided stability that demands in the United Nations

and large-scale protests by monks on the streets of Myanmar could not move.

And yet, it moved, if only in the passing of another year in the mortal lives of

men and women.

Internal Affairs

The National Convention and SPDC

Myanmars National Convention, first convened in controversy in January 1993,

adjourned sine die in April 1996, having agreed a set of fundamental principles for

a future constitution. The most controversial of these was the continuing political

power and autonomy of the army in any future power-sharing arrangements with

political parties and former ethnic insurgent or ceasefire groups. The convention

resumed in expanded form with 1,086 largely government appointed delegates

with the addition of a number of ceasefire groups in May 2004, following the

announcement of a seven-step road map to a discipline flourishing democracyin August 2003. In all, the convention met for four additional sessions, each of

several months duration, at a conference centre north of Yangon. The penultimate

session concluded at the end of 2006 with an expectation that it would resume

for a final session in May. However, because of an outbreak of bird flu near

the convention site, it did not reconvene until 18 July. The final session ended

on 3 September and a fifty-four member Commission for Drafting the State

Constitution was appointed on 18 October.2 A referendum on the new document

would eventually follow with national elections subsequently.3

Though there was much speculation about the health of the chairman of the

SPDC Senior General Than Shwe apparently continued to perform his functions as


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Myanmar in 2007: Growing Pressure for Change but the Regime Remains Obdurate 249

normal during the year. He spoke and reviewed the troops for several hours at the

annual Armed Forces Day ceremonies in March and addressed the fiftieth intake

graduation ceremony of the Defence Services Academy (DSA) in December.4 The

death of a leading member of the next generation of army personnel, expected

eventually to succeed the SPDC Chairman and Vice-Chairman, occurred during

the year. The passing of the Prime Minister, General Soe Win, on 12 October,

aged 59, led to the appointment of Secretary 1 of the SPDC, Lt General Thein

Sein, as successor on 24 October and his subsequent promotion to the rank of

General. Lt General Thiha Thura Tin Aung Myint Oo became Secretary 1, and

other minor changes in the cabinet were made at the same time.5

The military took steps to reduce its bloated officer corps and remove anumber of middle ranks during the year by retiring 800 officers and indicating

that a younger, more highly qualified officer corps would emerge in the next

three years. Many retirees received assignments in the civilian bureaucracy, often

replacing military officers who held these posts previously. The civilianization

of the bureaucracy,6 however, appeared much like what occurred under the

previous socialist-cum-military regime with the least competent officers placed

in the bureaucracy, thus blocking skilled and knowledgeable talent rising through

the ranks. The result was an increasingly apparent return to the motto of the

Myanmars civil service prior to 1988: ma loke, ma shote, ma pyote.7 With the

senior civil servants ensconced in Naypyitaw8 removed from the travails of Yangon

life, getting government licences and permits became increasingly difficult, time

consuming, and expensive for persons seeking import/export licences or other

business-related decisions.

The Economy Stumbles

Denied significant investment in the sectors other than energy,9 or any meaningful

foreign economic assistance, plus the ineptitude of the government in managing

the economy after tightening regulations following the departure of former Prime

Minister Khin Nyunt, Myanmars economy continued to fail to generate jobs and

improve living standards for most of the population. Foreign economic sanctions

also played a role as garment exports continued to decline in the wake of the 2003

ban on sales to the United States and retailer boycotts elsewhere.10 As a result, many

continued to seek employment abroad with Malaysia and Qatar becoming major

destinations for Myanmar workers. Their remittances were doubtless important for

the support of their families back home but as some governments took steps totry to limit such transfers, the flow was perhaps not as great as expected.11 There


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were a number of indicators of the economys faltering condition from shortages of

sufficient transportation equipment and fuel supplies to rapidly increasing inflation,

particularly urban food prices.12 Electricity, despite the governments increasedgenerating capacity, remains in short supply with daily power cuts.

Until the suppression of the monk-led demonstrations in September, the fourth

quarter of 2007 and the first of 2008 looked to establish new records in the tourist

sector. However, after September there were nearly universal cancellations and

only gradually did tourist bookings begun to return to previous low levels. The

poor end of the year stood in contrast with the increased growth of the sector in

2006, which saw an increase of 7 per cent in revenue terms.13

Despite exhortations from international agencies such as the Asian DevelopmentBank, the government undertook few economic reforms in 2007. Though at least

215 formerly state-owned businesses were privatized after 1995, at least 65

wholly-owned concerns and 11 joint ventures remained to be sold including a

gold mine and beer, soft drinks and cosmetic factories.14 There were changes

in some key members of Trade Council, including the departure of its former

Chairman, Vice Senior General Maung Aye, but few signs of increasing efficiency

or proclivity to allow market forces a wider role. The creaking administrative

system demonstrated its inability to function effectively by its inability to increase

substantially tax revenues from the private sector where tax avoidance remains

rife.15

Trade continued to grow during the year with Thailand remaining Myanmars

most significant trading partner, growing by 51 per cent in 20062007. Massively

in Myanmars favour due to sales of natural gas to Thailand, the Union enjoyed

a US$1.9 billion trade surplus with the Kingdom. Singapore and China, however,

had significant trade going the other way, recording large balances in their favour.

Total trade, according to government statistics, grew by 40 per cent over the

previous fiscal year, to US$7.93 billion by the end of March 2007, with a third raretrading surplus of nearly US$2.1 billion.16 Reserves stood at over US$2 billion

near year end, support for eight months trading.17 Though various sources

speculated about the level of GDP growth, no one really knows with any degree

of certainty.18

Humanitarian and Social Affairs

The faltering economy, coupled with economic sanctions and a refusal by major

Western governments to recognize the governments efforts to eradicate drug

production, all contributed to Myanmars large and growing humanitarian issues.


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Under-spending on health and education has contributed to a huge problem for any

future government. The government and foreign donors have responded to some

extent but inadequately to meet the peoples needs. For example, in January theEuropean Union provided US$20.2 million but mainly for expenditure in border

areas.

Myanmar announced it seized five times as many amphetamine tablets in

2006 over 2005, while seizing 3,900 kilograms of heroin and opium and arresting

4,360 drug dealers.19 The United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

stated in March that poppy cultivation had declined by 34 per cent to 21,500

hectares the previous year and was therefore on target to have eliminated all

poppy cultivation by 2014. The United States International Narcotics ControlBoard confirmed the UNODC report, though noting that there was some expanded

production in the southern and eastern parts of the Shan State. Some of that area

remains out of government control, having been part of the empire of former drug

warlord Khun Sa who died in late October.20 The UNODC reported cultivation

and yields were both up in 2007 to August because of a lack of action by a

number of actors, including some government officials, to address the problem.

