[Mustafa Aydin] Turkish-Greek Relations the Secur(Bookos.org)

TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONSThe Security Dilemma in the Aegean

THE ASAM SERIESISSN: 1740-3758

ASAM Series on International Affairs aims to publish scholarly mono-graphs on global and regional problems with a multidisciplinaryapproach ranging from international relations to economics, religion,sociology and security. The ASAM series subscribes to no political or methodological identity and welcomes proposals dealing with topicswith which the series is concerned. With its multidisciplinary approach,the series intends to re-evaluate conventional thinking on internationalrelations and regional studies.

TURKISH-GREEKRELATIONS

The Security Dilemma in the Aegean

Editors

MUSTAFA AYDINAnkara University

KOSTAS IFANTISUniversity of Athens

First published in 2004 in Great Britain by Routledge11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

Copyright collection © 2004Copyright chapters © 2004 contributors

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataTurkish–Greek relations: the security dilemma in the

Aegean. – (The ASAM series)1. National security – Greece 2. National security – Turkey3. Greece – Foreign relations – Turkey 4. Turkey – Foreignrelations – Greece 5. Greece – Foreign relations – 1974–6. Turkey – Foreign relations – 1980–I. Aydin, Mustafa II. Ifantis, Kosta III. Center for EurasianStrategic Studies (Ankara, Turkey)327.4'950561

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataTurkish–Greek relations: the security dilemma in the Aegean / editors, Mustafa Aydin,Kostas Ifantis.

p. cm. – (The ASAM series, ISSN 1740-3758)ISBN 0-7146-5272-51. Turkey–Foreign relations–Greece. 2. Greece–Foreign relations–Turkey. I. Aydin,

Mustafa. II. Ifantis, Kostas. III. Series.DR479.G8T87 2004327.4950561–dc22

2003065341

ISBN 0-7146-5272-5 (cloth)

This edition published in the Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2005.

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To Sevim and Agapi

Contents

List of Tables ixNotes on Contributors xAcknowledgements xviList of Abbreviations xix

Introduction 1Mustafa Aydın and Kostas Ifantis

Part I: From Conflict to Reconciliation?

1. Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and 21OpportunitiesMustafa Aydın

2. National Perception of the ‘Other’ and the Persistence 53of Some ImagesHercules Millas

3. The Greek-Turkish Conflict: Towards Resolution and 67ReconciliationAlexis Heraclides

4. Turning a New Page in Turkey’s Relations with Greece? 95The Challenge of Reconciling Vital InterestsTozun Bahcheli

Part II: Building a Security Regime?

5. Tension-Reduction and Confidence-Building in the Aegean 123Thanos P. Dokos

6. The Economic Imperative: Prospects for Trade Integration 145and Business CooperationPanagiotis Liargovas

7. Crisis Management in Greek-Turkish Relations: A Political 163Economy Analysis since 1974Ozay Mehmet

8. Environmental Security in the Aegean Sea 185Nesrin Algan

Part III: Stabilizing Expectations?

9. Negotiation and Deterrence in Asymmetrical Power 213Situations: The Turkish-Greek CaseS. Gülden Ayman

10. Perception and Rapprochement: Debating a Greek Strategy 245Towards TurkeyKostas Ifantis

11. Rapprochement on Non-Governmental Level: The Story 269of the Turkish-Greek ForumSoli Özel

Conclusion 291Mustafa Aydın and Kostas Ifantis

Bibliography 303Index 347

List of Tables

1. Greek-Turkish trade 1462. Growth rates of Greek-Turkish trade 1463. Growth rates of EU-Turkish trade 1474. Greek and EU trade with Turkey 1485. Significance of individual Balkan countries in total 150

Greek-Balkan trade6. Significance of individual Balkan countries in total 151

EU-Balkan trade7. Greece’s bilateral trade with Turkey in agricultural products 1528. Greece’s bilateral trade with Turkey in raw materials 1529. Greece’s bilateral trade with Turkey in manufactured goods 152

10. Gravity model for 29 countries and Greece 15511. Estimated potential Greek imports (exports) from (to) 156

Turkey12. Comparative macro indicators for Greece and Turkey, 164

1980–200013. EU transfers to Greece, 1994–96 17314. Threatened plant species of the Aegean Sea and Islands 19715. Threatened animal species of the Aegean Sea and Islands 19816. Loads of dissolved nutrients from major rivers 199

discharging into the Aegean Sea17. Priority pollution hot spots in Greece and Turkey 20118. Human-originated environmental security issues in the 204

Aegean19. Non-human-originated environmental security issues in 205

the Aegean

Notes on Contributors

Nesrin Algan is Associate Professor of Environmental Science at theFaculty of Political Science, Ankara University. She graduated andalso received her Ph.D. from the same university. She worked at theTurkish Ministry of Environment from 1984 to 1998. She also workedas the national focal point for UNEP’s Mediterranean Action Plan,and took part in a number of international negotiations and draftingcommittees, including the preparations of several regional and bi-lateral agreements and programmes on environmental cooperationduring her tenure at the Ministry of Environment. Among others,she is the author of Mediterranean Action Plan and Sustainable Develop-ment (1998, in Turkish), Environmental Pollution in the Black Sea (1999,in Turkish), Short History of Turkish State’s Environment Policies (2000,in Turkish), Sensitive Sea Areas: A New Approach to the Protection ofEnvironment in Turkish Straits (2000, with Özden Sav, in Turkish), TheSignificance of International Legislation in Coastal Zone Management(2000), Common International Commitments of Turkey and Greece on theProtection of the Aegean Sea with Special Reference to the MediterraneanAction Plan (2000), Problems of Regional Seas (co-editor with BayramÖztürk 2001), Environmental Security in the Turkish Straits (forth-coming).

Mustafa Aydın is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University, as well as at theNational Security Academy, Ankara, Turkey. He was Research Fellowat the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

(1998); UNESCO Fellow at the Richardson Institute for Peace Studies,Lancaster University, UK (1999); Fulbright Scholar at the John F.Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (2002); andAlexander S. Onassis Fellow (2003). Among other works, he is theauthor of Turkish Foreign Policy During the Gulf War (1998), TurkishForeign Policy Towards the Year 2000 (1998, in Turkish), Central Asia andthe Caucasus: Conflict and Security in the Post-Soviet Space (1999), andNew Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus: Causes of Instability andPredicament (2000); and he is the editor of Turkey at the Threshold of the21st Century (1998), Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present, Future(forthcoming, with Ç. Erhan); and Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21stCentury: A Changing Role in World Politics (2003, with T. Y. Ismael).

S. Gülden Ayman is Associate Professor of International Relations atthe Faculty of Political Science, I

.stanbul University. She studied

Political Science at Bosphorous University and received her Ph.D.from I

.stanbul University. She was a Research Fellow at the Cesare

Alfieri Institute of Social Sciences in Florence, Italy (1989–90), andworked as a foreign policy columnist in the Turkish daily Radikal(1996–98). She has published various articles on the dynamics ofconflict and cooperation in Turkish-Greek relations. She is the authorof Conventional Arms Control (I

.stanbul: Alfa, 1994); A Case of Brinkman-

ship: S-300 Missile Crisis (Ankara: Center for Eurasian StrategicStudies, 2000) and Power, Threat and Alliances: Greek Foreign Policy afterthe Cold War (Ankara: SAEMK, 2001), all in Turkish.

Tozun Bahcheli is Professor of Political Science at King’s College,University of Western Ontario in London, Canada, where he teachescourses in international politics. During the past 25 years, he hasconducted research and written on Turkish foreign policy, theCyprus conflict, and other Greek-Turkish issues. He is the author ofnumerous journal articles and of Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955(New York, Westview, 1990). Bahcheli has given interviews on CNN,Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and Voice of America. He holdsa BA/MA in political science from the University of Western Ontarioand a Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School ofEconomics. During the 1995–96 academic year, Bahcheli was a seniorFellow at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, DC.Currently he is preparing a book on ethnic conflict in Cyprus, and

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xi

co-editing a volume with Barry Bartmann and Henry Srebrnik on defacto states in international society.

Thanos P. Dokos has a Ph.D. from Cambridge University and hasheld research posts at the Hessische Stiftung Friedens und Konflikt-forschung in Frankfurt (1989–90), and the Center for Science andInternational Affairs (CSIA) at Harvard University (1990–91). Heserved as the Director for Research, Strategic Studies Division,Hellenic Ministry of National Defence (1996–98) and as an Adviseron NATO issues to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1998–99). He wasalso a NATO research fellow for 1996–98. Since August 1999 he hasbeen Director of Studies at the Hellenic Foundation for Europeanand Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). His publications include Negotiationsfor a CTBT: 1958–1994 (University Press of America, 1995), ‘The Pro-liferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Mediterranean’,Mediterranean Politics (Fall 2000); Turkey’s Geostrategic Role in the Post-Cold War Era (in Greek, 2001), as well as a number of contributions incollective volumes on non-proliferation, Mediterranean security andGreek-Turkish relations.

Alexis Heraclides is currently Associate Professor of InternationalRelations at the Department of Political Science and History of thePanteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens. He has studied Political Science at Panteion and International Relationsat University College, University of London (M.Sc.) and at theUniversity of Kent at Canterbury (Ph.D.). He has served as counsellor-adviser for minorities and human rights in international organi-zations at the Greek Foreign Ministry (1983–97). His books includeThe Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (London,Frank Cass, 1991), The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Problematique of PeacefulResolution (Athens: Papazissis, 1991) [in Greek], Security and Co-operation in Europe: The Human Dimension, 1972–1992 (London: FrankCass, 1993), Helsinki-II and its Aftermath: The Making of the CSCE intoan International Organization (London: Pinter, 1993), InternationalSociety and Theories of International Relations: A Critical Review (Athens:I. Sideris, 2000) [in Greek], Greece and the ‘Threat from the East’ (Athens:Polis, 2001) [in Greek], The Cyprus Question: Conflict and Resolution(Athens: I. Sideris, 2002) [in Greek]. His papers have appeared inedited books and in periodicals such as International Organization,

xii TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS

Journal of Peace Research, Journal of International Affairs, Paradigms,Security Dialogue, Journal of Modern African Studies, Nations andNationalism, Millennium, The Review of International Affairs, Cahiersd’Etudes sur la Mediterranee orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien, The GreekReview of Social Research and Elliniki Epitheorisi Politikis Epistimis[Greek Review of Political Science].

Kostas Ifantis is an Associate Professor of International Relations inthe Department of Political Science and Public Administration,University of Athens, and Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foun-dation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). He studied lawat the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki and international relationsat the University of Bradford, where he received his Ph.D. He workedas a Lecturer in International and European Politics at the univer-sities of Bradford and Portsmouth, UK (1991–95). In 1997–98, heworked in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a Special Adviseron European Security Affairs. He was Research Fellow at the Centerfor Political Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (1998), andFulbright Scholar at the John F. Kennedy School of Government,Harvard University (2002). Among other works, he has publishedGreece in a Changing Europe (Manchester, Manchester UniversityPress, 1996), NATO in the New European Order (London, Macmillan,1996), and Theory and Reform in the European Union (Manchester,Manchester University Press, 1999); NATO and the New SecurityParadigm: Power, Strategy, Order and the Transatlantic Link, AnkaraPaper 4 (London, Frank Cass, 2002).

Panagiotis Liargovas is an Assistant Professor of InternationalEconomics and Economic Policy at the Department of Economics,University of Thessaly, Volos; as well as at the Hellenic Open Univer-sity, and Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for Europeanand Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). He has been a Fulbright Scholar(1987–91) at Clark University, Worcester, MA, and has worked as aSpecial Adviser to the Deputy Minister of Finance (1998–99). He hastaught in many universities including Clark University, Universityof Bologna and the Universities of Athens, Patras and Crete as wellas the Athens University of Economics and Business. He is the authorof four books (in Greek) and editor of three books (two of them inEnglish). He has written numerous articles in collected volumes and

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xiii

more than 20 articles in academic journals in areas such as inter-national, European and regional economics. His articles appear inthe following journals: Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans,Economic Analysis and Policy, Annals of Regional Science, Open EconomiesReview, The European Union Review, Current Politics and Economics ofRussia, Central and Eastern Europe, Eastern European Economics, Euro-pean Environment, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Journal of EconomicIntegration, Post-Communist Economies, Regional Studies, Small BusinessEconomics, East-West Series in Economics, Business and the Environment,Economia Internazionale, International Review of Economics and Business,and Greek Economic Review.

Ozay Mehmet is Professor of International Affairs, Norman PattersonSchool of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario,Canada, and Visiting Professor of Economics, Eastern MediterraneanUniversity, Gazimagusa, TRNC. Educated at the English School,Nicosia (1951–57); the London School of Economics (B.Sc., Econ.-Hons., 1959–62); and the University of Toronto (MA, 1964 and Ph.D.,1968), Mehmet has taught economics at several Canadian univer-sities. He has published more than a dozen books on economics,especially on development economics, and some 70 academic articlesin scholarly journals. His books include: Islamic Identity and Develop-ment (1990), which has been translated into German; Westernizing theThird World (2nd edition, 1999), and Towards a Global Labor Market(2000). Mehmet has specialized in human capital and human resourcedevelopment with special reference to Southeast Asia (Malaysia,Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore), and he has been consulted byseveral international development organizations, including theWorld Bank, UNDP, Asian Development Bank, ILO and WHO.

Hercules Millas is a civil engineer (M.S. Robert College, I.stanbul)

with a Ph.D. degree in Political Science (University of Ankara). From1970 to 1986 he worked as an engineer in various countries; from 1990 to 1994 he taught Greek at the Department of Modern GreekLanguage and Literature of Ankara University, and is currentlyteaching Turkish and Turkish political thought at Aegean Universityin Rhodes, Greece. Among his publications are Tencere Dibin Kara …(The Pot Called the Kettle Black) I

.stanbul, Amaç, 1987; Yunan

Ulusunun Dogusu (The Birth of the Greek Nation), I.stanbul, I

.letisim,

xiv TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS

1999; Türk Romanı ve Öteki, Ulusal Kimlikte Yunan I.majı (Turkish

Novels and the Other, The Image of Greek and National Identity),I.stanbul, Sabancı Univ. Publications, 2000 [all three in Turkish];

Eikones Ellinon kai Tourkon (The Images of Greeks and Turks –Textbooks, historiography, literature and national stereotypes),Athens, Aleksandria, 2001 [in Greek]; Do’s and Don’ts for Better Greek-Turkish Relations, Athens, Papazissis, 2002 (also in Greek; and inTurkish by Tarih Vakfı, I

.stanbul). He translated and published more

than 15 volumes of Greek literary texts, mostly poetry, into Turkishas well as many articles in Turkish, in Greek and in English, on literarytexts, historiography and national perceptions, all related to Greek-Turkish relations.

Soli Özel teaches international relations and political science atI.stanbul Bilgi University. He was senior fellow in 2002 at St Antony’s

College, Oxford University, UK. He is the editor of the Turkish editionof Foreign Policy and Private View, the international journal of TurkishIndustrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. He has been a memberof the Turkish-Greek Forum since November 1998.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xv

Acknowledgements

Our idea to co-edit a volume on Greek-Turkish relations dates backto the summer of 1998 when we first met each other in the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Agenerous USIS Research Fellowship Program on ‘US Foreign Policy’enabled us to spend some time discussing Greek-Turkish problemsin an open, friendly and relaxed way. The latest round of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, which started in autumn 1999, provided uswith the necessary academic and political impetus to engage moreactively in collaborative work in a way that sincere academic com-munication can be enhanced.

Two years later, the first phase of the project came to fruition whenbetween 7 and 8 December 2000, we organized a two-day workshopin Ankara, under the auspices of the Faculty of Political Science,University of Ankara, on ‘Turkish-Greek Relations: Escaping fromthe Security Dilemma in the Aegean’. The first rough outline for thisvolume was sketched during that conference meeting, when most ofthe ideas found in the following pages also emerged. The stimulatingpresentations and the positive experience of uninhibited closed-session discussions led to attractive interactions that definitely en-hanced our understanding – at least. Since then, the process ofcooperation with a continuously enlarged group of friends andcolleagues accelerated.

Preparing an edited volume is a long, difficult and, most of thetime, frustrating task. As is usually the case with a project of thisscope, there are many people and organizations to which we owe

much. Thanks are due to USIS, both in Athens and in Ankara. With-out knowing, they brought us together in 1998. We would also liketo extend our gratitude to those colleagues who attended the 2000Conference and helped to set the context of the project, but wereunable to contribute to this volume. Also, to Professor Celal Göle,Dean of the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University, for hisreadiness and enthusiasm to host the event; to Ms Emel Üresin,former Liaison Officer for Turkey in NATO Information and PressOffice, and Ambassador Ünal Maraslı, former head of the StrategicResearch Center of Turkish Foreign Ministry, for their generousfinancial support of the conference; and to Çagrı Erhan, KudretÖzersay and the students of the Faculty of Political Science andmembers of the organizing committee, who so efficiently dealt withthe day-to-day organization of the conference.

Financial support from the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholar-ship Board and the Council for International Exchange of Scholarsin Washington, DC was instrumental in bringing this project tocompletion. A generous grant under the Fulbright Aegean InitiativeProgram offered us the opportunity to work in the most stimulatingenvironment of the John F. Kennedy School of Government atHarvard University. Our debt to the amazing people of the KokkalisProgram on southeastern and east central Europe is enormous. Weare sincerely grateful to Dimitris Keridis, Elaine Papoulias, NicholasYatromanolakis, Mikhala Stein and Nicole Stewart who not only putup with us, but also made us feel welcome.

Mustafa Aydın would like to thank Sergei Konoplyov, Director ofthe Black Sea Security Program, Harvard University, for his friend-ship and readiness to make available the wonderful facilities of theProgram. There, I was able to concentrate on the last-minute franticcorrespondence with the authors. My thanks are also due to Profes-sor Ersin Onulduran, Executive Director, and Gülesen Odabasoglu,Turkish Programs Officer, of the Turkish Fulbright Commission inAnkara for their advice and support. Finally, a benevolent grant bythe Alexander S. Onassis Public Benefit Foundation facilitated thelast-minute updates and finalization of the text.

Kostas Ifantis would like to thank Ms Artemis Zenetou, ExecutiveDirector, and Ms Sophia Cousoula, Greek Program Officer, as well asthe rest of the staff of the Fulbright Commission in Athens for theirsupport and kindness. Ms Helen Margiou, US Cultural Attaché in

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xvii

Athens as well as Ms Katerina Perentzi and Ms Georgia Galanopouloualso of the Cultural Division of the US Embassy in Athens havealways been extremely helpful and supportive. I also wish to thankmy colleagues in the Department of Political Science and PublicAdministration at the University of Athens when they generouslyallowed me to take a short leave during the spring semester of 2002.Special thanks are due to the then Head of the Department, ProfessorKostas Kostis. I am grateful to Panos Lambridis, an excellent doctoralstudent and good friend, as well as Georgia Astraka and AlexandraStefanou, both of the Postgraduate Programme on Southeast Euro-pean Studies, who took very efficient care of most of my Athensduties during my absence. I am also indebted to Professor TheodoreCouloumbis for stimulating my thinking on Greek-Turkish relations,first as a teacher and more recently through a jointly taught seminaron Greek foreign policy at the University of Athens. His kind mentor-ship and commitment to the study of international politics have beenand will continue to be formative for years to come. His generousand constant support will always be highly appreciated.

Obviously, our gratitude goes to the friends and colleagues whohave contributed to the volume. They dutifully and gracefullyresponded to our deadline reminders and never-ending queries andrequests for revisions, necessitated by the fast-changing landscape ofTurkish-Greek relations. We would also like to thank Dr AndrewMango for his critical and very helpful comments on the finalmanuscript.

Finally to our wives, Sevim and Agapi; our eternal gratitude fortheir understanding and support in allowing us to pursue our craftat great sacrifice to their own interests and priorities. To you wededicate this volume.

Mustafa AydınKostas Ifantis

June 2003

xviii TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS

List of Abbreviations

AHEPA American-Hellenic Educational ProgressiveAssociation

AKP Justice and Development PartyATAF Allied Tactical Air Force (NATO)BATNA Best Alternative To a Negotiated SettlementCAM Crisis Avoidance MeasuresCAP Common Agricultural PolicyCBM Confidence Building MeasureCES Constant Elasticity of SubstitutionCET Constant Elasticity of TransformationCFE Conventional Forces in EuropeCFSP Common Foreign and Security PolicyCIESIN Consortium for International Earth Science

Information NetworkCU Customs UnionEC European CommissionELIAMEP Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign PolicyEMU European Monetary UnionESDP European Union and Defense PolicyEU European UnionFIR Flight Information RegionFYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of MacedoniaGEF Global Environmental FacilityGTF Greek-Turkish ForumICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

ICJ International Court of JusticeIFOR/SFOR NATO Enforcement/Stability ForceIMF International Monetary FundKFOR United Nations Kosovo ForceLOS Law of SeaMAP Mediterranean Action PlanNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNGO Non-governmental organizationsNSC National Security CouncilNSSG National Statistical Service of GreeceOECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and

DevelopmentOSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in

EuropePAG Political Analysis GroupPASOK Greek Socialist PartyPKK Kurdish Workers PartyPRIO Peace Research Institute of OsloRUSI Royal United Services InstituteSEE State Economic EnterpriseSUR Seemingly Unrelated RegressionTL Turkish LiraTRNC Turkish Republic of North CyprusUK United KingdomUN United NationsUN/ECE United Nations Economic Commission for EuropeUNDP United Nations Development ProgramUNEP United Nations Environment ProgrammeUS United States of AmericaUSIS United States Information ServiceWB World BankWEU Western European Union

xx TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS

IntroductionMUSTAFA AYDIN AND KOSTAS IFANTIS

I

For at least the last 40 years Greece and Turkey have been experienc-ing a relationship of Cold War-type, protracted conflict ‘disrupted’by shorter or longer détente breaks. This situation has also beendescribed as a relationship of manageable tension. Regardless ofterminology, what does exist is a very disturbing potential forescalation, which can lead to a more serious crisis with alarmingdestabilizing effects at a regional level. The dispute has certainly beena major source of instability in the eastern Mediterranean and amajor concern for Greece and Turkey’s NATO allies. Since theCyprus crisis of 1974, the potential for a major clash between Greeceand Turkey has been important for the regional security equation,albeit overshadowed for decades by Cold War dynamics.

In the post-Cold War era, relations between Athens and Ankarahave remained one of Europe’s most dangerous flashpoints. Evenwith tangible conflicts in the Balkans, western observers, especiallyin the United States, worried about the prospect of a wider confron-tation pulling in Greece and Turkey. ‘This concern was a consistenttheme of arguments for American intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo,despite the fact that Athens and Ankara have pursued distinctlymoderate and multilateral policies in the Balkans – perhaps inacknowledgement of the risks of doing otherwise but also out ofshared interest.’1 This shows vividly that there exists a multitude offactors in the Aegean that have been producing an intense securitydilemma.

This collection of essays seeks to address, in a rather modest way,the nature of the Greek-Turkish security dilemma as well as whetheramelioration of it is feasible in the current international setting. Theanalytical framework is defined along clear neo-realist lines, whereinsecurity and conflict are caused by the inescapable self-help natureof the system and the emergence, thus, of threatening balance ofpower and/or power politics state behaviours.

The neo-realist approach to international politics derives fromtwo core assumptions: the centrality of autonomous states wishingto survive and the salience of international anarchy.2 Anarchy – theabsence of any common sovereign – is the single most distinguishingfeature of international relations. The anarchic structure of inter-national politics, thus, shapes most international outcomes.Christopher Layne explains, that ‘anarchy’, rather than denotingchaos or rampant disorder, refers to the fact that international politicstakes place within a self-help realm, and therefore states must relyon their own resources to protect themselves and further theirinterests.3 Under anarchy, states are dependent upon self-help fortheir security and must maintain and perhaps expand their militarycapabilities. International politics is fundamentally competitive. Insuch an environment, the state’s primary goal is survival. To attainsecurity, states engage in both internal and external balancing tasks, for the purpose of deterring aggressive competitors, and of‘neutralizing’ them should deterrence fail.

In a realist world, whether states desire safety or opportunisticexpansion, they are better served by superior, not equal, power. Theimperative of survival in a threatening environment forces states tofocus on strategies that maximize their power relative to their rivals.4

For this reason, statesmen are usually more concerned with relativeadvantages than with absolute gains. The problem of uneven gainsgiving advantage to one side or another makes international co-operation difficult to achieve and hard to maintain. The neo-realistparadigm is built on a fundamental belief in strong links betweenanarchy, security and relative gains. Though states are not in aconstant state of war, anarchy means that nations must constantlyfear enslavement or extinction. Because the consequences of amistake can be catastrophic, states must be cautious in assessing theintentions of both foes and allies, since today’s friend may betomorrow’s enemy.

2 TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS

In the neo-realist perspective, therefore, the security dilemmarefers to the notion that a state’s efforts to increase its security, bythreatening another state which then responds with steps to increaseits own security, paradoxically erodes the first state’s security.5 Thetwo states, without intending to do so, thus find themselves in a spiralof mounting hostility and arms build-ups. The intensity with whichthe security dilemma operates depends upon a number of conditions:the degree of trust between states; the extent to which uncertaintyand incomplete information produce misperceptions of intentions;whether offensive or defensive forces would have the advantage;and whether states can distinguish between others’ offensive anddefensive armaments.6 The security dilemma follows from theinability of the two sides to observe each other’s intentions directly.Because military power is inherently offensive rather than defensivein nature, states cannot easily escape the trappings of the securitydilemma; only if each side had perfect knowledge that the other wasarming strictly for defensive purposes, would the potential spiralstop.7 But because states operate in conditions of less than completeinformation and of uncertainty, policies are almost always shaped inresponse to others’ capabilities. What one does to enhance one’s ownsecurity causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure.

In an international system, where fear and distrust of other statesis the normal state of affairs, the issue of relative power is of vitalimportance. Although ‘relative power is difficult to measure and isoften subjectively appraised’, as Posen put it tactfully, ‘what seemssufficient to one state’s defence will seem, and will often be, offensiveto its neighbors. Because neighbors wish to remain autonomous andsecure, they will react by trying to strengthen their own positions.States can trigger these reactions even if they have no expansionistinclinations. This is the security dilemma.’8

The operation of the security dilemma is one of the key reasonsthat peace under anarchy may not be stable. Even if no states haveexplicitly aggressive intentions, anarchy fuels the security dilemmaand can produce spirals that lead to growing hostility and, ultimately,to conflict. ‘The possibility that force may be used to settle disputes,even among peaceful, status-quo powers means that states cannotescape the security dilemma – an increase in one state’s securitydecreases the security of others.’9 Insecurity and the use of force,realists argue are enduring attributes of the self-help international

INTRODUCTION 3

system. In the broadest sense of the concept, the security dilemma isindeed understood to follow axiomatically from the anarchicstructure of the international system.

Although structure matters, in the absence of a rigid bipolardistribution of power in the wider international system, moreattention should be paid to unit-level variables. When dealing withregional conflicts, like the Greek-Turkish competition, while structure-level variables are extremely important, studying unit-level variablesalso becomes necessary. This means that, differences in state goals –whether states seek the minimum power required for security oradditional power for goals other than security – have to be accordedan equal consideration along with anarchy and the distribution ofcapabilities. Discussion in the following chapters aims, inter alia, athelping us focus at micro/unit level so as to assess the prospects ofameliorating the security dilemma in the Aegean. At bottom, theconcept of the security dilemma in international politics rests on thefundamental assumption that states are perceived by other states tobe either currently harbouring aggressive designs, or that they maybecome aggressive in the future. The operation of the Greek-Turkishsecurity dilemma is a case in point. On both sides of the Aegean,perception is a dynamic element. In both countries, there is strongbelief that the other has been harbouring and pursuing revisionistpolicies. In this way, the security dilemma rests also on the inabilityboth to know with certainty the intentions and abilities of the others,and to make credible commitments not to arm for offensive purposesthat can drive the insecurity spiral.

In general, the unique analytic core of the security dilemma liesin situations where one or more disputing parties have incentives toresort to pre-emptive use of force. The term is used to refer to thesespecific incentives. As Robert Jervis has noted, incentives to pre-emptarise when offensive military technologies and strategic preferencesdominate the more defensive postures, thus offering the ‘attacker’ astrategic advantage. Offence is likely to dominate when there areimportant military benefits from surprise and mobility.10 Geographycan also matter when the terrain seems to be giving an advantage.When offence dominates, ‘even status quo groups (and states), itfollows, may be tempted to launch pre-emptive strikes to avoid apossibly even worse fate.’ 11 When incentives to use force pre-emptively are strong, the security dilemma takes hold and works its


disastrous effects. Fearful that the other might pre-empt, a state hasan incentive to strike first and negotiate later. In crisis situations,when pre-emption looks like offering a decisive advantage, a cycleof violence can seize even previously thought peaceful or status-quoactors, even as they seek nothing more than their own safety. Theseactors can be driven to become aggressors, destabilizing regional andinternational security arrangements.12

States behaving aggressively are motivated by expansion andzero-sum goals and are mainly responsible for power politicsbehaviours – instead of the more ‘benign’ security-seeking balancingbehaviour – that can prevail in international relations. The aim ofstates perceived to act in a revisionist manner is ‘self-extension’,which often requires power enhancement. ‘Goals of self-extensiongenerally place an extremely high premium on the resort to poweras a means. The chances of bringing about any major change in theinternational status quo by means other than power or even violenceare slim indeed. Because it is also true that self-extension is oftensought passionately if not fanatically and by actors with various sortsof motivations, the tendency is toward frequent and intensive questsfor enhanced power by nations belonging to this category.’13 Statesthat behave aggressively, or are perceived by others to behaveaggressively, trigger recurring power political turmoil (crises). There-fore, the level of system stability depends on unit-level variations,namely on the strength of revisionist (and status-quo) forces, how-ever they are perceived by the actors involved.

II

A look at the post-war history reveals that the Greek-Turkishentanglement has become over the decades an almost unqualifiedpower politics relationship. Power politics makes a quite validequation of the Hobbesian state of nature with international politics.Each state is, at least potentially, in the situation of a war against (all)others. State-to-state relations are dominated by conflict. The verybasic assumption is the state quest for maximization of power. Thus,power is seen both as an end and as a means. Power is not only acrucial means for achieving security, but also a key objective for itsown sake.14 According to the power politics perspective, states,wishing to maximize their power and seeking superiority, will

INTRODUCTION 5

embark on expansionist foreign policies and adopt offensive militarydoctrines. In times of crisis, such inclinations are likely to result inaggressive, or force-prone, behaviour.15 The popular image of Greek-Turkish relations meets nicely the expectations of the power politicsperspective concerning aggressive security and power-maximizingstate behaviour.

Given the anarchic nature of the international system as well asthe exclusivist quality of the state as the dominant form of politicalorganization, the security dilemma can be neither solved norabolished, but only ameliorated.16 The collection of essays in thisvolume attempt to survey the overall security dilemma in the Aegeanand to address questions related to its amelioration. Its ambition is toprovide a fairly good – but by no means exhaustive – treatment ofthe terrain of the new Greek-Turkish rapprochement debate. It is notan attempt to confirm empirically the operation of the securitydilemma in the Aegean and to determine its nature. On this, theinterested reader would like to refer to the collection of articles in aspecial issue of the Études Helleniques/Hellenic Studies.17

As in that volume, in this collection individual analyses andassessments are in the vast majority of cases formed and/or influ-enced by diehard national perceptions. The editors themselves sharethese perceptions as can be seen by their individual contributions.However, they also share the conviction that cooperation and securityin the Aegean can be achieved, if the two countries – governments andpeople – succeed in redefining their interests so as to allow a securityregime to develop. Analyses like Heraclides’, Bahcheli’s, Mehmet’s,etc., seem to provide considerable insight into how this can beachieved. At a more analytical level, redefinition of interests can bethe result of the two actors’ power location and capabilities as wellas the domestic interplay in both sides of the Aegean. Following thepopular reactions to the 1999 earthquakes and in the same year theEU Helsinki decision to grant Turkey candidate status, the domesticinterplay has been – in both countries – more favourable than everbefore. The success of Greece in joining the European Monetary Union– contrary to most predictions – helped the establishment of a morefavourable bilateral balance-of-power arrangement vis-à-vis Ankarathat made Athens more confident in its Turkish policy initiatives.

Throughout the history of international relations, states, on thewhole, have been operating in a rational manner. Miscalculations


that call into question the rationality assumption do occur, especiallywhen actors’ incentives are ‘contaminated’ by perceptions that havenothing to do with security-seeking and interest-satisfying. Statesrespond to the rationality of the situation in which they find them-selves. In many instances this may result in negative outcomes, fromthe breakdown of cooperation to outright war. However, it can alsoresult in highly desirable cooperative outcomes. This is the advantageof the current rapprochement in the Aegean, and this is ourargument. It is a situation whose rationality calls for a greater effortto cooperate. The case of the post-war European integration projectis an example. The current rapprochement – with definite elementsof an alliance-forming process – between the US (and NATO) andRussia is another case in point. Ameliorating perceptions about the‘other’ and about the other’s intentions could lead to a state of affairswhere a convergence of interests in the post-Cold War and post-11September 2001 world is not only possible but desirable as well.

Hercules Millas’ ‘National Perception of the “Other” and thePersistence of Some Images’, thus attempts to discuss the issues ofperceptions and images related to Greek-Turkish relations. Accord-ing to Millas, these relations are generally perceived as a series ofpolitical and military controversies. However, due to historicalreasons, each party conceives the ‘other’ as a prospective threat or asa challenge to its identity and interprets each of his actions accord-ingly, creating a vicious circle where the national perceptions dictatethe vigilant attitude of ‘ours’. The image of the ‘other’ in each countryis portrayed and reproduced negatively: (a) in textbooks, where themost ‘official’ discourse is encountered; (b) in historiography, i.e.,within the academic world; and (c) in literary texts where morewidespread opinions are voiced.

There are, however, a small number of historians and authors ofliterature who do not exactly follow this recipe. Their case is reveal-ing. Greek writers who actually met and lived with the Turks portraya much more realistic picture of the ‘other’ relative to the authorswho have never lived with the Turks and sketched an imaginary(abstract) ‘other’. The first category wrote mostly about recent times,about their experiences (1890–1950) and much less about ‘history’.Literary characters and events that are drawn from life, in otherwords heroes who are inspired by concrete personalities, are muchmore balanced. The same trend is noticed in Turkish literature too.

INTRODUCTION 7

Positive Greeks are encountered either, (a) in memoirs, where mostlyconcrete characters are portrayed, or (b) in literary texts based onactual experience and on real encounter with the ‘other’. The con-juncture that created the positive image of the ‘other’ in literary textsseems to be repeated in Greece and Turkey in the period of theearthquakes of 1999. For the first time the television screens in eachhome in the two countries presented the ‘other’ as he/she really is:concrete and alive (not historical). People appeared under the débris,in pain, as family members, as children, as old people. They lookedhuman and not as a threat, the ‘other’ trying to save ‘us’ (not harmus), and to rejoice when successful, in tears when failed. The picturewas a shock therapy of images.

For Millas, it is still too early to say how permanent the friendlyfeelings that the earthquakes caused in the two communities willprove. It is safe to argue, however, that the overcoming of national-istic dilemmas will have to be accomplished in two spheres: (a) com-bating on the cognitive sphere the typical traits of nationalism, i.e., xenophobia, insecurity, stereotypes, prejudices etc.; and (b) inpractice, creating opportunities in which members of the two com-munities may meet the ‘concrete other’, i.e. increase the communi-cation between the parties.

The same line of argument is pursued by Mustafa Aydın, ‘Contem-porary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities’,who is confident that ‘the majority of long-standing disagreementsbetween the two countries could have been overcome years ago hadthe leadership in both countries acted responsibly … and not turneda blind eye to the other’s needs and fears’. Instead they ended up‘with a fearful state of “security dilemma” on the brink of war andwith populations on each side thoroughly “educated” to distrusteach other at every level’. The basic reason for this state of affairs,Aydın argues, is ‘living history’, in the sense that both Greece andTurkey refuse to let go of the past and ‘the past continues to live inthe present’, which creates and refuels the distrust between them.

Further, Aydın insists that despite the détente since 1999, Greeceand Turkey have not yet reached the point where the ‘securitydilemma’ would make way for a ‘security community’. The majorobstacle in front of overall rapid reconciliation is the need toovercome years of distrust and prejudice, which requires a long-term commitment to a problem-solving approach, and cannot be


solved easily and summarily. Therefore, Aydın argues, ‘magicalformulas for rapid reconciliation’ in the short term would not workin the Aegean.

In ‘The Greek-Turkish Conflict: Towards Resolution and Recon-ciliation’, Alexis Heraclides examines the 1999 détente between thetwo countries. He starts by posing the question whether reconcili-ation (as distinct from an ephemeral thaw) is at all possible andargues that the main issue is perceptual hence amenable to resolutionand an overdue one at that. Then he examines how and why the recentdétente seems to have come about, particularly from the Greek pointof view. He also takes stock of the main tangible achievements so farin this novel, by Greek-Turkish standards, Mitrany-type low politicsapproach to peace. Then the main hurdles ahead are examined, thosethat cannot be wished away and need to be addressed forthwith lestthe whole processes runs aground. The main emphasis is on thebilateral Aegean dispute, though Cyprus – hardly a bilateral question– is in fact the most daunting problem. Heraclides concludes by aseries of suggestions, both practical and theoretical, of how to goabout the task of cementing the reconciliation.

For Tozun Bahcheli, in ‘Turning a New Page in Turkey’s Relationswith Greece? The Challenge of Reconciling Vital Interests’, enduringsuspicion and mistrust have made it very difficult to reconcile themostly strategic interests that both countries have in Cyprus and theAegean. It is probable that without the legacy of past conflicts,compromise solutions could have been found to both the Aegeanand Cyprus disputes, leaving the two neighbours free to pursueother priorities. However, even as the two countries occasionallybecame embroiled in dangerous confrontations, raising the spectreof war against each other, they have also shown care to manage andstabilize their relations. Bahcheli points out that, although encour-aged by such third parties as the United States and NATO to reconciletheir differences over many decades, Ankara and Athens have beenunable to make progress in resolving outstanding issues in theAegean or Cyprus. The Aegean dispute has been essentially a bi-lateral problem between Turkey and Greece, and so far Ankara hassucceeded in resisting Greek attempts to ‘internationalize’ and‘Europeanize’ such issues. The Cyprus problem, on the other hand,in spite of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot wishes, has been an inter-national issue for decades. Since 1974, Ankara and the Turkish

INTRODUCTION 9

Cypriot government have felt international pressure to end thepartition of the island and negotiate a bi-zonal federation. Greek andGreek Cypriot successes in securing a commitment from Greece’s EUpartners that the accession of Cyprus to the EU can be realizedwithout a prior settlement between the Cypriot communities hasupset Turkish (and Turkish Cypriot) planning. However, Turkey’sown interest in advancing towards EU membership has created astrong incentive to solve the Aegean issues and to help achieve asettlement in Cyprus. Talks have been conducted by Turkish andGreek officials on Aegean issues since early 2002. At the same time,Cypriot leaders on the island have engaged in a renewed effort tobreak the Cyprus log-jam. Previous failures in achieving solutions inthe Aegean and Cyprus suggest that these new talks will not easilyyield breakthroughs. However, there are numerous ideas for com-promise that could help achieve progress in both issues. Therapprochement between Ankara and Athens that began in late 1999and Turkish candidacy for EU membership have created a newwindow of opportunity for Turkey’s relations with Greece andCyprus to enter a new, more hopeful era.

Thanos Dokos in his contribution, discusses the current debateand process on ‘Tension-Reduction and Confidence-Building in theAegean’. For Dokos, the burden of history and the ghosts of the pastare the major causes of the lack of trust between Greece and Turkey.Indeed, historical animosities do play a significant role. Greeks andTurks are classic examples of rival peoples (one can think of severalother examples, including French and Germans, or Russians andGermans); however, it is important to realize that such peoplescannot afford to be prisoners of the past and history should becometheir guide, not their prison. Suspicion concerning the other side’smotives is deep-rooted in both popular opinion and the media; thisin turn affects, and at times even drives, the respective governments.This intense distrust on both sides of the Aegean prompts manyobservers to call for a reduction of mutual suspicion as the essentialfirst step toward peace and stability. Unfortunately, this is easier saidthan done. Reduction of suspicion is a long-term process, and, assuch, is beyond the horizon of serving governments. There is also abasic lack of mutual knowledge between Greeks and Turks on issuesother than foreign and security policy, including culture, society andreligion.


According to Dokos, to have even a minimal chance of success,any effort for a substantial improvement of Greek-Turkish relationsand, perhaps, the resolution of the fundamental problems betweenthe two countries, should be as well prepared as possible. The costof failure, in the case of a hastily and poorly prepared initiative, maybe quite significant because of heightened expectations, leading tofrustration. Therefore, a number of preconditions should exist. Amongothers, these include the avoidance of high expectations, as sub-sequent failure may have very negative consequences for bilateralrelations; the exercise of strong leadership in both countries; arelative military balance; an active and balanced involvement ofinternational actors in the confidence-building process; an under-standing of the political and economic costs of the continuedconfrontation by both leaderships; an absence (or low importance)of domestic factors contributing to the continuation of the conflict;the political will on both sides to improve bilateral relations, and so on.

Overall, Dokos does not think that, at least in the short term,expectations can be realistic. In any case, tension-reduction andCBMs are necessary – but not sufficient – prerequisites for theresolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict. They could (and should),however, constitute integral parts of a limited security regime thatcould be adopted by Greece and Turkey, with the aim of managingboth crisis-stability and arms-race stability, as well as avoiding thecatastrophic losses of a war. In the latter part of his essay Dokospresents some practical and hopefully feasible ideas and suggestionsfor a longer-lasting reduction of tension between Greece and Turkey.

Panagiotis Liargovas’ essay, ‘The Economic Imperative: Prospectsfor Trade Integration and Business Cooperation’, is an attempt toidentify areas of convergence and shared interests between the twocountries, and tries to shed some light on the prospects for trade andbusiness cooperation between Greece and Turkey. It is first demon-strated that trade integration between Greece and Turkey isincreasing fast and the Turkish share of total Greek exports reached9 per cent by the year 2000, though in imports, the correspondingshare has been much lower, around 3.5 per cent. Liargovas theninvestigates the future prospects for the development of bilateraltrade with the use of a gravity model. Finally, the paper sheds lighton economic cooperation in selected sectors of interest for both

INTRODUCTION 11

countries, such as tourism, sea fishing, pisciculture, industry, bank-ing, local government and universities.

Ozay Mehmet, on the other hand, in his paper on ‘Crisis Manage-ment in Greek-Turkish Relations: A Political Economy Analysis Since1974’ identifies the more fundamental determinants of the profoundnational difference between Greece and Turkey in the field of crisismanagement. An explicit understanding of this national differenceis important in analysing its consequences particularly in terms ofpromoting peace and cooperation between the Aegean neighbours.Mehmet focuses on the political crisis management in two key areasof Greek-Turkish relations, namely the disputes over Cyprus and theAegean. He observes that in both cases, extreme nationalism hasdictated policy design at home. But, externally Greece has sought to ‘Europeanize’ the disputes, whereas Turkey has opposed thisapproach, proposing direct bilateral dialogue between Athens andAnkara, preferring American to European mediation wheneverGreek-Turkish relations took an explosive turn. The Cyprus disputeis, of course, the key to Greek-Turkish relations and that is where themost marked difference in conflict management between these twonations is manifest.

In the second part of the paper, Mehmet is concerned with theeconomic costs and benefits of crisis management in Greece andTurkey. While Greece has managed to derive tremendous economicbenefits from its membership in the EU, Turkey’s struggle withstructural adjustment has been a story of successive rounds of crises.The Turkish economy has been undergoing stabilization and struc-tural adjustment since 1980, designed largely in Washington. Thislong story does not have a happy ending because of extensivepolitical corruption, which ultimately led to the banking and cur-rency crisis of February 2001. Mehmet concludes by arguing thatGreek-Turkish relations in future need to be efficiency-driven tomaximize joint benefits. Nationalistic premises should be replacedby higher standards and criteria (such as the Copenhagen Criteria)in public policy that hold the key to future peace and cooperationacross the Aegean.

Nesrin Algan, in ‘Environmental Security in the Aegean Sea’,deals with an overlooked area of potential security concern, whichby its nature cannot be addressed outside a bilateral – if not multi-lateral – framework. Environmental problems such as the ecosystems


are transboundary and supranational. It is unlikely for traditionalnational sovereignty concepts to allow the protection and manage-ment of shared ecosystems and the global commons. Environmentalthreats due to environmental degradation and/or environmentalresource scarcity may act as the structural reason for a conflict betweencountries or may act as a trigger or a catalyst for a conflict. A signifi-cant part of the environmental threats and stresses in the Aegean Seathreaten drastically to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitantsat its shores. Its particular geomorphologic structure, oceanographic,hydrographic, ecological and biological characteristics and relation-ships between its two coastal countries make the Aegean even more vulnerable. Both Turkey and Greece need a new politicalcommitment that accepts the Aegean Sea as a common asset, and asthe keepers of this common heritage, they should sensitively avoidpolicies and implementations likely to cause environmental conflicts.

Gülden Ayman’s ‘Negotiation and Deterrence in AsymmetricalPower Situations: The Greek-Turkish Case’ argues that in order tounderstand one of the major sources of intractability of the Turkish-Greek conflict and the problems related to the Aegean Sea, one needsto examine the overall asymmetrical perceptions of power, threat andstrategic behaviours affected by these perceptions. Ayman’s argu-ment is that in most international conflicts the behaviour of theparties vis-à-vis to each other is closely linked with the mutualperceptions of power and threat. Especially when the adversariesperceive themselves unequal in power, it is generally observed thatmutually acceptable outcomes are difficult to obtain. However, it isnot easy to determine the dynamics behind how relative powerdistribution contributes to the intractability of the internationalconflicts. Ayman tries to examine it in the Turkish-Greek conflictcontext related to the problems in the Aegean. In doing so, theanalysis poses two sets of questions: (1) How do Turkish and Greekstrategic elites cognitively construct power and threat?; and (2) Howdo these relative perceptions affect their strategic behaviour vis-à-viseach other? For Ayman, a detailed analysis of the Greek-Turkishconflict with a special emphasis on the Aegean problems could notonly provide us with some clues about the dynamics of asymmetricalpower conflicts, but may also help determine what might be donemore constructively for their resolution.

Like Ayman, Kostas Ifantis draws upon structural realism to

INTRODUCTION 13

analyse the relationship between the Greek national perception ofTurkey and the current rapprochement process, while reflecting onthe debate over Greek strategy towards Ankara. Ifantis acknow-ledges that in a security environment increasingly characterized by‘transregional’ problems and ‘transsovereign’ challenges, from awestern and, above all, an American perspective, Turkey is certainlya transregional partner par excellence. What in the early years of thetwenty-first century seems to be less certain is the role Ankara willchoose to play, and for that matter how Greek-Turkish relations willevolve. In the context of a – let us assume, durable – rapprochementprocess, will Turkey become a partner and a stabilizer or will it –rather aggressively, to the Greek mind – seek regional dominance?Given this uncertainty, the challenge to Greek policy is to find aposture that can encourage a positive evolution in Greek-Turkishrelations and appropriately respond to negative developments in theshort term, while also protecting Greece against the possibility thatin the longer term, Turkey may embark on a rather hostile course.

Ifantis explains that, although in Greece there is a dominant per-ception about Turkish behaviour and (revisionist) foreign policyaims, there is a lack of consensus on what strategy can best achievenational strategic purposes. The central question in the current post-Helsinki debate (as with the post-Madrid one in 1997) is whetherGreece should pursue, abandon or modify what seems to be a strategyof engagement. Many in Greece have argued that the engagementstrategy currently pursued is doomed to fail. Some strongly believethat constraining or balancing the growth of Turkish power shouldbecome (again) the overriding focus of Greek strategy. In effect, theyimply that Greece must move from engagement to an exclusivelycontainment policy. Ifantis points out the profound polarizationwithin the Greek policy-making and academic communities.

The aim of Ifantis’s paper – in the overall framework of amelio-rating the Greek-Turkish security dilemma, and through the domi-nant Greek perception of the bilateral relationship – is, first, to showthat both strategies have serious limitations, which are the result ofa profound misreading of the new international and regionalstrategic environment; and second, to point out the fundamentalrequirements for an effective strategy towards Turkey, a strategy thatcan effectively result in supporting Turkey’s modernization efforts,enhancing the process of stabilization and democratization at the


wider regional level, and in strengthening Greek economic, politicaland above all military capabilities thus reinforcing a stabilizingbalance of power arrangement in the Aegean. The objective of Greekpolicy-makers should be the gradual reduction and eventual abo-lition of the strategic competition between the two countries, and the advancement, at the same time, of cooperative and even inte-grative arrangements. The latter refers to reaching a stage – with time– where common assessments and common policies in an ever-expanding issue agenda can be adopted. In that context, the discus-sion focuses on the central strategic question confronting Greece inits interaction with Turkey. What are the principal threats to Greekinterests? How can those interests best be defended? What com-bination of economic, diplomatic, and other instruments should beused to protect and advance Greek interests? For Ifantis, these arethe enduring questions that should shape the landscape of Greekstrategic choices in the Aegean.

Finally, Soli Özel’s elegant contribution demonstrates the impor-tance of ‘second-track’ diplomacy. The story of the Greek-TurkishForum shows how unofficial organizations, think-tanks and otherscould act as agents of change and provide an engine for policylearning and innovative policies. Unconstrained by establishedbureaucratic norms, rules and parameters, such organizations canattempt to redefine material interests, change the perceptions ofgroups and indeed promote social learning. In these times, theresources available to civil society in human, information, expertiseand material terms make institutionalized second-track diplomacyan effective supplement to interstate relations, particularly in conflictsituations. Perhaps more importantly, the practical lesson that onecan draw from the Greek-Turkish Forum’s successful journey is thatsecond-track initiatives need both a first-track opening in the back-ground and a degree of official sanctioning that does not jeopardizetheir independence of thought and action.

III

It is obvious that the essays included in this volume are not intendedto provide a comprehensive overview of the Greek-Turkish conflict.This has been done – by Turkish, Greek and others – over the yearsmany times, more or less successfully. Moreover, they do not cover

INTRODUCTION 15

all the issues raised in the debates, disputes and conflicts in theAegean. And they do not attempt to evaluate the very well knownclaims of each side. The essays do, however, demonstrate thatalthough national perceptions die hard, the security dilemma thathas been at work between Turkey and Greece for at least four decadescan be ameliorated.

As Ifantis notes in his contribution, there can be little strategicrationale for premeditated conflict between two state actors likeGreece and Turkey. Open conflict would pose enormous politicalrisks for both of them, quite apart from uncertainties at the oper-ational level. Yet the risk of an accidental clash remains, given thecontinuing armed air and naval operations in close proximity andthe highly charged atmosphere surrounding competing claims. TheAegean and especially Cyprus are sensitive national questions parexcellence. Moreover, with both countries modernizing their militarycapabilities, the potential for destructiveness and escalation is fargreater today than in the past.

Normalization, even at an embryonic level, represents a changein Greek-Turkish relations that is indeed strategic in nature. TheGreek decision to support the offer of EU candidacy to Turkey at theDecember 1999 Helsinki summit – although emphasizing particularconditions favourable to Greek interests – reflected a new, strategicapproach to the future of relations with Ankara, and it represents amajor step towards dampening the sources of unintended spirals.The strategic motivations for the Helsinki compromise and theGreek-Turkish rapprochement were facilitated by a series of proxi-mate factors. There was a perception on both sides in the wake of theKardak/Imia crisis, the 1997–98 tension over the planned deploymentof S-300 surface-to-air missiles on Cyprus, and the spring 1999Öcalan affair, that brinkmanship had reached very dangerous levels.An accident or miscalculation in the Aegean could easily escalate tolarge-scale warfare. ‘This sense of peering over the brink, palpable in1996, was arguably not unlike the effect of the Cuban missile on US-Soviet relations more than 30 years earlier.’18 The Helsinki decisionsproved to be instrumental in reversing the deterioration in EU-Turkish relations that had followed the Luxembourg and Cardiffsummits and offered a path toward closer Turkish integration inEurope, paving the ground for the most serious attempt towardsreducing, and even abolishing the tension in the Aegean. In that


sense, the future path of Turkish-EU relations will, to a great extent,determine the fate of the post-1999 rapprochement developments.

The following discussion makes clear that reducing or evenabolishing conditions of uncertainty should be a target and theoverriding concern for all involved on both sides of the Aegean, anda source of vibrant but positive debates and policy innovations. Theeditors, having full knowledge of their modest effort, really hope thatthis collection stimulates additional debate, research, and ultimatelybetter explanation and understanding.

NOTES

1. Ian O. Lesser, Stephen F. Larrabee, Michele Zanini and Katia Vlachos, Greece’s NewGeopolitics (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), p. 20.

2. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

3. Christopher Layne, ‘Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace’, InternationalSecurity, 19, 2 (Fall 1994), p. 10.

4. Ibid.5. See Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30, 2

(January 1978), pp. 167–214.6. Ibid. and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58–113.7. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, ‘Containing Fear: The Origins and

Management of Ethnic Conflict’, International Security, 21, 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 41–75.8. Barry R. Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, in Michael Brown (ed.)

Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993),p. 104.

9. Randall L. Schweller, ‘Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?’, inBenjamin Frankel (ed.) Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996),p. 116.

10. Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, pp. 169–89.11. Lake/Rothchild, ‘Containing Fear’.12. On this issue, see the very accurate critique of Panayotis J. Tsakonas of the work of

the late Panayotis Kondylis [Theory of War (Athens: Themelio, 1997), in Greek].Kondylis proposed a strategy of a massive first-strike, which is based on the falseassumption ‘that a Greek-Turkish war would result in Greece’s destruction whilepeace will sooner or later turn Greece into Turkey’s satellite’. Panayotis J. Tsakonas,‘The Security Dilemma in Greek-Turkish Relations: Theory and Practice’, ÉtudesHelleniques/Hellenic Studies, 9, 2 (Autumn 2001), p. 25.

13. Arnold Wolfers, ‘The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference’, in Arnold Wolfers(ed.), Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1962), as cited in Schweller, ‘Neorealism’s Status-QuoBias’, p. 99.

14. Kenneth Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, Journal of InternationalAffairs, 44, 1 (Spring/Summer 1990), pp. 34–6.

15. Benjamin Miller, ‘Competing Realist Perspectives on Great Power Crisis Behavior’,in Benjamin Frankel (ed.) Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass,1996), p. 328.

INTRODUCTION 17

16. Robert Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, International Organization, 36, 2 (1982), p. 178, asquoted in Tsakonas, ‘The Security Dilemma in Greek-Turkish Relations’, p. 6.

17. See Études Hellenique/Hellenic Studies, 9, 2 (Autumn 2001). The project is an attemptby a group of Greek and Turkish scholars to examine particular case studies, whichfall into the three basic manifestations of the Greek-Turkish conflict: (a) arms race, (b)crises situations and (c) competitive alliance formation.

18. Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini and Vlachos, Greece’s New Geopolitics, p. 22.


PART I

FROM CONFLICT TORECONCILIATION?

1Contemporary Turkish-Greek

Relations: Constraints andOpportunities

MUSTAFA AYDIN

INTRODUCTION

The Turkish-Greek problems are not new, are well-delineated andhave proved unsolvable until very recently when a flurry of inter-related events brought them into the limelight once again: mutualunderstanding created by the earthquakes that hit both countries inlate summer 1999; Turkish acceptance of the EU Helsinki Summit(1999) decisions, comprising acknowledgement of Turkey’s candi-dature, lifting of Greek veto and veiled Turkish acceptance of theUnion’s relations with Cyprus; agreement to refer Greek-Turkishproblems to the International Court of Justice should they not solvethem by the end of 2004; EU’s promise at long last in the CopenhagenSummit to consider starting membership negotiations with Turkeyat the end of 2004 or soon thereafter; imminent Greek Cypriot EUmembership on behalf of the whole island; successful Greek effortsto involve the Union into the Cyprus problem; and finally a pro-tracted plan by the UN Secretary-General to solve it within a time-frame concomitant with the EU enlargement agenda.

However, it would be naive indeed if we attempt to understandthe long-standing Greek-Turkish entanglement from the lenses ofrecent developments and fail to judge the impact of the not so recentpast, marred with its frequent ups and downs, various attempts tosolve the problems, and many odd incidents. A Turkish coasternamed Figen Akat, for example, ran aground on 25 December 1995over one of the hitherto unnoticed rocks in the Aegean, 3.8 nautical

miles off the Turkish coast. At the time, nobody could foresee that thissimple incident would start a series of events that brought two alliesto the brink of war, which, thanks to US mediation, was only justavoided. This was only one of the recent occasions when Greece andTurkey almost went to war with each other. Judging by their size, the Kardak/Imia Rocks do not seem like much to fight over. But there were serious issues at stake and the incident might well haveescalated to full-scale war between two allies. Though the wholeaffair took less than five days to be played out, the nature of the crisisover a couple of barren rocks, the speed by which it escalated, andthe manner in which it was resolved, underscored the delicate stateof relations between the two countries in the Aegean.

The majority of long-standing disagreements between themcould have been overcome years ago had the leadership in bothcountries acted responsibly by abandoning the policy of making useof those disagreements in domestic power struggles, and had they,with a nationalistic myopia, not turned a blind eye to the other’sneeds and fears. However, as this has not been the case, we end upwith a fearful state of ‘security dilemma’, on the brink of war andwith populations on each side thoroughly ‘educated’ to distrust eachother at every level. Although the thaw in relations since 1999 hasprovided renewed hopes for a comprehensive reconciliation, wehave not yet reached the point where the ‘security dilemma’ can beovercome to make way to a peaceful coexistence, or better still to acreation of a ‘security community’ between the two states. The mainreason for this, which is also the basic proposition of this paper, isthat the existing disagreements and problems between the twostates, further complicated by years of distrust and prejudice, requirethe creation of a comprehensive understanding between the nations,and which cannot be solved easily and summarily. Therefore, tryingto create a general understanding and trusting environment betweenthe two states and more importantly, between peoples, would havemuch better chances, in the long term, than running after magicalformulas for rapid reconciliation.

Living History

Among the obstacles that prevent not only the solution but even thediscussion of the ‘real’ problems is the distrust between the two


nations created by their ‘living history’. In both Greece and Turkey,‘history is not past; indeed, the past continues to live in the present’.1

This anomaly stems from the fact that both Turkey and Greecehave obtained their national identities by fighting against, andinteracting with, each other. Therefore, it would not be possible, forexample, to understand modern Greek history without taking the‘Turkish factor’ into account. Almost every corner of today’s Greecehad been under Turkish rule for about four hundred years, andmodern Greece was born out of the struggle against the OttomanEmpire. The popular Turkish image of Greek ‘Independence War’ isthat of a rebellion, instigated and supported by the Great Powers ofthe nineteenth century, who ‘used’ the Greeks for their own purposesto break up the Ottoman Empire. In a similar fashion, modern Turkeyearned its nation-state status only after defeating Greek occupationforces in Western Anatolia following World War I. For the Greeks, thisstruggle, which is revered as the ‘War of National Liberation’ by theTurks, is still remembered as the ‘Asia Minor catastrophe’.2

The fact that these two states earned their national identities byfighting each other has undoubtedly affected their subsequentrelations. It also reinforced identity crises of both peoples. BothTurkey and Greece – maybe more so Turkey – have felt insecure abouttheir situation between East and West. Though ‘they share a commonheritage’, i.e. Ottoman-Levantine, neither Greece nor Turkey, fordifferent reasons, wishes to acknowledge it. This creates animportant problem as ‘neither state is at peace with itself, because, todeny one’s own past which lives on in the present, is to deny one’sown very identity’.3 In order to compensate for this denied commonheritage, both nations have to remember their national struggles forindependence unceasingly and cling to the best delineated parts of their identities, i.e. their nation-stateness, defined in terms ofopposition to the ‘other’. In this way, they are not only pushing thecommon heritage into a forgotten past, but are also creating a livingpart of history by advancing confrontation and conflict to theforefront.4 This, then, only helps to reinforce and widen mutualmistrust. Therefore, as argued by Clogg,

… even if a rapprochement between two governments isachieved, it would be a much more difficult and arduousprocess to overcome the mistrust between two peoples, mutual

CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 23

stereotypes and fears that are fundamental for existing confron-tation. Until a fundamental change in mutual (mis)perceptionshas been achieved, we will continue to see a mutual proclivitytowards suspicion and crisis in the relations between two states.5

As is often the case between long-suffering neighbours, locked inchronicled enmities, the history of relationship between Greece andTurkey is littered with a long list of past failures and deceptions.However, the symbolic strength of this history in defining currentand future relations is often misunderstood by outsiders, whousually trivialize the nature of the ‘love–hate’ relationship betweenthe two countries. This then leads to leaving them alone, an act thathelps prolong the disputes and makes them insoluble. Because,‘although both sides stress their willingness to engage in dialogue toresolve outstanding grievances’, the danger is that, in the absence ofan external threat or ‘encouragement’ to move closer, ‘neither lacksexamples to cite of the other’s perceived intransigence or paranoia’.6

It is clear that threat perceptions on both sides of the Aegean havenot been symmetric and will not be in the foreseeable future. Giventhe disparity between the two countries’ history, resources andpopulation, the fact that most of the Greeks consider Turkey as a‘threat’, and that in turn, most of the Turks do not attribute priorityto a ‘Greek threat’ is understandable.7 However, distrust that hasbeen created by the ‘living history’ is a sense that is shared andcontinually reinforced on both sides of the Aegean. Therefore, whendealing with Greek-Turkish relations, it is necessary first to take intoaccount the lack of faith in each other’s reliability; then, in order toovercome such an overwhelmingly negative psychology, both sideshave to be resolute in sustaining a long-term commitment to non-political confidence-building measures. Such a determined effort hasnot been made so far by either side. Although the two foreignministers have engaged for the first time in years in what seems tobe a ‘dialogue’, and individuals and NGOs on both sides of theAegean have created a lively atmosphere of cooperation andexchange of views, it is still too early to argue that these efforts haveproduced irreversible results. It is clear that, given the excessivebaggage of distrust both sides bring to discussions and the effects ofthe importance of third-party related developments (especiallyTurkey’s relations with the EU) on bilateral relations, even the good-


intentioned efforts on both sides would not be enough by themselvesto ensure real harmony. The past record of ethnic conflicts through-out the world has shown that temporary measures ‘do not providemuch hope for the eradication of wholesome memories of real orimagined past mistakes. Also, it is impossible to reduce the existingGreek-Turkish confrontation to mutual misunderstandings’.8 There-fore, only a sustained long-term effort and increased cooperationcould heal the wounds of a living history and put it into its properplace – the past.

Exceptions That Prove the Rule

Cooperation is very easy and tempting to advocate, but difficult torealize in Turkish-Greek relations. As even a rudimentary analysis ofpast record could easily demonstrate, the dominant trend in Greek-Turkish relations is conflict and competition, and that cooperation isthe exception.

There have been two cooperative periods between Greece andTurkey in modern times: the 1930s and the first half of the 1950s.During the first period, there was a common threat from Italy’s MareNostrum policy and encouragement from England to cooperateagainst it, and the two countries were engaged in friendly relationsculminating in the establishment of the Balkan Entente in 1934.During the second period, there was Soviet threat and Americanencouragement. Judging from these examples, we may conclude thatTurkey and Greece, as a rule, could improve their harmony onlywhen there is a common threat and, at the same time, they areencouraged to cooperate against this threat by an outside power thathas a leverage over them.9

Accordingly, during the Cold War, both Greece and Turkey wereable to cooperate under the NATO banner in putting away theirdisagreements and, in an effort to prove their loyalty to the Alliance,often ‘subordinated their own national interests to the dictates ofalliance cohesion and the need for collective action’. In the 1960s andthe 1970s, however, ‘as the security consensus that had characterizedthe early post-war period began to erode’, most of the old problemsand tensions, coupled with new ones, re-emerged, ‘complicatingrelations with the US and NATO’.10 What initially tipped off thedisagreements between the two states were the developments


related to the 1963–64 Cyprus crisis and, over the next decade, whenrelations were exacerbated by a number of other events, rangingfrom the continental shelf to the treatment of national minorities.

Since then the West has become a reference point in relationsbetween the two states. Both sides have shown persistence in tryingto explain their bilateral problems and complain about each other tothe West, especially to the US. They have also quite consistently takenup positions that, instead of reflecting their strict national interests,have adopted those they thought would be favoured by the West. Inthis respect, Greece has been particularly attentive since itconsidered NATO membership as an insurance against Turkey, andtried to use its influence to curtail Turkey’s importance for theAlliance.11 Moreover, after obtaining its EC/EU membership on 1981,Greece had utilized all the assistance that the European institutionscould provide against Turkey, which has become vulnerable anddisadvantaged as it remained outside and wanted to be let in.

On the other hand, one of the important consequences ofaccepting the West as a reference point in bilateral relations has beenthat both countries have attempted to utilize their bilateral disputesand confrontations in order to solidify their place within the westernstate system. In the early 1980s, for example, Greek Premier AndreasPapandreou, by exaggerating the threat perception that Greece hadof Turkey, tried to obtain a better place in the western world for hiscountry. His Turkish counterpart, Turgut Özal, on the other hand,tried to reach the same point from an opposite way. He affected acontemptuous attitude acting as if the existing problems between thetwo countries amounted to nothing, and thereby, while minimizingtheir importance, tried to create a favourable image in the westernworld both for himself and for Turkey. In short, the effects of externalfactors, especially western patronage and influence, on Turkish-Greek relations and on the decision-making processes of bothcountries’ foreign and domestic policies are obvious.

BILATERAL ISSUES

Since 1974, Greek-Turkish relations have been handicapped mainlyby two sets of issues: Cyprus and the Aegean. Although, politicallyand legally, they are quite separate issues, there is ‘an obvious


psychological linkage between them in the sense that a resolution ofone would have an important psychological impact on the resolutionof the other’,12 because it is felt that a weakening of one’s position inone of the areas would have an effect in the other. Of the two, thedispute over the Aegean is more important because, unlike theCyprus issue, it touches more directly on vital national interestsconcerning territorial sovereignty and security for both countries.13

Then, there are other thorny issues between the two countriessuch as the treatment of Greek population within Turkey and ofTurkish minority within Greek borders, the Greek veto (untilrecently) of Turkish membership of the EU, and numerous otherdisagreements within NATO. Most of these issues are immenselycomplex, intertwined and hotly disputed. But, as much has beenwritten on the issues involved and on the presentation ofperspectives, only a simplified sketch of the disputes related with theAegean and Cyprus will be attempted here, with some suggestionson how to deal with them.14

Confrontation in the Aegean

The Aegean issue is, in fact, a set of four separate issues. Theseinclude: (1) delimitation of the maritime boundaries and continentalshelf; (2) breadth of territorial waters; (3) control of the air spacebeyond the territorial waters; and (4) Greek militarization of easternAegean islands. Each of these is entangled with the general mistrustbetween the two nations and with their attempts to gain politicaladvantage in settling outstanding differences. However, as theAegean is a semi-closed sea with unique geographical features andequal strategic, economic and political importance for its two littoralstates, in order to reach a long-term settlement particular attentionshould be paid to the establishment and maintenance of a balancebetween the interests of the two countries.

The dispute over territorial waters relates to Greece’s claim that,though currently operating a 6-mile limit, it is entitled to a 12-mileterritorial sea both for its mainland and for its islands in the Aegean.The Turks, however, feel differently about the matter because to themit represents an ‘age-old attempt by Greece to turn the Aegean intoa Greek lake’. They point to the fact that if a 12-mile limit isimplemented, then virtually all passage to high seas from Turkish


Aegean and Black Sea ports would be through areas under Greeksovereignty and jurisdiction.16 Thus, in case of an extension, Turkeywill be locked out of the Aegean and confined to its own territorialwaters. While international law grants the right of innocent passage,Turkish officials feel that ‘Greece would be able to create artificialdifficulties’.17 Moreover, as the territorial waters issue is very muchinterlinked with other Aegean disputes, any extension of Greekterritorial waters will have a direct bearing on the settlement of thoseissues, as well.18 Hence, the Turkish governments have repeatedlydeclared that if Greece goes ahead with the unilateral adoption of 12-mile territorial waters in the Aegean, it would represent a casus belli.

It is obvious that an extension of territorial waters is not a practicalnecessity for Greece unless valuable mineral resources are found onthe continental shelf and Greece feels that it could not protect themin any other way. Short of that, the only other motivation for theextension of the territorial waters would be political, in a sense thata weak government might find it useful to play this card in order togenerate domestic popularity and support. However, the benefitsthat may be obtained in this way for the government must beweighed against the dangers of war with Turkey. The various Greekgovernments, therefore, have shown restraint so far by not extend-ing territorial waters, thereby avoiding a dangerous confrontation.Consequently, the territorial waters dispute has stagnated and hasbeen dormant for years.

The continental shelf dispute is also related to the existence of oilin the Aegean, and complicated by the fact that Greece and Turkeyhave never had a delimitation agreement regarding maritimeboundaries in the Aegean. It first became an issue of contention whenthe Greek government announced oil and natural gas discoveries inthe area and went on to claim, in February 1974, most of the Aegeancontinental shelf. In order to prevent a fait accompli, Turkey proposednegotiations to demarcate the respective spheres of the Greek andTurkish continental shelves, but the then ruling Junta in Athens didnot respond.19 Turkey, in return, sent a survey ship accompanied bywarships, to the disputed areas, mainly to serve as symbol of Turkey’sinterest in the Aegean seabed. Since then, the dispute has continuedto poison relations as most of the other issues, in one way or another,are linked to the continental shelf issue.

The Greeks argue that most of the Aegean continental shelf


belonged to them with an attendant economic zone because of thenumerous Greek islands, and deny any Turkish right in areas to thewest of the Greek islands since this, according to Greece, wouldconstitute a threat to its sovereignty. The Turks, on the other hand,have argued that much of the Aegean continental shelf is geologicallyan extension of the Anatolian mainland, or that it should be delimitedon an equitable basis.

Traditionally, Greece proposes taking the issue to the Inter-national Court of Justice, and in fact did so in August 1976. However,the Court’s decision was that it did not have jurisdiction to entertainthe Greek application. Later in November 1976, Greece and Turkeysigned an agreement in Bern and decided to hold negotiations witha view to reaching an agreement. They also undertook to refrain fromany initiative or act concerning the Aegean continental shelf. Thetalks between the two countries continued without a final agreementuntil 1981 when Greek Premier Papandreou decided to stop negoti-ations with Turkey.

The problem is clearly more than a superfluous whim for bothsides, as shown by the crises of 1976 and 1987 when explorations byone of the parties in the disputed areas led to confrontation andnearly war.20 In fact, the Greek discoveries turned out to have beenmuch smaller than originally estimated, and the Turkish explorationslocated no oil.21 Thus, the existing resources are hardly worth fightinga war over, though the issue remains as the most contentiousdisagreement between the two countries.

Air-space related problems are linked with territorial seas issuesince, according to the 1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation,the width of the latter determines the former. Greece, however,claims a 10-mile national airspace over its current 6-mile territorialwaters. Turkey disputes this and frequently exercises ‘its right’ to flyover international airspace of the Aegean up to a distance of 6 milesto the Greek mainland, thus prompting regular protests from Greeceon the ground that Turkey, yet again, violated Greek nationalairspace. Incidentally, Greece’s 10-mile airspace is not recognized byother states; including NATO countries which often ‘violate’ Greekairspace during NATO exercises in the Aegean.

A related issue is the Flight Information Region (FIR) responsi-bility over the Aegean Sea. The existing FIR arrangement on theAegean airspace, devised in 1952 by the International Civil Aviation


Organization (ICAO), puts much of the Aegean beyond Turkishnational airspace under Greek responsibility. The core of the conflictis the insistence of Greece, since 1974, to use its FIR responsibility asa means to monitor Turkish movements over the Aegean. In fact, theAegean airspace between the two countries was a ‘no-go area’ for along time after 1974 as Turkey, in the wake of the Cyprus inter-vention, had asked with Notam 714 to be notified of any aircraftapproaching Turkey from the median line in the Aegean; and Greeceresponded by declaring the area unsafe for international civilaviation (Notam 1157). The flights between the two countries wereresumed in late 1980 after the two states reciprocally withdrew theirNotams.

However, the problem still persists between the two countries ina sense that Turkey demands modification of the Aegean FIRresponsibilities on the grounds of equity and national security, andGreece, while refusing this demand, insists that Turkish state aircraftsshould file flight plans with Athens. Fearing that any kind ofresponsibility given to Turkey to the west of Greek islands might laterlead to further demands regarding their sovereignty, Greece isadamant to preserve the status quo, while Turkey complains ofGreece’s ‘abuse’ of its FIR responsibility and attempts to use it ‘as ifthis responsibility entailed sovereign rights’.22

Another problem that emerged in the aftermath of the 1974Cyprus crisis has been the Greek decision to fortify those Aegeanislands that were demilitarized by earlier international treaties.23

While Turkey accuses Greece of violating international legal obliga-tions, Greece alternately either denies the validity of such obligationsor the fact of violation. Beyond the legal arguments, however, afterthese islands had been fortified by Greece in practice, Turkey decidedto establish its Fourth Army, dubbed the ‘Aegean Army’ by Greeks,with headquarters in I

.zmir. This, in turn, increased Greek apprehen-

sions about Turkish intentions in the Aegean. It is a ‘chicken and egg’situation in which the Turks point to the need for such a force due tothe Greek fortification of the islands and the Greeks talk of the needfor fortification because of the ‘Aegean Army’.

Again the dispute arises out of general mistrust. The Turkishintervention in Cyprus and attempts at oil exploration in the Aegeanled the Greeks to fear Turkish ‘designs’ against their sovereign rightsin the Aegean. Turkey, on the other hand, saw in the fortification of


the islands disrespect for legality and an attempt to undermine thestatus quo between the two countries established by the LausannePeace Treaty, by changing the existing balance in the Aegean inGreece’s favour and then denying Turkey any rights in the area. Infact, neither the Greek fortification of the islands nor the TurkishFourth Army represent significant military threats to the other side,because, in the case of war, it would be calamitous for Turks toattempt ‘island-hopping’ and quite impossible for Greeks to musteran offensive against the Turkish mainland from the islands. But, itonly adds up to general mistrust and second-guessing of each other’sintentions.

The two states also disagree on what are the problems in theAegean and how to solve them. In general, Greece advocates thatthere is no problem in the Aegean between Turkey and Greece otherthan the delimitation of the continental shelf which should beresolved only through the International Court of Justice (ICJ). AgainstGreece’s ‘one problem-one solution’ position, Turkey traditionallyargued that there exist various problems in the Aegean which shouldbe solved through bilateral negotiations. However, since 1998, Turkeyhas broadened its approach and now agrees to employ a whole rangeof means for peaceful solutions as appropriate (including recourse toICJ), though all the problems should be addressed as a whole. Withthe advent of the Simitis government to power in 1996, Greece, too,gradually decided to employ engagement with, instead of deter-rence against Turkey. These moves have somewhat narrowed thegap between Greek and Turkish positions, though Greece still refusesto negotiate any issue other than the continental shelf and, in return,Turkey declines to discuss disputed issues separately.

Although most of the bilateral disputes between Athens andAnkara have become intractable because the Cyprus conflict hasforced the Greek and Turkish governments to become reluctant tocompromise lest they are perceived as soft on national ‘issues’, theyare not completely insoluble, as both countries have already shownthe ability to contain these disputes and thereby raise the thresholdof war. The 1987 near-war crisis and following conciliation is anexample in point (see Note 20). Apart from the crisis that brought thetwo states close to an armed clash, the enormous burden of defencespending on the balance of payments and the long military service,which detracted from the government’s populist image, convinced


the Greek Premier Papandreou that he needed to reduce the prospectof a possible outbreak of war with Turkey. Thus, in a significantdeviation from PASOK’s earlier foreign policy line, he agreed to meetwith Turkish Premier Özal in Davos in early 1988.24 Although someprogress was made in developing a set of confidence-buildingmeasures regarding accident prevention in international waters ofthe Aegean, thus raising hopes that a true rapprochement mightfollow, the ‘Davos spirit’ gradually lost momentum as both leadersfound themselves under increasing domestic pressure.

