Mutinies - Dave Lamb

7/29/2019 Mutinies - Dave Lamb

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Mutinies - Dave Lamb

Solidarity's excellent pamphlet on mutinies in the British armed forces towards the end ofWorld War I.

MUTINIES

by Dave Lamb

"Our experience accustoms us to seeing how at a word of command a mass of soldiers will

enter into an organised fury of carnage and into the lottery of life and death, and how at

another command they will again become peaceful. The same thing is required of a people

that has armed itself. Here the word of command is liberty, the enemy tyranny. . . But there is

a great difference between the passivity of ordinary military obedience and the ardour of an

insurrection: between obedience to the order of a general and the flame of enthusiasm which

liberty pours into the vein of every creature. . These efforts are the enjoyment of liberty, and

you wish it to be renounced; these occupations, this activity is for the public cause, this

interest is the driving force, and you want the people to sink into inertia and boredom oncemore."

G.W.F. Hegel (1)These words were written a hundred years before the 1914-1918 war, yet they capture the

sentiments of the forgotten men and women of that period who decided to take a hand in theirown destiny. Hegel drew attention to the timeless urge to self-determination and to the joywhich accompanies a victory of mutineers or insurrectionists over tyrants, bureaucrats,manipulators, and sanguinary generals. In the following pages I have tried to uncover some ofthe conveniently forgotten moments of freedom which flowered in the shadow of total war.

Between 1917 and 1919 a series of mutinies took place amongst the world's most disciplinedarmies. The Russian, German, Italian and French forces as well as the British all 'suffered'major outbreaks. Yet many of these events have virtually been ignored by historians of bothright and left-wing persuasions. Mutinies, like heath fires, burst our here and there and assuch are inexplicable to those whose criterion for revolutionary activity is that it should be

bound up with a clearly defined goal and with a strategy, usually embodied in a revolutionaryleadership. Accordingly an outbreak of autonomous activity is seen by the leadership


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fetishists to be purposeless and mindless. Marx was speaking for future Fabians and Leninistswhen he said:

'A motley crew of mutineering soldiers who have murdered their officers, torn asunder theties of discipline, and not succeeded in discovering a man on whom to bestow supreme

command are certainly the body least likely to organise a serious and protracted resistance.'(2) There is here a conception of social change as an orderly, disciplined activity. Thisconception is reflected in the tendency of both Leninists and Fabians to see themselves as theelite officer corps, imparting their will on the direction of social change. It is difficult to seefrom this standpoint how people might have aims and aspirations of their own, which are notalways comprehensible to their self-appointed leaders.

One of the reasons why mutinies are largely ignored is because most historians tend to see theaims and objectives of the masses through the eyes of leaders or institutions that claim torepresent popular interests. In this way the problems of the leaders become the problems ofthe class. Lenin's problems in 1917 become those of Russian workers. The problems facing

the TUC become those of the British working class. In this perspective the mutinies in theRussian Army of 1917 are important insofar as they furthered Lenin's objectives. Mutinies inthe British armies are deemed relatively insignificant because they were not subordinated tosome external movement.

That ordinary men and women might have their own goals is conveniently ignored byhistorians whose vision is restricted to the ambitions and strategies of those in power orseeking to achieve it. This, to a certain extent, is understandable since the historian is verymuch at the mercy of his sources (press reports, autobiographies, and institutional minutes areusually the expression of the point of view of those who have made them). It is easy to dealwith the memoirs of a Haig, a Petain or a Ludendorff. Conversely, it is 'uninteresting' anddifficult to record the aspirations of those millions of Russians who collectively destroyedcenturies of Tsardom because of their decision to return home, and their willingness todisobey and even kill their officers in the process.

We are living in an age where the aspirations of the collective are unable to find expression;the medium for such expression is limited to the individualistic categories of the bourgeoisepoch. A sometimes all-too-willing victim of his medium, the historian tends to look at massautonomous movements through the eyes of those who seek to direct the process, thespokespersons, the revolutionary generals, the political programmes and revolutionarytextbooks. The historian looks to those who have staked their claim to impose their will upon

human history. And in so doing those countless millions struggling for some control overtheir destiny are largely ignored. We can perceive why governments and military authoritieshave concealed information about mutinies. We can equally understand why those countlesshacks who write history in order to justify the status quo do not demand the release ofinformation. But why has this area been neglected by allegedly left-wing historians? Could it

be that what happened ran counter to the presuppositions of both Fabians and Leninists thatmeaningful activity could only be envisaged in relation to some structure of authority? Themutinies in the United Kingdom did not throw up any such permanent structures and, for thisreason, have been ignored by those who see social change as dominated by permanentinstitutions led by experts whose interests are antagonistic to autonomous mass activity.

A concentration on leadership strategies can blind one to some of the most powerful forces inhistory. For example, did the American government's decision to pull out of Vietnam arise


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out of the wily schemes of Richard Nixon? Were the Americans out-manoeuvred at thenegotiating table? Perhaps it was the brilliant strategy of the North Vietnamese generals?Historians will grow fat on their published ponderings over these issues. But what about thefact that hundreds of thousands of GI's could no longer be relied upon? No one organisedthem. They left no permanent structures behind, yet their resistance had a profound effect on

world history. It might be said that they were acting in the interests of 'world communism' buthardly one of them would accept this as an explicit motive. They just wanted to go home.

The following pages are an account of mutinies which occurred among UK andCommonwealth troops. There will be no attempt to impute any motives other than those putforward at the time by the participants themselves.

Perhaps the most significant factor in this sadly neglected chapter in working class history isthe emergence of equalitarian tendencies, unstinting self-sacrifice and loyalty to one'scomrades under conditions capable of bringing out the worst in men. A mutiny againstarbitrary authority provokes situations where class loyalties are put to the severest test. If

properly understood the mutinies within the armed forces during the First World War willstand as one of the great landmarks of working class history.

COULD BRITISH TROOPS MUTINY ?

The first question one should ask is why did the troops in World War I take so much? Why,year after year, did they allow themselves to be used as cannon fodder? In trying tounderstand the phenomenon of mass disobedience the central question is not why theymutinied but why they endured for so long the conditions which make mutiny the mostnatural of responses. In 1917 the Russian soldiers declared 'enough'. Shortly after, a series ofmutinies in the French armies were only put down after hundreds of executions.

There are many today who regard the power of the armed forces as beyond challenge. Theysee military might as the ultimate weapon in the hands of the state. This view, however, doesnot take into account the fact that armies are made up of men, that men have ideas and needsof their own; that they have an urge to take decisions themselves, however suppressed thatdesire may be, and that under appropriate social and psychological conditions the armedforces can themselves become a source of revolutionary activity giving expression tolibertarian demands. If one is looking for the establishment of permanent structures mostmutinies will be seen as failures. But behind the apparent failures is a more complex reality.

Such struggles reveal that the mighty are not invincible, and that their weapon of last resortmay break in their hands.

Mutiny can be defined as the revolt of men under discipline of death. The decision to mutinyis not taken lightly. For this reason it is not usually the demands made by the mutineers thatmake the mutiny significant (the demands are often granted) but the decision to mutiny. Amutiny is, in certain respects, a manifestation of class conflict, if by 'class conflict' we meanthe rejection of the hitherto accepted relationship between order-givers and order-takers.Those involved in a mutiny may participate for a number of reasons. A man may becomesickened by official barbarity, or by excessive punishment for trivialities. Others may rebelover bad food, low pay or overwork. Homesickness or questions of conscience may play

important roles. The common factor behind a mutiny is not so much the resentment as thedecision to defy orders. Mutinies are made by those who decide to mutiny, knowing that they


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themselves will bear the brunt of what happens.

What makes a mutiny tick? Under what circumstances do men act in solidarity, in defiance ofthe powers-that-be? Those who mutiny come together for diverse reasons and hold verydifferent ideas about the point and purpose of the mutiny.

In the British armed forces, during the first two decades of this century, all the material andpsychological factors for mutiny were present and many incidents took place. One of thereasons they did not grow to full stature is the skill of 'our' ruling classes. Those in authorityhave known how and when to grant concessions, and had the resources to do so. The Britishruling classes before World War I had over a hundred years of experience at being thesupreme masters in industry. Throughout the nineteenth century they had been ruthless,clever and rich enough to repress, manipulate or buy off classes or groups that posed any realthreat to the status quo. Bestowing respectability on a limited number of working classleaders and granting concessions that did not lead to any fundamental transfer of power.

