Muslim Minority , Multiculturalism and Liberal State: A Comparison of India and Europe BY Anwar Alam AVH Fellow, Islamwissnschaft University Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany.

I The recent setback in multicultural thrust of European nation- states,( Modood:2003, Joppke:2004, ) despite being modest in forms, has raised many questions about the efficacy of liberalism and liberal- democratic state to integrate the people of other religions and cultures, particularly the Muslim immigrants. This setback was reflected in many ways ranging from heated controversies over the hijab, the requirement for ( halal) food for Muslim children in the schools, the construction of mosques, the teachings of Islam in schools, the demand for Islamic/ Muslim schools, Muslim burial rites, women’s rights, church-state relations, and compatibility of Islam with democracy to the passing of legislation banning the wearing of Islamic headscarves in public school in France and and in some states of Germany and finally in various policy pronouncements . These policy pronouncements range from Law on Civic Integration on New Comers (1998) in Netherlands which obliges non- European new-comers to take 600 hours of languages and civic lessons to the adoption of Cantle Report (2001) in Britain that emphasised that “ the greater sense of citizenship’, ‘common elements of nationhood’ and ‘the use of English language’ that had to be strengthened in the minority communities, and overall ‘ the non- white community had to develop a greater acceptance of, and engagement with, the principle national institutions”. Similar programmes were sought to be instituted by various European governments whether – left or right- (including all Scandivinian countries, except Sweden), Belgium, Austria and Germany. With its new stress on civic integration and assertion of majoritarian national ethos, the liberal- democratic state in Europe is becoming more assertive about its liberal principles, and shows itself less willing to see them violated under the clock of ‘multicultural’ toleration. There are many who have associated this retreat of Western liberal states from commitment to multiculturalism as an evolving policy perspective of integration with the assertion of rightwing politics and incompatibility of Islam with the secular, liberal- democratic values of western society. However one has to go beyond this stereotypical narration of the failure of multiculturalist model of political integration. Rather one has to look at the issue at much more theoretical level, ie, going back to the foundation of western liberalism. How far the liberal-democratic state in Europe can go in accommodating the demands of other cultures, particularly Muslim communities? What is the nature of multiculturalism that was being practiced for last two decades but had to abandon in the face of growing political assertion of Muslim communities in last decade? Does the current form of multiculturalism offers an alternative mode of integration or is another variant of assimilationism that was being practiced in varying degrees at both policy level and societal level in almost all of European society? Does the retreat in multicultural thrust of state policies reflect its logical outcome, not a deviation, given the nature of multiculturalism that was pursued? Can the Indian model of liberal state and multiculturalism provide the answer to the problem of integration of Muslim minority communities in the European world? This papers examine some of these questions and compare with the Indian tradition of liberalism and its experience in managing the cultural and religious diversity, particularly the management of their Muslim minority communities.

Before one should proceed to address the above questions, a short of definition of liberal state and multiculturalism required at the outset. By liberal state I mean a state that guarantees the basic fundamental rights to its citizen and people and governs in accordance with the principles of rule of law, accountability and non-discrimination. Both Indian and European states fall within the scope of this definition, despite the vast difference in the historical trajectory of evolution of liberal state (Mahajan, 1998). Defining multiculturalism is a problematic as it means different things depending upon different contexts. In sharp contradiction to the notion to pluralism, multiculturalism unmasks the ‘value neutrality’ of liberal state and demands the equal recognition and representation of group/ community rights and its culture in public sphere. It advocates the notion of multi-cultural citizenship and multi- cultural nationhood. At a broader level it aims at reconciliation of cultural diversity and political unity. (See, John Rawls, 1993, Charles Taylor/ Amy Gutmann, 1992, Will Kymalicka, 1989, 1994,1995, Joseph Raz, 1994 and Mulhall and Adam Swift, 1996, Bihku Parekh,). However while taking into consideration of this broader meaning of multiculturalism, I am concerned with the political aspect of multiculturalism or what is called state multiculturalism. State or political multiculturalism deals with the policy of management of social, cultural and religious diversity within the logic of nation-state and represents a kind of liberal pluralism which implies both a hidden norm from which minority groups diverge while failing to recognize prevailing power differentials (Goldberg, 1994). Integration underlies the basic thrust of state multiculturalism, however forms of integration varies from country to country depending upon the country’s specific tradition, character of nationalism and relationship between minority and majority It operates most clearly in the discourses and the practices of education, sociology, the law and immigration and is often contradictory in its application and assumptions. It is within this framework of multiculturalism that state policies towards Muslims in Europe will be examined in this paper. The second point of clarification is regarding the basis of comparison between India and Europe. One may question the efficacy of comparison between what is called a post- modernist society like Europe and a’ tradition bound society like India’. Without going into debate about modernity, post –modernity and traditionality, the comparison between the two is premised on the following considerations:----

1. Both share two common features: a secular, liberal-democratic polity and Muslims as a

dominant religious minority.