This experience demonstrated clearly one of the main require-ments of a genuine thaw in Turkish-Greek relations. The basic weak-ness of the ‘Davos process’ was its dependence on two leaders, bothof whom were politically weakened with time, and with the ‘spirit’waned. The self-evident truth which the ‘Davos process’ furnishedus is that, for such a process to succeed over the long run, a broaderconsensus on each side of the Aegean ‘for increased cooperation overconfrontation needs to be developed’.25 While doing this, the leadersand public opinion on both sides of the Aegean should keep in mind,and be reminded constantly if necessary, that both Greece andTurkey would be better off were they to reconcile their differences.

Forever Cyprus

Beyond the disagreements in the Aegean, the conflict of interestsover Cyprus also remains an important stumbling block to a broaderGreek-Turkish rapprochement.26 During the summer of 1992, therewere signs that the Cyprus problem might, with US help, be movingcloser to resolution. A breakthrough was achieved in the inter-communal negotiations, drawing up the details of a transitionalarrangement towards a new form of federal government for thewhole island. However, another deadlock set in shortly as the GreekCypriots, encouraged by the EU’s acceptance in July 1993 to considertheir application for membership, suddenly started to entertainaspirations to return to the status quo ante of July 1974; and TurkishCypriots, enraged and frustrated by the EU decision, became lesscooperative and started to entertain ideas of recognition of theexistence of two states in the island prior to the solution of theproblem. What followed was almost ten years of inactivity withoccasional exchange of accusations, and failure to achieve a


substantial progress in the intercommunal talks. With the ever-increasing involvement of the EU, the dispute has moved intoanother dimension which brought the leaders of the two Cypriotscommunities, Denktas and Clerides, back to the negotiating table inearly 2002.

On the Turkish side, the death of President Özal in 1993 removedone of the few proponents of a speedy resolution of the conflict.Moreover, as the country has been more occupied with the economicdownturn, Islamic revivalism, and the Kurdish insurgency, it wasunlikely that various weak coalition governments, until the 3November 2002 general elections, would have attempted any newinitiative on Cyprus. However, this has changed with the advent of pro-Islamic-turn-conservative Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP –Justice and Development Party) to power, with a comfortableparliamentary majority. The new government promises changes inTurkey’s policy vis-à-vis Cyprus, though it is not clear yet where thecurrent (February 2003) stand-off between the traditional foreignpolicy-making elite of the country and the AKP leadership wouldlead over Turkey’s Cyprus policy.

On top of these, additional stress was brought to Cyprus with theGreek Cypriot plan to acquire Russian medium-range S-300 surface-to-air missiles. Turkish policy-makers interpreted this plan, whichwas thought necessary by the Greeks to enhance their security byamending the disadvantageous balance of power in the easternMediterranean, as a challenge by the Greek side to change theisland’s dormant 25-year status quo, as well as an attempt to encircleTurkey. When considered with its defence pact with Greece, Cyprus’smissile purchase plans were signs of a government that is eager toconsolidate its military position along with its likely political positionwithin the EU.27 Thus Turkey responded to these moves by statingthat deployment of the missiles and Greek Cypriot entrance into theEU before Turkey would be grounds, respectively, for ‘seriousconflict’ on the island and ‘further integration’ of the TurkishRepublic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) with Turkey.

As far as the S-300 missiles were concerned, after emotionalstatements were exchanged and excitement abated somewhat, GreekCypriots, increasingly realizing the seriousness of Turkey on thisaccount, decided to let Greece acquire and deploy them to the islandof Crete instead of Cyprus. This effectively ended the confrontation


in Cyprus and the danger of ‘serious conflict’ against which Turkishofficials had warned.

However, the second part of the warning that Turkey would movetowards ‘further integration’ with the TRNC, matching EU’s inte-grative moves with the Republic of Cyprus, remained credible untilthe EU Copenhagen Summit in December 2002 decided to acceptCyprus as a full member by the spring of 2004, without the northernpart of the island if necessary, and gave Turkey a specific date toreview its membership status. It is clear that the EU’s stand hasgradually changed regarding the Cyprus issue since late 1980. TheCommunity, which adopted a ‘hands-off ’ and ‘non-involvement’policy on Cyprus until 1980, had to face complications after Greeceformally became a full member in 1981. Since then, while the Turkey-EU relations have experienced frequent ups and downs, relationsbetween Greek Cypriots and the EU got closer and Cyprus startedto appear on the EU agenda more often.

In the meantime, Greek Cypriots had worried that the UN reunifi-cation plan drafted in 1993 implicitly recognized Turkish Cypriot self-rule while outwardly supporting Greek Cypriot claims to overallsovereignty. The proposal for a ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’ ofnorth and south was viewed by Greeks as the ‘de jure recognition ofa de facto partition’.28 Thus, with the help of the prospective EUmembership, they tried to back down from the long-agreed positionsof bi-communality and bi-zonality. The Turkish side, on the otherhand, has been trying, since the EU decision to consider the Greekapplication, to get back into the process as an equally recognizedpartner.

Thus, when the EU Helsinki Summit of December 1999 stated thatit will take all the relevant factors into account when deciding withthe full membership of Cyprus by the end of 2002,29 it only added tothe sense of urgency, mainly on the Turkish side, to solve theproblem. The so-called ‘Annan Plan’, submitted to both sides by theUN Secretary-General in November 2002, under the clear instigationby the EU, to solve the problem before the approaching EU Summitin Copenhagen, did not produce any result. The revised plan anddeadline (28 February 2003) failed again to produce the desiredsolution in the island, despite strong EU pressure on the Turks,because the Greek and Turkish Cypriots still entertained ratherincompatible views regarding the question of how sovereignty was


going to be shared between the two communities. Thus, althoughthe intercommunal talks have contributed to the bridging of the gapson some issues, many diplomatic initiatives conducted by the UN,the US, NATO and the EU have all, so far, run aground on the samethorny issue, while the status quo has solidified, making any returnto the status quo ante more difficult.

Although a settlement of the Cyprus problem can provide anecessary catalyst for an improvement in Greek-Turkish relations,even the priorities that the Turkish and Greek governments attach tothe Cyprus issue are significantly divergent. Turkey, considering thestatus quo achieved in Cyprus after 1974 ‘advantageous to itsinterests’, has not been in a hurry for years ‘to reach an agreementthat would entail surrendering some of the gains from the 1974intervention’,30 though the involvement of the EU has somewhatchanged this perception. Greece, on the other hand, has beenadamant that the resolution of the Cyprus issue should precede thesolution of bilateral differences in the Aegean.

In this context, Turkey has long been argued that the Cyprusproblem was not a dispute between Greece and Turkey, but anintercommunal dispute between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, andthat it should therefore be resolved through intercommunal talkswith UN mediation. During the negotiations, the Turkish Cypriotshave increasingly emphasized a solution which would keep the twocommunities essentially separate in a loose bi-zonal federation of twoautonomous republics that restricts contact between the twocommunities. Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, favour a unitarystate, but seem ready to embrace a tightly knit federation betweentwo zones, emphasizing the three freedoms anywhere on the island.However, the Turks, arguing that the implementation of thesefreedoms would render the idea of bi-zonality meaningless andcould lead to Greek Cypriot domination once again, are reluctant toaccept them.31

On the other hand, the events of 1974 and developments sincethen have highlighted the enmity between Greece and Turkey andcreated a psychological block to true reconciliation. Furthermore, ‘amixed society that has been destroyed by force once cannot bereconstituted, at least not until ethnic hatred has subsided and thewounds of separation have been healed’.32 It may be overcome, butit will take a very long time. In the meantime, a de facto settlement


has emerged in Cyprus. Therefore, ‘the idea that Greeks can beresettled’, any time soon, ‘among the Turks of northern Cyprus isquite impracticable’, for such an attempt might result in a renewal ofthe bloodshed that ceased in Cyprus with the effective separation ofthe two communities in 1974. In the absence of an overall settlement,and more importantly rapprochement in views and feelings, itwould be a mistake to push for a settlement that has no chance ofsucceeding, as ‘recreating an ethnically mixed Cyprus under afederal government’ might only help to ‘multiply points of frictionbetween Greeks and Turks’.33

On the other hand, should Greece and Turkey continue toimprove gradually their relations over a wide range of issues, theycould also come up with a temporary solution in Cyprus until a moredurable settlement is put in its place, which would in the short termallow Cyprus to be associated with the EU without jeopardizing theTurkish or Turkish Cypriot connection. Based on this acceptance,Greece and Turkey can then gradually improve their understandingover Cyprus as both parties would see the uselessness of under-mining each other on the wider international stage.

MANOEUVRING IN THE EU AND NATO

As the disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean were contained, bothcountries have attempted to outflank each other in the EU and in NATO as well as in their bilateral relations with other Balkan states.

Although the EU had, in the past, declared that it would not be aparty to the Greek-Turkish disputes and would not allow them toshadow its relations with Turkey, it has gradually, and perhapsinevitably, shifted from this stance since Greece’s membership in1981.34 Until the late 1980s it seemed that the Community lacked thepolitical will to go beyond verbal clichés in order to play a moresubstantive role in efforts to resolve the Greek-Turkish dispute. Itlooked as if the Community was unable to harmonize the per-ceptions and interests of its members with regard to these issues. Asa result, the EC launched no initiatives of its own to further theresolution of either the Aegean or the Cyprus disputes. Instead, itconfined its actions to occasionally expressing hope, satisfaction or


dissatisfaction in the UN Secretary-General’s efforts concerningthese problems, and endorsing related UN resolutions. In short, theEC avoided declarations on the causes of these disputes, limitingitself to occasional statements acknowledging the need for a‘peaceful, fair and viable settlement’ of existing problems.35

More complications started to emerge after Greece formallyapplied for the EC membership on 12 June 1975. While afraid ofbecoming entangled in the fiery Greek-Turkish friction, the Com-munity felt obliged to dispel any impression that it was prepared tofavour Greece. After all, if the EC looked as if it were leaning towardGreece, Turkey could have perceived itself as being alienated. Thus,in its Opinion on Greece’s membership, the European Commission,while stating clearly that it would not become involved in thecontroversy between Turkey and Greece, also called for a pre-accession period for Greece.36 However, the Council of Ministersrejected the Commission’s Opinion apparently under politicalinfluences, convinced perhaps that, as a member of the Community,Greece might become more amenable to solving its problems withTurkey. Consequently, negotiations for Greece’s membership werecompleted on 3 April 1979, and the signature of a Treaty of Accessionin Athens on 28 May 1979 led to Greece becoming the tenthCommunity member on 1 January 1981.

While negotiations were underway for Greece’s entry, Com-munity members further tried to subdue Turkish fears that if Greecebecame a member before Turkey, she might deny the latter’s right tomembership or make it conditional to concessions received fromTurkey on the Aegean or Cyprus. Consequently, statements wereissued from various EC officials to the effect that the EC would notallow itself to be drawn into the Greek-Turkish disputes over theAegean and Cyprus. Hence, the Community’s ‘hands-off ’ policy wasbeing supplemented by a more active yet still ‘balanced’ stance onthe Greek-Turkish dispute, apparently intending to reflect an overallsense of equidistance from the both sides.

However, after Greece joined the then EC in January 1981, adramatic shift occurred in the position of the two states. It is clearnow that Greek membership has profoundly altered the Com-munity’s relations with Ankara, a development long dreaded byTurkey. Greece now has the political and economic weight of theCommunity behind her, and the EU has found itself increasingly at


odds with Turkey because of a variety of ways Greece has tried toutilize the Union’s backing in its disputes with Turkey.

While Turkey cannot regain its earlier position vis-à-vis Greece inthe EU until it obtains full membership, it is not completely withoutinfluence in other Europe-related theatres such as NATO and OSCE.In the case of NATO, it enjoyed a temporary advantage between1974, when Greece withdrew from the NATO military structure, andOctober 1980, when it was allowed to reintegrate under the RogersPlan. According to this plan, it was agreed that two new headquarters(6th and 7th ATAF) were to be established respectively in I

.zmir and

Larissa, and command and control responsibilities in the Aegeanwould then be shared between them. However, Greek PremierPapandreou, after taking over the government in 1981, refused toproceed with the establishment of the command until the operationalresponsibilities of the two headquarters had been agreed. Later on,he declared the pre-1974 command and control delimitation as ‘non-negotiable’.37

What followed was a period of cross-vetoes in NATO, employedby both sides to the detriment of NATO’s structural developmentplans in the region. This bickering ended partly with the Yılmaz–Papulias agreement, signed on 27 May 1988 during the temporarythaw in relations after the Davos meeting between the two premiers.Among the agreed principles was the partial removal of reciprocalvetoes on NATO infrastructure plans. A major breakthrough wasachieved when both sides finally agreed to allow the establishmentof Larissa (with a Greek Commander and Turkish Chief of Staff) andI.zmir (with Turkish Commander and Greek Chief of Staff) com-

mands in September–October 1999.38 However, since then, the NATOcommand and control-related disagreements have remained as oneof the minor grounds of dispute between the two countries, evenafter the recent thaw as demonstrated during the Dynamic Mix-2000manoeuvres. The present disagreement appears to centre around theGreek insistence and Turkish refusal to file reports with the Greekcommand for state aircraft leaving Turkish airspace, and Greekattempts and Turkish protests to assign to NATO the Greek forcesbased on the Island of Limnos, which, according to Turkey, wouldamount to the acceptance of the militarization of the Aegean islandsby Greece.

It should also be remembered that both countries’ relations with


NATO have undergone change from the Cold War through détenteto the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War, the southernperiphery was a source of instability and turmoil. Many westernpolicy-makers, in fact, initially questioned whether it was wise toaccept Greece and Turkey into NATO.39 In the first decade after theirentry, however, these doubts significantly diminished as bothcountries vigorously cooperated with the Alliance, putting theirnational interests behind Alliance cohesion. Accordingly, NATO hadmore leverage then the EC over both countries during the Cold War,and, unlike the EC, put considerable pressure on them to reach asettlement. Again unlike the EU, NATO proved to be a valuableforum for conflict resolution and mediation, as well as a safety valvefor various tensions.

However, in the post-Cold War era, a number of extraregionalissues in contiguous areas and a growing potential for instability inthe Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus have affected thethreat perceptions of both countries. Most importantly, the collapseof the Soviet Union reduced the sense of threat felt by Turkey andGreece from the North. This sense of reduced threat, in turn, under-scored ‘the centrifugal trends on the southern periphery, which …have made both countries … less willing to contribute to collectivedefence’.40

In addition to NATO and the EU, the WEU (and later EuropeanSecurity and Defence Policy – ESDP) has become a playground forGreek-Turkish disagreement. Greece’s application to join the WEUat the end of 1988 was motivated mainly by its aim to gain greaterwest European support for its position vis-à-vis Turkey.41 However, it was asked by the WEU at a 1991 summit to provide ‘guaranteesthat it will never invoke some of the security provisions in thisorganization, a requirement at best contradictory and at worstdownright insulting against a full EC member’.42 Moreover, the EC’sdecision at Maastricht that Article 5 of the modified Treaty of Brussels– which provides a security guarantee in case of attack on members– should not be applied between member states of NATO and theWEU (in fact, the only conceivable future scenario that a conflictmight occur between the members of the two institutions was thatof a conflict between Greece and Turkey) caused considerableirritation in Athens and has somewhat diminished the importance ofWEU membership from Greece’s point of view.43


With the moves from EU to incorporate WEU into its ESDP, a newstrain was brought to bear on both Turkey’s European connectionand on Greek-Turkish relations. Being a member of NATO but not ofthe EU, Turkey’s position vis-à-vis ESDP (and later Common Foreignand Security Policy – CFSP) has been rather ambiguous, as it arguedfor the indivisibility of security, meaning that NATO should be themain organ for European security, and tried at the same time to avoidthe possibility of the planned EU force being used in any way toendanger Turkish interests. Thus Turkey demanded a more influ-ential position within the ESDP, holding up the process by refusingto allow indiscriminate use of NATO sources by the EU.

Greece, on the other hand, in an attempt to keep its options open,refused to accept Turkish reservations, a move that was interpretedin Turkey as yet another attempt by Greece to involve the EU intoGreek-Turkish relations, trying to use it against Turkey as leverage inthe Aegean or Cyprus to obtain concessions. However, as the issuewas hardly a bilateral one, the involvement of the EU and the US inthe negotiations had considerably eased the process, and finally anagreement between Turkey and the EU (thus Greece) was reached intime for the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, moving onemore thorny issue out of the way.44

Paradoxically, Greece has a stake in the success of Turkey’sEuropean aspirations, because ‘the process would tend to strengthenthe latter’s democratic institutions and minimize its assertiveness inits relations with its Western neighbor’.45 Although Turkey’s entryinto the EU has been postponed until 2005 at the earliest, Greeceshould continue to support Turkish entry, as Greece’s political andeconomic interests would be more easily served by a Turkey in theEU than a Turkey outside it.

BALKAN CONNECTION

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War,both Turkey and Greece have sought to improve their relations withthe other Balkan countries and have shown an interest in increasedregional cooperation. Beyond the fairly usual political, military andeconomic reasons, however, their earlier aim in pursuing an activepolicy in the Balkans appeared to gain support for their policy


objectives in their bilateral dispute and to avoid being outflanked byeach other.46

With their general efforts to increase security in the region, Greeceappeared to prefer multilateral relations while Turkey leant moretowards bilateral contacts. Although the intensive struggle of theGreek and Turkish leaders to gain the support of their neighbours fortheir own positions did not produce comparable returns, bilateraland multilateral cooperation, nevertheless, has motivated and helpedto bring about increased contact between Greece and Turkey which,in the longer term, paradoxically enhanced the prospect of mutuallybeneficial cooperation between the two countries. While this doesnot guarantee a speedy solution to the Greek-Turkish disputes, it atleast outlines the areas of common interests, thereby helping tonarrow the gap between them.

However, the past record of both countries on regional co-operation shows that even though they have been allies since 1952,they usually evaluate proposals for collaboration primarily with the‘other side’ in mind, and in time move into a zero-sum game.47 Thecrisis caused by the break-up of the former Yugoslavia has offered aunique example of how their mutual competition affects their foreignand security policy-making.

It was argued that the pro-Serbian policies of Greece during theBosnian crisis was in part affected by its perception of how theevolving situation might or might not work to Turkey’s advantage.48

Although close ties between the Greeks and Serbians have deephistorical roots, including a shared Orthodox heritage, the collapseof the former Yugoslavia has given these traditional ties a newdimension. First of all, Greece was uneasy about the idea of a newMuslim state almost on its border. The possibility of such an entityencouraged worst-case scenarios ‘because of the Greeks’ foregoneconclusion that a Muslim state, with positive roots in Ottomanhistory, would be friendly to Turkey’.49 Moreover, both Greece andSerbia shared a common concern about the emergence of an inde-pendent Macedonia as well as a desire to prevent the expansion ofTurkish influence in the Balkans. Accordingly, Serbia and the BosnianSerbs were supported by Greece. Similarly, Greece’s later detach-ment from Serbians also in part represented a lessening of fears thatTurkey would destabilize the balance of power in the Balkansthrough ties to Muslim and Turkish populations in the region.


The rapprochement between Bulgaria and Turkey after the adventof the Union of Democratic Forces to power in Bulgaria providedanother example of the regional alignments that have emerged withthe end of the Cold War. Since 1989, relations between Turkey andBulgaria have improved to unprecedented levels, as highlighted bythe signing in May 1992 of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.This rapprochement, on the other hand, had contributed to a tem-porary cooling of Sofia’s relations with Athens. Although relationshave improved since then, Athens remains suspicious about thepossibility that, at some point, Bulgaria, with Turkish support andencouragement, might raise claims against Greek territory. Greecehas, therefore, viewed the Bulgarian-Turkish rapprochement withsome misgivings.

During the Cold War, Turkey generally maintained a low profilein the Balkans which were largely regarded as of secondary impor-tance in its foreign and security policies. However, the end of theCold War has dramatically altered Turkey’s strategic environmentand she has started to play a more active role in Balkan affairs, as wellas in the Caucasus and Central Asia.50 One of the earlier indicationsof Turkey’s newly found interest in the Balkans was the Black SeaEconomic Cooperation initiative, which was basically Turkey’sresponse to its feeling of loneliness at the end of the Cold War, afterbeing ‘abandoned’ by the West (i.e. Europe).

On the other hand, the war in Bosnia has also increased thepressures on Ankara to play a more active role in the Balkans.Though Bosnia is several hundred miles from Turkey’s borders andthe Bosnian Muslims are not ethnic Turks, it seemed that Turkishpublic opinion had developed a feeling of kinship and responsibilityfor the Muslims left behind by the retreating Ottoman Empire fromthe Balkans after around five hundred years of domination. More-over, the existence of a substantial number of Bosnak, Turkish citizensof Bosnian origin, estimated at about four to five million, in Turkeyfurther increased the identification of Turkish people with theBosnian Muslims. As a result, Turkey lent strong political and moralsupport to the Bosnian Muslims and also stepped up militarycooperation with Albania. These moves reinforced fears in Athens ofthe emergence of an ‘Islamic arc’ in the Balkans on Greece’s northernborder.

Although both Greece and Turkey had declared in the wake of the


Cold War that they aimed for a strategic balance in the Balkans, theirearlier moves in the region were taken with one eye on the other. Asthey moved with the perception that the other side enjoyed astrategic advantage in the region, they invariably felt the need toamend this imagined strategic imbalance. As a result, both countriesworked to achieve a favourable strategic foothold in the Balkans overthe contested area, and the break-up of former Yugoslavia gave theirefforts a sense of urgency while at the same time complicatingmatters. For example, Greece objected to the deployment of Turkishsoldiers in Bosnia to join the IFOR/SFOR forces out of fear that theirpresence would ‘dangerously [destabilize the] balance of power inthe region’, then did not allow Turkish aircraft to fly over Greece ontheir way to join the NATO force against Serbia.51 However, adiminution of Balkan conflicts and an understanding that bothcountries have legitimate interests in the Balkans and that they arenot trying to undermine or circumvent the other in the region, haveallowed matters to cool down.

GREECE AND TURKEY; CAN THEY BE RECONCILED?

Greek-Turkish differences are not new, but as long as they remainunresolved there is a chance that some unforeseen incident couldtouch off a conflict. Continuing disputes over Cyprus, over theAegean, over membership of and association with the EU, in relationswith NATO and in areas of bilateral and multilateral relations withthe other states, all have the potential to threaten bilateral andregional security.

Yet, none of the issues outlined above is really insoluble; whatmakes them appear so obstinate is that ‘both sides bring to theproblem all their susceptibility to real or imagined humiliations.When a nation’s very being is staked on every detail, and every issueis infused with the collective memory of past hurts, even the best-meant efforts may be doomed to failure’.52 The actual situation inCyprus, for example, though far from ideal, represents a sort ofuneasy modus vivendi which lessens the likelihood of direct militaryconfrontation between Greece and Turkey. The Aegean disputes arealso soluble, ‘barring any major discoveries of oil’.53 The resolution ofthe air traffic control dispute in 1980 showed that they can cooperate


when rationality rules. Today, the two countries can agree todisagree, particularly because few material interests are involved andsome disputes have become less important with the ending of theCold War. Thus, it should be recognized by both sides that a militaryconfrontation cannot bring about desired results and is not worthany potential gain either side may make.

Irrationality, of course, is always a present element and war maystill break out between the two countries or relations may deterioratesharply. In this context, the experience of January 1996, when the twocountries almost came to blows over tiny and uninhabited Aegeanrocks, has not only raised concerns about the two countries’ abilityto prevent differences from escalating into a major crisis, but alsotheir ability to resolve them without engaging in direct militaryconfrontation.54 Yet, current trends, despite frequent flare-ups, tendto indicate that the two countries are doomed to cooperate, thoughbreaking the deadlock in the Greek-Turkish dispute will not be easy.In this effort, it might be a good idea to follow the path suggested byGreek Foreign Minister George Papandreou in his letter of 25 June1999 to his Turkish counterpart I

.smail Cem, responding to his call for

dialogue: ‘I strongly believe that we must adopt a realistic approachwhich will allow outstanding issues to be dealt with in sequencecreating thus both a strengthening sense of confidence in ourrelations and a perspective of further steps along the way.’55

Obviously, Turkey is not as preoccupied by Greece as Greece is byTurkey. Indeed, the feud with Greece is peripheral to Turkey’s mainconcerns, among which implementing economic, political andstructural reforms to catch up with European standards and findingways to come to terms with Kurdish nationalism at home nowassume a greater prominence.56 The general belief in Turkey, bothamong decision-makers and people at large, is that a bilateral dia-logue is necessary, and the issues are not irreconcilable, providedGreece is able to acknowledge Turkey’s legitimate fears and rights inthe Aegean and is ready to engage in a dialogue with Turkey without,at the same time, trying to score some point against her in the EU,NATO, the UN or in any other forum when Turkey temporarilyrelaxes its vigilance.

For the Turkish government, the basic parameter is the Treaty ofLausanne for any reconciliation in the Aegean. Turkey’s belief in thisregard is that the Lausanne Treaty established a delicate balance


between the two countries in the Aegean, and that Greece has beentrying for years to change that balance in its favour throughunilateral acts. ‘It is clear that if one of the littoral states unilaterallyextends its jurisdiction in the Aegean and deprives the other coastalstate from exercising its existing rights, it is no longer possible tospeak of the Lausanne balance in the Aegean.’57 According to theTurkish Foreign Ministry, the fundamental source of tension betweenTurkey and Greece ‘is the Greek perception to regard the entireAegean as a Greek sea in total disregard of Turkey’s legitimate rightsand vital interests’.58 On more practical issues, Turkish arguments areusually a mixture of legal and political views with frequent appealsto the principle of equity. In the worst-case scenario of Turkishdecision-makers, if Turkey feels that it will be boxed in because of anyGreek extension of territorial waters beyond six miles, then there willbe war; at best, the Aegean could become ‘an area of fruitfulcooperation between Greece and Turkey to their mutual benefit’.59

In general, the sovereignty of Greece in the Aegean is notchallenged by Turkey, though the argument that the Greek sover-eignty is not absolute as it is limited by international agreements isstated frequently.60 However, Greece does not appear prepared toadmit that Turkey might have a case, or something to fear. Greekfears, on the other hand, are based on the concern that its sovereigntyover its numerous Aegean islands could be circumscribed signifi-cantly by Turkish claims for equity, and are encouraged by consciousor unconscious misapprehensions about Turkey’s ‘aggressiveness’against Greece.61 It is obvious that, justified or unjustified, the fear ofTurkey rules the minds of Greeks. Thus, instead of trying to come toan understanding with Turkey on the basis of mutual equity andreciprocity, Greeks try to cling to a vigorous defence of their positionsin legal arguments. This, however, creates a suspicion in Turkey thatGreece does not wish to negotiate with Turkey; that its main aim is to enlarge its hold on the Aegean; and that it is continually tryingto undermine Turkey’s relations with other countries, especially in Europe; thus actually creating a more dangerous environment for both countries. So, we are back again to mutual suspicion andmistrust.

How we can break this vicious circle is not clear, though theunfortunate incidents of earthquakes helped, as they created ‘human’instead of ‘enemy’ images of the ‘other’. In the past, constraints,


imposed on both countries primarily by NATO and the US, havehelped to prevent hostilities between the two rivals. In general, ‘aslong as security in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle Eastcontinues to be high on the NATO agenda, Greece and Turkey willstill be under pressure not to jeopardize the solidarity of theAlliance’s southern flank’.62

However, it is generally accepted on both sides of the Aegean thatthe existing problems between the two countries cannot be solvedeasily or soon, so both sides have to learn to live with them. In themeantime, it is obvious that the problems must be taken up with anew and realistic approach, by isolating them from the emotionsstemming from history and the constraints imposed by temporaryconsiderations. Otherwise, there is no ground for optimism as longas the biggest achievement of efforts to solve the problems is to setup frequent summit meetings without obtaining any concreteresults. Leaders on both sides have to strive with new methods andimaginative ideas to overcome current bottlenecks and to make surethat ‘dialogue’ does not mean ‘cacophony’.

What is needed is a ‘means of exploring the problems in a non-negotiating, non-coercive, problem-solving framework so that thereare not winners and losers, but only winners’.63 In this context, thedevelopment of Greek-Turkish economic relations may be the mostimportant element in the long-term improvement of relations. Thesethen can lay the groundwork for a broader political dialogue at a laterdate (see Liargovas’ contribution to this volume).

It is clear that the improvement of Greek-Turkish relationsdepends on mutually sustained efforts of both sides. Although in thepast, one or the other side seemed reluctant to rise to the challenge,either because it considered the existing status quo to be in its favouror was constrained by domestic and/or international pressures, it istime now to move beyond traditional suspicions and fears toward amore favourable atmosphere of understanding and reconciliation. Inthis context, the groundwork has already been laid down by theimprovements in relations since 1999.

The positive tone that Greece adopted in its foreign policy ingeneral after the establishment of the Simitis government in January1996 had enabled Turkey to hope for some improvement in relations.Since then the somewhat aggressive image and tone of contem-porary Greek politics, embodied by the late Andreas Papandreou,


together with his strident nationalistic and confrontational remarks,have been changing, and with them many obstructive aspects of thecountry’s domestic and foreign policy.64 Behind this change lies theunderstanding in Greece for the first time that it is part of Europeand that its political and economic success is ‘wholly dependent onthe extent to which it chooses to cultivate its relationship with theEuropean Union’.65 This realization has eased Greece’s perceivedinsecurity over its identity crisis between Europe and the East, whichcreated a defensive and sometimes antagonistic attitude towards itsregional neighbours. As a result, Greece avoided using its veto toprevent Turkish candidature for full EU membership at the HelsinkiSummit of December 1999, opening the way for rapprochementbetween the two countries. Greece has continued its policy ofengagement since then and was among the few EU states, during theEU Copenhagen Summit of 12–13 December 2002, that supportedTurkey’s bid for a date to begin accession negotiations.

Similarly, it is the same differences that in part postpone Turkey’shopes for obtaining full EU membership. When one considers thedevelopments in western Europe since Greece became an EUmember in 1981, the inescapable conclusion is that, in terms of powerpolitics, the relationship between Greece and Turkey has beenchanging to the advantage of the former (see Mehmet’s contributionto this volume). Thus, many in Turkey now realize that it has toovercome its fear of ‘giving-in’, thus ‘losing-out’, on issues of nationalimportance. As a result, Turkey now appears to be determined toadapt EU Copenhagen criteria, including improving its relationswith neighbouring countries. The widespread changes of Turkishlegislature since the autumn of 2002 represent Turkey’s determin-ation and provide further hopes for the enhancement of Greek-Turkish rapprochement.

There is a responsibility for Greece, too, to keep Turkey within theEuropean domain, if nothing else, simply because a Turkey insideEurope constitutes a lesser threat for Greece than a Turkey out-flanked and left outside. It is clear that ‘the exclusion of Turkey fromthe perspective of European unification does not secure even one of Greece’s strategic interests’.66 On the contrary, the geostrategicposition of the two countries overlaps with regard to security andstability in the region; thus, they are weakened if both countries donot share common aims.


Although the domestic political upheaval in Turkey in the secondhalf of 2002 somewhat stalled the dialogue between the twocountries, which remained low key until the advent of the AKP intopower in November 2003, significantly the talks ‘without an agenda’between experts that started on 12 March 2002, have continuedunimpeded. After the elections, the conciliatory approach of the AKPleadership towards Greek-Turkish relations and solving the Cyprusproblem was warmly welcomed in Athens, though the party has notyet been able to provide Turkish public opinion with the necessaryconviction that it would find ways to further Turkey’s relations withGreece without actually harming its national interests in the Aegeanor Cyprus.

It is clear that the fundamental interests of both countries lie inpeace and cooperation, not confrontation. It is literally absurd tohave the sky over the Aegean Sea shadowed by military aircraft whileboth countries stand to benefit from developing friendly and good-neighbourly relations. Thus, they have to overcome the memories ofpast injustices. History is history and there are reasons for every-thing. But in this day and age, when not just a century but a millen-nium has come to an end, the way to proceed should be forward, notbackward.

NOTES

1. Sükrü Sina Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut I.çinde Türk-Yunan I

.liskileri, 1821–1993 (Turkish-Greek

Relations in Historical Context, 1821–1993) (Ankara: Ümit, 1993), p. 10.2. See for example, Peter Kincaid Jensen, ‘The Greco-Turkish War, 1920–1922’,

International Journal of Middle East Studies, 10, 4 (1979), pp. 553–65.3. A. J. R. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey: A Treadmill for Diplomacy’, in John T.

A. Koumoulides (ed.), Cyprus in Transition, 1960–1985 (London: Trigraph, 1986), p. 152.

4. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut I.çinde Türk-Yunan I

.liskileri, p. 11.

5. Richard Clogg, ‘The Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey’ in Richard Clogg (ed.),Greece in the 1980s (New York: St Martin’s, 1980), p. 141.

6. Claire Spencer, Turkey between Europe and Asia, Wilton Park Paper (London: HMSO,1993), p. 17.

7. In mid-1980s, ‘90% of the Greeks believed that Turkey threatens Greece’. SeePanayote E. Dimitras, ‘Greece: A New Danger’, Foreign Policy, 58 (Spring 1985), p. 137.Moreover, 63 per cent of the Greeks expressed distrust of Turks. See Jean Catsiapis,‘L’attitude de la Grèce face a le demande d’adhésion de la Turquie aux CommunautésEuropéennes’, CEMOTI, 8 (1989), p. 116. See also Ifantis’, Chapter 10 this volume.

8. Clogg, ‘The Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey’, p. 143.9. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut I

.çinde Türk-Yunan I

.liskileri, p 13.

10. Stephan F. Larrabee, ‘The Southern Periphery; Greece and Turkey’, in Paul S. Shoup


(ed.), Problems of Balkan Security: Southeastern Europe in the 1990s (Washington: WilsonCenter Press, 1990), p. 175.

11. For Greece’s NATO policies see Van Coufoudakis, ‘Greek-Turkish Relations,1973–1983: The View from Athens’, International Security, 9, 4 (1985), p. 212.

12. Larrabee, ‘The Southern Periphery; Greece and Turkey’, p. 188.13. Ibid., p. 89; Aurel Braun, Small State Security in the Balkans (London: Macmillan, 1983),

p. 237.14. As the discussion of these issues will be crudely simplified here, for more detailed

and detached review see Andrew Wilson, The Aegean Dispute, Adelphi Paper, No. 155(London: IISS, 1980). For the presentation of the positions taken by Turkey andGreece on their bilateral disputes see Duygu B. Sezer, Turkey’s Security Policies,Adelphi Paper, No. 164 (London: IISS, 1981); Thanos Veremis, Greek Security: Issuesand Politics, Adelphi Paper, No. 179 (London: IISS, 1982); Theodore A. Couloumbis,The US, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1983); and TozunBahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955 (Boulder: Westview, 1990).

15. Marcia Christoff Kurop, ‘Greece and Turkey: Can They Mend Fences?’, Foreign Affairs,77, 1 (January–February 1998), p. 8.

16. Under the present 6-mile limit, Greece holds approximately 43.5 per cent of theAegean Sea and Turkey 7.7 per cent, the remaining 49 per cent being high seas. Shouldthe 12-mile limit be applied, the Greek territorial waters in the Aegean will increaseto 71.5 per cent whereas Turkey’s share will increase to 8.7 per cent, and the area ofhigh seas will be drastically reduced to 19.7 per cent, which will also be fragmenteddue to the existence of Greek islands. See Wilson, The Aegean Dispute, pp. 36–7.

17. For the official Turkish view on this issue see Turkish Foreign Ministry’s home pageat [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/ege.html], p. 3.

18. The Aegean territorial waters issue is also linked with Cyprus in the sense that in caseof Turkey’s inability to use its principal harbours in the Aegean because of ‘enemycontrol’ of the Aegean Sea, Turkish ships could still reach to open seas from easternMediterranean ports so long as the island of Cyprus, which could block thenavigation in the area, is controlled by a friendly government. Hence, the very samefear, which prompted Turkey to declare the extension of Greek territorial waters inthe Aegean as casus belli, also encouraged its resistance to Enosis (union of Cypruswith Greece) since 1950s.

19. US Congress, Senate, Turkey’s Problems and Prospects: Implications for US Interests.Report prepared by the CRS of the Library of Congress, 3 March 1980, p. 53.

20. In late February 1987, Greece announced it would take control of the Canadian-ledinternational North Aegean Petroleum Consortium, which had drilling permits innorthern Aegean. Later on, when Greece ordered the National Oil Company to startdrilling outside Greece’s territorial waters, a controversial move in Turkey’s view,Turkey, too, issued permits to the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Company for soilexploration in a number of disputed regions, including the Gulf of Saros and theareas near the Greek island of Lesvos. The then Greek Premier Papandreouresponded by warning that Greek armed forces would ‘teach the Turks a hard lesson’.Turkey reacted by declaring that any Greek attempt to harass a Turkish researchvessel would meet retaliation. The controversy was defused when Turkish PremierÖzal restricted the research to Turkish territorial waters and Papandreou returnedto the status quo ante, but not before the dispute led the two countries to the brinkof war for the first time since 1974.

21. Wilson, The Aegean Dispute, pp. 4 and 30; Couloumbis, The US, Greece and Turkey, p. 118.

22. See [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/ege.html], p. 8.23. The islands concerned are the Eastern Aegean Islands of Lemnos, Samothrace,

Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria in addition to the 12 Dodecanese islands.24. Veremis, Greek Security: Issues and Politics, pp. 123–4.25. Larrabee, ‘The Southern Periphery; Greece and Turkey’, p. 190.


26. A detailed discussion of the Cyprus issue is beyond the scope of this paper. For acomprehensive background study, see Robert McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus,Adelphi Paper, No. 234 (London: IISS, 1988–89); and Chapter 4 of this volume, pp. 95–120.

27. Kurop, ‘Greece and Turkey; Can They Mend Fences?’, p. 9.28. Quoted from Van Coufoudakis, ibid.29. Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, Article 8b states: ‘The

European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accessionof Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by thecompletion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will bemade without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take accountof all relevant factors.’

30. Veremis, Greek Security: Issues and Politics, p. 130.31. See Ellen B. Laipson, Cyprus: Status of UN Negotiations (Washington: CRS, Library of

Congress, 1990).32. Andrew Mango, Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role (Washington: Praeger, 1994),

p. 127.33. Ibid.34. Given its direct relationship with all the parties concerned, it is no small wonder how

the EU had been kept out of entanglement in the complicated issues surroundingthe island of Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish disputes. Greece became an associatemember of the then EC in November 1962 and has been a full member since January1981. Turkey and the ‘Cyprus Republic’ are associate members, having signedagreements with the Community in December 1964 and December 1972, respec-tively. A customs union protocol between Greek Cypriots and the EC was signed in1987 and between Turkey and EU in March 1995. Cyprus is due to become a fullmember in spring 2004.

35. Constantine Melakopides, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey from the EuropeanCommunity Perspective’ in Christos P. Ioannides (ed.), Cyprus: Domestic Dynamics,External Constraints (New York: de Caratzas, 1992), p. 67.

36. ‘In the view of the Commission, specific steps will need to be taken … [to ensure]that the examination of the Greek application for membership will not affect relationsbetween the Community and Turkey and that the rights guaranteed by theAssociation Agreement with Turkey would not be affected thereby.’ Bulletin of theEuropean Communities, Supplement, 2/76, p. 7.

37. For Papandreou’s speech in Athens Home Service, 5 December 1985, see BBC, SWB,11 December 1985, C/4.

38. See Güven Özalp, ‘Yunanistan’da Türk Generali’, Milliyet, 4 October 1999; and MuratI.lem, ‘Yunanistan’da Bir Türk Komutan’, Cumhuriyet, 6 Ekim 1999, p. 8, at:

[http://www.nato.org.tr/pressreleases/pressreleases/reflagging.htm].39. Larrabee, ‘The Southern Periphery; Greece and Turkey’, p. 175.40. Ibid., p. 177.41. Larrabee, ‘The Southern Periphery; Greece and Turkey’, p. 181.42. Jonathan Eyal, ‘A Force for Good in a Cauldron of Turmoil’, The European, 3–6

September 1992.43. Veremis, Greek Security: Issues and Politics, p. 125.44. Turkey essentially secured a commitment that the European rapid reaction force,

planned to be established in 2003, will not be involved in the Aegean and Cyprus,and will obtain NATO approval on case by case when it plans to use NATO assets.Ankara obtained this concession only after it clearly threatened to block thedevelopment of CFSP connection to NATO.

45. Veremis, Greek Security: Issues and Politics, 129.46. Larrabee, ‘The Southern Periphery; Greece and Turkey’, p. 91; Braun, Small State

Security in the Balkans, p. 246.47. Duygu Sezer in Vojtec Mastany and Craig R. Nation (eds), Turkey Between East and


West: New Challenges for a Rising National Power (Boulder: Westview, 1996), p. 83.48. Ibid., p. 84.49. Ibid.50. For an analysis of the Turkish position in the Balkans after the end of the Cold War,

see Gareth Winrow, Where East Meets West: Turkey and the Balkans (London: AlliancePublishers, 1993).

51. Danopoulos, ‘Turkey and the Balkans: Searching for Stability’, p. 217.52. Norbert Kohlhase, ‘The Greco-Turkish Conflict from a European Community

Perspective’, The World Today, 37, 4 (April 1981), p. 130.53. Braun, Small State Security in the Balkans, p. 248.54. Danopoulos, ‘Turkey and the Balkans: Searching for Stability’, p. 214.55. For the texts of both letters see [http://www.greekturkishforum.org/documents.htm].56. Mango, Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role, p. 122; Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and

Turkey: A Treadmill for Diplomacy’, p. 147.57. See [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/agean.html], p. 1.58. See [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/ege.html].59. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey: A Treadmill for Diplomacy’, p. 148.60. Ibid., p. 147.61. Ibid.62. Danopoulos, ‘Turkey and the Balkans: Searching for Stability’, p. 214.63. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey: A Treadmill for Diplomacy’, p. 147.64. R. J. Gutman, ‘Greek Foreign Policy’, Europe, 370 (October 1997), p. 16; Daniel N.

Nelson, Balkan Imbroglio: Politics and Security in Southern Europe (Boulder: Westview,1991), p. 97.

65. Kurop, ‘Greece and Turkey; Can They Mend Fences?’, p. 7.66. Theodore Psalidopoulos, ‘The Hour of Truth and Responsibility in a Changing

World; Greek-Turkish Relations after Luxembourg’, Perceptions, 3, 2 (June–August1998), p. 111.


2National Perception of the

‘Other’ and the Persistence ofSome ImagesHERCULES MILLAS

The problems in Greek-Turkish relations are generally perceived asa series of political and military controversies directly or indirectlyconnected to economic interests and to security concerns. True as this observation may be, there is still a more complex framework inwhich the bilateral relationships can be envisaged and which can also provide an explanation for the persistence of these unresolveddisputes: due to historical reasons each party conceives the ‘other’ asa prospective threat or as a challenge to its identity and interpretseach of his actions accordingly, creating a vicious circle where thenational perceptions and the negative images concerning the ‘other’dictate the vigilant attitude of ‘ours’ and which in turn also aggra-vates the attitude to the ‘other’. As John W. Burton has written‘Conflict, like all relationships, is a perceived relationship.’1

This chapter will try to demonstrate how the image of the ‘other’in each country is constructed and reproduced in three differentspheres: (1) in textbooks, where the most ‘official’ discourse is en-countered, (2) in historiography, i.e. within the academic world, and(3) in literary texts and more specifically in the novels of the twocountries where more widespread opinions are voiced. The image ofthe ‘other’, its development in time, its variants and its peculiarities,give information with respect to the conflict, to the perceptions of itsparticipants and to the expected future behavior of the parties. Thisknowledge will be used to make some suggestions for the improve-ment of the bilateral relations.2

TEXTBOOKS AND NATION BUILDING

The founding of the two nation-states, Greece in 1831 and Turkey in1923, also marked the beginning of a new mission in educating thecitizens in accordance with the targets of these new states. Thepresentation of the ‘other’ as the national enemy was quite an easyand a persuasive task since in both cases the liberation war wasfought against the ‘other’. One of the targets was the strengtheningof national identity and the ‘historical enemy’ played a decisive role:united ‘us’ against the ‘other’. The enmity can be traced back a fewdecades, but still education played its role in reinforcing it.

All studies on Greek textbooks show that up to very recent timesthese books recreated a negative image of the neighbouring nation,the Turks. The ‘other’ is an ‘enemy’ with barbaric characteristics –rude warriors, uncivilized, invaders, etc. – an anathema that causedthe slavery of the nation for many centuries. The students are pre-sented with acts of violence (massacres, forced conversion to Islam,etc.) performed by the Turks, described in very vivid language. TheTurks are also unethical: sneaky, dishonest, etc. The Greeks are theopposite of all these: almost the perfect race. Alexis Heraclides, whoconducted the first study on Greek textbooks and the image of the Turks in 1980, concludes that this ethnocentric approach createsnational stereotypes that harm the students and renders difficult thesolution of bilateral relations.3

Turkish textbooks are almost a mirror image of the above: theTurks are perfect and the Greeks, who hate and massacre the Turks,carry many negative characteristics: they are unreliable, unfaithful,cunning, insatiable, etc.4 A major metaphor is voiced directly orinsinuated in all Turkish textbooks. Turkish rule in the Christian landswas magnanimous but the Greeks did not appreciate the toleranceshown to heterodox minorities, revolted and eventually establisheda state, the main target of which is to create a wide empire, the ancientByzantine Empire anew at the expense of Turkish lands. This Greekproject is known in Turkey as the Megali Idea and its name is derivedfrom the nationalistic ideal that aroused an irredentist ideologyamong the Greeks especially in the years 1904–1922.5 The past is usedto explain the present but also to make predictions for the future.

The similarities are easier to detect. The Manichaean dualism of ‘we are good and superior; the other is malicious’ seems to


run through all nationalistic parlance. The peculiarities, however,point to what is special and worth discovering in each case. Thedifferences bring forth the traits out of which each nation is made.The dissimilarities distinguish one nation from the other, not only onan ‘us–other’ basis – which in actuality is the outcome of otherparameters, not the cause of the distinction but a side effect of it –but on a basis of different perceptions of the environment, past andpresent.

The Greek community seems to face a query with respect toTourkokratia, the centuries-long Turkish rule (‘occupation’ in Greek),and the extended ‘slavery’ of the nation. This prolonged ethnicsubjugation is justified by exaggerating the size and the violentaspect of the dominating ‘other’: Turks normally are pictured as‘barbaric hordes’. The war of independence is an act of resurrectionof the nation, a transition from darkness to light. The existence of anegative ‘other’ appears as indispensable both to justify therevolution for ‘liberty’ and to vindicate the ‘slavery’.

The Turkish side, on the other hand, faces insecurity with respectto sovereignty rights. The modern Greeks – and the western histori-ography in general – developed a thesis according to which modernGreeks are shown as the reborn ancient Greeks and Byzantines, and, for some, therefore the heirs of their lands. Turkish textbooksdeveloped a series of defence lines based on various interpreta-tions of historical past. In the 1930s, a ‘Turkish History Thesis’ wasdeveloped and publicized mostly through the textbooks, claimingthat all the nations of Eurasia, the ancient Greeks included, wereevolved from ancient Turks.6 Later this thesis was attenuated and onlythe people of Anatolia were presented as ancestors of the presentTurks. Thus the Turkish textbooks present the Ionians devoid of anyGreek characteristic. The history of the Byzantine Empire, whichlasted over a thousand years in Anatolia and the lands and the peopleof which the Ottomans inherited, are almost completely passed overin these textbooks.

The Greeks seem to develop a historical consciousness where the‘other’ is constantly brought to mind in order to justify the past andfoster the present national identity, and the Turks seem to silence agreat part of history to strengthen the legitimacy of national sover-eignty. In both cases uneasiness, doubt and fear become apparentespecially when the recent major changes that occurred in these

NATIONAL PERCEPTION OF THE ‘OTHER’ 55

textbooks are critically examined. The negative attributes of the‘other’ have been drastically reduced; adjectives such as ‘murderers’and ‘fanatics’ do not appear in the textbooks any more, probablymostly due to the criticism that came from third parties. However,the general approach with respect to the past and to the ‘other’ hasnot changed. Both sides still do not attribute any positive charac-teristics to the neighbouring nation, or anything negative to theirown part, and the narrative is egocentric. The Turkish side, in the lastfew years, stresses even more the dangers that the country faces dueto irredentist plans of neighbouring countries (mostly withoutspecifying names). The ideological paradigm of a thousand-year-oldsuperior nation of ‘ours’ is still paramount, though can now be tracedonly in frequent hints. Students would have to complete the missingpart from other sources that the community provides: histori-ography, literature, oral history, media, movies, etc.

HISTORIOGRAPHY CONSTRUCTS A NATIONAL PAST

The historiography of the two nation-states in question, especiallyduring the dawn of the ‘nation’, is not much different from the story-telling of history textbooks. In fact, there are cases where an almostperfect harmony is noticed between the textbooks and the ‘officially’and usually ‘academically’ accepted historiography. The main differ-ence is encountered mostly in the style and in the mode of expressionrather than in the essence of what is inferred. The textbook is a simpleversion of a more detailed history thesis or, inversely, historiographyis an extended version of a text that appeared first in a textbook. The historiography can be broadly classified as ‘popular’ when theauthors are semi-professional historians or ‘academic’ when thewriters stick closer to the requirements of the academic community.Naturally, the discourse varies, some are clearly advocates of anational thesis, of an ethnic credo; others adhere to academic norms,and then a more reserved language is used and the characterizationsare kept to the minimum. Competence, both in research and inexpression, varies according to individual capacity.

Greek and Turkish historians who produce works on Greek-Turkish relations, except some rare cases, are annoyingly predictable.The conclusion and the message are almost always the same: ‘we’


had a historic course that was in general fair and honourable,contrary to the ‘other’s’. As I tried to demonstrate on anotheroccasion, four Greek and four Turkish eminent historians, who wroteon the situation in the Balkans during the Ottoman advance in thefifteenth and sixteenth century reached completely opposite con-clusions: the Turks claimed that the Ottomans were well received bylocal Christians, ‘as saviours’, the locals were treated with justice andtolerance, and after the conquest the economy of the area developedand the people were satisfied or happy (depending on the degree ofenthusiasm the historian chooses to express his views). The Greeks,on the contrary, reached the ‘scientific conclusion’ that the localsreacted to the invasion, revolted repeatedly against the intruder whoresorted to harsh measures and that the economy deterioratedcausing suffering and even starvation of the Christian and Greekpopulation.7 When the narration approaches more recent events, thediscrepancy increases, as for example is the case with the Cyprusproblem.

A closer examination of the texts brings to light the manner (thesystem) with which the historians manage to reach such contra-dictory results. Actually the Greeks prefer to propound the situationduring the conquest and of the later periods, when the Ottoman Statefaced economic problems and revolts. The Turkish side ‘notices’ andconsiders as ‘typical’ the peaceful periods of the ‘classical period’.Another example of this system of selective (and national) histori-ography is noticed when the status of the millets, i.e. the non-Muslimcommunities, is considered. The Turkish side points to the ‘laws’ and‘principles’ that were laid down by the state to protect the well-beingand the rights of the millets; accepting that there were cases wherethe dignitaries or the masses violated the ‘laws’ and harmed themillets. The Greeks evaluate the same situation by changing thecriteria for judging a situation. They say that the dignitaries and the Muslim masses could at any time harm the non-Muslims eventhough there were some rights but only on a ‘theoretical’ base.Irrespective of whether this approach is chosen consciously or not,the end result does not change: each side develops a nationalhistoriography and two diametrically different past periods.

There are two small categories of historians and writers of historyof other disciplines, such as political scientists, economists, andsociologists, etc. who differ. They are critical of ‘our’ history and


especially of the state apparatus and to its practices. Traditionallysome Marxists who mostly appeared in the second quarter of thetwentieth century in Greece and in the third quarter in Turkey, onthe one hand, and some liberal historians much later, distancedthemselves from the official and traditional academic approach.8

Even though few, they have been influential. Their common startingpoint is the modern interpretation of the nation. Accepting therelatively recent appearance of the nations they enabled themselves,(1) to distance their present community and themselves from all realor imaginary controversies of the distant past, (2) to feel innocent ofand irresponsible for the past wrongdoings of ‘ancestors’, since forthem the continuity of the nation did not have a major significance,(3) to consider the ‘other’ innocent of the unhappy past too, since heis also a member of a new community, and finally (4) not to refrainfrom criticizing the wrongdoings of ‘our’ (imagined) side since theidentification is not immediate any more. Some of these academicsdeveloped various common projects with their counterparts of the‘other’ country.9 Here, however, we will deal only with the maintrend in each country since this main trend determines largely thecourse of Greek-Turkish relations.

NOVELS REVEAL COMMUNAL VISIONS

The first Greek novel circulated in 1834, five years after the estab-lishing of the Greek national state, whereas the first Turkish novel in1872, three decades prior to the dawn of the Turkish nationalistmovement of Young Turks and fifty years before the establishmentof the Turkish national state.10 The first consequence of this incon-gruity of nationalism and of the novel becomes apparent in the waythe ‘other’ is portrayed in the literary texts of the two respectivecommunities. In the first Greek novels the ‘Turks’ are presented as (meaning they are perceived as) a nation, stereotypically, withcommon negative characteristics and as the historical enemy. In thefirst Turcophone novels however, i.e. when national identity was notdominant within the Ottoman society, the Greeks did not appear asa political issue and whenever some Greeks appeared they were notidentified as members of a nation, as the ‘other’, but only as (‘neutral’)citizens of the Ottoman state.11 Some Turkish novelists who did not


exhibit a negative ‘other’ in their texts are Semsettin Sami, AhmetMithat, Halit Ziya and Recaizade Ekrem.12

Greek authors, such as I. Pitsipios, Gr. Palaiologos, St. Ksenos, D. Vikelas and A. Papadiamantis, portrayed a negative Turk who isin confrontation with ‘us’ right after 1834. On the Turkish side, thefirst writers to portray a negative ‘Greek’ were Ömer Seyfettin, HalideEdip and Yakup Kadri, and who started publishing their works in thesecond decade of the twentieth century. This tendency persistedthroughout the twentieth century in both countries. From there on, nationalism existed not only as an ideology and as a politicalmovement but also as a rhetoric that ran across all kinds of texts:textbooks, historiography, literature, newspapers, etc. This nationaldiscourse undertook to legitimize all military and/or political actionsagainst the ‘other’, who was portrayed stereotypically as an enemy,as a source of various political problems (a threat to ‘our’ freedom),as very different from ‘us’ and as a negative character (dishonest,violent, etc.).

During periods of better bilateral relations and within a morerelaxed international milieu the negative image of the ‘other’ isrelatively improved, while still preserving his/her main traits. How-ever, a closer inspection reveals that even this positive ‘other’ is acharacter who is completely assimilated and has become one of ‘us’;he has actually lost his ethnic identity: he thinks, feels and behaveslike ‘us’. I call these characters ‘naively positive’ because naivetécharacterizes the concept of a positive ‘other’, who actually no longerexists.13

This naively positive ‘other’ is especially in abundance when the‘other’ appears as a woman. Women play a special role in national-istic discourse. They do not directly participate in the interethnicfights and therefore they are perceived acting as criteria that indicatethe righteous side. Their preference counts. They normally fall inlove with ‘us’ and prefer ‘our men’. In the novels of the two countries– in real life of course the case is different – among 200 cases of loveaffairs between Greeks and Turks, it is always the women of the‘other’ who prefer to unite with ‘our men’. Cases to the contrary are– according to my findings – completely absent.14 Among the variousreasons that may exist for this sensitivity with respect to our/theirwomen may be the fact that traditionally the wars were marked withthe enslavement of the women of the ‘other’ ending up being the


wives of the ‘other’, as war trophies. Symbolically the marriage of‘our woman’ to the ‘other’ may be a sign of defeat. Whatever thereason, the role assigned to women in nationalistic rhetoric is directlyassociated with national identity and it reveals this identity morethan any other parameter.

The political situation and the wars between the two countries(the war of 1897, the Balkan Wars of 1912–1914, the Greek-Turkishclash of 1919–1922) are not enough to explain the negative image ofthe ‘other’. The literary texts do not ‘take a photograph’ of the actualenvironment of the writers but ‘sketch’ the ‘other’ in accordance witha nationalist ideology and a constructed past, irrespective of personalexperiences. A comparison of the image of the ‘other’ in the memoirsand in the novels of three Turkish authors is revealing. In theirmemoirs, where real and concrete events are narrated, the Greeksare almost all ‘normal’ and positive personalities, whereas in thenovels, written by the same authors and at the same period, they areall, almost without exception, extremely negative.15 This negativeimage is in harmony with the images of the ‘other’ encountered intextbooks and historiography.

There are, however, as it is also the case with the historians, a smallnumber of authors who do not exactly follow the recipe. Their caseis revealing. It helps in understanding the dynamics that create and reproduce the stereotypes. Greek writers who actually met andlived with the Turks portray a much more realistic picture of the‘other’ relative to the authors who sketch an imaginary ‘other’.16

Some Greek writers, who lived in Asia Minor within the Ottomanlands and closer to the Turks, were I. Venezis, Str. Mirivilis, N. Politisand M. Iordanidou. These authors wrote mostly about recent times,about their experiences (1890–1950). Writers who lived only in Greeklands, e.g. M. Karagatsis, Th. Kastanakis, P. Prevelakis, and distancedfrom Turks, wrote about ‘historical’ Turks, about imagined Turks and‘old times’ (sixteenth to early nineteenth century). Literary charactersand events that are drawn from ‘life’, in other words heroes who areinspired by concrete personalities, are much more balanced andportray complex and realistic characters. It should be rememberedthat the same trend is noticed in Turkish literature too. PositiveGreeks are encountered either in memoirs, where mostly ‘real’characters are portrayed, or in literary texts based on actual experi-ence and on concrete encounter with the ‘other’, as is the case of Sait


Faik, of Resat Nuri Güntekin, Demir Özlü, Sevgi Soysal and manyothers. These writers do not present ‘historical’ characters but modernand real characters.17

JUDGEMENTS ARE PERCEPTIONS

In practice, the bearers of stereotypes, of prejudices, of perceptions,of ideological bias, naturally do not perceive them as such – if theyhad done so, they would have abandoned them – but as soundjudgements, as knowledge, as a result of analysis, as realistic evalu-ations, etc. The addressees of the textbooks, of historiography, ofliterature mentioned above, experience these as a source of infor-mation. They do not simply believe in them, they perceive ‘truth’ interms of the paradigm created by them. Each nation has its owninterpretation of the past, and more precisely, each community thathas a particular view with respect to its (imagined) past, forms itsseparate nation. The fact of being in harmony with these texts, butalso with other commonly accepted sources, such as newspapers,films, etc.18 which are dominant in a community, signals an identity,in our case a Greek and a Turkish national identity. Those who donot fully comply with the communally accepted ‘truths’ either havenot yet acquired a national consciousness, try to introduce a newparadigm (a new frame of relationships), or because they are bearersof another national identity.

Both Greek and Turkish societies have an understanding of the‘other’ which manifests itself in various texts, as shown above.Textbooks are primarily instruments of education and, as such, theyshow the intentions and the frame of understanding of the states andgovernments; but at the same time they are documents that exhibitnational perceptions. So are historiography and literary texts. The‘other’ in both the Greek and in the Turkish case is, in general,negative, even though there are various cases that prove the oppo-site. The general trend is to see the ‘other’ as an unreliable neighbour.The ‘other’ is perceived and portrayed either as an enemy, as aninvader, as a potential danger; or, as a product of wishful thinking,as a ‘domesticated other’, as a ‘naively positive other’.

All indications point to the existence of some psychologicalproblems in each society with respect to the image of the ‘other’. The


problems seem to exist with the parties as well and not only ‘betweenthe countries’. Various other studies and some opinion polls confirmthese findings.19 Individuals and nations do not behave ‘rationally’but according to socially determined feelings and perceptions.Communal identities influence these perceptions that operate asjudgements, which in turn, in a vicious circle, are used to evaluatethe behaviour and the views of the ‘other’ negatively, not allow-ing the overcoming of the ‘security dilemmas’ and of bilateralcontroversies.

With the above in mind, there are two groups of questions to bedealt with. First, since our perceptions limit and direct our judge-ments, is it possible for Greeks and Turks to perceive the ‘other’positively or neutrally? How do we explain the friendly manifes-tations between Greeks and Turks that appeared after the earthquakeof 1999 and the rapprochement of Papandreou-Cem? How can theybe interpreted? Second, how can the cases in literary texts whereGreeks and Turks perceive a really positive ‘other’ be explained? Can these cases disclose the pathway leading away from stereotypesand all related paraphernalia? How will nationalistic dilemmas beovercome?

OVERCOMING SECURITY AND ‘OTHER’ DILEMMAS

The friendly feelings between Greeks and Turks that inspired the twosocieties right after the earthquake in Turkey in August 1999 came asa surprise to many. Individuals and NGOs showed unprecedentedsigns of affection and amiable feelings. Mutual visits increasedconsiderably. In the same period the foreign ministers of the twocountries started a policy of détente and decreased the politicaltension to a considerable degree.

There are two schools of thought in each country (it makes fourin total!) that advance an optimistic and a pessimistic interpretationof the phenomenon respectively. The pessimists are more cynical andcloser to traditional evaluations. They see only a political manoeuvreand the masses only responding, as obedient subjects, to the greenlight given by the politicians. For them, the two states saw theatmosphere of the earthquakes – the misery that moved the citizens;


the heroic acts of the ‘other’ saving ‘our’ people, etc. – as anopportunity to advance their tactics. The (pessimist) Greeks believethat Turkey took advantage of this manoeuvre and made one moredecisive step towards joining the European Union without makingany concession; and the (pessimist) Turks believe that Greecemanaged to transfer the Greek-Turkish disputes to the EU forumhaving Turkey confronting the whole Union instead of only Greece.Naturally both of these groups are not happy with these so ‘friendly’relations and they see them either as romantic exaggerations or assneaky traps of the ‘other’.

Some other Turks perceived Greece as having regretted her pastpolicy and, seeing the earthquakes occasion as an opportunity, tryingnow to comply with Turkey’s ‘reasonable’ demands. These Turkssoon started feeling disappointed. Naturally there are Greeks whoperceived the Turkish side in the same way and soon felt that ‘theTurks never actually change and insist on their traditional politicallines’. Some saw the Greeks sharing a sense of superiority given theopportunity of helping the ‘enemy’ who is clearly in need. In shortthe pessimists saw only self-interest in a zero-sum game in everysingle action of the ‘other’. Some Turks might have expressed theiradmiration for the Greeks but only to criticize and irritate their ownstate dignitaries: ‘Even the Greeks behaved so nicely helping us,whereas you …’

The optimists (even though they may accept that most of theabove is correct) gave attention to the positive atmosphere createdbetween the two communities and much less to the immediate andshort-term political consequences. The improvements in this spherein the long term would bring only positive results to both parties.The trust created, the changing image of the ‘other’, the decrease of xenophobia, of paranoia, of phobias on national security haveliberating effects on the citizens. The less the tension, the better thethinking.

As for the explanation of the phenomenon – the views vary. Some,mistakenly, see the ‘other’ eventually recognizing ‘us’ as worthy ofappreciation, esteem and love. In other words they see ‘naivelypositive others’, those who ‘love us because we deserve it’. Othersbelieve that all the mishaps were caused by the politicians (of the‘other’ side). The politicians changed, so the situation has changed.


Others remembered that ‘people are good at heart’ or that thecommon enemy, the earthquake, united ‘us’.

All of the above may have played their part. However, it shouldnot escape our attention that the conjuncture that created thepositive image of the ‘other’ in literary texts seems to be repeated inGreece and Turkey in the period of the earthquakes. Namely, for thefirst time the television screens in each home in the two countriespresented the ‘other’ as he/she is: real, concrete and alive (not histori-cal). People appeared under the debris, in pain, crying, desperate, asfamily members, as children, as old people (whereas the ‘other’ untilthen appeared as aggressive middle-aged people, mostly in uniform).They looked ‘human’ and not as a threat. The ‘other’ never beforeappeared like that. Even the players of football, of basketball, etc.before, were by definition the rivals, the obstacle. The citizens of thetwo countries, in each and every house saw – surprised, I assume – the ‘other’ trying to save ‘us’ (not harm us), and to rejoice whensuccessful, in tears when failed.

All the work of textbooks, of historiography and literature,together with what the society up to that moment had produced withrespect to the ‘other’ contradicted the pictures on the televisionscreens, which, according to the perceptions of the spectators, trans-mitted nothing but the truth: a shock therapy of images.

It is still too early to say how permanent the friendly feelings thatthe earthquakes caused in the two communities will prove. It is safeto argue, however, that the overcoming of nationalistic dilemmas willhave to be accomplished in two spheres: (1) combating in the cogni-tive sphere the typical traits of nationalism, i.e. xenophobia, insecurity,stereotypes, prejudices etc., and (2) in practice, creating opportunitiesin which the members of the two communities may meet the ‘con-crete other’, i.e. increase the communication between the parties.

The first way seems practically difficult. Few are bothered by theeffects of nationalism and even fewer notice the negative aspects ofit. However, ‘practice’ itself, i.e. meeting with the real, existing,current (not historical) ‘other’ may improve the image of the ‘other’and the capability of ‘ours’ in evaluating the international situationand indirectly overcoming security and ‘other’ dilemmas. Still, every-thing is interconnected; much will be determined by who is inpower: the ‘pessimists’ will hold back the meetings with the ‘other’,the ‘optimists’ will support them.


NOTES

1. John W. Burton, ‘Resolution of Conflict’, International Studies Quarterly, 16, 1 (1972),p. 18.

2. The main ideas presented here appeared in various publications of the author inTurkish and in Greek. Two major publications that incorporate most of the findingsare Hercules Millas, Türk Romanı ve ‘Öteki’ – Ulusal Kimlikte Yunan I

.majı (Istanbul:

Sabancı Yayınları, 2000); and Ikones Ellinon kai Tourkon-scholika vivlia, istoriografia,logotechnia kai ethnika sterotypa (Athens: Alexandria, 2001).

3. Alexis Heraclides, ‘Socialization to Conflict’, National Centre of Social Research, 38(1980).

4. Hercules Millas, ‘History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey’, History Workshop, 31(Spring 1991).

5. The Turks interpret the coup d’état of the Greek colonels against Makarios, head ofCyprus in 1974, as a manifestation of a Greek (permanent) wish to extend theircountry’s borders, disregarding agreements and against Turkish interests (thusGreece is irredentist, unreliable, sneaky, followers of Megali Idea), and the Greeksinterpret the Turkish intervention as a practical demonstration that the Turks neverlose an opportunity to capture Greek lands and keep them under different pretexts,by ethnic cleansing and eventually by enslaving the Greeks (thus the Turks aresneaky, invaders, disrespectful of international law, followers of Ottoman practices).

6. Büsra Ersanlı, I.ktidar ve Tarih, Türkiye’de Resmi Tarih Tezinin Olusumu, 1929–

1937 (I.stanbul: Ada, 1992); Hercules Millas, ‘Türk Ders Kitaplarında Yunanlılar:

Bütünlestirici Bir Yaklasım’, in Tarih Egitimi ve Tarihte Öteki Sorunu (Istanbul: TarihVakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998); Millas, Ikones; and Etienne Coupeaux, Türk Tarih TezindenTürk-I

.slam Sentezine (I

.stanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1988).

7. For a general review of Turkish historiography on Greece see Hercules Millas, YunanUlusunun Dogusu (I

.stanbul: I

.letisim, 1994), pp. 201–43; and Hercules Millas, ‘Non-

Muslim Minorities in the Historiography of Republican Turkey: The Greek Case’, inFikret Adanır and Suraiya Faroqhi (eds), The Ottomans and the Balkans: a Discussion ofHistoriography (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 155–91. For a comparison of Greek and Turkishhistoriography and the related discourse on the ‘other’ see Millas, Ikones, where thetexts of the four Greek and four Turkish historians are also given. The eight historiansare: K. Paparrigopoulos, A. Vakalopoulos, G. Kordatos, N. Svoronos, I

.. H. Uzunçarsılı,

K. Karpat, H. I.nalcık and M. Kunt.

8. For analysis of their works, see Millas. ‘Non-Muslim Minorities in the Historiographyof Turkey’, pp. 183–7; and Millas, Ikones, pp. 311–27.

9. A good example of these projects is the study jointly conducted by Greek and Turkishhistorians, political scientists, anthropologists, etc., mostly members of Panteion andSabancı universities, about the incidents surrounding ‘the fire of Smyrna in 1922’ andthe national interpretations that followed. A second example is of course the presentbook.

10. Conventionally Leandros by Panayotis Soutsos and Taasuk-ı Tal’at ve Fitnat bySemsettin Sami are considered the first Greek and Turkish novels respectively.

11. Millas, Türk Romanı, pp. 18–35.12. Only 40 years before the appearance of the first Greek novel, in the decade of 1790,

the image of the ‘Muslim Ottoman’ or the ‘Turk’ in Grecophone literature was notnegative either, nor was he perceived as a member of a distinct nation, as can bereadily noticed in the politically oriented poems (and other writings) of RigasVelestinlis and of other Grecophone intellectuals. See Millas, Yunan Ulusunun, pp. 87–122, 257–94.

13. An example of a naively positive Turkish hero in Greek literature is Moskof Selim inthe novelette of 1895 that bears the same name, written by Georgios Viziinos. Selimis presented as a ‘mature and balanced’ person who declares that the Turks shouldleave Anatolia to the Greeks and go back to the East, to Asia, from where they once


came. Naively positive Greeks appear very often in Turkish novels, too, e.g. in theworks of Kemal Tahir, Halikarnas Balıkçısı and in many others. These Greek heroesare happy to welcome the Turkish conquerors, fighting against the Christians on theside of the Turks, accepting the ‘superiority’ and ‘magnanimity’ of the Turks; the bestamong them are willingly converted to Islam.

14. Hercules Millas, ‘Les Romans, Les Femmes et Les Relations Gréco-Turques’,Genèse/Olusum, 60–61 (May/August, 1999), pp. 46–64.

15. Hercules Millas, ‘The Image of Greeks in Turkish Literature: Fiction and Memoirs’,in Oil on Fire? Textbooks, Ethnic Stereotypes and Violence in South-Eastern Europe(Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1996), pp. 79–87.

16. Damla Demirözü, I kona tov Tourkov sti genia tov ‘30, unpublished Diss. (University ofAthens, 1999); and Millas, Ikones.

17. Millas, Türk Romanı, pp. 173–212.18. For Greek and Turkish newspapers see L. Dogan Tılıç, Utanıyorum, Ama Gazeteciyim

(I.stanbul: I

.letisim, 1998). For Greek newspaper and the image of Turkey see, Hercules

Millas, ‘1998 Yunanistan Basınında Türkiye’, in Bilanço 1923–1998, Siyaset, Kültür,Uluslararası I

.liskiler (I

.stanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2000), pp. 341–50.

19. See for example: Anna Frangoudaki and Thalia Dragona, Ti ein’i patrida mas-Ethnokentrismos stin ekpedevsi (Athens: Alexandreia, 1997); Alexis Heraclides, I Elladakai o’ex Anatolon Kindynos (Athens: Alexandreia, 2001). For opinion polls see the pollcarried out jointly by PIAR of Turkey and ICAP (GALLUP) of Greece in 1989.


3The Greek-Turkish Conflict:

Towards Resolution andReconciliationALEXIS HERACLIDES

Throughout the twentieth century, relations between Greece andTurkey (and the Ottoman Empire) followed a chequered course,from bitter armed conflict and tense relations to cordial relations.

Poised as we are at the dawn of the twenty-first century, let us take a glimpse at the record of the previous century. From 1901 until2000, leaving out the years 1914–16 and 1940–44 for obvious reasons,there are seven years of armed conflict (1912, 1917–18, 1920–22, 1974),15 years of strained relations with occasional outbursts of violence,all on or with regard to Cyprus (late 1954–58, December 1963–73), 42years of strained relations or cold war (1901–11, 1919, 1923–28,1975–87, 1990–February 1999), and almost 30 years (29 and a halfyears to be exact) of cordial relations (1929–39, 1945–early 1954, 1959-November 1963, 1988–89 and March 1999–2000).1

There are almost 30 years of détente as opposed to almost 70 yearsof war, conflict or cold war and strained relations. Clearly com-petition and rivalry have been the dominant themes.2 Is this to betaken as a clear indication that antagonism is more characteristic ofGreek-Turkish interaction? Or could one draw the opposite con-clusion, that the some 30 years of stability, almost one year out ofthree, is hardly a meagre harvest and an indication that reconciliationis achievable. One remembers the well-known platitude, ‘Greece andTurkey are destined by geography to be friends.’ But as RichardClogg has retorted ‘they are condemned by history to be enemiesand where history and geography come into conflict then historytends to prevail’.3

IS RECONCILIATION POSSIBLE?

Reconciliation Unrealistic

The assumption that reconciliation is impossible is based on thepremise that ‘the other’ is a threat (for the Greeks the great threat)and the historical enemy par excellence. Consequently, reconciliationis inconceivable. The two neighbours have no other realistic choice;they are destined to remain at loggerheads. Put in less extreme terms,détente or reconciliation is extremely difficult to achieve; if and whenit takes off, it is rickety and tends to be ephemeral. It is more likely tobe a marriage of convenience, a respite that as time goes by is boundto serve the purposes of the enemy and thus has to be abandoned soas not to jeopardize the national interest.4

What is to be done? Obviously no less than constant alert; a cred-ible deterrence-containment strategy, as argued by many foreignpolicy analysts, diplomats and politicians in either country; resolveand readiness to exploit any advantage on the horizon to inflictdamage to the other side; willingness to fight if need be; andmilitarization, counter-balancing alliances and an offensive on alldiplomatic fronts to ‘enlighten’ and sensitize ‘uninformed’ inter-national public opinion about the ways of its ‘audacious’, ‘provoca-tive’ and ‘unscrupulous’ neighbour.

In addition, Greeks are prone to argue that it is very difficult to live peacefully and comfortably with Turkey nearby, with its‘perennial political and social instability’, its ‘problematic dem-ocracy’, its daunting military prowess and its ‘readiness to resort to the use of military might’ with little regard to the exigencies of international law. In view of its threatening and assertive posture,Turkey’s relations with most of its neighbours have been cool formost of the time and it would be ridiculous to argue that all the othersare to be blamed for the strained relations (as Ankara has often done).Ankara’s ‘tough stance’ on Cyprus, its ‘clear threat’ to Greece’s sover-eignty in the Aegean as well as in Thrace and its general comport-ment as a ‘hegemonic power’ in the region, leave little doubt aboutits true intentions vis-à-vis its western neighbour.5

Turks for their part point to Greece’s adventurism on the Cyprusquestion, particularly from 1955 until 1974, in what was a far-fetcheddrive ‘to annex’ an island only 40 miles away from the Turkish shoresand a thousand miles from the Greek mainland; Greece’s ‘creeping


extension of territory’ in the Aegean, starting with the increase ofterritorial waters from three nautical miles (in the Lausanne Treaty)to six, the ‘illegal’ ten miles in the airspace, and, more recently,contemplating to expand the territorial waters to 12 miles, when it is obvious that this would be very disadvantageous for Turkey (as itwill then be completely surrounded); and there is said to be ‘clearevidence’ of moral encouragement as well as tangible support to the PKK, Turkey’s most implacable foe, whose aim is not less thanthe country’s dismemberment. Greece has repeatedly frustratedTurkey’s closer links with the EC/EU, a preposterous act, for no state can legitimately dictate another state’s chosen internationalorientation.6

A telling Greek argument worth mentioning is that Turkey is afterall the more powerful neighbour and as a consequence can hardlyfeel threatened by Greek statements or by its armed forces andmilitary hardware. It is fairly well established that Turkey is notconstantly preoccupied by Greece and that ‘the vast majority of theTurkish people do not place as much importance on a Greek threat’.7

If this is indeed the case, why has Ankara been so reluctant to initiategestures of goodwill through the years?