As the United Wa State Army declared their area a poppy free zone in 2005, the

lack of alternative incomes meant that the World Food Programme (WPF) was

feeding 726,000 people as their region failed to generate inward investment from

the international community that had been expected.

Fraught relations between the government and the International Committee

of the Red Cross (ICRC) ended in a bitter exchange of accusations and threats.

Failing to get an answer to its request to resume operations, including unescorted

visits with political prisoners and operating independently in conflict zones, the

ICRC announced in January a significant cut in staff at its five operational centres

and Yangon headquarters. The ICRC effectively terminated its role in Myanmar

when the Committee issued a strongly worded statement, contrary to its normalconfidential procedures, accusing the government of widespread and systematic

human rights abuse especially in the recruitment of porters in conflict zones. The

regime replied, via the then ill Prime Ministers wife, claiming ICRC personnel

had clandestine relations with insurgent groups.21 However, the government and

the International Labour Organization (ILO) came to an understanding during

the year on how to deal with complaints about forced labour which obviated the

possibility of the UN agency taking the regime to an international court.

Bird flu added to the list of diseases that continue to impact upon Myanmars

citizens. The country faced five outbreaks of the H5N1 variety during the year,

ending in the first case of human infection in Myanmar The Three Diseases Fund


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established by the European Union and five donor governments, commenced

work in 2007 against tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS. It replaced the UN

Global Fund that withdrew after the United States and Mr George Soross Open

Society Foundation pressured the international organization.22 Natural disasters,

including heavy rainfall and flooding, also afflicted Myanmar, leading to several

deaths from storms and forcing up food prices.23

Waning Insurgency

The declining military capacity of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA),

the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU), now six decades old, was

underscored in January by the announcement that the commander of the KNLAs

7th Brigade had travelled to Yangon for talks with the government. Brigadier

General Htain Maung, a long-standing colleague of the late KNU leader Bo Mya,

led a delegation for talks with Lt Gen Thein Sein and the head of Military Affairs

Security, Major General Ye Myint. At the conclusion of the meeting, the KNU

delegation, which contained both KNLA officers and KNU council members,

including three Christian ministers, announced that a deal had been agreed to

the effect that the Myanmar army would withdraw from certain border areas

that would then be occupied by the 7th Brigade forces. This was outwardly lessthan the unwritten ceasefire agreements previously reached with other insurgent

groups, and preserved the contention made by General Htain Maung that some

Karen would never give up their arms or the intention of achieving autonomy

despite the presence of Myanmar government forces and agencies operating in

the same area.24

The return of the 7th Brigade posed a serious problem for the KNU. Brigadier

General Htain Maung founded a Karen Peace Council as a rival to the KNU,

and was condemned by Mahn Sha, General Secretary of the KNU, at a three-day

Karen Unity Council in February. Karen journalists were threatened for reporting

this disunity as Mahn Sha claimed that sixty of the defecting 7th Brigade had

returned to the KNU. On the contrary, the Karen Peace Council claimed that

more 7th Brigade troops were defecting to General Htain Maung. KNU supporters

also were leaving the camps in Thailand for third countries where they were

being resettled, further draining manpower from the organization. Armed clashes

between the KNU and the army and its ally, the Kayin Democratic Buddhist

Army (DKBA), continued as in the past. Throughout the year, the government

press reported casualties as a result of farmers stepping on land mines in areasof military contention as well as isolated attacks on buses and trucks.


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Despite once more opening ceasefire talks with the army, the Karenni National

Progressive Party (KNPP), which had earlier entered into and then abandoned such

a deal, also came under military pressure during the year as did the Shan State

Army (South) (SSA[S]). The Kachin Independence Organization (KIA), though

maintaining its ceasefire agreement, suffered from internal splits and government

pressure as its ceasefire agreement continued to hold, though there were reports

that its armed wing, the Kachin Liberation Army, was seeking new recruits in

preparation for returning to battle.25 The KIA and also the United Wa State Army

had disagreements with the government during the year, which led to enhanced

tensions in the northern border areas.26 Limited fighting along Myanmars western

Rakhine State border was mainly between Rohingya forces and the Bangladeshmilitary and police.27 No total figures are available for the number of casualties

as a result of armed conflict in the border areas, but in comparison with previous

years, the rate would appear to have declined as the army has been increasingly

able to impose the governments authority on all but the most remote areas.

Opposition Politics

Overt Politics Re-emerging?

During early 2007 mixed signals from the SPDC as both liberal and repressive

tendencies were perceived, and it was initially difficult to fathom the governments

political intentions. For example, it permitted the publication of an article critical

of the regimes news censorship policies and tolerated, if not encouraged, three

days of protests outside the United States and United Kingdom embassies. Action

for corrupt behaviour was taken against a number of officials, as in the previous

year, and the public was encouraged to register complaints about inefficient or

duplicitous civil servants on special phone lines.

For whatever reason,28

and there is no way of knowing for certain, the firstseven months seemed to herald a growing political space for activists as long as

they kept their activities within somewhat undefined bounds. For example, included

among the 2,831 prisoners released on Independence Day, 4 January, were more

than fifty political activists, including two journalists, according to the NLD.29

Some had been incarcerated for a decade or more, among them key figures from

the events of 1988. They formed a loose grouping known as the 88 Generation

Student Group. Six days later five prominent members of the 88 Generation,

detained without charges since September the previous year, were released. These

were to become prominent in political events later in the year but they acted

quickly in January to make a mark by launching a two-month-long letter writing


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campaign among the public to express their opposition to their conditions directly

to the SPDC. The passage of time was again marked by the death of one of the

NLD candidates elected in the 1990 abortive elections.30

The government repeatedly warned of possible terrorist attacks following

major international events concerning Myanmar and the reconvening of the

national convention. Their close monitoring of the activities of opposition groups in

neighbouring Thailand led to a belief that exile groups were plotting to destabilize

the country.31 The regime also repeatedly reported that the NLD had contacts

and received advice and support from the United States and United Kingdom

embassies, citing the number of visits received from embassy cars per month to

NLD headquarters. The government press also reported frequent announcementsof resignations on their own volition of NLD members during the year.

Nevertheless, the regime was relatively tolerant of various minor

demonstrations and campaigns directed at rising food prices and political issues

such as the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other activists. A group who

went regularly from January to pray for their release was watched closely, at least

once doused with water, occasionally harassed, but otherwise tolerated. In late

February, a group of about twelve individuals calling themselves the Myanmar

Development Committee marched from one of the main market to the Sule Pagoda.

Though they were arrested, most were released within 24 hours, including three

journalists who were covering the incident. Four days later, there was a similar

demonstration with the same result. This relative tolerance by the authorities

prompted two veteran politicians to issue an unusual statement of praise for the

SPDC. That, however, did not save one of them, along with a colleague, from

detention for one day following a press briefing they gave on what they described

as the countrys economic and social crises.