One could argue that the British soldier's cultural background acted as a check that preventedhim from taking revolutionary action. But during World War I the rationale behind militarytraining was to drive out any qualms and restraints and replace them with simple 'blood lust'.This is how Brigadier General Crozier described his battalion's training programme in 1915:

'I, for my part, do what I can to alter completely the outlook, bearing and mentality of over1000 men... Blood lust is taught for the purpose of war, in bayonet fighting itself and bydoping their minds with all propagandic poison. The German atrocities (many of which Idoubt in secret), the employment of gas in action, the violation of French women, the"official murder" of Nurse Cavell, all help to bring out the brute-like bestiality which isnecessary for victory. The process of "seeing red" which has to be carefully cultured if theeffect is to be lasting, is elaborately grafted into the make-up of even the meek and mild .. .The Christian churches are the finest "blood lust" creators which we have, and of them wemust make full use.' (3) The British soldier, Crozier concludes, 'is a kindly fellow ... it isnecessary to corrode his mentality.' (4)

Following this kind of indoctrination men were ordered into attacks and were killed in theirthousands. Bewildered survivors returned, only to find the guns of their officers trained onthem, forcing them back to certain death. The ordinary soldier was literally caught betweentwo fires. He faced two enemies - and it was not always clear which was the worse.Gradually the split between officers and men was to widen. As the officers who went with the

men were killed off, those officers employed to 'hunt back' the men became increasinglyalienated from those they commanded. (5)

Towards the end of the war the situation worsened. The widening gap between officers andother ranks is reflected in the official figures relating to those condemned for acts ofindiscipline, refusal to obey orders or mutiny:

'Shot for desertion : 266 soldiers, 2 officers

Shot for cowardice : 18 soldiers

Shot for disobedience : 5 soldiers


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Shot for sleeping on post: 2 soldiers

Shot for quitting post: 7 soldiers

Shot for striking or violence : 6 soldiers

(Some 2,600 other death sentences were passed but the sentences were commuted to variousterms of penal servitude). ' (6)

Tom Wintringham's figures also show a marked increase (from 1916 onwards) in the numberof sentences handed out. In 1916 these amounted to 60, in 1917 to 221, in 1918 to 676. (7)These figures, of course, do not tell us much about those 'dealt with on the spot' but theyreveal a substantial increase of acts of indiscipline. (8)

The authorities relied heavily on the fear of the firing squad. According to Philip Knightley inthe Sunday Times Supplement (April 30, 1972), 'About once a week during the war, in

France, Belgium, East Africa, Gallipoli, Salonica, Egypt, Palestine or Serbia ... a notice wasread out on parade that an unnamed British soldier had been shot for cowardice or desertion'.With such morale-boosters the decision to mutiny was not taken lightly.

Few of those executed were mutineers in the proper sense of the word; many were victims ofwhat later became known as 'shell-shock'. Real mutinies began to break out in the alliedarmies in 1917. A heavily guarded secret at the time, it is now widely known that the FrenchArmy was partly neutralised by mutinies in the summer of 1917. This led to a drastic revisionof military strategy - with British troops having to bear the brunt of the offensive. Many ofthe facts were even concealed from the War Cabinet in England. In his biography of GeneralTrenchard, Andrew Boyle gives us an inkling of the workings of the official mind:

'It was doubtful whether a dozen senior officers, including Robertson, were fully aware of theCommander in Chief's motive for concealing from Lloyd George and the War Cabinet thereal reason for maintaining the offensive to the bitter end that autumn (1917). It is certain thatfew realised more vividly than Trenchard why Petain had insisted on absolute security. Onlythe British Army could buy time to stop the rot in the French forces.' (9) But the problem waswider. It was also about how to stop 'the rot' spreading to British troops.

ETAPLES: 1917

Etaples, about 15 miles south of Boulogne, was a notorious base camp for those on their wayto the front. Under atrocious conditions both raw recruits from England and battle-wearyveterans were subjected to intensive training in gas warfare, bayonet drill, and long sessionsof marching at the double across the dunes. After two weeks at Etaples many of the woundedwere only too glad to return to the front with unhealed wounds. Conditions in the hospitalwere punitive rather than therapeutic and there had been incidents at the hospital betweenmilitary police and patients.

Matters came to a head one Sunday afternoon (September 9, 1917) after the arrest of a gunnerin the New Zealand Artillery. A large crowd of angry men gathered and did not disperse even

when told the gunner had been released. It was clear that the protest over the arrest was onlythe tip of an iceberg and the atmosphere was tense. The arrival of military police only made


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matters worse and scuffles broke out. Suddenly the sound of shooting was heard. Private H.Reeve, a military policeman, had fired into the crowd killing a corporal and wounding aFrench woman bystander. (11) News of the shooting spread quickly. By 7.30 pm over athousand angry men were pursuing the military police who fled in the direction of the town.The Camp Adjutant describes how the men 'swarmed into the town, raided the office of the

Base Commandant, pulled him out of his chair and carried him on their shoulders through thetown. ' (12)

The following morning measures were taken to prevent further outbreaks and police picketswere stationed on the bridges leading into the town. Nevertheless, by 4 pm men had brokenthrough the pickets and were holding meetings in the town, followed by sporadicdemonstrations around the camp. On Tuesday, fearing further outbreaks, the BaseCommandant requested reinforcements. Meanwhile, the demonstrations gathered momentum.On Wednesday, September 12, in spite of orders confining them to camp, over a thousandmen broke out, marched through the town and then on to Paris Plage. Later that dayreinforcements of 400 officers and men of the Honourable Artillery Company (HAC) arrived,

armed with wooden staves. A more sinister presence was cavalry support from the 15thHussars and a section of the Machine Gun Squadron. The threat worked: only 300 men brokecamp and were arrested at Etaples. The incident was now over and the reinforcements weredispersed. (13)

If shooting had broken out who knows what the effect would have been on the rest of theBritish army in France, particularly at a time when the French army was itself in suchtrouble? Moreover, at Etaples, the authorities could not rely on New Zealand troops to shootdown Scottish demonstrators with whom they had close loyalties. And a cavalry attack onunarmed men might have provoked a strong reaction. In the event the authorities were able tomanage with the HAC. (14)

Not all mutinies that year ended as peacefully. On September 5, only a few days before theoutbreak at Etaples, two companies went on strike at Boulogne. The following day they triedto break out of camp and although unarmed they were shot down. Twenty three were killedand twenty four wounded. (15) Yet despite such harsh reprisals within four days Number 74Labour Company also struck. The authorities responded on September 11 by killing fourmen, wounding fifteen, and inflicting prison sentences on twenty five more. (16) Only amonth later a similar dispute took place in the First Army Area, where five men were killedand fourteen wounded. Many other strikes in the Labour Corps were similarly 'overcome', butcasualty lists are not recorded. We know that in December 1917 a Guards detachment opened

fire on strikers of No. 21 Labour Company at Fontinettes, near Calais, killing four andwounding nine. 'Despite such rebuffs', say Gill and Dallas, 'strikes amongst labour companiescontinued to occur'. (17)

The severity of the repression can be explained by the fact that these particular mutineerswere Chinese or Egyptians whose treatment was determined by the colour of their skins. Notevery mutiny was put down by a display of superior strength. This was due to one of thefundamental paradoxes of a rigidly disciplined organisation, in wartime, of which theauthorities were well aware. Once men reach the point where death is familiar, fear of deathhas less effect. There were other restrictions on the decision to shoot: draconian methodscould themselves provoke further trouble.

So whilst 'native' labour troops continued to be subdued by shooting, reforms were instituted


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to try to prevent further outbreaks at Etaples. The system of training was virtually abandoned.Thousands came to believe that the Etaples mutiny 'changed the whole phase of routine and"bull" from Base to Front Line'. (18)

There was a rumour that 'ringleaders of the Etaples mutiny were later shot'. (19) But we have

no concrete evidence to corroborate this. Official policy was flexible. 'Men responsible fororganising disaffection on a far larger scale the following winter' say Gill and Dallas, 'in bothFrance and the Middle East, escaped without punishment at all, so threatening were thenumber and temper of the troops who backed them up. Equally, unfortunates who ran awayfrom the trenches, if only for a day, were very often shot.' (20)

Whatever steps the authorities took they did not stop the rising tide of mutinies whichcontinued throughout 1918, reaching a peak in the winter of 1918-1919. Sometimes the angerof the mutineers broke into full-scale riots, as on the night of December 9-10, 1918 'whenmen of the Royal Artillery stationed at Le Havre Base burnt down several depots in a riotwhich, in its destructiveness, outweighed anything which Etaples base had seen.' (21)

ARRAS AND VAL DE LIEVRE

Armed with the experience of the French mutinies the authorities took careful steps to avoidthe spread of strife within the British Army. This partly explains why severe punishmentswere always dished out to isolated individuals whilst mass autonomous movements wereoften left unpunished, lest they lead to further trouble. (22)

Yet in spite of the efforts of the authorities organised disobedience continued. In Arras,Canadian troops held out for two days against the officers and the Military Police. It was onlythe supply of drink from the wine cellars that prevented a further escalation of the mutiny.(23)

At Val de Lievre there is evidence that the distribution of socialist literature may haveinfluenced the nature of the protest. This mutiny of artisans and trade unionists enrolled in theRoyal Army Ordnance Corps took place in the Val de Lievre workshops, near Calais. Atmany of these camps dissatisfaction over food, hours and pay were motivating factors.Grievances were communicated through the Messing Committees but no action was taken.Some twelve month before the Armistice matters came to a head at Val de Lievre in the formof a stay-in strike. An anonymous spokesman for the mutineers said:

'We were demanding that the working day should finish at 5 pm instead of 6 pm and wefailed to secure this by negotiation. A committee of the works decided that all men shouldleave at 5 pm, ignoring the official hours. This failed as the response was only partial. A staffsergeant who had been most active in promoting this was moved and, we have reason to

believe, victimised. However, the hours were shortened by half an hour. Neverthelessdiscontent continued, and Government war propaganda lecturers have good reason toremember the tows ing they received at Val de Lievre Camp - one of the effects of readingsocialist publications which were smuggled into camp. ' (24)

PIRBRIGHT, SHOREHAM, FOLKESTONE AND DOVER


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The Val de Lievre strike was followed by a similar mutiny in Britain. In early 1918 there wasa mass walkout by Guards Machine Gunners stationed at Pirbright, between Woking andAldershot. The origins of this mutiny are obscure, yet for three days every private soldierrefused duty. Instead they organised voluntary route marches along the lanes near the camp,in defiance of their officers, returning only for meals. The strike was eventually called off

when a colonel of the Welsh Guards arrived and, giving an assurance that there would be novictimisation, asked for a spokesman from each of the five regiments involved. According toan eye-witness:

'Five old soldiers agreed to come to the front, though to my knowledge they were by nomeans ringleaders. They were taken off to London under close arrest, court-martialed andsentenced to two years each in a military prison. The breach of faith may have come about

because the colonel was overruled by the GOC London District. But I think we were naive toexpect the public school code of honour to be extended to mere rankers. The rest of the rebels- they must have numbered a couple of hundred or so - were split up into their originalregiments, and a detachment sent to its reserve battalion for a short time before being put on a

draft for France again . . . Many of those men were killed in action during the Great GermanBreakthrough of March 1913, and in subsequent fighting'. (John Wood, recalling 'TheGuardsman's Revolt', The Guardian. March 30, 1968.)

Only two days after the Armistice, on November 13 1918. Shoreham was the scene of amutiny. The men marched out of the camp after a major had pushed a man up to his thighs inmud. One of the mutineers (GP, from North Shields) reports:

'The next day the General came down...and formed us into three sides of a square, drove hismotor car into the centre, read the Army Act out, and then invited any man to step out and goto work who liked; I myself was made to fall out on the right by myself. You can imagine myfeelings, as being an old soldier of over twenty years service. Of course, I knew theconsequences of my act. But I never saw such loyal men in my life. Not one man moved. Icould hear the sergeants in the rear of the men telling them to stand by me, and it was wellthat thev did, or I should have got ten years or so. The following morning one thousand of uswere demobbed, my name at the head of the list, and one thousand every week afterwards. '(25) The policy of partial concessions is a recurring theme in British mutinies between 1918and 1919. Wherever possible ringleaders would be arrested. If this proved inexpedient theywould be demobbed. If the level of militancy led to a decision to demobilise the most militantwould be the first to go, with the aim of strengthening the power of the authorities over thoseremaining. At the same time all publicity was suppressed, and each outbreak isolated.

The election campaign following the Armistice of November 1918 encouraged the growth ofdisobedience in the armed forces. In a desperate bid to win votes Lloyd George had made

promises of immediate demobilisation. It matters little whether he intended to keep these asthe military authorities had already decided to the contrary. But the promise itself had theeffect of weakening military discipline. The war was over and, in the absence of externalthreats, the pressure to submit to authority was less. This was not fully appreciated by thosein command. There was a feeling of militancy - even of revolution - in the air. People

believed it was possible to build a more just society than the one which had just sent so manymillions to their deaths. This attitude was not confined to Britain. From 1918 on, the fears ofEuropean war were replaced by fears of internal revolution, throughout Europe. In Britain

these fears were not laid until the combined efforts of the Government and the TUC haddefeated the General Strike in 1926. There is no more promising material for revolution than


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soldiers returning from wars, careless to danger and accustomed to risks and to takingcollective action. Peace held no prospect for them. The 'homes fit for heroes' were not fit for

pigs. That winter of 1918-1919 was the nearest Britain ever came to social revolution: theauthorities lacked the support of the armed forces and the careerists in the TUC were facedwith a similar situation in industry.

Dissatisfaction within the army in the winter of 1918-1919 had a number of sources, one ofwhich was the 'pivotal' scheme. Only 'key men' - those with jobs to go to - could bedemobilised. This meant that those who had recently joined up could be released before thosewith longer service. The scheme was worsened by bureaucratic bungling: men were senthome for Christmas and told that those who had found jobs need not return. But forms had to

be filled in by their employers. The employers' contract had then to be endorsed by theMinistry of Labour. After this the man's unit would be asked if he could be spared.Meanwhile, while 'procedure' took its course, the men had to return via Folkestone to Calais.Some were demobbed on arrival, only to discover that there was no transport back toEngland. To make matters worse, there were no facilities for food and refreshment on the

return journey.

Then there was the very real threat of being sent to fight against the Bolsheviks in Russia.Although the Government were insisting that only volunteers were being sent to Russia therewas widespread knowledge that many unwilling conscripts had been packed off.

During the few weeks following the Shoreham incident there was a flood of mutinies. Thoseat Folkestone and Dover were major disturbances. The mutinies broke out too soon after theArmistice for delay in demobilisation to be considered the sole cause. Antagonism towardsofficers, hatred of arbitrary discipline, and a revolt against bad conditions and uncertaintyabout the prospect of being sent to Russia all combined with the delay, confusion anduncertainty about demobilisation, to provide suitable ingredients. In Folkestone, on January 31919, the news that men were to be sent back to France kindled the spark of mutiny. TheDaily Herald reported in somewhat euphoric terms:

'On their own signal - three taps of a drum - two thousand men, unarmed and in perfect order,demonstrated the fact that they were fed up - absolutely fed up. Their plan of action had beenagreed upon the night before: no military boat should be allowed to leave Folkestone forFrance that day or any day until they were guaranteed their freedom. It was sheer, flat,

brazen, open and successful mutiny. Pickets were posted at the harbour. Only Canadian andAustralian soldiers were to be allowed to sail - if they wanted to. As a matter of no very

surprising fact they did not want to. One officer tried to interfere. He leapt across thegangway and got a rough-house. 'I am a relative of Sir Douglas Haig' one of the officerspleaded.

'We are all King's messengers' said another party. But nothing of that kind availed them.

Meanwhile troop trains were arriving in Folkestone with more men returning from leave andon their way to France. They were met with pickets... in a mass they joined thedemonstrators.

On Saturday an armed guard of Fusilliers was posted at the quays by the Army authorities.

They carried fixed bayonets and ball cartridges. The pickets approached. One rifle made ashow of going up: the foremost picket seized it, and forthwith the rest of the guard fell back.


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The mutineers visited the station in a body, after having posted their own harbour guards, andtore down a large label marked 'For Officers Only'...

On Saturday a great procession of soldiers, swelled now to about 10,000, marched through

the town. Everywhere the townspeople showed their sympathy. At midday a mass meetingdecided to form a soldiers union. They appointed their officials and chose their spokesmen.'(26) Sir William Robertson, from the War Office, came down from London and conceded themen's demands. Everyone was to be given seven days leave. The men were allowed to electone hundred and forty demobilisation committees, from the rank and file. Completeindemnity was promised. The Herald said:

'Everywhere the feeling is the same, the war is over, we won't have to fight in Russia, and wemean to go home.' (27) There were fears that soldiers would be sent to fight in Russia but themessage came over loud and clear: the vast majority were not prepared to be used. It is thanksto the courage of those who put their own needs before loyalty to the flag that a much larger

contingent of British troops was not sent to Russia.

Another 4,000 troops demonstrated at Dover, in support of the Folkestone mutiny. They helda mass meeting in the harbour station and selected a deputation to meet the authorities. Theythen marched up to the Town Hall behind their deputies and formed lines on either side of theroad, overflowing into the side streets. The mayor had to admit them into the Town Hall,where a piano was provided for their entertainment. Nearby a cinema was opened for thesoldiers to enjoy a free film show.

The implications of these mutinies were very serious. To prevent a spread of unrest it wasresolved that Horatio Bottomley, well known demagogue and MP and editor of the magazineJohn Bull, be sent to intervene as the 'soldier's friend'. (28) Leave was extended. A team ofMinistry of Labour officials backed by an army of clerks arrived to speed up the checking oflabour contracts so that those with jobs could be quickly released.