2. They represent two different models of integration within the broad framework of multiculturalism.

3. Equal opportunity for different communities placed group equality on the agenda of late 20th century liberalism. With these changes in liberal sensibilities the Indian constitution does not appear to be alien or hostile to the liberal agenda. Once liberalism makes space for the concepts of equal opportunity and group equality, the idea that all religious and cultural communities must be equal in public domain appears reasonable compatible with concerns of liberalism. Indeed the system of minority rights in India appears to reflect the concern of minorities within liberalism and western democracies.

4. While Europe is struggling to usher into a multicultural society, India is a living

multicultural society.

5. Europe had an early encounter with Islam that was virtually displaced as a result of the Crusades and did not have a role in the making of modern Europe. Islam has started refiguring itself in the context of colonial encounter and waves of migrations in this last century. Islam has had a more or

less continuous presence in India and has substantially contributed to the making of Indian culture and civilization. It is worth exploring whether this difference in the pattern of encounter makes for differences in how the Muslim question is viewed

6. Irrespective of legal positions—whether Citizens or immigrant status---- the loyalty of Muslims on

account of its trans-national nature of religion are suspected in the eyes of a section of majoritarian communities in both—India and European states.

II Within the framework of political multiculturalism there appears to be two distinct phase of the engagement of European governments with Islam and Muslim immigrant communities. During the first phase (1974-1989) one finds the display of multicultural concerns on the part of European governments in dealings with the Muslim immigrant communities. The multicultural concerns were reflected in accommodating the religious needs for Muslims populations of immigrants’ origin: the availability of burial sites, prayer spaces, ritual animal slaughter, religious education, chaplains in hospitals, prisons and the army, permission for the construction of mosque, establishments of Muslim schools etc. The accommodation went to the extent of granting aid to opening of Muslim schools ( for example in Netherlands and UK) and recognizing Islam at national level ( Beligium, Spain, Austria, Italy) in many European countries but refusing to accord the legal recognition of Muslim communities as religious communities on account of the absence of single centralized body. However what is interesting to note here is that these multicultural concerns were totally absent during the period of intensive Muslim immigration (1950s and 1960s) needed for the post war reconstruction of Europe and began to appear in 1974 when the policy of immigration was officially ended (though it continued in the shape of family reunification) in most of the European countries under the impact of Oil shock. Hence the contextualization of the limited form of multicultural thrust of European policies during 1970s and 1980s and its abandon in 1990s is important to understand the dilemma and limit of European liberal states to pursue the policies of multiculturalism while dealing with the Muslim populations. These multicutural pragmatic arrangements made during 1970s and 1980s were derived from multiple objectives: ranging from a sort of cultural packages to immigrants Muslims to cope with the economic crisis that resulted from shift in economy from manufacturing to service industry, securing Muslim governments cooperation to manage the religious needs and tapping the Arab resources for investment in Europe. The Turkish DITIB in Germany, the Saudi Muslim world League in Italy and France, and Algerian Grande Mosques de Paris in France (GMP), were all granted a privileged institutional presence in State- Islam relations and Saudi- funded Islamic Centre were allowed to mushroom in Europe. But beyond the management of immigrant populations, European government’s diplomatic and commercial motivations remained paramount in their interaction with Islam. In 1974 a Euro_ Arab Dialogue was institutionalized between 21 Arab states and 10 countries of the European community. A convention signed by France and Morocco in 1981 obligated Judges to apply Moroccan Islam law in matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance, for Moroccan living in France ( without French citizenship). However by the end of 1980s when the Muslim immigrant community asserted their claim of representation in public sphere that was reflected in the Honeyford affair, in the Rushdie affair, the Bradford riots and other inter- racial conflicts in UK and the headscarf affairs in France and Germany, and coupled with the Iranian revolution in 1989 and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism with anti- western tone in the Muslim world made the Western governments more sensitive to the need of regulating Islam in European hemisphere. The governments