In an effort to keep attention on the continuing detention of a number of

activists and politicians, the 88 Generation group launched a white Sundaycampaign whereby, dressed in white like prisoners, they would ostentatiously call

on the families of detained individuals. Around the time of the renewal of the

detention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the tolerance shown to those praying for

her release dissipated as the intensity of their protests grew. Forty were arrested

in mid-May for allegedly using religion for political purposes. Allegations that

they were detained initially by so-called thugs who it was claimed were not

police but government-organized toughs, members of the government-sponsored

Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), or swann ar shin, an

auxiliary community force, were made in frequent public statements issued by

the 88 Generation group during the year 32 These protest activities reached a


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climax on the anniversary of the 1990 elections, 27 May, when alleged thugs

confronted approximately 500 NLD supporters including the 88 Generation who

were preparing to march from the Partys headquarters to the nearby Shwedagon

Pagoda to hold a prayer meeting. They were thwarted in that ambition but three

days later the Party was able to organize a much more low key religious event

to mark the fourth anniversary of the 2003 Dipayin confrontation.

Faced with the continued inability of those members of the Central Executive

Committee of the NLD to communicate with their General Secretary, Party

Chairman U Aung Shwe wrote in late June to the Cabinet in Naypyitaw requesting

permission to meet her. Receiving no reply, the following month the Party asked

that the regime send someone to ask Daw Aung San Suu Kyi whether she wouldconsent to a judicial appeal on her continued detention. It looked as if this would

be a year of press releases and futile gestures, such as the NLD request that

the regime talk with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi about the constitutional principles

being finalized at the national convention. The idea of opening the conclusions of

the National Convention for reconsideration in the wake of proposed three-way

talks between the SPDC, the NLD, and ethnic minority leaders was also mooted

in a letter to the UN Secretary General from ninety-two persons who had been

victorious in the 1990 election. Meanwhile, however, more direct action figures

were drawing attention to the deteriorating economic position of the people, and

trying to engage the power of the Buddhist monkhood into the process.

Or Regime Snare? August and September

On 15 August, the government increased petrol and diesel prices by 100 per cent

and compressed natural gas (CNG) prices by 500 per cent. While the increase

had marginal effect on most of the country where the open market rate for

petrol prevails and CNG is little used, for urbanites the governments attempts

to reign in energy subsidies had an immediate and devastating effect. As

many Yangon residents and businesses rely for some of their electricity from

diesel generators and as all buses and most taxis run on CNG, the impact on

household incomes was significant. Overnight bus fares doubled and for many

who earn about 1,000 kyat per day, 40 per cent of their daily wage went on

getting to and from work. The governments action was a gift to its political

opponents, especially the 88 Generation group. As the National Convention was

about to conclude, the question of the peoples poverty was connected easily

with a generalized complaint about the competence as well as the intentions ofthe government.


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On 19 August there commenced a series of protest marches in Yangon. As

the pictures relayed to international media revealed, these protests were small.

Groups, perhaps no more than thirty or forty persons, walked relatively short

distances in areas known as being scenes of anti-government protests. Little more

happened other than to mount additional demonstrations in other areas when the

authorities failed to take any action. As the international media campaign grew,

however, the government encouraged, if not organized, local toughs or swan ar

shin to harass the demonstrators, thus forcing the authorities to arrest leaders.

As arrests began, few other political activists emerged to face a similar fate.

One can speculate that even without the increase in gas and petrol prices,

these demonstrations would have taken place in any event. Political as well aseconomic factors were at the base of the demonstrations. The NLD and the 88

Student Generation argued that the National Convention was a sham. The United

States and British governments agreed, but were concerned, nonetheless, that many

international actors including the United Nations and neighbouring governments

might accept it as a legitimate part of a process of establishing a new power-

sharing constitution between the dominant army and civilians willing to work

with it. The government press, which argues that the 88 Generation demonstrators

and the NLD are mere puppets of neo-colonialists, demonized them as traitors

to be isolated and suppressed by the people who believe in the official goal of

establishing a discipline flourishing democracy.

The failure of the demonstrations in August to involve the wider public

suggested than most of the population were resigned to the army maintaining

its political influence while they struggle on a day-to-day basis to make a living

and attempt to ensure their childrens education. Unlike the socialist society and

economy that collapsed in 1988, todays society is much more one of self-help,

individual entrepreneurship, and community support while the government has

learned the lessons of 1988 and has ensured the shops relatively well stockedfor those who can afford them.

As the August demonstrations in Yangon were suppressed, Buddhist monks in

the central city of Pakokku staged protests, initially peaceful, against local supporters

of the military regime and held some government officials hostage overnight

after allegations of torture and violent beatings spread following a confrontation

with security forces and an unpopular chief abbot. But the swift action by the

authorities to placate the hierarchy of the monkhood while taking action against

the perpetrators ensured that they did not spread to other monasteries, although it

reported that monks in other central cities had threatened to take protest action.

Again perhaps because violence committed by monks is a violation of their vows


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to avoid worldly action, especially the harming of life, the demonstrations failed

to draw more than passing comments from those who became aware via the

international media. Speculative comments in the international media that a new

politically motivated sangha organization had been formed, the National Front of

Monks, was confirmed by government media in an article on 19 September.33

While monks did organize themselves politically in the 1920s and 1930s in

association with anti-colonial nationalists, and after independence some monks

were known to support the Burma Communist Party or factions of the governing

Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League, since 1980 when the government organized

a national governing body for the sangha, political activity by the monkhood

has become insignificant. Even following the 1988 demonstrations, when somemonks refused briefly to cooperate with the post-socialist military regime, the

hierarchy of the monkhood did not discourage the army from taking action against

politically active monks. After nineteen years of the army lavishing resources on

the monkhood, the hierarchy was unlikely to turn against them. The State Sangha

Maha Nayaka Committee, the governing body of the monkhood composed of

venerable sayadaws from each of the faiths sects, was effectively in alliance

with the government.

These are much closer links between the army and the upper levels of

monastic hierarchy than existed under the previous secular socialist ideology.

In that the events in Pakokku, and in later in Chauk and Kyaukpadaung, were

initially isolated, they did not seem to herald a larger threat to the political power

of the government. However, the appearance of normality was soon shattered.

On 17 September, monks and lay persons demonstrated in Sittwe, demanding an

apology from the government for the action it had taken against the protesting

monks in Pakokku. Similarly, approximately a hundred monks marched through

downtown Yangon.

Initially the monks were marching in demand for an apology for the Pakokkuincident. Soon, however, their protest came to include the economic plight of the

people including the monkhood. The rank and file monkhood was feeling the

consequences of the absence of significant growth in the Yangon economy since

the imposition of the total trade ban with Myanmar by the United States in 2003.