Immediately after the victory at Folkestone-Dover there were other outbreaks. The 'irondiscipline' of the British Army was cracking under the strain. One of the more spectacularevents took place on Monday January 6 1919, when over 1500 members of the Army ServiceCorps at Osterley (Isleworth) seized lorries and drove them into Whitehall. It was widely

believed that this corps would be the last to be demobilised. The men had other intentions.Within four days they were all demobilised. There were further outbreaks at Shoreham where

seven thousand walked out, marching into Brighton. They were joined by a detachment ofRoyal Marine Engineers from Southwick. There were no reprisals and the men's grievanceswere dealt with immediately. That same day (January 6) there were several other incidentsincluding a walk out at the Shortlands RASC depot where five hundred walked out, andmarched to the central hall at Bromley. There were further demonstrations in London, whenfour hundred men bound for South Russia refused to board a train - a surprising incident if allsoldiers destined for Russia were really volunteers.

Later that week mutinies broke out at Bristol, Fairlop, Grove Park, Kempton Park, ParkRoyal, Sydenham and Aldershot.

THE WAR CABINET


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There was panic at the War Office. The War Cabinet was deeply divided. On February 6,1919 Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, wrote in hisdiary:

'The whole of the demobilisation has been completely boxed up by Lloyd George, who in hisanxiety to get votes at the General Election, kept adding every sort of authority to help. .. IfLloyd George doesn't announce to the country that the war is not over, the whole army will

be turned into rabble.' (29) The next day, following talks at No 10 Downing Street, he wrote:

'I told Lloyd George to come out into the open and back the War Office.. .to crush thepoisonous parts of the press. . .to say that the war is not over. ..To prepare the public mind forarmies of occupation in India, Gibraltar, Malta, France, etc. .. This frightened Lloyd Georgeand he agreed.' (30) On January 8 delegates from the Folkestone and Dover mutinies arrivedin London, with delegates from other camps. This was the first overt sign of the growth ofrank and file links,, No matter what the War Office intended the Army was going home.

There was nothing the Government could do but concede their demands. Field MarshallWilson was furious. He recorded his displeasure in his diary:

'the whole trouble is due to Lloyd George and his cursed campaign for vote catching. Now heis forced up against something ugly as I told him he would be. At a meeting of the militarymembers this afternoon we agreed that the AG should draw up a paper showing how constantcivilian interference has wrecked our carefully worked scheme for demobilisation andexplaining clearly that unless we soldiers were allowed to run our own show, we would havea disaster.' (31) The War Cabinet had adopted a scheme to retain a large percentage of thetroops in some form of compulsory service. Wilson and Churchill supported sending troopsto Russia, to 'knock out' Bolshevism. When Lloyd George left for the first Paris peace talksthey co-operated to devise a compulsory service scheme. The plan aimed at having a millionmen in khaki, ready to put forces on the Rhine, to send men to Russia, to provide otherarmies of occupation and to cope with the situation in Britain. From the point of view of thefanatics in the War Office the manpower demands for Britain's post-war policy (repression inIreland, intervention in Russia, occupation of the Rhineland, and curbing of industrial unrestat home) were incompatible with large-scale demobilisation. Wilson and Churchill agreedthat once they had piloted the scheme through the War Cabinet they should go together andconfront Lloyd George with a fait accompli. They could then put the scheme into operationwithout further delay. Lloyd George, more aware of the realities, suspected that the schemewould not be accepted by troops already in open defiance. Churchill was therefore prevented

from putting his plans to the War Cabinet.

Undaunted, Wilson and Churchill held an unofficial Cabinet meeting. Says Wilson:

'An unofficial Cabinet meeting took place in the form of certain 'conversations'. The case wasput strongly by Churchill, that discipline was disappearing fast in the Army and Haig addedthat if things continued there would be no army left in France.' (32) Reluctant assent wasgiven to their proposals. No secretary was present and no minutes taken. Following themeeting Churchill and Wilson crossed the Channel and pressured Lloyd George into anequally unwilling agreement. Even members of the Government expressed reservations atthis blatant breach of faith. 'Bonar Law', says Wilson, 'is terrified of the scheme coming out,

because of his election pledges.' The next stage was comparatively easy: the support of thepress was needed for the re introduction of compulsory service. Wilson had no doubt that


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they would comply and he wrote confidently in his diary:

'We will get all the press to bring out their puffs on Wednesday, and we will follow up withan Army Order on Thursday. Then the great adventure of compulsing (sic) a million men inthe name of peace will have begun. There is not a moment to lose. All power within the

Army is slipping away. We shall get one million men, who will be compelled to serve formonths. Of course if these men refuse to serve we are done, but I have no fear. Winston and Ican get full support from the press.'(33) Support from the press was crucial if a scheme whichnegated election pledges made only a few weeks earlier was to be implemented. As expected,the meeting with the press went off smoothly. Churchill and Wilson told them of 'theirresponsibility to the nation.' The hacks eagerly complied. According to Wilson 'the press

behaved loyally and understood that the Army was in a state of flux and that the men weredisposed to take their opinions from what they read in the newspapers.' (34)

But events were slipping out of the hands of megalomaniacs in the War Office. Unrest wassweeping the country. The common soldier was beginning to write history with his feet.

Whatever the War Office had in mind the troops were determined to make their owndecisions. A military adventure in Russia was low on their list of priorities.

By January 8 1919, some 300,000 men had been demobilised. The release of the 'pivotal' menalone was proceeding at the rate of 4, 000 a day. Disturbances were still taking placethroughout the country. On January 8, over 4,000 RASC men marched from Park Royal toWhitehall, where a reluctant Sir William Robertson conceded their demands for animmediate demobilisation, and promised there would be no victimisation. There was a furtherdemonstration by 600 men of the Flying Service at Westerham Hill aerodrome, Kent. Severalhundred men of the RAF School of Imperial Gunnery at Hythe marched to the Hotel Imperialand protested. Several hundred RAF men at Felixstowe marched on the Harwich defence.100 men belonging to the Highland Light Infantry marched to the headquarters of theScottish Command in Edinburgh. A large contingent of men from the Queen's, theGloucester's and Wiltshire's in Maidstone, held a protest meeting in the High Street beforemarching on the Town Hall. (35) The first significant concession was the abolition of thecontract system.

In a. desperate attempt to keep control Lloyd George made an appeal for restraint on January9 1919. This was followed up by an Army Council notice to all units stating that:

'Officers and soldiers who embarked on and after January 12 for leave in the United Kingdom

are only permitted to proceed on leave to the United Kingdom on the distinct understandingthat they are to return to their units on the expiration of their leave, and that they will not bedemobilised, under any pretext whatsoever, while on leave.' (36) The day this notice was

published a large number of RAMC men in Blackpool refused to go on parade until allrestrictions on their Corps were lifted. By now the number of 'pivotal' men released daily hadreached 6,000 and a further 70,000 applications had been received. Meanwhile 125,000miners had secured demobilisation and it was estimated that no less than 140,000 men perweek were being discharged in the United Kingdom alone. The military authorities hoped toregain some control over the demobilised troops since they believed that a clash between theGovernment and organised labour was inevitable. There was therefore considerableembarrassment when the Daily Herald published a circular that had been sent to discharged

members of the Honourable Artillery Company (HAC), which stated:


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'The CO hopes that all those who have served in the HAC and are physically fit and able torejoin in the event of any national emergency should communicate their address from time totime to the OCHAC depot... Those who are fully competent as either motor mechanics,mechanical railway, electrical engineers, dispatch riders, telegraphonists, signallers, etc. , are

particularly requested to notify on the back thereof these or any other special qualifications

which they may possess.' (37) The Government were pinning hopes on their ability to defeatthe unions in the event of a confrontation. There was plenty of evidence before the tradeunion 'leaders' that in the event of a showdown the Army would not stand by theGovernment. However, the labour bureaucrats did everything they could to avoid aconfrontation.

SOUTHAMPTON: 1919

A reminder of the strength of ordinary soldiers came from Southampton, in the middle ofJanuary, when 20,000 soldiers went on strike and took over the docks. Robertson,Commander in Chief of the Home Forces, sent General Trenchard to restore military

authority. Trenchard had witnessed several mutinies in the French Army and was quiteprepared to employ the most ruthless measures. Nevertheless he underestimated the men ashe approached the dockgate and attempted to address a reluctant audience. A chorus of boosand catcalls accompanied his remarks. The meeting came to an undignified end when a groupof men took hold of him and gave him a going over before ejecting him. Said Trenchard:

'It was most unpleasant.. . It was the only time in my life I'd been really hustled. They saidthey did not want to listen to me. They told me to get out and stay out.' (38) Smarting fromhis minor injuries and major wounds to his pride, Trenchard acted with the vengeful cunningwhich had preserved his military caste for generations. Indifferent to the grievances of thesoldiers - many of whom had seen active service - he saw only a mutinous rabble to be putdown by force. Fully aware that the mutineers were not armed he phoned a request to thegarrison commander at Portsmouth for 250 armed men plus an escort of Military Police. Inspite of fierce objections from Southern Command, Trenchard made it perfectly clear that ifnecessary he would initiate a blood-bath.

The following morning Trenchard returned to the quayside and waited for the troop trainfrom Portsmouth. Only when the unarmed mutineers had been surrounded by armed troopswith their safety bolts in firing position did Trenchard make a second attempt to address thetroops. And even then he was told to 'drop dead' by a sergeant, who was promptly arrested.Following this incident the mutiny collapsed. 170 soldiers were personally selected as

ringleaders by Trenchard, fifty three of whom were confined in a nearby troopship.