A predictable Turkish counter-argument is that Turkey has maderepeated attempts at opening a dialogue on all the outstandingmatters for years, with the most celebrated instance being theovertures made by Turgut Özal, which paved the way for the Davosprocess. Yet most of the time the reaction has been negative, as seenwith Andreas Papandreou’s well-known stand that ‘Greece hasnothing to discuss save the Cyprus issue’ or the line that it is for theInternational Court to decide and only on the continental shelf issue.Greece may indeed not be a real threat militarily, but it has constantlytried to defame and belittle Turkey.8 More far-fetched denunciationshave also surfaced for decades, at least since the UN GeneralAssembly of 1954, such as the famous accusation that Athens has onceagain embarked upon the Megali Idea project (Megalo Idea as it isknown in Turkey) or that it is always on the alert for the opportunity‘to stab its neighbour and ally in the back’ or assist Turkey’s enemies(e.g. the PKK).9 The Megali Idea bogey may appear absurd;10 however,if coupled with deeply ingrained distrust and the well-knownTurkish ‘Sèvres syndrome’, then it appears plausible at least to theeyes of many a Turkish beholder.

At this juncture it is worth remembering a well-known dictum in

THE GREEK-TURKISH CONFLICT 69

conflict studies that conflictual relations are stable over time, as theytend to elicit the same type of social relationship (the same applies,incidentally for cooperative relations).11 Any friendly gesture on thepart of the adversary, even the most sincere attempts at initiating asubstantial dialogue leading to eventual reconciliation, are deemeda devious ploy, not worth taking seriously under any circumstances.In any event, the worst cost/case scenario, always prevalent amongavowed adversaries, leaves little leeway for reciprocating a coopera-tive gesture. The Greek-Turkish landscape is replete with suchoccurrences, on both sides of the fence. The predictable outcome isthat initiators of sincere friendly gestures are left deeply frustratedand bitter. They are convinced more than before of the mauvaise foisand implacable animosity of their adversary. The prestige factor andnational honour have also played a role in the difficult Turkish-Greekrelationship. Ankara for instance is at pains not to be seen (internallyas well as internationally) as giving in to a smaller power and ‘aninsolent’ one at that. By the same token Greece does not want to beseen as giving in to its ‘haughty’ neighbour, who knows ‘only thelanguage of military prowess and bullying’ and is still under theinfluence of high-handed ‘imperial’ comportment.

To conclude, from the point of view of traditional strategic think-ing and its various more simplistic versions that smack of ‘patrioticmoralism’ (i.e. the ‘good against the evil’),12 as they are more readilyunderstood by diplomats, politicians and the military in bothcountries, there is only one pragmatic strategy available: a credibledeterrence vis-à-vis the encroaching neighbour. As for striving forpeace and security, the only available realistic prospect is a ‘no-warsituation’ which calls for efficient crisis management on either sidewhen a dispute arises. Yet no crisis management, however adroit andcoolheaded can rule out the possibility of armed confrontationbetween the two countries. The irrelevance of war is simply in theminds of ‘idealists’ and other ‘utopians’, who by wishing awayarmed conflict in fact make it more likely, unpredictable and moredisastrous should it come about.

Reconciliation a Realistic Alternative

In the Greek-Turkish dyad, the more detached observer is bound tospot a textbook security dilemma.13 For both countries the threat


comes exclusively from the other side and is indisputable; ‘we’ couldnot possibly pose a threat, for ‘us’ it would be contre nature; ‘we’ aresimply pursuing our legitimate right to arm ourselves for purelydefensive reasons; we have no other choice if we want to deter suchan unscrupulous foe. Curiously, until very recently, the securitydilemma line though more than obvious, was not entertained as auseful analytical tool to scrutinize the Greek-Turkish discord.14

The impossibility of reconciliation, the thesis of perennial eternalconfrontation between the two countries, is self-fulfilling.15 Suchattitudes legitimize the existing situation of conflict. The prospect ofchange, indeed contemplating change from conflict to reconciliation,is killed in the bud, as it has been persuasively argued in the Inter-national Relations literature by sound criticisms of traditionalrealism, emanating from liberalism and pluralism and, more recently,from reflectivist strands, but also from milder shades of realism.16

In the final analysis, there is nothing more practical than goodtheory.17 The opposite also applies: far too narrow or militant theorygives rise to impracticable policies and dead-ends. As it is increas-ingly suggested in recent years, conflict resolution and peace researchhave far more to offer in dealing with the Turkey-Greece conun-drum. Recent trends in strategic studies (now security studies) are ofconsiderable value, not least with the abandonment of one-sided‘ethnocentric strategy’ and their emphasis on ‘common security’ and‘security community’.18 Equally, some trends in the post-positiveInternational Relations literature, especially those dealing with geo-politics, security and self-other identity are essential reading in thedeconstruction of the permanence of the Greek-Turkish antagonism.

Let us see, in a nutshell, why other perspectives critical of tradi-tional strategy have more to offer, analytically as well as practically,in the search for a self-standing resolution of the Greek-Turkishconflict. For one, in the Greece-Turkey debacle, under the antagon-ism, even in its milder form of mutual deterrence and ‘no-war’,armed conflict and the threat of force is in no way expunged (asreadily accepted even by the advocates of the ‘no-war’ approach). Itremains a distinct possibility so long as the relationship is foundedon threat perceptions, enemy images, arms races and adversarialposturing.

Furthermore, it is abundantly clear that both countries have moreto lose from the continuation of the antagonism on all fronts; and


alternatively, that they have far more to gain from cooperating andburying the hatchet.19 The conflict has been a considerable drain ontheir economies, with the arms procurements (the highest in Europeas a percentage of GNP, around 5 per cent) not permitting socialdevelopment and more adequate education. Probably the only tan-gible gain is the diversionary (scapegoat) tactic,20 which supposedlyreinforces internal cohesion and national we-feeling vis-à-vis theenemy (along the well-known Simmel-Coser hypothesis). Cohesionof this kind is usually flimsy and more likely to be extremely costlyin the longer term. It reinforces the hand of the uncompromisinghawks and nationalists who have a vested interest in the continu-ation of the Greek-Turkish cold war at all costs. This powerful lobbystands resolutely in the way of any attempt at reconciliation and isalways on the alert to exploit any opportunity to mar reconciliationattempts, as seen, for instance, with the recent détente.

For several decades now the Greek-Turkish discord, thoughdifficult, is hardly zero-sum (win-lose) as a whole or in its variousparts. This is in sharp contrast to the state of play in the first decadesof the twentieth century. At that time the discord could not be settledpeaceably as long as Greek irredentism could not be abated and theOttoman Empire could not turn overnight into a secular culturallypluralistic democracy. The various imaginative approaches fromintellectuals and politicians on both sides, for a bi-national demo-cratic Turkish (or Ottoman)-Greek federation, where not a realisticprospect, for the ‘Western Question’, as Arnold Toynbee had put it,that is nationalism (the idea of the mono-ethnic state) had come tostay in the region.21

The Crux of the Problem: The Subjective Dimension of the Conflict

In our days what makes the Greek-Turkish conflict appear intract-able is above all its subjective dimension, the awesome psycho-logical barrier of years of antagonism and enmity: total lack of mutual confidence, suspicion bordering on paranoia, demonizationof the other, political cost (the fear of being seen as selling out) and,of course, the great influence of the nationalists in both countries.22

Greece and Turkey, though neighbours, have strikingly littleknowledge or understanding of each other.23 Indeed, until the earth-quakes of 1999, they had shown markedly little interest in each other.


Within the ambit of the subjective dimension, the main stumblingbloc to a genuine rapprochement is arguably the national historicalnarrative and the resultant national identity, an essential ingredientof which is the need to belittle and demonize ‘the other’. In thiscontext not only the solution but even the discussion of existingoutstanding disputes is hampered by the distrust between the twopeoples created by their ‘living history’.24 In both Greece and Turkey‘history is not past, the past continues to live in the present’.25 Ofcourse their national historical narratives could hardly have beenotherwise. After all, both ‘have shaped their “nation-state” identitiesthrough struggle against and interaction with each other’.26 Greeceand Turkey became independent states by fighting each other, inwhat could plausibly be portrayed – and in many respect was – avaliant struggle for cultural and physical survival as a nation andstate.

The essence of the Greek-Turkish conflict is the clash of historicalnarratives; it is these very narratives cum resultant collective identi-ties that are irreconcilable as they stand today. Thus if attempts atrapprochement between the two countries are to make any realheadway, a painful scrutiny of the historical record is in order by non-nationalist historians and other social scientists. Such interpretationsof history will give us a very different and far more varied picturethan the one peddled by the various ethnocentric and anachronisticversions of national history. This process is already under wayamong the academic community in Greece and Turkey and will,hopefully, be reflected in new school history textbooks in bothcountries.

However, any change in the realm of attitudes towards the past is fraught with difficulties, for clearly a friendlier, civilized and likeable ‘other’, worthy of respect, puts into question thecherished but insecure self-image and collective identity. The trick is to be able to attain a sense of collective self-worth that is self-standing and far more self-confident and not dependent on belittling‘the other’. Some would argue that this is simply impossible (theinnate or socially induced discrimination approaches). The onlything that can be done is a slight change in the extreme we–other polarization. But even this would be a gain in Turkish-Greekinteraction.


THE RECENT THAW: PROBING THE EVIDENCE27

A widely held popular view in both Greece and Turkey is that it wasthe earthquakes of August-September 1999 that brought about theconsiderable change in relations. If this popular view is an accuratedepiction of reality, then we are faced with the phenomenon ofpublic opinion swaying reluctant governments. This is not uncom-mon in Greek-Turkish relations but with a major difference: it hasswayed them in the very opposite direction, towards conflict andanimosity rather than towards reconciliation and peace. In view ofthis experience, would it not have been more likely for the Greekpublic to be unimpressed with the difficulties faced by its ‘enemy’?

Leaving aside for the moment political encouragement, if any, I would offer four possible explanations of the uncharacteristicattitude of the Greek public: the salience of human suffering anddisaster; the sense of common fate before insurmountable naturalforces;28 the vivid image of the concrete ‘other’ which contrastedsharply with what is expected of him/her as a representative of amerciless foe;29 and in the Greek case at least, the exceptional levelsreached by the nationalist rhetoric, of a presumed unending confron-tation along deterministic and existential lines à la Carl Schmitt(‘Friend-Foe’) with no conceivable way out of the quagmire saveperhaps in a final showdown. This latter view may have convincedseveral more optimistic segments of the Greek public, perhaps eventhe silent majority, to be more receptive and ready for any sign ofbreakthrough from the impasse.

However, in the explosive Greece-Turkey realm, where vitalnational interests are at stake, can there be any real move forwardbetween the two peoples without state encouragement? The answer,as we shall see, is probably yes and no.

Major crises between countries have been known to have sober-ing effects, leading to attempts at dialogue to defuse the situation.This has occurred in Greek-Turkish relations on several occasions,from 1974 onwards in particular. Thus, following the Imia/Kardakcrisis of February 1996 which brought the two countries to the brinkof war, attempts were made by the moderate Greek and Turkishgovernments of Kostas Simitis and Mesut Yılmaz to ease the tension,as seen with the Madrid Joint Statement of July 1997. But there was


little move forward, as the mainstream in both countries was underthe sway of the traditional adversarial approach.30 In any event,during the period 1996–1998 one cannot detect any clear signal tocivil society, the media or the wider public by the two states to, say,prepare the ground for an eventual reconciliation. The starting pointshould probably be found elsewhere.

The Imia/Kardak crisis introduced an important new dimensionnot present on other occasions, at least not in Greece. It set forth anunprecedented mobilization by one section of Greek civil society,which previously had been strikingly silent or had expressed itsviews with the greatest of caution when it came to relations withTurkey. Various NGOs, comprising leading intellectuals, noted retiredambassadors, veteran politicians and several journalists sprang up;existing NGOs were revitalized making their voices heard more thanever before in the last 30 years.31 Similar, if more cautious, develop-ments took place in Turkey. Joint Greek-Turkish NGOs appeared aswell as committees within international NGOs. There was therevitalization of the previously dormant Greek and Turkish businesscouncils (founded in 1988 within the evanescent Davos spirit) andthe establishment of the Greek-Turkish Forum (in 1998), which isengaged in cautious Track-Two diplomacy, or perhaps ‘One and aHalf-Track Diplomacy’.32 Worth mentioning also is the consistentencouragement of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to the sup-porters of reconciliation in both countries.33

Another turning point was the 1999 Kosovo crisis. It was not untilthis event that the two governments made a decisive entry as clearsupporters of détente. The common fear of destabilization in theregion and, most of all, the threat of a possibility of change ofboundaries in the vicinity by the threat or use of force, intensified thecontacts between the two worried sides.34 In the wake of the crisis,the two ministers exchanged letters. Turkish Foreign Minister I

.smail

Cem suggested reconciliation, but only after sorting out the terrorismquestion, a sensitive issue for Turkey, particularly in view of, as heput it, ‘what is perceived in Turkey as links that exist in Greece withterrorist organizations and their systematic encouragement’.35 ThusTurkey could be credited as having been the initiator of the resultantdétente between the two countries. However, the way the initiativewas formulated could have had adverse effects on the receiving


end, for it implied that Greece had to admit, however indirectly, its involvement in the Öcalan issue (read condoning or even encour-aging the unsavoury PKK).

The explosive element in Cem’s letter was defused by GreekForeign Minister G. Papandreou, who, in his answering letter of 25June, outlined a whole range of issues of common interest on whichthere could be dialogue: cooperation on culture, tourism, environ-ment, crime, economic cooperation and ecological problems, placingterrorism under a wider rubric, namely that of ‘organized crime, drugtrafficking, illegal immigration and terrorism as a priority for Greeceand Turkey’.36 For lack of other evidence, it would seem that Greeceinitiated a particular kind of reconciliation procedure: suggestingconcentrating on the issues where agreement was in sight on thebasis of common interest and thus bringing in business, civil societyand the media, rather than trying to tackle head-on the difficultissues, soon ran into trouble, as had been the case in all previousattempts at reconciliation from 1975 onwards.37

After the exchange of letters, the two ministers met in New York,on 30 June 1999 (in the margins of a UN meeting on Kosovo), andagreed to initiate a dialogue on bilateral cooperation on issues of‘limited antagonism’, as it was curiously put.

The earthquakes were, of course, the next obvious turning point.But without one more crucial decision by Athens vis-à-vis Ankara,the whole edifice of the Greek-Turkish thaw would probably havecollapsed, the earthquake spirit notwithstanding. This was the need to withdraw the Greek veto for Turkey’s admission as an EU-candidate state at the EU summit of Helsinki in early December1999.38 For Athens it appeared at the time as a close decision. But it isarguable whether this was indeed the case in view of the convictionof the prime minister and foreign minister that the previous stone-walling strategy was the wrong policy and was leading nowhere. Bethis as it may, without the reigning earthquake spirit, it is doubtfulwhether any Greek government would have summoned the couragefor such a volte-face. It is worth pointing out that the idea that thevarious Greek vetoes were the wrong policy had been in the air sincethe early 1990s and apparently had been adopted (in private at least)by many a major political figure. Yet no Greek government daredbudge but moved along as if in a trance, dreading the political costof appearing ‘to appease aggressive-expansionist Turkey’.39


In conclusion, the 1999 rapprochement can be seen as a processwhich started with the shock of the Imia/Kardak crisis, whichmobilized influential segments of civil society as never before and toa lesser extent the two governments (they were still under the swayof the hawks on both sides). Then came a dangerous twist in theirrelations, with the Öcalan crisis that momentarily caused a virtual‘black-out’ in their interaction.40 From then onwards the two foreignministers, with the Kosovo crisis as the springboard, joined therapprochement attempt and took the lead, initiating the low politicsprocess. This was followed by the earthquake spirit which made therapprochement more widely popular and in so doing freed thehands of the Greek government to add the final essential touch tothe new scenery of Turkish-Greek relations: lifting the Greek veto onTurkey’s candidacy to the EU. In other words, we have here a caseof enlightened civil society playing an important role in the firstinstance and presenting a credible alternative to perennial antagon-ism; the decisive role played by the two foreign ministers, who weregenuinely convinced and committed to such a process; and theunexpected earthquakes, which had one positive effect, the involve-ment of the wider public, this time wanting peace and friendship.

MAIN INROADS SO FAR

The various tangible gains in the two and a half years of the newspirit in Greek-Turkish relations can be distinguished into activitiesand contacts at the level of civil society (cultural, scientific, etc.),profit-making (business, trade, investment, economic integrationetc.) and official interstate interaction.

The first category is a novelty in Greek-Turkish relations. Sufficeto say that the sheer volume and variety of interaction in this domainis unprecedented and cannot be compared with any similar previousexperience from 1923 onwards. As such it could make the difference,provided it retains its momentum.

As for trade and business transactions, they were previouslynegligible, due of course to the climate reigning between the twocountries for decades. However, they picked up steadily, though not impressively, from 1990 until 1998.41 In 1998 businessmen cametogether and tried to bring to life the Greek-Turkish and the


Turkish-Greek business councils, but could make little headway. Theopportunity to cover lost ground came with the earthquakes inTurkey, when Greek businessmen associated with the Greek-TurkishCouncil came to the assistance of their economically strickencolleagues.42 The dividends of these overtures were soon obvious,starting with impressive conferences of Greek and Turkish business-men. By 2000 the exports-imports between the two countries hadmore than doubled to over 900 million dollars; investment had goneup by 775 per cent from 2.4 million dollars in 1999 to 14.7 in 2000. Thejoint ventures in both countries and elsewhere abroad are also appar-ently impressive though it is difficult to access their magnitude.43

As to developments at the state-to-state level, until June 1999official relations were cool, minimal and very formal. Real dialoguesimply did not exist.

From mid-1999 onwards the intergovernmental landscape looksvery different from the cool and formal level of the past. In June 1999the two sides agreed to hold meetings on issues concerning tourism,culture, the environment, trade and commerce, multilateral coopera-tion, mainly in the Black Sea region and the Balkans as well asorganized crime, illegal immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism.They covered the ground swiftly and came up with no less than nine bilateral agreements by early 2000 (all by now ratified):44 (1)cooperation on customs administration, (2) economic cooperation,(3) promotion and protection of investments, (4) cooperation onenvironmental protection, (5) cooperation on tourism, (6) maritimetransport, (7) science and technology, (8) cultural cooperation, (9)combating crime, especially terrorism, organised crime, illicit drugtrafficking and illegal immigration.45 With the nine agreements, thetwo countries now have a fairly adequate and more up-to-dateinstitutional-legal framework on matters of low politics.46 In addition,the two governments have signed a protocol on the re-entry of illegalrefugees; they have decided to draft an agreement on sea and airtransportation and to address the outstanding question of doubletaxation, which hampers economic transactions.

Interestingly, the Steering Committee of the two foreign min-istries with its six working groups, that had been set up to draft thenine agreements, did not dissolve once its task was concluded, butcontinued to hold periodic meetings, overseeing implementation, inwhat seems to be an ongoing process of consultations. This is in itself


of considerable value and has helped in breaking the ice further andpromoting much needed understanding.

Worth mentioning also is the Task Force on cooperation on mattersof the EU that was decided by the two countries in Ankara in January2000 (following a Greek suggestion). The object of the exercise is to provide Turkish functionaries with EU know-how. A series ofseminars in Turkey and Greece have been organized, apparentlywith success, on matters such as customs and financial issues, judicialquestions involving EU law, agricultural matters, police cooperation,etc., and there are more to follow.

It would seem that the Task Force mechanism together with theSteering Committee and its six working groups functions as a kindof confidence-building device.47 Within confidence-building onecould place the agreement of the two countries to ban anti-personnelland-mines on the basis of the relevant Ottawa convention, thepractical implications of which would be dismantling and destroyingthe mines along the river Evros/Meriç border between the twocountries.48 The decision of both countries to establish a direct redtelephone line between the two foreign ministers can also be seenwithin the confidence-building spirit.

Predictably, Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) per se are alsoa matter that has preoccupied the two countries since autumn 2000.They have agreed to discuss three categories of CBMs: (1) CBMs withinthe framework of the five set in the 1988 Papoulias-Yılmaz Memo-randum of Understanding; (2) nine ‘Tension Reduction Measures’;and (3) three ‘Measures of Good Neighbourliness’, all regarding theEvros/Meriç river border between the two countries.49 Until the end of2001, four CBMs had been adopted: the exchange of information onthe scheduled military exercises on a yearly basis; invitations to officersto attend one military exercise per year; the possibility of heads of staffmeeting in the margins of intergovernmental sessions; and coopera-tion aimed at averting the pollution of then Evros/Meriç river withinthe sustainable development of the region.

THE HURDLES AHEAD

The process inaugurated in 1999 by the two countries seems to followDavid Mitrany’s blueprint for peace, the functional approach against


war: a web of mutually functional transactions (particularly at thenon-state level) that will eventually make boundaries irrelevant andthe use of military force for political ends inconceivable.50 Its ambi-tious goal is to open a new page in Greek-Turkish relations. Of courseit is still very early to determine whether it can hold and withstandthe rugged road that inevitably lies ahead, in view of the still existingmajor disputes that divide them and put them on edge.

As we have seen, the process so far has made several inroads. Theyare clearly far more than those achieved following two previousattempts at rapprochement, notably the one of 1959-1963 and the1988 Davos process.

The differences from Davos with which it is more comparable, isthe low as distinct from the high politics strategy; the scale of activityin business transactions; the involvement of civic society and notleast cultural activities; and perhaps above all the frame of mind. TheDavos attempt, which in fact lasted less than a year (though tech-nically it remained in force until the spring of 1989) also appreciatedthat business, contacts, tourism, cultural exchanges and so on, shouldbe brought in. Thus it encouraged the formation of the economiccouncils and, at the interstate diplomatic level, it established theEconomic Committee to promote trade and tourism and to work inparallel with the Political Committee that was to tackle the difficultquestions. However, business and cultural exchanges made littleheadway. Perhaps the most noteworthy change was a rise in tourismthat lasted for a while. The whole policy of rapprochement was adecision from above; in fact exclusively at the level of Turgut Özaland Andreas Papandreou. It found little sympathy not only amongthe two publics but also among influential diplomats, the militaryand other government and administrative cadres. In the Greek case,in particular, there was no forewarning of the volte-face or a previousin-depth study based on recommendations by diplomats or otheradvisers. In both Greece and Turkey it did not present a real breakfrom the past, probably not even at the level of the two maininitiators. It was a new strategy within old mindsets founded on thetraditional zero-sum outlook, now re-framed as self-restraint andavoiding crises that could lead to messy situations.51

The ensemble of Greek-Turkish differences is widely known. Itsbasic areas of major dispute are the Aegean (namely continental-shelf, territorial waters, airspace, militarization-fortification of the


eastern Greek islands, civil aviation region) and the Cyprus ques-tion,52 which, strictly speaking, is not a bilateral Greek-Turkish conflict,even though Greece and Turkey have often seen it in such terms.Indeed had it been a purely Greek-Turkish issue, it would not havebeen as impervious to settlement as it has been until now.

Other points of friction include the minorities question, Turkey’sprocess towards the EC/EU, the encouragement and tangible sup-port which Greece, according to Ankara, has afforded the PKK, anda recent addition to the Aegean dispute, the ‘grey areas’ disputewhich is linked with the wider problem of lack of clear demarcationof the territorial borders on water between the two countries.

The Aegean Dispute

A fundamental difference between the Cyprus and the Aegeandispute is that, in the first case, Turkey strongly favours the existingde facto status quo, which, however, is not accepted by Greece (orthe Greek Cypriots) who regard it as unjust as well as illegal on thebasis of international law and UN resolutions. In the Aegean case,maintaining the legal and de facto status quo is the almost non-negotiable position of the Greek side. Turkey calls for its revision forit regards the existing situation as unfair and discriminatory.53

The heart of the problem in the Aegean is above all perceptual,namely mutual suspicion of the true intentions of the other side,largely deeply ingrained threat perceptions associated with the otherside. There is on the one hand the ‘Greek lake’, ‘choking Turkey’,‘creeping sovereignty’ feared by Turkey; and on the other the ‘halfthe Aegean’, ‘grabbing islands or rocks at will’, ‘surrounding theislands by Turkish continental shelf ’ dreaded by Greece. What isbeyond doubt is the sincerity of the perceived threat to vital andlegitimate interests. The Greeks for instance are horrified at thepossibility of ‘island hopping’ with the use of the Turkish FourthArmy based in I

.zmir; while the Turks regard the militarization of the

Greek islands a transparent threat in the form of ‘daggers’ to theirexposed and very extended Aegean coastline.54

In the case of Greece, for which we are in a better position tocomment upon, two schools of thought have dominated publicdebate from the mid-1970s onward, on how to cope with the Aegeandisputes: what could be called the negative political approach and


the legal line. The negative political approach is associated with thelate Andreas Papandreou (Greek premier, 1981–89, 1993–1995).Papandreou maintained that Athens has nothing to discuss let alonenegotiate since after all it was satisfied with the existing status quo inthe Aegean Sea. It was Turkey who was striving for the revision ofthe status quo at Greece’s expense, hence any initiation of a dialoguewith Ankara was bound to be damaging. The evasive Papandreouline was skilfully presented to the Greek public as an adroit handlingof the situation. But it hardly made the conflict disappear. In fact itexacerbated the Turkish-Greek antagonism in the Aegean as well asover Cyprus. Yet it is not without merit as ‘a first line of defence’,55 ifseen as an initial bargaining posture within a process of dialogue andnegotiations, since, after all, Greece is not the demandeur in most ofthe issues of the Aegean.

The Greek legal viewpoint can be distinguished into the restric-tive line and various more flexible approaches. The restrictive line,the official position of Athens from 1996 onwards, is that the mostappropriate venue for resolving the conflict is the InternationalCourt of Justice as regards the one and only, according to mostGreeks, outstanding legal dispute, namely the continental shelfdispute. Another dispute that could be included is the ‘grey zones’issue raised by Turkey. This stance is too cautious and smacks oflegalistic pettifogging. However, it is not unjustifiable, again as astarting point. On both issues Greece feels it is in a comfortable,though far from unassailable, position from the point of internationallaw. Another possible reason for clinging so steadfastly to the juridi-cal procedure may be that Greek governments are afraid to face theirpublic, which is under the erroneous impression that a resoundinglegal victory is assured. The court will no doubt hand over a sub-stantial portion of the seabed to Turkey. But a decision from a court,however painful, would in all probability be more palatable to theGreek people than anything, even a better deal that comes out ofbilateral negotiations.56

The more open legal approaches include other issues in thejuridical procedure of The Hague, not least in view of the fact thatseveral of them are interconnected and inseparable, notably theterritorial waters and the continental shelf questions.

As to what could be called the positive political approach, namelyopening the road to extended direct negotiations, with or without


adjudication as an auxiliary method, it has been entertained as well, though cautiously and not publicly, particularly by premierConstantine Karamanlis in the late 1970s and also by Papandreouhimself not only during the brief Davos séjour but also upon his riseto power in 1981-1982.57

By and large, however, the Greek side is apprehensive of negoti-ations. The legal mind still dominant in Greek decision-making is notat ease with such processes and does not seem to appreciate that ithas more benefits as a procedure than international adjudication.58

Another reason for avoiding talks is the great influence of the moretraditional realist approach, which understands negotiations only asa zero-sum win-lose framework, whereby the stronger party, in thiscase Turkey, is bound to win negotiation-wise, by the sheer fact thatit is a more powerful party (as if the two sides were negotiating apeace treaty where Turkey was victorious). Very few Greeks realizethat even if it were possible to convince Turkey to accept the com-petence of The Hague court, any clear Greek victory would be of littlereal worth and would be unlikely to further reconciliation. Turkeywould no doubt be furious and consider the court decision biased(‘Greece the spoiled child of Europe’) and unjust. Only a win-winsolution in the Aegean is viable and indeed reasonable, and this canbe achieved by way of negotiations with adjudication perhaps as anauxiliary road within parameters set previously in meticulous talksbetween the two parties.

Coping with the Difficulties Ahead: Some Suggestions

What can be done to cope with the ominous clouds that have notdisappeared from the Greek-Turkish horizon? According to one viewthere is no need to rush to the difficult issues, at least not for the timebeing.59 They can learn to live fairly peacefully side by side with theoutstanding disagreements not necessarily or automatically marringrelations; they may ‘agree to disagree’ as it were and at the same timedeepen their interaction at all levels. Thus with the passage of timeand with the greater volume and quality of interaction, the newunprecedented web of transactions à la Mitrany could make war andbrinkmanship after a time unthinkable and so costly that they wouldnot be entertained by any serious government in Ankara or Athens.However, this course can work for a while provided the two parties


are crystal clear and in full agreement on the following basic point:that they can solve their outstanding difficulties when the time isripe, only by way of dialogue and through peaceful means and not,under any circumstances, by the threat or use of force and by variousforms of adversarial posturing (i.e. through rival alliances and rivalaxes, attempts at encirclement, arms races, etc.).

This optimistic scenario may be realizable – though with difficulty– for the Aegean dispute and other bilateral questions. But how aboutCyprus? Cyprus cannot wait, in view of the prospect of entry intothe EU, which has given rise to heated debates from Ankara toBrussels. Any conciliatory line either by Athens or Ankara on Cyprus,however careful, may amount to political suicide. Indeed, both statescould become hostages of the uncompromising Greek-Cypriots or the uncompromising Turkish-Cypriots respectively, who untilrecently (until the unexpected 5 December 2001 private meetingamong Klerides and Denktas in the latter’s home which led to theclosed talks of 2002 under UN auspices) appeared to hold sway inboth communities of the island. The key is for the two communitiesto reach their own solution, with the gentle push and encourage-ment of a Greece and a Turkey fully committed to their own recon-ciliation, and to enter the EU together in a united loosely federatedCyprus.

But let us go back to the bilateral questions. So long as the Aegeandisputes remain in a state of limbo, they offer ample ground forsevere misunderstanding and tension. And more generally, can onespeak with confidence of a stable Greek-Turkish rapprochement asdistinct from a more ephemeral and shaky détente, without a seriousif protracted dialogue on the difficult issues that continue to divideand haunt them?

At this juncture we will emphasize five points, the aim being tosustain the dynamic of the recent détente, which by 2002 has lost itsmomentum, and make of it a real rapprochement and reconciliation.For a start, the two governments could well point out to the morenervous segments of their publics, that they have indeed amelioratedtheir relations without on the other hand ‘giving in an inch’ on themajor issues. Good relations have not meant abandoning or com-promising their national interests. The process has been costless sofar and can continue to remain so in the hands of moderategovernments who believe that tension does not pay.


Furthermore, several aspects of the Greek-Turkish conflict appearin a different light within the new cordial atmosphere. Some havealmost disappeared, such as the Turkish minority issue in Greece(Thrace) as well as the putative Greek encouragement or aid to thePKK, and of course the European orientation of Turkey that hadpreviously been in various ways (to be more exact in almost everyconceivable way) frustrated by Greece.

Another obvious development is that, under the spirit reign-ing between the two countries, the prospects for a crisis and tension have been drastically curtailed and new uncharted territoryfor peaceful coexistence, transactions and communication hasopened.

But more is needed. They must gradually come to realize – or tobe more precise their wider public should comprehend – somethingthat is widely known among more detached analysts: that thevarious Aegean differences are not zero-sum and even less whenplaced within a wider Aegean package deal, provided of course thatthe two sides do not cling to their maximalist positions (occasionallyset forth mainly for negotiation purposes or for internal consump-tion).60 It is to be noted that more recently, even the very cautiousGreek-Turkish Forum has come with a useful – if mainly procedural– proposition of how to go about the settlement of the Aegeanconflict.61

More generally, tension and bitter relations are no longer consid-ered a given by a rising number of Greeks and Turks. The fact thatthe two peoples are condemned by geography to live side by side asfriends rather than as enemies is becoming somewhat more accept-able and desirable. Peace and security between the two countries isnow a ‘cognitive alternative’ for more people than ever before sincethe Venizelos-Atatürk rapprochement – and this time with a differ-ence; it has wider support in the two countries (at least from late 1999until early 2002).

At a more analytical level, in addition to the Mitrany approachmentioned above, at least three other avenues are of relevance:superordinate goals, negotiation strategy and conflict transformation.

Superordinate goals are vital needs of two adversaries that cannotbe met as long as the conflict continues unabated. They require a jointeffort by the two parties and this process, once initiated, can gradu-ally smooth their wider differences.62 A joint effort, such as the


co-exploitation of the Aegean, wholly or partially, could be an answeras far as the continental shelf is concerned.63

The negotiation strategy from the easier to the more difficultissues may create a dynamic of its own, as a level of mutual confi-dence is established, making the image of the enemy and theprisoner’s dilemma mentality less pivotal than before. As in otherprotracted conflicts, there are at least three ways of going about thetask of dialogue and eventual negotiations. One is to put the empha-sis on tangible interests and try to pin-point manageable negotiableissues to be placed within a cost-benefit calculus by comparison tothe cost and benefits of the ongoing clash. A deal could be struck bysplitting the difference. Here it is important for both parties to reachthe conclusion that the other side also sacrifices its goals and is takinggreat risks in order to achieve the final agreement.

In conflicts such as the one between Greece and Turkey, however,where issues of perceptions and collective identity are omnipresent,the emphasis on tangible interests on their own is not likely to makemuch headway. Thus it is also necessary to address at the same timeor in parallel, mutual attitudes, notably enemy images and theresultant extent of misunderstanding of the other, without forgettinga fundamental source of bias and demonization, namely groupidentity as shaped by national history. As Richard Clogg had con-cluded, almost two decades ago, ‘even if a Greek-Turkish rapproche-ment is achieved at official level, the changing of the popular attitudes,reciprocal stereotypes and mutual fears that underlie the presentantagonism will be a much more protracted and difficult process’.64

Turning now to the third way of going about negotiating the peaceprocess, the aim is to try to resolve the conflict as a common problemas in the ‘problem-solving’ approach.65 It seeks to promote an inte-grated solution by the parties themselves, not so much by way ofhard bargaining and negotiations, but by discretely inducing a re-definition of the conflict by dwelling into its deep underlying causes,by trying to understand the other’s needs and concerns in an attemptto reach, creatively, a mutual acceptance solution. The solution maybe unique to each situation and positive-sum in its outcome. As A. J.R. Groom has argued in this context, what is needed is an extendeddialogue between Greece and Turkey, where the two adversariesexplore ‘the problems [of the Aegean] in a non-negotiating, non-coercive, problem-solving framework so that there are no winners


and losers, but only winners’.66 This is after all the stuff of goodrelations which served the European Community, now the EU, fromits very first steps, making the French-German historic antagonisma thing of the past.67

What is known as ‘conflict transformation’68 is also of relevance inGreek-Turkish relations and could open new avenues for resolution.It includes all kinds of changes, particularly as regards vital aspectsof the two actors or of their environment (regional and global) ininstances where the conflict appears intractable, as has been the casemost of the time with the Cyprus question, from 1950 onwards.Changes in leadership, regime, political system or ideology, a shift ininternational orientation and alignments, a distinct change in theregional or international system and so on can present a window ofopportunity for meaningful talks. In the Greek-Turkish case as onprevious occasions, leadership changes did play a role, as for instancethe switch from Papandreou (who was a hardliner on everythingregarding Turkey for most of the time, but for his 1988 volte face) toSimitis in the mid-1990s. Clearly the role of the two foreign ministers,Cem and Papandreou, was crucial for the process of rapprochementin its early phase. The greater relevance of the EU is also of greatimportance for conflict transformation on the bilateral issues andeven more with Cyprus. But it could also be a source of great frus-tration and may not act, as the much needed deus ex machina.

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

I will conclude with a list of prerequisites and goals for Greek-Turkishconflict resolution and reconciliation. I would argue that a finalhistorical compromise between Greece and Turkey would succeed ifit incorporates most, or preferably all, of the following concerns andgoals:69

1. If the resultant agreement or agreements are the outcome ofthe free will of the two parties.

2. If it is the end result of a sincere, careful and protracteddialogue and negotiation between them, with no externalparties involved other than as facilitators or informal diplo-mats (Track-2).


3. If no party aims to impose its will or its preferred solution onthe other side, be it by pressure, ruse, outwitting or otherwise.

4. If both parties realize that attempting to impose their will ontheir erstwhile adversary is simply unrealizable, a loss of timeand effort. It is in one way or another self-defeating.

5. If both abandon their respective maximalist initial positions,namely ‘Greek lake’ and ‘half the Aegean’ as regards theAegean conflict; and ‘Cyprus is Greek’ and ‘the Cyprus issuewas resolved in 1974’ as regards Cyprus.

6. If the gains for both as a result of the settlement in the makingappear to exceed the profits from the ongoing conflict and itsnon-resolution.

7. If the two sides come to realize that a zero-sum outlook is ofvery little value even within a scrupulous ‘split the differ-ence’ approach.

8. If they realize that at the end only striving for positive sumoutcomes (win-win) can lead to viable solutions, to an Aegeanand a Cyprus of peace, stability and cooperation.

9. If the overall agreement (the package deal) is regarded assensible and just, and certainly not as unfair, replete withunbearable compromises (by the two parties as to the Aegeanand the four parties as to Cyprus).

10. If with the set of solutions reached, the vital needs andinterests of Greece and Turkey are met and served, in parti-cular security (common security), territorial integrity, inviola-bility of frontiers, lack of any expansionist or threateningstance in the future, the continuing European orientation ofboth countries, development and modernization, the deep-ening of pluralist democracy and respect for human rightsand as far as their bilateral relations are concerned, mutualrespect and mutually legitimized relations.

The ten above prerequisites are undoubtedly a demanding ensemble,difficult to achieve overnight, even with the best of intentions. In fact the two parties could proceed having a list of this kind as ameasuring rod. Yet as things gradually fall into place within a newspirit, a reciprocal paradigm shift is far from impossible. It is not


inconceivable in our day and age, not least in the otherwise difficulttwenty-first century that we have embarked upon, which once againfinds the two countries in the same camp, craving to be part of thezone of peace and stability.

NOTES

1. For a review of Greek-Turkish relations see Richard Clogg, ‘The Troubled Alliance:Greece and Turkey’, in Richard Clogg (ed.), Greece in the 1980s (London: Macmillan,1983), pp. 123–49; Theodore A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece, and Turkey: TheTroubled Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1983); Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relationssince 1955 (Boulder: Westview, 1990); Süha Bölükbası, ‘The Turco-Greek Dispute:Issues, Policies and Prospects’, in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy: NewProspects (London: The Eothen Press, 1992), pp. 27–54; Dimitri Constas (ed.), TheGreek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s (London: Macmillan, 1991); Dimitris Keridis andDimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds), Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization(Herndon, Virginia: Brassey’s, 2001).

2. Sükrü S. Gürel, ‘Turkey and Greece: A Difficult Aegean Relationship’, in Canan Balkırand Allan M. Williams (eds), Turkey and Europe (London, New York: Pinter, 1993), p. 163.

3. Clogg, ‘Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey’, p. 125.4. This thinking is very much along the lines of classic realism and in particular Varuch

Spinoza’s thesis on the evanescence of international agreements. See Steven Forde,‘Classical Realism’, in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds), Traditions of Inter-national Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 77.

5. See e.g. Athanassios Platias, ‘Greece’s Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy andDeterrence’, in Constas, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s.

6. See e.g. Hüseyin Pazarcı, La delimination du plateau continental et les îles (Ankara: SBFYayınları, 1982); and Aslan Gündüz, ‘Greek-Turkish Disputes: How to ResolveThem?’, in Keridis/Triantaphyllou, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization,pp. 81–101.

7. Gürel, ‘Turkey and Greece’, p. 163.8. As Mehmet Ali Birand has put it recently, ‘to the Greeks Turkey was the “Evil Empire”

whose sole aim was to rob Greece of territory. To the Turks, Greece was a nuisancethat wasted no chance to defame and belittle Turkey’. See Mehmet Ali Birand,‘Efcharisto File (Thank You, Friend)’, at [http://www.greekturkishforum.org].

9. In 1996, a far-fetched scenario has been put forward in all seriousness by a dis-tinguished former ambassador and academic, Sükrü Elekdag, namely that Greececould coordinate an attack with another unfriendly neighbour, namely Syria. SeeSükrü Elekdag, ‘21⁄2 War Strategy’, Perceptions, 1, 1 (March–May 1996).

10. Clogg, ‘Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey’, p. 126.11. Morton Deutsch, ‘Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution’, in Raymo Vayrynen

(ed.), New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation(London: Sage, 1991), p. 31.

12. Forde, ‘Classical Realism’, p. 63.13. Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30, 2 (January

1978); Alan Collins, ‘The Security Dilemma’, in M. Jane Davis (ed.), Security Issues inthe Post-Cold War World (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996).

14. See on this Panayotis J. Tsakonas, ‘The Security Dilemma in Greek-Turkish Relations’,Hellenic Studies, 9, 2 (Autumn 2001).

15. The Cyprus conflict in particular, as it evolved from 1963 to 1974 can be seen in self-fulfilling terms particularly as far as Greece and the Greek-Cypriots are concerned.


See Alexis Heraclides, To Kypriako: Sygkrousi kai epilysi (The Cyprus Question: Conflictand Resolution), (Athens: I. Sideris, 2002).

16. For the liberal-pluralist line on this see John W. Burton, International Relations: A General Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965); Robert L. Rothstein,‘On the Costs of Realism’, in Michael Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton(eds), Perspectives on World Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1981 [1972]); John AVasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (London: Pinter, 1983). For the post-positivist criticism see Richard K. Ashley, ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, and Robert W.Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International RelationsTheory’, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1986); Robert B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations asPolitical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

17. Kurt Lewin’s expression in Henry Tajfel and Colin Frazer, Introducing Social Psychology(London: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 12.

18. Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Barry Buzan,Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: LynneRienner Publishers, 1998); Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.) On Security (New York:Columbia University Press, 1995).

19. Gürel, ‘Turkey and Greece’, p. 186; Mehmet Ali Birand, ‘Turkey and the “DavosProcess”: Experiences and Prospects’, in Constas, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the1990s, pp. 29–30; On the Greek side this point has been made on several occasionsby retired ambassador Byron Theodoropoulos. See his Oi Tourkoi kai Emeis (The Turksand Us), (Athens: Fitrakis, 1988).

20. Jack S. Levy, ‘Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique’, in I. Manus and L. Midlarsky(eds), Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin-Hyman, 1989), pp. 259–88.

21. Arnold Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, 2nd edn (New York:Howard Fertig, 1923).

22. In Turkey the nationalists are very visible as a group in the Nationalist Action Party(MHP: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi). In Greece the nationalist lobby is active in almost allpolitical parties. Towards the end of the 1990s its influence and numbers fell but it isstill a force to reckon with in the Greek political arena.

23. Clogg, ‘Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey’, p. 142.24. Mustafa Aydın, ‘Cacophony in the Aegean: Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations’,

Turkish Review of International Relations, 28 (1997), p. 111.25. Sükrü S. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut I

.çinde Türk-Yunan I

.liskileri, 1821–1993 (Turkish-

Greek Relations in Historical Context, 1821–1993), (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), p. 10.

26. Gürel, ‘Turkey and Greece: A Difficult Aegean Relationship’, p. 161. See also Clogg,‘Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey’.

27. For more details on this chapter see Alexis Heraclides, ‘Greek-Turkish Relations fromDiscord to Détente: A Preliminary Evaluation’, The Review of International Affairs, 1, 3(2002).

28. In the sub-field of conflict resolution there have been discussions regarding traumaticexperiences and the need to suffer but also to acknowledge the suffering of the other.See e.g. Vamık D. Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies and Allies (Northvale: JasonAronson, 1988); Joseph V. Montville, ‘The Healing Function in Political ConflictResolution’, in Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van den Merwe (eds), ConflictResolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application (Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press, 1993).

29. For an experiment with Soviet radio broadcasts which were able to alter, in part atleast, extreme anti-Soviet attitudes, see Don D. Smith, ‘Mass Communications andImage Change’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 17 (1973), pp. 116–29.

30. Ekavi Athanassopoulo, ‘Blessing in Disguise? The Imia Crisis and Turkish-GreekRelations’, Mediterranean Politics, 2, 3 (1997), pp. 76–101.

31. See paper by Soli Özel in this volume. And Dimitris Keridis, ‘Domestic Developments


and Foreign Policy: Greek Policy towards Turkey’, in Keridis/Triantaphyllou (eds),Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization, p. 16.

32. This is in view of the level of participation, particularly of the members of its PoliticalAnalysis Group, all of whom have close links with the higher echelons ofgovernment. The ‘One and a Half ’ expression was coined by a leading Greekpolitician. Interview by the author with Paulina Lampsa, member of the PoliticalAnalysis Group.

33. Patriarch Athinagoras had made similar attempts in the 1950s, but his efforts wereswept aside by Turkey within the Cyprus conundrum. See Alexis Alexandris, TheGreek Minority in Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations (Athens: Centre for Asia MinorStudies, 1983), pp. 244–56.

34. See George Papandreou’s letter to I.smail Cem on the Kosovo crisis opportunity, at:

[http://www.greekturkishforum.org].35. Cem’s letter to Papandreou, at: [http://www.greekturkishforum.org].36. Papandreou’s letter to Cem, at: [http://www.greekturkishforum.org].37. It is clear that George Papandreou had prepared the ground for the thaw in the Greek

foreign ministry (not without difficulty) well before the exchange of the letters.Author’s interviews with officials of the Greek Foreign Ministry.

38. For the importance of this move see interview of I.smail Cem to Anni Podimata, in

To Vima, 13 January 2000, also in English at [http://www.greekturkishforum.org]. Equally the interview of George Papandreou to Nuri Çolakoglu and AlkisKourkoulas, broadcast in NTV, 21 January 2000; also printed in English at [http://www.greekturkishforum.org]. See also Giorgos Papandreou, ‘Oi Ellinotourkikessheseis apo ti syngrousi sti synergasia kai tin oikodomisi tis Evropis tou 21ou aiona’(The Greek-Turkish Relations from conflict to cooperation and the building of Europein the twenty-first century), Anaskopisi Amyntikis kai Exoterikis Politikis (Review ofDefence and Foreign Policy), (Athens: Eliamep, 2000), pp. 27–8.

39. Note that autumn 1999 had seen a backlash of the nationalist anti-Turkish bloc inGreece, whose thrust was that Turkey was simply availing itself of this uniqueopportunity to pocket gains at no cost. Interestingly, similar fears were voiced inTurkey, in what is one more instance of mirror imagery between the two sides.Author’s interview with Hercules Millas.

40. Maria Berberidou, ‘I ellino-tourkiki oikonomiki synergasia: provlimata kaiprooptikes’ (Greek-Turkish economic cooperation: problems and prospects), AgoraHoris Synora, 7, 1 (2001), p. 5.

41. Ibid., pp. 3–14. See also the papers by Panagiotis Liargovas and Ozay Mehmet in thisvolume.

42. Author’s interview with the Greek Chairman of the Greek-Turkish Council andChamber, Panayotis Koutsikos.

43. Berberidou, ‘I ellino-tourkiki oikonomiki synergasia’, pp. 6–10; Panayotis Koutsikos,in an internal document for use by the Greek-Turkish Business Council, entitled‘Information Document for the Activities of the GTBC’, undated; PanayotisKoutsikos, ‘Elinotourkiki filia: prokliseis kai prooptikes sti nea hilietia’ (Greek-TurkishFriendship: Challenges and Prospects in the New Millennium), Anaskopisi Amyntikiskai Exoterikis Politikis (Review of Defence and Foreign Policy), (Athens: ELIAMEP,2001), pp. 63–9.

44. There were some sticking points and difficulties here and there, but the instruc-tions from above to the drafters were to be as flexible as possible and not permit minor difficulties to mar the whole enterprise. Author’s interviews with Greekofficials.

45. For the full texts of the agreements see National Bank of Greece, Greek BusinessAlmanac (Athens: National Bank of Greece, 2001), pp. 35–82.

46. The existing institutional framework (the 1951 cultural agreement, the 1970agreement on road transport, the 1979 tourist cooperation and some others) wasdated and of little use.


47. See in this context G. Papandreou’s interview to Çolakoglu and Kourkoulas,Broadcast on NTV, 21 January 2000, at: [http://www.greekturkishforum.org].

48. Panayotis J. Tsakonas, ‘Turkey’s Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greeceand the Cyprus Issue’, Turkish Studies, 2, 2 (2001), p. 26.

49. For details see ibid., p. 26 and note 109 in p. 39.50. David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (London: Royal Institute of International

Affairs, 1943).51. Bölükbası, ‘The Turco-Greek Dispute’, pp. 45–7; Richard Clogg, ‘Greek-Turkish

Relations in the Post-1974 Period’, in Constas, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s,pp. 19–22; Birand, ‘Turkey and the Davos Process’, pp. 27–39; Geoffrey Pridham,‘Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement’, in Constas, TheGreek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, pp. 78–86; Van Coufoudakis, ‘Greek Political PartyAttitudes towards Turkey: 1974–89’, in Constas, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s,pp. 40–55.

52. See Mustafa Aydın’s paper in this volume.53. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey’, pp. 147–8.54. Andrew Wilson, ‘The Aegean Dispute’, Adelphi Papers (London: The International

Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979/1980), pp. 1, 13, 27–9; Aydın, ‘Cacophony in theAegean’.

55. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey’, pp. 147–8.56. See on this point Wilson, ‘The Aegean Dispute’, pp. 13–14.57. See for such approaches Theodoropoulos, Oi Tourkoi kai emeis; Theodore A.

Couloumbis and Louis J. Klarevas, ‘An Outline of a Plan Toward a ComprehensiveSettlement of the Greek-Turkish Dispute’, in Vangelis Calotychos (ed.), Cyprus and itsPeople: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community, 1955–1997(Boulder: Westview, 1998), pp. 121–34.

58. For a thorough listing of the disadvantages of the legal procedures, see Richard B. Bilder, ‘Adjudication: International Arbitral Tribunals and Courts’, in William I.Zartman and Lewis Rasmusen (eds), Peacemaking in International Conflict(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), pp. 175–8.

59. Voiced in Greece, among others, by Theodore Couloumbis.60. Wilson, ‘The Aegean Dispute’, pp. 1, 13, 27–9; Theodoropoulos, Oi Tourkoi kai Emeis,

pp. 324–5. Couloumbis/Klarevas, ‘An outline of a Plan Toward a ComprehensiveSettlement of the Greek-Turkish Dispute’, pp. 121–34; Bahcheli, Greek-TurkishRelations since 1955, pp. 129–30, 152–9, 192–3; Bölükbası, Turkish-American Relationsand Cyprus, pp. 28 and 49; A. J. R. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey: A Treadmillfor Diplomacy’, in John T. A. Koumoulides (ed.), Cyprus in Transition, 1960-1985(London: Trigraph, 1986), pp. 147–8; Richard Haass, Conflicts Unending: The UnitedStates and Regional Disputes (New Haven, London: 1990), pp. 59–64; MonteagleStearns, Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (New York:Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), pp. 134–44. See also Alexis Heraclides, I Ellada kai o ‘ex Anatolon Kindynos’ (Greece and ‘the Threat from the East’), (Athens:Polis, 2001), pp. 242–50.

61. See Political Analysis Group, ‘Issues in the Aegean: Openings and Possibilities’, at:[http://www.greekturkishforum.org].

62. Mujafer Sherif, Conflict and Co-operation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966).63. Heraclides, I Ellada kai o ‘ex Anatolon Kindynos’ (Greece and ‘the Threat from the East’),

p. 244.64. Clogg, ‘Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey’, p. 141.65. John W. Burton, Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in

International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1969); Edward A. Azar and John W.Burton (eds), International Conflict Resolution (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986).

66. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey’, p. 147.67. Ernst Haas, International Political Communities (New York: Anchor Books, 1966),

pp. 94–100.


68. Raymo Vayrynen, ‘To Settle or to Transform: Perspectives on the Resolution ofNational and International Conflicts’, in Raymo Vayrynen (ed.), New Directions inConflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation (London: Sage, 1991), pp. 4–6.

69. This is a reworking of this author’s last lines in Heraclides, I Ellada kai o ‘ex AnatolonKindynos’ (Greece and ‘the Threat from the East’), p. 331.


4Turning a New Page in

Turkey’s Relations with Greece?The Challenge of Reconciling

Vital InterestsTOZUN BAHCHELI

The relaxation of tensions between Turkey and Greece since late 1999,the improved prospects for Turkey’s accession to the EuropeanUnion (EU), as well as new diplomatic initiatives to solve the Cyprusissue, constitute the most hopeful developments in recent Turkish-Greek relations. To be sure, it is far from certain that the recentimprovement in Turkish-Greek relations will yield the kind ofprogress that eluded Turkish and Greek leaders in the past. As theirinterests clashed in Cyprus for nearly half a century and in theAegean since the early 1970s, rivalry and deep mistrust have beenthe hallmarks of Turkish relations with Greece for decades. Althoughperiods of détente between the two countries have not been uncom-mon, they have also succumbed to sporadic crises: on three occasionssince the 1970s, they nearly went to war against each other. Giventhis background, reconciling vital Turkish and Greek interests willpresent a formidable challenge.

In spite of these reservations, the conditions for sustainingTurkish-Greek détente in the early years of the new millenniumappear promising. In Turkey and Greece public opinion respondedwarmly when both countries reacted to each other’s earthquaketragedies in the latter half of 1999 with dispatch and generosity. Evenbefore the earthquakes, former Turkish foreign minister Ismail Cemand his Greek counterpart, George Papandreou, had begun atentative dialogue and cooperated in providing humanitarian aid toKosovo during the North Atlantic (NATO) military campaign againstYugoslavia in the spring of 1999. With the mutual aid during the

earthquakes energizing bilateral dialogue, Greece lifted its veto onTurkey’s candidacy for EU membership at the EU’s Helsinki Summitin December 1999. During the subsequent EU summit in Copen-hagen of 12–13 December 2002, Greece was among a few EU statesthat supported Ankara’s bid for an early date to begin accessionnegotiations with Brussels.

Since 1999, bilateral meetings between Turkish and Greek officialshave yielded more than a dozen agreements on largely non-controversial issues related to economic and cultural ties, bordersecurity, terrorism and cross-border crime. There has been a virtualexplosion of contacts between Turkish and Greek non-governmentalgroups. In addition, Greek and Turkish businesspeople haveincreased their contacts, and trade between the two countries hasrisen.

BETWEEN WAR AND MANAGED RIVALRY

That Turkey and Greece were adversaries for long periods in theirhistory has deeply influenced their relationship and the politicalreactions of their leaders to disputes. The mistrust traditionallyexhibited is a product of an acrimonious historical legacy. Never-theless, Greeks and Turks have shown that they are not entirelyprisoners of memory. Their history of conflict has not ruled outperiods of peace and reconciliation, or even close and inter-dependent relations. Only eight years after their last war (1919 to1922), which was fought with great ferocity and bitterness, Greeceand Turkey began a period of détente.

Greek-Turkish reconciliation was introduced in 1930 by thepowerful, visionary leaders, Kemal Atatürk and Eleftherios Venizelos.It yielded agreements in the political, economic and security spheresand weathered occasional irritants. After the Second World Warprospects for closer relations were further enhanced when they bothjoined the western alliance system and simultaneously becameNATO members in 1952.

Amid these auspicious developments, Cyprus emerged as anarena where Greek and Turkish interests clashed, beginning in themid-1950s. Turks depicted their policy in Cyprus (and the Aegean)as consistently reactive. From their viewpoint, it was Greece and the


Greek Cypriot leadership that repeatedly forced open the issue ofsovereignty over the island, even after the Zurich-London agree-ments created Cypriot independence in 1960. In the Aegean, Ankaraaccused Athens of wanting to bring about unilateral changes to thestatus quo by claiming the right to extend its territorial seas from sixto 12 miles.

While these disputes seriously damaged relations, and evenbrought them to the brink of war on several occasions, the twoneighbours also showed a capacity to cool tempers and to adoptmeasures that would discourage future confrontations. The Aegeanconfrontation of 1976 ushered in a period of calm and the adoptionof the Berne Declaration, which brought a decade of peace and quiet.Another Aegean confrontation in 1987 had a profoundly soberingeffect and led to the short-lived dialogue known as the ‘Davosprocess’. But these respites of relative stability failed to yield anysustained negotiating process. In fact, again in January 1996, the twoneighbours briefly confronted each other over Imia/Kardak – anuninhabited islet – without, however, any subsequent improvementin the climate of relations until the latter half of 1999. Moreover, the UN-sponsored Cyprus negotiations – to which Greek leadersattached a much higher priority than Ankara – failed to achieveprogress and remained unhelpful in advancing overall Turkish-Greek relations. Indeed, more often than not, tensions over Cypruspreoccupied the two countries. Just in the years 1997–99, these werefed by such events as violence along the line separating the com-munities, Cyprus’s bid for accession to the EU, and – before itscancellation in 1999 – the proposed deployment of Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missiles in Greek Cyprus. These events keptGreek-Turkish relations strained through most of the 1990s. Even asrelations between Turkey and Greece warmed in late 1999 andbeyond, the climate in the relations between the two Cypriot com-munities remained tense until late 2001 when the decision to start anew round of intercommunal negotiations raised hopes of a settle-ment on both sides of the Green Line. These expectations have beenapparently boosted by the receptivity of AKP (Adalet ve KalkinmaPartisi – Justice and Development Party) government and Athens aswell as the Greek Cypriot leadership to the peace plan for Cyprusthat UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted to the parties on11 November 2002, a month before the EU summit in Copenhagen.

TURNING A NEW PAGE? 97

However, at the time of writing (July 2003) the opposition of TurkishCypriot leader Rauf Denktas to the plan has cast doubts that the long-standing Cyprus conflict might finally end with an agreedsettlement.

THE AEGEAN: TURKEY’S APPROACH AND INTERESTS

Many Greeks, who have feared Turkish expansionism for decades,would be surprised to hear Turkish officials argue that Greece hasbeen an expansionist power in the Aegean, at Turkey’s expense.These Turkish contentions refer to historical maps of the Aegean thatshow the remarkable expansion of Greek sovereignty over Aegeanislands since Greece attained independence. Turkey’s boundarieswith Greece were established under the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. The treaty granted all of the 2,200 Aegean islands and islets toGreece, with the exception of Gökçeada, Bozcaada and the tinyRabbit Islands at the entrance of the Dardanelles. These largelyGreek-inhabited islands, which had been ruled by the OttomanEmpire for centuries had, in any case, passed to Greek control duringthe Balkan wars of 1912–13. It was also decided, however, thatTurkey’s security concerns warranted the demilitarization of theeastern Aegean islands. The equilibrium established by the LausanneTreaty in the Aegean did not pose any large problems for the twoneighbours for half a century. No Turkish-Greek controversy overthe Aegean surfaced even when the Cyprus issue created strains andbitterness in both Turkey and Greece in the late 1950s and the 1960s.

Since the early 1970s, however, Turkish and Greek differences in the Aegean, related mostly to sovereign rights, have seriouslydamaged their relations. Most of the quarrelling has been over theentitlement of each to the Aegean continental shelf. In addition tothis, Ankara and Athens have had serious disagreements on thelimits of the territorial sea, sovereign airspace, the control of themilitary and civil air traffic control zones, and the militarization ofthe Greek islands in the eastern Aegean (see Aydın’s chapter in thisbook).

To the great disappointment of Turkish leaders, internationalmaritime laws have been modified seemingly in Greece’s favour inrecent decades. Article 3 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention


provides for the right of states to establish territorial seas of ‘amaximum breadth of twelve miles from the baselines’.1 Greece wasone of the first signatories, but Turkey has not signed it. Nevertheless,Greece thus far has refrained from extending its territorial sea in theAegean beyond six miles.

While most of the Aegean quarrelling centred on the continentalshelf, the territorial sea issue is the one that is most vital for Turkey.The two issues are not unrelated. All of the shelf claimed by Greecewould lie within its prospective 12-mile territorial claim. Greekextension of its Aegean territorial waters would make Turkey’s accessto its major ports, I

.stanbul and I

.zmir, more difficult. As Andrew

Wilson pointed out in his 1980s study The Aegean Dispute, ‘alreadythe application of the six-mile limit restricts Turkey to only threeplaces where shipping may enter or leave Turkish territorial watersfrom international waters’.2 Thus Ankara has repeatedly declaredthat an extension to 12 miles would constitute a casus belli, that is, ajustification for war. After the Greek Parliament ratified the Inter-national Law of the Sea on 1 June 1994, the Turkish Parliamentfollowed on 8 June with a resolution authorizing the government touse all measures to protect Turkey’s rights in the Aegean.

The access issue applies also to aircraft, as Turkey feels similarlyconfined by the airspace of Greece’s islands. Ankara’s challengeswith its military aircraft to Greece’s ten-mile airspace over its six-mileterritorial waters are usually countered by Athens’ responds with its own aircrafts (see Chapter 1). These aerial challenges have longworried their NATO allies, but Athens and Ankara have thus farmanaged to prevent mock dogfights from escalating into moreserious exchanges. Ankara has also occasionally quarrelled withAthens over lesser issues related to flights in the Aegean byrepeatedly accusing Greece of abusing its purely technical FlightInformation Region (FIR) responsibilities to gain sovereign rights.Again, like the US and other NATO states, Turkey does not accept theGreek claim that it is obliged to notify Greek authorities when itsmilitary aircraft enter Aegean airspace.

While the FIR issue has been an irritant, the stakes for both Turkeyand Greece have been greater in the Aegean continental shelf. Theshelf – comprising the seabed and sub-soil of the submarine areabeyond the territorial sea, to the point where the land mass is deemedto end – has proved to be one of the most difficult and potentially


explosive issues facing the Aegean neighbours. Athens has statedthat delimitation of the continental shelf is the sole Aegean issue andthat the problem must be adjudicated by the International Court ofJustice at The Hague. Greek leaders assert that their islands aresurrounded by continental shelf beyond that of the Greek mainland.In the Turkish view, the Greek Aegean islands lie within Turkey’scontinental shelf as a natural extension of the Anatolian peninsula.

While both countries have generally avoided serious provoca-tions in the Aegean, mutual suspicions sometimes create tensionsand even provoke confrontations. A case in point was Ankara’sconsternation following Greek attempts to populate remote Aegeanislands in 1995.3 But Athens accused Ankara of a greater transgressionin challenging Greek sovereignty over an unpopulated islet off theTurkish coast (known as ‘Imia’ to Greeks and ‘Kardak’ to Turks).Indicating a hardened policy, Turkish leaders announced a newposition that there are more than a hundred uninhabited Aegeanislets whose legal status is unclear, and thus represent ‘grey areas’ ofuncertain sovereignty. This departure sowed new doubts in theminds of Greek leaders concerning Turkish intentions.

Unlike Athens, which apparently feels confident about its legalposition, Ankara fears that its case on the issues discussed thus far isweaker and demurs on the desire of Athens to pursue a courtdecision. However, Turkish leaders do feel confident on the issue ofdemilitarization of Greece’s eastern Aegean islands, and they haveperiodically brought up the issue to demonstrate Greece’s seemingcontravention of the treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947).

Nevertheless, Ankara’s approach to resolving its Aegean prob-lems is driven by a general strategy of avoiding the InternationalCourt of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague, or indeed any other third-partyadjudication or arbitration, except ‘as a last resort’. Turkish leaderscalculate that they can obtain better terms from Greece throughbilateral negotiations. In accordance with this approach, Ankarastrongly resists Greek attempts to ‘internationalize’ (and ‘Euro-peanize’) Aegean issues. Turkish leaders traditionally react angrily toAthens’s attempts to enlist the support of its EU partners and warnthose states not to take Greece’s side. On the other hand, Ankara hasperiodically signalled to Athens that it did not rule out third-partymediation, including recourse to the ICJ. In an appeal to Greece on24 March 1996, not long after Turkey and Greece nearly went to war


over Imia/Kardak, Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz announced Turkey’swillingness to accept third-party mediation. Upon returning to theprime ministry in the following year, Yılmaz urged that the twocountries ‘resolve everything possible through negotiations andleave the rest to international arbitration and, as a last resort, to theInternational Tribunal in The Hague’.4

Turkey has periodically tried to induce Greece into bilateral nego-tiations on Aegean issues (see Chapter 9). Greece has occasionallyaccepted these overtures, but the ensuing talks did not yield anysignificant agreements and were essentially exploratory. For instance,there were intermittent talks on Aegean and other issues, particularlyafter the adoption of the Berne agreement in 1976. These ended withthe election of the first PASOK government under AndreasPapandreou in 1981. Talks concerning Aegean issues were brieflyrevived during the ‘Davos process’ in 1988–89, but these too provedinconclusive. A dialogue on Aegean issues between Ankara andAthens was launched in early 2002. However, at the time of writing(July 2003), no progress was reported in bridging the gap betweenTurkish and Greek positions on the major Aegean disputes.

THE CYPRUS ISSUE

The Cyprus issue has bedevilled Turkey’s relations with Greece foralmost half a century and has inflicted more damage on Turkey’srelations with Greece than any other problem. Unlike the Aegeanwhich has remained an essentially bilateral problem, due to Greekand Greek Cypriot efforts – and against Turkish wishes – Cyprus has been an internationalized issue for decades. This has adverselyaffected not only Turkey’s relations with Greece but also those withsuch important allies such as the United States and Britain. MoreoverCyprus has assumed an increasing importance as an issue in Turkish-EU relations. Though heavily engaged on the island and supportiveof its ethnic kin, Ankara has often found itself (as has Athens) reactingto, rather than initiating, events by one or the other of the twoCypriot communities.

Ankara has long been frustrated that it has not been able toconvert the position of strength it acquired with its military inter-vention in 1974 to secure Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests on


the island in a manner which it deems necessary. Above all otherfactors, the proximity and strategic significance of Cyprus has beena key consideration for Turkey. Fed by media reports over many yearsthat Greek and Greek Cypriots victimized Turkish Cypriots andthreatened Turkish interests, most Turks harbour bitter memories ofsuch conduct. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Cyprus has long beenelevated to the status of a ‘national cause’ championed by practicallyevery political party. With national interests and honour at stake, theissue has lent itself ideally to nationalist mobilization and populiststances. These attributes have helped forge multi-party consensus inTurkish politics, but have also burdened any government in Ankaracontemplating a compromise settlement with Greek Cypriots andGreece. Charges of ‘selling out’ have been commonly levelled againstgoverning parties whenever a compromise or conciliatory stepsconcerning Cyprus have been contemplated in Ankara.

It is worth recalling that Cyprus first became a disputed Turkish-Greek issue in 1955, 18 years before the continental shelf issue firstemerged in the Aegean in 1973. Turkish-Greek relations had sufferedover Cyprus during the preceding years, thus complicatingsettlement prospects for the Aegean problems. Turkey’s relationswith Greece were tranquil when Greek Cypriot leaders began theirEnosis (union with Greece) campaign in the mid-1950s against theBritish administration on the island. At the time, both Ankara andthe Turkish community in Cyprus were content to see a continuationof British rule. The presence of a sizeable Turkish community, alegacy of three centuries of Ottoman rule (1570–1878) in Cyprus,made it almost certain that Turkish interest would be aroused by anydevelopments affecting its kin. More problematic for Turkish leaders,however, was that Greek Cypriots and Greece contested the sover-eignty of the island. In spite of the post-war improvements inTurkish-Greek relations, Turkish leaders still had strategic concernsvis-à-vis Greece. Already feeling hemmed in by Greek islands in theAegean, Turkish leaders felt that Greek sovereignty over Cyprus – 40 miles from its southern coast – would enable Athens to controlaccess to its southern ports of Mersin and I

.skenderun. This concern

was at the heart of the Turkish objection to Enosis.In the mid-1950s, Greek backing for the Greek Cypriot insurgency

for union with Greece, and Turkish backing for the Turkish Cypriotstruggle against Enosis seriously strained Turkish-Greek relations. To


counter Enosis, Ankara adopted partition as a goal. But GreekCypriots and Athens rejected this. Clashes between Turkish andGreek Cypriots claimed hundreds of lives, and poisoned the relation-ship of the two communities, leaving a poor legacy for future com-munal relations on the island. Three years of Cypriot disturbances(1955–58) and the clash of goals about the future of Cyprus nearlyundid the progress that Ankara and Athens achieved in theirrelations during the preceding 30 years.

Nevertheless Turkish and Greek diplomacy succeeded in pre-venting their relations from getting any worse, by taking the lead indrawing up a settlement based on independence for Cyprus. Innegotiating the Zurich-London agreements that created the Repub-lic of Cyprus, Ankara did well in securing Turkish Cypriot andTurkish rights. The agreements created a power-sharing constitutionfor the island, providing numerous safeguards for the protection ofthe Turkish community from the more numerous Greek Cypriots.The principal benefits for Turkey were that, in accordance with thetreaties of Guarantee and Alliance,5 it became a guarantor of Cypriotindependence (along with Greece and the United Kingdom), andwas authorized to station a small number of troops on the island.

However, Turkish satisfaction turned to disenchantment anddismay as the Turkish and Greek communities quarrelled over theapplication of constitutional provisions, particularly those related to separate municipalities and the 30 per cent Turkish Cypriotrepresentation at every grade of civil service employment. From theTurkish Cypriot and Ankara’s point of view, the Greek Cypriotleadership refused to apply the provisions of the 1960 Constitution,and violated the independence agreements by reviving the Enosiscall.

Both Turkish Cypriots and Turks view the period between thecollapse of the bi-communal government on the island in late 1963up to the Turkish military intervention of 1974 as a period of greatadversity for the Turkish community. Greek Cypriot successes in thecivil war that began in 1963 had reduced the Turkish communityfrom the status of partner-in-government to a harassed community,with Turkey hard-pressed to intervene without provoking a war withGreece. Ankara was not just angered by the Greek Cypriot abuse ofTurkish Cypriots, but also at the support Greek governments gaveMakarios while the latter altered the constitutional order that Turkey


and Greece had bequeathed for the island. Turkish anger turned tooutrage when Greek leaders lent their support to the resurrected callfor Enosis. It was one thing to want Enosis, however, and another to achieve it in the face of a war threat by Turkey. This was wellunderstood by Makarios and most Greek leaders who were carefulnot to provoke the intervention of Turkey. However, in an unex-pected twist of events, Greek junta leader Brigadier Ioannidisunwittingly handed Ankara the pretext for military intervention onthe island. This happened when Ioannidis engineered a coup againstMakarios in July 1974, in an apparent bid to bring Cyprus underGreek control.

When Ecevit dispatched Turkish troops to Cyprus in July 1974, hedid so by citing Turkey’s rights of intervention as provided by the1960 Treaty of Guarantee.6 By aborting the Greek junta’s attempt tounite the island with Greece, Turkey had acted in accordance withtreaty requirements. But the Treaty of Guarantee authorized thethree guarantor powers (Turkey, Greece and Britain) to intervene inorder to restore the 1960 constitution that established the island’sindependence. The Ecevit government had no intention of allowingthis to happen. Instead, using Turkey’s new position of strength, andworking closely with Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas, it helpedcreate the basis of a new settlement on the island based on thephysical separation of the two communities.

As a consequence of the war of 1974, 160,000 Greek Cypriots (athird of the Greek community) became refugees, as did 45,000Turkish Cypriots (representing nearly 40 per cent of the Turkish com-munity). The forced movement of people resulted in the creation oftwo homogeneous ethnic entities on the island. Most Greek Cypriotsfled or were forced to leave the Turkish Cypriot-administered area inthe north and moved to the south; virtually all Turkish Cypriotsmoved from the south to the north. In a bid to enhance the demo-graphic balance in favour of Turkish Cypriots, Ankara arranged fortens of thousands of its citizens to settle in northern Cyprus.7

Turkish leaders exploited the Greek junta’s blunder in 1974, andturned the tables on Greek Cypriots and Greece on the island. With37 per cent of the island’s territory under their control, includingsome (such as the uninhabited resort town of Varosha) that could bebargained away in a settlement, Turkish Cypriots could negotiatefrom a position of strength. For almost two decades, the Turkish


Cypriot leadership called for the creation of a loose federation, andargued in favour of retaining Turkey’s rights as a guarantor as wellas the indefinite stationing of Turkish troops on the island. By aboutthe mid-1990s this position hardened with the demand that GreekCypriots recognize Turkish Cypriots’ right to self-determination.Later, in 1999, with Ankara’s support, the Turkish Cypriot leadershipcalled for a confederation based on the union of two sovereign states,one Turkish Cypriot and the other Greek Cypriot.

Greek Cypriot leaders have rejected these demands, arguinginstead for a unified state with a single sovereignty, though struc-tured as a bi-zonal federation. They have also sought safeguardsagainst Turkey’s intervention in the future. In spite of the Island’s de facto partition for more than a quarter century, and Turkey’sundoubted military superiority, Ankara has been unable to compelthe Greek Cypriots to accept Turkish/Turkish Cypriot terms. That is because, in spite of their considerably weakened position in 1974,Greek Cypriots – bolstered by Greece – have enjoyed several advan-tages. First, even though a separate Turkish Cypriot state, the TurkishRepublic of Northern Cyprus (hereinafter TRNC), was established in1983 and recognized by Ankara, the international community hascontinued to recognize the Greek Cypriot-controlled Republic ofCyprus as the legitimate government of the whole island. Acting intandem with Athens, the Greek Cypriot leadership has used itslegitimacy advantage by internationalizing the dispute and puttingpressure on Turkey to withdraw its troops. Second, the Greek Cypriotgovernment succeeded in imposing an economic embargo on theTurkish Cypriot-administered area since 1974. As a result of success-ful Greek Cypriot pressures, European governments do not permitscheduled flights to the TRNC, thus handicapping the promisingtourism sector in the Turkish Cypriot economy. Third, Greek/GreekCypriot lobbying in Washington has regularly caused problems forAnkara by generating critical congressional resolutions, and imped-ing US arms transfers to Turkey. In Europe, too, European Parliamentresolutions criticizing Turkey’s Cyprus policy have been common-place. Furthermore, in a major blow to Ankara, in a ruling dated 28July 1988, the European Court of Human Rights held Turkey (ratherthan the Turkish Cypriot government) responsible for barring aGreek Cypriot refugee’s access to her property in northern Cyprus,and ordered the Turkish government to pay her compensation.


Athens has used its EU membership to exert pressure on Turkey.Until the warming of Greek-Turkish relations in the latter half of 1999,Athens repeatedly vetoed the release of aid that the EU agreed toprovide Turkey as part of the association and customs union agree-ments. More importantly, it persuaded its EU partners in Brussels tocommence accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriot-controlledRepublic of Cyprus, in spite of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot objec-tions. While releasing its veto on granting of EU membership statusto Turkey at the Helsinki summit in 1999, Greek lobbying secured apledge that the accession of Cyprus to the EU would proceed evenwithout a prior settlement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. At its summit in December 2002 the EU affirmed that Cyprus willbecome an EU member in the next round of enlargement in May2004.

PROGRESS ON OTHER FRONTS

Ankara and Athens have taken prudent steps since 1999 by tacklingissues that have damaged their relations in recent years. Apart fromCyprus and the Aegean, Ankara’s biggest grievance against Greecein recent years has been the alleged support of the latter for theseparatist PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) insurgency. The discoverythat Greece has sheltered PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in its embassyin Nairobi, Kenya, enraged the Turks, whose leaders had longaccused Athens of supporting PKK terrorism against Turkey. Turkishthreats of retaliation in early 1999 during the Öcalan debacle seem tohave had a sobering effect on the Simitis government, and futureGreek governments may be wary of provoking Turkey on an issueof such existential importance to Turkey. If the PKK armed struggledoes come to an end, as its leadership has pledged, the Kurdish issuewill likely fade as a bilateral bone of contention.

Compared to the PKK controversy, which became an explosiveissue in a short period of time, Greek treatment of the Turkish com-munity in Western Thrace (numbering an estimated 125,000) hasbeen a long-standing irritant in Turkish-Greek relations. ThracianTurks have accused the Greek government of neglecting theireconomic and educational needs, as well as restricting their rights ina number of areas, including the freedom to choose their muftis


(religious leaders).8 Until 1999, Athens refused even to call this group‘Turks’ insisting instead on the terminology of the 1923 LausanneTreaty, which designates them as ‘Muslims’.

The Greek government has generally denied applying a policy ofdiscrimination against its Turkish minority. Moreover, it accusesTurkey of having forced out most of the Greek minority in I

.stanbul.