The closure of a number of textile factories and the initial loss of employment

by about 80,000 mainly young women plus the tightening of rules regulating

economic activities since 2003 have imposed grinding poverty on a growing

underclass of young urbanites. Monasteries often become the depositories of young

children who their mothers cannot feed and the burden of care on the monkhood

was expanding as the ability of the laity to feed the monks declined Similarly


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in times of economic hardship many men join the monkhood in order to relieve

their family of the burden of feeding them.

Following the small march on 17 September, the marches continued

unhindered by the authorities for one week. Initially they drew little public

attention or support and most people just watched as they walked past in a

quiet dignified manner. Some onlookers speculated as to whether they were

genuine monks or political activists or even government soldiers posing as

monks. One rumour had it that the leading purveyor of monks robes in Yangon

sold more than 5,000 garments during the week. In any event, what apparently

started at one monastery soon began to spread, in an uncoordinated manner, to

others and each day more monks were marching in sometimes more than onedemonstration.

Still the authorities took no action and the protests remained largely good

natured though tense with angry shouts, waved fists, and claims on the international

media that the monks would march until the army government fell began to give

an edge previously lacking. On 22 September, a group of monks and protesters

breached the security cordon around Daw Aung San Suu Kyis home, and she

came out to the gate to pay respect to the monks. The government finally acted

late on Monday, 24 September, with a supplication to the State Sangha Maha

Nayaka Committee by the Minister for Religious Affairs in which he blamed

the unrest among the monks on agitation by NLD extremists, Communist Party

remnants, and foreign radio stations. His appeal lead to the issuing of Directive

93 and the reissue of earlier such Directives from 1984, 1990, 1991, and 1996

instructing the monkhood to avoid political and secular activities. By implication,

those monks who continued to do so were considered having violated the rules

of the sangha, and therefore not immune from action from lay authorities. That

night, the army and police raided a number of monasteries in Yangon, allegedly

beating and perhaps even killing some monks.By Tuesday, even more monks were involved and varying their route,

perhaps as many of 10,000 marched down the Shwedagon Pagoda Road to

the Thein Gyi Zei, Yangons largest market and department store block. While

some international media claimed that there were 100,000 people on the street,

a more realistic estimate would put the number at no more than 25,000 or so.

Also, approximately 700 monks and 30 nuns were joined in a march down the

Sule Pagoda Road by two NLD flag bearers, a party banner, and about 500 NLD

supporters. The stage was set for a major confrontation. That evening after dark

the police conducted additional raids on several monasteries in northern Yangon

and elsewhere in the city A number of monks were detained Also that evening


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the authorities imposed a 9 p.m. to 5 a.m. curfew on Yangon and Mandalay as

well as banning assemblies of more than five persons.

The following day there were demonstrations and confrontations with the

police and army in several areas of Yangon. Violence remained relatively limited

until Thursday, the 27th, when no monks were seen on the streets, having been

confined to their monasteries by their abbots or the secular authorities. Two or

three thousand lay persons, both men and women, began to taunt and harass the

police and other government authorities. The relative restrain that the monks had

imposed on violent action was no longer obvious and eventually the authorities in a

number of locations in Yangon and Mandalay took action against the demonstrators,

firing into the crowd and clearing the streets. (See Appendx I for the authorsobservations of events on Wednesday and Thursday, 2627 September 2007.)

The next day, Friday, the police and army resumed their positions and began

to patrol the city from mid-morning, meeting small groups of mainly young men

who played a game of cat-and-mouse with them. A number were arrested. On

Saturday, Yangon began to return to normal and by the end of the following week

there were no unusual sign of riot police or troops remaining. The authorities

announced that in total nine persons were killed on the 27th and eleven persons

including one woman injured, while thirty-one members of the security forces

were injured. Western diplomats claimed that the casualty rate was in multiples

of those numbers. Following an investigation made in November, the UN Special

Rapporteur for Human Rights stated that thirty-one were killed.34 Further arrests

followed and the authorities detained over 3,000 persons, all but ninety-one of

whom were subsequently released.35 The quelling of the demonstrations had a

very negative impact on the population and a mixed mood of despair and anger

prevailed into the final months of the year.36

International Relations

Relations with Western Countries

Keeping Western attention focussed on Myanmar has been a problem for exiled

and domestic political opponents of the SPDC. With more pressing strategic and

political problems in the Middle East, and without the missionary guilt that Africa

inspires in European politicians, Myanmar has frequently slipped to the bottom of

many governments lists of priorities. However, years of campaigning seemed to

reach a significant milestone in 2007 as a result of efforts by the United States,

echoed by the United Kingdom, to pass a resolution in the UN Security Council

calling on the government of Myanmar to enter into substantive talks with the


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NLD and unnamed ethnic minority groups. The attempt was justified in terms of

Myanmar posing a threat to the peace and security of its neighbours. The fact that

none of the neighbours endorsed that view, just as none endorsed Western-imposed

economic sanctions, failed to dissuade the United States. The impossibility of the

resolution passing was noted by Russian Ambassador to the UN who stated that

Myanmar was not a proper issue to discuss in the Security Council. 37 China

also made it clear that it did not support the American resolution but insisted

the best method of resolving Myanmars issues was through the agency of the

UN Secretary Generals Special Envoy to Myanmar as well as through ASEAN.

Indonesia, the only member of ASEAN then on the Security Council, also indicated

that it would not support the resolution. When the Security Council eventuallyvoted, the resolution was vetoed by both Russia and China, in the first double

veto in more than twenty years. South Africa also voted No. Nine members

voted in favour38 and three others abstained, including Indonesia.39

In the wake of the failed UN initiative and the U.S. Presidents renewal of

his countrys National Emergency with Respect to Burma, the United States

took an unprecedented and previously unannounced step of meeting with three

Myanmar ministers in Beijing, presumably arranged by the Chinese government.

As the United States refuses to send any top officials to Myanmar unless they

also meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and refuses visas to Myanmar officials,

a third capital was needed. Nothing fruitful came of the meeting with both

sides firmly restating their publicly declared positions. Following the events of

September, both the United States and the European Union imposed new but

largely redundant economic sanctions on Myanmar, and President Bush indicated

that an ASEAN-U.S. summit planned for 2008 would not take place because of

Myanmars pariah status. The European Union also appointed a leftist Italian

politician as its special envoy on Myanmar with an unspecified mandate. The

U.S. Secretary of State ended the year with a call for greater vigour in theinternational effort to change Myanmar.