were alarmed by the fact that demand for recognition of Islam in public sphere came from second and third generation of Muslims who were expected to get assimilated into the dominant European culture. Controlling the Islamic fundamentalism became government’s overall concern in dealing with Muslim immigrant communities. This was also necessitated with the slow realization that Muslim immigrants were no more a gust workers but a permanent reality, a part of European landscape. With these consideration in mind began the second phase (1989-2004) in the engagement of European governments with Islam and its Muslim immigrant communities---- the phase characterized by the policy of regulation, control and incorporation that reflects the continuity of historical pattern of subordination of Church to the state in Europe. III Following liberal democratic revolutions of 18th and 19th centuries, European nations aimed to weaken the influence trans-national Catholic networks by eliminating its monopolistic or dominant positions in state- church discussions. Napoleon and Cavour recognized religious minorities and subjected the catholic clergy to a civil code, taxing or seizing their property and wealth. Well before the gradual separation of state and Church, religious minorities (beginning with Jews, and later Christians and Muslims) had posed a particular set of problems stemming from their refusal to obey what Rousseau calls the “ law of the vanquished”: the customary obligation to convert upon military defeat: The refusal to recognize the god of the majority makes religious minorities’ loyalty as citizens forever circumspect and begs the questions of whether the beliefs of religious individuals undermine the legitimacy of the state. States have always behaved as though they can do something about the place of religion in public sphere, and European states sought to de-transnationalize Catholic and Jewish communities in the past. The state’s desire for community interlocutors is about fitting religious organizations into round pegs of the interior ministries’ religion bureaus. Institutionalization, the assignment of political status to interest groups, “is always two-sided in its effect------ “ Groups gains advantages and privileges although---they have to accept certain constraints and restrictive obligations----. They gain access to government decision making positions—but are subject to more or less formalized obligations, for example, to behave responsibility and predictably and to refrain from any non-negotiable demands or unacceptable tactics”. The relations bureaus of contemporary European interior ministries structure and mediate the relationship of citizens and their ( chosen or native) religion: to ensure” that the centrifugal push of religious loyalties that translational religious regimes foster does not grow enough to overcome the centripetal pull toward national unity that the state must nurture. The mechanism of re-territorilization and “de-trans-nationalization” are not new to Europe: these states initiated similar institutionalization to resolve the dilemmas of loyalty and identity in the 19th century (Markel, 2003). Enlightenment thinkers from Von Dohm to Mirabeau suggested that emancipated, domestically oriented Jews would make more useful members of society as full citizens ( Parekh 2002,). Yet community recognition represented the first step towards emancipation, incorporation and dissolution of the religious minority into the national polity.--- “ The recognition of difference was an instrument of, rather than a threat to, sovereignty----- The law secured recognition for the Jews, yet it also secure recognition for Purssia by placing Jews into a new relationship with the state” ( Markell, 31 and 138). Making use of their government’s religious affair bureaus, China, Japan and Korea “ de-transnationalized” Buddhism, Christianity and Islam by “ bringing them within state corporatist regimes. Allowed them to operate on the condition that they sever foreign

connections--- accept state control of appointments and finances ( Rudloph, 247). The “ insistence on financial and institutional independence from transnational religious regimes led to a reorganization of Chinese Protestantism (1951) and Catholicism (1957). Thus looking in this background the European requirements are not as stringent with regards to Islam as generally the case is made out. It is within this framework of State- Church relationship that European governments aims to manage their Muslim immigrant populations by effectively nationalizing, if not secularizing, Islam. Throughout the 1990s this approach was manifested in many of their policy pronouncements. These governments are trying to foster nationally oriented Islams subordinate to the state as well as to establish European norms stretching back to the treaty of Westphalia, the Enlightenment and Napoleonic rule that were developed in different times, for different religions, in very different environments. By nationalizing Islam and putting it squarely within existing structures in the tradition of state churches, governments are seeking to contain a sensitive issue on familiar ground, maintaining the leverage established structures afford. These efforts favour certain Muslim groups over others; seek to educate imams locally, require them to speak the vernacular, and understand the local culture; facilitate construction of mosques and religious instruction in the hopes of reducing Muslim state financing and influence, restrict wearing the hijab; and virtually shoehorn Muslim organizations into structures that correspond to national criteria and objectives, such as Belgium’s Central Body for the Islamic Council, Germany’s central Council of Muslims, and the French Council of the Muslim religion. In all too many cases, state established Muslim councils have failed the tests of fair and equal treatment and are not truly representative. States have excluded certain Muslim groups, predetermined and or selected –out individual representatives, and taken a “ one size fits all” approach that fails to take into account the diversity and variety of the Muslims communities in most European states, including their sectarian and doctrinal differences, the inherently non-hierarchical nurture of Islam, and other functional and structural differences from Christian religions. However the European governments refusal to accord the legal recognition of ‘faith communities’ to Muslim immigrants on account of lack of single organization, lack of consensus on the normative structure of Islam, logic of transparency and organizational structure as well as non- conformation to the values and principles of states appears to be a violation of principle of human rights and liberal as well as legal values. In the past the governments in Europe have recognized the internal pluralism within Christianty and as such has accorded the legal recognition of faith communities to many Christian communities exhibiting various tendencies ( Cathiloicism, Protestantism/ Anglicanism and Orthodoxy). It was also found that atleast in case of Beligium, the Roman- Catholic ( majority religion) is represented by eight independent bodies ( eight bodies in eight dioceses) and that Protestantism is offered state support in its Lutheran, Reformed and Anglican tendency and was represented by various bodies, not a single body? ( Marie- Claire and Adriaan Overbeeke, 122- 123 in Shadid and Koningsveld, 2000). Hence given this background it is pertinent to ask why Muslim communities are required to be represented through a single body in order to meet the criteria to obtain the legal status of faith communities and thereby becoming eligible for state financial support? Moreover very recently, in 2000, German’y highest judicial court, the Constitutional Court, has finally granted the faith community of the Jehovah’s Witnesses the status of Corporation of Public l Law. Jehovah’s Witnesses are evangelical Christians who believe in the imminence of doomsday and consider all state authority the work of devil. More important is the nature of judgement. The judges explicitly stated that German constitution should function as a means to further freedom of religion as a constitutional right and not tie religious identity to state interest. They even question the