Whereas the population of the Turkish community in Thrace hasbeen constant, that of the Greek community in I

.stanbul has dimin-

ished drastically over the decades, from roughly 120,000 in 1923 to about 3,500 in 1999. Ankara found that the virtual disappearanceof the I

.stanbul Greeks substantially reduced its leverage vis-à-vis

Athens regarding the Thracian Turks. Still, the discriminatory treat-ment meted out to this community is widely reported in the Turkishmedia. Ironically, while resisting pressures from several EU countriesregarding its own human rights practices, Turkey sought additionalleverage against Greece by using European forums such as theCouncil of Europe to publicize the plight of Thracian Turks. To someextent, this approach has worked. It was European, rather thanTurkish, pressure that prompted Greece to abolish the controversialArticle 19 of its constitution on 11 June 1998. This law had effectivelydeprived many Thracian Turks of their Greek nationality when theytravelled to Turkey or to other countries.9

In recent years Athens has taken numerous measures to improvethe economy of Greek Thrace, which remains the country’s poorestregion. With the help of EU funds, investments were made in largeprojects to boost employment prospects, thus benefiting the Turkishcommunity. The end of official restrictions on assertions of Turkishethnicity – as of July 1999 – was welcomed by Turkey. Nevertheless,both the Thracian Turks and Ankara contend that the Greek govern-ment should adopt further measures to improve the economic statusand educational opportunities of the minority and allow it to allowit to elect its own muftis.

DOMESTIC FACTORS

Except during short periods of détente, the image of Greeceportrayed in most of the Turkish media is usually that of a countrywhose leaders and people harbour perpetual enmity toward the


Turkish nation. During the period leading up to the most recentTurkish-Greek rapprochement, the press regularly carried newsstories and articles highly critical of Greek policies concerningCyprus, the Aegean, EU-Turkish relations and the PKK. This helpsexplain the ease with which nationalist feelings were mobilizedduring the Imia/Kardak episode. When the issue of contested sover-eignty over the uninhabited islet first emerged, both Ankara andAthens discussed the matter quietly for weeks. However, once thestory was leaked to the Greek press, the media of both countriesturned it into a cause célèbre. Aroused public opinion constrained bothgovernments, making it difficult for the leaders to end the confron-tation without losing face.

Given the vital security issues involved in disputes betweenAnkara and Athens, key matters relating to Greece (and Cyprus) aredeliberated within Turkey’s National Security Council (NSC), whichis dominated by top military officers. During the 1990s, particularlywith short-lived coalitions serially serving in office during 1991 to 2002, military influence in Turkish decision-making increased.Turkey’s military establishment is obviously keen to influence theGreek-Turkish military balance. While Middle Eastern adversariessuch as Syria became weaker, Greece continued to use its diplomaticand military assets, as well as the Greek lobby in Washington, tocheck Turkish power.

Policies toward Greece and Cyprus ordinarily enjoy considerablesupport across the political spectrum. But governments that take thepublic for granted could provoke much unwelcome criticism. Suchwas the case in early November 2001 when former prime ministerEcevit and foreign minister Cem warned that Turkey was preparedto make ‘great sacrifices’ if the EU proceeded to admit Cyprus,against the wishes of Turkey.10 These remarks unleashed an intensedebate in Turkey regarding official policy on Cyprus. Many Turkishcolumnists and media commentators, together with some non-governmental groups, questioned the wisdom of the government’sapproach to the issue; they feared that Ankara might forsakeTurkey’s EU membership for the sake of its Cyprus policy. TurkishCypriot leader Denktas too was widely criticized, particularly overhis lengthy boycott of UN-sponsored talks with his Greek Cypriotcounterpart. Criticism of Denktas became commonplace in themainstream Turkish media due to his refusal to endorse the UN plan


for the island’s reunification before the EU summit decision inDecember 2002 regarding Cypriot accession. His critics berated himfor his inflexible stance, by emphasizing the UN plan’s favourableterms for Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, namely, political equality anda wide measure of autonomy for the Turkish community in a loosebi-zonal federation, the reaffirmation of the Treaty of Guarantee, andthe endorsement for stationing thousands of Turkish troops on theisland.

Nevertheless, in spite of the apparent receptivity of the AKPgovernment to the UN blueprint, it was unable to overcome thecombined opposition of Denktas, the Turkish military and seniorofficials of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the terms of theUN plan.

During the 1990s, weak coalition governments in Ankara shuffledin and out of office at the average rate of one per year. Eleven govern-ments, including nine coalitions, and 11 different foreign ministersheld office in Ankara during the decade. This made any major policychanges toward Greece most unlikely, since only a strong govern-ment backed by the military could undertake bold policy departures.It is not a coincidence that one major effort for rapprochement tookplace during the leadership of Turgut Özal, whose party enjoyed asolid majority in Parliament during 1983–1991. Keen on securing theaccession of Turkey to the EU, for which his government applied in1987, Özal initiated the ‘Davos process’ together with Greek primeminister Andreas Papandreou following their meeting in Davos,Switzerland, in early 1988. But the Davos initiative failed to yield any major breakthroughs, and momentum was lost by 1989. Thedomestic political weakening of both leaders soon afterwards spelledthe end of the ‘Davos spirit’.11

THE US FACTOR

The United States has long been involved in managing Greek-Turkish differences, particularly since the onset of civil strife onCyprus in 1963. This has not been an easy task, and US actions havesometimes caused strains in Washington’s relationship with bothTurkey and Greece. The arms embargo the US Congress imposed onTurkey in 1975 is a case in point, as is the famous letter from President


Lyndon B. Johnson to Prime Minister I.smet I

.nönü in 1964, warning

him against a military intervention in Cyprus. Both caused muchbitterness in Turkey and strained relations for several years.

Adding to its anger over the effect of anti-Turkish lobbies inWashington, Ankara resented the 7:10 ratio applied by Congress(usually against White House’s wishes) to aid provided to Greece andTurkey, respectively, since 1980. At 65 million, Turkey’s population issix times that of Greece and its armed forces are considerably larger.12

Turkish leaders contend that Turkey offers more strategic assets tothe US and NATO than does Greece, thus resent the Congressionalmove to link the assistance to Turkey to Greek needs, as it give Greeceleverage over Turkish security. Greece, on the other hand, saw theratio as vital for maintaining the balance of power in the Aegean and regarded any attempt to eliminate it as an obvious Americanfavour for Turkey. As the military aid programme ended in the 1999fiscal year, the issue has died out, though Ankara continues to beunhappy about the activities of pro-Greek groups in Washington,including some Greek-American legislators and others with largeGreek-American constituencies, to limit any other American movefavouring Turkey.

Turkey faces more obstacles in Washington than those posed bylobbies and the US Congress. Successive US administrations haveroutinely called upon Ankara to remain committed to solving itsproblems with Greece and to helping settle the Cyprus issue. InTurkish eyes, the handling of these issues by Washington is lessoffensive than that of European governments, but still unwelcome.

In spite of these difficulties, Turkish leaders attach great impor-tance to relations with the US. Defence and political cooperation withWashington remains as much a core interest for Turkey as it wasduring the Cold War. Ankara appreciated US efforts to help bringTurkey closer to Europe, particularly representations of Washingtonto the EU states in favour of Turkish membership. Turkish initiativesto transport oil from the Caucasus have been bolstered by US supportfor the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline in preference to proposalsfavoured by Russia, Iran, Greece and Bulgaria. Moreover, US supporthas been crucial in the multi-billion dollar stabilization programmenegotiated between Ankara and the International Monetary Fundwhen a severe economic crisis gripped Turkey in 2001. In manyimportant respects Turkey needs the US to cope with the Greek


‘threat’ as well. About 80 per cent of Turkey’s military weapons areof US manufacture.13 Ankara also counts on Washington’s reliance onTurkey in pursuit of policies in the regions abutting Turkey to get theWhite House help in neutralizing the pro-Greek tilt in Congress.

Unlike the EU, which is often beholden to Greece and takespositions on Greek-Turkish issues that upset Ankara, the US haspursued a more nuanced policy on such disputes. This evokes morerespect among Turkish leaders than do the policies of EU states. Insome respects, US policy on a number of Aegean issues lends indirectsupport to Turkey. A case in point is the US position that the sovereignairspace of a state corresponds to its territorial seas, a position iden-tical with that of Turkey. Moreover, by discouraging any unilateralmove to alter the territorial status quo in the Aegean, Washingtonmay also be said to bolster indirectly the Turkish position on the six-mile territorial-sea limit.

Washington’s close relations with both Ankara and Athens,together with the NATO link, have given the US considerable lever-age in stabilizing the Turkish-Greek relationship and in exploitingopportunities to help resolve disputes. There is, after all, a sharedgeneral interest between Washington, Ankara and Athens in avoid-ing crises and confrontations in the Aegean. But moving beyondcrisis prevention to the settlement of disputes has been a dauntingtask.

Since Ankara and Athens have rejected US involvement in thepossible resolution of their Aegean disputes, Washington hasexpended a good deal more effort in trying to settle the Cyprus issue.It has been hoped in Washington – indeed in many capitals in theWest – that a breakthrough in Cyprus would pave the way forsubstantially improving Turkish-Greek relations and enhance theprospects for settling Aegean disputes. Washington has strongly sup-ported the United Nations Secretary-General’s Cyprus plan issuedon 11 November 2002, and has lobbied all of the main actors in a bidto secure a settlement.

A recurring concern for the US and its allies has been the perennialthreat that Turkish-Greek tensions pose to NATO cohesion, even tothe point of potential collapse of the southern flank. Indeed, NATOhas been preoccupied with these quarrels throughout much of itsexistence. It is hard to assess the contribution of NATO, especially asdistinct from that of the US, in moderating Greek-Turkish conflicts


over the years. NATO meetings have afforded opportunities forAnkara and Athens to discuss their problems in a forum where theirallies have encouraged them and offered ideas for the bridging oftheir differences. On the other hand, it has been argued that theAlliance has unwittingly exacerbated conflicts between Greece andTurkey. According to political scientist Ronald Krebs, their member-ship in the Alliance has destabilized relations by, in effect, contractingout their national security and thus allowing each power to pursueits regional interests with reduced vulnerability.14

In this connection, questions have been raised concerning thedestabilizing effect of arms transfers by the allies to Turkey andGreece. The huge transfer in the early 1990s under the ‘cascade’programme of the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treatyenabled each country to bolster its arsenal. As a result of the transfer,through ‘cascading’ of material that exceeded the CFE limits of theirNATO allies, Turkey and Greece received thousands of tanks, combathelicopters, fighter aircraft and other equipment. These transfers,together with ongoing major purchases, have fuelled an arms race.As one concerned observer asserted: ‘Until now, the two could onlyfight it out in the Aegean, but things are changing rapidly. Theemphasis on both sides is on “force multipliers” such as smart stand-off missiles, avionics, radar, and air-to-air refuelling capabilities.’15

THE EU FACTOR

In keeping with the Kemalist vision that Turkey’s rightful place iswithin the western family of nations, the Turkish secular establish-ment has pursued closer European ties for many years. Turkey’sassociate EU membership – attained in 1963, a year later than Greece– envisioned eventual full membership. Although Turkish leadersdid not apply for membership when Greece did in 1975, they soughtand received assurances from the EU that Turkish interests andmembership prospects would not be affected by the full membershipof Greece.16 Credible or not at the time, these assurances provedhollow. In the eyes of Turks as well as many EU members, Greece for years used its membership to impede progress in EU-Turkishrelations.

In the aftermath of the EU’s Luxembourg Summit of 12–13


December 1997, which rejected the Turkish bid to be included amongthe countries eligible for EU membership, Ankara vented its angeragainst Greece (and Germany) for its active role in the decision.Turkish bitterness was compounded by the EU’s decision to bend toGreek pressure and place Cyprus on a fast track for EU accession, inspite of Ankara’s insistence on a prior settlement between Greek andTurkish Cypriots. Turkish leaders were additionally upset that,instead of placing the onus for settlement of bilateral problems jointlyon Athens and Ankara, EU members called upon Turkey to settle itsdisputes with Greece ‘in particular by legal process, including theInternational Court of Justice’.17

From the Turkish point of view, the EU’s Helsinki Summit ofDecember 1999, although overall more pleasing than Luxembourg in its acceptance of Turkey as an EU membership candidate, never-theless was similarly problematic in endorsing recourse to the ICJand for its statement on Cyprus. In the words of the Helsinkicommuniqué:

The European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settle-ment of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charterand urges candidate states to make every effort to resolve anyoutstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failingthis they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute tothe International Court of Justice.

The European Council will review the situation relating toany outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the reper-cussions on the accession process and in order to promote theirsettlement through the International Court of Justice, at thelatest by the end of 2004.

The European Council underlines that a political settlementwill facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. Ifno settlement has been reached by the completion of accessionnegotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be madewithout the above being a precondition. In this the Council willtake account of all relevant factors.18

While tilting toward Greece, the Helsinki Summit communiquéalso seemed to acknowledge Turkish interests. Thus, the EU state-ment called for the resolution of ‘any outstanding border disputes


and other related issues’, in seeming acknowledgement of Ankara’sposition that there are Aegean issues unrelated to maritime boun-daries (e.g. the militarization of Greece’s eastern Aegean islands) thatrequire resolution. Moreover, the communiqué called on candidatestates to make ‘every effort’ to resolve disputes; Ankara will arguethat this underscores the necessity for bilateral negotiations in theresolution of its Aegean disputes with Greece prior to any recourseto the ICJ.

As much as Ankara has been upset by EU states’ episodic involve-ment in Greek-Turkish disagreements, it should be recognized that European governments have usually preferred to steer clear ofbilateral Greek-Turkish disputes, as well as of the Cyprus issue.However, Greece’s membership has made this very difficult. Whenits EU partners have disagreed with its policies, Athens has oftenused its veto powers, as shown by its blocking of EU aid earmarkedfor Turkey under the 1963 association agreement and the 1995customs union agreement. Athens lifted its veto in 1995 against the customs union, but only as a quid pro quo for the EU to beginnegotiations with Cyprus for full membership. As noted, Greecesecured a similar trade-off (concerning Cyprus and the Aegean) inDecember 1999 at the Helsinki Summit when it lifted its veto to allowthe EU’s assignment of candidate status to Turkey. Furthermore,Athens’ threat to veto the EU’s expansion into eastern Europe wasinstrumental in winning EU support for the Greek Cypriot bid forthe island’s EU accession.

Even though the EU partners defer to Athens in many instances,in the area of paramount concern to Turkish security, the security armof the EU, they have resisted Greek pressures on several occasionsand have accommodated Turkish concerns, though after Ankaraclearly threatened to use its NATO membership to veto thedevelopment of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (seeChapter 1).

The issue of Cyprus’ EU membership may yet create lastingdifficulties for both Turkish-Greek and Turkish-EU relations if nosettlement of the island’s dispute proves attainable by the timeCyprus (in effect, the Greek-Cypriot controlled territory) joins the EU in 2004. Before losing the elections on 3 November 2002, thecoalition government led by Bülent Ecevit took a hard line on theCyprus issue, warning that Turkey might annex the TRNC and close


the doors permanently to any hope of re-unifying the island if(Greek) Cypriot accession is allowed prior to a settlement. However,although the EU summit of 12–13 December endorsed Cypriotmembership, several factors ensured that Turkey’s relations withGreece remained intact, at least in the short term. Ankara appreciatedAthens’ support for its bid to secure an early date for the start ofTurkey’s accession talks with Brussels. Also, senior members of thegovernment of the Justice and Development Party (elected on 3November 2002 with a solid parliamentary majority) have consid-ered the UN plan of 11 November 2002, as acceptable as a basis fornegotiations. Although the plan calls for substantial territorial adjust-ments in favour of Greek Cypriots by the TRNC, it also providespolitical equality for the two communities, as demanded by TurkishCypriots. Justice and Development Party leader Tayyip Erdogan, andother senior members of the government, have encouraged TurkishCypriot leader Denktas to strive to reach a settlement before Cyprusis admitted as an EU member in May 2004. This represents a notabledeparture from the hard-line policy of former prime minister BülentEcevit who championed separate Turkish Cypriot statehood andoften stated that the Cyprus issue was resolved in 1974 whenTurkey’s intervention partitioned the island. Unlike its predecessors,the Justice and Development Party appears committed to pursue a reformist agenda and to secure Turkish entry into the EU, andfurthermore, to remove the Cyprus issue as an impediment toTurkish accession.

POSSIBLE COMPROMISES?

While officially expressed positions indicate a wide gap in the Turkishand Greek positions in the Aegean, there is considerable room forcompromise on key issues by both parties. In recent years, numerousideas have been floated by retired diplomats, academics and others,that are suggestive of the type of compromise solutions in the Aegeanthat would go a long way to satisfy Turkish and Greek needs, andallay their anxieties.

Turkey’s greatest anxiety has been to avert the Aegean becominga ‘Greek lake’, by Athens’ extension of its territorial waters in theAegean from six to 12 miles. There have been numerous unofficial


indications that Athens is prepared to accept a six-mile territorial seain much of the Aegean in order to allay Turkish concerns. In turn,Ankara would be expected to match this major concession bysafeguarding the interests of Greece, particularly by accepting a legalsettlement mechanism for the continental shelf issue.

Would Turkish officials be anxious that Greece would receive thelion’s share of the continental shelf by virtue of the Greek islands’entitlements to the shelf if the issue is taken to the International Courtof Justice at The Hague or be adjudicated by a legal tribunal? Orwould Ankara look toward legal adjudication confident that it wouldbe granted a fair share of the shelf? There are reportedly contendingviews among Turkish officials regarding the wisdom of accepting alegal recourse.19 According to some sources, there is considerablescope for compromise in the official Turkish position that claims halfof the Aegean continental shelf. Retired Turkish diplomat Yalım Eralpunderscored the critical importance of Athens and Ankara reachingagreement on a compromise to be presented to the ICJ, and specu-lated that Turkey would be entitled to roughly 20 per cent of theAegean continental shelf.20

Ultimately, provided that Turkish-Greek relations make sustainedprogress, it should be possible to create a balanced regime in theAegean that both meets vital Turkish and Greek interests and issaleable to public opinion in both countries. As Alexis Heraclidesaptly argued, ‘only a win-win solution in the Aegean is viable’ andwill be possible ‘if both abandon their maximalist initial positions,namely “Greek lake” and “half the Aegean”’.21 Another observer ofGreek-Turkish relations, Monteagle Stearns, has described the broadoutlines of a Turkish-Greek compromise in the Aegean in thefollowing terms:

… a regime in the Aegean that respects the sovereignty ofGreece over its islands, that satisfies Turkish concerns overfreedom of navigation, that enables both countries to exploreand exploit the resources of the Aegean shelf on an equitablebasis, and that assures third parties that their rights of innocentpassage will not be jeopardized by hostilities between Greeceand Turkey.22

In the case of Cyprus, although Turkey and Greece are centralactors, it has been the Cypriot communities that have conducted the


negotiations for a settlement. To be sure, Greek and Turkish Cypriotleaders collaborate with their respective counterparts in Athens andAnkara, and no Cyprus settlement is possible without the consent ofTurkey and Greece.

Over the years, Ankara has endeavoured to use its militarypresence – consisting of over 30,000 troops in 2002 – as a bargainingchip to secure Turkey’s strategic interests on the island. In addition,having invested so much of its resources and prestige to sustain itsethnic kin on the island,23 Ankara has insisted that any futuresettlement provides adequate safeguards to protect Turkish Cypriotsfrom Greek Cypriot domination. This is the logic behind Ankara’ssupport for the Turkish Cypriot demand that the TRNC be recog-nized as having sovereign rights, and to enjoy equal status in anyfuture union with Greek Cypriots. In August 1988, Ankara supportedDenktas’s call for a two-state confederation. However, since the EUsummit’s offer of a date for the beginning of accession talks withTurkey, and the almost simultaneous presentation of the Annan Planin late 2002, the AKP government has indicated a willingness to settlefor a Cyprus solution that provides a loose federation, rather thaninsisting on the acceptance of a sovereign Turkish state.

CONCLUSION: A NEW WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY?

Practically all writers who have addressed Greek-Turkish issues haveargued that a lasting improvement in their bilateral relations requiresthe resolution of their major disputes in Cyprus and the Aegean.Given the active third-party mediation process in Cyprus, and thecertainty of EU membership for the island regardless of a settlement,efforts to improve Turkish-Greek differences in recent decades havefocused mostly on Cyprus rather than the Aegean. Although Turkishleaders have long resisted Greek and other external pressures forTurkish/Turkish Cypriot concessions on the island, they have alsobeen aware that Turkey’s EU membership cannot be achieved with-out a settlement in Cyprus.24 But if the prospects of Turkey’s EUmembership were uncertain, no Turkish government was likely totake great domestic political risks by endorsing important con-cessions (such as abandoning the claim of Turkish Cypriot sovereignstatehood) to achieve a Cypriot settlement.


The convergence of a few developments during the last twomonths of 2002 enhanced Turkish receptivity toward a Cyprussettlement. The first was the election in Turkey on 3 November 2002,of the AKP with a comfortable parliamentary majority, marking anend to 11 years of short-lived coalition governments in Ankara; theparty’s commitment to a reformist agenda in order to achieve EUmembership set it apart from its predecessors. Secondly, and moreimportantly, by offering Ankara a date (December 2004) for the startof accession negotiations, the EU summit of 12–13 December 2002,marked a crucial step in advancing Turkey’s EU prospects. Moreover,Greek support at the summit for the Turkish bid for an early date tostart accession negotiations helped in assuaging Turkish disappoint-ment over EU endorsement of the Greek Cypriot bid for Cyprus’ EUmembership.

The boost to Turkey’s EU membership hopes in late 2002 hascreated prospects for real progress in Greek-Turkish relations sincethe short-lived ‘Davos process’ of 1988–89. It is worth rememberingthat the Davos initiative by former Turkish leader Turgut Özal andGreek prime minister Andreas Papandreou to attain lasting improve-ment in Turkish-Greek relations, failed in part because they could notachieve progress in settling the Cyprus issue. Whereas Turkey’s EUmembership was merely a distant possibility during the Özal era, ithas seemingly become a realizable goal since the EU’s Copenhagensummit of December 2002. More than any other reason, this factorwill provide the strongest incentive for the Turkish government toreach a compromise settlement in Cyprus. A Cyprus settlementcould in turn create a momentum for settling Turkey’s disputes withGreece in the Aegean.

NOTES

1. Tozun Bahcheli, Greek Turkish Relations since 1955 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990),p. 142.

2. Andrew Wilson, The Aegean Dispute (London: International Institute for StrategicStudies, 1980), p. 27.

3. ‘Economist Intelligence Unit Report’, Turkey, 1st Quarter, 1996, p. 17.4. Interview with Yılmaz, El Pais (Madrid), 25 November 1997, as reported in FBIS-WEU,

25 November 1997.5. For the text of the treaties of Alliance and Guarantee, see Conference on Cyprus

Documents Signed and Initialled at Lancaster House on 19 February 1959 (London: H.M.Stationery Office, 1964).


6. The Turkish government relied on the following provision of the Treaty of Guarantee:‘In the event of any breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, the UnitedKingdom, and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view to makingrepresentations, or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of thoseprovisions. In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each ofthe three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim ofre-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty.’ Ibid.

7. Although there are no reliable figures on the number of Turkish settlers, manyobservers estimate that they constitute about half of the population in north Cyprus.

8. Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece, Helsinki Watch Report (New York:Human Rights Watch, 1990).

9. Bahcheli, Greek Turkish Relations, p. 182.10. Middle East International, 23 November 2001.11. Geoffrey Pridham, ‘Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement’,

in Dimitri Constas (ed.), The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and ExternalInfluences (Basingstoke, London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 84–6; Also see Chapter 1 ofthis volume, pp. 21–51.

12. See The Military Balance, published annually by the Institute of International StrategicStudies in London.

13. Alan Makovsky, ‘The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy’, SAIS Review, 19, 1(Winter–Spring 1999), p. 106.

14. Ronald R. Krebs. ‘Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict’,International Organization, 53, 2 (Spring 1999), p. 369.

15. Tassos Kokkinides, ‘Turkey-Greece: Two Nations Arming for Peace’, Inter Press Service,10 October 1997.

16. Constantine Stephanou and Charalambos Tsardanides ‘The EC Factor in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle’, in Constas, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, p. 210.

17. Luxembourg European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 12–13 December 1997, para-graphs 31–6, at: [http://www. europarl.eu.int/dg7/summits/en/lux1.htm].

18. Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 10–11 December 1999, at:[http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99/_en.pdf].

19. This is based on the author’s interviews in Turkey with some retired and currentTurkish diplomats during May 2001.

20. Haberturk, Internet edition, 10 March 2002. Jon Van Dyke, a legal scholar who haswritten widely on the Aegean issues confronting Turkey and Greece, has conjecturedthat ‘… the ICJ would probably adopt a solution that allocated to Turkey somewherebetween 20 and 41 percent of the Aegean’s Exclusive Economic Zone and continentalshelf …’ See Jon Van Dyke ‘Marine Limitation in the Aegean Sea’, in Bayram Öztürk(ed.), The Aegean Sea 2000 (I

.stanbul: Turkish Marine Research Foundation, 2000),

p. 168. A Greek legal scholar, however, has argued as follows: ‘With respect to thecontinental shelf and exclusive economic zone, given the geographical locations,circumstances, and measurements, any adjustments of the median line (championedby Greece) for reasons of equity (relied upon by Turkey), would not significantlyextend the Turkish share beyond the Turkish territorial waters except in some small areas in the northern Aegean.’ See Phaedon John Kozyris, ‘The LegalDimension of the Current Greek-Turkish Conflict’, in Dimitris Keridis and DimitriosTriantaphyllou, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization (Virginia: Brassey’s,2001), p. 106.

21. See Alexis Heraclides’ chapter in this volume (Part I, Chapter 3).22. Monteagle Stearns, ‘The Security Domain: A U.S. Perspective’, in Keridis/

Triantaphyllou, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization, p. 244.23. Turkey’s aid to the TRNC was given as 100 million dollars in 1998; in addition ‘under

a separate protocol … Ankara has pledged to provide the Turkish Cypriots with anadditional 250 million dollars to support several infrastructure projects’, AgenceFrance Press, 24 December 1998. Turkey has invested in several infrastructure projects


in the TRNC, and has provided credits and other forms of development aid. It wasTurkey, too, that assumed the large costs associated with re-exporting Turkish Cypriotcitrus and clothing when the European Court of Justice ruled in 1994 that EUcountries could not receive goods from northern Cyprus without the health safetycertificates issued by the Republic of Cyprus. More recently, in 1998, Turkey beganto alleviate chronic water shortages experienced by Turkish Cypriots by shippingwater to the TRNC; these shipments will be accelerated with the plannedconstruction of a water pipeline from Turkey to northern Cyprus.

24. In a reminder of the linkage between the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s EU prospects,Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis warned that ‘it is wrong of them to believe thatjust because the date Turkey was given was 2004, the Cyprus problem can wait aswell … the farther we get from the current juncture, the weaker the possibilities forresolving the Cyprus problem, and consequently Turkey’s EU prospects will get’.Interview with Simitis, To Vima, 5 January 2003, as reported in FBIS-WEU, 7 January2003.


PART II

BUILDING A SECURITYREGIME?

5Tension-Reduction and

Confidence-Building in theAegean1

THANOS P. DOKOS

The eastern Mediterranean has historically been a troubled andturbulent region. During the second half of the twentieth century, itwas the stage of a chain of ‘hot wars’ between Israel and its Arabneighbours and a ‘cold war’ between Greece and Turkey (with atleast one hot confrontation in Cyprus in 1974, as well as severalserious crises in the Aegean). The Mediterranean was a secondaryarea of competition between the US/NATO and the USSR, but itsgeostrategic importance is steadily increasing in the post-Cold Warera, as NATO’s Southern Flank is where the sources for several of therisks and challenges mentioned in the new Strategic Concept of theAlliance, adopted in the Washington summit meeting in April 1999,are to be found.

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pacthave not led to greater cohesiveness within the surviving alliance(NATO), or to a reduction in intra-alliance tensions. In fact, the oppo-site has occurred. Relations between two allies, Greece and Turkey,continued to be tense in the post-Cold War era, and both countriesstill maintain, despite the recently announced reductions, a highlevel of defence expenditures compared with other NATO members.

Most of the 1990s has been a difficult period for Greek-Turkishrelations. This dark picture started changing during the Kosovo con-flict, when the two governments reached an understanding that animprovement of relations was necessary. Greek Foreign MinisterGeorge Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart I

.smail Cem, pre-

pared the ground for an official rapprochement that was enhanced

by two unexpected events: the catastrophic earthquakes in Turkeyand Greece in August and September 1999, respectively. The swiftGreek reaction to the Turkish tragedy spectacularly changed themood and led to a similar Turkish reaction after the Athens earth-quake. Both countries, either through official channels or throughprivate initiative, dispatched medical supplies, equipment andrescue teams to alleviate the plight of earthquake-torn Turks andGreeks.

In December 1999 EU Summit in Helsinki, Greece took a decisionthat was described by other EU states and the US as courageous.Athens accepted the granting of EU candidate status to Turkey,attaching only two conditions. Firstly, Turkish claims concerninggrey zones in the Aegean and the continental shelf had to besubmitted to the International Court of Justice in The Hague by 2004,if all other efforts toward settlement failed, and secondly, that theaccession of Cyprus to the EU would not require as a prerequisite thesettlement of the problem. This decision was, of course, based onGreece’s national interest; however, it should be noted that therewere strong domestic reactions and a considerable political cost forthe Greek government.

Helsinki and its aftermath demonstrated what should have beenclear a long-time ago: that Greece is not the major obstacle to Turkey’sEU accession path. The major sceptics are to be found in some otherEuropean capitals and inside Turkey itself. In fact, under certaincircumstances, Greece could become the strongest supporter ofTurkey’s effort to secure EU membership.

In January and February 2000, Foreign Ministers Papandreou andCem visited each other’s capitals and signed a total of nine bilateralagreements on ‘low politics’ or ‘low confrontation’ issues. Theseagreements concerned tourism, culture, the environment, trade andcommerce,2 multilateral cooperation (especially with regard to theBlack Sea and southeast Europe regions), organized crime, illegalimmigration, drug trafficking and terrorism.3

However, the current rapprochement between Greece and Turkeyremains weak and fragile. Both countries have not moved from theirfirm positions regarding ‘high politics’ issues. The Cyprus problemand issues related to the Aegean Sea, most of which are perceived byGreece as unilateral Turkish revisionist claims, are nowhere nearresolution.


THE CONSEQUENCES OF GREEK-TURKISH MILITARYCOMPETITION: SOME THOUGHTS

Both sides need to understand fully the possible consequences of aGreek-Turkish military conflict. One cannot emphasize enough thata war between Greece and Turkey, whether it involves Cyprus or not,would be a disaster for NATO and the West. In a military conflict bothsides stand to suffer substantial damage. Furthermore, a limited, 24-or 48-hour conflict should not be seen as the most probable scenario.Crises have their own dynamic and are very difficult to control andcontain. An escalation would be more likely than not. Even if Greeceor Turkey were to secure some marginal territorial or military gains,a chain of revanchist conflicts would surely follow, classifying bothcountries as high risk zones with a devastating impact on theireconomies and societies. An armed conflict between Greece andTurkey could lead to the collapse of NATO’s Southern Flank andwould severely disrupt the Alliance’s efforts to play a meaningfulrole in the post-Cold War world.4 Furthermore, in that case, one has to ask the question: ‘If an armed conflict between two NATOmember-states were to erupt, what kind of example would thatconstitute for NATO’s prospective members and partners in Eurasiaand the Mediterranean?’

The Cyprus problem and the Greek-Turkish conflict are alsomatters for serious concern for the European Union (EU). All partiesinvolved to the conflict have some form of association with the EU:Greece is a member of the EU, Cyprus has begun membership nego-tiations as of 1998 and could become a member of the Union as earlyas 2003 or 2004, and Turkey is an associate member and a candidatefor full membership.

Finally, the Aegean Sea is a very important shipping route, con-necting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean and a major transitroute for the transportation of energy products (after the con-struction and operation of pipelines from Central Asia and theTranscaucasus). Therefore, it is in the interest of all parties involvedto move toward the reduction of tension and the establishment ofstability in the Aegean and the settlement of disputes on the basis ofrespect of international treaties and the principles of internationallaw. In addition, a policy that would prepare the ground (i.e. createthe necessary conditions) in order for high-politics issues to be

TENSION-REDUCTION IN THE AEGEAN 125

successfully addressed is also needed. Such a policy could befacilitated by the CBM measures proposed in this chapter.

DEFENCE EXPENDITURES

Where are the consequences of the existing Greek-Turkish ‘securitydilemma’ reflected? Mainly, in an arms build-up, which has verymuch gone against the European trend. Neither country has bene-fited from the so-called ‘peace dividend’ after the end of the ColdWar. As a result of the Turkish announcement in April 1996 of a ten-year $31 billion armament programme (and of an earlier announce-ment of a $150 billion programme for 30 years), Greece responded inNovember of the same year with a $14 billion programme for the nextfive years, 1996–2000.5 It is worth mentioning that Greek defenceexpenditures have for the past 15 years been at the level of approxi-mately 5.5 per cent of GNP ($5 billion per annum), the highest pro-portion among NATO members, while Turkey’s are approximately4.5 per cent of GNP ($8–10 billion).6

Of course, in the eyes of some people, paying for the survival ofdefence industries in the US, western Europe, Israel and Russia maybe a ‘humanitarian’ action. The majority would agree, however, thatthe current level of defence expenditures is pure foolishness for allsides involved in the Greek-Turkish imbroglio: Cyprus, Turkey andGreece. One cannot ignore economic imperatives without payingthe price, perhaps not in the short term, but certainly in the mid andlong term. Economic realities dictate that Greece and Turkey, and alsoCyprus, should reduce their defence spending, not to mention thediplomatic and economic costs (of missed opportunities) as each sidecontinuously tries to undermine the other in what is seen as a ‘zero-sum’ game.

Defence expenditures constitute a heavy burden for the Greekeconomy, at a time when Greece has just joined the EuropeanMonetary Union (EMU), but needs to implement a series of vitalstructural changes to strengthen its economy.7 Defence expendituresare, to a certain extent, responsible for the country’s budget deficit,as well as for Greece’s lower than desired level of social services.Similarly, the bilateral arms race places a very heavy burden onTurkey as well, faced as it is with chronic high inflation and


considerable social and political problems, which contributed in thepast to the increase of popular support for the Islamic Refah (Virtue)Party and more recently helped one of its successors, Adalet andKalkınma (Justice and Development) Party to obtain parliamentarymajority in the November 2002 general elections.

As a result of the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey, and under tacitpressure from the IMF and other international financial organi-zations, Ankara decided to reduce its defence expenditures by $19.5billion over the next 2–3 years. This will probably be achieved bypostponing or extending the procurement process rather thancancelling the acquisition of some weapon systems.8 In an earlierunrelated move, as a result of the higher than predicted cost of theAthens 2004 Olympic Games and the obligations imposed by itsmembership to the EMU, Athens too decided to reduce its defenceexpenditures by $2.5 billion over the next 2–3 years.

Over the past 45 years there have been three major crises inCyprus (1963/4, 1967, 1974), another three in the Aegean (1976, 1987,1996), and a number of ‘hot’ incidents: for example the 1995 casus belliover the possibility of the extension of the Greek territorial waters to 12 miles according to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, theaborted plan to deploy S-300 surface-to-surface missiles in Cyprus,the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in the Greek Embassy inKenya. Those events have increased mutual distrust and suspicion.The burden of history and the ghosts of the past are the major causesof the lack of trust between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, historicalanimosities do play a significant role.9 Greeks and Turks are classicexamples of rival peoples (one can think of several other examples,including French and Germans, or Russians and Germans); however,it is important to realize that such peoples cannot afford to beprisoners of the past, and history should become their guide, nottheir prison.

Suspicion concerning the other side’s motives is deep-rooted inboth popular opinion and the media;10 this in turn affects, and attimes even drives, the respective governments. This intense distruston both sides of the Aegean prompts many observers to call for areduction of mutual suspicion as the essential first step toward peaceand stability. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. Reductionof suspicion is a long-term process, and, as such, is beyond thehorizon of serving governments. There is also a basic lack of mutual


knowledge between Greeks and Turks on issues other than foreignand security policy, including culture, society and religion. In amodest effort to address this problem, the Hellenic Foundation forEuropean and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) has published a volume inGreek on contemporary Turkey, with contributions from Turkish,Greek, American, Israeli and French authors.11

To have even a minimal chance of success, any effort for asubstantial improvement of Greek-Turkish relations and, perhaps,the resolution of the fundamental problems between the twocountries should naturally be as well prepared as possible. The costof failure, in the case of a hastily and poorly prepared initiative, maybe quite significant because of heightened expectations, leading tofrustration. Therefore, a number of preconditions should exist. Theseinclude:

1. The avoidance of high expectations, as subsequent failure mayhave very negative consequences for bilateral relations.

2. The exercise of strong leadership in both countries. This does notnecessarily mean a repetition of the Venizelos-Atatürk era, but atleast ruling coalition governments with a comfortable majority,a relatively small number of partners, and a degree of ideologicalhomogeneity.

3. A relative military balance.

4. The active and balanced involvement of international actors(mainly the United States, NATO, EU) in the confidence-buildingprocess.

5. The absence (or skilful diplomatic handling) of certain types of regional disputes which, by default, might drag the twocountries into opposite camps (for example, in the Balkans).

6. An understanding of the political and economic costs of thecontinued confrontation by both leaderships.

7. The lack (or low importance) of domestic factors contributing tothe continuation of the conflict, such as serious domestic political,economic and social problems that cannot be dealt withefficiently by each government, which might then be tempted toresort to a ‘foreign policy adventure’ to deflect attention fromdomestic problems.


8. Finally, the political will on both sides to improve bilateralrelations,12 which is the sine qua non for the success of all suchendeavours.

Despite the spectacular change in people’s feelings, as a result ofthe Greek response to the disastrous earthquake that hit Turkey andthe similar Turkish response to the earthquake that hit Athens shortlyafter, the permanent settlement of disputes is, unfortunately, notperceived as realistic in the short term (mid-term prospects for asettlement will be discussed at the end of the chapter). In any case,steps in the following three categories are necessary, but notsufficient, prerequisites for the resolution of the Greek-Turkishconflict.13

1. Tension reduction measures, without a formal agreement. Suchmeasures could be agreed upon without extensive negotiationsand might include transparency and some restraint CBMs.

2. Formal military confidence-building measures, which wouldinclude restraint and limitation measures.

3. Soft security confidence-building measures, with emphasis on the so-called ‘bottom-up approach’ or ‘people-to-people’contacts.

It is the author’s belief that a set of the above-mentioned types ofmeasures could constitute integral parts of a limited security regimethat could be adopted by Greece and Turkey, with the aim ofmanaging both crisis-stability and arms-race stability, as well asavoiding the catastrophic losses of a war.14 Steps towards thesemeasures are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for theresolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict, though it seems probable tomany analysts that any improvement in relations between the twoand the implementation of any of these measures will remainhostage to another incident in the Aegean or on Cyprus.

Every prudent strategist or national security official would planon the basis of capabilities, not on the basis of nice, but often emptywords. The American expression ‘talk is cheap’ would fit nicely intosuch a situation. I would, therefore, like to present some practicaland, hopefully, feasible ideas and suggestions for a longer-lastingreduction of tension between Greece and Turkey.


TENSION-REDUCTION AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDINGMEASURES 15

Such measures could be agreed upon without extensive negotiationsand might include transparency and some restraint CBMs.16

1. A ‘hot line’ between prime ministers and perhaps chiefs of staffof the three branches of the armed forces (although not betweenchiefs of general staff, because of the different levels of authority).A direct line between foreign ministers has been in principleagreed upon by Papandreou and Cem in spring 2001. This mightnot solve any problems or play a role in avoiding or de-escalatinga crisis, but it certainly cannot hurt. The establishment of mutu-ally acceptable (or mutually understood) crisis-managementprocedures also needs to be considered.

2. Implementation of the Papoulias-Yılmaz Agreement and use ofit as a basis for further discussions.

3. In the context of this agreement, extension of the summermoratorium on exercises in the Aegean to four months.17

4. Demonstration of additional goodwill by both sides when dis-cussing the NATO Secretary-General’s proposals on CBMs orother ideas about CBMs.18

5. Annulment of casus belli statements for reasons other than clearviolation of territorial integrity.19 It is difficult to imagine agenuine rapprochement and meaningful progress in relationsbetween the two countries with the threat of a casus belli hangingin the air.

6. Cessation of bellicose and provocative statements by all officials.Both sides engage in such activities. However, while Greekstatements are infuriating to the Turkish side, some statementsfrom Turkey are perceived as challenging or even threateningGreece’s territorial integrity. It should be pointed out in thiscontext that claims on rocks and islets poison the atmosphereunnecessarily and that claims on inhabited islands ring alarmbells for even the most moderate Greeks.20

7. NATO’s new command structure has been established and hasbeen successfully functioning since 2000. A spirit of goodwill and


reason from all parties involved should be demonstrated in thefuture to avoid ‘Destined Glory 2000’-type of incidents.

8. Reduction of intelligence activities in each other’s territory, aswell as other low-intensity conflict activities, if such activitiesindeed take place. Also, limitation of behind-the-scenes role ofconsulates in sensitive regions.

9. Reinforcement and, if possible, institutionalization of the tacitagreement between navies and air forces on incident-preventionin the Aegean.

10. Finally, the agreement for the establishment of a multinationalBalkan peacekeeping force, with the participation of units fromboth Greece and Turkey, is a positive development and a step inthe right direction. However, it is rather premature to take it forgranted, and it remains to be seen whether the concept of sucha multinational force, with all the practical problems and issuesof minor or major importance, can be successfully implemented.In the meantime, both governments should give strong supportto this effort. Based on this model, the two sides should contem-plate the creation of a joint Greek-Turkish or Balkan disaster reliefunit.

Formal Military CBMs

These would include constraint CSBMs: 21

1. Limitation of land and air forces might be unacceptable to Turkey,as its current relations with its eastern neighbours are ratheruneasy. However, naval arms control should be more acceptable,as the only serious naval ‘opponent’ for the Turkish navy is theGreek navy. As there is a general balance between the two naviestoday, the two sides could conceivably agree to a ceiling of largesurface units (for example, 15) and submarines (for example, 7–8).22

2. Turkey’s landing fleet, which is deployed at arm’s length oppo-site the Greek Aegean islands, can easily be moved or reducedwithout any significant impact on Turkish security or militarycapability. Turkey could move the bulk of the fleet to the BlackSea, and, at the same time or after an agreed period of time,numerically reduce it.


3. In Cyprus, a number of CBMs could be discussed in the frame-work of the military dialogue promoted by the UN, along withthe issue of the demilitarization of the island and the politicalsolution of the Cyprus problem.

Soft Security CBMs (Track-II Diplomacy)

The emphasis here would be on the so-called bottom-up approach,or people-to-people contacts. It is worth mentioning at this point thata series of soft security confidence-building measures are alreadyincluded in some of the bilateral agreements on ‘low politics’ signedin Ankara and Athens, in January and February 2000.23 However, thelist of soft security CBMs could be further broadened with thefollowing:

1. The further promotion and strengthening of the already numer-ous bottom-up approaches: regular meetings between profes-sional associations, labour unions, businessmen, journalists,academics and ordinary citizens, especially those living near theborders.

2. Discussion of the role of the press and mass media, and theirimpact on bilateral relations.

3. Continuation of the extremely delicate and difficult, but poten-tially rewarding, exercise of discussing the possible change ofhistory books.

4. As a consequence of the successful implementation of some ofthe measures outlined in all three categories, Greece shouldcontinue to actively support Turkey’s candidacy for membershipin the EU. Also, the Greek lobby in the United States shouldadopt a more flexible attitude towards Turkey.

The issue of minorities is also quite significant. The fate of theGreek community of I

.stanbul and the islands of Imvros and Tenedos

(Gökçeada and Bozcaada) in the post-Second World War era, andespecially the events of 1955 and 1964 (and, of course, the 1942–43Varlık tax) have been traumatic experiences for Greeks. The Greek-Orthodox minority in Turkey shrank from 112,000 to less than 2,500people, mainly older persons. Greece made its own grave mistakes


regarding the Muslim minority in Thrace (a reaction, to a certainextent, to what many had interpreted as Turkish secessionist rhetoricand the role of the Turkish Consulate in Komotini), but there wasnever any physical violence, and successive Greek governmentshave been trying in earnest since the early 1990s to correct any pastinjustices and have, by the admission of the US, the EU, internationalhuman rights organizations, and the members of the minority itself,made considerable progress.

RESOLVING THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

Because the détente structure is currently not strong enough towithstand a possible crisis over the forthcoming accession of Cyprusto the EU, it is urgent to start thinking about crisis managementmethods. Greece can hardly retreat from its basic diplomatic positionof support for the accession of Cyprus to the EU as soon as thecountry fulfils the Copenhagen criteria. Therefore, the only realisticoption is to make quick progress towards a solution of the Cyprusproblem.

One of the major obstacles for the resolution of the Cyprusproblem is the existence of deep suspicion between the two sides.24

Normally, a confidence-building process that would last severalyears would be a prerequisite for the resolution of the conflict. In thiscase, however, the clock is ticking. With the decisions taken inCopenhagen Summit in December 2002, Cyprus is included in thegroup of new members in EU’s latest phase of enlargement, to befinalized gradually until May 2004.

Turkey, through its foreign minister and other high officials has warned in the past that its reaction would be ‘unlimited’,suggesting that it would be strong or even violent. The annexationof ‘Northern Cyprus’ has been among the Turkish options discussed.Even if one dismisses those threats of a very strong reaction, as thisauthor does, and assumes that this rhetoric is directed to a domesticaudience in Turkey, and that Ankara will most probably accept the new realities, it is possible, if Turkey is still in the middle of apolitical and economic crisis when the decision for the admission of Cyprus to the EU is made, that the Turkish government may notbe able to resist populist calls for a strong reaction. In this case, there


will be serious repercussions for Turkey’s relations with the EU andwith Greece.

An acceptable solution to both sides would be along the followinggeneral lines:

� Both communities should be willing to make a sincere effort to livepeacefully together, despite the shrinking numbers and influenceof the Turkish Cypriots vs. the Turkish settlers.

� It should be accepted by a majority of Turkish Cypriots thatadmission to the EU, along with Greek Cypriots, would solve theireconomic problems. There is concern, however, about their equalstatus and to an extent, about their physical security.

� The Greek Cypriots must realize that such concerns are not totallyunfounded. Even if the atrocities committed by Greek Cypriots inthe 1960s were more limited than those of the Turks, and were forthe most part acts of individuals rather than the government ofCyprus, they left, however, their scars on the average TurkishCypriot. An official admission and an apology by the Cypriotgovernment would have a beneficial effect.

� At the same time, however, Mr Denktas should acknowledge theviolent actions of the Turkish Cypriot Organization TMT, the large-scale atrocities of the Turkish forces during the 1974 invasion,apologize for the loss of the 1,619 missing persons and offer specificinformation on their whereabouts. There is a significantly smallernumber of missing persons on the Turkish Cypriot side. Thegovernment of Cyprus should in turn make public any availableinformation in those cases. The psychological benefit may bespectacular.

� The two sides could agree on a loose federal system (based on theso-called Belgian model). Agreement to such a solution, whichwould also involve significant return of territory by the TurkishCypriots along the lines of the Ghali Plan, would render EUadmission relatively trouble-free.

� The fundamental principle would be that of subsidiarity. If the EUis moving to the direction of a ‘Europe of peripheries’ with a strongcentral bureaucracy in Brussels, then we should be able to applythis model to Cyprus even earlier than in the rest of the European


Union. A comparatively greater proportion of important functions(e.g. economic, foreign and security policies) of the new federalstate of Cyprus would be delegated upward to Brussels, whereaseveryday issues would be handled at the communal/local govern-ment level.

� The security issue would be resolved by the withdrawal of theTurkish and Greek forces from the island and the dismantling ofthe Greek Cypriot National Guard. They could be replaced by aNATO force (CFOR or CYFOR) involving American, British, Greek,Turkish and other mutually acceptable national contingents.

The benefits for Turkey would be obvious and significant: it wouldsalvage its relationship with the EU, enhance its international pres-tige as producer, not consumer of security; save some much-neededmoney from subsidies to Northern Cyprus; strengthen the détenteprocess with Greece; challenge the wrong perception/allegation thatthe EU is a Christian club; and, in a very symbolic development,render Turkish into an [active] official language of the EU.

The above analysis is probably an oversimplification of thesituation. It leaves a number of questions unanswered: for instance,when will the freedom of movement, of labour and acquisition ofproperty be applied? Could economic sanctions applied to TurkishCypriots be terminated to facilitate late-stage negotiations for asolution? Finally, it should be emphasized that the people of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, will make the finaldecision regarding their fate. Mainland Greeks and Turks and otherinterested parties, the UN, the EU, British, Americans, Russians, etc.can only try to facilitate the conflict resolution process by offeringsome ideas and suggestions.The plan submitted by UN Secretary-General Anan on 11 November 2002 is a rather balanced proposal,demanding compromises by both sides. If accepted and imple-mented in good will, it could lead to the re-unification of the Islandat last.

PROSPECTS FOR GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

Overall, the two countries are much better off today in terms ofbilateral relations than they were two years ago. Having said that, it


should be emphasized that there has been no progress so far inresolving, or even addressing, the fundamental differences betweenthe two countries (probably intentionally in recognition of theextreme difficulty of the task). This rapprochement – by instalments– had a very low cost as neither side had to give up its vital interests.The next phase, however, will be a considerably more difficult andcomplicated undertaking.

Should we expect a Davos-III (or more appropriately a Camp-David or Oslo-style meeting) between Greece and Turkey anytimesoon? Is the international context reasonably favorable for such acomprehensive rapprochement? One should not be terribly opti-mistic. The EU is not yet speaking with a single voice on EU-Turkeyrelations or on Greek-Turkish relations and therefore lacks the diplo-matic clout to promote a solution. Moreover, because of Greece’smembership, it is not perceived by Turkey as an objective actor. Asfor the United States, there is a new administration, with the waragainst international terrorism, Iraq and the other members of the‘Axis of Evil’, missile defence and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts asits top priorities.

Is the domestic context in Greece and Turkey favourable to arapprochement? In Greece, Prime Minister Simitis’ top priority is the further improvement of the economy, the resolution of some key socio-economic problems and Greece’s continued and fullparticipation in the EMU and CFSP. After his re-election in April 2000 by a very thin majority, there was no fundamental change in the policy of rapprochement with Turkey, despite certain dis-illusionment among Greek politicians and government officials due to the lack of a Turkish reciprocal ‘goodwill gesture’ to the Greek position at Helsinki. George Papandreou maintains theforeign affairs portfolio and his good personal relationship with his Turkish counterpart (as long as Ismail Cem remained in his post) facilitated efforts for rapprochement. It should be also men-tioned that, in principle, Greece’s conservative party (New Dem-ocracy) supports the improvement of relations with Turkey, althoughit often disagrees with the government’s handling of the issues at thetactical level. During 2001–2 there have been a number of setbacksfor the governing party, which is currently (early 2003) laggingbehind the main opposition party, New Democracy, in opinion polls. This limits considerably the freedom of manoeuvre on both


domestic and foreign policy issues for the Greek government,especially as the general elections approach, in late 2003 or early2004.25

In Turkey, there is a severe economic crisis, with serious politicalrepercussions, the impact of which at this point (early 2003) on thecrisis on Greek-Turkish relations is rather unclear. Furthermore, it is far too early for any predictions about the impact of the rise topower of the moderate-Islamic Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice andDevelopment Party), both for the domestic and the foreign policyscene in Turkey.

Generally, however, this author is rather pessimistic about theprobability of formal military confidence-building measures or – aneven more remote possibility – the resolution of the Greek-Turkishconflict in the immediate future. On the other hand, there are signsthat the Turkish military leadership wishes to avoid high tension inGreek-Turkish relations (although the real intentions of the Turkishmilitary leadership on relations with Greece have traditionally beenextremely difficult to decipher),26 and concentrate on the perceiveddomestic Islamist problem and, perhaps, potential external problemson Turkey’s eastern borders. Given the considerable influence of themilitary in Turkey, this would facilitate agreement on some tension-reduction proposals, such as those outlined here. And, of course, thetwo sides can always continue to engage in bottom-up or people-to-people activities. On the other hand, the possibility that a negativereaction of the Turkish military to changes necessary for Turkey’sEuropean accession or a serious crisis over the accession of Cyprusto the EU might sweep away the prospects for Greek-Turkishrapprochement cannot be excluded.27

What does the analysis presented here suggest about the pros-pects of an agreement on CBMs between the two antagonists and therole of international actors in this? CBMs could pave the way foreventual discussion of ‘high politics’. ‘Gentle’ pressure from theUnited States, the European Union and NATO, especially on the non-cooperating party, would, under certain circumstances, facilitate the negotiating process. Despite, however, the relative pessimismexpressed above, the resolution of the Cyprus problem mightradically transform the situation and open the way for the fullnormalization of Greek-Turkish relations. As a final conclusion, Iwould like to provide ten considerations:


1. Before we move into high politics, we should prepare the groundby implementing agreements already signed. To this end, theproposed CBMs have a catalytic role to play.

2. Is it feasible to de-couple the Aegean and Cyprus? This might bepossible in theory, at least to a certain extent, in terms ofimplementing agreed CBMs, but the situation in the Aegean hasa direct impact on the situation in Cyprus, and vice-versa. It israther unlikely that fundamental progress towards a compre-hensive Greek-Turkish settlement (i.e. the establishment of acomprehensive security regime) will be achieved without a just,lasting and mutually acceptable solution of the prickly Cyprusproblem. A ‘European’ solution for both Cypriot communities,along the general lines of the November 2002 United Nationsplan, would probably be the optimum solution.

3. The political and economic costs of the Greek-Turkish conflict forthe chief protagonists (Cyprus included), as well as NATO, theEU and the United States, are considerable, especially after the11 September events and the US-led war against internationalterrorism.

4. To quote a highly experienced Greek diplomat, Ambassador (ret.)Byron Theodoropoulos, ‘If I was a Turkish decision-maker, Iwould look at the map and conclude that having to live withwhat is perceived in Turkey as “difficult” neighbours on theeastern borders, I would rather close other fronts, such as the“Aegean” one.’28

5. Certain Confidence-Building Measures between Greece andTurkey would contribute significantly to the reduction of tensionand to the probability of accidental war and, most importantly,to a further improvement in Greek-Turkish relations, but will notaddress the underlying causes of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Thetwo sides should therefore agree that the fundamental principleguiding Greek-Turkish relations is respect for international lawand agreements, i.e. the Treaty of Lausanne and other inter-national treaties. For any other bilateral differences concerningissues not covered by those treaties, especially those of aterritorial nature, Greece and Turkey could resort to The Hague.Indeed, going to the International Court of Justice and acceptingits verdict would constitute definite proof that Turkey has no


expansionist aims and would effectively address Greek concernsabout Finlandization.29

6. It is much easier for the stronger side in a conflict to make thefirst substantive move, especially if this is the side that appearsunhappy with the status quo. To ease concerns about unilateralmoves, this could be a largely symbolic and certainly retractablegesture. Having said this, the other side should be prepared toquickly recognize such a gesture and respond in kind, withoutany delay.

7. Let us try in earnest to move away from stereotypes andperceptions of zero-sum game between Greece and Turkey.30

8. There are significant internal and external challenges for Greekand Turkish security and prosperity. In the case of Turkey, eco-nomic and social development, progress to EU accession, tradi-tional security threats, especially on Turkey’s eastern borders; inthe case of Greece, instability along its northern borders andsuccessfully competing in an increasingly interdependent, butalso highly antagonistic international economic system. Com-mon threats include organized crime, environmental pollution,etc. Both countries will need all available national resources todeal with such problems. Using such resources in a Greek-Turkish competition looks today very much like a waste of effortand resources.

9. Athens does not wish a ‘lone wolf ’ Turkey. It is in Greece’s interestthat Turkey remains firmly anchored in the western harbour andengaged in a political, economic and social modernizationprocess. Whatever the short-term course of the rapprochementprocess, relations with Turkey will continue to remain a toppriority concern for Greek foreign and security policy well intothe twenty-first century.

10. At George Papandreou’s initiative in early 2002, Greece andTurkey engaged into a so-called ‘Pre-negotiating dialogue’intended to address the fundamental issues between the twocountries and prepare the ground for submission to theInternational Court of Justice in The Hague (according to theprovisions of the Helsinki Agreement). Prospects for a successfuloutcome for this effort are highly uncertain, partly as a result of


the domestic situation in Turkey. However, a successful reso-lution of the Cyprus problem would greatly enhance efforts fora negotiated Greek-Turkish settlement. Therefore, there is awindow of opportunity for Greece and Turkey to erase a hot spotfrom the global map of conflicts. Let us hope that this oppor-tunity will not be wasted.

NOTES

1. I would like to thank Professor Theodore Couloumbis and Dr Panayotis Tsakonas fortheir thoughtful comments and suggestions. All errors are, of course, the author’sresponsibility.

2. There has been a 30 per cent increase in bilateral trade over the last two years,bringing it to its 1995 level. The improvement is not spectacular, but there is potentialfor economic cooperation, especially in joint ventures in the Balkans and the BlackSea. However, political relations will remain the key factor.

3. There has also been an extension of bilateral cooperation in the fields of agricultureand energy. A Protocol of Cooperation on Agriculture was signed in June 2000 andtwo additional agreements are now under negotiation. In the field of energy, bothcountries are interested in connecting electricity and gas pipeline networks.

4. See Theodore Couloumbis and Louis Klarevas, ‘Proposals for a Greek-TurkishReconciliation’, in Tozun Bahcheli et al., Greek-Turkish Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy(Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace, 1997), p. 36.

5. See the White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces: 1996–7 (Athens: Hellenic Ministry ofNational Defence, 1997), p. 107. According to this document, ‘1.95 trillion drachmasare expected to be disbursed until 2000, immediately after the placing of orders, andthe remaining according to deliveries’.

6. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Defence Planning Committee, EnhancingAlliance Collective Security: Shared Roles, Risks and Responsibilities in the Alliance: A Reportby NATO’s Defence Planning Committee (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization,1988), p. 13 and 50; Van Coufoudakis, ‘The Essential Link – Greece in NATO’,Southeast European Yearbook 1988 (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1988), p. 19.

7. For the implications of the enormous defence expenditures on investmentexpenditure as a share of Greece’s Gross Domestic Product, see Christos Kollias andAnastasios N. Refenes, ‘Modelling the Effects of Defence Spending Relations UsingNeural Networks: Evidence from Greece’, Peace Economics, Peace Science, and PublicPolicy, 3, 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 1–12.

8. According to Panayotis Tsakonas, ‘Turkey’s Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Implicationsfor Greece and the Cyprus Issue’, Turkish Studies, 2, 2 (2001), ‘Several examples canindicate the confrontation within the Turkish elite due to economic turbulencefollowing the Helsinki Summit. First, the military … was confronted with thecondition to “trim the budget for the armed forces”. To this end, the Turkish militaryannounced the postponement of … defence procurement programs worth $19.5billion, although the Turkish General Staff had carefully avoided detailing whichprograms had actually been postponed … The Turkish decision to shelve some of theproposed contracts followed the unilateral postponement by the Greek governmentof … $4.5 billion purchase of about 60 … new generation Eurofighter planes, aimingto use those funds to overhaul Greece’s outdated pension and welfare system.However, such a move by the Generals should be seen less as a sincere effort toprovide “more butter” for Turkey (something that other parts of the Turkish elite arein favour of), and more as an attempt to further advance their position by denouncing


pledges of defence cutbacks according to IMF conditions as well as by reviving majorprocurement programs as bailout money flows from global lending organizations.’For statements made by the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, Gen. HüseyinKıvrıkoglu, who denied that in Turkey’s Letter of Intent to the IMF there werereferences to the military cutbacks Turkey should make in order for economic aid to be granted, see ‘Turkey denies any pledges on military cutbacks’, Middle EastNewsline, 11 April 2001, at: [http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2001/april]. Inaddition, Kıvrıkoglu stated that Turkey suspended or postponed (but not cancelled)lesser priority procurement programmes, and that the General Staff will revive thoseprogrammes once the economic situation improves. See ‘Contractors see hope inTurkish IMF bailout’, Defense News, 14 May 2001.

9. As a Carnegie Endowment Discussion Paper, Carnegie Forum on the United States,Greece and Turkey (Washington, DC: CEIP, 1997), p. 3, describes the situation: ‘ForGreeks and Turks, the past involves a pervasive underlying historical legacy ofnationalistic, ethnic and religious emotions drawn from: A millennium of Muslim-Orthodox conflict; 400 years of Ottoman rule over Greece; and a century of bitterfighting and cruel atrocities from Greece’s declaration of independence in 1821through to the battles in Asia Minor in 1922. From the sweep of this history comestereotypes of alleged ethnic behaviours, Greeks and Turks locked in ‘age-old’ enmityand the clash of their civilizations.’ Major events in the modern Greek-Turkishrelations include the Lausanne Treaty (1923); the Venizelos-Atatürk détente (1930s);the 1930 Friendship Treaty and the Naval Arms Control Protocol; NATO membership(1952); Balkan Pact (1954); the emergence of the Cyprus issue in the mid-1950s;attacks on Greeks of Istanbul in September 1955, which, together with the events of1964 led to the reduction in number of the Greek minority in Turkey; the Zurich-London agreements to create an independent federal state in Cyprus; the Cypruscrises of 1963–64, 1967 and 1974, when an abortive coup – an act of incredible stupid-ity, combined with incompetence – staged by the Greek junta against the presidentof Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, offered Turkey a pretext to ‘invade’ the island andkeep it divided for the past 28 years; the closure of the Halki Theological School,creating serious problems for the survival of the Ecumenical Patriarchate; the disputeon the delimitation of the continental shelf which led to the 1976 and 1987 crises; andthe unsuccessful 1988 rapprochement effort in Davos between Andreas Papandreouand Turgut Özal, which, however, produced the Papoulias-Yılmaz agreements, betterknown as the Vouliagmeni and I

.stanbul Memoranda, establishing general principles

on Confidence-Building Measures in the Aegean, neither of which was ever fullyimplemented.

10. To give one very pertinent example, Turks should realize that Megali Idea (‘Great Idea’of Greek irredentism) is a thing of the past; what is there to take back? I

.stanbul/

Constantinople? Even if it was offered to us, we would have to refuse. How couldwe possibly accommodate 12–13 million Turks in a city with a shrinking communityof 1–2,000 Greeks?

11. ELIAMEP, Contemporary Turkey: Politics, Economy, Society, Foreign Policy (in Greek),(Athens: Papazissis Publishers, 2002).

12. Even today, after two years of low tension and close to ‘normal’ relations with Turkey,the majority of Greek analysts question Ankara’s willingness to improve its relationswith Greece.

13. Although not the central theme of this paper, a short reference to the roots of theGreek-Turkish conflict is necessary. The sources of conflict between Greece andTurkey, not necessarily in order of importance, include the following: 1. Competitionfor regional influence in the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, and to a lesserextent, the Black Sea; 2. The burden of history, one of the major causes of the currentlack of trust between Greece and Turkey; and 3. Turkey’s revisionist policy in theAegean as manifested by statements of Turkish political leaders, actions and the orderof battle of the Turkish Armed Forces. On this one, I am writing, of course, from a


Greek perspective; obviously, Turkish scholars might have a different perception. Itis important to emphasize, however, that Greece’s major airfields are situated on themainland. Any major attack would give sufficient warning time to Turkey. However,air-refuelling aircraft and the proximity of Turkish airfields to the Greek islands giveTurkey the capability for a surprise attack. Furthermore, Greek forces on the islandshave a purely defensive order of battle and no power projection capabilitywhatsoever.

14. A limited security regime can be very useful after its establishment, particularlyduring periods of relatively unconstrained rivalry, because it can provide regulation;encourage and institutionalize cooperative outcomes; play a moderating role; codifymutual vulnerability (the link between offence and defence) and parity, rather thanmilitary superiority, as the pillars on which arms cooperation would rest; solve the defection problem, due to improvement on each side’s information about thebehaviour of the others; provide and promote balanced and reciprocal agreements;aid in the negotiation of cooperation in another issue-area; and last, but not least,intensify the learning process in the conflict which, in turn, will allow each side tochange its mode of thinking, redefine its goals and means in the conflict, and, mostimportantly, change its attitude toward war, by dismissing the use of war as alegitimate political means to accomplish its incompatible objectives in a conflict. SeeRobert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984);and ‘Reciprocity in International Relations’, International Organization, 40 (Winter1986); Peter Haas, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press,1990); John S. Duffield, ‘International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: ExplainingNATO Conventional Force Levels’, International Organization, 46, 4 (Fall 1992), pp. 819–55; and ‘Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of RegionalSecurity Regimes’, Review of International Studies, 20, 4 (October 1994); StephenKrasner, ‘Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables’, inStephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

15. See also, Thanos Dokos and Panayotis Tsakonas, ‘Continuity and Change in Greek-Turkish Relations’, in Christos Kollias and Gülay Gülnük-Senesen (eds), Greece andTurkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation. The Political Economy Perspective(London: Frank Cass, forthcoming); Panayotis Tsakonas and Thanos Dokos, ‘Greek-Turkish Relations at the Dawn of the Twenty First Century. A View from Athens’, inLenore Martin et al. (eds), The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: MITPress, 2002).

16. As mentioned in the Carnegie Forum on the United States, Greece and Turkey, pp. 6–7;‘Some have suggested that CBMs be viewed as measures that concede principle orwould reduce pressure to go to the negotiating table. In fact, however, certain CBMs(sometimes referred to as “military” CBMs) are designed to avoid incidents or conflictin ways that scrupulously preserve principle for both sides. They reduce politicalpressure only in the sense that they take the sides out from “under the gun”, thuscreating a sounder, more acceptable basis for negotiating. Such “conflict avoidance”CBMs can provide emergency communication capabilities, agreed rules of the road, and transparency; in sum, measures to avoid miscalculation and expeditenegotiation.’

17. Suggestions No. 2 and 3 are currently included in the agenda of issues discussedbetween the political directors of the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministries.

18. Turkey proposed certain bilateral military CBMs during the visit of the TurkishMinister of Foreign Affairs I

.smail Cem to Athens, in February 2000. Greece did not

accept those measures because it felt they touched upon the country’s sovereignrights. Yet Greece responded positively to other measures proposed by Turkey.Greece has insisted, however, that any military CBM should be based on the 1988Papoulias-Yılmaz agreements and discussed within the framework of NATO. Afterseveral official meetings between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Greece and Turkeyhave agreed to consider a series of measures included in the following categories of


CBMs: (a) Measures within the framework of the Papoulias-Yılmaz Memorandum ofUnderstanding (Athens, 27 May 1988), (b) Measures of Tension Reduction and (c)Measures of Good Neighbourliness. The Permanent Representatives of bothcountries to NATO will discuss the measures included in the first category, while themeasures included in the other two categories would be examined by the PoliticalDirectors of each country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finally, of particular signifi-cance in confidence-building was the joint statement made by the Greek and theTurkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Ankara on 6 April 2001, which stated that thetwo countries would initiate procedures needed to make both countries party to the1997 Ottawa Convention regarding the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, produc-tion and transfer of anti-personnel land mines and their destruction.

19. Since September 1994, and shortly before the entry into force of the 1982 Law of theSea Convention, which calls for a territorial waters width of up to 12 miles, the thenTurkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller and other senior government officials explicitlyand repeatedly stated that such an extension by Greece would be considered a casusbelli. This then became official policy through a resolution of the Turkish NationalAssembly in June 1995.

20. As one analyst points out, ‘Turkish official declarations, usually making headlines inGreek mass media, have been intensifying Greek fears. For instance, Turkish PrimeMinister Demirel stated in 1975, “half the Aegean is ours. Let the whole world knowthat this is so … We know how to crush the heads of our enemies when the prestige,dignity and interests of the Turkish nation are attacked’’. Turkish officials’ referencesto a “growing Turkey” and to the twenty-first century as the “era of Turkism” havefurther escalated concern. Moreover, direct challenges (e.g. “The group of islandsthat are situated within 50 km of the Turkish coast … should belong to Turkey”), aswell as indirect questioning of Greek sovereignty over the Aegean islands, have beenviewed with great alarm.’ See Yannis Valinakis, Greece’s Security in the Post-Cold WarEra (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1994), p. 30. Also see AthanassiosPlatias, ‘Greece’s Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence’, inDimitri Constas (ed.), The Greek Turkish Conflict in the 1990s (London: Macmillan, 1991)p. 93.

21. Constraint CSBMs constitute a category of arms control measures. Since they actuallylimit military operations, as opposed to the ‘transparency’ CSBMs, which merelysubject these operations to prior notification or observation, they are more intrusiveand inherently more difficult to negotiate. See Lynn M. Hansen, ‘The Evolution fromTransparency to Constraints’, Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations, 13,3 (1990), pp. 61–76.

22. In 1930, Venizelos and Atatürk signed a Protocol limiting naval armaments.23. The bilateral agreements signed include inter alia the establishment of an Educational

Committee of experts with the aim of examining the history books to reflect a morebalanced account of the two countries’ history and relations; the promotion ofeducational exchanges and cooperation in tourism; the promotion of cooperationbetween police forces against organized crime, drug trafficking, and migration;environmental cooperation in the Aegean, etc. See Theodore Couloumbis and TanosDokos (eds), Yearbook of Foreign and Defence Policy 1999–2000 (in Greek), (Athens:ELIAMEP, 2000), pp. 425–67.

24. Cyprus is a very painful story, with ‘angels’ and ‘devils’ on both sides. The Greekside made its grave mistakes, with the 1974 coup d’état being the most serious one.It is believed, however, by Greek Cypriots that the Turkish Cypriot leadership nevertried in a sincere way to make the bi-communal system work and that the results ofthe 1974 Turkish invasion were much more catastrophic than anything that hap-pened in the pre-1974 period. Furthermore, among the real victims were the TurkishCypriots themselves who, as a result of the large numbers of settlers from Anatolia,began feeling like strangers in their own land, with large numbers emigrating towestern Europe.


25. If no substantial improvement in bilateral relations takes place, Greece’s strategy willcontinue to be a mix of internal balancing (the strengthening of its armed forcesthrough increased emphasis on quality, with the adoption of a modern strategic andoperational doctrine; emphasizing combined/joint operations; improved personneltraining and acquisition of modern weapons systems, including smart weapons and,especially, force multipliers) and external balancing (its membership in the EuropeanUnion), with the aim of effectively deterring the perceived Turkish threat.

26. However, some Greek analysts claim that recent moves, such as the increase ofviolations of the Greek airspace by Turkish fighter aircraft and statements about aTurkish ‘reaction’ in Cyprus demonstrate exactly the opposite.

27. For the impact of Turkey’s domestic turbulence on its foreign policy vis-à-vis Greeceand the Cyprus issue, see Panayotis J. Tsakonas, ‘Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Impli-cations for Greece and the Cyprus Issue’, Turkish Studies, 2, 2 (2001).

28. Byron Theodoropoulos, ‘Hreomenoi Logismo Aftokratori’, Anaskopisi (Yearbook)2000 (Athens: ELIAMEP, 2000), p. 143.

29. One should also note the very interesting memorandum of 10 March 2000, submittedinitially to the EU officials in Brussels, and later sent to the Ministers of Foreign Affairsof Greece and Turkey, in which the Greek-Turkish Forum (GTF) set out the issues inrelations between Turkey and Greece. The GTF’s preferred methodology is to startnot from legal or political positions and arguments, but from an assessment ofinterests. Acknowledging the existence of common interests in areas of contentionbetween the two countries can be a useful starting point in the search for solutionsto existing problems. It is also necessary, of course, for each government to clarify itsaims and to comprehend its neighbour’s particular interests. Recognizing commoninterest makes the search for solutions a mutual exercise: understanding each state’sseparate interests is a necessary component of a sustainable agreement. Commoninterests between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean include: a fundamental interestin freedom of navigation; an interest in cooperation on environmental protection,on search and rescue, and policing; an interest in cooperation in promoting tourism;an interest in ensuring there is no use or threat of force in the pursuit of attemptedsettlement of differences; an interest in understanding each other’s attitude as towhether when and how the issue should go to the International Court of Justice.

Two other very interesting points should also be mentioned. Discussions in theGTF have made it clear that the underlying issues are overlaid by perceptions ofthreat and of prestige. Were all other issues in the Aegean settled, and were the Greek-Turkish rapprochement making progress on other key questions, the GTF suspectsthat the salience of the issue of the effects of treaty restrictions on the militarizationof certain Greek islands would decline sharply. For the full text of the memorandumsee [http://www.eliamep.gr].

30. Indeed, the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ mentality has been a dominant onein both countries for the past two decades. Turkish automatic recognition of FYROMas Republic of Macedonia, for example, was not very well received in Greece and hasactually reinforced this zero-sum game mentality. One can think of other examplessuch as Greek or Turkish policies vis-à-vis Armenia, Syria, Albania, etc., although itwould certainly be an oversimplification to attribute such policies to the mentalitydescribed above, as there are respective ethnic and religious links and affinities withsome of those countries.


6The Economic Imperative:

Prospects for Trade Integrationand Business Cooperation

PANAGIOTIS LIARGOVAS

INTRODUCTION

Economic cooperation between two partners can take various forms,but most of them are expressed through trade and businesses. Greeceand Turkey represent two neighbouring countries whose economicrelations have undoubtedly been affected by the bilateral politicalproblems, and which used to create a climate of tension and uncer-tainty between them. Attempts to enhance the stability of relationsbetween the two countries were not successful, but a new opportun-ity is at hand. If this is taken up, then trade and business cooperationwill flourish. It will be interesting to know the future prospects ofsuch cooperation. The purpose of this chapter then is to fill this gap.The next section of this study analyses the current stage of tradeintegration. The following section then investigates the futureprospects for the development of bilateral trade with the use of agravity model. The third section aims to shed light on the economiccooperation in selected sectors of interest for both countries, suchsectors are tourism, sea fishing, fish culture, industry, banking, localgovernments and universities.

THE CURRENT STATE OF TRADE INTEGRATION

Trade integration between Greece and Turkey might manifest itselfin numerous ways, including rising growth rates of exports andimports and rising shares in total Greek trade.

Tabl

e 1

Gre

ek-T

urki

sh tr

ade

(in m

illio

n dr

achm

as)

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Gre

ek e

xpor

ts to

Turk

ey18

,195

.019

,95.

025

,430

.034

,029

.233

,499

.851

,223

.585

,357

.211

9,02

1.1

102,

004.

810

2,22

1.1

198,

936.

0

Tota

l Gre

ek e

xpor

ts1,

267,

506.

01,

579,

967.

01,

880,

763.

01,

933,

422.

02,

288,

289.

02,

540,

891.

02,

855,

837.

03,

044,

640.

02,

679,

582.

53,

212,

362.

92,

218,

917.

7

Gre

ek im

port

s fro

mTu

rkey

22,8

93.4

30,5

79.6

27,9

97.4

31,7

71.7

41,3

97.0

48,5

81.9

56,0

53.8

81,3

38.7

109,

128.

111

1,39

5.6

142,

003.

0

Tota

l Gre

ek im

port

s3,

137,

524.

03,

921,

522.

04,

484,

059.

05,

050,

531.

05,

206,

797.

05,

908,

368.

06,

905,

019.

07,

433,

230.

07,

612,

026.

78,

687,

058.

710

,156

,798

.7

Sour

ce:

Nat

iona

l Sta

tistic

al S

ervi

ce o

f Gre

ece

(NSS

G)

Tabl

e 2

Gro

wth

rat

es o

f Gre

ek-T

urki

sh tr

ade

Rate

s of e

xpor

ts19

9119

9219

9319

9419

9519

9619

9719

9819

9920

0019

91–0

0

Turk

ey5%

32%

34%

–2%

53%

67%

39%

–14%

0%95

%31

.0%

Tota

l Gre

ek e

xpor

ts25

%19

%3%

18%

11%

12%

7%–1

2%20

%–3

1%7.

2%

Rate

of i

mpo

rts

Turk

ey34

%–8

%13

%30

%17

%15

%45

%34

%2%

27%

21.0

%To

tal G

reek

impo

rts

25%

14%

13%

3%13

%17

%8%

2%14

%–5

2%5.

7%

Sour

ce:

Nat

iona

l Sta

tistic

al S

ervi

ce o

f Gre

ece

(NSS

G)


Table 1 presents evidence as regards total exports and imports ofGreece to and from Turkey over the period 1990–2000. Table 2 showsthe growth rates of both exports and imports of Greece to and fromTurkey during the relevant period. For comparison we also presentthe growth rates of both exports and imports of EU to and fromTurkey during the relevant period 1991–2000 (Table 3).