Relations with Neighbours Remain Friendly

China

Chinas growing dominance as Myanmars closest and firmest international

partner was convincingly demonstrated during the year, even if the government

in Beijing occasionally made plain its frustration at the slow pace of political and

economic reform. On the economic side, Chinas role in the countrys economic

development was apparent. Incomplete data at the end of the year showed that


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China is now officially Myanmars sixth largest foreign investor with thirty

projects at a contracted value of US$638 million mainly in hydropower, oil and

gas, manufacturing and mining. Trade from China increased by nearly 46 per centin the first three quarters of 2007, with China exporting textiles, steel, and

refined oil products to Myanmar in exchange for raw wood, sawn timber, natural

rubber, and cane products. During the same nine-month period, Myanmars

exports to China increased a mere 5.2 per cent over the previous year. Total

trade was heavily in Chinas favour, US$1.435 billion to Myanmars exports of

US$220 million.40

Political contacts between China and the SPDC at the highest level occurred

relatively frequently. Though Head of State Than Shwe met with few foreigners,except for routine diplomatic functions, top-level Chinese visitors were welcomed.

In January, he met with Li Tieying, the Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee

of the National Peoples Congress, and the following month received Chinese

State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan. Following the September demonstrations, China

sent as a special envoy to Myanmar, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi.

On that occasion, Mr Wang emphasized the paukphaw (cousinly) relationship

that existed as well as the deepening of political, economic, cultural, and other

contacts between the two countries.

Myanmar sent two high-level delegations to China. In February, General Thura

Shwe Mann, Chief of the General Staff of the Myanmar army, and third-ranking

member of the SPDC, visited Beijing. State Councillor and Chief of the General

Staff of the Peoples Liberation Army Cao Gang-chuan said that a profound

friendship between the two countries and the two armed forces is not only in the

fundamental interests of the two peoples, but also conducive to regional and world

peace and stability.41 Acting Prime Minister Thein Sein made a five-day visit to

Beijing and Yunnan, accompanied by four other ministers. During this visit, a deal

to sell natural gas to Yunnan was confirmed. In the midst of the AugustSeptemberdisturbances in Myanmar, Foreign Minister Nyan Win was despatched as special

envoy of the Senior General to explain developments. At that time, State Councillor

Tang Jiaxuan emphasized Chinas desire that internal stability be restored and

that Myanmar push forward a democracy that is appropriate for the country as

soon as possible.42

Chinese spokespersons were asked frequently to explain their governments

position on Myanmar. Throughout the year, the same response was forthcoming,

although occasionally nuanced with some implied criticism. As the Chinese

Premier Wen Jiabao said in Singapore at the ASEAN+3 summit in November,

China sought peace stability and development in Myanmar through national


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reconciliation by the efforts of the people of Myanmar with the good offices

of the United Nations to assist the process. It was clear, however, that China

was encouraging the regime to implement more rapidly its seven-step road

map while refusing to intervene or comment on matters such as the detention

of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. As Assistant Foreign Minister He Yafei said, We

cannot permit Myanmar to fall into chaos, we cannot permit Myanmar to become

another Iraq. No matter what ideas other countries have, Chinas stance on this

is staunch.43

India

Cooperation between India and Myanmar continued to grow and develop

despite political pressure within India to limit support for the SPDC. Myanmar

demonstrated its utility to India in a number of ways, including in late

December 2006 and early January 2007, undertaking extensive military operations

in northern Sagaing Division against anti-Indian guerrilla forces of the National

Socialist Council of Nagaland that sought refuge there. The fighting continued

into February during which the Indian Home Secretary paid an official visit to

Naypyitaw to discuss security, border management, and drug smuggling. Military

cooperation between the two sides was further discussed in a visit by the headof the Myanmar navy to India. The desire to see an improvement in the

economic position of Indias impoverished northeast led to a doubling of its

financial assistance to Myanmar in order to enhance highway and rail links in

border areas, opening trade routes via Sittwe and central Myanmar to India. It

was believed that as many as 20,000 anti-Indian insurgents were operating in

northwest Myanmar from about thirty different groups in addition to the Naga.

During the year, India agreed to sell Myanmar maritime surveillance aircraft and

helicopters.

The public demonstrations in August and September did nothing to dampen

Indias desire to maintain cordial relations. In the midst of the demonstrations,

the Indian Petroleum Minister arrived to witness the signing of an additional

production sharing agreement. The Indian government viewed the suppression of

the demonstrations an internal matter, according to the head of the Indian army,

stressing Myanmars importance as a strategic partner in the ending of insurgency

in India.44 However, Indias Prime Minister did encourage Prime Minister Thein

Sein when they met in Singapore in November to include Daw Aung San Suu

Kyi and various ethnic leaders in a broad-based reform process of the kindadvanced by the United Nations.45


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The ASEAN Member States

The member states of ASEAN take divergent views on the question of Myanmars

political future and how best to move the country from military to civilian

constitutional rule. Those most closely allied militarily and economically with the

United States, such as the Philippines, use every opportunity to be seen putting

pressure on the SPDC to engage with the NLD and hasten constitutional rule,

including the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Others, such as Cambodias

Prime Minister Hun Sen, make it clear that Myanmars affairs are its own and

the United Nations and Western governments should desist with their frequent

resolutions and expressions of condemnation. In the year when ASEAN revealed

its new charter, such differing views on Myanmar created tensions within theorganization that were revealed at the ASEAN heads of state summit. Due to

these differing views, it was earlier agreed at the ASEAN foreign ministers annual

meeting in January that the organization and its members would no longer defend

Myanmar in international fora.

Meetings between ASEAN government leaders and their counterparts

in Myanmar were frequent during 2007. In addition to multilateral meetings,

there were a number of visits by officials to Naypyitaw as well as in the other

direction. Myanmars new Prime Minister pointedly made his first official get

to know you visits to Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, symbolically expressing

the regimes discomfort with its more pro-American ASEAN critics. Despite

expressions of criticism, when the organizations members were forced to

demonstrate their adherence to the ASEAN principle of non-interference, they

largely voted in support of Myanmar. At the ASEAN summit in November, when

Singapore invited UN Special Envoy to Myanmar Ibrahim Gambari to address a

working dinner on Myanmar, the meeting acceded to Myanmars objection and

Gambari was consequently told to stay away. Similarly, in the annual vote to

condemn Myanmar in the UNs Third Committee, the Humanitarian and Culture

Committee, no ASEAN member voted for the motion, and Laos, Vietnam, and

Malaysia voted against as did China and India. The proposed ASEAN Charter was

held hostage to developments in Myanmar, moreover, as its ratification apparently

depends on developments in its most troublesome member.46

Active Diplomacy Including Fellow Pariahs

Myanmar has normally been noted for its quiet and often inactive diplomacy but

following the UN Security Council vote in January, the Foreign Minister and his

two deputies were busy flying around the globe thanking their supporters and


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improving relations with other states including a few of their fellow pariahs in the

eyes of the West. Not only did Myanmar and Iran agree to cooperate in agriculture

and trade, but North Korea re-established diplomatic relations broken since a

North Korean organized bomb attack on the South Korean Premier in Yangon

in 1983. Diplomatic, as well as business links, with Russia were underscored by

the third Moscow-Naypyitaw consultation in June. The announcement that Russia

was going to build a nuclear research reactor under International Atomic Energy

Agency supervision, coming in the same year as relations were restored with

North Korea, led to intense speculation but little news. Myanmar also established a

high-level commission with Venezuela and announced the opening of an embassy

in Riyadh, its thirty-fifth diplomatic mission.