necessity for faith communities to confess loyality to the state at all ( Gerdien Jonker, 36-37, in W.A.R Shadid and von Koningsveld (eds) 2000). Further in two recent cases regarding Muslim minorities, namely in Greece and Bulgaria, the Strasbourg based European Court of Human rights has drawn clear demarcation- lines, on the basis of interpretation of art 9 of European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties (ECHR), concerning the requirements for a religion to be institutionally unified under one umbrella. In the case Serif vs Greece ( Dec. 14, 1999) the Court has stated that it “ does not consider that, in democratic societies, the state needs to take measures to ensure that religious communities remain or are brought under a unified leadership”. In the case Hasan & Chaush vs Bulgaria (October 26, 2000), the court has confirmed and refined its position in examining and condemning- the way the Bulgarian government had refused to give effect and recognise the elections of Muslim leaders: “State action favouring one leader of a divided religious community or undertaken with the purpose of forcing the community to come together under a single leadership against its own wishes would--- constitute an interference with freedom of religion. In democratic societies the State does not need to take measures to ensure that religious communities are brought under a unified leadership”. ( Marie, p.122) Two explanations can be advanced for most of European states' policy of regulation and theirs’ refusal to include new faiths, particularly Islam. First the 'autonomy' to various denominational churches in Europe was granted only in the twentieth century after exercising strict state control/supervision over them and was subjected to thoroughgoing processes of democratization and secularization. Christianity lost its political influence and has been reduced to the domain of 'private matter' and to the status of 'civil religion'. In other words, in the West collective community rights have been placed on the agenda after a uniform structure of social and civil laws has been established in society. The existence of a uniform code is important because it has, to some extent, prescribed the limits of permissible cultural diversity. That is, aspects of the liberal ethic have been incorporated into community practices and, as consequences, in these liberal societies community rights have not frequently conflicted with the principle of gender equality. On the other hand, the Muslim world has hardly undergone such structural transformation. Thus, many fears that granting autonomy to Islam might be misused for the promotion of fundamentalist world view against the secular-democratic order of Western countries. Second, Western liberal-democratic states can control (and deal with) an organized church, but not an amorphous, unorganized Islam. As Rudolph writes, “elite- controlled is more predictable and manipulability, but religion from below less so. High religion lends itself mere to formal or informal pacts with state; religion from below is amorphous-----hard for states to monitor, to control or to bring into a regularized relationship” (252). However given the context of globalization and the age of information technology one wonders whether the application of this institutional assimilation model of integration of 18-19 century will have any desired result in terms of the integration of Muslim immigrant communities. In fact this approach has multiple implications that hinder the meaningful integration of Muslim communities in European society. First, the problem with this approach is that, although it ostensibly puts Islam on the same plane as traditional European religions it fails to integrate Muslims into European society. This outcome is not at all surprising, given that the governmental goals are primarily control and regulation, not outreach and accommodation. To date, not a single national Islamic council created by a European state has become an effective interlocutor with the government, facilitating a fruitful two-way dialogue. Most have foundered. The attempt to promote a nationally oriented Islam artificially, however, may accentuate the trend toward Muslim alienation, promoting further movement toward communalism. By deliberately excluding or failing to foster

structures that permit the full range of Muslims sectarian groups to have a voice in the dialogue European governments further segregate Muslim communities, limiting the possibilities for engagement with the broader society. For their part, Europe’s Muslims have tendency to move in a similar directions, reinforced by the state’s approach of trying to nationalize Islam, in Europe or elsewhere. Roy has described this path as “ re-communalization along supranational lines, which is defined in essence by European Muslims’ identification with a universal umma, or community of the faithful------- It is with this---- phenomenon that radicalism and violence become potentially serious issues”. (Oliver Roy : 2003, p.63) Second, attempts to nationalize and secularize Islam, moreover, hinder the development of modern Euro- Islamic identity that amalgates Western culture with Islamic orthopraxy, parallel to the distinct Arab Islamic, South Asian Islamic and East Asian Islamic cultures and identities that have emerged elsewhere in the world. The Arab Islamic culture has most profoundly shaped the practices of Muslims in continental Europe, but much of this influence derives from Arab customs and traditions, not Islamic orthopraxy. The development of parallel Euro—Islamic model (Tariq Ramdan: 2004) could provide a framework for Muslims to make the adjustments necessary to integrate into European society while maintaining their Islamic identity and for European societies to make appropriate accommodations and adaptations to encompass a growing segment of Europe’s citizenry. Third, as the thrust of this approach is on minority, it fails to take into consideration of the need to educate the majoritarian community about minority’s culture and religion, given that a meaningful integration is a two way process. The government initiative in this regard has not gone beyond the promotion of inter- faith centres and indulgence in the ‘symbolic politics of multiculturalism’. (Sigrid Baringhorst in Sophie Body- Gendrot and Marco Martinieello, 2000). Despite the public advocacy of integration, many Europeans and Muslims in Europe remain convinced that their respective values are not only incompatible with each other but also that the others values directly challenge their own identity. These perceptions thus perpetuate each group’s separate existence within Europe. Although many European Muslims are open to milder form of integration, overwhelming majorities of Muslims in France, the UK and Germany resist assimilations, preferring to be a part of Europe while maintaining their own Islamic identity. If anything, the trend toward Muslim differentiations and alienation appears to be growing stronger, with the younger generation in the vanguard. In a 2003 Ipsos poll, for example, three-fourths of French Muslim respondents considered the values of Islam to be compatible with those of the French Republic, but only one-fourth of those under 25 shared that view” ( ( Le Figaro Survey.). Conversely, an Ipsos poll conducted around the same time indicated that 62 % of the general French population believed that values of Islam were not compatible with those of the French Republic.( Jerome Cordelier, “ IPOSOS –Le point Poll: Islam Is a Worry for the French”, Le point, May 16, 2003). In a 2002 survey conducted in Germany, 19% of respondents said that Muslims should not be allowed to practice their religion in Germany, 43% voiced doubts about Islam’s capacity to be tolerant and 67 % said that, when practicing their religion, Muslims should be more respectful of the views of German public.( Ulrich von Wilamowitz- Moellendorff, 2003). According to the 2000 European Values Survey, in comparison with people of a different race, immigrants, and Jews, Muslims are the societal group that Europeans least want as a neighbour and, in some cases, by significant margins. Moreover that European governments and publics tend to view and respond to all Muslims as an undifferentiated whole further reinforces the tendency among Europeans to see the Muslim presence as a real threat, which, in some respects, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The threat is framed in terms of security (terrorism) and