The docks were now quiet but a few score soldiers had barricaded themselves in their billets.Hose pipes were commandeered and after half an hour Trenchard's riot squad had capturedabout 100 soaked and shivering men who were then forced to stand in the January frostoutside Trenchard's office until the latter had satisfied his desire for vengeance.

A few weeks later, in early February, Trenchard was called in by Churchill, then Minister forWar and Air, and was congratulated on his 'masterly handling of the Southampton riots' andappointed Chief of the Air Staff. (Duel of Eagles by Peter Townsend, Weidenfeld &:

Nicolson, 1970, pp 47-8)

Unrest amongst the troops merged with unrest in industry. By February 1919 large numbers


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of soldiers were refusing to return to the Continent. Civil disturbances in mining areas, whichunder normal circumstances would have been quelled by a show of force, presented grave

problems to the authorities, since it was not clear whether the troops could be relied upon.Eventually the Army Council decided that there was a Guards division that could be trustedand issued instructions for them to be brought back from the Continent. The Guards were

used on a number of occasions, for example to disarm the Durham Light Infantry atColchester, when they refused to embark for Russia.

How near was Britain to a full scale revolution during these weeks? This must remain amatter for speculation. The Army was in disarray: soldiers and sailors councils anddemobilisation clubs were being formed. Delegates from various camps were beginning tocombine their efforts and resources. The number of strikes in Liverpool and Glasgow wereincreasing. There were riots in Glasgow and troops sent to occupy the streets were beginningto fraternise with the strikers and demonstrators. There were riots in Belfast and a nationalrailway strike was imminent. From August 1918 until mid-1919 even the police force wasaffected by militant strike action.

RAF BIGGIN HILL: JANUARY 1919

This dispute was in many ways typical of the smaller struggles of this period. The 500 RAFmen of the Wireless Experimental Establishment at the South Camp of the famous 'Battle ofBritain' airfield at Biggin Hill had been living in absolutely appalling conditions. Most ofthem slept in tents, the camp was a sea of mud and all the duck-boards and other stealablefuel had been burnt to obtain warmth in the freezing weather. The dining hall was a canvashangar with its roof in shreds. The men had to eat in a morass of three inches of mud. Foodwas prepared in a cookhouse which was an open, rusty shed. Matters were made worse by theofficious attitude of the authorities.

One evening in January, after a particularly foul meal, the men held a meeting. They hadalready complained many times to the authorities, without result. The meeting decidedoverwhelmingly in favour of strike action. The 'Red Flag' was sung and there were calls for amore active and radical policy, including a call for a march down Piccadilly smashing all thewindows en route. These proposals were defeated.

The next morning no one turned out for duty. When the orderly officer tried to discover whatwas happening he was turned away from the dining hall by a sergeant and two men who

refused to recognise his authority. The men removed magnetos from all vehicles in the camp,including those belonging to civilian contractors. Support came from the men of 141Squadron of the RAF stationed in the neighbouring North Camp, who refused to intervene onthe side of the authorities. The strike committee was in complete control.

A deputation was sent to the CO, Colonel Blanchy (the new RAF ranks had not been fullyintroduced) and presented the following demands:

1. No man to be victimised.

2. Unless we receive a satisfactory answer from the Commandant we will put our case before

Lord Weir, i.e. our deputation will proceed to his quarters.


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(a) The men state that when they go "sick" the Medical Officer says that their complaints aredue to the disgraceful conditions of the camp food and sanitary arrangements.

(b) Names of the men who can bear witness to the above statement can be supplied ifnecessary.

(c) We demand that Major --- shall be dismissed from this unit.

(d) Leave to be carried on in the normal way.

(e) The men demand that they leave the camp until it is put into a habitable condition by thecivilian employees.

(f) Temporary release of those men who have jobs waiting and those who want to get jobspending discharge. While the men are at home demobilisations must continue, and the menbe advised by letter or telegram.

(g) Abolition of work on Saturday afternoons and Sundays.

(h) Restrictions placed on Y.M.C.A. to be removed, prices in canteen to be lowered and a fullexplanation given as to what happens to P.R.I, funds.

(i) Efficient transport to be provided for officers, NCOs and men.

3. Grievances.

Sanitary:

(a) Wash-house - only 5 basins for 500 men.

(b) Wet feet - no gum boots issued.

(c) Dirty and leaking huts.

(d) NO BATHS.

(e) Inefficient latrines.

Food:

(a) Shortage.

(b) Badly cooked.

(c) Dirty cook-house staff.

(d) Dining Hall in a disgraceful condition.

(e) Fully trained cooks should be substituted for present inefficient youths.


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THESE DEMANDS TO BE CONCEDED BY NOON TODAY.

Blanchy offered to accompany the delegation to the Area HQ at Covent Garden to supporttheir case! The men agreed, and the magnetos were replaced in a sufficient number ofvehicles to transport the delegation. Meanwhile the rest of the camp remained on strike. The

Area second in command was shown around the camp by the strike committee, and theoutcome was that the whole camp was immediately sent on leave for ten days, during whichtime conditions were drastically improved and the other demands largely conceded. When thestrike ended there were no victimisations. This solid, but limited, struggle had met withcomplete success.(source: RAF BIGGIN HILL, by Graham Wallace, Putman, 1957)

CALAIS: 1919

Unrest within the Army in France continued. A court martial at Etaples on September 22,

1918 sentenced five youths aged seventeen to nineteen to ten years imprisonment for acts ofindiscipline. (40) This led to further agitation for their release. There was a growingcampaign against the censorship of news from home and soldiers at Calais elected delegateswho also acted as distributors for the then prohibited Daily Herald. There were also demandsfor instant dismantling of the Val de Lievre workshops.

The stability of the Army on the Continent was affected by events back home. In France, inthe war zone, official brutalities were rife. One example was at the prison at Les Attaques.where men were detained for trivial offences such as overstaying their leave by a few hours.Prisoners were only supplied with one blanket, during one of the severest winter for decades.They were flogged and manacled for merely talking to each other.

At the end of January 1919, the men of the Army Ordnance and Mechanical Transportsections at the Val de Lievre camp called a mass meeting which decided to mutiny.Conditions in the camp were bad, and reports of several incidents had already found theirway into the newspapers.

The Calais mutiny began after agitation for demobilisation. It coincided with the arrest ofPrivate John Pantling, of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, while delivering what theauthorities described as a 'seditious speech to an assembly of soldiers.'

On pay night the men at Val de Lievre smashed open the jail and let Pantling out. Theauthorities tried to recapture him. When this failed, fresh military police were brought in.They arrested the sergeant of the guard for failing to prevent the prisoner's 'escape'. Angerwas now rising. The Commanding Officer - by now a very frightened man - released thesergeant, and called off the attempt to recapture Pantling. He also agreed to a meeting withthe men to discuss their grievances. The next day many concessions were made, includingshorter hours.

While this was taking place there was a distinct hardening of the attitude of the officers. Thesoldiers spent the weekend organising the other camps into Soldiers Councils. On Sunday theofficers struck back and rearrested Pantling. The news spread quickly. On Monday the newly

organised Soldiers Councils called a strike. Not a single man turned up for reveille. Thesentries were replaced by pickets. That same morning, at another camp in nearby Vendreux,


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over 2,000 men came out in sympathy. Later that morning they marched to the Calais campas a gesture of solidarity. After a mass meeting both camps marched behind brass bandstowards the headquarters, where Brigadier Rawlinson was stationed. By now the mutineerstotalled 4,000. The headquarters were quickly surrounded and a deputation entered. Theydemanded the release of Private Pantling. The authorities capitulated and promised that he

would be back in his camp within twenty-four hours.

On Tuesday morning he was returned. But by now some 20, 000 men had joined the mutinyand the strike was spreading French workers were cooperating and a total embargo was

placed upon the movement of British military traffic by rail. In fact the rail stoppage was asignificant factor in the escalation of the struggle. 5,000 infantrymen due to return home,finding themselves delayed, struck in support of their own demand for immediatedemobilisation. (41)

In an attempt to intimidate the mutineers General Byng and fresh troops were sent for.Unfortunately Byng made the mistake of arriving before his men. His car was immediately

commandeered by the mutineers and replaced by a modest Ford. Byng's troops were delayedfor a further two days by Lhe blacking of British transport. When they arrived machine gunswere placed at strategic points, such as food stores and munition dumps. Byng's troops, in thewords of a participant, were 'bits of boys who were sent out just as the war ended. ' (42)

Fresh from the growing unrest at home. they were even more reluctant to be in khaki than theCalais mutineers themselves. They started fraternising with them and before longhad joinedthe mutineers. The strike continued.

Some barrack room lawyer pointed out that Pantling could be rearrested at any time. It wasdecided that it would be to his advantage to be court-martialled whilst the soldiers were stillin control. His acquittal would then be binding and he would be safe from further arrest.Reluctantly, the officers had to agree.