The information in these tables confirms that Turkey representsan increasingly dynamic export market for Greek products. Theaverage annual growth rate of Greek exports to Turkey over theperiod 1990–2000 is 30.9 per cent and it is mainly due to the recentsteep increase. It far outweighs the average growth rates of totalGreek exports of around 7.2 per cent as well as the average growthrate of EU exports to Turkey of around 5.6 per cent. Its importance inthe near future is likely to increase, as those Greek firms that find itdifficult or unprofitable to place their products in the competitive EUmarkets, will have an easy outlet in Turkey. Imports also accelerateat a fast rate. The average growth rate of Greek imports from Turkeyover the period 1990–99 is 21 per cent. They accelerate faster com-pared to the average growth rate of total Greek imports of around5.7 per cent. For the EU as a whole the average increase in importsfrom Turkey was only 6.7 per cent on average over the period 1991–2000. However, it far outweighed the average growth of total EUimports of around 5 per cent over the same period.

The contribution of the increase in exports to total Greek-Turkishtrade is reflected in the exports-to-imports ratio (Table 4). For Greek-Turkish trade this ratio increased from 79.2 per cent in 1990 to 152.3per cent in 1996. It then declined but increased in 2000 to 14.1 per

THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE 147

Table 3Growth rates of EU-Turkish trade

Rates of exports 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1991–00

Turkey 3.9% 27.9% –23.7% 59.5% 27.8% 10.8% –5.8% –7.9% 24.3% 13.0%Total EU exports 5.9% –8.5% 14.5% 22.1% 2.7% 1.0% 6.7% 3.1% 2.8% 5.6%

Rates of imports 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1991–99

Turkey 8.1% –8.3% 16.6% 16.4% 3.8% 6.5% 6.5% 10.0% 1.1% 6.7%Total EU imports 4.2% –15.1% 13.7% 20.6% 0.9% 2.3% 10.7% 4.6% 0.2% 4.7%

Source: National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG)

cent, turning a trade deficit with Turkey into a trade surplus. The EU-Turkey trade increased from 131 per cent in 1991 to 183 per cent in2000, thereby increasing its trade surplus with Turkey.

Trade integration between Greece and Turkey is increasing fast.The Turkish share in total Greek exports had reached 9 per cent bythe year 2000. With regard to imports, the corresponding share ismuch lower, around 3.5 per cent. However, there is an increasingtrend not only for Turkish exports but for Turkish imports as well. Forexample, the share of imports in total Greek imports was 0.7 per centin 1993 and 1.3 per cent in 1998. For the EU-Turkish trade the totaltrade share is around 1.7 per cent and its evolution is much moremoderate compared to Greek-Turkish trade. Finally, Greek competi-tiveness vis-à-vis Turkey (measured by the index B=(X–M)/(X+M),


Table 4Greek and EU trade with Turkey

Greece-Turkey X M X–M X/M(%) RX RM R B

1990 18,195 22,893 –4,698 79.5% 1.4% 0.7% 0.9% –0.111991 19,195 30,580 –11,385 62.8% 1.2% 0.8% 0.9% –0.231992 25,430 27,997 –2,567 90.8% 1.4% 0.6% 0.8% –0.051993 34,029 31,772 2,258 107.1% 1.8% 0.6% 0.9% 0.031994 33,500 41,397 –7,897 80.9% 1.5% 0.8% 1.0% –0.111995 51,224 48,582 2,642 105.4% 2.0% 0.8% 1.2% 0.031996 85,357 56,054 29,303 152.3% 3.0% 0.8% 1.4% 0.211997 119,021 81,339 37,682 146.3% 3.9% 1.1% 1.9% 0.191998 102,005 109,128 –7,123 93.5% 3.8% 1.4% 2.1% –0.031999 102,221 111,396 –9,175 91.8% 3.2% 1.3% 1.8% –0.042000 198,936 142,003 56,933 140.1% 9.0% 3.4% 5.4% 0.17

EU-Turkey X M X–M X/M(%) SX SM S B

1991 10,784 8,242 2,542 131% 0.7% 0.5% 1.3% 0.131992 11,202 8,908 2,294 126% 0.7% 0.5% 1.3% 0.111993 14,332 8,165 6,167 176% 1.0% 0.6% 1.6% 0.271994 10,932 9,522 1,410 115% 0.7% 0.6% 1.2% 0.071995 17,441 11,084 6,357 157% 0.9% 0.6% 1.4% 0.221996 22,290 11,501 10,789 194% 1.1% 0.6% 1.6% 0.321997 24,692 12,250 12,442 202% 1.2% 0.6% 1.8% 0.341998 23,254 13,048 10,206 178% 1.0% 0.6% 1.6% 0.281999 21,416 14,352 7,064 149% 0.9% 0.6% 1.6% 0.202000 26,610 14,511 12,099 183% 1.1% 0.6% 1.7% 0.29

X=exports, M=imports, R=share in total Greek trade, S=share in total EU trade, B=(X–M) /(X+M)Source: NSSG

where X=exports, M=imports) is very volatile and improved in 2000.This is reflected in the rise of the index, compared to the previousyears of 1998 and 1999.

In addition, it is interesting to note the position of Turkey in Greekand EU trade with the Balkans. As seen in Table 5, Turkey is thesecond most important supplier of Greece in its trade with theBalkans. The Turkish import share accounts for 29.3 per cent. As faras exports are concerned, Turkey with a share of 24.1 per cent is themost important trade partner of Greece with the Balkans. Turkey isalso the most important Balkan partner of the EU (Table 6).

The aggregate picture as regards the bilateral trade between the two countries could be complemented with a more disaggre-gated analysis. To this end, we analyse the bilateral trade betweenGreece and Turkey as regards three sectors: agricultural products(SITC 0,1 and 4), raw materials (SITC 2 and 3) and industrial products(SITC 5–8). The results are shown in Tables 7–9. It can be seen thatthe bilateral trade between Greece and Turkey has been developedin favour of the former in the case of primary products. On thecontrary the bilateral trade of agricultural and industrial goodsbetween Greece and Turkey has been developed at the expense ofGreece.

THE FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR TRADE INTEGRATION

The future prospects of trade integration between Greece and Turkeywill definitely depend on the bilateral political stability between thetwo countries. If we make the assumption that the political frame-work will not allow any tension, uncertainty and distrust to appearbetween the two partners, then we can make a forecast regarding the evolution of the bilateral trade. To this end we can utilize ourknowledge regarding gravity models. The gravity model has beenone of the most popular models in the international trade literatureaiming at explaining the proportion of bilateral trade flows.1 Thismodel relates bilateral trade from origin (i) to destination (j) witheconomic forces at the flow’s origin, economic forces at the tradedestination, and economic forces either aiding or resisting the flow’smovement from origin to destination. The following specification isproposed:


Tabl

e 5

Sign

ifica

nce

of in

divi

dual

Bal

kan

coun

trie

s in

tota

l Gre

ek-B

alka

n tr

ade

Gre

ek e

xpor

ts to

:19

9019

9119

9219

9319

9419

9519

9619

9719

9819

9920

00

Rom

ania

14.0

%18

.8%

19.9

%10

.6%

10.5

%14

.6%

10.9

%10

.3%

12.0

%12

.0%

16.9

%Bu

lgar

ia12

.5%

19.5

%31

.0%

36.1

%46

.5%

36.3

%19

.7%

18.7

%26

.2%

23.1

%20

.1%

Alb

ania

4.2%

2.7%

7.6%

15.0

%24

.0%

21.2

%20

.3%

14.7

%11

.5%

12.4

%11

.2%

FYRO

M2.

9%16

.6%

1.6%

3.5%

14.6

%16

.0%

15.9

%23

.9%

20.1

%Yu

gosla

via

42.4

%35

.5%

12.5

%Sl

oven

ia0.

4%1.

2%0.

8%3.

6%0.

8%1.

1%1.

3%1.

2%1.

0%C

roat

ia0.

2%1.

0%1.

1%1.

1%0.

9%1.

6%1.

1%1.

4%1.

0%Tu

rkey

27.0

%23

.4%

24.7

%17

.7%

15.5

%17

.9%

22.2

%25

.5%

20.5

%18

.8%

24.1

%Bo

snia

-Her

zego

vina

0.8%

1.8%

0.1%

0.0%

0.1%

0.2%

0.4%

0.8%

0.6%

Serb

ia-M

onte

negr

o0.

0%1.

8%10

.6%

11.8

%11

.1%

6.4%

5.1%

Balk

ans

100.

0%10

0.0%

100.

0%10

0.0%

100.

0%10

0.0%

100.

0%10

0.0%

100.

0%10

0.0%

100.

0%

Gre

ek im

port

s fro

m:

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Rom

ania

11.7

%14

.1%

14.3

%12

.9%

14.2

%14

.5%

15.3

%17

.3%

16.5

%18

.4%

22.6

%Bu

lgar

ia17

.8%

23.8

%35

.1%

39.0

%48

.2%

52.2

%39

.6%

35.4

%33

.1%

30.7

%29

.9%

Alb

ania

2.0%

1.8%

3.7%

3.0%

5.4%

4.0%

3.9%

3.1%

3.1%

3.3%

3.1%

FYRO

M1.

3%5.

7%0.

7%1.

6%4.

2%5.

1%5.

0%5.

2%5.

2%Yu

gosla

via

45.0

%34

.6%

13.4

%0.

0%0.

0%0.

0%0.

0%Sl

oven

ia0.

5%2.

7%3.

2%3.

2%2.

8%2.

0%2.

1%2.

0%1.

7%C

roat

ia1.

1%3.

4%2.

1%1.

5%1.

1%0.

6%1.

0%2.

7%1.

8%Tu

rkey

23.5

%25

.7%

30.0

%27

.2%

25.9

%22

.6%

24.7

%25

.1%

31.0

%32

.1%

29.3

%Bo

snia

-Her

zego

vina

0.6%

6.1%

0.3%

0.1%

0.1%

0.1%

0.2%

0.3%

0.4%

Serb

ia-M

onte

negr

o0.

0%0.

1%8.

2%11

.3%

8.1%

5.3%

6.0%

Balk

ans

100.

0%10

0.0%

100.

0%10

0.0%

100.

0%10

0.0%

100.

0%10

0.0%

100.

0%10

0.0%

100.

0%

Sour

ce:

NSS

G


Tabl

e 6

Sign

ifica

nce

of in

divi

dual

Bal

kan

coun

trie

s in

tota

l EU

-Bal

kan

trad

e

EU e

xpor

ts to

:19

9119

9219

9319

9419

9519

9619

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Table 7Greece’s bilateral trade with Turkey in agricultural products (SITC 0, 1, 4)

1998 1999 2000

Exports 8,697.3 5,465.8 10,703.9Imports 10,560.4 1,233.4 12,427.5Balance –1,863.0 –6,767.6 –1,723.6B –0.10 –0.38 –0.07

Source: NSSG

Table 8Greece’s bilateral trade with Turkey in raw materials (SITC 2, 3)

1993 1994 1995

Exports 53,037.3 63,296.5 139,161.2Imports 4,293.5 3,564.1 5,005.7Balance 48,743.8 59,732.4 134,155.5B 0.85 0.89 0.93

Source: NSSG

Table 9Greece’s bilateral trade with Turkey in manufactured goods (SITC 5, 6, 7, 8)

1993 1994 1995

Exports 40,089.5 34,043.8 50,509.8Imports 92,270.3 97,955.4 12,397.2Balance –52,180.8 –63,911.6 –73,460.4B –0.39 –0.48 –0.42

Source: NSSG


(Trade)g- t = Á Oá\it Oâ

jt Äag- Ut

where Oá\it and Oâ

jt stand for purchasing power of country of originand destination respectively and Äa

g- denotes the distance betweenthe two countries. Ut is an error term.

Under this framework, an exporting country’s income can beinterpreted as the country’s production capacity, while an importing

country’s income is the country’s purchasing power. The above isthe reduced form equation resulted from a general equilibriummodel of world trade where consumers are assumed to share aConstant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function and theproducers use an internationally immobile production factor accord-ing to a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) productionfunction. For the purpose of the present work we also emphasize the‘law of one price’ or the Purchasing Power Parity model and thesignificant effects of price changes on the volume of the tradedgoods. To this end, we incorporate the nominal exchange rate to thestandard gravity model.

In attempting to make inferences about the Greek-Turkish tradewe have to take into consideration the economic and politicalenvironment of the two countries. The frequent tensions betweenthem make it difficult to estimate on the basis of extrapolation fromhistorical levels the size of trade likely to prevail. For this reason we attempt to extrapolate information for the trade developmentsby using as basis the trade patterns between Greece and a referencegroup of countries that are assumed to exhibit ‘normal’ traderelationships.

In order to estimate the trade potential between Greece andTurkey, we adopt a two-stage approach. At the first stage, we estimatethe gravity coefficients of the implemented trade between Greeceand 30 selective trade partners at various years. This set (see Appen-dix) consists mainly of countries from the EU, Asia, Africa andAmerica. The sample includes both developed and developingcountries. In this way the model avoids producing results that aresolely of trade flows between countries with specific characteristics.The idea behind this method is that the estimated coefficients willmanage to incorporate both the effects of favourable trade conditionsbetween EU countries and also the effects of unfavourable tradeconditions. Across this framework the variety of destinations andorigins also ensures that the estimated coefficients point out bothmanufactures-driven and resources-driven trade.

At the next step, we obtain the potential trade volumes by apply-ing the coefficient estimates derived from the reference group toTurkey. Specifically, we implement a research exercise by incorporat-ing the estimates parameters to a gravity equation of Greece andTurkey.


MODEL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS

For the purpose of the present work we use cross-section data toestimate the trade effects and relationships for a particular timeperiod. By keeping the observations of each time period separate, weobtain four equations for each specification, as follows:

ln(exports)t = á +âéô(yit)+ â2ô(yGRt) +âéô(Di) +âéô(eit)ln(trade)t = á +âéô(yit)+ â2ô(yGRt) +âéô(Di) +âéô(eit)

Where t=1985, 1990, 1995, 1998 and yit, yGRt stands for the logarithmictransformation of per capita gdp of the trade pattern and per capitagdp of Greece respectively. Di denotes the logarithmic transfor-mation of the miles’ distance between the capital cities and eit denotesthe logarithmic transformation of the exchange rate expressed interms of USD.

We estimate these four cross-section equations jointly using themethod of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR).2 In this way weallow for correlation between the error terms since, for example, theerrors for Greece-Germany may be related with the errors of Greece-France (see in the Appendix the correlation coefficients across theSUR residuals). Furthermore, in order to improve the efficiency weconstrain all coefficients (except the constant term) to be equal acrosstime.

The data of international trade is withdrawn from the GreekNational Statistical Service for the year 1985, 1990, 1995, 1998, and thedata of GDP per capita real GDP Per Capita in constant dollars(international prices, base year 1985).3 The exchange rate data is takenfrom International Financial Statistics of IMF over various years.Since we take the logarithmic transformation the zeros have beensubstituted by the number 0.001.

Taking into account the evident heteroscedasticity (using theBruce Pagan test we can reject the null of no heteroscedasticity at anysignificance level) we compute regression standard errors and co-variance matrix allowing for heteroscedasticity and serial correlationof the residuals (robust errors).

One can argue that the use of pooled data into a time series andcross-sectional framework could derive more sensible estimate co-efficients. But is seems not clear whether one should apply a random


effect or a fixed effect in order to derive a unique vector of coefficients.On the other side, we should also take into consideration that two ofthe explanatory variables – the distance variable and the per capitaGDP of Greece – both have one dimension and consequently thepanel techniques cannot derive sensible estimators.

Initial estimates indicated that it makes a difference whether weuse bilateral exports, imports or trade (the sum of exports andimports) as the dependent variable.4 We report the results usingexports from Greece to third country (Table 10) and imports fromthird country to Greece. In line with other studies we find that thebasic gravity model has a high explanatory power given the highvalues of R2 for the SUR model. When considering a set of seeminglyunrelated regression equations the standard R2 is an unambiguousmeasure. One possibility for a measure of a goodness of fit is the R2

obtained by applying least squares to the whole system. The esti-mated R2 varies from 85–96 per cent across the three specifications.Among the three SUR specifications the smallest statistic used isF=27.4, which significantly exceeds the critical value of F(12,60)= 3.5at the 1 per cent level.

According to the derived results,5 the estimated coefficients on


Table 10Gravity model for 29 countries and Greece

Exports Imports

Regresses Estimated EstimatedCoefficients Coefficients

Constant 0.853 –0.8630.225 –0.319

GDP trade partner 0.438* 0.52*2.210 3.35

GDP Greece 0.479* 0.62*2.080 3.08

Distance –0.526* 0.356–2.003 1.204

Ex-Rate –0.001 –0.0009–0.36 –0.134

R2 0.85 0.96F-statistic 31.2 30.8

(0.000) (0.000)

The t-stat in parentheses estimated using heteroscedasticity robust errors.* Denotes statistical significance at 5 per cent

GDP in all cases are significant at the 5 per cent level and have theexpected sign.6 An increase in the GDP of Greece by one unit leadsto increase in lnexports by 0.479 and in lnimports by 0.62. The one-unit increase in the GDP of the trade partner results in 0.726 increaseof total lntrade, in 0.479 increase Greek lnexports (imports of otherpartner) and by 0.56 of Greek lnimports (exports from othercountries). The coefficients of the GDPs are quite close to those foundin other studies, as is the coefficient of distance. In contrast, thederived coefficients for exchange rates are not statistically significant.One potential explanation relates to the irresponsiveness of inter-national trade to exchange rate fluctuations. The important issue,which must be considered in the trade flows-exchange rate relation-ship, is the time needed for trade flows to be adjusted to nominalexchange rates due to sunk cost. The time lag gives rise to the notionof hysteresis.

The variable distance enters significantly into the equation oftrade and exports. Finally, the constant is significant only in tradeequation. It is also worth mentioning the insignificance of distancein the imports regression. A proposed rationalization is related to thegeographical distance of Greece from the main import partners(Japan, USA). According to the statistical data of 1998 approximately20 per cent of Greek imports come from destinations at an averagedistance of 3,452 air miles.

In Table 11, we compare the trade volumes predicted on the basisof the gravity coefficients with actual flows for 1998 for the referencegroup. This gives us an indication of trade flows that would haveprevailed between Greece and Turkey if there were normal bilateralrelations between the two countries.

It appears that Greece is ‘under-trading’ with Turkey. Under-trading is more pronounced in the case of imports where the actualtrade represents only 48 per cent of the potential. For exports thecorresponding percentage is 71 per cent.


Table 11Estimated potential Greek imports (exports) from (to) Turkey (million $)

Estimated Actual Actual/Estimated

Imports 680.7 327.34 0.48Exports 420.997 300.6 0.710

PROSPECTS FOR BUSINESS COOPERATION

In addition to trade, economic cooperation between Greece andTurkey can be beneficial for both countries. Sectors which might beof interest are tourism, sea fishing, pisciculture, industry, banking,local governments and universities.

Tourism Sector

Economic cooperation in the tourist sector can be beneficial forGreece given that:

1. The distance between the Greek islands and the Turkish coasts isvery short and therefore a regular connection would be a first steptowards tourist development.

2. The cost of transportation in the islands is usually 30–40 per centhigher compared to the corresponding cost on the mainland.Sometimes it is even 200 per cent higher. For example, the trans-portation cost of one tonne of cargo between Piraeus and Lesvos,which is a distance of 346 km, is more than three times the cost ofland transportation.

3. The difficulties in transportation are sometimes due to short-comings in communication and other infrastructure.

Greek authorities should aim at:

1. simplifying the bureaucratic procedures for visitors (issuing ofvisas, yachting);

2. making cooperation between businessmen easier;

3. enlarging the tourist market by increasing the tourist and culturalattractions on offer;

4. reviving the interest in historical heritage;

5. highlighting and showing historical periods;

6. allowing the easier attraction of tourists from the two countries;

7. encouraging special types of tourism (e.g. ecological, agro tourism);

8. building new infrastructure (tourist offices, exhibitions).


Fish Culture

Both Greece and Turkey have already developed the culture of fish.The two countries are characterized by similar conditions, and theyhave similar prospects as regards fish culture. Greek companies havealready expressed their interest for bilateral agreements and jointactions with Turkish ones.

A necessary step for the success of Greek-Turkish cooperation inthis sector is the protection of the invested funds and profits byTurkey. An agreement as regards the guarantee of re-exporting thefunds and profits in the currency in which they were importedwould be helpful. The avoidance of double taxation is another impor-tant precondition. Import levies should also cease.

Joint strategies in the sector might include the efforts of marketingin the EU (patented names, products of origins, etc.) as well asstandardization (common standards) and improvement of quality.

Sea Fishing

Both sides have a benefit in seeking the diffusion of the results ofMediterranean cooperation for the protection of fisheries in the area.The development of joint research in the sea eco-system and theinvestigation of common solutions to any problems found is neces-sary. Currently the efforts for the harmonization of fishing laws and methods of fishing at the Mediterranean level are still open. Itwould be useful for Greece to encourage the harmonization of Greekand Turkish laws as regards technical measures. Today technicalmeasures concern Greek fishing boats only, not Turkish ones.

Industrial Cooperation

According to recent data (Hellenic-Turkish Business Association)there are 32 Greek companies in Turkey. Most of these are involvedin services and trade and only six in industry.7 Greek businessmenhave also a presence in Turkey through European joint ventures inTurkey. In Greece there are around 40 Turkish firms. With theimprovement of the political climate between the two countries, alarge number of Greek businessmen are interested in cooperationwith Turkish firms. The Greek daily papers have frequent references


to initiatives taken by Greeks who want to invest in Turkey. Greekand Turkish companies could create joint ventures not only in Turkeyand Greece but in third countries as well. It could be possible thatGreek construction companies work together with Turkish ones withthe aim of investing in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where Turkishcompanies have a significant presence. For example, in UzbekistanTurkish companies execute 40 per cent of the infrastructure work.Greek construction firms could offer know-how, as well as oppor-tunities to Turkish companies in countries where they have presence(e.g. Black Sea).

Banking

Greek banks expect to gain a lot if they will cooperate with Turkishbanks. The area of cooperation concerns mostly investment bankingand capital markets. The first bank having a presence in Turkey is theNational Bank of Greece, the biggest Greek bank. The bank will beoperating from Istanbul.8 At the same time, the National Bank ofGreece in cooperation with the Turkish Guarantee Bank and J. P.Morgan will create a venture capital with initial funds of 45 billiondollars. Interest for Turkey has also been expressed by another Greekbank, Alpha Bank.9

Local Governments and Universities

In this sector there are many prospects of economic cooperation. Thisis because local governments and institutions are closely related toEU projects. Cooperation between the two countries could refer tosectors such as protection of environment, energy, city management,social issues, local taxation, culture etc.

Specific measures should aim at:

� the creation of task forces within local governments;

� transfer of know-how;

� communication and information;

� seminars, conferences, symposia.

Greek local government bodies have already obtained useful experi-ence with the country’s northern neighbours (e.g. Bulgaria, Albania).


Universities and research centres could also develop commonresearch projects. The Universities of the Aegean and of Xanti andthe Universities of the Marmara or I

.stanbul, for example, could also

take advantage of the proximity of the two countries. Projects couldinclude the environment, technology, health, renewable sources ofenergy, city culture and rural development.

NOTES

1. See Jeffrey Bergstrand, ‘The Gravity Equation in International Trade: Some Micro-economic Foundations and Empirical Evidence’, The Review of Economics and Statistics,67, 3 (1985); and Jeffrey Frankel, Ernesto Stein and Shang-jin Wei, ‘Trading Blocksand the Americas: The Natural, the Unnatural, and the Super-Natural’, Journal ofDevelopment Economics, 47 (1995), pp. 61–95.

2. A similar approach is taken by Shang-jin Wei, ‘Intra-national versus InternationalTrade: How Stubborn are Nations in Global Integration?’, NBER Working Paper, 5531(1996); and Spiros Bougheas, Panicos Demetriades and Edgar Morgenroth,‘Infrastructure, Transport Costs and Trade’, Journal of International Economics, 47(1999).

3. We derived similar results by using GDP in dollar terms, instead of real GDP percapita.

4. This idea is further supported by the variance covariance matrix. The estimations areavailable upon request.

5. We perform a two-sample test assuming that the means of the estimates representsmeasures of the means of the true distribution of the estimators and the differencebetween the means should follow a normal distribution with zero mean anddeviation (s12/n1 + s22/n2) where s1 is the standard error of the coefficient derivedfrom the model i and n is the sample size. According to this test we reject thehypothesis that the coefficients of the explanatory variables of trade, imports andexports are different.

6. We also attempted to derive the coefficients of the gravity equation by using the cross-section data, OLS, at a particular time. There exist two sorts of problems related withthis proposed method. The first is associated with the quality of the estimatedcoefficients since most of them are statistical insignificant. Constraining the co-efficients of the SUR system to be equal across time we gain efficiency. The secondproblem is associated with the magnitude of each coefficient that differs across theexamined periods, creating selection problems. In any case the OLS estimations areavailable from the authors upon request.

7. One of the biggest investments is ‘Kapniki’, a tobacco company. Another one is‘Yiotis’, a food company.

8. See ‘National Bank of Greece in Turkey’, To Vima, 26 June 2000.9. ‘Greek Banks penetrate the Turkish market’, Ependitis, 1–2 July 2000.


APPENDIX

Countries Used for the SUR estimations

Argentina, Austria, Belgium + Luxemburg, Brazil, Canada, Switzer-land, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Egypt, Spain, Finland, France,UK, USA, Ireland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, N. Korea, Morocco,Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey and USA.

Residuals Correlation Matrix

This is a square table with covariance on and below the diagonal andcorrelation above the diagonals.

Covariance\Correlation Matrix of Export Residuals

EX98 EX90 EX95 EX98

EX98 2.444191895616 0.0976020578 0.8282898656 0.9986305325EX90 0.243078762099 2.537702946453 0.2483387653 0.1067524538EX95 1.849273506889 0.564957866255 2.039399463771 0.8303436721EX98 2.412631072733 0.262794750327 1.832430271048 2.388013917975

Covariance\Correlation Matrix of Imports Residuals

IM98 IM90 IM95 IM98

IM98 1.928204617018 0.9998430267 0.9997652287 0.9997429392IM90 1.946856815740 1.966306710622 0.9999651423 0.9999377992IM95 1.951196013347 1.970773911233 1.975388973341 0.9999843912IM98 1.955252884096 1.974861515899 1.979509380498 1.983700308174


7Crisis Management in Greek-Turkish Relations: A Political

Economy Analysis Since 19741

OZAY MEHMET

INTRODUCTION

Both Greece and Turkey are crisis-prone countries, not only becausethey are located in a highly volatile region but also because nationalpolicy-making tends to be more emotional than rational. A good partof the explanation for this fact stems from two factors in particular:the psychoanalytical similarities between Greeks and Turks andshared historical traumas;2 and the differences in their under-standings of the status quo in bilateral relations.3

These factors, in turn, generate major contrasts in the Turkish andGreek approaches to political and economic crisis management.Whereas Greece tends to appeal to Europe to solve political andeconomic crises, in contrast, Turkey has looked beyond the Atlanticto the USA. These differential responses create further problems inGreek-Turkish relations, exposing vulnerabilities that third partiesoften exploit to the disadvantage of Greeks and Turks themselves,especially in a long-term context. In the shorter term, however, theGreek approach seems to have been the more successful, as will bedocumented in the following pages. This is reflected on the basis ofsome macro indicators shown in Table 12: GNP/capita has risen fasterin Greece since 1979, and Greeks have enjoyed significantly higherHuman Development Index, ranking 25th in the UNDP list, almostthree times better than Turkey’s rank.

What is the explanation behind these trends in crisis managementduring economic and political development? At a superficial level, it

can be argued that the Greek response and relative success stemsfrom the fact that Europeans have historically been pro-Helleniccompared with centuries of enmity against the Ottoman Turks. Bycontrast, the distant Americans, located beyond the Atlantic, havehad no wars with the Turks, and historically have had a relativelysympathetic response to modern Turkish nationalism and state build-ing.4 The US has generally adopted an even-handed policy betweenGreece and Turkey despite the powerful Greek lobbies alwaysattempting to inject a Greek ethnic bias into American foreign andmilitary policy in the eastern Mediterranean.5 But there must be somemore fundamental determinants of this national difference in crisismanagement. Why are the Greeks more inclined to look to Europein problem solving, while the Turks look across the Atlantic? Andequally significantly in terms of outcomes, are the payoffs equallyrewarding? Or are there better win-win options? An explicit under-standing of these national differences is important in analysing con-sequences particularly in terms of promoting peace and cooperationbetween the Aegean neighbours. That, broadly, is the objective of thischapter.

At the outset, it is useful to note some remarkable similaritiesbetween Greek and Turkish policy environments. In particular, bothcountries have a tradition of a highly centralized system of subsidy


Table 12Comparative macro indicators for Greece and Turkey, 1980–2000

Indicator Turkey Greece

GNP/cap. in US $1979 1330 39601999 2900 11770

Central Government Deficitas % of GDP:1990 –3.0 –23.21998 –8.4 –8.4

Human Development Index1992 (Rank) 0.732 (85/150) 0.875 (25/150)1998 (Rank) 0.739 (68/173) 0.874 (25/173)

Source: Economic data from World Bank, World Development Reports, HDI from UNDP HumanDevelopment Reports.

politics, i.e. fiscal policy has been viewed as simply an extension ofpolitics. Thus, as shown in Table 12, both countries have sufferedfrom fiscal deficits, although Greece has managed to reduce its deficitsignificantly during 1990–98, whereas the Turkish deficit over thesame period rose sharply. In both countries, politics are oftenmanaged by highly nationalistic elites that periodically exploitchauvinism for war-threats across the Aegean, which has aptly beendescribed by one American diplomat as an ‘accident waiting tohappen’.6 This chauvinism has been largely responsible for themarked ignorance amongst Greeks about modern Turkey and, to alesser extent, vice versa. Thus, it is only in the very recent past thatGreek scholars have begun objective study of Turkish foreign andsecurity policies,7 matching earlier Turkish scholarship.8

In strategic resources such as oil and natural gas, both Greece andTurkey are poor. But in economic policy management, there is onemajor difference: unlike Greece, Turkey has lacked an independentcentral bank and has suffered from an inadequate supervision ofcommercial banks. This has resulted in a politically managed monet-ary policy, and a weak Turkish balance of payments. Thanks to partlyan effective central bank, Greek macro-economic indicators during1980–2000 have been far more impressive than Turkish indicators.

The chapter is organized into four main parts, the first of which isthe Introduction. The second part focuses on political crisis manage-ment in two key areas of Greek-Turkish relations, namely, thedisputes over Cyprus and the Aegean. In both cases, extreme nation-alism has dictated policy design at home. But externally Greece hassought to ‘Europeanize’ the disputes, whereas Turkey has opposedthis approach, preferring direct bilateral dialogue between Athensand Ankara, and, as a last resort, opting for American (sometime viaNATO) rather than European mediation whenever Greek-Turkishrelations took an explosive turn. The Cyprus dispute may illustratethe national differences in conflict management between these two nations. The Greek loss in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 wasundoubtedly a national humiliation for Hellenism, just as the sameevent was a major triumph of Turkish nationalism. But, creativeexternal policy management in Athens turned this loss ultimatelyinto dividends. Within a couple of decades, Greece was able to trans-form its humiliation in Cyprus into a political and economic success.In the short term, this national humiliation obliged Greece to replace

CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS 165

a military dictatorship with a return to democracy. In the yearsfollowing, the Greek democratic transition has been consolidated,thanks to Athens’ readiness to adopt European norms and practicesas the price for closer integration with Europe. In particular, theGreek state went a long way toward modernizing and democratizingitself after winning membership in the EEC/EU in 1980. By contrastin Turkey, the 1974 Cyprus operation, while militarily a success, ledto political stagnation and instability at home, culminating in thesecond coup d’etat of 1980, and a series of crises in Turkish externalrelations with both Europe and the USA.

The third part of the paper is concerned with the economic costsand benefits of crisis management in Greece and Turkey. WhileGreece has managed to derive tremendous economic benefits fromits membership of the EU, Turkey’s struggle with structural adjust-ment has been a story of successive rounds of crises. Unlike the Euro-pean insistence on domestic reform as the price for Greek integrationin Europe, American aid for Turkey came with no similar pre-conditions for Turkish reform. Consequently, Turkish stabilizationand structural adjustment since 1980 is not a story with a happyending. Why? The primary responsibility must rest with Ankara’smanagement of the economy.

The fourth part of the paper suggests political corruption as themajor determinant of economic mismanagement. In 1980 bothGreece and Turkey shared similar forms of highly centralized andcorruption-ridden bureaucracy and economic management. Sincejoining the EU, while Greece moved closer to European norms andstandards in its political and economic management, culminating inits success to join the European Monetary Union in 2000, Turkishpolitical corruption became more entrenched and institutionalized,ultimately leading to the banking and currency crisis of February2001.

The concluding part of the paper offers a brief comparativeanalysis of future prospects in crisis management in the relations oftwo Aegean neighbours in the age of globalization. It is argued thatGreek-Turkish relations in future need to be efficiency driven tomaximize joint benefits. Nationalistic premises should be replacedby higher standards and criteria (such as the Copenhagen Criteria)in public policy that hold the key to future peace and cooperationacross the Aegean.


GREEK-TURKISH POLITICAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT SINCE 1974

July 1974 marks a turning point in modern Greek-Turkish relationsbecause this is when the Turkish troops landed in Cyprus to pre-vent Enosis in the wake of a Greek Junta-inspired coup against the Makarios regime on the island.9 The events, as well as theirinterpretation and the terminology employed, constitute the criticalelements of the diametrically opposed perceptions as seen fromGreek and Turkish lenses, and as such, they provide the essentialclues to the differential response to crisis management betweenTurks and Greeks, not just as regards the Cyprus dispute itself but inthe larger field of Greek-Turkish relations as well. In nationalisticterms, what happened in the summer of 1974 was a Greek-Turkishwar in Cyprus, which the Greeks lost. But one must look beyondextreme nationalistic sentiments, which, after all, should be transient,giving way to peaceful relations as happened, for example, betweenAtatürk and Venizelos in 1930. Seen in this context, it is really per-plexing that subsequent Greek-Turkish relations have been managed,or rather mismanaged, on the basis of irrational or chauvinisticpremises.

In the summer of 1974, when the Greek Junta engineered an anti-Makarios coup in Nicosia, Ankara had no choice but to act to preventEnosis, as provided under international treaties. The coalition Turkishgovernment then in power, led by a much younger and dynamicPrime Minister Bülent Ecevit, termed the Cyprus intervention a‘Peace Operation’, deliberately planned as a limited military action.10

It was justified as an ‘intervention’ under Article 4 of the 1960 Treatyof Guarantee, which designated Greece, Turkey and UK as the threeguarantors of the Cyprus Republic. The purpose of the Turkishmilitary intervention was twofold: to prevent Enosis about to bedeclared by Nicos Sampson who had violently succeeded Makarios;and to restore constitutional power-sharing between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots which had been systematically destroyed byMakarios during the preceding decade as a result of violent expul-sion of the Turkish Cypriots from the partnership Republic createdin 1960.11 The Greeks, of course, saw the Cyprus landings as an illegaloccupation, not warranted by the Treaty of Guarantee.12 Some even saw an American-inspired conspiracy,13 although some Greekauthors,14 and none other than Makarios himself, towards the end of


his life, confessed openly to a Norwegian reporter: ‘It is in the nameof Enosis that Cyprus has been destroyed’.15

Whatever its nature or justification, a war took place in Cyprusand Greek and Turkish soldiers fought and died in the summer of1974. In this war, the Turks won and the Greeks were humiliated allthe more because the ultra right, under the direction of the Junta in Athens, had started the violence in the first instance.16 There were several far-reaching and immediate results in Cyprus, Greece,Turkey, and beyond. In Cyprus, the 1960 Republic was dead, and inits place two zones were created, with Turkish Cypriots in thenorthern one-third of the island. In Greece the Junta lost power anddemocracy was restored with the return from Parisian exile of theelder statesman Karamanlis. In Athens anti-Americanism explodedinto violence, Greece formally left the military structure of NATO,and a decisive decision was taken to move closer to Europe. None ofthese were unexpected outcomes. What followed in Turkey, how-ever, was most surprising: Ecevit, hailed by the Turkish nation as the ‘Hero of Cyprus’, was unable to cash in on his popularity and win outright power at the polls. The complexity of the constitution,and most significantly, intense personal rivalry with such politicalpersonalities as Süleyman Demirel, prevented early elections. Ideo-logical battles on the street between left and right ensued, and Turkeyentered a period of political instability, followed by economic bank-ruptcy, as a result of embargoes and external shocks, ultimatelyleading to the second military intervention in September 1980.17

In Athens, the 1974 Cyprus tragedy revolutionized Greek dom-estic and foreign policy. It forced Greece to become a modern state,closely integrated with Europe then evolving from EEC toward EU.Anti-Americanism was, of course, the trigger that pushed Greece intoEurope, and despite all odds, Athens (like Spain and Portugal) wonfull membership of the EU in 1981, ostensibly in order to consolidatenascent democracy. In 1981 Karamanlis became President, and thePan-Hellenic Socialist leader Andreas Papandreou as Prime Ministertook control of Greece, and despite Papandreou’s confusing and, attimes quixotic European policies, Athens remained committed toEuropean ideals. Papandreou reformed the Church–State relations,organized Greek lobbies in the USA, forged Greek alliances with theSoviets and its Balkan neighbours, and redefined Greek-Turkishrelations by adopting a hard-line policy on the Aegean and Cyprus.


On the Aegean, while accusing Turkey of expansionism, he initiatedmeasures to increase the Greek territorial sea to 12 miles, an act,which Ankara had previously and repeatedly declared to be a casusbelli.18 On Cyprus, Papandreou indulged in creative diplomacy,ignoring the 1960 Constitutional partnership state on the island, andredefining the Cyprus problem as a post-1974 problem of ‘occu-pation’ by an ‘expansionist’ Turkey. He vowed not to normalizerelations with Ankara until the departure of all Turkish soldiers fromthe island, totally ignoring the provision for political power-sharingbetween Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Papandreou, paradoxical andeccentric to the end, relented, at least briefly. Before his death, hemade an about-face and met, in January 1988, the Turkish PrimeMinister Özal at Davos, Switzerland, and opened a short-lived andunfruitful episode of Greek-Turkish relations, ostensibly to demon-strate his capacity as a world-class leader. Subsequent Greek primeministers, such as the Conservative leader Constantine Mitsotakisand the Socialist Costas Simitis, have followed a strongly Europeanpolicy reshaping fiscal and monetary policies in line with Europeannorms. In effect, Greece submitted itself to a restructuring and stabil-ization process, made in Europe in contrast to Washington, in factnot only modernizing its economy but its entire political and bureau-cratic institutions as well. Turkey, for its part, did not democratize inreturn for aid from Washington because the US merely wantedTurkey to be a loyal ally.

What has been the Greek response and recovery after the 1974Cyprus war? National loss was converted into economic gain. Majorfinancial gains in the form of subsidies and credits from the EUbudget helped to modernize and democratize the Greek state. Greekfarmers benefited from huge subsidy programmes available toGreece under the Common Agricultural Policy, whereas regionaldevelopment funds and infrastructural projects financed underseveral EU programmes refurbished Greek transportation, commun-ication and tourism industries. In the 1990s Greece successfullyfollowed an economic diplomacy towards the Balkan neighbours,achieving rapid expansion of its foreign trade in new markets, evenin the former Yugoslav Republic of Macadonia, the country whoseinternational recognition was held up for several months by Greekopposition.19

Economic benefits from the EU and other donors flowed to Greek


Cyprus as well, helping rehabilitate Greek Cypriots moving from theNorth. At the same time, Athens deftly piloted a strategy of ‘Euro-peanizing’ the Cyprus dispute,20 realizing, quite realistically, that theUN negotiations under the Secretary-General’s good offices wereunproductive.21 Therefore, taking advantage of the Greek presidencyof the EU, starting with the Corfu Summit of EU leaders in 1994,hosted by Papandreou, Athens was able to ‘sell’ its version of theCyprus dispute to its fellow EU members. Henceforth, Greek ‘black-mail’22 ensured that, regardless of constitutionality or legality of thematter, it became EU policy to include Cyprus [i.e. Greek Cypriot siderepresenting the whole of the island] in the next round of enlarge-ment.23 Full membership for Greek Cypriots thus became de-linked,as far as the EU was concerned, from prior settlement on the islandwith Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, the prospect of such one-sidedmembership, well ahead of Turkey’s own membership, presentedthe Greek Cypriot side with a potentially powerful veto againstAnkara. Many observers, however, doubt that if Greek Cypriotsacquired a veto in addition to Athens’ own in the EU, Turkey will everbecome a full member of the Union. Moreover, if the EU admits GreekCyprus but excludes Turkey, this will seriously increase tensions andinstability in the region.24

Concerned with this prospect of instability in the region, Athensseems to have made a major shift in its Turkish policy in the daysleading to, and following the Helsinki EU Summit in December 1999when Turkey’s formal ‘candidate’ status was approved. It appearsthat Athens now has decided that it might derive positive gains from‘pushing Turkey deeper into the European integration process’.25

There are several reasons for this strategic shift. First and foremost,within the relatively short space of one or two decades, Greece hasbeen able to transform its humiliation in Cyprus into a major politicaland economic success, thanks to its closer integration with Europeand its ability to modernize and democratize itself. Secondly, the endof the Cold War also helped Greeks, along with other East Europeanpeoples, to show greater appreciation of the ‘economic as well of thepolitical market’.26 While these two reasons tend to account for agreater Greek sense of confidence within EU and regionally, the mosttelling explanation for the recent shift, detailed at length by Tsakonas,lie in the terms that Athens has successfully wrested from its EUpartners to protect Greek national interests in Cyprus and on other


issues. What this implies clearly is that Greek EU membership haspaid off handsome dividends for Athens.

By contrast, in Turkey, the 1974 Cyprus operation failed to energ-ize domestic politics. Neither did it foster economic development inNorth Cyprus where in particular Turkish private businessmendistinguished themselves with their reluctance to invest in a com-parable manner with Greek investors in the South. Turkish politicalinstability and a series of foreign exchange crises culminated in thesecond coup of 1980, and a series of crises in Turkish external relationswith both Europe and the USA. The economic costs of these criseshave been high. We now examine these costs.

ECONOMIC CRISIS MANAGEMENT SINCE 1980

Immediately after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, the AmericanCongress, acting in large measure in response to pressure from thepowerful Greek American lobby, AHEPA, imposed a long anddevastating arms embargo on Turkey. Ankara responded by shuttingdown American bases in Turkey. It took years of diplomacy to mendTurkish, Greek and American relations. In the end, some degree ofnormalcy was restored when in 1978 the US Congress voted to liftthe military embargo on Turkey and Greece returned to the NATOfold with Ankara’s acquiesce in Greek readmission.27

Turkey’s relations with Europe also worsened, especially after themilitary coup in 1980 when Turkey’s membership in the Council ofEurope was suspended. Greece, now an EU member, utilized itsinfluence to the maximum in sustaining a hostile posture, accusingTurkey of ‘occupying the territory of the small Cyprus Republic’, offollowing an expansionist policy in the Aegean, and of violating thehuman rights of its Kurdish citizens. Ankara’s reaction to these Greekdiplomatic misinformation campaigns was inept and inadequate.Subsequently, Turkish foreign policy lost ground in the diplomaticwar in Europe. While Greece achieved membership of the EEC,Turkey’s 1963 Association Agreement, foreseeing phased member-ship following a customs union and providing, inter alia for freemobility for Turkish workers in Europe, was put on ice. Ankara failedto assess the deterioration in its relations with Europe. In this nega-tive environment and to almost everyone’s astonishment, President


Turgut Özal decided in 1987 to apply for EU membership, arguingthat Turkey had strong European credentials historically and cultur-ally.28 The surprising element of this application was that it camewithout any prior diplomatic effort to prepare the ground. It resultedin an embarrassing initial rejection of Turkey’s application followedby long waits and often bitter and acrimonious relations betweenAnkara and Brussels. In 1990 Özal decided, again in a highly personalmanner, to join the US-led Gulf War against Saddam Hussein,overnight terminating a highly lucrative $7 billion Turkish exportmarket in Iraq (a huge cost for which no compensation has beenreceived from the US, and only a minimal amount from the UN). Aminor political payoff, however, was realized when, thanks toAmerican diplomacy in Europe on behalf of Ankara, Turkey wasfinally able to win a Custom Union (CU) agreement with the EU in1995, by which time Greece had successfully placed Greek Cypruson the path to eventual membership. As a concession for the CU, thechief Turkish negotiators were obliged to consent to the start ofmembership negotiations between Brussels and Greek Nicosia. TheCU, however, quickly resulted in a huge bilateral trade deficit withthe EU: in 1994, Turkish net imports from the EU amounted to about$4 billion; within five years they jumped threefold to over $12 billion.The clear implication here is that Turkey did not gain economicallyfrom the CU, which resulted in a worsening trade deficit that contri-buted to the foreign exchange crisis of February 2001 (see below).

The full economic costs of the American embargo and failureswithin the European Union for Turkey have been great, but impos-sible to quantify. For one thing, the Turkish economy has been in astate of restructuring and stabilization ever since 1980 so that in thiscrisis mode it would be difficult to clearly establish cause and effect.For another, and objectively evaluated, external costs have paled incomparison with the cost of missed opportunities in terms of GNPgrowth and waste and inefficiency in domestic resource allocation.To give just one example, the Turkish share of labour in agricultureis still 45 per cent of the total labour force, thanks in large measure tocostly state subsidies that perpetuate extremely low productivity inrural areas.

Greece has managed to derive significant economic benefits fromthe EU, receiving some US$4–5 billion transfers annually, enough to more than cover the entire Greek current account deficit over1994–96 (Table 13). What is especially significant about these EU


transfers to Greece is that they are essentially grants, unlike Turkishloans from New York-based international financial institutions.

While Greece has managed to derive tremendous economic bene-fits and grants from the EU, Turkey’s struggle to finance structuraladjustment with loans and high-interest bearing external borrowinghas been a story of successive rounds of crises and missed oppor-tunities. Until 1980, the Turkish economy was a ‘closed’ economy inwhich the ratio of foreign trade to GNP was a mere 4 per cent. Thisclosed economy was also highly statist built according to Kemalistprinciples since the 1930s,29 in which state economic enterprises(SEEs) operated as state monopolies, dominating every sector. Thedevelopment of a competitive private enterprise sector started rela-tively late, and even then it required huge state subsidies in a highlypolitical environment of a ‘rent-seeking’ society.30 Since 1980 theTurkish economy has been liberalizing, relying heavily on advice andcredit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WorldBank (WB). The major elements of this restructuring are the standardneo-liberal IMF-WB prescriptions, known as the ‘Washington Con-sensus’,31 requiring de-regulation, privatization, the elimination ofstate subsidies, tax reform and financial liberalization with a floatingexchange rate.

During 1980–2001, various Turkish governments have signed atotal of 18 structural adjustment and stabilization agreements with IMF-WB. The overall aim of these agreements was economicrestructuring, eliminating chronic inflation running at about 100 percent annually, restoring fiscal discipline, stabilizing the balance ofpayments by encouraging exports and foreign investment in Turkey,and making the Turkish economy generally more efficient and com-petitive. The last austerity and stabilization programme with the IMFprior to the February 2001 crisis was aimed at reducing inflationto single digit level within two years, and it targeted a maximum


Table 13EU transfers to Greece, 1994–96

1994 1995 1996

EU Transfers 4.3 5.0 5.1Current account deficit 0.1 2.8 4.5

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report on Greece, 2nd quarter 1997.

monthly devaluation of the Turkish lira (TL) within a band of 2.5 percent against a basket of hard currencies, principally the US dollar andthe German mark. In return for financial and technical support fromthe Fund, the Turkish government undertook to push through overa three-year term a wide-ranging series of reforms in the bankingsector, such as granting independence to the Central Bank, alongwith enabling legislation to facilitate the privatization of SEEs.

The three-party coalition, made up of Social Democrats, National-ists and Conservatives, failed to deliver on these promised reformsin the stipulated time-frame. At the same time, the IMF prescriptionof targeted 2.5 per cent monthly devaluation, without first curing theunderlying excess demand for foreign exchange, resulted in a stead-ily over-valued TL. Imports shot up, while exports lagged. As a result,Turkey experienced a sudden foreign exchange crisis in November2000, occasioned by a worsening trade deficit. This mini-crisis oughtto have served as a wake-up call both for the Turkish governmentand the IMF. It was glossed over thanks to an emergency relief aidfrom the Fund and inertia on the part of the Turkish government.None of the underlying reforms were enacted or implemented.Monetary and fiscal policies remained hostage to coalition politics in Ankara. The uppermost concern of the coalition in power was self-preservation, oblivious to widespread corruption within partyechelons especially in the award of big government contracts. Eachof the three parties in the coalition government controlled a statebank (Ziraat Bank, Emlak Bank and Halk Bank – the State AgriculturalBank, the Housing Bank and the People’s Bank, respectively). Theparty bosses seemed happy to accumulate huge operational debts inthese state banks in their effort to buy votes. One significant achieve-ment in this period was the steady decline in the inflation rate to arespectable 30–35 per cent level by the end of 2000. However, thisgain was at the cost of increasing public debt as the governmentrelied on domestic borrowing to pay civil servants and meet its otherfiscal obligations, while using IMF credits supplemented by short-term commercial loans from European money markets to service itsgrowing external debt. Domestic borrowing represented a classicexample of overcrowding, stifling private investment as rates ofinterest exceeded 100 per cent. Interest payments on governmentdebt represented well over 90 per cent of all public expenditure.

In the end, this unsustainable system collapsed suddenly in


February 2001 when a row between the Prime Minister and Presidentover corruption during a routine National Security Council meetingexploded into the open, creating havoc on the financial markets.Within hours, a huge capital flight followed and some US$7 billion(i.e. a third of official reserves) was transferred out of Turkey, andovernight inter-bank lending rates briefly hit astronomical levels of7,000 per cent. The austerity programme and the managed pegagreed with the IMF were destroyed. The TL was let to float freelyin order to preserve whatever reserves remained in possession of theTurkish Central Bank. In the days following this devastating crisis,the Turkish currency was immediately devalued by 40 per cent, andin subsequent months further devaluations eroded more than halfthe pre-crisis purchasing power of the Turkish Lira. The coalitiongovernment hung on to power, simply because the alternative ofearly elections offered little prospect of a breakthrough since allpolitical parties were now discredited. The Turkish governmentinvited Kemal Dervis, a Vice-President at the Word Bank, to comeand join the government as a Minister in charge of the economy. WithDervis installed as Economy Minister, and backed by the Bank andthe Fund as well as by the US, came some US$15.7 billion emergencyline of credit from the IMF and WB to help Turkey ride through thecrisis. At the end of summer 2001, it appeared that Dervis hadmanaged to enact most of the essential reforms, notwithstandingstrong opposition from nationalist politicians, and to contain theworst aspects of the crisis. With a boom in tourism and someimprovement in the trade balance, the Turkish economy, at the endof summer 2001, showed some early signs of recovery, which wasconsolidated throughout 2002, although with inflation running atover 60 per cent, real wages declining, and excess capacity in realsectors, unemployment and poverty levels have risen sharply and apositive growth of GNP is still some way off.

THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION

Up till 1980 both Greece and Turkey shared highly centralized-level politics and bureaucracy managed by nationalistic elites.Political corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency were endemic.Since joining the EU, Greece moved closer to European norms and


standards in economic management. Successive Greek govern-ments, led by leaders from Karamanlis to Simitis have steadfastlyfollowed pro-European policies,32 modernizing the country’s politi-cal institutions and economic policy in line with EU norms andcriteria. Large transfers of subsidies have helped this process, but to their credit, the Greek authorities utilized these financial inflowswith relative efficiency, although at times Greek corruption madeheadlines. In the 1990s the Greek inflation rate and the budget deficithave been resolutely reduced to meet EU standards. Most notably,the Greek Central Bank followed an independent and strict mone-tary policy, successfully enabling Greece to join the EuropeanMonetary Union in 2000. By contrast, Turkish fiscal and monetarypolicy management became tools of political corruption. The level of corruption in Turkey since 1980 did not decline; it worsened,ultimately leading to the banking and currency crisis of February2001.

The issue of political corruption in Turkish politics is not a newproblem. Anne Krueger’s classic paper on ‘Rent-Seeking Society’was, after all, based on personal experience gained in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s.33 The Turkish system of political corruption isone of the most institutionalized in the world. In the heyday of theSEEs in 1960s and 1970s, collusion between politicians and business-men was standard practice whereby the politicians would getsupport and campaign funding in exchange for lucrative govern-ment contracts preferentially allocated.34 Several political partybosses rose to prominence and eventual leadership thanks to theirbusiness partnerships.35 In the coalition government prior to the crisisof February 2001, the image formed by the public at large was that, while the Prime Minister himself had a reputation as a cleanleader, almost every Ministry operated as a ‘fiefdom’, with loyalappointees strategically placed, answerable only to the relevantMinister. The ‘fiefdom’ worked as a classic example of what MancurOlson has termed ‘distributional coalitions’36 whose principal ration-ale is to shift income distribution to the privileged members of the‘fiefdom’.

The root cause of the February 2001 crisis is political corruption,disclosing a systemic case of the domestic version of a moral hazardproblem whereby public benefit is subordinated to the private gain


of the decision-makers, due, among other things, to lack of infor-mation about the decision-making process and the actors involvedin it. This, in return, reflects failure to modernize and democratize the Turkish state and get rid of its corporatist, patron-client andmono-centric structures.37 Could the February 2001 crisis have beenavoided? In a strictly technical sense it could have been avoided;however, it was inevitable, given the institutionalized corruptionthat existed in Ankara. To elaborate, if Turkish macroeconomicmanagement had been in the hands of professional, technicallycompetent experts, not subject to political pressure and manipu-lation, it would have been possible to put into effect an early warningsystem. The signals, such as a rapidly worsening current accountdeficit and an overvalued TL, were self-evident for both the IMF andthe Turkish technical experts to see, and, no doubt, technical analystsdid see the warning signals. But neither the IMF, nor the Turkishauthorities took preventive action, primarily because those in chargeof Turkish fiscal and monetary policies were not independent. Notonly did the political leaders fail to enact and implement the reformsas part of the austerity programme but, they put political expediencyahead of fiscal and monetary prudence and ignored the economicdanger signals.

In short, the Turkish monetary crisis of 2001, as those in previousyears (e.g. 1994, 1978/9) was fundamentally political in nature,resulting directly from the deficiencies of the old Ottoman traditionof a centralized state founded on patrimonialism and collectivism. Inthis centralized political system there are no checks and balances,and no clear boundary between politics and economics. Businesselites are closely tied to political elites within an institutionalizedsystem of ‘distributional coalitions’.38 These coalitions work on thebasis of rent-seeking behaviour, far removed from market efficiency,through a political party system that shelters corruption while pro-moting loyalty to the leader at all costs. There is little democracywithin parties, which concentrate decision-making power in thehands of the leader. Loyalty to the leader is prized above efficiencyor merit. The Turkish state has yet to evolve into a fully functioningcivil society, shedding its Ottoman roots. In the Ottoman state tradi-tion, the interest of the Sultan was supreme, and all other interests(such as the economic welfare of subjects) were subordinated to the


Sultan’s. In the Republican era the Ottoman state tradition has beenrecast in nationalistic terms as the omnipotent Devlet (the state), andpopularly labelled Devlet Baba (the Father State), similar to a head offamily. While the state authority physically resides in Ankara, the restof Turkey essentially being a periphery, the exercise of state authorityis centrist, patrimonial and authoritarian. The military occupy aspecial, vanguard role in Devlet,39 generally playing a moderating role both in restraining religious extremism and excessive politicalcorruption. That is why the military, as an organization, alwayscommands a high rating in public esteem.

Past modernization efforts in Turkey have not established a clearboundary between economic management and politics. The formerrequire technical expertise, while strong leaders running weakpolitical parties dominate politics in Turkey. Turkish political partiesreward loyalty to the leader, not creativity or ideas. In this politicalenvironment, it is difficult to safeguard the rule of law. The 1982Constitution, drafted after the military coup d’état of 1980, hastransplanted onto an Ottoman state tradition elements of both theAmerican principle of the separation of powers, dividing authoritybetween the executive, judicial and legislative branches; at the sametime it also has significant elements of the highly centralized Frenchsystem with a powerful President and Prime Minister. Though un-elected by the citizens, the Turkish President has extensive powers,including ratifying key appointments and vetoing legislation. Thepresent incumbent, who was the president of the ConstitutionalCourt, has, since his appointment by Parliament about two years ago,vowed to uphold the rule of law. In the process, he has collided onnumerous occasions first with the three-way coalition governmentuntil 3 November elections and, since then, with the Justice andDevelopment Party leadership. In February 2001, after being calledby the President on the sensitive issue of corruption, the PM Ecevitwent public telling his row with the President. The currency crisis,waiting to happen, burst into the open, plunging the country intoeconomic chaos.

The row between the President and the Prime Minister was, ofcourse, the tip of the iceberg. The coalition government has beenmarked by economic mismanagement, as demonstrated by its failureto stick to the original austerity programme agreed with the IMF and


undertake the promised reforms in fiscal and monetary policy in atimely manner. On the political front, it has been slow in improvinghuman rights, in dealing with vision on Kurdish rights and in doingits part to enhance relations with the EU so as to speed the pre-accession phase. This inaction at home had a further cost in that itstrengthened the hands of anti-Turkish and Greek nationalist lobbies,supported by such groups as the Armenian and Kurdish groupsoperating abroad, to create a poor external image of Turkey. Dom-estically, the coalition government’s popularity has been damagedby persistent and widespread news of high-level graft and cor-ruption; indeed, a number of ministers were forced to resign onvarious corruption charges. In one notorious case that occurred inthe autumn of 1996,40 political corruption at high levels seems linkedto underground criminal elements. This case is yet to be resolved inthe Turkish courts and in the meantime there are perceptions of anofficial cover-up.

In this system of political corruption, the loser is clearly theTurkish citizen because the state system fails to distribute publicgoods efficiently and equitably. Instead, the system works for thegreatest benefit of the few enjoying power and privilege at the centre.Nothing demonstrated these truths in modern times more clearlythan the terrible earthquake of 17 August 1999 in the industrial heart-land of I

.zmit, killing more than 18,000. Stephen Kinzer, the percep-

tive correspondent of the New York Times in Istanbul and author of arecent best-seller on Turkey, has done a superb job of exposing theinherent failure of the Turkish state in responding to this humantragedy.41

In the Turkish system what made things worse is the indirectelection system under which MPs are appointed, not elected. Thecitizens cast their votes for parties, not individual candidate MPs, andparty bosses in turn appoint MPs on the basis of the party’s share ofthe popular vote. Under this system, accountability toward thecitizens is minimal, whereas unquestioned loyalty of the rank andfile to the party leader is paramount. The system empowers theleader, and in Turkish politics, party leaders tend to hold office forlife! The system contributes to the excessive centralization in Ankara,where rewards are maximized when politics and economics areintegral, inseparable elements of one and the same game.


CONCLUSION AND LESSONS FROM THE GREEK-TURKISHCRISIS MANAGEMENT

As national economies are integrated within the global economy,external shocks and destabilization risks increase, making theseeconomies more vulnerable to financial crisis. By joining regionalgroups or blocs such as the EU, the costs of crises can be minimized,while membership in a regional bloc also generates political andstrategic benefits. Greece has successfully modernized and democra-tized itself since the Cyprus humiliation in 1974. This sharplycontrasts with Turkey’s efforts at reform and restructuring aided andguided by advice from across the Atlantic. However, the chief explan-ation for comparative Turkish failure here is political corruption.

The Turkish experience with political corruption provides anumber of major lessons for the management of crises in the globaleconomy. Foremost is the moral hazard problem (of subordinatingpublic interest to personal gain) that suggests that foreign exchangecrises tend to originate first in the economy. In the Turkish example,the economic crisis started in the balance of payments, as the foreignexchange shortage grew out of control. An economic crisis, however,quickly becomes a political inertia problem as politicians ignore earlywarning signals, hoping that these unfavourable signals woulddisappear. Instead, political indifference deepens the economic crisis,and it becomes cumulatively more critical the less clear is the dividingboundary between politics and macro-economic policy manage-ment. At the root of political inertia lie political corruption as the chiefexplanation for the budget deficits and foreign exchange shortages.Therefore, a clear boundary between politics and economic policymanagement should be the basis of democratizing and modernizingthe political process. Just as the Turkish elites in Ankara insist on aclear separation between politics and religion, so too, there must bea parallel and equally transparent demarcation line between eco-nomic policy and party politics.

Accordingly, in countries such as Turkey undergoing structuraladjustment and stabilization designed by the IMF and WB, theremust be a solution to the moral hazard problem. A clear boundarybetween politics and economics is an essential ingredient of thetechnical prescription (i.e. fiscal and monetary reform programme).For, in the end, the success of the programme will depend on the


political will to modernize and democratize the institutions imple-menting public policies. How can modernization and democratiz-ation of institutions and policies be achieved in a developing society?There must be will at home, first demonstrated by the politicalleadership itself, but external support is critical as well. Theseconditions enabled Greece to modernize and democratize after 1974,although the Greek state of 1974 was in a more serious crisis com-pared to Turkey. However, policy-makers in Athens managed to copewith the crisis better. They chose to look to Europe for externalsupport to modernize and democratize the country. In the process,the Greek State significantly overcame the Greek version of the moralhazard problem. As a result, its resource allocation capability becameincreasingly more efficient, enabling the creation of a modern anddemocratic state. When Turkey, however, entered its crisis from thelate 1970s, it looked to Washington, not just to the USA government,but equally importantly to the IMF-WB for support. While some ofthe blame for past economic policy failures can be attributed toexternal actors, the primary responsibility for the lack of greaterachievement in Turkish modernization and democratization must beattributed to the failure of the ruling elites in Ankara to overcome themoral hazard problem.

Indeed, this problem got progressively worse. In the politics ofcrisis management of Greek-Turkish relations, several comments areworth making. First, and foremost, it is remarkable how muchpassion, and how little reasoned reflection, prevail in the bilateralrelations between these two Aegean neighbours. Clearly, history andcultural differences are major explanatory variables here, but at thesame time, there are significant social-psychological similarities, inparticular a ‘hot’ temper and high ethno-nationalistic perceptions.Greeks tend, on the whole, to demonize Turks, and this fact not onlydistorts their vision of reality about Turks and Turkey, it also under-mines Athens’ ability to conduct an independent Turkish policy; thusGreeks naturally tend to prefer to see Turkey and Turks throughEuropean lenses, not directly and openly across a small sea to theeast. For their part, Turks bear historical hurt and anger toward theGreeks as the first ethnic group to revolt against the Ottoman stateand, even more deeply, for pursuing the Megali Idea, of which Enosisin Cyprus is seen as one manifestation.

In the age of post-modernism, these outmoded perceptions and


fears belong to history. Hopefully, in the aftermath of the 1999earthquake diplomacy, and the Helsinki decision, and now in thewake of the terrorist attack on the USA unleashed on 11 September2001, common interests42 between Greece and Turkey will prevailever more strongly in the political, economic, security as well as insocial-psychological dimensions. Much will depend on how Europehandles Greek-Turkish relations in the next two years. To date, sadly,the EU can only show a poor track record.

NOTES

1. Comments on an earlier draft by Mustafa Aydın, Tozun Bahcheli and Marc Baudouinare gratefully acknowledged with the usual disclaimer that the author alone isresponsible for statements and opinions in the paper.

2. Vamık Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, The Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict(Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 1994).

3. See Aslan Gündüz, ‘Greek-Turkish Disputes: How to Resolve Them?’, in DimitrisKeridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds), Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era ofGlobalization (Herndon, Virginia: Brassey’s, 2001).

4. Ferenc A. Váli, Bridge Across the Bosporus, the Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins, 1971); and Roger R. Trask, The United States Response to Turkish Nationalismand Reform, 1914–1939 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1971).

5. See for example, Van Coufoudakis, ‘US Perspectives of Security and RegionalCooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean’, paper presented at the Hellenic-Canadian Federation of Ontario Meeting, 5–7 February 1999, Toronto.

6. For an extended discussion of the Aegean dispute, see Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-TurkishRelations Since 1955 (Boulder: Westview, 1990), esp. Chapter 5.

7. A good example is Keridis/Triantaphyllou, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era ofGlobalization. Even here some distorted perceptions linger. For example, DimitriosTrinataphyllou, ‘Further Turmoil Ahead?’, p. 59, argues; ‘Turkey used force repeat-edly in Cyprus in 1964 and 1974 and is now threatening to use force against Greece.’Another sweeping statement is to be found in Andreas Theophanous’ article, titled‘The Cyprus Problem and Its Implications for Stability and Security in the EasternMediterranean’, p. 194: ‘Turkey has a huge democratic deficit and a negative recordin its foreign policy with Greece and Cyprus.’ These two examples can easily bemultiplied. However, on the other hand, and citing from the same book, there aremore balanced opinions as well. For example, Dimitris Keridis, ‘Domestic Develop-ments and Foreign policy: Greek Policy toward Turkey’, p. 13, explains the recentsoftening of Athens rigid stance vis-à-vis Turkey in the following terms: ‘(P)olicymakers in Athens have realized that time is not on their side … The policy of (Greek)obstructionism and disengagement was no longer safe.’ Likewise, Kalypso Nicolaidis,‘Europe’s Tainted Mirror: Reflections on Turkey’s Candidacy Status after Helsinki’,p. 277, realistically acknowledges in her assessment of the possible exclusion ofTurkey from EU, that: ‘If that were the case, the bigger loser would be the EU.’

8. E.g. works by Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955; Volkan/Itzkowitz, Turks andGreeks.

9. The Cyprus Problem began, not in 1974, but in 1963, when, on Christmas Eve, theGreek Cypriot forces launched an offensive against the Turkish Cypriots and, byforce, destroyed the partnership Republic. See the works cited such as Glafkos


Clerides, Cyprus, My Deposition, Four Volumes (Nicosia: Alithea Press, 1989); J. Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986); ClementDodd (ed.), Cyprus, the Need for New Perspectives (London: Eothen Press, 1999);Volkan/Itzkowitz, Turks and Greeks; Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955.

10. Mehmet A. Birand, 30 Sıcak Gün (30 Hot Days), (I.stanbul: Milliyet, 1975).

11. Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, esp. Chapter 4.12. Clerides, Cyprus, My Deposition, esp. Vol. 4.13. Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the

Turkish Invasion (London: Tauris, 1999).14. Zenon Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict, National Identity and Statehood (Nicosia: n.p.,

1975). See also Zenon Stavrinides, ‘Greek Cypriot Perceptions’, in Dodd, Cyprus, theNeed for New Perspectives.

15. Quoted in Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus, p. 8016. Costas M. Constantinou and Yiannis Papadakis, ‘The Cypriot State(s) in situ: Cross-

ethnic Contact and the Discourse of Recognition’, Global Society, Journal ofInterdisciplinary International Relations, 15, 2 (April 2001), p. 13.

17. Ozay Mehmet, ‘Turkey in Crisis: Some Contradictions in the Kemalist DevelopmentStrategy’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 15, 1 (1983), pp. 47–66.

18. Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, pp. 141–3.19. Charalambos Tsardanidis and Evangelos Karafotakis, ‘Greece’s Economic Diplomacy

toward the Balkan Countries’, Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs, 5, 3(November 2000), p. 82.

20. Of course, Greek Cypriots cleverly promoted their cause in other international arenawithout any Turkish presence (e.g. the Commonwealth).

21. Süha Bölükbası, ‘The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-Settlement Between 1954–1996’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 30(1998), pp. 411–34.

22. This is the language used in a recent article by The Economist, ‘The Case forFederation’, 29 November 2001: ‘… the EU should refuse to be blackmailed by theGreeks into letting in Greek Cyprus willy-nilly.’

23. Christopher Brewin, ‘Turkey, Greece and the European Union’, in Dodd, Cyprus, TheNeed for New Perspectives.

24. Atila Eralp, ‘Turkey and the European Union’, in Mustafa Aydın (ed.), Turkey at theThreshold of the 21st Century, Global Encounters and/vs Regional Alternatives (Ankara:International Relations Foundation, 1998), p. 146.

25. Panayotis J. Tsakonas, ‘Turkey’s Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greeceand the Cyprus Issue’, Turkish Studies, 2, 2 (Autumn 2001), p. 1.

26. Theodores Psalidopoulos, ‘Alternatives for Turkey’s International Position; A GreekView’, in Aydın, Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century, p. 176.

27. This, by the way, contrasts sharply with the subsequent Greek veto over EU-Turkeyrelations prior to Helsinki Summit in 1999 when Turkey was declared a candidatecountry.

28. Turgut Özal, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey (Lefkosa: K. Rustem & Bros, 1991).29. William Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey (London: Croom

Helm, 1981).30. For a critical assessment, see Mehmet, ‘Turkey in Crisis’.31. See Williamson in L. Emerij (ed.), Economic and Social Development in the XXIst Century

(Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1997).32. Andreas Papandreou might be regarded as an exception in terms of his EU relations,

but nevertheless he was a strong modernizer.33. Anne Krueger, ‘The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking Society’, American Economic

Review (June 1974).34. Bertil Walstedt, State Manufacturing Enterprise in a Mixed Economy, the Turkish Case

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).35. Ziya Önis and Umut Türem, ‘Business, Globalization and Democracy: A


Comparative Analysis of Turkish Business Associations’, Turkish Studies, 2, 2 (Autumn2001).

36. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press,1982).

37. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s(Berlin: de Gruter, 1988).

38. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations.39. Heper/Evin, State, Democracy and the Military; Stephen Kinzer, Crescent & Star, Turkey

Between Two Worlds (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), pp. 26–8.40. This is the infamous Susurluk case. See Kinzer, ibid., pp. 96–9.41. Ibid., Chapter 8.42. These common interests can be modelled on the Atatürk-Venizelos rapprochement

of 1930s, when years of war and conflict were suddenly replaced, thanks to visionaryleadership, by shared peace and cooperation. Now, similar cooperation and friendlyrelations within an EU framework may be fostered in such fields as tourism, tradeand investment across the Aegean.


8Environmental Security in the

Aegean SeaNESRI

.N ALGAN

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS

The pressures on the environmental resources and the problems dueto the irreversible destruction of the natural resource base haveescalated to globally threatening levels for the future of humanity.Transboundary environmental problems such as climatic change,desertification, decline in biodiversity, acid rains, environmentalmigrations, illegal trade of hazardous wastes affect all humanityalike. The scarcity of natural resources due to disruption of ecologicalbalances creates risks for fundamental life-support systems. Environ-mental problems like the ecosystems are transboundary and supra-national in quality, hence they require complex solution methodsdue to the interconnected structure of environmental pressures andoften lead to local, national and international consequences. Owingto the general characteristics of environmental problems, counter-action necessitates cooperation not only among various social actorsat national level but also among various states.

Protection of the global commons is also a prominent reason forinternational environmental cooperation. It is unlikely for traditionalnational sovereignty concepts to allow the protection and manage-ment of shared ecosystems and the global commons such as the space,the oceans and the migratory species. This magnitude of the environ-ment issues requires the development of multi-directional coopera-tion mechanisms among the countries at various levels. Countriesprefer to build environmental cooperation on a legal basis that

include the conclusion of various multilateral or bilateral, regional or global international agreements, as well as activities by manyinternational organizations such as the United Nations, OECD andthe European Union to create special units for the environment and develop common policies, actions and guidelines for theirmembership.

The potential of all these to produce national and internationalinstability, disputes and even armed conflicts has compelled govern-ments to develop common policies and introduce legal regula-tions in order to prevent and eliminate such problems. The UnitedNations Stockholm Conference on Human Environment 1972, theUnited Nations World Commission on Environment and Develop-ment Report (Our Common Future) published in 1987, and the UnitedNations Conference on Environment and Development organizedin Rio in 1992 may be regarded as the primary milestones for the development of international environment policies. The UnitedNations Conference on Sustainable Development held in Johannes-burg between 26 August–4 September 2002 was expected to evaluatethe decade since the Rio Conference of 1992 and adopt new reso-lutions for future common action pertaining to a number of issuesincluding poverty eradication, changing unsustainable patterns ofconsumption and production, protecting and managing the naturalresource base of economic and social development, sustainabledevelopment in a globalizing world, and health and sustainabledevelopment. The attitude of developed countries in the meetingsheld during the preparatory process for this Summit was criticizedby the NGOs as deviating from the principles and policies agreed inRio. Unfortunately, the outcome illustrated that the criticisms werejustified since this first environmental summit of the century wasprobably a disappointment rather than a significant step forward inrendering the poverty eradication as the fundamental principle ofinternational environmental policies. Though the funding resourcesand mechanisms for the adopted Plan of Implementation for theWorld Summit on Sustainable Development still remains ambigu-ous, the number of global treaties concluded between 1970 and 2000for international cooperation in respect of the environment hasexceeded fifty. Moreover, there are also certain principles and guide-lines created by jurisprudence and common law practices. A signifi-cant portion of these arrangements involves norms in respect of the


protection of the seas, biodiversity and natural resources. In thiscontext, it can be argued that the quantity and quality of internationallegal arrangements for the purpose of protecting environmentalsecurity in the Aegean Sea are sufficient.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENTALSECURITY CONCEPT

As environmental problems became globally effective from 1970sonwards, various debates have taken place towards redefining theconcept of national security to include environmental issues. Theglobally felt impact of the oil crisis in the 1970s led to the under-standing that resources are limited/exhaustible and that scarcity ofresources might reach threatening dimensions not only in economicsecurity but also energy security.

In the literature it is argued that Richard Falk’s 1971 work ThisEndangered Planet is a landmark pointing to the bond between theenvironment and security.1 Lester R. Brown’s ‘Redefining NationalSecurity’,2 published in 1977, is another study that suggests that thetraditional security concept needs to be expanded in order to fightagainst the security problems caused by the degradation of planet’sfundamental life-support systems. Later, in ‘Redefining Security’,published in 1983, Richard H. Ullman defined the environmentalsecurity concept as follows:

A threat to national security is an action or sequence of eventsthat: 1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for inhabitants or a state,or 2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policychoices available to the government of a state or to private, non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) withinthe state.3

Norman Myers, another advocate of this view, states in the same veinthat:

… national security is no longer about fighting forces and wea-ponry alone. It relates increasingly to watersheds, croplands,forests, genetic resources, climate, and other factors rarely

ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN THE AEGEAN 187

considered by military experts and political leaders, but thattaken together deserve to be viewed as equally crucial to anation’s security as military prowess. The situation is epito-mized by the leader who proclaims he will not permit onesquare meter of national territory to be ceded to a foreigninvader, while allowing hundreds of square miles of topsoil tobe eroded away each year.4

The first noteworthy international organization document thataddresses the relations between the environment and security is theUnited Nations World Commission on Environment and Develop-ment Report called Our Common Future.5 It introduced the concept ofsustainable development to the agenda of the governments and theinternational community, and provided for a global transformationof environment policies. This new approach that emphasizes therelation between poverty and the environment and underscores theunderstanding of justice between generations and regions wasinfluential in directing international environment policies. Anothersignificant feature of the report was its addressing the interactionbetween the environment, peace and security. Our Common Futurealso called for

… recognition that security was partly a function of environ-mental sustainability. The Commission highlighted the causalrole environmental stress can play in contributing to conflictwhile also stating that a comprehensive approach to inter-national and national security must transcend the traditionalemphasis on military power and armed competition.6

According to Barnett, ‘Because it identifies with the earlier Brantand Palma reports, it is not surprising that Our Common Future mademuch of the links between environmental degradation and secur-ity.’7 In the report Common Security: A Program for Disarmament,published by the Independent Commission on Disarmament andSecurity Issues in 1982, the ‘comprehensive security’ concept wasused for the first time, and the changing quality of global securitywas noted. Introduced to the global agenda with this report, theconcept of ‘comprehensive security’ involves many threats such aspoverty, global environmental problems and nuclear war.

A notable increase in security literature is observed towards the


end of the 1980s. The period also marked the end of the Cold War,which is also characterized by the increasing interest of internationalorganization in environmental issues that used to be limited to the scholarly community. By the early 1990s concepts such as foodsecurity, environmental security, ecological security and humansecurity were gradually developed in international relations, whilethere was also an increasing trend in the number of activities in thefield in organizations such as the United Nations and its affiliates,OSCE and NATO. The United Nations Development Program (1993)Human Development Report reads ‘The concept of security must changefrom an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stresson people’s security, from security through armaments to securitythrough human development, from territorial security to food,employment, and environmental security.’8 In 1995, the UnitedNations Global Governance Commission report Our Global Neighbor-hood 9 added the ‘planet security’ concept to this new securityapproach. According to the report, global security must expand thetraditional focus of state security concept to cover human and planetsecurity.