economics (jobs); yet, the core issue is identity and the perceived cultural threat Islam poses to European way of life. Europeans have even coined a name for it: Islamophobia. However the Western fears of Islamic fundamentalism is totally misplaced. Various survey conducted on this issue has pointed that this is a very minor trend prevailing among a section of deprived Muslim youth. In fact what is generally being ignore is the question, ie; under what conditions fundamentalism emerged within the minority community—whether Muslims or non- Muslims? A survey of the cross-cultural examples in this regard shows that the potential for the development of politicized form of fundamentalism within the minority community- depends upon, to a large extent, the perception of majority community and and their internal perception of relative material and cultural deprivation. Moreover minority tends to be more conservative about their values and traditions in every society lest they be dissolved in the collective majority. In fact Islam, to a great extent, functions as a marker of social identity in a minority societal context. As jocelyne cesari has remarked, “ Islamization in a Western context is a means of maintaining and reinforcing the sense of belonging to Islam in a non- Muslim context, while in Muslim countries it can refer to a process of politization. The experience of belonging to a minority in a context of political and cultural pluralism is the major difference between Muslim and Western countries”. ( Jocelyne Cesari, ‘ Islam in European Cities’ in Sophie Body Gendrot, 2000, p. 90) Given this scenario and framework of integration which does not address the pathetic economic situations of Muslims and comes closer to the model of assimilation, those Muslims confronting poverty, bigotry, defacto segregation, and limited social mobility, are likely to find it difficult to embrace Europe’s liberal democratic views on gender equality; sexual liberalization; and the principles of compromise, egalitarianism and identification with the state. These are all issues that challenge the traditional views not only of Muslims but also of individuals with an Arab, Turkish or South Asian heritage, as the vast majority of Europe’s Muslims are. These cultural backgrounds have not included the Enlightenment as a central pillar, and the idea of a secular society is for the most part alien. Moreover, as Mustafa Malik notes, in these societies, “resistance to liberalism was heightened by hatred for European colonialists, who represented liberal values”. Having examined the European states’ policy toward Muslim immigrant communities and its implications in terms of integration of Muslim immigrant communities, there are two other factors related to the nature of liberalism itself that obstructs the meaningful accommodation of Islam and Muslim minorities. First, the growth and development of liberalism in Europe is associated with the general process of homogenization of society and nation- state. Official recognition of a religious identity, within the boundaries of nation- state, compelled and enforced homogenization of the population. It eliminated the ‘other’, or atleast pushed it outside the boundaries of the self. This flushing out of the internal ‘other’ created conditions in which the liberal orientations could grow. With the eliminations of the religious and cultural others, the only thing that stood in the way of such expressions of equality was differences of privileges based on status. Early liberals recognized this impediment, and consequently they were hostile to privilege held by corporate bodies and classes. The point to be noted is that when the ‘other’ is metonymically related, the ideology of formal equality is widely disseminated. And conversely, when the ‘other’ confronts the self metaphorically, the discourse of cultural difference gains substantial ground. Further, religious persecutions and elimination of internal others makes the individual rather than the community the legitimate subject of political discourses. Indeed, when forced homogenization is the operative norm, the