The strike was now total. It was led and coordinated by the strike committee, which now tookthe title of 'The Calais Soldiers' and Sailors' Association.' Their method of organising wasstrictly democratic. Each hut or group of huts elected a delegate to the Camp Committee.These committees then sent delegates to the Central Area Committee. By-passing theofficers, these committees issued daily orders from the occupied Headquarters.

The quality and quantity of the food increased. The food surplus served to confirm the

rumour that officers had secretly been selling food to French businessmen. S.C.A. Cannel,who was working as a clerk at the Ordnance Depot testified how:

'our food was being "flogged" to French people. In fact, I saw with my own eyes, clothesbaskets full of bully, cheese and bacon going out of the camps at night. ' (43) Eventually aconference was arranged, at which major concessions were won. But the mutiny was drawingto a close. On the evening of the conference, whilst most of the soldiers were attending alocal cinema, a surprise vote was taken. The result was acceptance of an officer's ultimatumto return under orders. These men then had to face the wrath of their comrades, who returnedto discover that the mutiny had virtually collapsed.

During the mutiny contacts had been made with French workers, and with allied forces on theRhine. Troops at Dunkirk were also ready to come out, and there was little doubt that they


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would have found support amongst workers and troops back home. Had the movementcontinued it could clearly have developed a revolutionary character. A further significant signthat the army was crumbling was when women of the Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary stayedaway from work, in solidarity with the Calais strike. (44)

Meanwhile, in Scotland, the Clyde strike had also collapsed. This played a part in loweringthe morale of the Calais mutineers, who drew back from a course of action leading torevolution.

This incident had shaken the authorities to the core. British troops had shown they werecapable of highly sophisticated forms of struggle, forging important links with other sectorsof the army and with the civilian population. Although the strike was over, the authoritiesnever felt strong enough to victimise the strike committees or to reimpose the old type ofmilitary discipline. Soldiers were free to return to camp whenever they felt like it, and toenter cafes and the like during 'prohibited' hours, without fear of disciplinary action. The foodwas improved. New huts were erected. Weekend work was abolished. The Calais Area

Soldiers' and Sailors' Association continued to meet and applied for representation on thenewly formed Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's Union.

The mutiny had ended on January 30 1919. Within three months demobilisation began inearnest - only just in time to avert another wave of mutiny. The lesson that the militarymachine could be beaten had been learnt. (45) Churchill commented at the time that 'if thesearmies had formed a "united resolve", if they had been seduced from the standards of dutyand patriotism, there was no power which could have attempted to withstand them. ' (46)

WHITEHALL (FEBRUARY 1919) AND THE WAR OFFICE CIRCULAR

This fear of uniting the troops prevented the War Office from giving full rein to Neanderthal-types like Trenchard. An incident occurred however which could have led to severe loss oflife with untold consequences. It happened when three thousand demonstrating troopsmarched on Whitehall in February 1919. On February 8 troops returning to France after a

period of leave refused to board for Calais. Orders were given for the railway station to besurrounded by a detachment of Guards. Sir Henry Wilson expressed the fear that there wereno troops that could be relied upon to deal with the trouble.

A few hours later the three thousand mutineers marched into Whitehall. From his window

Churchill could see the men, who by now had occupied Horse Guards Parade. He wasinformed by General Fielding that a reserve battalion of Grenadiers and two troops of theHousehold Cavalry were available. Churchill then asked whether they could be relied upon toobey orders. After an affirmative answer he ordered the General to have his men surround thedemonstrators and take them prisoner. The Guards encircled the demonstrators, machine gunstrained on them. They then advanced, bayonets at the ready. If the mutineers had notsurrendered there could have been a bloodbath. This was one time when Churchill was noteager to be seen with his troops. Later the mighty warrior confessed: 'I remained in my room,a prey to anxiety.'(47)

Meanwhile the rot in the army in England continued, unchecked. At Battersea, troops of the

Army Service Corps went on strike. They were joined by Service Corps men in Camberwelland Kempton Park, the latter demanding civilian rates of pay for mending lorries intended for


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sale.

One question dominated the Government: 'Could the troops be relied on, in the event ofrevolution or serious civil disturbance in England?' The Guards Division, as we havementioned, was hastily recalled from Germany. But uncertainty about the reliability of the

Army persisted, as reports flooded in.

Towards the end of January 1919 a most revealing episode took place. Concerned at thespread of the spirit of disobedience among civilians and about the constant talk of 'tradeunionism' in the army, and alarmed at the prospect of a miners' strike which might haverallied the support of the Triple Alliance (of railwaymen, miners and transport workers) theWar Office issued a circular, officially described as 'secret' to the Commanding Officers of allArmy units. Several weeks later the document was 'leaked' to the Daily Herald ... who

published it. A heated discussion of some of the issues involved took place in the Committeedebate on the Army Estimates, on May 29, 1919.

The Circular requested of the Army officers that they provide weekly reports 'to reach thisoffice without fail not later than first post each Thursday morning' on a number of importantmatters, including the following:

'Will troops in various areas respond to orders for assistance to preserve the public peace?'

'Will they assist in strike-breaking?'

'Will they parade for draft to overseas, especially to Russia?' Station Commanders were alsoasked to report weekly on:

'Whether there is any growth of trade unionism among the units under your command?'

'The effect outside trade unions have on them'

'Whether any agitation from internal or external sources is affecting them'

'Whether any Soldiers' Councils have been formed'.

The information was needed 'with a view to the establishment of an efficient IntelligenceService whereby the Army Council can keep its finger on the pulse of the troops'. The facts

were required 'for the information of the Secretary of State for War' (then Winston Churchill).

Nearly 60 years later the debate still makes fascinating reading. Better than many a learnedthesis it reveals the arrogance and duplicity of the ruling class and the cringing of the tradeunion bureaucrats turned professional politicians.

According to Winston Churchill the queries in the Circular, analysed over a 4 month period,had produced the following replies :

'Troops may be relied on to assist the civil power to preserve the public peace and to protectpersons and property. They resent unofficial strikes .. . and realise their duty as citizens in

repressing disorderly persons.'


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'They deprecate being used in "strike breaking" and the general feeling is that it would not befair to ask troops to do what they themselves would consider "blackleg" work.'

'Troops will parade for drafts overseas with the exception of Russia.'

Then, as now, the War Office was as interested in industrial relations as the Board of Tradeor, later, the Ministry of Labour. Then, as now, there was no doubt as to whose side theywere on. What was relatively unique about the episode was that as a result of a series of

bureaucratic bungles the military establishment was forced to discuss openly (even if onlyvery partially) a number of important matters that until then they had managed to disci onlyamong themselves.

THE NAVY

Whilst the mutinies in the German and French Navies have been well documented little

information is available concerning the Royal Navy. (49) There was, however, considerabletalk of mutiny at Portsmouth, in the summer of 1918. The threat was serious enough forLionel Yexley, an admiralty agent, (50) to write a report warning the Admiralty of impendingtrouble. This was only averted by immediate improvements in pay and conditions. Demandsfor 'lower deck' organisation were taken seriously. Agitation for trade union representationwas spreading throughout the Navy.

The material conditions of the sailors certainly justified a mutiny. Between 1852 and 1917there had only been one pay increase, amounting to a penny a day, in 1912. Wartime inflationhad reduced the sailors' nineteen pence a day to a mere pittance. Another twopence a day wasgranted in 1917, plus a miserable separation allowance of ten shillings and six pence a week,for wives. Following a series of mutinies in 1919 pay increases of over two hundred per centwere granted.

After the Russian Revolution the British Navy was sent into action against the Russians. Itproved ineffective, but this ineffectiveness had less to do with the efforts of the Bolsheviksthan with the unwillingness of the British seamen to fight. The extent of these mutinies can

be measured by reference to the following comment made in the House of Commons by G.Lambert MP, on March 12 1919:

'. . .undoubtedly there was, at the end of last year, grave unrest in the Navy. .. I do not wish to

be violent, but I think I am correct in saying that a match would have touched off anexplosion.' (51) Shortly after the armistice with Germany the crew of a light cruiser, at Libauon the Baltic, mutinied. Many other ships were sent home from Archangel and Murmanskafter similar experiences. In spite of a propaganda campaign against Russia it was becomingincreasingly difficult to obtain reliable crews. Refusals to weigh for Russia were a regularoccurrence at Invergordon, Portsmouth, Rosyth, Devonport and Fort Edgar.

We have heard a great deal from labour historians about the refusal of dockers to load the'Jolly George' with an arms consignment for Poland in May 1920. But we have heardvirtually nothing about far greater challenges to authority in the armed forces. For example,early in 1919 a group of dock workers discovered that the destination of a large cruiser being

refitted at Rosyth was Russia. Together with some members of the Socialist Labour Partythey leafleted the crew, who refused to sail. In fact the crew stayed put for three weeks,


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although isolated in mid-stream, until their demands were met and they were paid off atPortsmouth.