Turbulent Year for the UN as It Attempts to Find a Role

in Myanmar

The failure of the various international organizations and foreign governments

to find a formula to entice or punish the SPDC sufficiently to make it change

course and include opposition figures in an enlarged political process resulted

in the United Nations becoming the last point of action. From the perspective of

the regime, however, the United Nations was perhaps just another tool fordestabilizing the country and the SPDCs hold on power. Relations between the

government and a number of UN agencies and commissions were often strained,

although, as noted above, an agreement was reached with the ILO on a modus

vivendi for the investigations of claims of forced labour and UNICEF reported

a positive position on the issue of alleged child soldiers. The work of UN

Development Programme, and its head, the UN Country Team leader, Charles

Petrie, came in for criticism from all sides. The UNDP was accused of propping

up the government,47 and the UN Food Programme of being a government spy.

The government chided UN agencies for facilitating media coverage of the

September events, and accused Petrie of violating his diplomatic status. His

role in Myanmar was terminated in November following a statement critical of

the government and tacitly supporting the oppositions rationale for September

demonstrations issued by the UN Country Team to mark UN Day. Petries

departure was announced on the eve of the second visit in the year by Professor

Ibrahim Gambari in his role as the UN Secretary Generals Special Envoy to

Myanmar.48 Professor Gambaris terms might best be defined by what the French

call a raissoneur, appointed to bring the various political factions and intereststogether to reason out their differences.49


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Even before the September protests, Professor Gambari was quoted as

expressing views that were held to be inimical in Naypyitaw. Referring to the

arrest of the 88 Generation leaders in August, he indicated that they called intoquestion the Governments commitment to democratization.50 As the protests came

at the time when the worlds attention was focussed on the United Nations as

heads of government appeared daily to make their annual addresses to the General

Assembly, pressure was high for a UN response. Myanmars affairs were again

more discussed in the Security Council in September and the government felt

pressured to agree to a visit from the UN envoy.51 Professor Gambari arrived on

29 September and the next day met with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi following initial

meetings in Naypyitaw with the acting Prime Minister and the Information andCulture Ministers. On the third day, he met the top leadership of the government

for an hour, and on his return to Yangon he had a second brief meeting with

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

Via the Information Minister, the government stated its position on the

events of August and September to the UN envoy. Brigadier General Kyaw Hsan

stated that a small minority of the monkhood were being manipulated by political

elements from the 1988 uprising, backed by Western governments and encouraged

by misleading international media reports. He further stated that:

Those who staged these protests were released in order to participate

in the democratic activities. Many discussions have been conducted to

convince them not to attempt creating unrest. However, it is found that

todays protests and violences [sic] are created and manipulated by them.

Actually, they have been provided with cash and kind and directed by

an intelligence organisation of a big power.52

Though dissidents were then under detention, they would eventually be able

to participate in the political process, he contended. After the constitution was

ratified, the government wished

that all antigovernment groups form political parties and enter the

elections. Our good hearted efforts deserve no such antagonism and

violence. Todays protests are not caused by the Government but by

the conspiracies against the Government. As it is our duty to safeguard

the people from dangers, we have to investigate some persons. Such

investigations are aimed at preventing bloodshed incidents, minimizing

the intensity of unrest; and ensuring non-disintegration of the Union. Yet,

I would like to reiterate that we wish those opposing groups to participatein the democratic reform.53


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In the wake of Professor Gambaris October visit, the government announced that

the Senior General would hold talks with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi if she agreed

to renounce her policy of resisting all authority, supporting utter devastation, and

requesting that Western governments impose economic sanctions. Also, a Liaison

Minister, then Deputy Labour Minister Major General (retd) Aung Kyi, held the

first of three meetings with her.

Professor Gambari made his second visit to Myanmar in just over a month

arriving on 3 November. The issuance on the eve of the Professors arrival of

the letter to the UN Country Representative stating that he had acted beyond

his capacity and was no longer welcome in Myanmar added another item to

the agenda that Professor Gambari wished to discuss with the SPDC. Afterbriefly meeting with Mr Petrie in Yangon, the Professor departed for Naypyitaw

where he had meetings with the Foreign and Liaison Ministers on the first

full day of his visit, and the Myanmar Red Cross and ethnic leaders on the

second. In the midst of his meetings, it was announced that UN Human Rights

rapporteur, Professor Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, would be permitted to visit

Myanmar after four years of exclusion. On the third day in Naypyitaw, Professor

Gambari proposed that he personally involve himself in three-sided talks among

the SPDC, the NLD and ethnic minority leaders. This gambit was rejected

immediately.

In a spirited expression of the regimes position, the Information Minister

stated that Myanmar would not be bullied by big nations and that the conditions

set earlier for talks with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had yet to be met. 54 At that

point, the Professor might have recalled the words he quoted from Alfred Lord

Tennyson when, as Nigerias Foreign Minister twenty-two years earlier, he wrote

to his head of state, General Buhari:

Though we are not now that strength

Which (in old times) moved heaven and earth

What we are, we are

One equal measure of heroic heart

Made weak by time and fate

But strong in will

To strive, to seek, to find and not to yield.55

Before leaving, Professor Gambari also met with the Prime Minister and

others as well as three NLD leaders and others from the National Unity Party.

Read as a significant rebuff to the UN Secretary Generals Special Envoy wasthe absence of any meeting with the top three men in the regime.


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Immediately prior to his departure, Professor Gambari had brief meeting

with NLD General Secretary Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Prior to his arrival, she

had had the first of three meetings with Liaison Minister U Aung Kyi. Sub-

sequently she was allowed to meet for two and a half hours with four other

NLD leaders in a government guest house and very briefly with some political

activists. After her meeting with her NLD colleagues, she was said to be in

good health and optimistic about the prospects of talks with the government

but resigned to remaining under house arrest. Overshadowing Daw Aung

San Suu Kyis meeting with her NLD colleagues was the release by Professor

Gambari on arrival in Singapore of a statement in her name. Notification

of the release of this statement was not formally made to the government,and it consequently became a point of unspoken dispute as to the raissoneurs

role.