category of the individual becomes a more convenient unit of analysis because references to the community invariably draw attention to the differences between them and us. Indeed the non- suppression of the other made it exceedingly difficult to rise above the dialectic of self and other. In these circumstances, cultural pluralism rather than liberal individualism became the operative principle of democracy. The implication of linkage between the evolution of liberal state in Europe and the process of homoginization is that if Islam and Muslim communities had to find a place in the secularized society of Europe, then it had to undergo the process of assimilation. Related to this relationship between liberalism and homogenisation, there is a disjunction between the pluralist claim of liberal- democratic nation – state and its construction of exclusive nationalism derives from a common descent, religion, culture, language or history. There is a linkage between operative laws concerning citizenship, immigration and the further development of exclusive form of nationalism. In this nationalism outsiders are either excluded in principle or they have to be completely assimilated. This makes the task difficult for the policy makers to accommodate the religious and cultural demands of Muslim immigrant communities at national- political level. This will require the transformations of public mind set vis a vis the issue of nationalism. Indian Perspective Having examined the European liberal state’s policies and its plank of multiculturalism vis – a- vis the Muslim immigrant communities, let us turn our attention to see how Indian liberal state has manage and integrate its Muslim communities. The understanding of the Indian states’ policy- both central as well as state governments—towards the Muslim communities requires the understanding of Indian version of liberalism and multiculturalism that has shape the political practice of Indian state and its approach towards religion. In both respects the practice of Indian state differs radically from the European experience in this regard. First in mark contrast to European liberalism (despite its changing faces) that believes in the individual autonomy as the best guarantor of religious tolerance and cultural diversity, it regarded religious and cultural autonomy of the group for the same. In fact the framework of individual rights was considered to be insufficient because it saw differences only as a source of discrimination. That is, individual rights of citizenship ensured non- discrimination between individual and groups. Consequently little attention is paid in the west to the ways in which cultural differences can be represented in the public arena. In India, however, differences were considered to be both a source of discrimination and diversity. Hence the Constituent Assembly realized that that they would need to create conditions in which cultural diversity of the polity would be protected. While it accepted and endorsed the twin ideals of autonomy and non- discrimination it regarded autonomy for religious communities to be the best guarantor of equal treatment. Hence constitution guaranteed (Art 25-30) the minority rights. Thus by focusing on the cultural policies of the state and devising ways by which cultural communities receive equal consideration in the public realm, the Indian constitution deviated from the European liberal framework. The Indian constitution can be said to be a multicultural document in the sense of providing for political and institutional measures for the recognition and accommodation of the country’s diversity. Within the constitutional framework of multiculturalism the Indian state, to a large extent, has successfully reconciled the demands of unity and pressures of diversity. The perspective of unity-in-diversity and diversity-in-unity has been the guiding principle of the Indian state to manage its rich regional, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious diversities because the task of putting up a nationalist struggle against the colonial masters demanded

incorporation of diverse cultural groups and regions. Such perspective requires that every political community needs to provide autonomous spaces in which its different communities can feel secure and both affirm and negotiate their respective identities in their un-coerced interactions with each-other. This may take many forms such as the freedom to regulate their internal affairs themselves and set up appropriate cultural and educational institutions, with state support and subsidy when appropriate. It is this approach which underlies the thrust of Indian constitution and notion of secularism. In other words Indian constitution successfully harmonizes the notion of individual citizenship with cultural and religious collectivises/communities, something that the western model of multiculturalism has so far been unable to achieve. However because of certain inherent weakness of democratic tradition, which seeks to deal with communitarian leadership without ensuring that democratic processes reach deep down, the Indian model of multiculturalism has not been successful in achieving the goal of internal democratization of Muslim communities-- a vital aspect for the proper integration. India significantly differs from the European experience of the nation- building process. Unlike the Western construction of nationalism it began its nation- building exercise through the process of democratic consultations and negotiations among different individuals and communities as reflected during the making of the Indian constitution. In fact as a post – colonial state, India after independence was more a state- nation than a nation- state, for the institution of the state, very much a part of the British legacy, were already in place when the colonial rulers left, having transferred power to an English speaking Indian elite. The post colonial state thus needed to build a nation which would then be the repository of the ultimate allegiance of the citizens. But which of the many values that underpinned the freedom movements was to be chosen as the core of the state-nation? Faced with this question, the Fathers of the Indian Constitution did what the leaders of the Freedom movement before them had done. They remained deliberately vague in their formulation of the core values of the Indian nation. In fact the attempt even to establish Hindi in Devanagri script as the national language quickly became an open invitation to the different social and cultural groups of India to assert their differences as the opening gambit in the oncoming negotiation of their status within the new Republic. The Congress Party, based on a political culture of consensus and accommodation, acquiesced in these developments and adapted itself to this process for the purpose of winning elections. As such, the post-colonial state in India abandoned, at least for the time being, the path taken be nineteenth century nation states to pulverise cultural differences in the greater cause of the nation. Ironically, Just as Nehru’s regime and the Congress party as its main ruling instrument were resisting the attempts to impose Hindi as the national language but giving in cultural symbols like language as the basis of regional state formation, the less secure regimes in Pakistan and Sri Lanka were moving in the direction of elevating the status, respectively, of Islam and the Urdu Language, and, Buddhism and Sinhalese on reluctant minorities, respectively, in East Bengal and the Northern Sri Lanka. This lack of core values of Indian nationhood not only guided the post-colonial state to trek along the line of “moderate” and “cautious” nation building process that helps in smooth accommodation of various regional, cultural and religious aspiration and identity at the national level but save the Indian state from facing a situation like in France where the state refused to concede the religious demands of Muslim immigrants of wearing the headscarf in public sphere on the plea that such a concession amounts to undermining the heritage and identity of French nation--- the very principle of Republicanism and Secularism.. This flexible, accommodative process of nation- building process helps the various communities, particularly the minority religious community, in identifying themselves with the ‘nation’. It needs to be underlined here that since early 1980s when the Indian state started asserting the principle of majoritarianism as the basis of Indian nationalism, the majority-