In January 1919 there were mutinies on the mine-sweepers at Rosyth. On January 13, 1919there was a mutiny on the patrol boat 'Kilbride' at Milford Haven, where the red flag was

hoisted. This was an uneasy year for the Admiralty. On October 12, one hundred and fiftyseamen had broken out of their ships at Port Edgar on hearing that they were due to return tothe Baltic. The First Destroyer Flotilla was prevented from returning to the Baltic war.Eventually half the ships sailed on August 14, their crews made up from Atlantic Fleet

battleships. Although most of the mutineers were arrested, some 44 men made their way toLondon to present petitions at Whitehall. They were arrested at King's Cross and sent toChatham Barracks. (52) Between October 12 and November 21, 1919 some ninety sixoffenders had been arrested and punished, ten by imprisonment. (53) It should beremembered that the government had repeatedly pledged that only volunteers would be sentto fight against the Russians. It is clear that this was not the practice employed by theAdmiralty. Those who did not intend to 'volunteer' had little choice but to mutiny and face the

consequences.

By November 1919 discontent had spread to the aircraft carrier 'Vindictive' in Copenhagen.A marine detachment was called in to disperse a group of seamen demanding leave. Two menwere arrested. Later two stokers were caught trying to stop the fan engines. They were eachgiven five years. The following morning virtually no one turned up for duty. This provokedCaptain Grace to arrest five more alleged 'ringleaders'. They were condemned to ninety dayshard labour before a dishonourable discharge. Another six were arrested, but resistancecontinued. The next morning 14 crewmen were still refusing duty and were arrested. Thatevening another two arrests were made. (53a)

Meanwhile the crews of the minesweepers operating in the Baltic declared they had hadenough. There were incidents aboard the flagship 'Delhi', in December, when only 25% of thecrew responded to a command to return to Biorko in the Gulf of Finland.

There was a further naval mutiny in Russia, that of the gunboat 'Cicala' in the White Sea.Death sentences were imposed on the 'ringleaders'. The fact that these were later commutedto one year's imprisonment reflects the continuing strength of the sailors' movement. (54)

Mutinies in the forces of intervention were not confined to the Navy. There was a largemutiny in a Marine battalion at Murmansk. The 6th Battalion of the Royal Marines, formed

in the summer of 1919 at a time of unrest over demobilisation, were originally intended topolice Schleswig Holstein. But, at short notice, the Battalion had been diverted to cover theevacuation of Murmansk. They were sent to the Lake Onega region, a further 300 miles southof Kem. In August 1919 two companies refused duty : 90 men were tried and found guilty ofmutiny by a court martial. 13 men were sentenced to death and others to up to 5 yearsimprisonment.

None of the death sentences were actually carried out. The ninety mutineers were shipped toBodmin prison, where they continued their resistance to arbitrary authority. (In this they wereacting in the best traditions of the Royal Marines. In December 1918 some Marines had beeninvolved in a mutiny inside Bodmin prison which had resulted in three death sentences, later

commuted to five years penal servitude.) Continued resistance paid off. The ninety menarrested after the Murmansk incident had their sentences reduced as follows : the 13


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sentenced to death were commuted to five years, but 12 were released after only one year,and the other after two years. Twenty men, originally given 5 years, were released after sixmonths. Fifty one men sentenced to two years were also released within six months.

In recognition of the fact that their officers had acted contrary to Army instructions in

employing young and inexperienced lads at the front, the remainder of those arrested wereeither released or had their sentences commuted to 6 months. Following the announcement,on December 22, 19 of these acts of 'clemency' the First Lord of the Admiralty told theCommons that 'bad leadership' was a factor behind the mutiny. He even hinted at the

possibility of disciplinary measures being taken against several officers.

Many other mutinies occurred in North Russia. One took place in the 13th Battalion of theYorkshire Regiment, which ended with death sentences being passed on two sergeants whilstthe other mutineers were cowed by White Russian machine gunners called in by the Englishofficers.

News of these mutinies was suppressed. They highlighted the reluctance of British sailors tofight against Russia when the government was theoretically committed to a policy of peace.Contrary to what the people were being told, and at the very moment when the hysteriasurrounding the Armistice was at its height, the Foreign Office and Admiralty were finalisingtheir arrangements for intervention in Russia.

The Navy was not only required for the anti-Bolshevik crusade and to defend Britain'simperial commitments. It was also needed to quell internal disturbances. Towards the end ofthe 1914-1918 war seamen were trained in the noble art of 'blacklegging' in the event ofstrikes by railwaymen or power workers. 'The battleship Vanguard', says Walter Kendall,'was sent to the Mersey to command Liverpool during the Police strike of August 1919'. (56)

Resistance in the Navy continued between 1919 and the time of the Invergordon mutiny. (57)In 1930 there were no fewer than six major movements within the Navy against conditions ofwork and the arbitrary injustice of naval discipline. The 'Revenge', 'Royal Oak', Vindictive','Repulse', 'Ramillies' and 'Lucia' were all affected.

THE RUSSIAN FRONT

There is some evidence of fraternisation between Russian revolutionaries and the allied

armies sent to put them down, even in the Northern Sector. In December 1918 an occupationof the barracks by Russians of the First Archangel Company, who were sympathetic to therevolution, was supported by fraternising allied troops, who picketed the town so as to shut itoff from the barracks. The mutiny was suppressed when Russian NCOs, under Britishcommand, mortared the barracks, killing at least one innocent civilian bystander.

In February 1919 men of the Yorkshire Regiment refused to march on Seletskoe. Twosergeants, delegated to express the battalion's refusal to fight, were arrested, court-martialledand sentenced to be shot. In the light of 'secret' orders from the King prohibiting executionsafter the Armistice, these sentences were later commuted to life imprisonment. News of theYorkshire's mutiny spread rapidly through the allied forces. The first to follow suit were the

French battalion at Archangel, who refused to return from leave.


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Much has been said about the determination of Russian workers to protect the revolutionfrom the Western allies. What has rarely been recorded is how weak the Bolshevik armedforces were. When clashes with the allied Navy occurred, Bolshevik commanders oftensurrendered immediately. And the few planes the RAF had commandeered easily tookcommand of the air. In one instance an RAF pilot was able to follow a Bolshevik plane to its

aerodrome and land there, after shooting it up, before making a safe return. The ultimateBolshevik military victory was not due to the superiority of Lenin's forces in the field, but tothe decision of the Allies to pull out - a decision largely influenced by the mood of their ownsoldiers. Major setbacks on the battlefield were largely due to vast numbers of Whites goingover to the other side, rather than the superior forces of the Bolshevik armies.

In June 1919, in spite of the fact that the Bolshevik forces on the Dvina were on their knees,the Hampshire Regiment refused contact and withdrew from the battle. To prevent similaracts of indiscipline the ringleaders were sent home for demobilisation. Maintainingdiscipline, however, proved to be more difficult than it was thought. On July 7 the Slavo-British Legion, which had been at Dvina for only 3 days, mutinied, killing five British

officers and four Russian officers. Several mutineers called for volunteers to join theBolsheviks and some 50 did so, another 50 deserting. Two of the mutineers were captured,tried and shot. The rest of the battalion was disarmed and turned into a labour unit.

The situation in Russia was unique. Here was an army inflicting heavy losses on theBolshevik forces, breaking through their lines with relative ease, and yet, from the reports ofmutinies, it was evident that the whole Archangel force might easily collapse. It is againstthis background that we can understand the decision to withdraw allied troops from Russia.By September 1919 the evacuation of an army, scarcely damaged by Bolshevik forces, waswell under way.

MUTINY AT KINMEL PARK CAMP

In the autumn of 1918 Kinmel Park Camp (and its hospital) were assigned to the Canadianauthorities, under Camp Commandant M.A. Colquhoun. The camp was to be a 'concentrationarea', conveniently situated in North Wales, only a few miles from Liverpool and its docks.The only trouble was that the authorities showed little intention of doing any demobilising.

Weeks passed. Few men left for home. Day after day the authorities told the men that theirships had been cancelled, laying the blame upon striking dockworkers. But they did not

explain how it was possible for American and Australian troops to sail for home, in theirthousands, each week.

Conditions at Kinmel Park were unspeakable. The living standards of the 'returning heroes'were inferior to those in enemy prison camps. Men were sleeping on damp and draughtyfloors, with very few blankets. There was insufficient coal for fires. The food was describedas little better than pigswill.

The soldiers in the camp had been involved in some of the heaviest fighting of the war. Yet,instead of victory parades and peacetime celebrations, they were obliged to watch theircomrades die of influenza. Equally rankling was the discrepancy Ln the scale of wartime

pensions between officers and the ranks. 'I had my pension fixed at $600', a blind veteran wasto tell his comrades in 1920. 'I want to know how it is that the eyes of a Brigadier-General in


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Canada are worth $2700, while my eyes are only worth $600'.