The redefinition of NATO’s security concept to include theelement of environment after the end of the Cold War may be inter-preted as the most notable indicator to the international adoption ofthe environmental security concept. ‘The Alliance (NATO) is com-mitted to a broad approach to security, which recognizes theimportance of political, economic, social and environmental factorsin addition to the indispensable defense dimension.’10

In the same period, environmental security began to be consid-ered as one of the critical components of some countries’ nationalsecurity strategies.

It is a common knowledge that some states such as the USA, the Russian Federation and Canada have followed a similarapproach by including these phenomena as an integral com-pound of the security concept in the redefinition of theirnational security policies and strategies. Turkey has adopted, aswell, this new notion of security in the OSCE Military DoctrinesSeminar (Vienna, 1998), during which the Chief of General Staffhad referred to environmental threats as one of the recent risksand threats jeopardizing the world security.11


According to a report released in 1999 by the OECD EnvironmentPolicy Committee Working Party on Economic and EnvironmentalPolicy Integration, the term environmental security

… used most often to address national security issues andthreats of military action that are caused entirely or partly byenvironmental problems. For example, Gorrissen (1993) identi-fied several avenues through which national security interestscould be adversely affected by environmental issues: trans-boundary environmental issues as problems for external rela-tions; environmental degradation as a cause of regional conflict;destruction of global ecosystems that precipitate interstateconflict; environmental issues in international law; environ-mental degradation caused by military activity; ecological con-sequences of conflict; and destruction of the environment as aninstrument of war.12

The same report includes the following remarks about the definitionof the environmental security concept:

The various descriptions of environmental security that areoffered in the literature converge around four broad issues. One is environmental (or resource) degradation. Environmentaldegradation may then result in economic losses and/or increasedinternational economic competition. Environmental and eco-nomic problems can escalate into political conflict within andamong nations. If these political conflicts become severeenough, military conflict may ensue … For example, biodiversityis still largely an environmental issue, water pollution is mainlyan economic question, and climate change is now a politicalproblem. Whether any current environmental security issueposes real threats of military action is debatable. Other ways ofclassifying environmental security issues include their geo-graphic scope (global, regional or local), or whether they are‘environment-based’ (climate change, stratospheric ozonedepletion, air and water quality, biodiversity, oil spills, micro-organisms) or ‘resource-based’ (water quantity, minerals, landdegradation and fisheries).13

Within the framework of this approach, the principal environ-


mental security issues facing OECD nations are grouped accordingto the geographic scope of the question: Climate change (global),Stratospheric ozone depletion (global), Biodiversity (global), Viruses,micro-organisms (global), Fisheries (global, regional and local), Trans-boundary air pollution (regional), Transboundary water pollution(regional), Land degradation and desertification (regional), Waterscarcity (regional), Nuclear power plants (regional), Oil, natural gasand mineral deposits (regional), Introduction of alien species(regional and local), Natural disasters (regional and local), Disposalof hazardous wastes (local), Oil and other spills (local, regional).14

In addition, intergovernmental organizations like the UnitedNations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Eco-nomic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change, and Global Environmental Facility (GEF), suchnational agencies as the Pacific Northwest National LaboratoryCenter for Environmental Security, US Central Intelligence Agency,US Department of Defense, US Department of State, and Bureau of Oceans and International and Scientific Affairs, and non-governmental and scientific institutions including the BellonaFoundation, Cambridge University Global Security Program, Con-sortium for International Earth Science Information Network(CIESIN), International Security Network Center for SecurityStudies, University of Toronto, Project on Peace and Conflict Studies,Woodrow Wilson Center, Environmental Change and SecurityProject, World Resources Institute, and Worldwatch Institute areconsidered active in environmental security research.

Environmental threats or stresses due to environmental degra-dation and/or environmental resource scarcity may act as the struc-tural reason for a conflict between countries or may act as a triggeror a catalyst for a conflict. In this context, it is natural that differentenvironmental stresses and/or threats have different effects on secur-ity. Thus, it is not possible to assess each environmental problem asa security issue. Each environmental threat should be dealt withinits particular context in view of its specific qualities and extent, theaffected geographical area, and the socio-economic, political anddemographic consequences. In any case, it is clear that in the comingyears, environmental security will have a more prominent place onthe agendas of national governments and international organizations.


ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN REGIONAL SEAS

The adverse effects of global environmental pressure and degra-dation are also observed on a regional level. The degradation ofshared ecosystems like the seas, lakes and/or forest areas as well astransboundary waters have adverse effects primarily at a regionallevel and hence solutions are mostly possible through regionalcooperation. Problems caused by development activities emergesooner in water basins than in the other ecological areas, and oftencause harder to reverse and more complicated environmentaldegradation. The environmental stress and degradation in variouswater basins such as the Danube, Rhine, Mediterranean, Black Sea,Caspian, Aral and Baltic Seas constitute concrete examples to thissituation.

Environmental stress in water basins requires a holistic evaluationof all human activities in the circumferences and the hinterland of such water basins for measures to be taken and plans to beimplemented for those lands. A regional approach can be consideredas the most effective and efficient method in sustainable use andmanagement of common environmental resources and ecosystemsas well as preventing transboundary environmental problems.

The resolutions of the 1972 Stockholm Conference cover thefundamental principles in respect of the efforts to protect with aregional approach the oceans and seas that cover 70 per cent of theearth’s surface. Recommendation No. 92/b of the Stockholm Confer-ence, which provides that nations take efficient measures on thenational level in order to control all significant sources, includingland-based sources, that pollute the sea, and to coordinate and focussuch activities at a regional and, where necessary, international level,played a guiding role for the systematic and institutionalizeddevelopment of common protection policies for regional seas. As amatter of fact, one of the decisions taken in the First Meeting of theGoverning Council of UNEP in 1973 concerns the definition andprevention of all threats that adversely affect marine health, and theefforts of the Executive Director for concluding regional agreementsto that end. The principal purpose of establishing a Regional SeasProgramme under UNEP in 1974 was to protect the oceans with aregional approach.15

The ‘Regional Sea’ concept does not fit in any clearly defined legal


category. There are a number of locations and expansion areasexpressed by this concept that cover marine areas exposed to seriousdegradation threats and that require urgent and imminent measures.The geographical scope definition of many seas that are protectedunder the name ‘regional seas’ is sometimes limited to seas that areunder national sovereignty, sometimes include open seas, and insome examples cover the coastal areas and internal waters.16 Someregional seas are enclosed or semi-enclosed (e.g. the MediterraneanSea including the Aegean, Black Sea, Red Sea, Baltic Sea), whereassome others are open seas and even a part of an ocean (e.g. East andCentral Africa Region, Southeast Pacific Region, South Asia Region).17

On the other hand, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea(1982) includes arrangements to strengthen developments for theregional handling of the efforts for protection of the seas. Article 197of the Convention states that in consideration of their regionalcharacteristics, states should cooperate to create and adopt inter-nationally recommended practices and procedures in accordancewith this Convention as well as the rules and principles to protectand preserve the sea environment universally and where necessaryregionally, directly or through competent international organiza-tions. Article 122 of the United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Seas defines enclosed and semi-enclosed seas as follows: ‘A gulf,sea basin or sea surrounded by two or more states, connected withanother sea or ocean via a narrow strait or comprising territorialwaters or exclusive economic zones of two or more states.’18

Rio Summit Agenda 21 is the most recent arrangement adoptedon a global scale for the protection of common seas with a regionalapproach. The programme areas under Chapter 17 of Agenda 21(Protection of The Oceans, All Kinds of Seas, including Enclosed and Semi-enclosed Seas, and Coastal Areas and The Protection, Rational Use andDevelopment of Their Living Resources) that define the national, sub-regional, regional and global activities to be carried out by contract-ing states are defined as follows:

a) Integrated management and sustainable development ofcoastal areas, including exclusive economic zones; b) Marineenvironmental protection; c) Sustainable use and conservationof marine living resources of the high seas; d) Sustainable useand conservation of marine living resources under national


jurisdiction; e) Addressing critical uncertainties for the man-agement of the marine environment and climate change; f)Strengthening international, including regional, cooperationand coordination; g) Sustainable development of small islands.19

In Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, under the programme area ‘Marineenvironmental protection’ management-related activities are classifiedin two groups: ‘Prevention, reduction and control of degradation ofthe marine environment from land-based activities’ and ‘Prevention,reduction and control of degradation of the marine environmentfrom sea-based activities’. Sea-based activities recommend actionsspecifically addressing sea-based pollutants, i.e. shipping, dumping,offshore oil and gas platforms and ports.20

The regional approach offers significant opportunities to buildefficient cooperation mechanisms amongst neighbouring countries,aiming at an integrated approach to environmentally rationalmanagement for protection, improvement and development. As amatter of fact, the ongoing activities for the protection of the seasunder the United Nations Environment Programme’s Regional SeasProgramme constitute outstanding examples of regional plans ofaction that regard the marine environment and coastal areas fromthe point of view of inter-sectorial relations and assess environmentaldegradation not only in respect of its consequences but also itsreasons. Each environmental action plan conducted within theframework of this cooperation movement that includes approxi-mately 140 countries and 12 regions (including the Mediterranean)of the world is officially adopted in intergovernmental meetings heldby the regional countries concerned. These are holistic plans thatperceive environmental problems as a whole. The most developedamong these is the Mediterranean Action Plan, which has beenimplemented since 1975 and covers the Aegean Sea.

On the other hand, although not included in the UNEP RegionalSeas Programme, the Aral Sea Basin Programme, also a regionalcooperation programme, has clearly adopted the national securityrelated significance of ensuring environmental security in the regionalseas. The Almaty Declaration adopted in 1997 by the governmentsof the coastal states of the Aral Sea, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, notes that environmentalsecurity is a strategic component of national security and is vital in


protecting the priorities and interests of the countries in the region.The Declaration specifically underlines the need for creating a regionfree from nuclear tests and arms, and for fighting against leakagefrom nuclear technology and raw materials in the region thatrequires a comprehensive programme to ensure environmentalsecurity in Central Asia, including the Aral problem.21

GEOGRAPHICAL AND ECOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AEGEAN SEA

The Aegean Sea constitutes the northeast section of EasternMediterranean. Located between 35°–41° north and 23°–27° eastlongitudes, the Aegean Sea has a surface area of 2105 km2, and avolume of 7,4104 km3.22 Situated between Turkey and Greece, thelength north to south of the Aegean Sea is 660 km, and its width eastto west is approximately 270 km in the north, 150 km in the centre,and 400 km in the south. The southern boundary of the Aegean Seastarts from Elafonisos in the west, through Crete and Rhodes, andends at River Dalaman on Turkish mainland in the east. In the north,it is connected to the Black Sea via the Çanakkale Strait, Marmara Seaand the I

.stanbul Strait. Bearing the characteristics of an inland sea,

the Aegean

… has a special position in the Mediterranean ecosystem thanksto its regional location, geomorphologic structure, and hydro-graphic and ecological properties, and has a specific structureowing to its oceanographic and biological characteristics. As amatter of fact, its northern section is under the influence of therelatively cold and low salinity of the Black Sea waters, whereasits south is under the influence of the warm and salty Mediter-ranean waters. Thus (in hydrographic terms) it is divided intothree subsections as the north, the center and the south.23

On the other hand, although there are 2,962 m and 3,150 m deepgorges in the south of the Aegean, the deepest abyss does not exceed1,000 metres. With a form similar to the letter ‘S’, the Halkidikya gorgestarts in the Saros Bay and extends down to the shores of Crete as avalley, dividing the Aegean Sea into two plateaus. The deep-sea areas


outside of this gorge and crevasses consist of quite shallow sectionsno deeper than 500 m. Mostly the depth ranges between 100 m and500 m, with an average depth of 350 m. With this structure, it lookslike a high plateau between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea,which have an average depth of 1,300 m and 1,500 m respectively.Due to its geomorphologic structure, the coastline of the Aegean Seais long and curved. There are numerous islands and islets extendingfrom the mainland of the two coastal states in the Aegean Sea thatexhibits continental seabed characteristics and has a complexterrestrial bottom structure. Its continental shelf and side boundariesare not definite due to recent tectonic movements.24

This structure of the Aegean Sea reflects also on its biologicalfeatures that are divided into two subsections despite the relativelysmall marine area. In oceanographic terms, it combines the coldwaters of the north and the warm waters of the south, thus consti-tuting a meeting basin for marine living resources that biologicallyprefer cold waters and those that prefer warm waters. Therefore, theAegean Sea is rich in biodiversity. Even though it forms a rich part ofthe Mediterranean ecosystem in terms of the diversity of species, thenarrow continental shelf and complex topographical structure haveadverse effects on fisheries. Although production-wise it can beconsidered poor due to its bottom structure, the creatures living inthe basin have a high economic value. In addition, it is one of themost suitable basins in the world for water products productionowing to its innumerable islands, islets, rocks, gulfs and bays, whichrender the region even more important. Approximately 400 algae,5,000 invertebrate and 300 fish species were identified living in theAegean Sea basin,25 which is also very rich in coastal and pelagicseabirds.

Coastal breeding Seabirds occurring in the Aegean are, gulls,terns, grebes, cormorants, pelicans, flamingo, ducks, rails andcoots, shorebirds. Marine sites (rocky islands and islets) are[home to] yellow-legged Gull Larus cachinnans, Audouin’s GullsLarus audouinii. The pelagic seabirds are the Shag Phalacrocoraxdesmarestii, Hydrobates pelagicus, Cory’s Shearwater Calonectrisdiomedea and the Mediterranean Shearwater.26

Furthermore, the Aegean displays specific importance in respectof marine mammals. The endangered Mediterranean Monk Seal


Monachus Monachus with very few survivors in the Mediterraneanbasin is the most significant. Although very few in number, dolphins(Tursiops trucatus, Delphinus delphis, Stenella coeruleoalba, Grampusgriseus) and whales (Balaenoptera physalus, Physeter macrocephalus) alsoinhabit this sea.27

A large majority of the fauna and flora in the Aegean Sea and onits islands are today threatened species. These species, which areendemic to the Aegean and the Mediterranean, are largely vulner-able, rare and/or endangered due to environmental degradationcaused by human activities. Table 14 and Table 15 give lists of thethreatened species in the Aegean Sea basin.

ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS

Like all other marine areas, it is possible to list the general reasonsthat cause pollution in the Aegean Sea as follows: dumping fromships and aircraft, pollution from land-based sources and activities,pollution by oil and other harmful substances in cases of emergency,airborne pollution, illegal shipping and discharge of hazardous


Table 14Threatened plant species of the Aegean Sea and Islands

Species * Status Major risk

Cymodocea nodosa R †Coastal development and coastal fisheriesZostera marina E †Turbidity, set net fisheriesZostera noltii E †Turbidity, set net fisheriesPosidonia ocenica* E †Set net fisheries, coastal fisheries, anchoring

and coastal degradationCaulerpa olivieri* V Coastal developmentCystoseira spinosa* V Habitat destructionCystoseira zosteroides V TurbidityLithophyllum lichenoides V Oil pollutionTenarea undolusa V Oil pollution

Source: Öztürk/Öztürk, ‘Problems related to fisheries and …’, pp. 37–8.Based on the criteria of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and NaturalResources, 1994. Abbreviations for the status are: V: vulnerable; R: rare; E: endangered.*Mediterranean endemic species.†Under protection in Turkey according to the Fisheries Law, No. 1380.

wastes, and pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation ofthe continental shelf and the seabed and subsoil.

The chemical and bacterial contamination caused by all thesesources in the Aegean includes the spread of pathogenic micro-organisms and eutrophication from rivers, semi-enclosed gulfs,


Table 15Threatened animal species in the Aegean Sea and Islands

Species Status Major risk

Axinella polypoides V Set nets and sport diversAxinella verrucosa V Set nets and sport diversGerardia savaglia E †Set nets and sport diversEunicella singularis V Set nets and sport diversHomarus gammarus V OverfishingPalinurus elephas V OverfishingScyllarus latus V OverfishingScyllarus arctus V OverfishingMaja squinado V OverfishingCharonia tritonis E †Shell collectorsPinna nobilis V †Set netsTonna galea E †Shell collectorsAsterina pancerii* V †Sport diversAcipencer sturio CE †OverfishingHuso huso CE †OverfishingHippocampus hippocampus V †Sport diversEpinephelus marginatus V SpearfishingCaretta caretta E †Coastal degradation, by-catch, pollutionMonachus monachus CE †Loss of habitat, deliberate killingTursiops truncatus DD †Loss of habitat, bycatch, food shortageDelphinus delphis DD †Loss of habitat, bycatch, food shortageStenella coeruleoalba DD †Loss of habitat, bycatch, food shortageGrampus griseus DD †Loss of habitat, bycatch, food shortageZiphius cavirostris DD †Loss of habitat, food shortageBalaenoptera physalus R †Loss of habitat, food shortagePhyseter catodon R †Loss of habitat, food shortage

Source: Öztürk/Öztürk, ‘Problems related to fisheries and …’, pp. 37–8.Based on the criteria of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and NaturalResources, 1994. Abbreviations for the status are: V: vulnerable; R: rare; E: endangered; CE:critically endangered; DD: data deficient.*Mediterranean endemic species.†Under protection in Turkey according to the Fisheries Law, No. 1380.

untreated sewage, coastline industrial plants and the very heavymarine traffic in the basin. The rapid growth of tourism constitutesan additional threat to the marine environment, the sensitive eco-systems of coastal areas and biodiversity. One of the principal threats,eutrophication, is caused by the insufficient treatment infrastructureof the coastal cities of both littoral countries in the Aegean,particularly I

.zmir and Thessaloniki. ‘Due to eutrophication, red tides

occur in the Aegean Sea, which result in mortality of marineorganisms due to lack of oxygen. It may also cause bloom of toxicdinoflagelates. Moreover, turbidity increases as water is eutrophi-cated, then light diminution affects sea grass and algae’.28 Many ofthese adverse effects are due to the nutrients and pesticides carriedby the waters of rivers that discharge into the Aegean. According to UNEP Mediterranean Action Plan data, pollution caused by rivers discharging into the Aegean from both countries is listed inTable 16.

In accordance with the regional studies conducted within theframework of the UNEP Mediterranean Action Plan, the contractingparties of the Barcelona Convention were asked to identify thepriority pollution hot spots in the Mediterranean basin. A significantnumber of such hot spots that are identified and reported to UNEP/MAP by Turkey and Greece are on the Aegean coasts. The Aegean


Table 16Loads of dissolved nutrients from major rivers discharging into

the Aegean Sea

Rivers Flow Nitrate Ammonium Phosphate Countrykm3/year (N-NO3*) (N-NH4*) (P-PO4*)

mg/l mg/l mg/l

Evros/Meriç 6.80 1.9 0.05 0.36 Greece/TurkeyAxios 4.90 1.584 0.065 0.48 GreeceBüyük Menderes† 0.40 0.75 0.33 0.07 TurkeyStrymon 2.59 1.236 0.053 0.11 GreeceGediz† – 1.18 0.005 0.14 TurkeyAliakmon 1.177 0.395 0.05 0.10 GreeceNestos 1.03 1.24 0.071 – GreecePinios 0.672 2.32 0.167 – Turkey

Adapted from UNEP/MAP, Protecting the Mediterranean from land-based pollution (Athens: 2001),pp. 19–20.*Estimates of actual discharge from ‘Rosetta’ and ‘Damietta’ branches†Average values in 1996, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of Turkey

hot spots reported to UNEP/MAP by Greece are as follows: ElefsisBay, Heraklion Gulf, North Western Saronic Gulf, Inner Saronic Gulf,Thermaikos Gulf and Pagasitikos Gulf; moreover Turkey reportedthe Bodrum Area (Bodrum, Marmaris and Datça). The pollutionstatuses of these hot sports are summarized in Table 17.

In addition to these important land-based pollutants, Black Seawater, which enters the Aegean Sea through the Çanakkale Strait,also contributes to the enrichment of the Aegean Sea’s nutrients.Critically challenged by environmental risks, the Black Sea is exposedto substantial transboundary pollution. The Danube River crossesindustrialized countries and dense settlement areas, and conveysone-third of the pollution produced by continental Europe to theBlack Sea. In the period 1970 to 1990, the accumulated nitrogen andphosphorus load carried by the Danube increased 2.5 and 3.8 timesrespectively. Moreover, petroleum discharged to the Black Sea via theDanube is calculated at 53,300 tonnes/year. Accordingly, the oilwastes attributable to the Danube River correspond to nearly half ofthe total wastes in the Black Sea, and 48 per cent of total oil pollution.In addition, after the opening of the Rhine-Main channel, theDanube has started to carry pollution to the Black Sea from the BalticSea and the Rhine, the coasts of which are densely occupied byindustrial plants.29 Given that the Aegean Sea is connected with theBlack Sea via Marmara and the Turkish Straits, it is only natural thatthis transboundary pollution affects the Aegean. On the other hand,ship-based pollution as well as accident risks have increased due tothe addition of the Baltic-Rhine-Danube-Black Sea traffic to thealready heavy marine traffic in the Aegean Sea, which is a veryimportant waterway, not only for Turkey and Greece but also for thecoastal countries of the Black Sea. Ship accidents in this semi-enclosed basin with heavy marine traffic not only cause ecologicaldisasters but also damage tourism, and so harms the economies ofthe coastal countries.

Since 1980, ten significant accidents (more than 500t ofpetroleum discharged into the sea) have occurred in differentregions of the Aegean. Pollution from petroleum has led toobservation of tar balls along almost every coastline. The widerange of polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) concen-trations measured in the Aegean indicates that the most


Tabl

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No.

124

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significant pollution remains restricted to near the shore and toenclosed areas.30

Furthermore, it is clear that the environmental security problemsin the Aegean will be even heavier due to the plans to ship CentralAsian and Caucasian petroleum and natural gas to the world via the Black Sea, the Turkish Straits and the Aegean. ‘In case these plansare implemented the figure of approximately 5 millions tons/year ofcrude oil passing through the Straits today will increase to perhaps80–100 million tons/year.’31 Even when this crude oil reaches theAegean via pipelines through Thrace rather than the Turkish Straits,threats to the sensitive Aegean ecosystem will not diminish.

Another factor that threatens environmental security in theAegean Sea is the destruction of habitat. Concentrated population in coastal areas, urban settlements, industry, ports, tourism andexpanding power plants constitute the major reasons of destructionof habitat in the Aegean, as in the entire Mediterranean basin.Natural habitats of such species as Caretta caretta, Monachus monachusare lost or contaminated due to pollution and coastal erosionattributable to human activities besides the occupation of the coastsby human populations. On the other hand, exotic species, decline offisheries and aquaculture activities threaten environmental securityin the Aegean. The fisheries, historically the principal sources ofincome for the Aegean basin inhabitants, suffer the damages causednot only by pollution and degradation but also over-fishing in bothcoastal countries. According to scientific researches:

… the decline of the commercial fish stocks, such as sardine,spratt, mackerel, and horse mackerel … In regard to migratoryspecies like tunas and swordfish, the stocks [have] drasticallydeclined mainly due to over-fishing … Sponge fishing, tradi-tionally in the Aegean Sea, was greatly affected by an epidemicin the 1980s.32

The decline in fish stocks cannot be regarded just as an economicloss for fisheries. The adverse effects of this decline are pronouncedvery intensively in respect to a sustainable ecological balance in thebasin and the protection of biodiversity. For instance, the inhabitantsof this sea, the Mediterranean monk seal, Monachus monachus, as well


as the ceataceans are affected by this decline, and lose their basic foodsources. As a result, especially Monachus monachus attacks fishing netsto find fish and are frequently killed by fishermen, thus their alreadylow number in the entire Mediterranean basin drops further.Another problem attributable to fisheries is the rapidly growingaquaculture activities on both sides of the Aegean. ‘By marine aqua-culture, Turkey produces 15,000t of fish and Greece 35,000t in theshallow bays in the Aegean Sea.’33 The unplanned and uncoordi-nated development of this production brings about eutrophicationin enclosed or non-circulating bays where aquaculture fisheries areplaced, and on the other hand has adverse effects on tourism.‘Particularly, remains of food and chemicals cause unpredictableharm to native fauna and flora in the entire basin.’34

The exotic species problem is relatively new in the Aegean just asin the Mediterranean.

Most of the common exotic species are from the Indian Oceanthrough the Suez Canal and [are] called Lessepsian species …40 Lessepsian species have reached the Anatolian coast, Rhodes,Cyprus and Crete-Santorini areas … ship ballast water alsocarries exotic species to the Aegean Sea. One of the examples isblue crab, Callinectes sapidus, found in Turkey and Greece. TheAegean Sea fauna and flora are under the threat of the combjellyfish Mnemiopsis leidyi that reached firstly the Black Sea fromthe North Atlantic in tanker ballast water in 1987 and damagedthe ecological balance there. This species has been found also inthe Aegean … Another risk is presented by Caulerpa taxifolia andCaulerpa racemose. These two algae species may cause harm tothe Aegean Sea native flora.35

ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN THE AEGEAN SEA

A significant part of the environmental threats and stresses in theAegean Sea threaten drastically to degrade the quality of life of theinhabitants. In the Aegean Sea, potential dangers caused by naturaldisasters such as earthquakes may also qualify as environmentalsecurity issues. There is concrete evidence to this potential problemincluding the seismic location of the basin and recent earthquakedisasters on both sides of the Aegean. On the other hand, climate


change, stratospheric ozone depletion, desertification, erosionemerging as a consequence of the cumulative changes or modifica-tions caused by various forms of human activity, may be consideredmedium to long-term environmental security issues for the AegeanSea. Based on the relatively long-term potential risks of the latter, onemay argue that there is a risk of an increase in the environmentalsecurity threatening factors in the Aegean.

Besides, it should not be forgotten that the environmentaldegradation threatening the quality of life of the human inhabitantsof the Aegean basin directly eradicates the right to life for non-humaninhabitants. In accordance with eco-centric and not anthropocentricethics, the lives and well-being of all creatures are viewed as indi-vidually valuable. This perception requires environmental securityto be guaranteed not only for humankind but also for all living beingsalike.

In this context, the existing and potential environmental securityissues in the Aegean Sea could be outlined as in Table 18 and Table 19.

Evidently, wars constitute the most critical threat to environ-mental security. Although not indicated in Tables 18 and 19, theprimary human-based risk that may completely destroy environ-mental security in the Aegean Sea is war. The potential of militaryactivities creating environmental security problems should not beoverlooked. Military activities which are likely to affect the environ-ment include the construction and operation of military bases, the


Table 18Human-originated environmental security issues in the Aegean

Geographic scope Regional Local Term of effect

Climate change x x Long-termStratospheric ozone depletion x x Long-termWater quality x x Short-termBiodiversity x x Short-termHabitat destruction x x Short-termOil spills x x Short-termExotic species x x Short-termMarine accidents x x Short-termWater scarcity in the islands x Medium-termCoastal erosion x Medium-termDesertification x Long-termFisheries x x Short-termMarine aquaculture x x Short-term

production of military equipment and weapons, the undertaking ofmilitary exercises, disposal of toxic materials and pollution resultingfrom toxic material spills during the transport of military goods.Accidental oil spills or the use of weapons with depleted uranium ina marine environment during military manoeuvres may also createirreversible catastrophes.

Military exercises disturb fish-spawning grounds and naturalhabitats of birds and other marine fauna. The usage of nuclear,chemical, biological or conventional weapons during military exer-cises, too, contributes significantly to environmental degradationand genetic mutation, creating illnesses, gradual destruction and thedeath of marine living resources. Some coastal areas that are used formilitary activities are around, or close to, important roosting orbreeding areas for endangered bird species. An intensive use of theseareas for target practice and training flights by military aircraft cancause considerable disturbance for the birds. Moreover, militaryexercises with warships, fighter planes, tanks and artillery can havenegative impacts on whales, monk seals, marine turtles and dolphins,such as disruption of vital biological behaviours, temporary or per-manent hearing loss, destruction of breeding areas and even death.

Finally, it should be underlined that the high percentages ofmilitary spending in budgets restrict the resources needed forenvironmental policies. All the above-mentioned threats are presentfor the Aegean Sea too. But, the political conflicts between Turkeyand Greece add to it and make those problems unsolvable.

CONCLUSIONS: THE WAY FORWARD?

The environmental security problem observed in many enclosedand/or semi-enclosed regional seas is also valid for the Aegean Sea.However, one may as well argue that environmental security in the


Table 19Non-human-originated environmental security issues in the Aegean

Geographic scope Regional Local Term of effect

Naturally caused climate change x x Very long-termNatural disasters (such as earthquakes) x x Short-term

case of this particular sea is far more sensitive. Its particular geo-morphologic structure, oceanographic, hydrographic, ecological andbiological characteristics make the Aegean even more vulnerable.Moreover, the problems may become chronic if environmentalprotection policies are regarded as ‘soft policy’ issues that can beeasily neglected or compromised especially in cases of regionalinstability and tension.

On the other hand, the chances of finding a common solution tothe environmental issues are restricted due to the dispute overnational sovereignty rights of this marine arena between the twoheirs to the Aegean Sea, Turkey and Greece. It is known that, fromtime to time, states tend to use the environment as a political tool fortheir national interests in sovereignty disputes. In such circum-stances, environmental security issues as trigger factors have thepotential risk of changing into national security issues. For instance,it is sometimes difficult to make a distinction between activities thatare supposedly conducted for environmental protection purposesand activities pursued to extend domination in disputed geo-graphical areas. In this context, Greece’s proposal to the EU to estab-lish bird-watching stations and nature sanctuaries on 14 disputedformations in the Aegean was interpreted by the Turkish media asusing the environment as a tool in the dispute on sovereignty issues.36

When it coincided with the Kardak/Imia crisis, Greece’s claim that ithad filed an application with the EU in order to nominate these areasas bird protection zones under the EU Habitat Directives and Natura2000 activities,37 was interpreted in the Turkish press as a preparationto take hold of such islets through ‘environment games’.38 Similarly,the pollution monitoring programme conducted in the Aegean since1987 by the Turkish Ministry of Environment with the scientificresearch ship Piri Reis was challenged by the Greek diplomatic com-munity which claimed that ‘Ankara used the said research ship forfabricating a crisis in 1987.’39

Despite all these negative aspects, it is not over-optimistic tosuggest that environmental security in the Aegean Sea may help the rapprochement of the two coastal countries. The environmentinherently encourages solidarity and cooperation between states,peoples and individuals. A state cannot possibly solve global,regional and/or transboundary environmental problems single-handedly. In fact, all international legal instruments on the


environment contain many provisions for encouraging multilateralor bilateral cooperation.

Some of these conventions serve directly or indirectly for theprotection of the Aegean Sea. International legal arrangements towhich Turkey and Greece are parties and that help eliminateenvironmental insecurity can be examined in three categories,namely global, regional and bilateral agreements.

There are a number of global international conventions or non-binding international instruments with relevance to the protectionof marine environment to which Turkey and Greece are both parties,such as the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, the Convention for theProtection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the IMOInternational Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,1973 (as modified by the Protocol of 1978 /MARPOL 73/78, and itsAnnexes), the United Nations Declaration on Environment andDevelopment and Agenda 21, the Convention on Biological Divers-ity and its Jakarta Mandate. At the regional level, the most importantlegal arrangements which can contribute to the protection of theAegean Sea are the Bern and Barcelona Conventions. The Council ofEurope Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlifeand Natural Habitats (1979) has a significant role in protecting thewildlife and natural habitats in the Aegean, since the Aegean stillenjoys the privilege of being a habitat for endangered species.

The Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediter-ranean Sea Against Pollution40 and its related protocols, whichencourage the strengthening of sub-regional and bilateral coopera-tion in the basin, offer an adequate legal framework for the protectionof the Aegean Sea. The Mediterranean Action Plan adopted andenforced by the Mediterranean coastal states and the EuropeanEconomic Community in 1975 for the purpose of implementing theBarcelona Convention was subjected to a series of amendments in1995. Currently, these activities, pursued by 20 coastal countries andthe European Union with the title ‘MAP Phase II/Action Plan for theProtection of the Marine Environment and Sustainable Development of theCoastal Areas of the Mediterranean’, also cover the Aegean Sea and itscoastal areas. Since its initiation, Turkey and Greece have beenstanding as active contributors to the MAP that acts as the principaltool for ensuring environmental security in the Aegean Sea thanksto its encouraging effect for sub-regional and bilateral cooperation


between contracting parties, although it is basically a multilateralcooperation plan.41

Environment is one of the subjects in the recently developingcooperation between Turkey and Greece. The Memorandum of Under-standing Between the Republic of Turkey and the Hellenic RepublicConcerning Cooperation on Environmental Protection (MOU) and itsAnnex signed on 20 January 2000 in Ankara, is the major legalinstrument which may be useful for the protection of the Aegean Seamarine environment. According to the Annex of this MOU, 11 itemsare identified as possible areas for cooperation. Among these 11items, combating marine pollution and land-based sources of pol-lution are directly related to the protection of the Aegean Sea. In themeetings held between the official boards of the two countries aftersigning the MOU, five of the 11 issues were determined as thepriority cooperation areas. However, the issue of combating marinepollution and land-based sources of pollution that would directlycontribute to the protection of the Aegean Sea is not within thosepriority areas yet. Hence, in addition to the existing multilateralenvironmental cooperation between the two coastal countries atglobal and regional levels, the initiation of bilateral cooperation is animportant step forward.42

In order to prevent and eliminate environmental insecurity in theAegean Sea, both parties need a new political commitment thataccepts the Aegean Sea as a common asset uniting the two countriesrather than separating them. And to eliminate the potential of theenvironment to create a new conflict or instability, this new politicalnotion must be the basis for the development of cooperation. Thepotential for reconciliation inherent in the environment enables thedevelopment of peaceful relations and can thus present newopportunities to both countries for the protection of human andenvironmental security in the Aegean.

NOTES

1. Jon Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security; Ecological Politics and Policy in theNew Security Era (London and New York: Zed Books, 2001), p. 37.

2. Lester Brown, ‘Redefining National Security’, Worldwatch Paper No. 14 (Washington,DC: Worldwatch, 1977).

3. Richard Ullman, ‘Redefining Security’, International Security, 8, 1, 1983, p. 133.4. Norman Myers, Ultimate Security, The Environmental Basis of Political Stability


(Washington, DC: Island Press, 1996), p. 21.5. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1987).6. OECD, State-of-the-Art Review of Environment, Security and Development Co-operation,

Working paper, February 2000, p. 19.7. Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security, p. 41.8. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 2.9. See, Türkiye Çevre Vakfı, Küresel Komsuluk, Küresel Yönetim Komisyonu’nun Raporu

(Ankara: Çevre Vakfı, 1996).10. Gülnur Aybet, ‘NATO’s Developing Roles In Collective Security’, SAM Papers No. 4/99

(Ankara: Strategic Research Centre, June 1999), p. 89.11. Nesrin Algan and Özlen Künçek, ‘Transboundary Population Movements: Refugees,

Environment and Politics’, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, No. XXVIII,1998, p. 83. According to the AC/UNU Millennium Project Report, ‘Few countrieshave an official definition of environmental security that unifies thought and action.Among the countries that do have definitions are: the Russian Federation and theCommonwealth of Independent States; and the United States which has severalworking definitions and a DoD Directive which includes a programmatic definition.Embassy representatives from Argentina and India indicated that their countries didhave an official definition, but the text had not been received at the time of writing.Respondents in China, Australia and Hungary said their governments werecurrently creating a definition. China considers environmental security under theumbrella of environmental protection.’ See, [http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Senate/4787/millennium/es-exsum.html], 12 March 2001.

12. OECD, ENV/EPOC/GEEI (98) 3/FINAL, Paris, 3 February 1999, p. 4.13. Ibid., p. 5.14. Ibid., pp. 5–14.15. UNEP/GC 6/7, 24 May 1978, p. 393.16. Maguelonne Dejeant-Pons, ’Les Programmes des Mers Régionales: Plan d’Action

Pour la Méditerranée’, Droit Méditerranéen de l’Environnement (Paris: Economica,1988), p. 85.

17. Idem.18. See Aydogan Özman, Birlesmis Milletler Deniz Hukuku Sözlesmesi (I

.stanbul: I

.stanbul

Ticaret Odası, 1984).19. United Nations, Report of the UNCED, A/Conf.151/26, Rio de Janeiro, 3–14 June 1992,

pp. 130–66.20. Idem.21. United Nations, General Assembly Fifty-second Session, Doc. No. A/52/112, 18 March

1997.22. [Http://archimedes.civil.auth.gr/krestenitis/en/aegean.html], (08.02.2003).23. Erdogan Güven, Sibel Çolak and Adem Çolak, ‘Ege Denizi’nde Deniz Balıkları

Yetistiriciligi ve Yeni Türler’, in Bayram Öztürk and Veysel Aysel (eds), Ulusal EgeAdaları 2002 Toplantısı Bildiriler Kitabı (I

.stanbul: Türk Deniz Arastırmaları Vakfı, 2001),

p. 206.24. Ibid., p. 207.25. Idem.26. John G. Walmsley, ‘Biodiversity of the Aegean Islands with Special Reference to

Seabirds and their Habitats’, in International Symposium on Aegean Sea 2000, 5–7 May2000, Bodrum (I

.stanbul: TÜDAV, 2000), p. 77.

27. Idem.28. Bayram Öztürk and Ayaka Amaha Öztürk, ‘Problems related to fisheries and threat-

ened marine species in the Aegean Sea’, in International Symposium on Aegean Sea, p. 35.29. Nesrin Algan, ‘Türk Bogazları’nda Çevresel Güvenlik’, Mülkiye, 26, 234 (2002),

pp. 21–34.


30. ‘Environmental Problems of Greece from a Chemical Point of View’, ChemistryInternational, 22, 1, January 2000, at: [http://www.iupac.org/publications/ci/2000/january/greece2.html], 1 May 2002.

31. Tulio Scovazzi, ‘New Turkish and IMO Regulations for the Turkish Straits’, ICCOPSNewsletter, No. 4, January 1995, p. 14.

32. Ibid., p. 34.33. Ibid., p. 36.34. Idem.35. Ibid., pp. 35–6.36. Mümtaz Soysal, ‘Kusseverlik ve Elenseverlik’, Milliyet, 22 May 1998, p. 13.37. Athens News Agency Bulletin, No. 55, 11 March 1996.38. ‘Ege’de Kus Krizi’, Milliyet, 21 April 1998, p. 3. A comment at the time from the Greek

government spokesman Dimitris Reppas that ‘the [EU] Commission’s decisionconfirms Greek sovereignty over islands Turkey may contest. It strikes two birds withone stone’, clearly indicated that the Turkish media was not too wide of the markabout the real intention behind Greece’s newly-found enthusiasm for the protectionof wild life. As Greece ‘didn’t seem to care much about birds until after the 1996 crisis’,even the director of the World Wildlife Fund’s Athens Office, Dimitris Karavelas,questioned ‘whether the government’s commitment to endangered species is asgreat as its political interests’. See, Time International, 27 April 1988, p. 26.

39. ‘Ege’de Piri Reis Krizi’, Hürriyet, 31 May 2001, at: [http://arsiv.hurriyetim.com.tr/hur/turk/01/05/30/dunya.htm].

40. Came into force in 1978 and has been amended as ‘Barcelona Convention for theProtection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Region of the Mediterranean in1995.

41. See Nesrin Algan, ‘Common International Commitments of Turkey and Greece onthe Protection of the Aegean Sea with Special Reference to the Mediterranean ActionPlan’, in International Symposium on Aegean Sea 2000, pp. 240–4.

42. Ibid., pp. 246–7.


PART III

STABILIZING EXPECTATIONS?

9Negotiations and Deterrence inAsymmetrical Power Situations:

The Turkish-Greek CaseS. GÜLDEN AYMAN

Though Cyprus is often mentioned as the main source of tensionbetween Turkey and Greece, and the total normalization of therelations is unlikely without achieving a durable peace in the island,it has not been the Cyprus problem but the Aegean Sea disputes thatseem to be intractable between the two countries; especially if wetake into account the fact that the parties have neither achieved acommon definition of the problem areas nor agreed upon the waysto resolve them.

Despite the recent rapprochement between the two countries, thedelineation of continental shelf of the Aegean, the extent of Greece’sair space and territorial waters, the militarization of the Aegeanislands in the eastern Aegean and the ownership of uninhabitedislets are the problems in the Aegean that still carry the potential ofdangerous confrontation between Turkey and Greece (see Aydın andBahcheli’s chapters, this volume).

In March 1987 the long-running problem over the location of thecontinental shelf and by extension rights to exploit potential oilreserves under the sea bed had led to a crisis and brought the DavosAgreement to end the crisis. Though both governments agreed inprinciple to pursue a series of confidence-building measures (CBM’s– see Appendix 1), designed to reduce immediate tensions in theAegean and to provide a conflict resolution process, these effortsremained largely unconsummated. Relations were further strainedby the end of 1995 after the Greek parliament ratified the UnitedNation’s Law of Sea (LOS) Resolution. Turkey has not recognized

LOS, stressing that the implementation of this resolution would turn70 per cent of the Aegean into Greek sovereign territory andunacceptably restrict freedom of navigation.1

Turkey and Greece again came to the brink of an armed conflicton 28 January 1996, as a result of a crisis regarding the status of theKardak/Imia Rocks,2 a mere 3.8 miles off the coast of Turkey in theAegean Sea. After the crisis, diplomatic efforts to reduce tension inthe Aegean gained a new momentum and, after months of negoti-ations, on 4 June 1998, Turkey and Greece agreed to a limited set of CBMs proposed by the NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana.Both the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Athens on 27May 1988, and the Guidelines for the Prevention of Accidents andIncidents on the High Seas and International Airspaces signed inI.stanbul on 8 September 1988 (see Appendix 2), oblige the two

countries to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrityand recognize their rights to use the high seas and internationalairspace of the Aegean. They have also agreed to allow NATO a rolein monitoring air sorties over the Aegean. However, similar to theprevious attempts, although both sides agreed to implement thesedeclarations, they were not complied with.

Therefore, this article will argue that in order to understand oneof the major sources of intractability of the Turkish-Greek conflict andthe problems related to the Aegean Sea,3 one needs to examine theoverall asymmetrical perceptions of power, threat and strategicbehaviours affected by these perceptions.

POWER ASYMMETRY AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

In most of the international conflicts the behaviour of the parties vis-à-vis to each other is closely linked with the mutual perceptions ofpower and threat. Especially when the adversaries perceive them-selves unequal in power, it is generally observed that mutuallyacceptable outcomes are quite difficult to obtain.4 However it is noteasy to determine the dynamics behind how relative power distri-bution contributes to the intractability of the international conflicts.In this article, I shall try to examine it in the Turkish-Greek conflictcontext related to the problems in the Aegean. In doing so, I shallpose two questions: How do Turkish and Greek strategic elites5


cognitively construct power and threat; 6 and how do these relativeperceptions affect their strategic behavior vis-à-vis each other?7

A detailed analysis of the Greek-Turkish conflict with a specialemphasis on the Aegean problems could not only provide us withsome clues about the dynamics of asymmetrical power conflicts, butmay also help to determine what might be done more constructivelyfor their resolution.

Perception of Power

In Turkish-Greek relationships, both the Greek and the Turkishstrategic elite understand and interpret power in the same way. Theirconceptualization of power is fundamentally based on what wedefine as the ‘classical components’ (or ‘tangible dimensions’) ofpower. They tend to associate power primarily with military power,size of country and its population. Though economic power com-parisons have also been used in some strategic analyses, especiallyin the 1990s, they have not yet been taken into the consideration tothe same extent as military power or population.

In terms of the classical components of power, Greece and Turkeydo not enjoy the same power status. Furthermore, Greece’s positionviewed by Turkey and by the Greeks themselves is as a ‘low powerstatus’ state or a ‘small state’, while Turkey seems to have a higherpower status vis-à-vis Greece.8 In this regard, Greek strategists oftenstress Greece’s smaller population compared with that of Turkey’s,and Greece’s geography and its comparatively meagre economicresources. While Turkey’s population is approximately 67 million,that of Greece is 10 million. Above all, long-term demographic trendsare more disturbing for Greece. According to a Greek projection,made for 2025, Greece is estimated to have about 10,500,000 peoplewhile Turkey will have 98,700,000. More importantly, Greece’s youngpopulation is decreasing.9 In this light, the perspective of Turkey’sadmission to the European Union was a critical subject of projectionsand debate in the Greek press:

We are a nation which is slowly dying. And if we continue atthis pace, in fifty years we will be an extinct species. WhereasTurkey has a population boom. And it will need no war in orderto re-occupy the whole of Greece. Because, simply, there is a

NEGOTIATION AND DETERRENCE 215

prospect of Turkey’s admission to the European Union. Thismeans a right to free settlement for millions of Turks in theEuropean region that will be called ‘Greece’, but only in the geo-graphical sense. No longer in the ethnic sense … If the Turkishpolitical leadership did not have so many internal problems toconsider necessary for it to preserve Greek-Turkish tensions forinternal consumption, Turkey would have neither threatenednor provoked Greece. On the contrary, it would have done itsbest to persuade [the international community] that it waseligible for inclusion in Europe’s enlargement at the next stage,or even at the stage after, and to exploit the advantage of freemovement and settlement. Among other things, in order toswallow, in the most painless as well as safe manner, Thrace andour islands, and Greece as a whole.10

Especially, when Turkey’s vast numerical superiority is taken asan indicator of sheer manpower, Turkey is perceived as a powerfulcountry, which is able to maintain a huge standing army and con-sequently as a potential threat. In explaining Turkish military threat,Greek strategists argue that manpower limitations make Greecevulnerable to surprise attack and to extended strategies of attrition.11

In addition to the asymmetry in terms of population, it is argued thatcertain characteristics of Turkey’s geographical configuration affectGreek perceptions:

Greek geography hardly lends itself to defensive arrangements.This absence of strategic depth in the east (and the north) andthe tremendous relative length of the border have plaguedGreek strategists for a long time. Geography creates problemsfor Greece in all possible theatres of war with Turkey. Cypruslies 600 miles away from Greece, but only 60 miles from Turkey.Furthermore, major Greek islands are very close to the Turkishmainland. Important Greek population centers and militaryinstallations are within Turkish artillery range.12

Greek disparity of economic resources relative to Turkey isanother dimension of existing asymmetric power perceptions. In this regard, Greece’s small GNP and uneven economic growth asopposed to Turkish growth rate has been a major concern of theGreek strategic elite,13 but these kinds of perceptions seems to have


been alleviated due to Greece’s economic improvement as opposedto the sharp economic crisis that Turkey has confronted in recentyears. According to Economic Intelligence Unit statistics, whileTurkey’s GDP has grown on average by 4 per cent per year since 1980,Greece’s has grown by 2 per cent. However, since 1997 growth inGreece has picked up speed to 3.5 per cent exceeding the EU average.The description of Keridis and Triantaphyllou of Greece and Turkeyas ‘the strongest nations in the South Eastern Europe’ could be givenas an example of a more confident Greek approach with regard toeconomic power comparisons.14

Only from the point of intangible dimensions of power, Greecehas been considered more powerful than Turkey.15 In this respect,particularly two aspects of power have critical importance. The firstone is the ‘social integrational power’ and the second one is the‘relational power’.

In terms of the social integrational power, which refers to a senseof social and ethnic homogeneity of a country, Greece’s perceptionof its power is based upon the belief that Greek society is morehomogeneous and less prone to internal conflict. On the other hand, Greeks perceive Turkey, just the opposite of themselves, as acountry that bears sharp divisions and social cleavages such asIslamists/Laicists and Turks/Kurds. Thus, Turkey is often portrayedas a thoroughly fragmented society and ‘a vulnerable state’, suffusedwith problems: ‘“Turkey is one and indivisible”, say the authoritiesin Ankara under the influence of the success of Öcalan’s arrest.Behind this seeming homogeneity which has become a dogma,however, there lives a multi-ethnic, contradictory and vulnerablecountry … which is confronted with multifarious decline.’ 16 Lateforeign minister Dimitrios Bitsios went even further to state that,‘Turks have complexes towards Greece. They cannot accept thatGreeks progress, and distinguish themselves; that they are Greeks,while they themselves are mere Turks.’17

It is interesting to note that this way of thinking has never beenshared by the Turkish strategic elite. In this vein, the Turkish strategicelite tend to believe that, ‘Greek policy towards Turkey is based upon;a) Dividing Turks on the basis of religion, faith and race; b) TurningIslam into a political issue; [and] c) Impairing Turks’ unity of powerby inciting struggles among brothers … .’18 The Turkish strategic elite,thus, interprets Greece’s rivalry with Turkey as a cure for its domestic


political strife and hence tends to view Greece as a country thatprovokes ethnic divisions with the aim of dividing the Turkishhomeland. It should be stressed that this view has been furtherstrengthened with the Abdullah Öcalan affair. Of particular notewas, the discovery that Greece sheltered the separatist PKK leaderin its embassy in Nairobi – a clear indicator of Greek ‘secret designs’to divide Turkey in the minds of the Turkish society and its strategicelite.19

The second important dimension of intangible power whereGreece has been considered more powerful than Turkey is Greece’s‘relational power’, which derives from its well-established relation-ship especially with the western world. From the Turkish per-spective, Greece is perceived as more powerful than Turkey in this dimension, which is formulated in the minds of Turkish elite as ‘Greece’s ability to activate alliances at the expense of Turkey’snational interests even when it has no right to be defended’.20 TheTurkish strategic elite bases this type of reasoning upon the historyof the loss of Crete after the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Towards the endof the nineteenth century, Crete had been granted self-rule by theOttoman Empire. Soon afterwards the Turkish population of Cretewas either massacred or forced to flee and Crete united with Greece.According to Denktas, ‘The Cretan struggle’ was taken as a modelfor the ‘Cyprus struggle’ as envisaged by the Greek OrthodoxChurch. Denktas quotes Archbishop Makarios’ statement on 8November 1966: ‘Cyprus always draws her inspiration from thestruggles and sacrifices of Crete. The eternal desire of Cyprus is tounite with motherland Greece and fight for Greece. Our only andinvariable aim is Enosis.’ 21 Thus, in the Turkish collective memory ‘theloss of Crete’ constitutes a hidden trauma and it is often mentionedto remind, ‘How Turkey may lose more land even if she wins a battleas long as the interference of outside powers persists to supportGreeks’.22 What is observed here is the use of an historical analogythat seems to affect the Turkish strategic elite’s understanding of theevolution of the Turkish-Greek conflict.

Today, because of the tendency of the international community torecognize the Greek-ruled Cyprus Republic as the sole governmentof the whole island, and its encouragement to enter the EU asopposed to the 1960 accords that forbid Cyprus ‘to participate, inwhole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state’,23


the above reasoning among the Turkish strategic elite seems to bereinforced once more. According to the Turkish perception, byaccepting the Greek Cypriot unilateral application, the EU has takenaway from them any incentive to reach an accommodation with theNorth24 and the Greek Cypriot admission to EU would constitute anEnosis (union with Greece) under a new name. While Turkey andTRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) have strongly objected to the realization of Greek Cypriot membership before a durableresolution is found, Greece and the Greek Cypriots have seen EUmembership as ‘an opportunity to reverse the balance of power byengineering a situation where Turkey is occupying EU territory’.25

The meaning of Greece’s EU membership could better be graspedwhen one examines the discussions held in the Greek press withregard to the Greek cultural superiority: ‘One of the main reasons forthe psychic loss of Ankara is the fact that it is conscious of Greeksuperiority. Greece is not only a member of Europe. It is Europe. Andwithout its consent, Ankara will never be able to pass the thresholdof Europe.’26

The second element of relational power is the parties’ relationshipwith the United States. Paradoxically both Greece and Turkey raisecomplaints about the United States not favouring them as much asthe other. While Turkish grievances seem to be deriving from nothaving a well-integrated group of Turkish-Americans who would actas a strong lobbying force in the United States, Greeks express theirdissatisfaction or disappointment with regard to USA because of notattributing to Greece the same level of strategic value that has beengranted to Turkey or because the US is trying to pursue a policy ofequal distance. As an example of the Greek view, Platias argues that:

External factors have a substantial impact on Greek-Turkishrelations in various direct and indirect ways. The most impor-tant external actor is the US, which has had a strong interest inboth sides. It seems however, that Turkey is systematically con-sidered more important than Greece in the American order ofpriorities. The American involvement is therefore asymmet-rical; in other words, the US tilts in favor of Turkey in almostevery crisis.27

However, according to Conalis-Kontos, the problem is not favour-ing one against the other, but seeking to achieve a delicate balance


between the two: ‘The United States continued to pursue the osten-sible objective of win-win in its relations with Turkey and Greece.Preferring a policy that would not overtly choose one (Turkey) overthe other (Greece), the Americans aimed to have their cake, but eatit too.’28

The relational power assessments have gained new insights in thepost-Cold War era. While Greece’s membership of the EU becomesa deeper strategic concern for Turkey in the phase of enlargement,Turkey’s relations with the US in the Middle East,29 Caucasus andCentral Asia has created anxiety among Greeks. Greeks express theirenvy and worry about the post-Cold War developments that seemto strengthen the United States’ strategic ties with Turkey. Greek‘uneasiness’ stems from the fact that Turkey as a strategic partner ofthe United States would have much more ability to bargain withGreece and realize its goals. In this regard some Greek academicsargue that Turkey is behaving like a police force for US globaldominance: especially Constas’ views Turkey as a ‘client’ of the ‘hege-monic patron’ who is ready to act for the realization of the patron’sgoals:

Turkey, America’s secular Islamic ally, came as a natural choiceof a client state willing to serve as the U.S. policeman in the area,provided that such a joint venture promised to meet economic,strategic, and policy objectives of both client and patron. Unlikebipolarity, the current international system of unipolycentrismor creeping multipolarity strengthens the client’s bargainingpower, especially when a weak state’s position and policies areimportant for the maintenance of the overall balance of power.30

Perception of Threat

In international conflicts, predisposition to perceive threat could betraced to a variety of sources. In the Turkish-Greek case, the deeproots of perceptions of threat are very much linked with how thecommon history of both parties evolved in the past. Whereas Greecehad gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1830, theAnatolian Muslims gained their national identity during theirstruggle with Greek forces that occupied Anatolia in 1922.

At the time of its independence in 1830, Greece consisted of the


Peloponnesus and the adjacent islands in the Aegean Sea and partsof the continental land as far north as Thessaly. From 1849 to 1922,the integration of all lands with a significant Anatolian Greek popu-lation into the newly founded state became the driving force behindirredentist Greek foreign policy, which was called in those days theMegali Idea. Expansion was initiated in 1864 when Great Britaingranted Greece the Ionian Islands. Greece annexed Thessaly in 1881,half of Macedonia, South Epirus and Crete at the Balkan Wars of1912–13. The Turkish elite perceive this mode of expansion, whichtook place in the past, as evidence of how Greece could enlarge itsborders at the expense of Turkey. The maps drawn by the Turkishstrategists still stress the fact that Greece in one century grew eighttimes, as much as the initial size of the Greek Kingdom in 1830.31

However, at this point, it would be wrong to assert that threatperceptions related to Turkish-Greek conflict are automatically deter-mined by memories of the past. On the contrary, in the era of Atatürkand Venizelos, Turkish-Greek relations experienced a relativelypeaceful coexistence in the inter-war period. This atmosphere wasan outcome of both countries’ needs to recover from the damages of war, restore their economies and build their respective nation-states. Furthermore the emergence of new enemies in the Europeanpolitical arena in the inter-war period helped Turkey and Greece tofind ‘a common cause’ to act together. However, even though the twocharismatic leaders perceived the need for peace and took steps tosettle their problems and no major crisis was experienced in that era,the conditions for an enduring peace were hardly created.32

As Bar-Tal stresses, the formal termination of a conflict begins withthe elimination of the perceived incompatibility between opposingparties through negotiation.33 Yet, the establishment of durablepeaceful relations between the opposing parties depends on asuccessful reconciliation process. Such a successful reconciliationprocess requires a change of the ‘conflicting ethos’ and formation ofthe ‘alternative peace ethos’, especially with respect to societal beliefsabout one’s own goals, about the adversary, about the in-group,about inter-group relations, and about the nature of peace.34 Whatwe observe in the Turkish-Greek relations in the inter-war period isthe absence of the evolution of an ‘ethos of peace’ which is a political,social, cultural and educational process involving all the societalinstitutions and channels of communication.


Like an illness which erupts again in times of weakness, all uneasyfeelings of Turks and Greeks towards each other that were kept undercontrol in the inter-war period came out as a result of what happenedin Cyprus from the late 1950s onward. British rule in Cyprus wasended in 1960 by the new constitution that vested sovereignty jointlyin the two communities.35 However, as many Greek Cypriotsregarded the settlement as biased against them, in 1963 they drovethe Turks out of their positions in the government. As inter-communal violence flared, Turkish Cypriots called on the guarantorpowers to intervene. Turkey as a guarantor power appealed toGreece and Great Britain to join it in a concerted effort to end thebloodshed in the island. Greece, being deeply involved in the GreekCypriot leaders’ plot aimed at destroying the bi-communality of thestate and abrogating the agreements which had created that state,refused to help. Great Britain, with her large British community ofresidents in predominantly Greek areas and her military bases atstake, did not wish to intervene. In 1974, supporters of Enosis stageda coup. When Britain did not want to get involved, Turkey inter-vened in the island.

Turks and Greeks draw different lessons from the Cyprus conflictthat have a deep impact on their present strategic behaviours. ForTurks, what happened in Cyprus was the most important proof ofthe fact that Megali Idea was not dead, and that Greeks will exploitany window of opportunity in order to expand their borders. Sincethen Turkish strategy focused on preventing Greek attempts, aimingat taking territorial concessions from Turkey. While for the Turks, theGreek threat is mostly associated with unprovoked acts aiming atrealizing ‘the secret designs’ related to Megali Idea, for the Greeks theTurkish threat is primarily defined as a direct ‘military threat’.36 Whenthe ethnic clashes and an aborted coup designed by the Greekmilitary Junta in Cyprus resulted in Turkish military intervention, itwas perceived by the Greeks as an evidence of Turkey’s aggressiveintentions and her military capacity of carrying out these intentions(see Heraclides and Bahcheli’s chapters).

In defining the Turkish military threat, Greek analysts also referto Turkish military expenditures and armament acquisitions as anindicator of Turkish aggressive intentions, though Greece is not theonly quarter for which Turkish military build-up is designed. How-ever, as Papasotiriou correctly stresses in accordance with the Turkish


military scenarios, Greece is one of the potential enemies at whichthe military plans are directed:

Turkish armaments are motivated in part by factors extraneousto Greek-Turkish relations, being largely aimed at deterring theSyrian threat to Turkey and fighting the Kurdish insurrection in Southeast Turkey. It is thus by no means the case that theincreasing Turkish military spending is exclusively motivatedby the Greek-Turkish disputes. Greek military spending, by wayof contrast, is primarily driven by the growth of Turkish arma-ments and the need to limit Turkish military superiority vis-à-vis Greece.37

In addition to this, it is important to note that Greece’s threatperceptions do not simply derive from military power comparisonsmade between Turkey and Greece, but they are also the result of aninevitable outcome of the imbalance between Greek and Turkishpower in general. A closer look at Greek concerns may even lead usto think that all the elements of Turkish power are likely to beperceived as a threat to Greece. Foremost of all, in the Greekperception of the Turkish threat, the size of the population is a criticalissue. In the definition of threat what we also observe is that whileTurkish concerns are mostly related to ‘further loss of land’ and‘encirclement’, Greek threat perceptions could be summarized as afear of Turkish ‘occupation’. This could be interpreted as the parties’attribution of different level of intensities to their conflict. For Greece,the Turkish threat is a threat directed to her ‘survival’, for Turkey, theGreek threat is to her ‘territorial integrity’. Nonetheless it is quiteimportant to note that the power asymmetries held by Turkey are notautomatically translated into a strong sense of security for Turkey.

Despite these differences in the definition of threat, what weobserve in the Turkish-Greek case is that both sides perceive eachother as intending to disrupt the status quo whenever a window ofopportunity appears. Similar to Turkish strategic thinking, Greekanalysts also tend to think that Turkey is likely to adopt a fait accomplidiplomacy against Greece when the following two preconditions arefulfilled: 1) the opening of the ‘window of vulnerability’ for Greece,that is, when Greece will not be capable or willing to resist Turkishencroachment; and 2) the opening of the ‘window of opportunity’


for Turkey, that is, when it is unlikely that major powers with interestsin the region will oppose a Turkish invasion.38

STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR 39

The strategic behaviour of Turkey and Greece is closely related totheir perceptions of power and threat. To overcome the threats per-ceived, while Turkey relies on her own capabilities to deter Greece,for Greece empowerment through allies is the most fundamentalelement of its strategy against Turkey.40

Turkish Strategy

Turkish strategy towards Greece is mainly twofold. On the one hand,it is based on maintaining a strong military deterrence to overcomethe Greek efforts to challenge the status quo. In this respect, weobserve that the Kardak/Imia crisis has further reinforced Turkishstrategic behaviour patterns. The crisis ended when Greece faced thechoice to wage war or to reach a political solution. As Greece decidedto withdraw its forces from the rocks after Turkish commandos hadlanded on the islet, ‘coercive diplomacy’ has gained further credi-bility in Turkish eyes. On the limits of territorial waters, Turkey hassimilarly adopted a clear deterrent strategy by warning that an exten-sion of territorial limits from a 6-mile to a 12-mile would constitute acasus belli.

On the other hand, Turkish strategy is also grounded oncontinuous efforts to find durable solutions through negotiations.41

It is frequently stated that Turkey is ready to enter into negotiationswith Greece, with a view to determine the possession of smallislands, islets and rocks in the Aegean and to find lasting solutions toall problem areas in the Aegean that are closely interlinked with eachother.42 Aslan Gündüz clarifies what Turkey means by the term‘interlinked’:

The outcome of one would necessarily affect that of the others.For example, a judicial settlement of the continental shelf dis-pute alone is likely to affect the future of other differences. If thecontinental shelf dispute and the territorial waters dispute are


not addressed as a package, any further extension of the terri-torial waters in the Aegean by one party (read Greece) wouldconsiderably diminish the area of the continental shelf to whichthe other party may be entitled to make a claim (read Turkey).Extension of Greek territorial waters would adversely affect theposition of the parties with regard to the other disputes. Forexample, this would affect the future of fishery rights or exclu-sive economic zone rights over the continental shelf of anotherstate …43

Turkey also suggests that the parties should, in the meantime,refrain from any unilateral act that would aggravate the situation inthe region. In contrast, Greece advocates that there is no problem inthe Aegean between Turkey and Greece other than the delimitationof the continental shelf, which should be resolved only throughrecourse to the International Court of Justice.44 Contrary to Greekview, Turkey argues that the present tension in the Aegean cannot beexplained only with the existence of the continental shelf problem asargued by Greece. Therefore, Turkey opposes the Greek acknow-ledgement of only one of these problems and neglect of the others,as well as Greece’s support of only one means for a solution in aselective manner. According to the Turkish view, this is not a viableoption for the peaceful settlement of all these issues.

Turkey believes that all problems should be addressed ‘as a whole’together ‘within the whole range of means’ for their peacefulsolutions. In this vein, Turkey proposes that all of the Aegean prob-lems should be addressed as soon as possible to work out mutuallyagreed methods for their solution. They should therefore approachtogether the whole range of procedural solutions without prejudice(see below). These means are enumerated in Article 33 of the UNCharter, namely, negotiation, good offices, conciliation, mediation,arbitration and recourse to the International Court of Justice. Turkeyconsiders each of these means referred to by international law asbeing equally acceptable.

Greek Strategy

What is common to both states’ perspectives is the dominance of thelogic of deterrence that is closely linked with possessing strong


military power. While for Turkey, the only means to stop the blood-shed in Cyprus, for example, is to prevent its annexation (i.e. Enosis)to Greece, and the way to deter Greek attempts of a similar characteris to have a strong military deterrence; for Greeks, the only way toencounter Turkish military threat is to extend Greece’s militarydeterrence to Cyprus.45

Whereas for Turkey ‘security’ means something to be attainedthrough ‘deterrence’ based on coercive power, for Greece, this poweritself is the essence of the threat that is perceived. However, since‘security could not only be achieved by the internal efforts alone, thusempowerment of Greece through allies becomes a serious necessity’.As Stearns points out, ‘the major preoccupation of Greek foreignpolicy since independence has been to improve her strategic positionrelative to that of Turkey … Greece perceived a strong need for alliesand has taken no major initiative that was not directly or indirectly,intended to create a more favorable balance of power with Turkey’.46

Greece’s search for allies has gained new dimensions in the post-Cold War era as the two adversarial blocs disappeared. On the onehand, the disappearance of the Soviet Union created a more flexibleatmosphere for Greece to develop strategic alignments with powerspreviously viewed as the enemies of the western block. Greece’sefforts to build strategic alignments, particularly with Syria, Iran andArmenia, however, have become important security concerns forTurkey.47

Greece’s reliance on building alliances to counter Turkey’s poweris very much in line with the assumptions put forward on thebehaviour of ‘small states’ by the neo-realist theory. Accordingly, itis more important for the small states to join alliances because theycannot attain their central values alone, and their success inachieving their aims depends less on their own capabilities than onthe strength of an alliance. In this context, it is assumed that eventhough small states are generally incapable of fully controlling andtransforming institutional agendas, they endeavour to persuade theAlliance to adopt their perspective of the struggle.48

Greece’s assistance to the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) could alsobe discussed in the same context as another strategy of small powers.As Kaminaris underlines, the purpose of this assistance aimed atequalizing the power balances between Greece and Turkey andgaining concessions from a weakened Turkey.49 As opposed to Greek


efforts to move the Greek-Turkish issues into the contexts of Greece’srelationships with other countries in an attempt to balance outTurkey, the latter keeps on trying to engage Greece alone with acontinuous effort to achieve mutual satisfactory solutions.

Turkish Initiatives

Turkey has been exerting numerous efforts to reach a commonunderstanding on the Aegean problems and to develop its relationswith Greece. The recent initiatives of Turkey regarding the AegeanSea are as follows:

� Turkish Premier’s opening to Greece in 1996 in which Turkeyaccepts third-party solutions, to be based on mutual consent, forthe overall settlement of all Aegean issues.

� The Turkish appeals to start contacts on all levels and to initiatecooperation with Greece.

� The support that Turkey has rendered to the Group of Wise Menestablished between the two countries, in May 1997 for thepurpose of seeking possible solutions for all Aegean issues in aninformal and non-binding manner.

� Turkey’s efforts for the realization of the Madrid Declaration of 8July 1998.

� Turkey’s proposal to fully implement the 1988 confidence-building measures (CBMs) package in the Aegean and to furthersupplement them with the new CBMs (see Appendix 1).

� Turkey’s favourable approach to the US, Dutch and Luxembourginitiatives, formulated to settle all the Aegean issues.

� Turkish proposals to Greece in February and March 1998.

Yılmaz’s Initiative in March 1996

On 23 March 1996, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Mesut Yılmaz, announcedthat he wanted to see a ‘Peace Process’ launched to resolve thetensions between Greece and Turkey; it was immediately turneddown by the former Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos,who, when asked about his reaction to Prime Minister Yılmaz’s offerfor a dialogue said; ‘The call for dialogue, in general, is rubbish!’ 50


This was not the first time that Turkey has made a démarche toGreece over the Aegean. In 1985, the late President Turgut Özalformulated an opening towards Greece, suggesting that the twocountries should find areas on which they could cooperate and tryto place their disputes on the back burner. The initiative, which wasmuch more elaborate than any of its predecessors, aimed at creatinga new approach for the improvement of Turkish-Greek relations inthe longer term. The important dimensions of this initiative were asfollows:

� Mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Turkeyenvisaged a whole range of possible instruments for a peacefulsettlement. It was not ruling out any third-party settlement.

� A Political Framework. Turkey wished to see the two sides producea common document, which could serve as the basis for a friendlyworking relationship. According to Turkey this could be achievedin the form of a Political Document or Declaration to be finalizedby the two countries or through an Agreement of Friendship andCooperation.

� A New Security Framework to help define military and defenceaspects of the relationship between Turkey and Greece. It wasthought of as a programme of confidence-building measures formilitary activities.

� A Code of Conduct that would lay down the ground rules for theday-to-day activities of the two sides. According to this, each sidewould refrain from statements or actions likely to generate hostileemotions and would encourage an atmosphere of cooperation todevelop.

From Turkey’s point of view, the démarche to Greece over theAegean in 1985 was one of the most radical Turkey had taken inrelations with Greece for nearly three decades. Turkey’s stance hasbeen that problems with Greece should be resolved through dialogueand direct negotiations. With this initiative Turkey was accepting thefact that the use of ‘third-party methods’ may also have a role to play.

What is equally important is that Turkey was trying to create a ‘pre-negotiation process’. Instead of beginning this process withformal negotiations, Turkey was proposing that at the initial stage,


the two sides could hold non-binding exploratory talks to develop aworking relationship and narrow the differences between them. Thisprocess was thought to define the areas and issues under dispute,review the range of third-party mechanism available for each par-ticular issue, and decide whether a ‘global’ approach is possible orwhether different mechanisms would be required, and identify theprecise results which may be expected from each third-partymechanism and consider fully the legal aspects and other con-sequences of resorting to particular third-party mechanisms.

Other Turkish Proposals

Most recently, on 12 February 1998 Turkey, through a verbal notepresented to the Greek government, called for the settlement of allthe Aegean problems by peaceful means and proposed to convene ahigh-level meeting between the two Foreign Ministries before theend of March 1998.51 The UN Secretary-General, the Secretary-General of NATO and the NATO members were informed about thisinitiative. The proposal contained the following:

� Jointly identifying the Aegean problems between the twocountries.

� Formalizing the ‘Madrid Declaration’ of 8 July 1997, which wasagreed upon by Turkey and Greece with the initiative of the USSecretary of State, Mrs M. Allbright.

� Developing and mutually implementing the ‘Confidence-BuildingMeasures in the Aegean’ with the collaboration of the NATOSecretary-General.

� Jointly initiating the Personalities Group process, composed ofrespected Turkish and Greek personalities assigned to come upwith proposals concerning the resolution of bilateral problemsbetween the two countries.

� Upon the positive reply from the Greek government to the Turkishinitiative, convening a high-level meeting between the twoForeign Ministries to discuss these proposals, before the end ofMarch 1998, either in Ankara or in Athens.52

Following up its first initiative, Turkey presented a second verbalnote to the Ambassador of Greece in Ankara on 11 March 1998. It


brought the ‘Turkish government’s constructive approach for initi-ating a process of peaceful settlement of disputes between Turkeyand Greece’ to the attention of the Greek government once again.53

On the same day, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, I.smail Cem,

also sent a letter to his Greek counterpart and invited him to Ankarato take up certain issues that could lead to a first step in resolving theproblems between the two countries. Greece initially adopted anegative attitude by rejecting these proposals through the letter ofthe Greek Foreign Minister on 19 March 1998.54

Though Turkey has prepared detailed proposals about themechanisms, which might be set up in order to create an effectivedialogue between the two countries, Greece has always been reluc-tant to enter into negotiations with Turkey until recently when itseemed to change its policy. Turkish offers in this sense tend toremain fruitless, as Greece had thought that the very acceptance ofnegotiations meant a concession from its sovereign rights, like‘accepting a defeat right from the beginning’. However, after the riseof G. Papandreou to power in the Greek foreign ministry, andespecially after the devastating earthquakes which hit both countriesone after another, Greece has been gradually shifting its line of argu-ment. In fact, Papandreou’s acceptance of Cem’s latest proposals,after presenting it back to Cem in a slightly different way in his letterof 25 June 1999, started the latest rapprochement process, which infact, is in line with the 1985 Özal proposals.

Third-Party Involvement

One way of dealing with intractable conflicts, like the Turkish-Greekcase, could be the mediation of a third party. US efforts to mediateGreek-Turkish conflict increased after the Kardak/Imia crisis broughtthe two countries to the brink of war. American diplomacy was notonly involved actively in crisis diplomacy in order to prevent theparties from waging an unintended war, but also tried to lead aprocess of reconciliation between Greece and Turkey.

Finally, at the NATO Summit in Madrid in July 1997, the UnitedStates was able to set up a top-level meeting between Greece andTurkey resulting in a declaration of intentions. The rapprochementengineered by the US aimed at creating a ‘pre-negotiation process’by creating an atmosphere of confidence-building and enhancing


mutual understanding. A six-point goodwill declaration was signedwhich included the commitment to ‘refrain from unilateral acts onthe basis of mutual respect’ and ‘to settle disputes without the threatof force’:

1. A mutual commitment to peace, security and the continuingdevelopment of good neighbourly relations.

2. Respect for each other’s sovereignty.

3. Respect for the principles of international law and internationalagreements.

4. Respect for each other’s legitimate, vital interests and concerns inthe Aegean which are of great importance for the parties’ securityand national sovereignty.

5. Commitment to refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of mutualrespect and willingness to avoid conflicts arising from misunder-standing.

6. Commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means based onmutual consent and without the use or threat of force.55

The Madrid declaration is a guiding document that contains acommitment to refrain from unilateral acts and the threat of force;hence it is directly related to the preservation of the 6-mile territorialwaters until an agreement is reached between Turkey and Greece.When Greece promises to refrain from unilateral acts, Turkey has noneed to stress the casus belli, which has incorrectly been interpretedas a threatening stance.

The Madrid declaration, like all previous attempts aimed atimproving perceptions of security across the Aegean Sea, had beenshort-lived.56 One explanation of the failure of third-party efforts isthat, in the Turkish-Greek case, as seen in most of the intractableconflicts, parties are more likely to accept a negotiation process underthe guidance of a third party whenever a mutually ‘hurting stale-mate’ exists.57 In the Turkish-Greek case ‘hurting stalemate’ hasimportant implications for third-party mediation efforts becauseonly during crisis periods is the urgent need for American involve-ment felt strongly. As soon as the critical moment is over, the willing-ness to invite the US to guide a peace process disappears. This is especially valid for Greece as it is more suspicious of American


mediation, since Greece believes that this mediation is biased, andthat therefore it will work for the benefit of Turkey. If we take Greekcomplaints about the emergence of a unipolar world into consider-ation,58 then it would be more understandable why American medi-ation is not perceived sufficient for reassuring Greece. Secondly,Greece does not support American mediation because it perceivesbetter alternative ways of defending its interests.59 Contrary to theTurkish tendency to argue that Turkish-Greek differences couldbetter be overcome under the auspices of NATO rather than by directUS mediation, Greece prefers to discuss the Aegean problems in EUplatforms, where Turkey is not a member. During the discussions onthe Turkish-EU partnership document, Greece demanded the inclu-sion of terms it wants used regarding the Aegean and Cyprus issues.

Since the role of a third party as a ‘mediator’ is quite limited, thereal impetus for a change in the conflict situation has to come fromthe parties to conflict. In this context, in dealing with conflicts thatcontain asymmetrical power situations, it is largely assumed that itwould be more appropriate for the party that has been perceived ashaving a high power status to take some initiatives in order to createan atmosphere of conciliation because it experiences more confi-dence. Regarding the Aegean problems, Turkey has been trying suchan approach for a long time without much success. Although someof her gestures received the sympathy of the Greek public, the effectsof these initiatives were limited.

A NEW ERA IN TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS

Greek-Turkish relations were strained further when Abdulah Öcalan,leader of the PKK, was captured after sheltering in Greece’s embassyin Kenya in February 1999. However, the Öcalan affair contributedin an important way to the shift in Greek policy. First it highlightedthe failure of Greece’s policy towards Turkey and consequently itgave more important room for manoeuvre to those within the Greekgovernment who believed that Greece’s political profile could beimproved more by following legal rules and norms governinginternational relations. This new approach favoured conciliation to defend Greece’s rights and interests vis-à-vis Turkey. It led to theresignation of Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos and to the


emergence of a new leadership in the Foreign Ministry headed bythe former alternate Foreign Minister George Papandreou. WhileTurkey was debating how Greece’s support for the PKK could bebrought up in international platforms, the Simitis governmentmoved fast to clean the debris of the Öcalan affair. A relaxation inrelations with Turkey was immediately needed, first because of theTurkish accusations related to the Greek support of terrorism, andsecondly because Simitis was seeking to repair Greece’s relationswith the EU and to make Greece’s entry into the Economic andMonetary Union a top priority. Only eight months after Greece wasaccused by Turkey of supporting terrorism, Athens decided to lift its opposition to Turkey’s EU candidacy. Helsinki represented acarefully balanced package of benefits because, in return for its moreaccommodating stance toward Turkey, Greece achieved two impor-tant foreign policy objectives. First, the EU agreed that a Cyprussettlement would not be a precondition for Nicosia’s accession to theEU, and, secondly, the EU stated that all candidates must take anyterritorial disputes to the International Court of Justice and at TheHague if the parties fail to resolve their disputes by 2004.