minority relationship deteriorated sharply, giving rise to sectarian divisive forces at the cost of national unity and integrity.

The second important factor that acted as a constrain on the Indian policy makers to embark on the aggressive, homogenising path of nation- building process is the constitutional provisions of religious and linguistic minorities, which is generally referred as minority rights ( Art 25---30) as well as the constitutional recognition of group rights. Although the Indian state has not always recognized these constitutional commitments, neither created institutions to implement these constitutional commitments, nevertheless the symbolic recognition of minority rights and its cultural symbols in public sphere goes a long way in retaining the confidence and loyalty of the minority communities. Of late the Indian government has given attention to the development of institutions that are crucial to fulfil the constitutional commitments to the minorities. One such development is the establishment of National Minority Right Commission in 1994. While it is still in the process of evolution and its recommendations not binding on the central governments, nevertheless its report get media attention and member of the minority communities does approach it for justice. The large number of petition the Commission receive every year does indicate that it has a symbolic value for the minority community from the point of view of justice. Though the critics, mostly from the right wing section of the society, have pointed how the system of minority rights breeds ‘ minorityism’, ‘fundamentalism’ ‘isloationism’, ‘ghettoism’ and thus hinders the process of integration of minority communities. However the reality is just reverse. It is the system of minority rights that has helped in instilling the confidence among the member of minority communities to live with dignity and without fear and participate in the national affairs, thereby strengthening the cause of national integration. The system of minority rights has multiple advantages from the point of view of enhancing the legitimacy of the state and strengthening the cause of national integration. First, it limits the possibility of cultural assimilation and homogenization by the nation- state. It strengthens religious minorities in their opposition against enforced assimilation Second, by providing resources and opportunities for religious minorities to organize and mobilize, it directly helps to redress serious inequalities among religions. It tends to tackle political and cultural hegemony of entrenched religious majorities and of aggressive secularism. In doing so, it contributes to a viable religious diversity in civil and in political society. Third, contrary to liberal fears, it may also help to prevent the development of religious fundamentalism in politics. Fourth, it shares the advantages of flexible and democratic institutional pluralism. It gives minority associations more resources, based on official recognition and opportunities for participation in the realms of information, public deliberation, decision making, and implementation. Finally, it helps to detect hidden secularist or religious majority bias in the distribution of material benefits and, especially, in the cultural and symbolic impregnation of state ceremonies, rituals, and practices( Bader: 2003, 265-294). Third, recognizing the strict religious neutrality of the state is not only an unachievable but an understandable utopia, and taking into account the actual religious bias of existing states as well as the unequal chances of organized religions, the most important issue is, How to achieve degrees of relational neutrality and more even-handedness with regard to existing majority and minority religion?. While this ‘notion of relational neutrality’ within the context of liberal- democratic state is currently being debated within the European landscape in order to deal with problem of cultural and diversity that has recently figured in the context of immigration, particularly the Muslim immigrants, India adopted this long ago in its doctrine of secularism without officially proclaiming so. This relational neutrality was maintained in