One of the immediate grievances was that recruits who had only just come over from Canadawere being sent back first. From the end of 1916 it had been accepted that the disbandment ofCanadian troops would Cake place on a 'first in, first out' basis, modified by marital status.

But this was fiercely opposed by General Currie and Sir Robert Borden who, along with othersenior officers, secretly longed for the preservation of the Canadian Forces on an armedfooting beyond the Armistice. Currie's views were overruled by the Privy Council, butBorden pressured Sir Thomas White (acting Canadian Prime Minister) to reconsider Currie's

plan to retain the troops until they could be returned in complete units. The Currie plan waseventually accepted, amid great administrative confusion.

Dissatisfaction in the camp grew, aggravated by the news of every ship cancellation. It wasbecoming clear that the economic prospects for returning troops were grim and that this wasan important factor in delaying their demobilisation. There were gloomy reports from troopswho had returned concerning discrimination in the job market in favour of officers.

Severe unemployment in Canada was coupled with an aggressive anti-working class policy.There were 12,000 unemployed in Montreal alone, and a similar number in Toronto. TheCanadian war debt stood at over 400 million. As usual the working classes were expected tomake the necessary 'sacrifices' for economic recovery. Lay-offs and wage cuts led toindustrial unrest. Some troops sent to quell rioting strikers had started to fraternise with them.Returning soldiers were adding fuel to flames, presenting a very serious threat to the statusquo.

On the whole, Canadian trade union leaders sided with the authorities. As a result they wereignored by the rank and file. Tom Moore, President of the Canadian Trades and LabourCongress, was booed off the platform at a public meeting in Toronto. During the war Ordersin Council had prohibited meetings of socialists and the circulation of socialist literature.Heavy sentences had been imposed for breach of this law. The Canadian authorities held that'aliens' (mainly Russian immigrants) were violating these Orders in Council. Plans were

produced for the deportation of these 'aliens'.

Early in 1919 the 'aliens' had held a mass meeting and drawn up the following statement: 'Wedo not wish to be sent to England as strike-breakers. Nor do we want to be compelled to takeup arms against our own people. Let us leave Canada as free agents, just as we came, to gowhere we will. We appeal to the workers of Canada and to the soldiers to protect themselves

by seeing that justice is done to us. Our cause, in reality, is their cause - for they will have tocombat the same elements in the endeavour to make the world better for themselves and theirchildren'. (58)

This protest was circulated to workers and to troops, and was translated into seven languages.

News of these events, and of the ill-treatment of the 'aliens', filtered back to the Canadians atKinmel. The unbearable situation in the camp and the depressing news from home combinedto ripen the conditions for mutiny. The final straw was the arrival of newspapers from homecarrying pictures of a hero's welcome being given to soldiers who had seen no fighting at all.

On Tuesday March 4, 1919 a meeting was held by the soldiers of Montreal Camp. A strikecommittee was elected. On it was a young Russian called William Tarasevich (often referred


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to in the press as Tarashaitch or Tarouke). He was picked to give the signal to start themutiny. The objective was to take over each of the 21 camps, between them involving 15,000to 20,000 men.

The newspapers gave contradictory reports of what happened. On March 7, 1919, The Times

ran a story under the headline: 'Riot in Canadian Camp: Twelve Killed and Many Injured. VCTrampled to Death'.

'A serious disturbance by Canadian soldiers occurred at Kinmel Military Camp, near Rhyl, onTuesday and Wednesday. As a result twelve lives were lost, including that of a Major of NewBrunswick who had gained the VC. About twenty others were injured. In addition damageestimated at 50,000 was done to the camp. '

The article went on to describe how Kinmel was a dispersal camp for Canadian soldiers,waiting for ships to take them home. It pointed out that the men in the camp were mainlyfrom France. During the last year they had been through some of the fiercest fighting. Their

patience had been exhausted during the weeks of delay at Kinmel. The article continued:

'On Tuesday night, the men held a mass meeting, which was followed by a mad riot. Theoutbreak began in Montreal Camp at 9.30 pm with a cry ''Come on the Bolsheviks", which issaid to have been given by a Canadian soldier who is Russian. The men rushed to the officers'quarters, helped themselves to all the liquor they could find, then went for the stores,disarmed the guards, and with their rifles smashed doors and windows, helping themselves tothe content of the stores. Boxes of cigarettes and cigars were thrown all about the ground.Then they went out to wreck the whole camp. One portion, where tradesmen's shops suppliedsoldiers, was stripped and in a few moments not a shop was left standing. The Church Armyand Salvation Army buildings, however, were not touched. The rioters then proceeded to thequarters occupied by the girls, who were in bed, and carried away their clothes. The girlswere not injured, but had to remain in bed the next day because they could not dressthemselves. Next day, the rioters were masquerading about the camp in girls' clothing.

By mid-day on Wednesday the camp appeared as if it had been passed over by legions oftanks. Unfortunately a brewer's dray containing 48 barrels of beer arrived at the camp. Themen took fire buckets, broke the barrels and drank the beer. Then they started shooting allround. In one of the distant parts of the camp a young soldier stood on guard and attempted todo his duty. In reply to his challenge one of the rioters shot him dead.

A little later a major from New Brunswick, who had gained the VC, attempted to interfere,but in his endeavour to hold the rioters back from such portion of the officers' quarters thatwas not demolished, he was thrown down and trampled to death. Another officer, goingamongst the rioters, was so badly mauled that he died a few hours later.

During this time some of the men had been arrested. The rioters demanded the release of themen. The colonel refused, and the rioters released the men themselves. The wholedisturbance was quelled by night and the ringleaders, numbering about twenty, and stated to

be mostly of foreign extraction, were taken away. The Canadian soldiers in the camp, whileexplaining the cause of the affair, are now regretting it. They say that they did not anticipatethat it would go to such lengths, and the mob went further than it meant to.

The disturbance caused great alarm in Rhyl, when it was reported that 5,000 to 6,000 men of


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the camp were going to raze the town.

Yesterday an officer from the War Office arrived at the camp by aeroplane and foundeverything calm. He addressed the men, telling them it was murder for Canadians to killCanadians. He gave them an assurance that within a few days about half of the Canadians in

the camp should be on their way home. The others would follow quickly. This statement wascheered by the men who said it was all they wanted.'

This is a neat, compact story informing the country of a riot by drunken Canadians led by aRussian. Private property had been damaged. Drunken soldiers had gone on a blood-spillingorgy, firing their guns and trampling someone to death. Not an ordinary soldier, but (oh,horror!)an officer with a VC.

Things hadn't been quite that simple. News of the mutiny reached Parliament. On MondayMarch 10, 1919 at question time, Mr Me Master asked the Secretary of State for War'whether he could make a statement regarding the regrettable discontent and breach of

discipline amongst soldiers at a Welsh camp awaiting shipment to their homes, on conclusionof long and meritorious service in the field'. Captain Guest, Joint Parliamentary Secretary forthe Treasury, replied:

'A court of inquiry has been set up by the Canadian Military Authorities to investigatethoroughly the whole affair. I think the House will agree with me that as the matter is sub

judice it would be improper for me to make a statement. The Canadian Military Authoritieshave issued a statement which was published in Saturday morning's papers'. A statement hadappeared in The Times on the morning of Saturday, March 8. Under the headline : 'The CampRiot: Further Details', the article 'stated :

'All was quiet yesterday at Kinmel Park, North Wales. It was officially stated that thecasualties were five killed and twenty one wounded. The inquest on the victims was openedyesterday, and adjourned until next week. Brigadier General M. A. Colquhoun, in a statementyesterday morning, said that no attack was made on the officers who were treated with thegreatest courtesy. "I myself", he went on to say, "went in and out amongst the men freely.Some of them actually put down their loot in order to salute me, and then picked up their lootagain. Reports of the damage are greatly exaggerated. Some fifty or sixty men got out ofhand, and attacked some canteens. The men in one camp, anticipating danger, armedthemselves and, contrary to express orders, fired. That was on Wednesday, when the fatalitiesoccurred. The girls' camp was not attacked. As a matter of fact the girls were treated with the

utmost chivalry. No man entered the girls' bedrooms while they were occupied. One manraised the red flag in an attempt to introduce Bolshevism, but was shot".

In view of the splendid discipline and record uniformly maintained by Canadian troops sincethe beginning of the war in England and France, the "incident" at Kinmel Park is regretted. Itis considered that by comparison with others discipline amongst the Canadian troops is of ahigh order. It is also regretted that reports of the incident have been exaggerated. Immediatelyafter the Armistice, Kinmel Park was secured as a concentration area through whichCanadian troops stationed near Liverpool could pass through to Canada. All documentation iscompleted there, and the troops are sorted into drafts, according to their destination inCanada. Considering the shortage of shipping, the Canadian authorities congratulate

themselves upon the splendid record they have for sending troops to Canada.


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In the month of February (1919), however, the Ministry of Shipping were unable to furnishsufficient ships to carry out the programme as promised to the Canadians. Owing to this the

programme in February and early March had fall

Documents

Mutinies - Dave Lamb