However, it is not possible to explain Turkish-Greek rapproche-ment only by rational calculations based on interest. The creation ofa new era in Turkish-Greek relations was also a product of the mutualsuffering that was felt after the devastating earthquakes. WhenTurkey was hit by an earthquake in August 1999, Greece was quickto join international efforts to provide rescue and help the victims,and Turks did the same when Greece was struck in September 1999.As both parties had sent rescue teams to help each other, theirgestures were greeted by waves of ecstatic publicity and popularemotion in the press and among the masses.

Intractable conflicts usually require two interdependent pro-cesses of reconciliation. The first is the formal termination of theconflict, which begins with the elimination of the perceived incom-patibility between opposing parties through negotiation. The secondis the psychological process, which requires the formation of a newweb of relations of peaceful coexistence based on mutual trust, co-operation and consideration of each other’s needs. What we observein the Turkish-Greek case is the initiation of a psychological phase ofreconciliation before the formal termination of the conflict, as a resultof the earthquakes that hit both countries during 1999.


It is interesting to note that none of the conciliatory actionspreviously taken by either side was capable of creating such anatmosphere of ‘empathy’ as the earthquakes have achieved. In anatmosphere where conciliatory actions could not be easily attributedto self-interest (hence perceived as sincere and voluntary), they were more easily reciprocated.60 In this vein, what is also importantto note is that the Turkish-Greek empathy has developed in asituation where the pre-existing images did not fit the actual reality.Particularly, the desperate situation of the Turks seems to pave theway towards a mutual understanding and sharing of the pain. ManyGreeks saw Turks, for the first time, not as a ‘powerful enemy’ but ashuman beings. While Turks were more easily treated as ‘friends’when they appeared on TV as ‘victims’, equally Greeks suddenlybecame most beloved friends of Turks when they ran to their help indifficult times.

A Fragile Peace

Though both countries benefited highly from the rapprochementprocess which followed the earthquakes, relations became tenseagain by a new crisis during NATO’s Destiny Glory 2000 MilitaryExercises, which was planned to be carried out in Doganbey andSaros Bay in the Aegean Sea, Western Anatolia and Eastern Mediter-ranean between 9 and 25 October 2000. The disagreement stemmedfrom the intent of Greek planes to fly in the air corridors over theLimnos and Ikaria islands. Turkey opposed this by arguing that theseislands should have a demilitarized status in accordance with theLausanne Treaty, thus, the air corridors around the islands should beleft out of the manoeuvres. As Greek jets entered this air space,Turkish planes took off to intercept them. Ankara warned that suchincidents could lead to unwanted consequences. Upon this warning,Greece requested that the NATO manoeuvres be cancelled. WhenNATO refused, Greece unilaterally withdrew its planes and otherforces just as the manoeuvres were concluding.61

Turkish authorities believe that Greece tried to use this manoeuvreas an opportunity to have its position on the islands’ status, one ofthe Aegean issues, accepted de facto. Thus, Ankara’s harsh reply wasaimed at preventing this, showing that Turkey will not allow a fait


accompli.62 In essence, this new crisis was a result of the fact thatalthough Turkey and Greece are experiencing a de-escalation period,none of the core problems have been resolved yet between them andtherefore the relations could again deteriorate very easily.

As the relations became tense again, the Greek government toyedwith the idea of freezing a series of agreements (focused on coopera-tion against terrorism and organized crime, cooperation in tourism,encouragement of mutual investments, cooperation in environ-mental protection, cooperation in science and technology, assistancebetween the Customs Administrations, cooperation in maritimetrade, economic and cultural cooperation), which had been sub-mitted to the Greek parliament. However, the idea was droppedquickly after the two foreign ministers met in Budapest in May 2001,decided to continue with the dialogue, and agreed to bring theconfidence-building measures on their agenda that would be imple-mented under the supervision of NATO. Furthermore, Greece andTurkey set 12 March 2002 as the starting date of their dialogue processaimed at solving the Aegean disputes after the two foreign ministers,I.smail Cem of Turkey and George Papandreou of Greece had

declared in February 2002 in I.stanbul that they had agreed upon

talks. Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman Panos Beglitis describedthe talks as being an exchange of views ‘without an agenda’, andspecified that they would not be negotiations.63

However, with the resignation of Turkish Foreign Minister, I.smail

Cem, one of the strong proponents of the Greek-Turkish rapproche-ment, and appointment of hawkish Sükrü Sina Gürel for ministry,shortly before the country plunged into domestic political upheavalleading up to general elections in November, the dialogue betweenthe two countries slackened. Although the new governmentestablished by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve KalkınmaPartisi – AKP) after the elections has seemed welcoming furtherconciliation with Greece, both in the Aegean and Cyprus, last-minutehectic diplomacy for Turkey’s EU membership before the Copen-hagen Summit in December 2002, and the raising crisis over Iraq’sfuture since then, have distracted Turkey from due attention to itsdialogue with Greece. Thus, the low-key dialogue between foreignministry bureaucrats, though continued, has not produced sub-stantial results as of February 2003.


CONCLUSION

Research on mutual perceptions and other psychological processesin international conflict has generally focused on parties who enjoyequal or close to equal power relations. An underlying assumptionof many studies is that whatever social psychological dynamics applyto one party, applies to the other as well. Usually, it is assumed thatthe enemy perceptions held by one party and the psychologicalprocesses that support them are the mirror image of the other side.However, an examination of differential power situations, as in theTurkish-Greek conflict, does not support this thinking fully, as eachparty brings to the conflict different motivations, concerns, percep-tions and analyses.

What is interesting in the Turkish-Greek case is the emergence ofan ‘incomplete mirror image’. The factors that are perceived asindicators of a threat in Greece (i.e. Turkey’s military power, size ofTurkish population, etc.) reassure Turkey against what is perceivedin Turkey as Greek secret designs, aiming at further division ofTurkish land. The factors that threaten Turks on the other hand (e.g.,Greek support for PKK, Greece’s alliance with Syria and Armenia)hardly matter for the Greeks.

The Turkish-Greek case shows us that the differential powerstatus affects the perceptions of power, threat and the intensity ofconflict, thus to a certain extent determining the strategic behaviourof the parties in conflict. For Turkey it encourages enhancement ofpower to deter Greece, whereas for Greece, it reinforces quest forallies and indirect ways of weakening the power of its adversary.

Greece is reluctant to deal with Turkey directly round a negoti-ating table, and attempts resolve issues by making their bilateralproblems the problems of her allies. On the other hand, as Turkey’sfeeling of security is strongly linked with its military power, and asTurkey believes that Greece tries to encircle it, it tends to rely andinvest more in its power to deter multiple threats and this in turnmay become a greater source of threat perception for Greece.

Besides, what is interesting to observe in the Turkish-Greek case is that particular efforts to redress asymmetric powerdistribution further complicates the problems between Turkey andGreece by introducing new dimensions, as in the case of the


Greek government’s support for PKK, and Greek-Syrian and Greek-Armenian cooperation.

Power asymmetry is a characteristic generally considered non-conducive to negotiation as the weaker party tries to prevent a face-to-face confrontation. Yet, in the Aegean case it is not clear whetherthe assumed existence of an asymmetry or a BATNA blocks thenegotiation process. What we observe is the presence of a ‘viciouscircle’ that is not easy to get rid of, even with the involvement of themain actor of the international system. In the Turkish-Greek case,related to the Aegean, only in crisis situations when a mutual ‘hurtingstalemate’ is felt, is there room for an American involvement. ThoughAmerican diplomatic initiatives may avert war between Turkey andGreece, such limited crisis management tactics cannot be relied uponto resolve the Turkish-Greek conflict. Adopting a comprehensive setof CBMs may decrease the likelihood of an accidental outbreak ofhostilities. However, the disagreements in the Aegean would stillcontinue to induce violence and cause instability if the problemswere not defined and resolved permanently.

NOTES

1. See, Yüksel I.nan, ‘Introduction: The Effects of the Entry into Force of the 1982 Law

of the Sea Convention on 12 Miles Territorial Sea Limit’, in Seyfi Tashan (ed.), AegeanIssues: Problems – Legal and Political Matrix (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute,September 1995); Hüseyin Pazarcı, ‘Ege Denizindeki Türk-Yunan SorunlarınınHukuki Yönü’, in Semih Vaner (ed.), Türk-Yunan Uyusmazlıgı (I

.stanbul: Metis, 1989),

pp. 106–26; Aydogan Özman, ‘Ege’de Karasuları Sorunu’, Siyasal Bilgiler FakültesiDergisi, XIII (July–December 1988), pp. 176ff.; Sule Günes, ‘12 Mil Sorunu ve Ege’ninYarı-Kapalı Statüsü’, Dıs Politika, VI, 1 (April 1995), pp. 73–95; Tozun Bahcheli,‘Turkish Policy towards Greece’, in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds), Turkey’sNew World (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001),pp. 131–52.

2. For analyses of Kardak/Imia crisis, see Gülden S. Ayman, ‘Bir Krizin Anatomisi:Kardak’, Foreign Policy (Turkish edition), 2 (1998), pp. 111–12; Gülden S. Ayman,‘Kardak (Imia) Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations’, Etudes Helleniques/Hellenic Studies,9, 2 (Automne/Autumn, 2001), pp. 49–72.

3. I prefer to use the term ‘conflict’ rather than ‘dispute’ for Turkish-Greek relationshipto stress the intractability of the problems. As John Burton argues, disputes aresituations in which the issues are negotiable, there can be compromise, and therefore,do not involve consideration of altered institutions and structures. Conflicts, on theother hand, are problems that are likely to be ‘intractable, and to lead to behaviorsthat seriously prejudice the physical and psychological security and the futuredevelopment of individuals, groups, societies or nations concerned’. John Burton,Conflict: Resolution and Prevention (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 2.

4. See, Louis Kriesberg, Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts, 1990–1991


Annual Report (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, SyracuseUniversity, 1991).

5. The term ‘strategic elite’ is different from that of ‘decision making elite’ in the sensethat it does not only comprise the government and the bureaucrats but alsoacademics and experts that both reflect and influence the state’s vision.

6. This article will examine the sense of threat that parties to conflict experience, notnecessarily threats that parties make or use.

7. See, Nadim N. Rouhana and Suzan Fiske, ‘Perception of Power, Threat, and ConflictIntensity in Asymmetric Inter-group Conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIL, 1(March 1995), pp. 49–81.

8. Especially, according to the dominant Greek strategic evaluation, any comparison interms of the capabilities between Turkey and Greece is sufficient to put Greece into‘small states’ category. See, Dimitri Constas, ‘Systemic Influences on a Weak, AlignedState in the Post-1974 Era’, in Dimitri Constas (ed.), The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the1990s: Domestic and External Influences (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 57–72.

9. Michael C. Geokas, ‘The Demographic Problem in Greece’, Point of View, at:[http://www.saeamerica.org/view/geokas/demographic.html].

10. Adesmeftos Typos, 13 September 1997, in Mariana Lenkova, ‘Positive and NegativeStereotypes of Internal Minorities and Neighboring Peoples in the Greek Press’,Balkan Neighbours Newsletter, 6 (1997), p. 46.

11. See, Athanassios G. Platias, ‘Greece’s Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy andDeterrence’, in Constas, The Greek-Turkish Conflict, pp. 91–105.

12. See Athanassios G. Platias, ‘Greek Deterrence Strategy’, at: [http://www.idis.gr/people/platias.html].

13. As an example, see Charalambos Papasotiriou, ‘The Dynamics of Greek-TurkishStrategic Interaction’ at: [http://www.idis.gr/people/papasot.html], pp. 2–3.

14. Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, ‘Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era ofEuropean Integration and Globalization’, in Dimitris Keridis and DimitriosTriantaphyllou (eds), Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization (Virginia:Brassey’s, 2001), pp. xvi–xxii. For economic indicators and measures for structuraleconomic reform in the Greek economy, see Greece in the World, A Global View of Foreignand Security Policy (Athens: Greek Ministry of Press and Mass Media, 1999), pp. 21–4.

15. As Zartman points out, tangible dimensions of power constitute ‘the most narrowlystructuralist definition of power seen as a possession, something a party “has” andtherefore something easily portrayed in distribution’. See William I. Zartman, ‘TheStructure of Negotiation’, in Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.), International Negotiation,Analysis, Approaches, Issues (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1991), p. 68. However, if weare going to examine power relationship among international actors as it happens inthe Turkish-Greek case, we need to consider all types of power that seem to beaffecting parties in conflict.

16. Ta Nea, 8 March 1999, in Dia Anagnostou, ‘Positive and Negative Stereotypes ofInternal Minorities and Neighboring Peoples in the Greek Press’, Balkan NeighborsNewsletter, 9 (1999), p. 23.

17. Kathimerini, 9 May 1995, in Panayotis Dimitras, ‘Image of Balkan Peoples in GreekPress’, Balkan Neighbours Newsletter, 3 (1995), p. 7.

18. Yücel Aktar (eds), Türk-Yunan I.liskileri ve Megalo-Idea (Ankara: Genel Kurmay

Baskanlıgı Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüd Baskanlıgı, 1975).19. For a Turkish view of the Greek support for terrorism, see Cem Basar, The Terror

Dossier and Greece (I.stanbul: International Affairs Agency, 1993); and Greece and PKK

Terrorism (Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999).20. Manisalı, expresses current Greece’s diplomatic capacity in these words: ‘Especially,

after Turkey had signed the Customs Union Agreement with the European Union,Greece got a chance to play cat and mouse with Turkey … It would be a big mistakeif we perceive Greece as a country with a population of 10.5 million living under thethreat of Turkey. If we take its political, social and cultural and its commercial


influence all around the world, it would be much fairer to evaluate it as a Mediter-ranean country which has the same influence as a country of 50 million.’ See, ErolManisalı, ‘Türkiye Sertlesmeli’, Yeni Safak, 25 Ekim 1997, p. 9; and Erol Manisalı,‘Yunanistan Krizi Neden Tırmandırıyor?’, Cumhuriyet, 4 October, 1997, p. 8. For acomprehensive analysis of Greece’s national power, see Türk-Yunan I

.liskilerinin Dünü,

Bugünü, Yarını (I.stanbul: Harp Akademileri Komutanlıgı Yayını, 1994), pp. 129–49.

21. Rauf R. Denktas, The Cyprus Triangle (New York: The Office of the Turkish Republicof Northern Cyprus, 1988), p. 19 and p. 161, footnote 2.

22. As an expression of this view see, Mümtaz Soysal, ‘Kıbrıs Sorununa Yönelik ÇözümÖnerileri’, in Kıbrıs Sempozyumu (I

.stanbul: Harp Akademileri Basım Evi, 1998), p. 214.

23. The clear wording of the second paragraph of Article 1 of the 1960 Treaty of Guaranteeprohibits inter alia, the participation of the Republic of Cyprus ‘in whole or in part,in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever’. See A. P. Blausteinand G. H. Flanz, Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Cyprus (New York: OceanaPublications, 1972).

24. At the beginning of the 1990s the outlines of a deal began to emerge: Turkish Cypriotswould relinquish some territory in return for recognition as equal partners in a bi-zonal federation. But, once the Greek Cypriots realized they could treat with the EUon their own, they lost interest in the talks.

25. Brussels has been bullied into accepting this problem by Greece’s threat to veto anyenlargement of the EU. This once again reinforced the Turkish view that Greece’salignment with European powers was and still is an important source of concern andanxiety for Turkey.

26. Eleftheros Typos, 4 December 1997, in Christina Rougheri, ‘Positive and NegativeStereotypes of Internal Minorities and Neighboring Peoples in the Greek Press’,Balkan Neighbours Newsletter, 7 (1998), p. 47.

27. Platias, ‘Greek Deterrence Strategy’.28. Marialena Conalis-Kontos, ‘U.S. Foreign Policy in the Settled Post-War Period: The

Cases of Greece and Turkey’, in Christodoulos K. Yiallourides and Panayotis J.Tsakonas (eds), Greece and Turkey after the End of the Cold War (New York, Athens:Caratzas, 2001), pp. 385–406.

29. For a Greek view, see Marios L. Evriviades, ‘Hegemonic Alliances and Destabilizationin the Middle East’, in Yiallourides/Tsakonas, ibid., pp. 101–20; and TheodorosKatsoufros, ‘Ege Deniziyle I

.lgili Türk-Yunan Uyusmazlıkları’, in Vaner, Türk-Yunan

Uyusmazlıgı, pp. 76–106.30. Dimitri Constas, ‘Challenges to Greek Foreign Policy’, in Dimitri Constas and

Theofanis G. Stavrou (eds), Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century (Washington:The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 84. For the original use of ‘patron-clientrelationship’ regarding the expansion of manoeuvrability and bargaining power ofsmall states in the post-Cold War era, see Panayotis Ifestos, ‘Patron-Client Relationsin the Emerging Security Enviroment’, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 4(June 1992), pp. 35–47.

31. As an example of this view see, Hasan Köni, ‘1964–1974 Yılları Arası Türk-YunanI.liskileri Algılama Analizi’, in Türk-Yunan I

.liskileri, Üçüncü Askeri Tarih Semineri

(Ankara: Genel Kurmay ATASE Yayını, 1986), pp. 81–93.32. See Gülden S. Ayman, ‘Settling a Conflict: Greco-Turkish Relations in the Inter-War

Period’, CIDC Insight, 16 (May 1998), pp. 93–101.33. See Daniel Bar-Tal, ‘From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to

Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis’, Political Psychology, 21, 2 (2000), pp. 351–65.34. Ibid.35. The 1960 Accords provided for a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-

president, both with veto powers. Cyprus was forbidden to unite with any other stateand these accords were guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Foraccords, see Blaustein, Constitutions of the Countries of the World.

36. Daphne Papahadjopoulos, ‘Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era:


Implications for the European Union’, CEPS Paper, 72 (1998), p. 30.37. See Papasotiriou, ‘The Dynamics of Greek-Turkish Strategic Interaction’.38. See Platias, ‘Greece’s Strategic Doctrine’.39. Analyses in this section are based on behaviour and strategies of both sides before

the recent thaw in relations. Although attitudes on both sides seem to evolve towardsa new approach, it is still too early to argue that this approach has become well-accepted and a norm in relations between the two countries.

40. For Greece’s internal (defence spending) and external efforts to balance Turkey, seeThanos Dokos, ‘Greek Security in the Post-Cold War Era’, Thesis (Summer 1998), at:[http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/summer98/index6.html].

41. See Gülden S. Ayman, ‘Türk-Yunan I.liskilerinde Güç ve Tehdit’, in Faruk Sönmezoglu

(ed.), Türk Dıs Politikasının Analizi, 2nd ed (I.stanbul: Der, 1998), pp. 543–55; Gülden

S. Ayman ‘Türkiye’nin Ege Politikasında Müzakere ve Caydırıcılık’, in Gencer Özcanand Sule Kut (eds), En Uzun On Yıl (I

.stanbul: Boyut, 1988), pp. 285–325.

42. See Sevin Toluner, ‘Some Reflections on the Interrelation of the Aegean Sea Disputes’,in Bayram Öztürk, Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Aegean Sea(I.stanbul: Turkish Marine Research Foundation, 2000), pp. 121–38; Sevin Toluner,

‘Which Straits Regime in the Aegean Sea’, in Bayram Öztürk and Nesrin Algan (eds),Problems of Regional Seas 2001 (I

.stanbul: Turkish Marine Research Foundation, 2001),

pp. 139–57.43. Aslan Gündüz, ‘Greek-Turkish Disputes: How to Resolve them’, in Keridis/

Triantaphyllou, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization, p. 95.44. See Angelos M. Syrios, ‘Greek-Turkish Disputes; Recourse to the International Court

of Justice and Stability in the Aegean’, in Yiallourides/Tsakonas, Greece and Turkey Afterthe End of the Cold War, pp. 286–7.

45. The doctrine of extended deterrence is presented as a ‘corrective measure’ in whichit aligns the military and diplomatic aspects of Greece’s strategy. According to Greekexperts by adopting such a strategy Greece aimed at being proactive rather thanreactive in the framework of Greek-Turkish conflict and at the same time reinforcingthe bargaining position of Greek Cypriots. The doctrine of extended deterrence isbeing implemented through increasing defense expenditures on the part of Cyprus,acquisition of military systems by Cyprus which is compatible with those of Greece,joint strategic and operational planning, joint military exercises and creating a jointcommand, control and communication mechanism between the armed forces ofGreece and Cyprus. See Christodoulos Yiallourides, ‘The Doctrine of ExtendedDeterrence as a Strategy of Containing Turkish Expansionism’, The Yearbook of theInstitute of International Relations (Athens: Sideris, 1996); and Yiallourides, ‘TheExternal Orientation of the Cypriot Republic’, pp. 352–3.

46. Montegle Stearns, ‘Greek Foreign Policy in the 1990’s: Old Signposts, New Roads’,in Constas/Stavrou, Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century, pp. 59–71.

47. See Gülden S. Ayman, Neo-Realist Bir Perspektiften Soguk Savas Sonrası Yunan DısPolitikası: Güç, Tehdit ve I

.ttifaklar (Ankara: SAEMK, 2001).

48. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1987), pp. 163 and 168.

49. See Spiros Kaminaris, ‘Greece and the Middle East’, Meria Journal, 3, 2 (June 1999), at[http://www.meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue2/kaminaris.pdf].

50. Murat I.lem, ‘Pangalos I

.kili Oynuyor’, Cumhuriyet, 22 July 1997, p. 8.

51. For the text see [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/ade/adec/07.htm].52. See [http://mfa.gov.tr/GRUPH/release/1998/07.htm].53. [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPH/Release/1998/14.htm].54. [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPH/Release/1998/19.htm].55. [http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/summer97/section.html].56. See R. J. Gutmann, ‘Greek Foreign Policy’, Europe, October 1997.57. Mutually hurting stalemate occurs when the parties perceive that they are suffering

in their current deadlock: they cannot ignore the conflict and cannot escalate their


way unilaterally to victory at an acceptable cost. While such mutual perceptions ofconflict can come at any level in a conflict, they are generally associated with rela-tively intense conflict behaviour. See William I. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflictand Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and RichardHaass, Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes (New York: YaleUniversity Press, 1990).

58. As an example, see ‘Simitis: Only One Superpower Can’t Secure World Peace’,Xinhua, 12 June 1999.

59. One of the sources of intractable conflicts is the presence of strong BATNA’s (BestAlternative to a Negotiated Agreement). If one or more of the parties to a conflict hasa BATNA that they consider to be better than a negotiated agreement, they will notsettle. See Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement WithoutGiving In (New York: Penguin Books, 1981).

60. See Gülden S. Ayman, ‘Springtime in the Aegean’, Private Review (Spring 2000), pp. 56–60.

61. [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupb/ba/baa20/october/#bm08].62. Ibid.63. See Alexis Papahelas, ‘Dıs Politika Aksıyor’, Radikal, 2 March 2002; Yorgo Kırbaki,

‘Ege’de Diyalog Devri’, Radikal, 30 January 2002; ‘Umut Rüzgarı Getirdi’, Radikal, 20January 2002; Deniz Zeyrek, ‘Yunanistan’la Ege’de Gizli Pazarlık’, Radikal, 19 January2002; Yorgo Kırbaki, ‘Yunan Elçiden I

.lginç Rapor’, Milliyet, 22 March 2002; ‘Greece

and Turkey Discuss Aegean’, BBC, 12 March 2002; ‘Ege I.çin Diyalog Baslıyor’,

NTVMSNBC, 29 January 2002; ‘Protopapas Comments on Greek-Turkish Affairs’,ANA, 1 February 2002; ‘FM Papandreou Tells Ecevit Solutions “Legal” and not“Political” Ones’, ANA, 19 January 2002; ‘Diriöz: Search for Dialogue Between Turkeyand Greece Should Cover All Problems’, Anatolian Agency, 30 January 2002.

APPENDIX 1: THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ONCONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (1988)

By the Memorandum of Understanding on Confidence-BuildingMeasures (Athens, 17 May 1988) Turkey and Greece have agreed onthe following confidence-building measures:

Both parties recognize the obligation to respect the sovereigntyand the territorial integrity of each other and their rights to use thehigh seas and international airspace of the Aegean.

In conducting national military activities on the high seas and inthe international airspace, the two parties shall endeavour to avoidinterfering with smooth shipping and air-traffic as ensured inaccordance with international instruments, rules and regulations.This would contribute to the elimination of unwarranted sources oftension and reducing the risks of collision.

The two parties have agreed that the planning and the conductof national military exercises on the high seas and in the internationalairspace which require the promulgation of a NOTAM or any other


notification or warning should be carried out in such a way as toavoid also to the maximum extent possible the following:

(a) the isolation of certain areas;(b) the blocking of exercise areas for long periods of time and their

conduct during the tourist peak period (1 July–1 September,for 1988, 7 July–1 September) and the main national andreligious holidays.

It is understood that the planning and execution of all nationalmilitary activities will be cancelled out in accordance with theexisting international rules, regulations and procedures.

With the view to achieving the above, and without prejudice tothe existing international regulations and procedures, the two sideswill proceed, when required, to due communication through diplo-matic channels.

The provisions of this memorandum of understanding shall haveeffect and be implemented in full conformity with the provisions ofthe Davos Joint Press Communique.

APPENDIX 2: GUIDELINES FOR THE PREVENTION OFACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS ON THE HIGH SEAS AND ININTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE, ISTANBUL, 8 SEPTEMBER 1988

The military and other activities carried out by the ships and aircraftof both countries on the high seas and in international airspace willbe conducted in accordance with international law and internationalcustom, instruments, rules, regulations and procedures. In accor-dance with the above:

A. The naval units of the parties will abide by the followingguidelines:

ii(i) They will refrain from acts of harassment of each otherwhile operating in the high seas in accordance withinternational law and custom.

i(ii) They will act in full conformity with international law,rules, regulations and procedures as well as militarycustom and courtesy.


(iii) Naval units engaged in the surveillance of ships of theother party during firing operations and other militaryactivities in accordance with international law shall main-tain a position which would not hamper their smoothconduct.

B. The air force units in conducting military activities in theinternational airspace will abide by the following guidelines:

ii(i) They will act in full conformity with international law andin particular international custom, instruments, rules,regulations and procedures.

i(ii) Pilots of the aircraft of the parties shall display utmostcaution when in proximity of aircraft of the other partyand shall not manoeuvre or react in a manner that wouldbe hazardous to the safety of the flight and/or affect theconduct of the mission of the aircraft. To promote theclimate of confidence whenever there are claims of actscontrary to above, the sides will in the first place informeach other through diplomatic channels prior to releasingofficial statements.


10Perception and Rapprochement:

Debating a Greek StrategyTowards Turkey

KOSTAS IFANTIS

INTRODUCTION

Turkey’s status as a regional power is beyond doubt. Its economicpotential, the size of its territory and population and its geopoliticallocation all make it likely that Turkey will remain a key player in theregional scene for some time to come. In a security environmentincreasingly characterized by ‘transregional’ problems and ‘trans-sovereign’ challenges, from a western and, especially, an Americanperspective, Turkey is certainly a transregional partner par excellence.1

What in the early years of the twenty-first century seems to be lesscertain is the role Ankara will choose to play and for that matter howthe Greek-Turkish relations will evolve. In the context of a – let usassume, durable – rapprochement process, will Turkey become apartner and a stabilizer or will it – rather aggressively to the Greekmind – seek regional dominance? Given this uncertainty, the chal-lenge to Greek policy is to find a posture that can encourage positiveevolution in Greek-Turkish relations and respond appropriately toany negative developments in the short term, while also protectingGreece against the possibility that in the longer term, Greek-Turkishrelations may return to a rather unstable course.

In Greek public debate, although there is a dominant, deep-rootedperception about Turkish behaviour and (revisionist) foreign policyaims, there is a lack of consensus on what strategy can best achievenational strategic purposes. The central question in the current post-Helsinki debate (as with the post-Madrid debate in 1997) is whether

Greece should pursue, abandon or modify what seems to be astrategy of engagement. Many in Greece have argued that since noprogress has been made in Cyprus, the Aegean and in Ankara’shuman rights record, the engagement strategy, especially as prac-tised by the Kostas Simitis government is doomed to fail. Somestrongly believe that Turkey will never stop being a major threat toGreece and that constraining or balancing the growth of Turkishpower should become (again) the overriding focus of Greek strategy.In effect, they imply that Greece must move from engagement to anexclusively containment policy.

However, the Greek government after Helsinki in 1999, seems toremain committed to a process of ‘step-by-step’ engagement. ForeignMinister George Papandreou and the great majority of the cabinetbelieve that this strategy will produce many benefits by moderatingthe Greek-Turkish interaction, increasing opportunities for trade andinvestment and improving the situation in Turkey itself through itsmodernizing ‘struggle’ with European integration challenges. It israther obvious to any student of Greek foreign policy and Greek-Turkish relations that the policy-making and academic communitiesin Greece have been and remain polarized because they approachGreek-Turkish relations through the competing prisms of contain-ment and engagement.

The aim of this chapter – in the overall framework of amelioratingthe Greek-Turkish security dilemma, and through the dominantGreek perception of the bilateral relationship – is, first, to show thatboth strategies have serious limitations, which are the result of aprofound misreading of the new international and regional strategicenvironment. Neither is adequate for dealing with Turkey, which inthe framework of Greek perception, is still a power characterized bya profound democratic deficit – by western standards – in its internalworkings, which at times pursues policies that Greeks believe to beaggressive in nature, and whose future orientation remains uncer-tain; and second, to point out the fundamental requirements for an effective strategy towards Turkey: a strategy that can effectivelyresult in supporting Turkey’s modernization efforts, enhancing theprocess of stabilization and democratization on the wider regionallevel, and in strengthening Greek economic, political and above allmilitary capabilities, thus reinforcing a stabilizing balance of powerin the Aegean. Such a balance-of-power arrangement is a sine qua non


factor for the steady advancement of the normalization process inthe short and medium run. The overall objective of Greek policy-makers should be the gradual reduction and eventual abolition of thestrategic competition between the two countries, and the advance-ment, at the same time, of cooperative and even integrative arrange-ments. The latter refers to reaching a stage – with time – wherecommon assessments and common policies in an ever-expandingissue agenda can be adopted.

In that context, the discussion focuses in turn on: first, the identi-fication of the fundamental characteristics of Turkish-Greek relationsas they have been shaped since the early 1990s. Greek-Turkishproblems and their historical development are very well known and,thus, the focus is on the impact of the systemic change on the inter-national and regional role, position and behaviour of the two actorsas well as on the transitional constellations of power. Second, thecentral strategic question confronting Greece lies in its interactionwith Turkey. What are the principal threats to Greek interests? Howcan those interests best be defended? What combination of eco-nomic, diplomatic and other instruments should be used to protectand advance Greek interests? These are enduring questions of Greekstrategy, even if they are often obscured by political-partisan rhetoricand heated debate over particular military policies and defenceprogrammes.

TURKEY AND GREECE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SETTING

The current phase in the development of Turkish-Greek relations ismarked by the monumental events of the late 1980s and early 1990s.When the Cold War ended Turkey and Greece found themselves ina new strategic situation. With the end of the bipolar structure ofEast-West competition, Europe’s morphology was transformed and, with it, the nature of the bilateral Turkish-Greek balance. Bothcountries began – more or less successfully – to consider their newstrategic options in a radically different security environment.

In order to assess the evolution of the relationship in the 1990s andlikely future trends and patterns of behaviour, several questionsshould be answered: how did the international and regional posi-tioning and behaviour of Turkey and Greece change as a result of

PERCEPTION AND RAPPROCHEMENT 247

systemic transformation? Has the bilateral constellation of powerbeen affected by the new security setting and, if so, how?

Greece: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?

In the past, the advent of multipolarity stimulated policy reposition-ing. States were expected to readjust their alignments and changethe course of their national security policies to accommodate shiftsin the hierarchy of world power. The challenge for Greece has beensimilar. What was the impact of the system-level structural changeon the country’s international position, power location and foreignpolicy array of options?

While for many commentators, the collapse of the Soviet polemeant the triumph of the western paradigm of pluralist democracy,free market economy and their institutional safeguards (NATO, EC,GATT, IMF, etc.), for Greece world transformation represented agrave need to learn and re-adjust. Cold War stability was replaced bypost-Cold War uncertainty and turbulence affecting the country’snorthern neighbourhood. Less than orderly political transitions,bankrupt economies, sharp ethnic conflicts and border disputes onGreece’s northern periphery threatened and still challenge regionalstability and vital national interests.

Throughout the post-1974 period, Greece’s national strategy wasbased on containing the Turkish threat. The end of the Cold Waradded to the problem of the ‘danger from the east’ by ending a staticregional environment. Greece could not remain indifferent to thesedevelopments. The disintegration of Yugoslavia clearly resulted inpotential dangers to Greece’s territorial integrity and to its social andpolitical order. Athens had to deal with the complex issues of theregion brought about by the end of the Cold War. Greek strategyoften seemed hesitant and uncertain. Events are well known, as isthe failure of Greek governments to formulate a coherent andeffective Balkan policy and thus play an important role in theresolution of the crisis. Instead, to a certain extent, Greece becamepart of the problem.2 Of course, the problems in the Balkans were notthe result of Greek actions. But the failure of the Greek governmentsappeared on two levels: first, an inability to grasp the complexity ofthe situation – a situation, which apart from the problem of ethnic,political and social disorder, was aggravated by the involvement of


third regional and non-regional powers that pursued divergentpolicies, and whose interests were not always compatible. Thecomplexity of actors, roles, policies and perceived interests partlyexplains why the crisis in Yugoslavia was bound to cascade intoneighbouring countries not directly involved, like Greece. Undoubt-edly, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) questfor statehood and nationhood as well as the incoherent Albanianattempt to create a new ideological identity in the place of a bankruptStalinist model, resulted in a considerable security uncertainty inGreece which led to policy without basic direction and well-assessedgoals. Although Greece was well equipped to deal effectively withnegative Balkan conditions, Athens was caught in a vicious cycle ofreacting to individual events, rather than understanding, evaluatingand keeping ahead of them. Second, and perhaps more importantly,the Greek response to the Balkan changes was a victim to the conflictwithin the New Democracy Party both at government and partylevels, as well as the government-opposition confrontation thatfound expression in an oral nationalist competition, the focus ofwhich was the ‘Skopje problem’.

Therefore, Greek foreign policy in (at least) the first half of the1990s found itself in a state of Balkan ‘suffocation’. The situationreversed itself, with the advent to power of the Simitis governmentin 1996. Greece seemed to be rediscovering its role and unfolding itscapabilities to respond successfully to regional challenges. Culturaland economic ties to the peoples of the region, in conjunction withGreece’s privileged location at the crossroads of three continents,created the potential for Greece to become an efficient gateway toemerging regional markets. Greece has started to realize this poten-tial by promoting free-market principles and securing democraticinstitutions. It became the first country to draw up a comprehensiveReconstruction Plan for the Balkans. Over the 2000–2005 period,Greece has pledged a total of almost 300 million Euro for the recon-struction of Kosovo, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and FYROM. A lookat the business front shows the considerable increase in the numberof Greek enterprises in the countries of the region.3

In the post-Dayton era, Greek foreign policy-makers have beenattempting to play a stabilizing role in the Balkan region by formu-lating a comprehensive and cooperative approach to the region’sproblems. The endeavour to define and pursue an appropriate


strategy continued, with considerable success, in the Kosovo crisis aswell as in the 2001 Yugoslav internal developments that led to thedramatic ‘change of guard’ in Belgrade, a change that seems to beopening up prospects of full democratization of that country and itsfast return to international legitimacy. Greece’s upgraded role inSoutheastern Europe is based on its strong economic performance.Solid progress over the second half of the 1990s guaranteed Greece’sparticipation in the European Monetary Union – the ‘hard core’ ofthe European integration process – as well as a constructive andcontinuing presence on the regional scene. A stable and dynamiceconomy is broadening its foreign policy perspectives and enhanc-ing its capabilities as a partner in stabilization.

At the same time, the perception of the Turkish ‘threat’, a heritageof the years since 1974, has taken on a different and more complexform given the new geopolitical realities affecting Turkey’s inter-national position and its internal development as well as the natureof the challenges the two countries face in their bilateral relations.For more than twenty-five years Greeks have perceived the externalthreat as emanating from a single ‘source’ – Turkey. Military anddiplomatic deterrence was indispensable to the concept of Greeksurvival. To Greek policy-makers the stakes seemed extremely high;successful deterrence generated at best an uneasy peace, whereasfailure would mean the transformation of Greek islands and Cyprusinto battlefields. Ironically, although the end of the Cold War resultedin the overnight transformation of the military situation in Europe,no other country experienced the change less intensely than Greece.The ‘new world order’ did not change the basic parameters as thesehave been consistently articulated by both Greek elites and publicopinion. The Greek point of view consistently treats Greece as ‘statusquo’ country, and Turkey as an adversary that has never stoppedpursuing revisionist policies in Cyprus, the Aegean and Thrace, aswell as aiming at altering the balance of power and interests in theregion.

Turkey: External Anxieties and Internal Uncertainties

Since the collapse of the Cold War order, Turkey has been deeplyaffected by changes on the domestic, regional and global levels. Overthe years, Turkey has been able to exploit effectively its strategic


position in order to obtain all types of assistance from the US, NATO,the EU, individual western countries, the USSR, Saudi Arabia andKuwait. At the same time, Turkey has been ‘accusing’ the West of notbeing responsive to its needs despite Turkish contributions to thewestern security effort. Turkey has attributed this to the activities ofthe Greek-American lobby in Washington and to EU’s discriminatoryattitude towards its Muslim identity.4 In addition to using its strategicleverage, Turkey since the early 1980s, has ‘exploited’ the dominantneo-liberal economic policies in the US, Britain and (to lesser extent)the rest of western Europe to obtain additional economic benefits.The country’s political and economic elites took a strategic decisionto limit traditional statist practices in favour of more free marketeconomic policies. Thus, the Turkish message became ‘trade andinvestment’ rather than ‘aid’, which was unlikely to come to anysignificant amounts anyway.5

In the 1990s, the changing international structure left Turkey in astate of anxiety, because the prospect of losing its traditional ColdWar leverage vis-à-vis the West and the USSR was considered – insideas well as outside the country – as real. According to Duygu Sezer,the collapse of the USSR ‘has had enormous adverse repercussionson an entirely different front: cohesion in the western world. ForAnkara, this has meant less confidence in the willingness and abilityof major NATO allies to continue business as usual with Turkey’.6

Developments in the East had outpaced whatever meagre prospectsTurkey might have enjoyed in western European eyes.7 In sum, thechanging geopolitical environment in the late 1980s and early 1990spresented Turkey with many new challenges. These included afragmentation of power along its northern and northeastern bordersfollowing upon the strategic withdrawal of Soviet/Russian power;the multiplication of political actors in the wider Eurasian region; the emergence and, in some cases, intensification of local conflictswith the potential of escalating into larger regional conflicts; and the absence of an easily conceived and articulated threat, ‘furtherisolating Turkey from mainstream European political and economicdevelopments’.8

At that time, the quest for a new role, that of peacemaker andregional stabilizer began. President Özal went on to define Turkey asa model for the region by its being Islamic, democratic, secular and,above all, stable in the centre of a disintegrating world from the


Balkans, to the former USSR, to the Middle East. The Gulf War simplyrevalidated Turkey’s self-definition and role in the region.9 Securitydebates in the US and Europe acknowledge Turkey’s geopoliticalsignificance and the need to reinvigorate relations with Ankara.

In this context, special reference must be made to the concept ofTurkey as a ‘pivotal state’. Turkey’s international position is directlylinked with the evaluation and geopolitical assessment producedmainly in Washington. Turkey’s importance for the US has notchanged after all. As has already been mentioned, many observersin Turkey and the West anticipated that Turkey would be a leadingcasualty of strategic neglect after the Cold War. Although the longer-term implications of developments in Europe, central Asia and theMiddle East for Turkey’s interests and geopolitical orientation are notclear (yet), the Gulf War and subsequent developments have reposi-tioned Turkey to the strategic front rank.10 For the US, the Middle Eastremains an area of vital importance. Turkey’s growing significance ismuch more powerfully defined by its centrality to a region of majorinstability and conflagration.

Moreover, Turkey’s significance lies not so much in its geostrategicvalue, as in the destabilization and uncertainty that the (even remote)possibility of its decline might produce.11 The regional balance andfor that reason the geopolitical value and role of Turkey depends andwill continue to depend on a number of factors, which seeminglywould contribute – not evenly – to either enhancing or diminishingTurkey’s role in regional and world politics, in the framework of theUS foreign policy and security interests.12

These factors include the following: the relations between USA/West and Iran; the Syrian-Israeli relations which are directly linkedwith the future strategic orientation of the former; the relationsbetween USA/West and Iraq; the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East; the relationsbetween the West and Russia as well as the general foreign andsecurity policy goals of Moscow; Turkish-Russian relations, especi-ally in the strategic environment of the Caucasus and central Asia;the continuation and intensification of the conventional arms race inthe region and the horrifying prospect of the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction; the stability prospects of the centralAsian countries and the security of the oil routes; the security andwelfare of the Muslim populations in the Balkans; the value and


position of Turkey in the club of the big emerging markets; the moregeneral American interest in the wider region; the issue of the controlof water resources; the evolution of European integration, especiallyin the field of foreign, security and defence policy; the future of theEU-Turkish relations and the prospects of membership; and finallythe issue of Turkish national power itself, with reference not only tothe military dimension but mainly to the political, economic andsocial development of the country.

The latter is of paramount importance and it has to do, mainly,with the management of internal uncertainties. As Ian Lesser haspointed out, the future conduct of Turkish foreign policy, and thefuture of Turkey as a security partner for the West ‘will be driven toa great extent by internal developments. Even if the overall directionof Turkish policy remains steady and pro-western, Turkey’s ability to play an active role in adjoining regions … will depend on politi-cal stability in Ankara’.13 The 1999 general elections produced anationalist coalition of the right and the left, with a sharp decline insupport for centrist parties and for Islamic political agents. Theconsolidation of military influence in defence of the secular state,which started with the removal of the Refah Party from power andits banning from Turkish politics, also means that, more than ever theTurkish military is a key interlocutor on foreign and security policyissues.14

In general, there has been relatively little progress in definingwhat a new agenda for strategic cooperation between Turkey and theWest should include. It seems that the relationship between Turkeyand the West still lacks a clear sense of direction. Uncertainty remainsas to what big issues the two, together, can work for, or against, in anew strategic environment. Moreover, a set of anxieties has arisendirectly linked with what has been an unusually poor (for Turkishdiplomacy) perception of national capabilities and post-Cold Waropportunities. For the first time in Turkey’s post-Ottoman history,the country’s foreign policy elites attempted to revise the traditionalKemalist precepts regarding the dangers of international activism.This attempt was largely in accordance with many analysts’ sugges-tions. According to Lesser, for almost 40 years, Ankara’s geostrategic‘reach’ was largely limited to its place within NATO’s SouthernRegion. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and turmoil inthe Balkans, Ankara was poised to play a leading role across a vast


region, from eastern Europe to western China. This assumptionemanates directly from a US analysis based on geostrategic projec-tions which include expectations that Turkey will contain Iran in theEast and Syria in the South, stand up against Russia in the North, andhelp stabilize the Balkans in the West.15 However, this attempt toestablish new spheres of influence has so far not lived up toexpectations.

According to Kuhnhardt, that has to do with the fact that Turkey’sability to project the necessary power as a regional force d’ordre isrelative: ‘Not only has Russia returned to the region of its directSouth, in an attempt to demonstrate what the geopolitical notion ofa “near abroad” could mean to a wounded, yet relevant, worldpower, but the Western world has begun to discover the Caucasusand Central Asia on their own terms.’ 16 This development may implya limited interest in the region or it may suggest that western actorshave not yet clearly defined their individual interests, and thus notyet determined how to deal strategically and economically with it,which is more likely. This does not imply that Turkey does not havean important role to play in the region. Rather, it means that this roleis analogous to its position as a fundamental and irreplaceable NATOpartner in an area of volatility and unstable transformation. In theexclusive framework of western interests, this fact could assign anextremely important standing to Turkey. Those who seek to redefineTurkey’s role in world politics in terms of multiple options maycredibly do so ‘only as long as they root their logic in the irretrievablefact that NATO membership is the single most important factordefining Turkey’s standing in the Western camp’.17 NATO member-ship is the basis for any Turkish strategic or operational outreach. Inthis context, the US (and NATO) has a powerful interest in securitycooperation with Turkey for power projection in adjacent areas ofcritical importance – the Caucasus and the Caspian, the Levant andthe Gulf.

THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE

In the context of the effects that systemic transformation had onTurkey and Greece, a central question is the extent to which changehas been cyclical or cumulative. The general course of events is well


known as also are the policy problems. What we need to assess hereare the implications of the new structural changes that have occur-red. What is and how important is the role of the USA? GivenTurkey’s potential to pose a political-military challenge to Greece, aswell as the uncertainty about the future course it will follow, howshould Greece deal with it? What Greek actions can both encourageTurkey to follow a more cooperative policy and prepare Greece forthe possibility that it will not? To the extent that these two objectivesmay come into conflict, how should Greece strike a balance betweenthem?

Conditions and Actors

Objectively, there can be little strategic rationale for premeditatedconflict between Greece and Turkey. Open conflict would poseenormous political risks for both of them, quite apart from uncer-tainties at the operational level. Yet the risk of an accidental clashremains, given the continuing armed air and naval operations inclose proximity and the highly charged atmosphere surroundingcompeting claims.18 The Aegean and especially Cyprus are sensitivenational questions par excellence. Moreover, with both countriesmodernizing their military capabilities, the potential for destructive-ness and escalation is far greater today than in the past. A Greek-Turkish clash would have profound implications for Turkey and theWest. It would also have operational consequences for the US. Instrategic terms, a conflict under current conditions might result in anopen-ended estrangement of Turkey from the West, since the ColdWar imperatives that argued for restraint in sanctions against Turkeyin 1974 are absent today. More broadly, a Greek-Turkish conflictmight encourage ‘civilizational’ cleavages in the West.19 The risk of aclash and the likely strategic and operational consequences make riskreduction an imperative for the US (and NATO). The same is true forthe EU.

The relative stagnation in EU-Turkish relations, despite thedecisions taken at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, has also contributed tothe sense of disappointment and uncertainty, and has made Turkishbehaviour towards Greece more unpredictable and perhaps harderfor the US to control. If Turkey cannot strengthen its relationship withthe EU – in the context of future membership – it cannot successfully


pursue its legitimate foreign policy goals. For the EU it would be adisaster to ‘lose’ Turkey, but how to properly bind it to Europe seemsnot very clear even after Helsinki. EU-Turkish relations have alwaysbeen complex. For many decades, Turkey has been a critical part ofthe European system, that is, part of the pattern of Europeanpolitical, economic and security relations. The question of whetherTurkey is part of the European integration project is far less clear.‘Despite a strong preference for a European orientation since thefounding of the Republic, Turkey’s own sense of identity in thisregard has varied with time.’ 20 The sense of ambiguity and ambiva-lence in EU-Turkish relations remains even after Helsinki. Helsinkiraises as many questions as it resolves. Is the EU serious about theprospect of Turkish membership? Can the EU deal effectively withthe economic, political, and ‘scale’ challenges posed by such anenlargement? Is Turkey really prepared for the enormous sover-eignty compromises that integration implies?

The policy implications for Greece are that the longer therelationship between Turkey and the EU remains overshadowed byuncertainties, the more the US remains ‘the only and undisputed’arbiter in an essentially balance of power game. The (potential)deterioration of Turkey’s ties with the EU will further increase theimportance of strong ties to the US. The US is generally seen byTurkey as being more supportive of Turkey’s security concerns thanEurope. Washington has strongly backed Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership and has lent strong political support to Ankara’ssecurity efforts. The nature of the European integration process has all the systemic properties needed to fundamentally alter theexclusive geopolitical, ‘zero-sum-game’ quality of the Greek-Turkishconflictual relationship.

However, the challenge for Turkey is enormous. So far, Turkishelites have not had to confront the dilemma posed by a strongnationalist tradition and a powerful attachment to state sovereignty,on the one hand, with the prospect of integration in a sovereignty-diluting EU, on the other. Even short of full membership, candidacyimplies a great institutionalized scrutiny, convergence and compro-mise. From the least political issues (e.g. food regulations) to highpolitics, a closer relationship with formal EU structures will posetremendous pressures on traditional Turkish concepts of sovereignty


at many levels. It is a process that has been difficult for all memberstates of the EU. Surrendering sovereignty has been one of the mostfundamental elements of the European integration success. For anEU member state, pursuing nationalist options outside the inte-gration context has become extremely difficult, if not impossible.

If there is a ‘Helsinki spirit’, that more than anything else revealsthe need – for both countries – for a more strategic approach towardseach other. Both countries have a longer-term strategic interest inseeing Turkey’s EU vocation succeed. Such a success has the potentialof changing Greece’s perception of threat, and fostering political andeconomic reform in a Turkey reassured about its place in Europe. TheUS and Europe will benefit from a more effective and predictablestrategic partnership with Turkey. A key task for US foreign policyelites will be to make sure that Greek-Turkish brinkmanship nolonger threatens broader interests in regional détente and inte-gration. The stakes of bringing to fruition this strategy of reciprocalaccommodation are extremely high. Lasting rapprochement wouldyield enormous benefits for everybody involved.21

However, such a rapprochement remains fragile (and to a certaindegree nascent) for three main reasons. First, the strong view inAthens is that most of the changes have come on the Greek side.There has been no major shift in Turkish policy. Without a Turkishgesture to match Greece’s lifting of its veto to Turkey’s EU candidacy,it may prove difficult for Athens to maintain domestic support overthe long run. The issue of the European Rapid Reaction Force isrevealing.22

Indeed, the Greek government operates with the benefit of the doubt even within its own party confines. Second, so far therapprochement has been limited to less-controversial areas such astrade, the environment and tourism. The really sensitive issues haveyet to be addressed. The current climate will prove its durability onlywhen these issues are included in the reconciliation agenda. Finally,there is the issue of Cyprus. While Cyprus is technically not a bilateraldispute, it is an integral element of the broader fabric of therelationship and cannot be ignored. Although there is a politicallycostly effort to downplay the linkage by Athens, without progress onCyprus the current rapprochement will be impossible to sustain overtime.23


The Role of the USA

To the extent that Turkish incorporation into the EU remains an openquestion for years to come, the Turkish-US-Greek entanglementbecomes even more complex. The issue here is the extent to whichUS strategy as far as the management of the Greek-Turkish conflictis concerned will remain the same. We have already identified strongelements of continuity in US foreign policy in general. In the contextof Greek-US relations, the analysis was in the past shaped pre-dominantly by the Greek-Turkish debate. This was appropriate giventhe pre-eminent perception of the Turkish threat in Greece since1974, but the rhetoric of this debate continues to shape both Greek and American thinking and strategy. As a result, the issue ofUS leadership – whether the US can continue to fulfill a balancingrole or whether there should be a different American approach and subsequently a different Greek response – is given continuingprominence.

The overall American strategic interests in the area have almostinevitably drawn the US into the dispute. The Washington approachwas always a pragmatic one, since no American initiative has suc-ceeded in achieving the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations.That is why the US has not been involved as actively as one mighthave expected in the search for a solution. Moreover, during the ColdWar, successive US administrations felt that the Aegean issues werenot as acute as some others, and therefore were placed well down inthe list of Washington’s priorities. Although the dispute was recog-nized as posing a threat to NATO’s southeastern flank, the primaryobjective of US foreign policy elites was to control Greek-Turkishtensions and the implications of the problem for the function of theAlliance.24 Since 1980, what does exist between the two countries is alow intensity conflict, disrupted by shorter or longer détente breaks.It can be described as a relationship of manageable tension. It is,however, a situation that has the disturbing potential of escalating toa more serious crisis with alarming destabilizing effects on a regionallevel.

It has already been pointed out that successive Greek govern-ments have conceptualized the problem in fundamentally differentways. For Greece, the issue has always been one of a Turkishrevisionist threat, and any attempt to normalize bilateral relations is


inevitably conditioned not only by the thesis that Ankara should stoppursuing any anti-status quo policies, but also by the need to find aviable solution to the Cyprus problem, acceptable to both com-munities. The policy traditionally pursued by Greece had twodimensions: it has been both a policy of deterrence, and a policy ofpolitical de-escalation. This twin character has been compatible withthe crisis prevention policy of the US, and has enabled Athens andWashington to converge on the specific issue of relaxation of tensionin the Aegean.

For decades, a major failure of US foreign policy has been itsinability to get its two allies astride the Aegean to settle their differ-ences through compromise and cooperation. Washington’s effortshave not, of course, been entirely fruitless. In January 1996, Americandiplomatic intervention prevented a major crisis from escalating intoviolent conflict. President Clinton, as Bush before him, repeatedlypledged to prioritize the solution of the Cyprus problem at the topof the US foreign policy agenda. However, succeeding adminis-trations have been unable to exert the pressure needed to producelasting results. The passing of time has done nothing to reduce thegulf that divides the island’s two communities or the suspicion withwhich Athens and Ankara view each other.25 At the same time,Turkey’s domestic political and social grievances have served tomake it more inflexible and to aggravate Turkey’s relations with theEU and to a lesser extent the USA.

In the framework of NATO, the augmented emphasis placed onMediterranean stability necessitated, more than ever, a cohesivesoutheastern flank free from the Greek-Turkish impasse. In whatappeared to be a critical step in easing an extremely strained relation-ship – after the 1996 crisis – the US in the margins of the Madrid NATOSummit in 1997 pressured the two countries to sign the Madrid JointDeclaration, whereby they committed to engage themselves to apeaceful and consensual settlement of their differences. ‘If both sidesindeed adhered to it, the communiqué portended a significant step inadvancing stability and security in the eastern Mediterranean.’26 Butthe expected shifts in relations did not follow. Cyprus, not specificallyalluded to in the Madrid Declaration, offered the setting for new–oldtensions during the same year. Joint Greek and Greek Cypriotmilitary exercises a few months later were ‘enriched’ by intense andquite alarming dogfights in the Greek and Cypriot airspace.


Although there is guarded optimism, the prospects for Greek-Turkish relations remain uncertain. The Aegean and Cyprus willremain potential flashpoints and pose a continuous problem of crisisprevention for the US (and Europe). The Greek sense of insecurityin relation to a neighbour of continental scale and uncertain strategicorientation has been sustained by issues like the Turkish threat thata Greek declaration of a 12-mile territorial sea limit would be a caususbelli. Of course, this is not a new development. Successive Turkishgovernments have employed such a threat since 1974. The newelement is that Turkey found itself overburdened – being a pillar ofstability in an ocean of troubles, on the one hand, and seeking toproject its concepts of stability, cooperation and order in an enor-mous land mass, on the other. It was an exaggerated role with thepotential of undermining its domestic stability and cohesion. In thiscontext, US policy-makers face an enormous challenge to continuebeing successful in defusing any new tension in the Aegean.

THE REALM OF GREEK STRATEGY

As has been pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, Greekforeign policy and academic elites as well as public opinion arepolarized because they approach Greek-Turkish relations throughthe competing prisms of containment and engagement. On the basisof the above structural and systemic assessment of the two countries’positioning and power location in the new international setting, andgiven the deeply rooted belief in Greece that reconciliation passesthrough Turkey’s policy responses and internal reform, it is clear thatneither strategy serves the key Greek objective, which should be toencourage Turkey to become more democratic and cooperative,while at the same time protecting Greek interests in case Turkeybecomes more hostile.

Engagement as a Strategy

In principle, engagement seeks to maintain and enhance relationswith Turkey as much as possible in the various policy realms. Strictlyspeaking, engagement is a tactic rather than a policy. It refers to themeans – increasing contact and producing a rather dense network


of relationships – rather than objectives. However, in practice itembodies some assumptions about how such a tactic will achievecertain objectives.

Engagement has had three elements. With respect to economicsand trade, engagement has meant seeking an expansion of relationsand a growth of exchanges. Politically, engagement has meantseeking to maximize bilateral contacts at every level, while pushingtraditional disputes to the back of the stage. Under this approach,Athens has agreed to the Turkish candidacy for EU membership, amajor political risk for the Greek government. Militarily, Greece hasagreed to a policy of enhancement of military-to-military relations inthe framework of NATO, with the specific aim of increasing mutualconfidence and reaching an agreement on ‘rules of the game’.

Engagement rests on the hope that growing economic, politicaland military contacts and cooperation will either transform Turkeyinto being more democratic (with the functional impetus of the EU)and cooperative, or, at a minimum, bring some kind of interest con-vergence. For Greece, enmeshing Turkey in the European integrationsystem can socialize the (powerful) sceptical part of the Turkish elitesinto European norms of behaviour and increase their stake in areforming course. The more Turkey is integrated into the Europeansystem, the less likely it will be to use force. Rather, it will act as aprudent and responsible member of the system, once it becomesaccustomed to the ‘rules of the game’ and understands the benefitsthat it can bestow. For some, this is a bold assumption: that continuedcontact will eventually affect Turkish behaviour towards Greece in apositive direction.

In the meantime, it is a fact that Greek (and European) engage-ment is helping Turkey develop economically. Thus, should Greek-Turkish relations remain hostile, the engagement approach willmerely have made Turkey into a potentially more threatening adver-sary. The problem is that engagement does not have any positivesuggestions on what should be done when things go wrong. At most,engagement indicates what should not be done. It does not indicatehow Greece should respond when Turkish actions come into conflictwith Greek interests, as for example when according to the Greekinterpretation, Ankara attempted to use the mid-October 2000 NATO‘Destined Glory’ exercise to press home its demand for the demili-tarization of the eastern Aegean islands. For many in Greece, the


incident indicated yet again that the ‘much-vaunted Greek Turkishrapprochement is far more problematic than some officials in Athensthink’.27 The majority view in Greece is that the Greek governmentdoes not have an alternative policy or, at a minimum, no parallelresponses are available, which means it is ‘trapped’, ‘when Ankara’sstandard expansionist policy is applied’.28 In the context of this kindof criticisms, it may be very difficult for any Greek government toobtain and sustain domestic consensus for such a strategy.

Containment as a Strategy

Some have suggested that a containment strategy would be a morerealistic way to deal with Turkey. The goal of such a policy would beto avoid an increase in Turkey’s political, economic and diplomaticpower relative to that of Greece. This would include efforts to slowdown the development of Turkey’s relations with the EU, thuslimiting its expansion of influence. Containment assumes that allow-ing Turkey to expand its relations with Europe will not change itsbehaviour but rather it will embolden its leadership, making aneventual clash with Greece even more likely. Thus, even modestprogress of the EU-Turkish relations should be resisted. Undercontainment, all elements of Turkish-Greek relations would be sub-ordinate to the goal of preventing the growth of Turkey’s European(and international) standing.

Couloumbis has described vividly this school of thought: Greeceshould abandon wishful thinking, trust less the so-called solidarityof its EU partners, and embark on an international crusade con-demning Turkey for its poor human rights record and for its relianceon force to attain its foreign policy objectives.29 At the same time,Greece should continue to upgrade its military capabilities, andincrease its military access to Cyprus in order to be in a position tothwart any potential aggression. Greece should, also, forge bilateralalliances. Without them, containment would be less effective.

A policy of containment assumes that the impasse in Turkish-Greek relations will remain. The argument is that Turkey, given itspolitical tradition of Kemalism, is unlikely to democratize, or thateven if it did, its policy would not become less bellicose, since it wouldhave to respond to the nationalist passions of a large part of both itselites and populace. Therefore, Greece should both demonstrate its


resolve to deter Turkey and take steps to prepare for a conflict shoulddeterrence fail.

Obviously, shifting to an exclusively containment strategy is evenmore troublesome and self-defeating. Such a strategy assumes thatTurkey will ultimately become even more hostile, giving short shriftto the possibility that Greek-Turkish relations could evolve in a morecooperative direction. In any case, such a policy might very wellcause Turkey to become more hostile than it otherwise would be by intensifying the already hard security dilemma in the Aegean. The underlying prediction of hostility can become a self-fulfillingprophecy, setting the stage for a confrontation where none wouldotherwise have occurred. Forging alliances will not only makeGreece appear as a rogue state, thus, isolating it from its Americanand European partners, but it would turn an already dangerousneighbourhood into chaos. In general, containment seems to accepta fatality that does not appear to be inevitable.

For an Alternative Strategic Option

With this in mind, Greek policy should transcend both containmentand engagement. The best strategic option must be able toaccomplish three things: preserve the hope inherent in engagementpolicy, while deterring Turkey from becoming hostile and hedgingagainst the possibility that a strong Turkey might challenge Greekinterests. Such a strategy could be called ‘balancing engagement’. It would continue to try to bring Turkey into the European inte-gration orbit while giving equal attention to deterrence and pre-paring for a possible Turkish challenge to the bilateral arrangements,while seeking to convince the Turkish leadership that such achallenge would be difficult to prepare and extremely risky topursue. In the post-Helsinki era, such a policy is not only desirablebut also possible. It is possible because the insertion of the EU in theGreek-Turkish relations is a factor arguing for an optimistic view, aview that supports pursuing such a policy. Three points should bemade:

First, as Turkey successfully modernizes under EU benevolenttutelage, the Turkish leadership could further develop an emphasison the importance of good relations with Greece and Europe. Themodernization process will not have a clear-cut end point, and the


Turkish elites as well as the Turkish society may still feel the need to‘catch up’. The Greek example is illuminating.

Second, the opening of Turkey to Europe increases the possibilityof a transformation of the Turkish polity in a more democraticdirection. The best idea may win out. Although the process ofmodernization could still produce aggressive external behaviour, thegrowth and consolidation of a genuine liberal democracy could leadTurkey to pursue peaceful and cooperative relations with otherdemocracies.

Third, successful EU-Turkish engagement is a definite ‘relative-gain’ project for Turkey (vis-à-vis Europe). As such, Turkish elites andpublic opinion would feel that the arduous course of reform andmodernization clearly pays off. That greatly contributes to theattractiveness and popularity of the European orientation in Turkey.

At the same time, under a strategy of ‘balancing engagement’,Greece should enhance economic, political, military-to-militaryrelations and cultural ties at all levels. This may help curb any ten-dencies towards military adventurism that might crop up from timeto time. Since there is potential for conflict with Turkey over issuessuch as Cyprus and the Aegean, and since Ankara might seekregional hegemony, as a hedge Greece should ‘aggressively’ moveon four fronts:

� Push Turkey deeper and deeper into the difficult but modernizingalleys of the integration process.

� Lead the way for a stable and democratic regional (Balkan andMediterranean) sub-system.

� Lock Turkey into various strong multilateral regimes that havebeen created to accommodate and satisfy needs.

� Seek to strengthen Greek economic, political and, above all,military capabilities, thus making the risk of escalation – followinga possible Turkish fait accompli (for example in Cyprus) – extremelyhigh for Ankara.

It should be indicated that such a strategy is agnostic about someof the key judgements about Turkey’s future – for example, whetherTurkey’s enmeshing in the European integration system will modifyits long-term objectives and behaviour, enhance the process of


democratization, or whether Turkey will inevitably pursue anaggressive policy and challenge the status quo – as perceived byGreeks – in the Aegean. Instead, this strategy can sharpen thefundamental choice faced by a country at a time of its peril, in thepost-Helsinki era – to cooperate for achieving mutual accom-modation, partnership and, eventually, friendship.

CONCLUSION

Greek-Turkish differences are not new, but as long as they remainunresolved, there is a chance that some unforeseen incident couldtouch off an open conflict. Continuing disputes over Cyprus, overthe Aegean, over European-Turkish relations, in relations with NATO(as, for example, the disagreement during the 2000 ‘Destined Glory’exercise), and in areas of bilateral and multilateral relations withother regional actors, all have the potential to threaten bilateral andregional security and stability.30 Couloumbis and Lyberopoulos wrotein 1998:

Judging by its size, the tiny Aegean island of Imia/Kardak doesnot seem like much to fight over. Yet in January 1996, two of themost heavily armed countries in Southern Europe nearly didjust that. Without quick and effective intervention from theUnited States, the incident might well have escalated into a full-scale war between Greece and Turkey.31

The history of the two countries’ bilateral relations shows thatsuch a situation might repeat itself more easily than many think. Itis therefore of paramount importance for all involved to prevent the(re)appearance of similar, conflictual conditions. The crises of thesecond half of the 1990s show the ease with which a state of pro-tracted tension between the two countries may degenerate intolarge-scale violence and warfare. Political elites in both countriesshould pursue a strategy that aims at reducing the risks and removethe possibility of armed conflict altogether, not only because warwould result in an isolation of both from their western institutionalaffiliations, but because, even if they were ‘to secure some marginalterritorial gains after some initial battles, a chain of revanchist


conflicts would surely follow, classifying both countries as high-riskzones’,32 with devastating consequences for their economic and socialdevelopment.

The differences are not intractable, especially if there is a politicalincentive on both sides to see them resolved, and given the fact thatthere is a measure of goodwill among individuals – as the publicresponse to the tragedy of the earthquakes revealed – that is notusually found in similar long-term conflicts. Greece would gaineverything that is associated with stability and cooperation, first ofall, an – at least – 1 per cent or even 1.5 per cent of a fast-growingGDP that now goes to defence spending. For Turkey, the gains shouldbe even greater.

However, the state of relations between the two countries is aproduct of the attitudes and perceptions of ruling elites and generalpublics, operating within global and regional settings. To the extentthat Turkish policies or claims are perceived as ‘revisionist’ and chal-lenging the bilateral status quo by Greece, Athens has no alternativebut to pursue the strategy outlined above: a mix of consistent engage-ment and prevention, making it as clear as possible that its ultimategoal is a historic, lasting and viable reconciliation in the functionalframework of European integration.

NOTES

1. Ian O. Lesser, ‘Western Interests in a Changing Turkey’, in Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O.Lesser and Stephen Larrabee, The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a StrategicPlan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), p. 48.

2. See among others, Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis (eds), Greece, theNew Europe, and the Changing International Order (New York: Pella, 1993); KevinFeatherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds), Greece in a Changing Europe: Between EuropeanIntegration and Balkan Disintegration? (Manchester: Manchester University Press,1996); Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds), Greece andthe New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities (New York: Pella, 1999); Graham T.Allison and Kalypso Nicolaidis (eds), The Greek Paradox: Promise vs. Performance(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997).

3. By the end of the 1990s, there were more than 1,200 Foreign Direct Investments ofGreek interest in central and eastern Europe: 82 per cent of these are in threecountries: Bulgaria (41 per cent), Albania (20.5 per cent) and Romania (20.5 per cent).These investments focus principally on trade (47 per cent), and to a lesser extent onindustry (36 per cent), while the clothing sector accounts for 48 per cent and foodand drink for 26 per cent. Greek foreign investments show the importance ofgeography in the sense that they are centred on neighbouring countries (Albania,Bulgaria and Romania) and especially in terms of their distribution within eachcountry (i.e. in the south, close to Greece). On a bilateral basis, Greece is the second


largest investor of foreign capital in Albania, and the third largest foreign investor inBulgaria. Greece is the most important trading partner of the Former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia. It ranks first among foreign investors in terms of investedcapital and in the number of investing groups. In Romania, Greece ranked eighth interms of invested capital and fourth in terms of established enterprises. See LoisLabrianides, ‘The Economic Consequences of Greek Business relocating in theBalkans: Thoughts on a possible new role for Greece in the International Division ofLabour’, Defensor Pacis, 7 (January 2001), pp. 77–88.

4. Van Coufoudakis, ‘Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and the United States in the ChangingInternational Order’, in Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis (eds), Greece,the New Europe, and the Changing International Order (New York: Pella, 1993), p. 393.

5. Ibid.6. Duygu B. Sezer, ‘Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black

Sea Region’, in Vojtec Mastny and Craig R. Nation, Turkey Between East and West: NewChallenges for a Rising Regional Power (Boulder: Westview, 1996), p. 74.

7. Ibid.8. Ibid., pp. 74–5.9. Coufoudakis, ‘Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and the United States’, p. 394.

10. Ian O. Lesser, ‘Bridge or Barrier?’, in Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser (eds), Turkey’sNew Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China (Boulder: Westview, 1993), p. 99.

11. Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy, ‘Pivotal States and US Strategy’, ForeignAffairs, 75, 1 (January–February, 1996).

12. Thanos Dokos, ‘The Geostrategic Role of Turkey’, in Yearbook 1996 (Athens: Ministryof Defence, 1996), pp. 144–7.

13. See Ian O. Lesser, NATO Looks South: New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediter-ranean (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), pp. 27–8.

14. Ibid., p. 28.15. See Fuller/Lesser, Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China.16. Ludger Kuhnhardt, ‘On Germany, Turkey, and the United States’, in Dennis L. Bark

(ed.), Reflections on Europe (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1997), p. 104.17. Ibid, p. 105.18. Lesser, NATO Looks South, p. 32.19. Ibid.20. See Khalilzad/Lesser/Larrabee, The Future of Turkish-Western Relations, p. 2.21. Charles A. Kupchan, ‘Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Strategic Interests and High

Stakes’, The Strategic Regional Report, 5, 2 (February 2000), p. 9.22. Turkey did not accept the accord on EU-NATO relations that every other member of

NATO – including the US – approved in December 2000. The EU’s response is thatTurkey should be involved in the shaping of decisions and the management ofoperations, when Turkish forces participate; but that because Turkey is not a memberof the EU, it cannot claim the right to veto autonomous EU actions that do not involveTurkey. Because of this blockage, the EU does not have guaranteed access to NATOplanning facilities at SHAPE. Furthermore, NATO has to approve any formal contactbetween EU and NATO officials on a case-by-case basis. This can have a hamperingeffect on the EU’s efforts to build up its military organization. Ankara’s chiefargument is that the EU might intervene in an area of strategic interest to Turkey –such as Cyprus, the Aegean or the Balkans. Here lied the Greek uneasiness with theTurkish position. Overall, if the EU wanted to borrow NATO assets or commandstructures for an operation, all NATO members would have to give their approvalon a case-by-case basis, which meant that Turkey would have the power of veto. Butit worried about the prospect of autonomous missions, which it would not be ableto veto. The issue remained unresolved until November 2002. In the Brusselsextraordinary Summit a compromise was reached in which the original agreementbetween the United States, Britain and Turkey was modified, incorporating decisionstaken in the European Council at Seville in June 2002. However its overall spirit


remains the same. Ankara will have a say on the European Rapid Reaction Forcegiven that this will not have its own adequate defense infrastructure and will use –in most cases – NATO assets instead.

23. Steven F. Larrabee, ‘Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Is it Durable?’, The StrategicRegional Report, 5, 4 (May/June, 2000), p. 15.

24. See Ronald R. Krebs, ‘Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-TurkishConflict’, International Organization, 53, 2 (Spring, 1999), pp. 343–77. Also, J. Alford(ed.), Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance (Aldershot: Gower, 1984); James Brown,Delicately Poised Allies, Greece and Turkey: Problems, Policy Choices, and MediterraneanSecurity (London: Brassey’s, 1991); Theodore A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greeceand Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1983); Monteagle Stearns,Entangled Allies: US Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (New York: Council onForeign Relations, 1992).

25. John O. Iatrides, ‘The United States, Greece and the Balkans’, in Coufoudakis,Psomiades and Gerolymatos, Greece and the New Balkans’, pp. 292–3.

26. Victor S. Papacosma, ‘NATO, Greece, and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era’, inCoufoudakis, Psomiades and Gerolymatos, Greece and the New Balkans’, pp. 61–2.

27. ‘War of nerves in Athens-Ankara rapprochement’, Kathimerini (Athens daily), 23October 2000, English edition, p. 6.

28. Ibid.29. Theodore A. Couloumbis, ‘Turkish Challenge and European Opportunity: Greek

Foreign Policy Priorities in a Post-Cold War Setting’, in Steve J. Blank (ed.), Mediter-ranean Security into the Coming Millennium (n.p.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999) pp. 259–60.

30. See Mustafa Aydın, ‘Cacophony in the Aegean: Contemporary Turkish-GreekRelations’, in The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, XXVII (1997), p. 134. Seealso Aydın’s contribution in this volume.

31. Theodore A. Couloumbis and Takis Lyberopoulos, The Troubled Triangle: Cyprus,Greece, Turkey, Occasional Paper 98.06 (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1998), p. 1.

32. Ibid., p. 2.


11Rapprochement on

Non-Governmental Level: The Story of the Turkish-Greek

ForumSOLI

.ÖZEL

Relations at many different levels between Greeks and Turks anddialogue between different groups never really came to a full stopeven at the worst of times. Businessmen conducted their affairs andquite often acted as intermediaries between political actors. Muni-cipalities organized get-togethers. Many Greek citizens, either origi-nating from Turkey or from different parts of Greece itself, visitedtheir neighbour after the lifting of the visa requirement for Greekcitizens in 1985. At the darkest periods of the relations there weremany attempts, mostly inconclusive, to have a sustained political orconflict resolution venue that was not official. Although there alwaysremained a level of communication, dialogue and constructiveengagement between a wide range of groups and individuals, somemeaningful and some not, no opening was able to generate its ownsustainable momentum. In the prevailing atmosphere of insecurity,mistrust and intimidation that defined the 1990s, particularly afterthe Imia/Kardak crisis of 1996, many concerned Greeks and Turksfrom different walks of life looked for a workable ‘second-track’diplomatic route.

Arguably, a majority of such efforts proved to be in vain for avariety of reasons. The political or conflict resolution groups, asopposed to cooperative endeavours between municipal authoritiesof the Aegean islands and the Aegean coast, were mostly ad hoc, andthe commitment in time, resources and follow-up could not alwaysbe taken for granted. In the best of circumstances the disconnected-ness of the process undertaken by private initiative from official

circles rendered it a dead-end track. Many initiatives suffered fromthe fact that the usual suspects appeared in most of them, whetherthese were academic gatherings, NGO meetings, professional con-ferences or panel discussions. Whereas all these efforts undoubtedlyplayed a role as building blocks in the critically necessary process ofconfidence building between two peoples, for far too long immersedin their own myth-making and mutual vilification, no progress couldbe registered in resolving the outstanding problems between the twostates.

There was also the fact that unlike the Palestinian-Israeli problem,no incentive existed for the officialdom of both parties to search fornew informal institutional arrangements for the resolution of bi-lateral issues. After all, Turkey and Greece were both mature states,allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, shared membershipin different organizations and had fully accredited diplomats presentin one another’s capitals. Whether they admitted it or not, there wasas much reason for cooperation between the two in places likesoutheastern Europe as there was for rivalry. There was no state ofwar between the two countries in spite of an endless flow of recrimi-nations, accusations and projections that at times may have borderedon the absurd.

In the seemingly zero-sum game they were engaged in, the twoparties took advantage of all opportunities to score against oneanother, keeping the rhetoric up, developing doctrines of war, look-ing for encircling alignments. There is no need to enumerate all theissues between the two countries, as they are dealt with in muchgreater detail in the articles that make up this book. It took the absurdcrisis over two pieces of uninhabited rocks that brought the twoallies/neighbours/rivals, once more since 1987,1 literally to the brinkof war, to change the perception on both sides that this game ofbrinkmanship and escalation was not without a substantive cost. Theatmosphere was then ripe for an opening on second-track diplo-macy. Under such circumstances there would have to be recognition,on the part of officialdom and civil actors alike, that there is a role toplay for informal actors in decision-making processes. These shouldgo beyond the historically well-tested practice of using private indi-viduals, businessmen, journalists who have extensive connectionson both sides to act as intermediaries and message carriers. Unofficialorganizations, think-tanks and others could act as agents of change


and provide a propeller for policy learning and innovative policies.Unconstrained by established bureaucratic norms, rules and para-meters, such organizations can attempt to redefine material interests,change the perceptions of groups and indeed promote social learn-ing. In these times, the resources available to civil society in human,information, expertise and material terms make institutionalizedsecond-track diplomacy an effective supplement to interstate rela-tions, particularly in conflict situations.