Ignoring the SPDCs previously announced conditions for entering into

talks with her, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, seemingly addressing the international

community as much as the government of Myanmar, welcomed the appointment

of U Aung Kyi and indicated she was looking forward to additional meetings.

Furthermore, she expected that this phase of preliminary consultations will

conclude soon so that a meaningful and timebound dialogue with the SPDC

leadership can start as early as possible. Her laying down conditions in advance

of the dialogue with her insistence that they be timebound doubtless rankled

in Naypyitaw. Her invitation to the government and all relevant parties to join

her in a constructive dialogue might also have been seen as a bit imperious

to her critics.56 Soon after the statements release, the government published

more than fifty counter-statements critical of her, and by implication, Professor

Gambari, for presuming to speak for them. The statements varied in content with

the expression of stronger or weaker views. Notably absent from those ceasefire

groups issuing statements was the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) andthe United Wa State Army.

Following his second visit, Professor Gambari informally briefed the UN

Security Council, which then had a four-hour discussion that failed to reach a

sufficiency coherent and agreed conclusion to allow for the issuance of a UN

Presidential Statement as was done previously. At the end of the year, the Secretary

General announced the formation of a fourteen-nation grouping to facilitate the

work of Ambassador Gambari. Given the differing views of the fourteen on how

to resolve Myanmars issues, it seemed unlikely to be more than just another

meeting place but perhaps its existence would lessen pressure to place Myanmar

on the Security Councils agenda.57


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Conclusion

The passing of another year, full of many tragic and unexpected events, might

lead one to expect that things in Myanmar would have significantly changed as

a result. Still, the SPDC ruled as before and its most vocal critics and opponents

within the country remained under detention. The member states of the international

community had once more failed to find a common approach to Myanmar and

its myriad issues. Life went on. But then, all were one year older, and time was

on no ones side. Things did move, but unseen and unknown. Cumulatively

pressures mount, but how will they be resolved? Can they be resolved? Neither

the astrologers of Myanmar nor the strategizers in the United Nations seemed

to know. Only the SPDC had a road map, but the rest of us were perhaps thevictims of a blinded alley.58

Appendix I

On Wednesday, 26 September, the number of monks seen on the streets was initially

greatly reduced. However, a crowd of several thousand persons gathered at the corner of

Sule Pagoda Road and Anawrahta Road, one block north of the Sule Pagoda after the

police put up barricades across the footpaths and parking areas on either side of the six

lane road. Soon there were two groups of riot police with shields and batons across thefootpaths behind the barricades and a group of about ten armed soldiers behind them. At

one point shots were fired overhead and the crowd retreated. Traffic continued to proceed

as normal and residents were allowed to pass the barricade to return home or collect

vehicles. Then fourteen monks approached and sat down in the middle of the intersection

with a crowd of about 2,000 standing behind and beside them.

Tension rose and it looked as if violence could erupt at any time. However, after less

than 30 minutes during which three monks came and spoke with the fourteen protesters

and retreated back through the crowd, about 10,000 monks and lay persons marched down

Pansodan, the next major street east of Sule Pagoda Road. The fourteen monks with theirflag bearers rose and walked off to join them. Later additional troops arrived, prompting

the army to fire over peoples heads to clear the road for the advancing trucks. The crowd

dissipated but the police and army remained in position until darkness fell and the city

became quiet as the curfew approached.

The next afternoon there was no march down Sule Pagoda Road by monks. Rather,

at about 11.30 a.m. the police and army resumed positions and a nervous wait began.

The streets were quiet though some shops and restaurants remained open. By about 1.30

p.m. a large crowd, estimated at about one to two thousand people gathered at the scene

of the previous days events and began taunting the police. However, they kept theirdistance. Additional riot police closed off the centre of the road and a light truck with


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around the city all morning reminding people of the order that assemblies of five or

more persons were illegal.

Soon an announcement was made that if the street was not cleared in ten minutes,the army would fire at the demonstrators. The riot police advanced about 10 yards and

the crowd drew back. After five minutes the announcement was repeated. The riot police

then parted to allow about eight to ten armed soldiers to enter the intersection and face

the demonstrators. It was announced after three minutes that shooting would commence

in two minutes. At the end that of period, automatic fire was released into the air and

shots were made into the direction of the crowd as well as tear gas being fired. The

crowd began to run but one man in the front of the crowd fell to the ground. He was a

Japanese photojournalist on contract to Agence France Presse. Relations with Japan were

badly affected by his shooting, and the Japanese-funded Human Resources DevelopmentCentre at the Yangon Institute of Economics lost its funding.

The police and army then proceeded to advance slowly, moving the crowd back.

At one point a truck load of bricks appeared and was promptly unloaded as ammunition

for the dwindling crowd of demonstrators. Plain-clothes police pursued protestors down

small side streets and brought them out handcuffed. They were placed in a police van

until about 6.00 p.m. when they were transferred to an army truck and driven out of the

city centre, presumably to a holding centre or gaol.

Notes

1 See, for example, Gordon Brown and Nicholas Sarkozy, Time for Serious Dialogue,

David Milliband and Bernard Kouchner, International Herald Tribune, 30 November

2007, preceded by their Foreign Ministers joint article Keeping the Momentum on

Burma,International Herald Tribune, 15 October 2007. In the midst of the September

events, one European Prime Minister offered to fly to Myanmar immediately to

affect the situation. Former United States President and Nobel Peace Prize winner

Jimmy Carter also offered himself to resolve Myanmars issues. Guardian Unlimited,

25 October 2007. Even the wife of the President of the United States joined in thelist of concerned international figures. Office of the First Lady, The White House,

Washington, D.C., 31 August 2007; Wall Street Journal, 10 October 2007; Irrawaddy

and Associated Press, 11 December 2007, Agence France Presse, 19 December 2007.

The news agency reports cited in these notes can be found in Burma Net News online

at as well as other websites such as .2 Despite efforts by some Western powers and the United Nations to use the Subsequent

Drafting Commission as a vehicle to open the constitutional process to opposition

and ethnic critics, the government appointed a commission composed of academics,

lawyers, and judges, many of whom had attended the National Convention. It convenedin Naypyitaw for its first full session on 3 December 2007. New Light of Myanmar,

4 December 2007


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26/29


salubrious restaurant in central Yangon frequented by local business and professional

people increased from 1,300 kyat to 1,850 kyat in 2007.

13 Total number of tourists arriving was actually down by 5 per cent but those whocame spent more. Thailand was the largest source of tourists (30,400) followed by

China (24,893), Japan (18,945), South Korea (18,265). Germany (18,003) was the

largest source of Europeans with France (15,498) next. Eighteen thousand and fifty-

two Americans visited in 20062007 contributing to a total of 630,000. Agence France

Press, 8 February 2007. Fiscal year end figures (to 31 March) showed that there were

654,000 total arrivals spending on average US$114 per day. More than half arrived

at border checkpoints rather than by air. Xinhua, 26 June 2007.14 Xinhua, 4 April 2007.