two senses. First, by avoiding any constitutional definition of secularism. Second, the adoption of the kind of working definition of secularism ( Sarva Dharam Sambhav) that neither endorse the American model of secularism in terms of complete separation of religion and politics (constitutionally speaking, if not in political practice) nor the European model of secularism, save France, that recognises the varying forms of associationship of religion and state at constitutional level. Clarifying the meaning of secularism, H. V. Kamath said: The State represents all the people who live in its territories, and, therefore it can not afford to identify itself with any particular section of the population-------- We have certainly declared that India should be a Secular state. But-----a secular state is neither a Godless State nor an irreligious, nor an anti-religious, state.( Quoted in Madan, p. 244). The Indian notion of secularism underlines the principle of non- discrimination and principle of equi- distance with each religion. Just three years before his death, Nehru remarked, “ We talk about a secular state in India. It is perhaps not very easy to find a good word in Hindi for “secualr”. Some people think it means something opposed to religion. That obviously is not correct------- It is a state which honours all faiths equally and gives them equal opportunities” (See, Gopal 1980: 330-1). Further by adopting that India will not have state religion, the constitution assured the minorities communities about non- homogenization path of nation- building process. The Indian notion of secularism reflects the approach of state towards the role of religion in public sphere. Thus, indirectly, it recognises and legalises the role of religion in public sphere to the extent that it does not adversely affect the democratic political process and political outcomes. Without going into details, suffice here is to say that India adopted, unlike Europe, the non- institutional and non-representative approach in dealing the religions and religious groups. Because institutionalized systems of representations are inherently characterized by conservative tendencies and exclusionary effects. Recognized religions will defend their privileges by holding newcomers at bay, thereby adding to the negative effects of thresholds on new religious minorities and their organizations. As a consequence, the gap between institutionalized religions and the actual religious state of affairs is widening (a fact well known in the aftermath of the Dutch history of pillarizaion from 1950s onwards). For obvious reasons, administrations also experiences difficulties in recognizing such changes and adapting their policies accordingly, thereby contributing at least unwittingly to institutional inertia and longer time lags. This difference in the approach is crucial to understand the non- coercive, non- regulative behaviour of Indian states toward Muslims. Thus the Muslim communities have, over the years, established a very large number of Islamic schools without any hindrance from the state. The historical experiences with separate religious schools (viz; the Catholics schools in countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands) shows that they regularly contribute to, instead of detract from, the integration of the respective religious communities into the common polity. The same may occur with the more recent policy of ‘ institutionalizing Islam’ in the educational system in the Netherlands. The low threshold for the establishment of Islamic schools in the Netherlands----compared to France, Germany or the United Kingdom---- may help to prevent the development of a ‘ fundamentalist’ Islam and its spill over into the political system. The upshot is that once states do not apply aggressive polices of enforced assimilation but rather engage in even-handed accommodationst policies and allow religious minorities considerable autonomy, including the freedom to voluntarily integrate into common public institutions, the chances will be minimized that minorities develop into ‘isolated’ groups living from cradle to grave in separate institutions.

Finally, the democratic political process has acted as a bulwark against the spread of militant fundamentalism among the Muslim minorities, despite their increasing alienation from state system. Muslim communities tend to articulate their demands through the major mainstream political parties. This has been reflected in all major initiative of the governments: ranging from the government grants to minority educational institutions, extending the benefit of affirmative policy of reservation in government employments to Muslims, inclusion of Urdu in 8th schedule and in many of state languages, to setting up Minority right commission. In addition to these constitutional commitments the government and ruling parties ensures the representation of Muslims in decision-making bodies through ensuring nomination of members of minority communities to elective offices and partly through their promotion to positions of power and authority in government. Whether this did in fact ensure that the minorities were able to affect political decisions remains an open question, this political practice did give to the minorities a sense of representation and participation in decision-making process. In fact By adopting multiple strategy and negotiations with multiple centre of decision making within Muslim communities at both levels-- centralized and decentralized-- and by encouraging the Muslim communities to participate in the general political process of the country the Indian state has not only been successful in accommodating the major concerns of Muslim community but has thwarted the rise of Islamic fundamentalism among the mainstream Muslim populations. Whereas the European states are finding it difficult to negotiate with Muslim communities in view of absence of single representative structure among Muslim immigrant communities. In this regard it is worth noting that given the fact that European societies have democratic regimes and if they do not keenly pursue a programmatic model of cultural and social homogenization that carries the potential to generate a counter tendency towards religious reassertion, the prospects are that except for concern with religious identity Europe would be spared any large-scale Islamic resurgence despite the alarmist fears that are expressed on this count. Experience of India is instructive in this respect. India with a weak structure of civil society and a weak democratic political tradition has successfully 'managed and administered ' the second largest Muslim population in the world without any threat of rise of pan-Islamism mainly because the state has been moderate in its nation-building activities and allowed democratic space to its minorities. European countries with a strong civil society and strong democratic institutions is surely in a better position to obviate the possibility towards a large-scale Islamic fundamentalist consolidation It is in this context that one can argue that the European educated generation of Muslims is probably the most valuable resource shared by both the Muslim communities and the wider society in the task of integration of the two into future multicultural society. Since they can operate more effectively in trans-cultural space, religion is re-appropriated through strategies of cultural reduction and hybridization, in order to bridge the gap between the country of origin of their parents and the social context in which they grew up. Hence the making of a "Muslim French", "Muslim British", "Muslim German" or even a "Muslim European" and a ‘Muslim Indian’ is quite possible. The task of integration is related to the internal democratization of Muslim communities. And it is through the European educated Muslim generation that internal democratization of communities can be achieved. However due to 'celebration of notion of community' in multiculturalism, the task of internal democratization of a community has often proven difficult as the Indian case indicates. It is clear from the forgoing that Europe and India had completely different trajectories so far as encounter with Islam and Muslims is concerned. Even so, their comparisons from the perspective of dealing with Islam and Muslims within the framework of the nation state suggest strong points of mutual convergence and contrasts. Europe having already evolved as a nation state in proceeding centuries, is now being called upon to accommodate and incorporate a substantial religious minority within the dominant national ethos. On the other hand, India

has devised a political framework where the attempt has been to incorporate minorities as an integral part of the polity while allowing them a modicum of religious space.

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