THE BIRTH OF THE FORUM

The idea to organize a gathering of prominent Greeks and Turks withthe expectation that there would be a follow-up and that beyond this opening a diplomatic track could be launched, originated withJamie Bruce-Lockhart. Bruce-Lockhart, a retired British ForeignOffice veteran who worked as a press officer in Cyprus for four years,took charge of the Roberts Centre, in London, a private charitablefund. The Wills family that prospered in the tobacco business fundedthe Centre. Previously, it concentrated on confidence and peace-building initiatives particularly in South Africa in the 1980s and laterin the Middle East. In the wake of the Imia/Kardak crisis that nearlybrought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war, Bruce-Lockhartbelieved that his organization could help sponsor a second-trackinitiative in a conflict that needed it much but did not have one. Afterall, following the crisis, some confidence-building steps were takenbetween the two parties with the help of their allies. The plan couldbe successful, provided that organizations that were well establishedand could be trusted by both parties would be willing to associatethemselves with the move.

Bruce-Lockhart chose Wilton Park as the site of the first meetingand arranged Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) to host thefollow-up sessions. Wilton Park had an excellent reputation aroundthe world for hosting important meetings where sensitive issuescould be discussed without reservations and links for furtherengagements could be formed between conflicting parties. RUSI, asthe first established British defence academy and with its affiliationwith NATO, of which both Turkey and Greece were members, hadimpeccable credentials for both sides. The presence of such reputable

STORY OF THE GREEK-TURKISH FORUM 271

organizations made the cooperation of the diplomats of the twocountries easier as well. Wilton Park consulted with the BritishEmbassies in both countries to choose the candidates who would besuitable for an ongoing process. Bruce-Lockhart also obtained sup-port from both countries’ ambassadors in London in preparing forthe initial meeting.

The most significant aspect of the meeting that took place inNovember 1997, where RUSI assumed the chairmanship, was prob-ably the opportunity for the participants from both sides to clear theair and present their perspectives, lay out their suspicions andperhaps expose their prejudices. It did help the prospects of themeeting that at the June 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid the twoantagonists also reached an agreement under the auspices of theUnited States on how to conduct their affairs in the future. Mindfulof the recent, almost calamitous crisis, the participants agreed on thenecessity not to make this meeting a one-off event and encouragedthe organizers to carry on with the work. It was thus decided that Bruce-Lockhart would go to Ankara and Athens to speak withpotential participants and prepare the groundwork for the nextmeeting.

Encouraged by the proceedings of the Wilton Park meeting,Bruce-Lockhart arrived in Ankara on the day when the EU at itsLuxembourg summit of 12–13 December 1997 decided to leaveTurkey out of the list of candidate countries for membership. Withoutany doubt, this was the most inauspicious time imaginable forseeking official support for a second-track experiment in Turkish-Greek relations as Greece (together with Germany) was universallyseen in Turkey to be responsible for what constituted a mostunwelcome summit conclusion for Turkey. In the event, the Turkishgovernment decided to break off political relations with the EU andthe country began to turn inwards. Contacted at that time to be thecoordinator of the Turkish side in this process, retired ambassadorCem Duna as well as his would-be counterpart in Greece, thepolitically engaged businessman Costa Carras, suggested that themeeting scheduled for early spring 1998 be postponed.

Despite the interruption, the search for appropriate coordinatorsand the teams that would participate in the meetings, continued.Based on his observations of and conversations with the participantsat Wilton Park and on advice from a range of international academics,


former diplomats, journalists and the British Embassies in Ankaraand Athens, Bruce-Lockhart began to select the participants for theupcoming meeting. In April Costa Carras and Paulina Lampsa, a keyfigure who worked both in the Prime Ministry and the ForeignMinistry, proposed Professor Christos Rozakis as Greek coordinatorof the first Forum meeting. Rozakis was a highly respected academicand a known dove, a confidant of Prime Minister Simitis and theDeputy Foreign Minister of Greece during the crisis over the islets.He was earlier one of the two official ‘wise men’ participating indiscussions with their Turkish counterparts on bilateral issues con-cerning the Aegean. Through the efforts of journalist Mehmet AliBirand, an old hand in Turkish-Greek relations and a personality whoenjoys close relations with many power holders on both sides acrossthe political spectrum, Bruce-Lockhart contacted retired admiralGüven Erkaya. At first sight, this was an odd choice since the lateadmiral, who was the commander of the Turkish navy during theImia/Kardak crisis, was considered a hardliner and one of the pri-mary forces behind Turkey’s tough posture then and on some otheroccasions. But Admiral Erkaya saw the advantages and benefits ofsuch an undertaking since he, himself, had been active in establishingbetter communications with his Greek counterpart in order to defusecrises that might get out of hand. He wanted to pursue an agenda ofconfidence building between the two countries and needed a plat-form to do it. The incipient Greek-Turkish Forum appealed to him asa concept and a possible vehicle to bring about the changes that hesought in bilateral relations.

With the sponsoring organization, the chairmanship and thecoordinators in place for the next meeting to take place on 15–16 May1998, a moderator was needed in order to ensure that the difficultprocess of sorting through a multitude of thorny issues during thefollowing meetings would remain on track. This was the cue for DanSmith, then director of Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), totake his place on stage. Norway and Oslo’s think-tanks had beenjealously admired by the rest of the think-tank communities aroundthe world. This was engendered by the contribution made by FAFO(a social science research institute with links to the NorwegianLabour Party and trade unions) to the Israeli-PLO agreement in Oslothat led to the Declaration of Principles. The Oslo agreement thenled to the historical Rabin-Arafat handshake on the White House


lawn on 13 September 1993. Smith, an accomplished academic witha substantial body of writings and experience on conflict resolution,turned out to be the ideal moderator as the record of the next fouryears would show.

THE FORUM TAKES SHAPE AND ITS FIRST STEPS

The first meeting of the Greek-Turkish Forum took place on 15–16May 1998 in London. In addition to the two coordinators, Rozakisand Erkaya, both sides were represented by a mixed group of jour-nalists, academics, businessmen, retired diplomats and politicianswho held a wide spectrum of views between them. TÜSI

.AD chair-

man Muharrem Kayhan, journalist Süleyman Gençel, journalistCostas Iordanides, businessman Theodore Papalexopoulos, Membersof the Turkish Parliament Bülent Akarcalı and Ali Dinçer, inde-pendent member of the Greek Parliament Stephanos Manos wereamong the participants. As the statement released to the press byRUSI at the end of the meeting summarized it, ‘the participantsagreed to form a contact network without delay that would seek tomaintain and enhance the dialogue between the two communities’.To carry out the work that needed to be undertaken as the Foruminstitutionalized itself, the following sub-groups were formed: website, public opinion survey, press and editorial matters, academicexchanges and conferences, documentation and history, confidence-building measures.

Of these sub-groups nothing of substance remained by the end of 2000 and many of their original coordinators have graduallydissociated themselves from the activities of the Forum. The web sitewas built and mastered by RUSI’s James Ker-Lindsay and it is stillrunning. Some of the essential information concerning the Forumand its activities can be found at http://www.greekturkishforum.org.For a variety of reasons the Forum opted not to have links to othersites, and decided to be overly discriminating about the articles thatit would post. The result is that the site’s current content leaves a lotto be desired.

The Forum spent a considerable amount of time and energy to getthe organization of simultaneous opinion polls, similar to the ‘euro-barometer’ surveys of the European Union, to be taken in both


countries. The results were then going to be published on the sameday in major national newspapers in each country. A Turkish and aGreek social scientist would each write an individual essay inter-preting the results and these were also going to be published in both countries. Although the Hürriyet newspaper in Turkey andKathimerini in Greece originally agreed to sponsor such a survey, inthe wake of the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya after he left theresidence of the Greek Ambassador, the deal fell through.2 Unhappywith the tone of the coverage of the event by Hürriyet, Kathimerinidissociated itself from the project and no suitable substitute wasfound even after the amelioration of relations between Greece andTurkey that started in the summer of 1999.

Most of the other sub-groups did not really take off. There wasalready a plethora of academic gatherings, conferences and the likeso that yet another one organized by the Forum could not have madea substantive contribution in that area. Although the Forum tried andto a degree succeeded in bringing together parliamentarians fromboth countries in its plenary meetings, such contacts did not lead to sustained relations. As the Forum gave up on having plenarymeetings after the last one in March 2001, both because of financialconstraints and the lack of tangible results, such contacts under itsauspices had also come to an end. On the issue of engaging in thewriting of history, there were better-equipped groups that hadalready begun to work on that matter or on reinterpreting thehistorical record.3 There was also no visible sign that any of the on-going endeavours would be interested in accepting the Forum as anumbrella organization.

The media were an important source of the problems between thetwo countries. At the very least, they did not, in general, make muchof an effort to rid their headlines, coverage and most often theireditorial statements from an approach that inflamed the prejudicesof the publics on both sides of the Aegean. Yet in the wake of theÖcalan affair and the beginning of the closer and cooperativerelations between the two foreign ministers, the situation began tochange. Representatives from the media in both countries throughtheir respective professional associations came together in a numberof conferences and took some steps to put a lid on the prevailingchauvinistic discourse in the way they reported the news. Althoughthere is yet much distance to be covered for a truly objective,


informed and unbiased presentation of the ‘other side’ in the media,the Forum no longer concerns itself with that matter.

In the early stages, therefore, the most productive and consequen-tial sub-group of the Forum turned out to be the one concentrat-ing on Confidence Building Measures (CBM). The Turkish side of the group was headed by Admiral Erkaya who was at the timeambassador-at-large and chief counsel to Prime Minister MesutYılmaz. Admiral Erkaya was aided by Professor Hasan Ünal, a know-ledgeable and increasingly hawkish specialist from Ankara’s BilkentUniversity. The two other members were Ali Dinçer, a Member ofParliament, and Captain Ziya Bülent, Admiral Erkaya’s aide-de-camp. The Greek side was headed by Professor Rozakis, aided byPaulina Lampsa. The other two members on the Greek side wereProfessor Theodore Couloumbis from Athens University, and retiredAmbassador Costas Zepos. Professor Couloumbis was an internation-ally renowned scholar of International Relations and one of the two‘wise men’ on the Greek side designated to discuss Aegean matterswith their Turkish counterparts. Ambassador Zepos was a highlyrespected diplomat, who negotiated Greece’s accession to the Euro-pean Community and had been active in Turco-Greek affairs. JamesKer-Lindsay of RUSI and Dan Smith of PRIO participated in thedeliberations of the sub-group as well.

The CBM sub-group held two substantive meetings after the Maylaunch. The Turkish side came prepared to the meeting in Athens thattook place on 19–20 September 1998 with a draft proposal on CBMs.The discussion that ensued was thorough, constructive, far-reachingand frank. The absence of a military person on the Greek side whocould discuss the technical aspects of military CBMs was deemed byall participants to be unfortunate especially given the open andproblem-solving oriented nature of the discussion. The group metonce more in I

.stanbul on 24–25 October 1998. By then Professor

Rozakis had to leave the Forum as he was appointed to the EuropeanCourt on Human Rights. Costas Zepos replaced him as the Greekparty’s head in the CBM group. Costas Carras, with his boundlessenergy, assumed the role of the overall coordinator of the Greek partyin the Forum. At the end of the deliberations the group prepared areport outlining the Suggested Confidence Building Measures andCrisis Avoidance Measures (CAMs), to be submitted to the plenary


meeting that was scheduled to take place on 6–8 November atDelphi, Greece.4

The Report was never made public but it included proposals that covered three different areas: Non-Governmental, Inter-Governmental and Peacekeeping and Military Related Proposals.5

The proposals that were made were characterized as either CBMs orCAMs. It specified by whom the measures would have to beimplemented. For each proposal the question as to whether or not itneeded governmental, non-governmental or a mixed approach wasraised. Although the Report was never officially submitted to the twogovernments, undoubtedly the nature and content of the discus-sions were relayed to the relevant authorities. This may have contri-buted to the continuation of the more relaxed atmosphere betweenthe two countries that began a year earlier and may have helped thecontainment of the frictions that erupted in the succeeding yearseither during NATO exercises or because of the dog fights over theAegean.

Following its second plenary in November, the critical thresholdfor the Forum was passed in the wake of the Öcalan affair and thegroup came into its own. The circumstances surrounding the appre-hension of Öcalan unsurprisingly generated great tension betweenTurkey and Greece. Not only were the two governments seriously atodds with one another, but long-standing collaborative enterpriseswere also threatened. The Turkish-Greek Business Council’s meetingwas cancelled because of the Turkish side’s unilateral decision.Individual Turks, long associated with favouring friendly relationsbetween Turkey and Greece, took to recriminations. Suddenly, almostall efforts to build bridges between Greece and Turkey and Turks andGreeks came to a halt. It was to the credit of the Forum and the highpoint of its existence that under the blistering winds of the post-Öcalan climate, its CBM sub-group met in Athens in April 1999 andthe plenary was convened in May in I

.stanbul.6 By then the ailing

Admiral Erkaya was replaced as coordinator of the Turkish side byformer Foreign Minister I

.lter Türkmen who had a long and dis-

tinguished career as a diplomat and also served as ambassador inAthens.

The very fact that these meetings took place was an importantlandmark in the growth and maturing of the Forum. It was also


widely agreed at that time, despite some strong dissent, that inaddition to the CBMs the Forum in general and the CBM sub-groupin particular had to involve themselves with political analysis as well.The shakedown in Greece following the Öcalan affair, the replace-ment of Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos by Yorgos Papandreouwho had a significantly different temperament and approach toTurkish-Greek relations were considered to be positive develop-ments. On the other hand, partially as a result of the apprehensionof Öcalan, the April 1999 elections in Turkey recorded an upsurge ofnationalism and brought to power a coalition government of the leftand right nationalists along with a centre-right party, under thepremiership of Bülent Ecevit.

The spring of 1999 was also the time of the NATO intervention inSerbia that aimed at protecting the Albanians of the province ofKosovo. Whereas the Greek public vehemently opposed the inter-vention, the Turkish public was delighted that NATO, in whoseoperations the Turkish Air Force also participated, would not allowa repeat of Bosnia. The concerns that the Turkish government had,about potentially supporting a separatist movement, remained un-articulated. The Greek government trod a delicate line between itsalliance obligations and the fury of its own public and managed toconduct a successful policy. It also transpired both before and duringthe Kosovo crisis that all the loose talk about this war eventuallyengulfing Turkey and Greece and possibly Bulgaria as well was justspeculation. The two countries had a strong interest in making surethat the conflict remained contained, that the operation was finalizedin a short time and that stabilization started immediately. It waspartially because of the personnel change in Greece and partiallybecause of the commonality of interests in southeast Europe, whichbecame so evident by the recent crisis in Kosovo, that the ice-breaking meeting of two foreign ministers took place in New Yorkon 30 June 1999.

Sensing that the turn of the mood in the relations provided animportant opportunity, the Forum decided to come forward andpresent some of the conclusions from its work to date to the twoministers. The CBM group met in Athens to discuss the recentdevelopments and to decide on the proper course of action. In a letterdated 7 July 1999, Admiral Cobbold from RUSI and Dan Smith from


PRIO, two of the facilitators, wrote to Ministers Cem and Papandreouon behalf of the Greek-Turkish Forum. In the letter, after mentioningthe two ministers’ recent exchange of letters and their meeting inNew York, Cobbold and Smith presented ten proposals that wereagreed upon at the Athens meeting. In the words of the letter:

These ten proposals are not an exhaustive list of possiblemeasures. They draw on the background of discussion over thepast fourteen months. Participants selected them on the basis of practicality and the potential for quick implementationwithout extensive staff preparation. These relatively modest yetmeaningful steps are aimed at addressing the five areas youdiscussed in your meeting in New York. The ten proposals areas follows:

Peacekeeping� Arrange liaison and co-operation between Greek and Turkish

contingents in KFOR [United Nations Kosovo Force].

� Convene a conference for Greek and Turkish staff officers onthe lessons learned from the experience of Operation Alba.

Official Conduct and Communication� Authorize direct contact and communication between the

ministers of the two governments who handle the issueshighlighted in your meeting of June 30, specifically: Culture;Tourism; Trade; Public Order/Interior; [and] Environment.

� Hold regular meetings of the Under-Secretaries of the twoMinistries of Foreign Affairs.

Business Cooperation� In order to strengthen the prospects for business and

investment between the two countries, select and implementone of the existing proposals for the prevention of doubletaxation.

� Implement the project on mutual restoration of monumentsdeveloped over several years by meetings of businessmenfrom Greece and Turkey


Exchanges and Contacts� Encourage exchanges of lectures to university students by

government ministers.� Facilitate special visa arrangements for journalists and

businessmen.� Encourage local authorities of the two countries to work

together to foster tourism.� Ensure that the encouragement given to contacts between

local non-governmental organizations of both countries isendorsed through direct practical assistance.

Given the feedback provided to the governments by some of theparticipants in Forum meetings, perhaps it was not at all surprisingthat this list of proposals and the list of the agreements signedbetween Greece and Turkey, including the pending agreement ondouble taxation, had a lot of items in common.7

In August and September 1999, the two countries were bothliterally shaken by strong earthquakes. The Greek public’s compas-sionate response and generous help in the aftermath of the devastat-ing earthquake in Turkey on 17 August that claimed at least 15,000lives broke the ice between the two societies. The Turks reciprocatedwith the full force of their emotions when Greece too was hit by anearthquake a few weeks later.8 With these lethal acts of nature, thetwo neighbouring peoples have rediscovered each other’s humanityand changed their attitude towards one another. The stage was trulyset for a rapprochement that was expected to bear its first fruit at theHelsinki summit of the EU in December 1999.

The circumstances were auspicious for the Forum to carry on itswork and produce papers to address the tangible problems betweenthe two countries. By the end of 1999, the CBM group became thePolitical Analysis Group (PAG) and effectively overtook the Forumwhose plenary meetings would prove to be less and less useful. Atthe end of 2000 both RUSI and the Roberts Centre exited in accor-dance with an earlier decision to localize the process. The ForeignMinistries provided the financing for the PAG meetings that tookplace six times a year, evenly divided between Athens and I

.stanbul.

PRIO remained on board and Dan Smith continued as the facilitatorwith Jamie Bruce-Lockhart, retired from the Roberts Centre as well,assisting him as co-facilitator.


THE WORK OF THE PAG

By the beginning of 2000, many of the original participants in theForum had gone their way. The core group that would tackle theissue of formulating policy frameworks for the Aegean and possiblyfor Cyprus decided to try the European Union as well for recognitionand funding consisted of the following individuals: Costas Carras,Costas Zepos, Theodore Couloumbis, Arghyris Fatouros (a well-respected professor of law at the University of Athens who served as the Minister of Communications prior to the Greek elections in 2000, and currently a wise man on the Greek side for discussingthe Aegean issues), Thanos Veremis (another well-respected pro-fessor from Athens University who wrote extensively on Turkish-Greek relations) and Paulina Lampsa made up the Greek side. I.lter Türkmen, Ziya Bülent, Cem Duna, Mehmet Ali Birand, Sami

Kohen (the doyen of Turkish foreign policy commentators and a well-respected journalist), Muharrem Kayhan (an industrialist andformer chairman of Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Associ-ation, who left the group after the Aegean paper) and Soli Özel werethe members of PAG on the Turkish side. Birand and Kohen couldrarely participate in meetings because of schedule conflicts. In 2000Özdem Sanberk, a seasoned diplomat who served as the Under-secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Ambassadorin London when the Forum was being launched, joined the group.Üstün Ergüder, an eminent political scientist and the former rectorof Bogaziçi University, I

.stanbul, followed suit in 2001. Until RUSI

officially withdrew from the Forum, Jonathan Eyal, a senior associateof RUSI, made invaluable contributions to the deliberations of thePAG.

The members of the PAG hold a wide variety of views, and havedifferent temperaments and negotiation styles. This fact bothenriches the debate and complicates the progress of the discussions.The meetings usually open with a brief presentation by the twocoordinators on Turkish and Greek political developments and thepolitical calendar. The political calendar usually serves to determinewhat can or cannot be done at a specific date. There are differencesof opinion, as would be expected between the two groups; but moreinterestingly there are also serious differences within each group asto the approach to certain topics or the best way to tackle a specific


issue. The discussions usually take place within the bounds of civilityand comity, in spite of the fact that all participants are fairly opinion-ated and express their views with passion. The occasional flare-up oftempers is well contained. What keeps the group disciplined is itsconcentration on the framework of common interests that it devisedfor itself. Dan Smith’s interventions and guidance also play a con-structive part in keeping the group to its task. The group also provedconsiderably imaginative in finding ways to break gridlocks andmove forward. The key to the exceptionally smooth operation of thePAG meetings, besides the presence of competent facilitators, is thefact that the members have weathered the worst period in Turkish-Greek relations. Having met fairly regularly, in an engaged fashion,to discuss issues of mutual concern, they developed mutual trust,which enabled them as individuals to be as forthcoming as possible.

The major achievement of the PAG/Forum to date has been thepublication of its report entitled Issues in the Aegean: Openings andPossibilities (see Appendix). The report was the fruit of many monthsof discussions and most specifically two meetings, one in Athens, theother in I

.stanbul, in April and June 2000 respectively, devoted

entirely to drafting the paper. During these sessions the points thatwere agreed upon would be put in draft form by the facilitators andthen debated, altered, contended and finally agreed upon. Thefinalized report was presented to both Foreign Ministers on 23 June2000 by the co-coordinators, Carras and Türkmen. As the paperstated, its ‘preferred methodology is to start not from legal or politicalpositions and arguments, but from an assessment of interests –common interests to start with, but each state’s particular interests aswell’. Referring to an earlier memorandum submitted to the EUofficials in Brussels during a visit in March 2000 and then to theMinisters of Foreign Affairs of both countries, the Forum identifiedthe following common interests of Greece and Turkey:

� A fundamental interest in freedom of navigation [in the Aegean].

� An interest in cooperation on environmental protection, on searchand rescue, and policing.

� An interest in cooperation in promoting tourism.

� An interest in ensuring [that] there is no use or threat of force inthe pursuit of attempted settlement of differences.


� An interest in understanding each other’s attitude as to whether,when and how the issue should go to the International Court ofJustice.

Discussions in the GTF (Greek-Turkish Forum) have made clear thatthe underlying issues are overlaid by perceptions of threat andprestige. Discussions in the GTF have identified the importance ofboth demystifying and unpacking the contentious issues over theAegean. This may already be producing results: recently progress hasbeen made towards settling the contentious issue of flight infor-mation procedures. Three key issues are:

� Delimitation of the continental shelf.

� Delimitation of territorial waters and air space.

� The disputed interpretation of treaty restrictions on the militari-zation of certain Greek islands.

The GTF then went on to propose a particular route in dealingwith these issues and suggested a three-step approach. The first issueto be dealt with was the delimitation of the continental shelf in a two-stage process. The first stage called for negotiations of a predeter-mined duration and the second stage called for the submission of allunsettled issues to the International Court of Justice. The GTF paperbelieved that the ‘issues of sea and air zones might be approachedincidentally to the main issue, at either stage of the process, as pri-marily problems of interpreting treaties and precedent’. As for thethird issue of demilitarization and disputed interpretations, the GTFpaper believed that once the first two matters were brought to asuccessful conclusion, ‘the salience of this issue would declinesharply’. So it was best to leave it to the very end of the process. The GTF paper also suggested that this avenue would be viable ifthere is:

� Informal agreement in advance by both sides that they will gothrough the procedures in 1 and 2 above in partnership:

� A low-key, low-publicity approach on both sides, backed by acontinuing dialogue that takes common interests as the startingpoint:


� Sensitivity by each government towards the concerns of andpressures by public opinion in the other country.

After finishing and submitting the Aegean paper that was silentlybut well-received by the Ministries, the Forum had to set a newagenda for itself. After lengthy deliberations the Forum decided toundertake a study on Cyprus which most participants agreed wasthe core issue that poisoned Turkish-Greek relations. Not wishing to be presumptuous, the Forum decided to analyse the importanceof solving the Cyprus issue from the perspective of the commoninterests of Greece and Turkey without dwelling on possible solu-tions to the problem. Although the initial plan was to just outline the common interests, once that task was finished the Forum decidedto undertake a paper identifying the ‘Elements of a settlement inCyprus’. After four PAG meetings which took place between Decem-ber 2000 and June 2001, a text was finalized. However, because ofobjections of one member it was not adopted as a Forum paper.

Nevertheless, the Forum remained determined to get involved inthe Cyprus issue. The opening by Rauf Denktas in December 2001and the resumption of talks between Glafcos Clerides and RaufDenktas gave further impetus to the Forum. In April and July of 2002the Forum sponsored, with the help of PRIO, two meetings, bringingtogether Greek and Turkish Cypriots from politics and business lifeand representing almost the entire political spectrum.9 These talkswere fruitful and they enabled the parties to understand oneanother’s positions, appreciate each other’s difficulties and to beintroduced to ideas and perceptions that might prove to be useful asthe critical deadline of the EU’s Copenhagen Summit in December2002 approaches. At that summit, the EU will make its decision onenlargement as well as whether or not Turkey will be given a date tostart negotiations provided that it fulfills the so-called CopenhagenCriteria of 1993. Should Cyprus be admitted as a divided island, thatis without an agreement with the Turkish side, most observers fearthat deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations may prove to be inevit-able. As a result of this concern the Forum also decided to go publicand present itself and its work to audiences in Ankara, I

.stanbul and

Athens. The inspiration for this enterprise also came from a success-ful ‘road-show’ that Forum members performed at Tufts University’sFletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in late March 2002.10 In a well-


attended two-day conference, Forum members explained to theaudience what the Forum was about and presented their personalviews on Turkish-Greek relations, on Cyprus, on Greek and Turkishforeign policies.

ASSESSMENT OF THE FORUM

The Greek-Turkish Forum has turned into a successful second-trackdiplomacy effort. From the beginning, the Greek Foreign Ministryshowed more interest and engagement in its activities than theTurkish one, although the latter continued to provide financialsupport for the Forum’s activities. It is essential to recognize thatwhatever success the GTF may have registered could not have beenachieved without the tacit support of the two governments. Perhapsmore importantly, the lesson that one can draw from the Forum’sjourney is that second-track initiatives need both a first-trackopening in the background and a degree of official sanctioning that does not jeopardize their independence of thought and action.Arguably, without the timid post-Kardak steps, the launch of theForum would have met the fate of many other such initiatives.Without the post-Öcalan, post-earthquake rapprochement, theForum could not have come of age. It is under these circumstancesthat the major accomplishment of the Forum, the paper on theAegean, is treated as an important document that could provide amethodological basis for any future negotiations on these matters.

The success of the Forum and its longevity may be the function ofmany factors. First among these is the fact that the Forum itself hadbeen a CBM. Four years of, at times gruelling meetings, open discus-sions, opinionated arguments, brought about a degree of mutualtrust between the two parties that was extraordinarily valuable. Theemphasis on a political analysis of Greek and Turkish public affairsprovided both parties with a better understanding of politicaldevelopments, public moods and perceptions in each country. Thisappreciation made it possible to be careful about how to approachcontroversial topics, how to select the language of proposals and howto devise policy alternatives.

It was also undoubtedly of critical importance that the Forumcould benefit from the expertise, experience and the impartiality of


reputed organizations and competent facilitators. The contributionsof Bruce-Lockhart, Smith, Eyal, Cobbold at the initial stages of thegatherings when the structure was still very fragile was indispens-able. As Bruce-Lockhart himself put it, ‘an umbrella of neutralimprimatur was needed in early days as GTF was finding its wayforward and in times of mutual national hostility and tension –because of real fears of participants of being branded “traitor” andpotential damage to personal career, standing or interests’. Thisobservation perhaps addresses a most important concern aboutsecond-track processes. There is always a careful balance that mustbe observed between getting too far ahead of the curve on an issueor trailing behind official openings. In the case of the Forum, therecord so far suggests that it managed to be just daring andimaginative enough to generate important openings and sensibleenough not to venture to the realm of irrelevance.

Ultimately, what made the Forum a relative success story was thedevotion of the participants to the cause and work at hand. Thewillingness to spend endless hours around a table, at times in stuffyrooms with bad coffee and cookies, and to discuss issues of mutualconcern with imagination until you find an opening is truly the sinequa non of any such endeavour. In a way a successful second-trackinitiative may be as much the result of stamina and stomach as it isof sense and sagacity.

APPENDIX:ISSUES IN THE AEGEAN: OPENINGS AND POSSIBILITIES11

In a memorandum of 10 March 2000, submitted initially to EUofficials in Brussels, and later sent to the Ministers of Foreign Affairsof Greece and Turkey, the Greek-Turkish Forum (GTF) set out theissues in relations between Turkey and Greece on which it will focus some of its work for the coming period, and explained itsmethodology.

The approach of the GTF is to attempt to facilitate the search forsolutions and to indicate fruitful approaches. Our preferred metho-dology is to start not from legal or political positions and arguments,but from an assessment of interests – common interests to start with,but with each state’s particular interests as well. Acknowledging the


existence of common interest in areas of contention between the twocountries can be a useful starting point in the search for solutions toexisting problems. It is also necessary, of course, for each governmentto clarify its aims and to comprehend its neighbour’s particularinterests. Recognizing common interests makes the search for solu-tions a mutual exercise: understanding each state’s separate interestsis a necessary component of a sustainable agreement.

In the context of the differences over Aegean issues, the GTF’sMarch memorandum identified both general and specific commoninterests. The general point made is that ‘the common interest inintegration emphasizes the importance of Turkey’s EU accessionprocess’, in the framework of the Helsinki summit declaration. As tospecific Aegean issues, the GTF’s earlier memorandum identified thefollowing common interests of Greece and Turkey:

� A fundamental interest in freedom of navigation.� An interest in cooperation on environmental protection, on search

and rescue, and policing.� An interest in cooperation in promoting tourism.� An interest in ensuring there is no use or threat of use of force in

the pursuit of attempted settlement of differences.� An interest in understanding each other’s attitude as to whether

when and how the issue should go to the International Court ofJustice (ICJ).

Discussions in the GTF have made clear that the underlying issuesare overlaid by perceptions of threat and of prestige. The GTF is fullyaware of and has reflected on the tone and contents of debate in bothGreece and Turkey over the years, which have made these importantissues so complex. However, the GTF has chosen not to go into thataspect of the Aegean issue here, because it seems to us that the long-term interests of both countries encourage settlement. If so, a freshapproach is required, and we have indicated above the commoninterests, both general and specific, which we believe should governsuch an approach.

Discussions in the GTF have identified the importance of bothdemystifying and unpacking the contentious issues over the Aegean.This may already be producing results: recently progress has been


made towards settling the contentious issue of flight informationprocedures. Three key issues are:

� delimitation of the continental shelf;

� delimitation of territorial waters and air space;

� the disputed interpretation of treaty restrictions on the militari-zation of certain Greek islands.

The GTF recognizes that these issues are affected alike by impor-tant questions of interpretation of international law, or procedure, ofconcepts of national interest, and of attitudes and perceptions. Tomake progress, it is important that accurate information about bothsubstance and procedure in these matters is publicly available.

The GTF wonders whether the following route could be a helpfulway to working towards a resolution of these problems. Any otherissue that concerns territorial jurisdiction should be treated as amatter of treaty interpretation to be brought before the ICJ by theparty raising it.

1. The delimitation of the continental shelf is an issue that may beentrusted to a two-stage process, these two stages to be deter-mined by the two countries in advance, with a mutual under-taking that neither country will act to change the existing legalsituation until the entire process has been completed. The firststage would be one of negotiation, of predetermined duration,which may lead either to an agreement on some or all substantiveissues or to submission of any remaining issues to the ICJ througha compromis. The settlement of any issues which may occur at thatstage shall be formally confirmed by relevant agreements, whileany issues not settled at the first stage will then be submitted tothe ICJ. The underlying premise of the entire process is that, at thestart, both parties will have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ.

2. Issues of sea and air zones might be approached incidentally tothe main issue, at either stage of the process, as primarily problemsof interpreting treaties and precedent. An ICJ judgement on thecontinental shelf and agreed interpretation of the treaty regime inthe Aegean would ensure the freedom of navigation each siderequires, as also the exploitation of sea resources.


3. The issue of the effects of treaty restrictions on the militariz-ation of certain Greek islands is best left until last. Were all theother issues in the Aegean settled, and were the Greek-Turkishrapprochement making progress on other key questions, the GTFsuspects that the salience of this issue would decline sharply. TheGTF therefore concludes there is nothing to be gained by openlyaddressing this issue at this time.

Following this avenue is viable if there is:

� Informal agreement in advance by both sides that they will gothrough the procedures in 1 and 2 above in partnership.

� A low-key, low-publicity approach on both sides, backed by con-tinuing dialogue that takes common interests as the starting point.

� Sensitivity by each government towards the concerns of and pres-sures by public opinion in the other country.

The GTF regards it as possible that, undertaken in this way, a newapproach to the Aegean issues would do a great deal to underpin thecurrent improvement in bilateral relations.

NOTES

1. For details of the crisis see Mustafa Aydın, ‘Cacophony in the Aegean: ContemporaryTurkish-Greek Relations’, Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 27 (1997), pp. 109–40.

2. For details of the Öcalan affair and its effects on Greek-Turkish relations see SahinAlpay, ‘After Öcalan’, Private View (Spring 2000), pp. 34–41.

3. As a result of the Agreement on Cultural Cooperation, signed between two foreignministers in February 2000, an official working group was established to ‘co-operateon the presentation of history, geography, culture and economy of the other country,especially in the school textbooks … [and to] exchange and study school textbooks,with a view to propose the correction of inaccuracies’. For the full text of theagreement see [http://www.greekturkishforum.org/bilat_6.htm].

4. For the text of the press release after the Delphi meeting see [http://www.greekturkishforum.org/pr_1.htm].

5. For details of the ‘Report Outlining the Suggested Confidence Building Measuresand Crisis Avoidance Measures Proposed by the CBMs Working Group’, see[http://www.greekturkishforum.org/rep_1.htm].

6. For the text of the press release after I.stanbul meeting see [http://www.

greekturkishforum.org/pr_2.htm].7. For the texts of the nine agreements signed between the two sides in January–

February 2000 see [http://www.greekturkishforum.org/documents.htm].8. For an excellent analysis of the effect of the earthquakes see Gülden Ayman,

‘Springtime in the Aegean’, Private View (Spring 2000), pp. 55–61.


9. For the participants and the press release of the later meeting see [http://www.greekturkishforum.org/pr_8.htm].

10. See [http://www.greekturkishforum.org/pr_9.htm].11. Text is taken from Greek-Turkish Forum website, at [http://www.greekturkishforum.

org/rep_2.htm]. The members of the Political Analysis Group who worked on the text were Costas Carras (Greek Coordinator), I

.lter Türkmen (Turkish Coordinator),

Mehmet Ali Birand, Ziya Bülent, Theodoros Couloumbis, Cem Duna, ArghyrisFatouros, Muharrem Kayhan, Paulina Lampsa, Soli Özel, Özdem Sanberk and CostasZepos.


Conclusion

MUSTAFA AYDIN AND KOSTAS IFANTIS

I

Differences between Turkey and Greece are not new, but as long as they remain unresolved, there is a chance that some unforeseenincident could touch off open conflict and large-scale warfare.Continuing disputes over Cyprus, over the Aegean, over relationswith the EU, in relations with NATO, and in areas of bilateral andmultilateral relations with other regional and extraregional actors, allhave the potential to severely threaten bilateral and regional peace,security and stability. The history of the two countries’ bilateralrelations shows that such a situation might repeat itself more easilythan many think. It is therefore of paramount importance for allinvolved to prevent the (re)appearance of similar, conflictual con-ditions. The history of crises in the Aegean shows the ease with whicha state of protracted tension between the two countries maydegenerate into large-scale violence and warfare.

Our perspective remains fundamentally neo-realist. Internationalpolitics is not a constant state of war, but it is a state of relentlesssecurity competition, with the possibility of war always in the back-ground.1 The intensity varies from case to case, and can be moder-ated, to a great extent, by structural factors – in terms of a militaryclash, can even be abolished – as is the case of the EU member states.This rather dark view of international relations directly derives fromrealism’s three basic assumptions about the nature of the inter-national system.

The first is that the system is anarchic. This does not mean that itis chaotic or disordered. Of course, it is hard to perceive of an orderwithout an orderer;2 however, in this case, ‘anarchy’ is an orderingprinciple, which depicts the absence of formal relations of super- andsubordination.3

The second assumption is that the most fundamental stateconcern is survival and security. Survival means first and foremostmaintenance of sovereignty. In this drive, states think strategically.They ‘are instrumentally rational’,4 although miscalculations are notunusual, since the conditions under which they operate are inher-ently uncertain and information is imperfect. States can never becertain about the intentions of the other states, even when the ‘other’strongly believes themselves to be reliably benign. Uncertainty abouta state’s motives, or the belief that a state is motivated by greed ratherthan security concerns, will increase the other state’s insecurity.

The third assumption is that in the absence of world govern-mental agents, and in an environment of uncertainty and unstableexpectations, the international political process is shaped in a rathercompetitive way.

Although the fundamental assumption dealing with state motivessays that states merely aim to survive (which is a defensive goal), theinescapable truth, is that ‘political structures shape political pro-cesses’5 and determine outcomes. The natural state of affairs is thatstates in the international system fear each other. And that is whatdoes trigger security dilemmas, under anarchy: the strong per-ception that exists among states that other (states) are most likely tobehave in a predatory way.

However, cooperation is possible and quite often does occur inmany parts of the world. In general, it is not difficult to achieve,although it can be hard to sustain. Under a wide range of conditions,‘adversaries’ can best achieve their security goals through coopera-tive policies, not competitive ones, and should, therefore, choosecooperation when these conditions prevail.6 This can be the caseespecially, under balance-of-power structures, with coordinatedpolicies designed to avoid threatening arms races, and when they(states) manage to be attuned to absolute-gains logic, instead ofrelative-gains logic. Such a framework can be instrumental inenabling states to moderate causes of conflict that already exist or toavoid competition that would intensify these causes. When states are


concerned about absolute gains, they need only to make certain that‘the pie is expanding and that they are getting at least some portionof the increase, while states that worry about relative gains must carealso about how the pie is divided’.7 The latter, ultimately, leads tozero-sum relationships, which terminates any cooperative efforts.

Rightly formulated, in the bilateral realm, the ‘absolute gains’logic refers to a profound increase in security. A state’s choicebetween cooperation and competition is highly conditional. Thisconclusion easily flows from realism’s core assumptions.

In the introductory chapter, we attempted to advance theargument that a sincere and viable rapprochement status betweenTurkey and Greece can only be the outcome of a novel bilateralstructural arrangement that would entail two fundamental elements.First, there should be a gradual and constant redefinition of the twocountries’ national interests, which would allow a historic conver-gence of interest-based strategies. This process is possible consider-ing the two actors’ current power locations, as well as the interplayat their respective domestic levels. That means that the presence oflarge socio-political majorities that favour the current process is vitaland must be sustained at any cost.

Second, it is imperative that for, at least, as long as the process ofrapprochement remains fragile and weak, a ‘healthy’, transparentand thus stabilizing balance of power should remain the overarchingprinciple of the bilateral structure. Such a structural constraintwould, above all, make the cost of an even accidental clash extremelyhigh, while adding, at the same time, value to the hard efforts ofrapprochement.

What underlies our argument is the certainty that when the risksof competition exceed the risks of cooperation, rational state-actorsshould direct their self-help efforts towards achieving cooperation.Although many of the authors in this volume do not share our real-ist conviction, they do deal with the issues in a way that clearlyreinforces our argument about the premises of any cooperative effortbetween Greece and Turkey. Normalization of the bilateral relationspromises to provide both states with greater security than thecompetitive alternatives.

As an analytical matter, our framework does not distinguishbetween ‘good’ state and ‘bad’ state but essentially treats them likethe famous Waltzian billiard balls. In principle, all states drive to get

CONCLUSION 293

maximum relative power. An oversimplified realist interpretation ofthe Aegean disputes allows for no meaningful difference in themotives behind Turkish and Greek behaviour. Both sides are drivenby concerns about the balance of power and do what is necessary toachieve a more favourable balance.

Most Turks and Greeks would be disgusted by such a descriptionof the Greek-Turkish relations, because they believe that theircountry has always been motivated by benevolent intentions whilethe other has not. Perceptions and historic grievances can be power-ful determinants of policies, especially when they refer to structuralarrangements, external and domestic.

Ultimately, the choice for rapprochement and high levels ofcooperation, under the right conditions and with the right motives,is an optimal ‘self-help’ strategy for both states, in a highly unstableEastern Mediterranean.

II

The state of relations between the two countries is a product of the attitudes and perceptions of ruling elites and general publics,operating within global and regional settings. To the extent that oneside’s policies or claims are perceived as ‘revisionist’ and challengingthe bilateral status quo by the other, a lasting and viable reconciliationis hard to find.

As Millas’ contribution demonstrates, stereotypes, prejudices,perceptions and ideological bias, have played and continue to playa decisive role in producing ‘knowledge’ and ‘evaluation’ in thesociology of the relations between Turks and Greeks. For Mehmet, itis rather remarkable how much passion, and how little reasonedreflection, prevail in the bilateral relations across these two Aegeanneighbours. Clearly, history and cultural differences are majorexplanatory variables here, but at the same time, there are signifi-cant social-psychological similarities, in particular the high ethno-nationalistic perceptions. For the people of the two countries, it is notjust the burden of distant and more recent conflicts, but it is the‘national truth’ which surrounds the past that fuels antagonism andinsecurity and makes policies of rapprochement based on well-defined national interests hard to adopt and pursue. ‘Each nation has


its own interpretation of the past, and more precisely, each com-munity that has a very particular view with respect to its (imagined)past forms a distinct nation.’ Millas has shown the very high degreeof ‘unhealthy’ nationalism that underpins Turks’ and Greeks’perception of the ‘other’. The perception is in general quite negative.The ‘other’ is perceived almost exclusively as an enemy, as a constantsource of evil, as a predator and an aggressor.

At the dawn of the new century, despite guarded ‘post-earthquake’ and ‘post-Helsinki’ optimism, the prospects for Greek-Turkish relations remain uncertain. The Aegean and Cyprus willremain potential flashpoints and pose an ongoing problem of crisisprevention for the US and Europe. International anarchy and thesecurity dilemma make cooperation among sovereign states – thaton top of everything else ‘enjoy’ a history of competition and conflict,like Turkey and Greece – difficult. Greece and Turkey cannot easilyescape systemic-structural impediments, but they could make aneffort to achieve a relatively high level of cooperation by exploringthe opportunities offered by the collective security environment ofthe EU. The challenge for the two countries is enormous. As Jervisnotes, it is impossible to eliminate the security dilemma, but it can beameliorated: ‘The ideal solution for a status quo power would be toescape from the state of nature. But escape is impossible. The securitydilemma cannot be abolished, it can only be ameliorated.’8 AsTsakonas has indicated quoting Buzan: ‘The impact of the securitydilemma can be mitigated through “improved anarchies” and by thedevelopment of a mature society of states.’9 Moreover, ‘Bonds ofshared values and interests can be developed. If actors care aboutwhat happens to others and believe that others care about them, theywill develop trust and can cooperate for mutual benefit.’10 The con-ditions that make collective security possible indeed ameliorate thesecurity dilemma to a certain extent. Uncertainty about motives wouldbe reduced. When the actors hold compatible views of an acceptablebilateral, regional and international order and share a minimumsense of political community, ideational change has already mitigatedthe suspicion and competitiveness that fuel the security dilemma.

In 1982, the former US ambassador to Turkey, Robert Strausz-Hupe, pointed out during a discussion about the Cyprus problemthat ‘governments may come and governments may go, butgeography never changes’.11 According to Ross Norton, ‘Here was

CONCLUSION 295

one immediate lesson in Ambassador Strausz-Hupe’s commentscontrasting the tenuous state of governments with the constancy ofgeography: change your thinking and look at the geographic imper-atives, not just the political ones. Using this premise helps to keepanalysis of eastern Mediterranean issues focused on realities. Greeceand Turkey share common land and sea borders and they both haveextensive coastlines along the Aegean Sea. The geographic imper-atives of both countries can moderate actions as well as provokethem.’12 These imperatives are long term and can transcend govern-ments and ruling elites. They are also interconnected, so that if oneimperative is altered it will probably affect others.

Political elites in both countries should pursue a strategy that aimsat reducing the risks and remove the possibility of armed conflictaltogether. Not only because war will result in an isolation of bothfrom their western institutional affiliations, but because, even if theywere ‘to secure some marginal territorial gains after some initialbattles, a chain of revanchist conflicts would surely follow, classifyingboth countries as high risk zones’,13 with devastating consequencesfor their economic and social development. The differences are notintractable, especially if there is political incentive on both sides tosee them resolved.

Overall, the two countries are much better off today in terms ofbilateral relations than they were a few years ago. Under a (delicate)spirit of rapprochement reigning between the two countries, theprospects for a crisis and tension have been drastically curtailed andnew uncharted territory for peaceful coexistence, transactions andcommunication has opened. Having said that, it should be empha-sized that there has been no progress so far in resolving, or evenaddressing, the fundamental differences between the two countries.This can be unsustainable in the not too distant future. As Heraclideshas emphasized, the longer the bilateral relations remain uncertainthe easier it becomes to return to the dangerous pre-1999 Cold War-like status. The difficult issues that continued to divide and hauntboth countries should be addressed, sooner or later. It should benoted though, that good planning and patience are vital prerequi-sites. Nobody should expect that decades of animosity and hatredcould be overcome quickly. Perceptions need to be changed, but thiswill happen gradually. Trust must be built, and bureaucracies andpopulations must be prepared for change.


Nobody should forget that these are not issues for interestedparties to experiment with, and it is counterproductive to pressureeither country into taking too many risks without having a goodexpectation of the outcome. Stable relations have not meant aban-doning or compromising national interests. The process has beenrather costless so far and that means that in a well-planned andsincere strategic interaction, progress should be possible even whenAthens and Ankara have not the strongest (politically) of govern-ments. It is true that strong governments in both countries areexpected to move faster towards normalization. Nevertheless, somelimited but important steps can be taken even when this is not thecase. Regardless of the relative strength of each government, themilitaries of Greece and Turkey will continue to conduct exercises inthe Aegean, pursue their national objectives, and protect theirinterests. This factor leads to a regular cycle of increased tensions andserious incidents, some of which involve loss of life and militaryequipment. Even weak governments want to keep such occurrencesto a minimum.

In such a context, the proposed and hopefully implementedCBMs can be of vital importance. Certain CBMs would contributesignificantly to the reduction of tension and to the probability ofaccidental war and, most importantly, to further improvement inGreek-Turkish relations, but are not expected to address the under-lying causes of the Greek-Turkish conflict; only – as Dokos notes – topave the way for eventual discussion of ‘high politics’. In that respect,the ‘encouragement’ of the United States, the European Union andNATO, especially on the non-cooperating party, would, undercertain circumstances, facilitate the negotiating process.

The Aegean differences are not zero-sum, provided of course thatthe two sides define their national interests in a true ‘win-win’arrangement and do not cling to threatening maximalist positions.The negotiation strategy from the easier to the more difficult issueshas created a dynamic of its own, as the level of mutual confidenceis established, making the image of the enemy and the prisoner’sdilemma mentality less pivotal than before. The essence of the pro-cess cannot be other than what Heraclides suggested as puttingemphasis on tangible interests and try to pin-point manageablenegotiable issues to be placed within a cost-benefit calculus bycomparison to the cost and (perceived) benefits of the historical

CONCLUSION 297

dispute. The political and economic costs of the Greek-Turkish con-flict for the chief protagonists (Cyprus included), as well as NATO,the EU and the United States, are considerable, especially after the11 September 2001 events and the US-led war against internationalterrorism. Hopefully, national interests will converge strongly in the political, economic, security as well as in social-psychologicaldimensions.

Algan’s contribution demonstrates how there can be novel areasof major interest convergence, in an era where there is clearly a majorinternational security paradigm shift. Since the end of the Cold War,we have witnessed an explosion of attention to and concern aboutenvironmental issues. They have become much more salient inpublic discourse, more prominent in media coverage, more visibleand important in political deliberations, and ultimately they seem tobe becoming a significant issue in international politics.14 In theAegean, environmental problems and issues are definitely matters ofrelevance to national and regional security. As such, under the rightconditions, they can generate high levels of cooperation and (even)integration. The reconciliation inherent in the environment cansupport the development of peaceful relations by presenting novelopportunities for the protection of human and environmental secur-ity in the Aegean.

Bahcheli rightly points out that while officially expressed posi-tions indicate a wide gap in the Turkish and Greek positions in theAegean, considerable room for compromise on key issues has beenidentified. In recent years, numerous ideas have been floated byretired diplomats, academics and others, that are suggestive of thetype of compromise solutions in the Aegean that would go a longway to satisfy Turkish and Greek needs, and allay their anxieties.Also, specific Greek-Turkish disputes should never be viewed inisolation. There is a delicate interconnection among them, even ifthey do not seem related. For example, Greece’s claim to a nationalairspace of ten nautical miles may appear to have nothing in commonwith Turkey’s pursuit of a ‘fair ’ share of the Aegean seabed. Yet, noGreek government would consider changing its policy until there isa mutually agreed settlement on the delineation of the seabed. To dootherwise would be viewed as a sign of weakness and could thusadversely affect its negotiating position on the issue, or on any otherbilateral issue. The same is true for Turkey.


It is, however, important always to remember that Greece andTurkey do not view their differences in the same way. What isimportant to one may not be to the other. For example, for Greece,Cyprus is a priority that adversely affects a broad range of bilateralissues. For Turkey, Cyprus is a problem that is secondary to its accessto the Aegean continental shelf. This means that at least two issues,one that is important to Athens and one that is important to Ankara,will have to be discussed simultaneously, or there will have to beagreement on the order in which they are discussed.15 As Bahchelinotes, the leaders of Turkey have realized that it is unrealistic toexpect to advance towards EU membership without working towardssolutions to its problems with Greece in the Aegean, and helpingsettle the Cyprus issue.

It is rather unrealistic, also, to think that decoupling Aegean andCyprus issues is feasible. As Dokos observes, to a certain extent, thismight be possible in terms of implementing agreed CBMs, but thesituation in the Aegean has a direct impact on the situation in Cyprus,and vice versa. It is rather unlikely that fundamental progresstowards a comprehensive Greek-Turkish settlement will be achievedwithout a just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution of theCyprus problem. For Dokos, a ‘European’ solution for both Cypriotcommunities would probably be the optimum solution. Indeed, asuccessful resolution of the Cyprus problem would greatly enhanceefforts for a negotiated Greek-Turkish settlement.

Redefining their national interests in a true realist fashion can beinstrumental in both Turks and Greeks abandoning their maximalistinitial positions. For example, Turkey’s greatest anxiety has been toavert the Aegean becoming a ‘Greek lake’, by Athens’ extension of itsterritorial waters in the Aegean from 6 to 12 miles. According toBahcheli, there have been numerous unofficial indications thatAthens is prepared to accept a 6-mile territorial sea in much of theAegean in order to allay Turkish concerns. In turn, Ankara would beexpected to match this major concession to safeguard the interests ofGreece, particularly by accepting a legal settlement mechanism forthe continental shelf issue. According to Bahcheli’s evaluation, thereis considerable scope for compromise in the official Turkish positionthat claims half of the Aegean continental shelf. Ultimately, providedTurkish-Greek relations make sustained progress, it should be pos-sible to create a balanced regime in the Aegean that both meets vital

CONCLUSION 299

Turkish and Greek interests and is saleable to public opinion in bothcountries.

At the end of the day, Heraclides is right when he suggests thatrealization of the very low benefit of a zero-sum strategy wouldalmost certainly lead to the realization that the cost of keeping theongoing clash is certainly higher than the cost of a settlement basedon positive sum outcomes (win-win). In such a context, any agree-ment(s) should be the outcome of the free will of the two parties. Itis important that no party aims at imposing its will or its preferredsolution on the other side, be it by pressure or ruse. Such attemptsultimately lead nowhere and end up by being self-defeating. ForHeraclides, only if an agreement is regarded as sensible and just, andcertainly not as unfair, replete with unbearable compromises, can itlead to viable solutions, to an Aegean and a Cyprus of peace, stabilityand cooperation.

III

If the current process leads to a situation where the vital needs andinterests of Greece and Turkey are met and served, in particularregarding (common) security, territorial integrity, inviolability offrontiers, then the two countries will probably find themselves oper-ating in an environment conducive to peace and cooperation. In suchan environment, the absence of expansionist, threatening, anddestabilizing dynamics, the continuation of their European vocation,the enhancement of development and modernization tendencies,the deepening of pluralist democracy and true respect for humanrights will have the very strong potential of becoming the order ofthe day in the Aegean. The European Union and its integrationistaegis are instrumental in this respect.

Bahcheli emphatically demonstrates the fact of the Turkish politi-cal establishment being engaged in a critical bid to achieve the reformgoals (namely those related to human rights) set by the EU as a pre-requisite to commencing the accession negotiations of Turkey.Bahcheli is confident that the great majority of Turkish people wantTurkey’s European vocation in the expectation that this would stimu-late economic growth and prosperity in their country. SuccessiveTurkish governments have pledged themselves not to miss ‘the EU


train’, although they are aware of the enormity of the tasks ahead inachieving EU membership.

The economic imperative can also be paramount. As nationaleconomies are even more integrated within the global capitalistsystem, external shocks and destabilization risks increase, makingthese economies more vulnerable to financial crisis. By joiningregional groups or blocs such as the EU, the costs of crises can beminimized, while membership in a regional bloc also generatespolitical and strategic benefits. Greece has been more or less success-fully engaged in a continuous modernization and democratizationprocess since the mid-1970s. According to Mehmet, this contrastssharply with Turkey’s efforts at reform and restructuring aided andguided by advice primarily from the US. However, the primaryresponsibility for the comparative Turkish failure here belongs toTurkish elites.

The EU, as a collective security entity, can ameliorate the securitydilemma since by its nature it promotes and deepens cooperation.Over time, repeated acts of cooperation alter expectations and fostertrust and confidence. As states come to expect each other to recipro-cate concessions, rather than to exploit them, the wariness that fuelsthe security dilemma gradually subsides. Moreover, the EU engage-ment, by increasing transparency and thereby reducing uncertaintyand the chances of misperception, decreases the likelihood ofunintended spirals. Uncertainty is one of the key factors fuelling thesecurity dilemma. Above all, the confidence in Ankara and Athensregarding both Greece’s successful entry into the EU’s EMU innercircle, and Turkey’s eventual EU membership, will dramaticallyreduce uncertainty and is bound to spur both Turkish and Greekleaders and people to proceed to a new era of cooperative securityarrangements in the Aegean.

NOTES

1. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, in Michael E.Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds) The Perils of Anarchy:Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,1995), p. 336.

2. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,1979), p. 89.

3. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 88.4. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, p. 337.

CONCLUSION 301

5. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 82.6. Charles L. Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help’, in Brown, Lynn-

Jones and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, p. 378.7. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, p. 339–40.8. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 82.9. Panayotis J. Tsakonas, ‘The Security Dilemma in Greek-Turkish Relations: Theory and

Practice’, in Études Helleniques/Hellenic Studies, 9, 2 (Autumn 2001), p. 22.10. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 82–3.11. S. Ross Norton, ‘Geography Never Changes’, The Strategic Regional Report, 3, 4

(June/July, 1998).12. Ross Norton, ‘Geography Never Changes’.13. See Theodore Couloumbis and Louis Clarevas, ‘Proposals for a Greek-Turkish

Reconciliation’, in Tozun Bahcheli, Theodore A. Couloumbis, and Patricia Carley,Greek-Turkish Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace,1997), p. 36.

14. Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, ‘Introduction’, in Sean M. Lynn-Jones andSteven E. Miller (eds), Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995), pp. 4–5.

15. Ross Norton, ‘Geography Never Changes’.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY 345

academic community 56academics 132Aegean region 1, 4, 22, 24, 35, 110, 288Aegean Sea; co-exploitation 87;

development of nature sanctuaries 206;environmental problems 298; exoticspecies 202, 203; geographical andecological characteristics 195–203;importance of shipping route 125, 202;importance to marine mammals 196–7;natural gas 28; oil 28, 29, 30, 44;pollution 197; threatened animal species198; threatened plant species 197

Aegean Sea disputes 10, 27, 31, 40, 95, 215,258, 264, 286–8; airspace issue 27, 29, 30,38, 111, 144n, 234; continental shelfissue 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 69, 80, 119n,224–5; militarization of E. Aegeanislands 27, 30, 80, 81, 98, 144n, 261;territorial waters issue 28, 45, 49n, 69,80, 81, 119n, 260, 283

air traffic control dispute (1980) 44airfields 142nAkarcali, B. 274AKP (Justice and Development Party) 33, 48,

97, 115, 127, 137, 178, 235Albania 43, 159, 249, 266n, 267nAlgan, N. 12, 298Allbright, M. (US Secretary of State) 229Anatolia 55, 65n, 220Anatolian mainland 29Anatolian peninsula 100Annan (UN) Plan 34, 97, 111, 115, 117, 135, 138Aral Sea 192; Almaty Declaration (1997) 194,

195; Basin Programme 194armed conflict 67Armenia 226, 236arms procurements 72

arms race 112, 126Asia Minor 60; catastrophe 23Atatürk, K. 96Aydin, M. 8Ayman, G. 13, 14

Bahcheli, T. 9, 118n, 222, 298, 299, 300Baku-Ceyhan pipeline 110Balikçisi, H. 66nBalkans 1, 36, 39, 41, 43, 51n, 57, 128, 149,

248, 252, 253; Entente (1934) 25;multilateral cooperation 78; Muslimpopulations 252; peacekeeping force131; Wars (1912–4) 60, 98, 218, 221

Baltic Sea 192, 193banking 12, 145, 159banking and currency crisis (2001) 12, 127,

166, 172, 175, 176, 177, 178Bar-Tal, D. 222Barcelona Convention for protection of

Mediterranean Sea 199, 207Barnett, J. 188Bartholomew (Ecumenical Patriarch):

encouragement 75BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated

Settlement) 237, 241nBeglitis, P. (Greek Foreign Ministry

spokesman) 235Berne Declaration (1976) 29, 97, 101bilateral agreements 78, 96biodiversity 187, 190, 191, 196Birand, M.A. 273, 281Bitsios, D. (Greek Foreign Minister) 217Black Sea 192, 193, 195; Economic

Cooperative initiative 42; multilateralcooperation 78

Bodrum 200Bosnak (Turkish citizens of Bosnian origin) 42

Index

Bosnia 1, 43Bosnian crisis 41, 42Bosnian Serbs 41Bozcaada 98, 132Britain 101, 102, 103, 104, 119n, 135, 167;

granting of Ionian islands 221; non-intervention in 1974 222; see also England

Bruce Pagan test 154Bruce-Lockhart, J. 271, 272, 273, 280, 286Budapest meeting (2001) 235Bülent, Z. 276, 281Bulgaria 42, 110, 159, 249, 266n, 267nBurton, J.W. 53Bush, G. (US President) 259business cooperation: prospects 157–60Buzan, B. 295Byzantine Empire 54Byzantines 55

Çanakkale Strait 195Cardiff Summit 16Carras, C. 272, 273, 281, 282Caspian Sea 192Caucasus 39, 42, 110, 159, 220, 252, 254Cem, I. (Turkish Foreign Minister) 44, 62, 87,

91n, 95, 108, 142n, 230; resignation of 235Central Asia 42, 220, 252, 254Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation

(1944) 29Chios 50nChristians 54, 57, 66nClerides, G. 33, 84, 284Clinton, B. (US President) 259Clogg, R. 23, 67, 86Cold War 1, 5n, 7, 25, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 110,

247, 252, 258Common Agricultural Policy 169Common Foreign and Security Policy

(CFSP) 5n, 40, 136Common Security: A Program For Disarmament

(1982) 188Conalis-Kontos, M. 219Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) 11,

79, 142n, 143n, 227, 241, 276, 277;military 131–2; soft security 132

Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 153Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET)

153Constas, D. 220Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

(1990) 112Copenhagen Criteria 12, 47, 133, 166Couloumbis, T.A 262, 276, 281Council of Europe 107, 113Crete 34, 195, 221crime 76Crisis Avoidance Measures (CAMs) 276, 277crisis management: conclusions and lessons

180–2; economic 171–5; political 167–71;political and economic 163–82

Cuban missile crisis 16culture 76, 78, 124customs union: Turkey 114, 238nCyprus: EU membership 10, 84, 113, 114,

115, 117, 118, 218–19Cyprus crisis (1963–4) 26Cyprus crisis (1974) 1, 30, 104, 167–9, 171,

180, 222Cyprus issue 9, 31–6, 50n, 67, 89n, 96, 213,

259–60; benefits of European solution138, 299; EU concern 125; key strategicsignificance 102; resolving 133–5; toughstance of Turkey 68; United Statesinvolvement 111

Danube: River 192, 200Dardanelles 98Davis, K. (World Bank V-P.) 175Davos process 32, 38, 69, 75, 118, 136, 169Dayton Accord: post 249Demirel, S. 168Denktas, R.R. 33, 84, 98, 104, 108, 134, 218, 284détente 1, 8, 9, 39, 62, 67, 75, 84, 95, 96, 107, 133Devlet Baba (the Father State) 178Dinçer, A. 274Dodecanese Islands 50nDokos, T. 10, 11, 297, 299dolphins 197drug trafficking 76, 78, 124Duna, C. 272, 281Dynamic Mix-2000 manoeuvres 38

earthquakes (1999) 6, 8, 46, 62, 73, 95, 96,181, 230, 280

Eastern Mediterranean 123, 164; balance ofpower 33

Ecevit, B. (Turkish Prime Minister) 104, 108,114, 167, 168, 178, 278

ecological problems 76, 185economic cooperation 76ecosystems 12, 13Edip, H. 59Ekrem, A. 59Elefsis Bay 200Endangered Planet (Falk) 187England 25Enosis (union with Greece) 49n, 102, 103,

104, 167, 168, 222, 226environment 76, 78, 124, 159environmental problems 12, 298environmental security: in Aegean Sea

185–208; development of concept187–92; in regional seas 192–5

Eralp, Y. 116Erdogan, T. (Turkish Prime Minister) 115Ergüder, U. 281


Erkaya, G. 273, 274, 277ethnic cleansing 65nEurasia 55, 125European Commission (EC) 36, 39; Opinion

on Greek membership 37European Court of Human Rights 105, 276European Court of Justice 120nEuropean Monetary Union (EMU) 6, 126,

127, 136, 166, 176, 233, 250, 301European Rapid Reaction Force 50n, 257,

268nEuropean Security and Defence Policy

(ESDP) 39, 40, 114European Union (EU) 12, 32, 43, 50n, 62, 69,

87, 300; Copenhagen Summit (2002) 21,34, 47, 106, 118, 133, 235, 284; CorfuSummit (1994) 170; Greek membership26, 106, 166, 168, 171, 175, 220; Habitat Directives and Natura 2000 Activities 206; Helsinki decision 6, 181; HelsinkiSummit (1999) 16, 21, 96, 106, 124, 136, 140n, 287; lifting of Greek veto on Turkish membership 76, 77; LuxembourgSummit (1997) 112, 272; post-Helsinki debate 14, 245, 246; relations with Turkey 255–6, 262, 264; Turkish membership 27,77, 80, 95, 120n, 215, 216, 253

Eyal, J. (RUSI) 281, 286

Faik, S. 61Fatouros, A. 281Figen Akat 21films 61, 56fire of Smyrna (1922) 65nfisheries 190, 191, 196, 202, 203Flight Information Region (FIR) 29, 30, 99fragility of peace 234–5

Gençel, S. 274Germany 154, 272Ghali Plan 134Global Environmental Facility (GEF) 191Gökçeada 98, 132Greece: EU membership 26, 106, 166, 168,

171, 175, 220; identity crisis 47;sovereignty of Aegean islands 45;strategy towards Turkey 225–7; Treaty ofAccession (1979) 37

Greek constitution: abolition of Article 19(1998) 107

Greek Cypriot: EU membership 21;National Guard 135

Greek Independence War 23Greek Junta: Cyprus coup d’état (1974) 65n,

104, 167–9, 222Greek National Statistical Service 154Greek Socialist Party (PASOK) 32, 101Greek-Turkish clash (1919–22) 60, 96

Greek-Turkish Forum 15, 75, 85, 144n,269–89; assessment 285–90; birth 271–4;first steps 274–81; political analysisgroup 91n, 280, 281–5

Green Line 97Groom, A.J.R. 86Group of Wise Men 227Guidelines for the Prevention of Accidents

and Incidents on High Seas andInternational Airspaces (1988) 214, 242

Gulf of Saros 49nGulf War (1990) 172, 252Güntekin, R.N. 61

Halkidikya gorge 195Hellenic Foundation for European and

Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) 128Helsinki European Council 50nHeraclidis, A. 9, 54, 116, 222, 296, 297, 300Heraklion Gulf 200historians 56, 57historiography 7, 53, 56, 57, 59, 61, 64, 65n;

academic 56; popular 56Human Development Index (HDI) 163human rights 88, 246, 300Hurriyet 275Hussein, S. (Iraqi president) 172

Ifantis, K. 14, 15, 16IFOR/SFOR (NATO stability) forces 43Ikaria 50nillegal immigration 76, 78, 124Imvros 132Inalcik,H. 65nindustry 12, 158I.nönü, I

.. (Turkish Prime Minister and later

President) 110International Civil Aviation Organization

(ICAO) 30International Court of Justice 21, 29, 69, 81,

124, 138, 144n, 225International Monetary Fund (IMF) 110,

127, 140n, 154, 173, 174, 177Ioannidis (Brigadier) 104Ionians 55Iordanides, C. 274Iordanidou, M. 60Iran 110, 226Iraq 136, 235, 252irredentism 54, 56, 72, 221I.skenderun 102

Islam 54, 217Islamic arc 43Islamic fundamentalism 252Islamic revivalism 33Israel 123, 126; Palestinian conflict 136Issues in the Aegean: Openings and Possibilities

(PAG) 282, 286–7

INDEX 349

Istanbul 99, 107, 132, 179Italy: Mare Nostrum policy 25I.zmir 30, 38, 81, 99, 199

Japan 156Jervis, R. 4, 295Johnson, L.B. (U.S. President) 110journalists 132

Kadri, Y. 59Karagatsis, M. 60Karamanlis, C. (Greek Premier) 83, 168, 176Kardak/Imia crisis 16, 22, 44, 74, 97, 100, 206,

237nKarpat, K. 65nKastanakis, T. 60Kathimerini 275Kayhan, M. 274, 281Kemalism 253, 262Kemalist vision 112Ker-Lindsay, J.(RUSI) 274, 276Kinzer, S. (New York Times) 179Kohen, S. 281Kordatos, G. 65nKosovo crisis (1999) 1, 75, 123, 278Krebs, R. 112Krueger, A. 176Ksenos, S. 59Kuhnhardt, L. 254Kunt, M. 65nKurds 217; groups 179; insurgency 33, 223;

nationalism 44; rights 179Kuwait 251

labour unions 132Lampsa, P. 273, 281land-mines: banning 79Larissa 38Lausanne Peace Treaty (1923) 31, 45, 69, 98,

100, 107, 138, 234Layne, C. 2Leandros (Soutsos) 65nLesser, I. 253Lesvos 49n, 50nLiargovas, P. 11, 46Limnos: Greek forces 38literary texts 7, 8, 53, 58, 60, 61, 62, 64literature 7, 56, 59, 61, 64local government 12, 145, 159Luxembourg Summit 16

Maastricht 39Macedonia 41, 144n, 169, 221, 249, 267nMadrid Joint Statement(1997) 14, 74, 227,

229, 230–1, 245, 259, 272Makarios 65n, 103, 104, 167, 218Manos, S. 274maritime boundaries 27, 28, 114

Marmara Sea 195Marxists 58media 56mediation: American 12, 109–12, 165, 230–2,

237, 256, 265; European 12, 112–15, 165,295

Mediterranean 1; Action Plan (UNEP) 194,199, 200, 207; monk seal 196–7, 202, 203,205

Megali Idea 54, 69, 141n, 181, 221, 222Mehmet, O. 12, 47, 294, 301Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

208, 214, 241Mersin 102Middle-East 39, 252Millas, H. 7, 8, 294millets (non-Muslim communities) 57mineral resources 28Mirivilis, S. 60missing persons 134Mithat, A. 59Mitrany, D. 9, 79, 83, 85Mitsotakis, C. (Conservative Party leader)

169Moskof Selim (Viziinos) 65nmovies 56, 61muftis (religious leaders) 106–7Muslim 41, 42, 57, 107, 133; identity of

Turkey 251Muslim Ottoman 65nMyers, N. 187

National Action Party (MHP) 90nNational Bank of Greece: presence in

Turkey 159national minorities 26National Oil Company 49nNational Security Council (NSC) 108nationalism 8, 12, 54, 59, 62, 64, 72, 165nationalist 74, 91n, 262nationalists 72: 89nNATO 1, 25, 35, 40, 50n, 95, 99, 128, 270;

Destined Glory 2000 exercises 131, 234,261, 265; impact of possibleTurkey/Greece war 125; Washingtonsummit meeting (1999) 123

natural gas: Aegean 28near-war crisis (1987) 31negotiations and deterrence 213–43New Democracy Party 136, 249newspapers 59, 61NGOs 24, 62, 75, 270North Aegean Petroleum Consortium 49nNorton, R. 295Norway 273Notam (714) 30Notam (1157) 30novels 53, 58, 59


Öcalan affair (1999) 16, 76, 77, 106, 127, 232,278, 289n

oil: Aegean 28, 29, 30, 44oil crisis 187Olson, M. 176Olympic Games (2004) 127Operation Alba 279oral history 56Organization for Economic Co-operation

and Development (OECD) 190, 191Organization for Security and Cooperation

in Europe (OSCE) 38, 189organized crime 76, 78Orthodox heritage 41Ottawa convention 79Ottomans 41,55, 57, 58, 65nOttoman Empire 23, 42, 60, 72, 98, 102, 218,

220Ottoman Turks 164Ottoman-Levantine 23Özal, T. (Turkish Premier and later President)

26, 32, 33, 49n, 69, 80, 172, 228, 251Özel, S. 15, 281Özlu, D. 61

Palaiologos, G. 59Pangalos, T.(Greek Foreign Minister) 227,

232, 278Papadiamantis, A. 59Papalexopoulos, T. 274Papandreou, A. (Greek Premier) 26, 29, 32,

38, 47, 49n, 50n, 69, 80Papandreou, G. (Greek Foreign Minister) 44,

62, 76, 92n, 95, 123, 124, 130, 136Paparrigopoulos, K. 65nPeace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 273,

284Peleponnesus 221perception of threat 24, 220–4Personalities Group Process 229Piri Reis 206pisciculture 12, 158Pitsipios, I. 59PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party) 69, 81, 85, 106,

108, 218, 226, 238nPlatias, A.G. 219political corruption 175–80Politis, N. 60ports: Black Sea 28; Turkish Aegean 28Posen, B.R. 3Prevelakis, P. 60Pridham, G. 92n

Rabbit Islands 98Rabin-Arafat handshake 273Ramsar Convention on Wetlands 207Redefining National Security (Brown) 187Redefining Security (Ullman) 187

Refah (Virtue) Party 127, 253refugees: Greek Cypriot 104; Turkish

Cypriot 104Republic of Cyprus 34, 105; see also CyprusRhine, River 192Rhodes 195Roberts Centre 271, 280Rogers Plan 38Romania 249, 266nRoyal United Services Institute (RUSI) 271,

272, 274, 280, 281Rozakis, C. 273, 274, 276Russia 110, 126, 135

S-300 missiles: tension 16, 33, 97, 127Sami, S. 59Samos 50nSamothrace 50nSampson, N. 167Sanberk, Ö. 281Saudi Arabia 251Schmitt, C 74sea fishing 12seabirds 196September 11th tragedy 7, 182, 298Serbia 41, 43Sèvres syndrome 69Seyfettin, O. 59Sezer, D. 251Simitis, K.: government 31, 47, 120n, 136,

169, 176, 223, 246Simmel-Coser hypothesis 72Sina Gürel, S. 235Skopje problem 249Smith, D. (Director of PRIO) 273, 276, 278–9,

280, 282, 286Social Science Research Institute (FAFO) 273Solana, J. (NATO Secretary-General) 214, 229sovereignty: Aegean islands 45Soviet Union 39, 40, 226, 251, 253; effect of

collapse on Turkey 251; threat 25; seealso Russia

Soysal, S. 61Stearns, M. 116, 226Steering Committee 78, 79strategic (security) studies 71Strausz-Hupe, R. 295, 296Svoronos, N. 65nSyria 89n, 226; alliance with Greece 236, 237;

threat to Turkey 223

Taasuk-ı Tal’at ve Fitnat (Sami) 65nTamir, K. 66nTask Force on EU cooperation 79Tenedos 132terrorism 75, 76, 78, 124, 136, 235, 238ntextbooks 7, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 61, 73, 132The Hague 82, 83

INDEX 351

Theodoropoulos, B. 138Thermaikos Gulf 200Thessalonoiki 199Thessaly 221third party involvement 230–2Thrace 68, 85, 106, 107, 133, 216, 250tourism 12, 91n, 124, 145, 235, 242, 279, 280,

282Tourkokratia 55Toynbee, A. 72Track-II Diplomacy 132trade 11, 124, 140n, 145, 149, 173; prospects

for Greek-Turkish integration andcooperation 145–57

Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance (1959)103, 104, 109, 119n, 167

Treaty of Accession (1979) 37Treaty of Brussels (1948) 39Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1992)

42Tsakonas, P. 170, 295Turkey: accord on EU-NATO relations

(2000) 267n; Constitution (1982) 178;Custom Union agreement with EU 114,172, 238n; economic crisis (2001) 127; EUmembership 27, 77, 80, 120n, 215, 216,287, 299; external anxieties and internaluncertainties 250–4; Fourth Army 30, 31,81; geopolitical value and role 252–4;recent initiatives 227–30; second coupd’etat (1980) 168, 171, 178; strategytowards Greece 224–5

Turkish Cypriot Defence Organization (TürkMukavemet Teskilati, TMT) 134

Turkish History Thesis 55Turkish Petroleum Company 49nTurkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

(TRNC) 33, 34, 105, 114, 115, 119n, 120n,219

Turkish-Greek Business Council 277Turkmen, I. 277, 281, 282

Unal, H. 276Union of Democratic Forces 42United Nations 35, 44, 108; Annan Plan 34,

97, 111, 115, 117, 135, 138; Charter 113,225; Development Program Our GlobalNeighbourhood 189; EconomicCommission for Europe (UN/ECE) 191;Environment Programme (UNEP) 192;Environmental Programme (UNEP) 191,194; General Assembly (1954) 69;Johannesburg Conference onSustainable Development (2002) 186;Law of the Sea Convention (1982) 98–9;127; 193; 213; 214; 237n; Rio Conferenceon Environment and Development

(1992) 186, 193, 194; Secretary-General21, 37, 111, 229; Stockholm Conferenceon Human Environment (1972) 186,192; World Commission onEnvironment and Development Report(1987) 186, 188

United Nations Kosovo Force (KFOR) 279United States of America (USA) 1, 7, 9, 26,

32, 35, 99, 111, 128; Congress’s armsembargo on Turkey 171; and Cyprus111; encouragement 25, 297; future roleof 258–60; Greek lobby 132, 168, 171,251; mediation 22, 109–12, 165, 230–2,237, 256, 265, 272, 295; perspective 14,245; relationship with Greece andTurkey 219–20; trade 153, 156;Washington 108, 110, 173

universities 12, 145, 159Uzbekistan 159Uzunçarsılı, I. 65n

Vakalopoulos, A. 65nVarlik tax (1942–3) 132Varosha 104Venezis, I. 60Venizelos, E. 96Venizelos-Atatürk rapprochement 85, 96,

128, 141n, 167, 184n, 221Veremis, T. 281Vikelas, D. 59

War of 1897 60War of National Liberation (1920–22) 23Warsaw Pact (1955) 123Washington 108, 110Washington Consensus 173weapons of mass destruction 252Western Anatolia 23Western European Union (WEU) 39;

importance of Greek membership 40Wilson, A. 118nWilton Park 271, 272women: nationalistic discourse 59, 60World Bank 173, 175, 180World War One (1914–18) 23World War Two (1939–45) 96writers 7, 65n

Yilmaz, M.: government 74, 101, 227, 276Yilmaz-Papoulias agreement 38, 79, 130,

142n, 143nYoung Turks 58Yugoslavia 41, 43, 95, 248, 249

Zepos, C. 276, 281Ziya, H. 59Zurich-London agreements 103