15 Xinhua, 17 July 2007.16 Myanmar Times via Associated Press, 21 May 2007. The United States and the

European Union accounted for 1.5 per cent and 4.8 per cent respectively of total

trade in 20062007 while Asian nations accounted for 90 per cent. Xinhua, 28 May

2007.17 Financial Times, 7 December 2007.18 Figures range from 3 to 11 per cent with most analysts at the bottom end of the

range and the government at the top; growth rates would seem to vary with some

agricultural districts apparently doing well and others very depressed.19

Agence France Press, 23 January 2007.20 Associated Press, 30 October 2007. The Shan State Army (South), a splinter group

of Khun Sas narco-army that surrendered in January 1996 operates in two areas of

Eastern Shan State, one near the Thai border and a second further north.21 Reuters, 5 July 2007.22 Irrawaddy, 26 January 2007.23 Irrawaddy, 29 June 2007; Agence France Press, 9 July 2007. Intenational Federation

of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,Information Bulletin No. 1, 29 August 2007,

FL-2007-000145MMR, Myanmar: Floods. Floods continued into late September

and early October in the central and northern regions of the Ayeyarwady Valley.24 This was confirmed in a meeting with Brigadier General Htain Maung the author

attended in early March 2007.25 Authors interview, July 2007.26 See below.27 Narinjara News, 31 May 2007; Reuters, 12 July 2007. Earlier in the year, the border

with Rakhine State was closed by the Bangladesh government to prevent approximately

1,000 Rohingya from entering. Xinhua, 15 January 2007.28 One school of thought advances the argument that the regime was allowing for a

greater degree of political activity and relaxed censorship as part of a process ofeventually concluding with a power-sharing arrangement through the constitutional

C iti f thi t t l th f liti l ti t th t th l d


27/29


its grip in order to draw its opponents out so as to suppress them in an effort to

ensure that their own constitutional plans went forward unopposed.29

Agence France Presse, 3 January 2007. Irrawaddy, citing an NLD spokesperson,reported that 43 were released, including 17 NLD members. Also Associated Press,

both 4 January 2007.30 U Tun Win, who was to have represented Mindon Township in Magwe Division.

Democratic Voice of Burma, 2 January 2007.31 Xinhua, 2 February 2007; Agence France Press, 15 May 2007; Associated Press, 4

July 2007. Some members of the Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors, the Democratic

Party for a New Society, and the All Burma Students Democratic Front allegedly

met near Maesot, Thailand, on the weekend of 2728 January. Other exiled political

leaders with no records of involvement in violent activities met in the Myanmar borderarea a month later. The Sixth Strategic Consultation Meeting, Revolutionary Forcess

Sixth Strategic Consultation Meeting Statement, 23 February 2007, ,

24 February 2007.32 See, for example, An Announcement of the 88 Generation Students, Regarding

Disturbances and Arrests of Peaceful Worshipers, Who Are Praying for the Release

of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and All Political Prisoners in Burma, 17 May 2007.33 Or Alliance of All Burmese Buddhist Monks or All Myanmar Sangha Sammaggi or

Young Monks Samagga. New Light of Myanmar, 19 September 2007.34

Having previously suggested that as many as 110 had died. Bloomberg, 25 October2007. Democratic Voice of Burma suggested that 138 had been killed. Associated

Press, 1 October 2007. The London Daily Mail reported thousands had died and

hundreds of bodies were dumped in the jungle, 1 October 2007.35 For Professor Pinheiros Report, See Human Rights Commission report A/HRC/6/14.

Also, Associated Press, 7 December 2007 and Government Press Conference 2/2007,

reported in New Light of Myanmar, 4 December 2007.36 In the aftermath of the protests, divisions arose among internal and external opponents

of the regime as exiled leaders such as Maung Maung of the Free Trade Union

(Burma) movement claimed responsibility for the protests, apparently confirming thegovernments version of events, and monks and other leaders described the protests

as a spontaneous expression of public distress. Irrawaddy, 13 December 2007.37 Agence France Presse, 10 January 2007.38 Belgium, France, Italy, Ghana, Panama, Peru, Slovakia, the United Kingdom, and the

United States.39 Also Qatar and Republic of the Congo.40 Xinhua, 9 December 2007.41 Xinhua, 2 February 2007.42

Xinhua, 13 September 2007.43 Reuters, 20 November 2007.44 A F P 1 O t b 2007


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45 Associated Press, 20 November 2007.46 Philippines lawmakers reiterated it would not ratify the treaty unless Myanmar was

a democracy. Manila Times, 20 December 2007.47 The Karen Human Rights Group published a report to that effect in April. Irrawaddy

andMizzima, both 26 April 2007. See for oral evidence before the House of Commons

International Development Committee on 7 June 2007 from spokespersons for Christian

Solidarity Worldwide and the Burma Campaign (UK) that were critical of Mr Petrie.48 Professor Gambari, a Nigerian, served as his countrys foreign minister for eighteen

months following a military coup in the mid-1980s. See his Theory and Reality in

Foreign Policy Making (Atlantic Heights, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1992).

49 Perhaps best discussed in P. G. Wodehouse, Stiff Upper Lip, Jeeves (London: PenguinBooks, 1966), p. 31 in the following exchange between Bertram Wooster and his Aunt

Dahlia when discussing the matrimonial affairs of one of his associates:

What can you do?

My role, as I see it, will be that of what the French call the raisonneur.

What does that mean?

Ah, there you have me, but thats what Jeeves says Ill be.50 United Nations News Centre, 5 September 2007.51 Reuters, 27 September 2007; Deutsche Presse Agentur, 28 September 2007.

52 Text of Information Ministers Briefing for the United Nations Special Envoy,1 October 2007, p. 19.

53 Ibid., p. 23.54 Associated Press, 7 November 2007. The Ministers explanation to Professor Gambari

was published in theNew Light of Myanmar, 7 November 2007. Among other points, it

was suggested that Professor Gambari had an incomplete understanding of Myanmars

history and myriad problems, and that the actions of many countries since the events

of September had had a negative impact upon his potential effectiveness.55 Gambari, Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making, p. 92.56

Associated Press, 9 November 2007.57 The fourteen were Australia, Indonesia, Russia, the United States, China, Japan,

Singapore, Vietnam, France, Norway, Thailand, India, Portugal, and the United

Kingdom. UN News Centre, 19 December 2007.58 With thanks to Tom Traubert via Tom Waits.


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Documents

Myanmar in 2007 by Robert H. Taylor