NICK ZANGWILL Music, Metaphor, and Emotion i. the issues We describe mus ic in ter ms of emotion. How should we und ers tand thi s? Some say that emotion descriptions should be understood literally. Let us call those views “literalist.” By contrast “nonliter- alists” deny this and say that such descriptions are typically metaphorical. 1 This issu e abo ut the lingui stic descr iption of mu- sic is conn ected with a centra l issue about the na- ture of music. That issue is whether there is any essential connection between music and emotion. Acc ord ing to what we cancall “emotionthe ori es ,” it is essential to music to be somehow related to real emotion. Prominent examples of such theo- ries are these: it is the main function of all or most music to express emotions, to arouse emotions, or to represent emotions. 2 In my view, such theories have little plausibility, and they face a battery ofpowerful objections. In particular, these theories are objectionable on the grounds that essential features of emotion preclude such essential rela- tions between music and emotion. 3 Yet to argue against various specific emotion theories of music, of which there is a large variety, does not address the reasons that draw people to emotion theories. I think that there are two main reasons. The firs t is tha t themost obv ious explana- tion of why we describe music in emotion terms is that emot ions , or relat ions toemot ions , are part of what music is. The second reason is introspective, or phenomenological—that much music moves us when we listen to it, so it seems that music gen- erates emotions in us, which we project onto the music when we describe it in emotion terms. In this article, my negative purpose is to dis- solve these two reasons. My positive purpose is to argue for a particular nonliteralist view of linguis- tic descriptions of music in terms of emotion, a view according to which emotion descriptions are metaphorical descriptions of aesthetic properties. I call this theaesthetic metaphor thesis. This view is naturally conjoined with a view of the nature ofmus ic accord ing towhich music hasthe fun ction ofsustaining aesthetic properties. On this view, mu- sic itself has nothing essential to do with emotion. If emotion descriptions are not literal, then that removes the fi rst rea son that people have for turn- ing to emotion theories. I shall also show how we can never theless allow a sense in which musicmay move us, even though it does not generate emo- tions. That undermines the second reason. Fur- thermore, we will see that in many respects, the precise role that emotion descriptions play sup- por ts the aes the tic met aph or the sis ove r its riva ls . ii. against the ob viousness of literalism Literalism is not obviously correct. I begin with some obs erva tions tha t show that literalismshould not be assumed to be the default view. First, we describenaturein emotion terms. As I mentioned, one reason that people are drawn to emotion theories of the nature of music is that they seem to be the most obvious way to explain the indi sput able fact that we so of ten descri be mu- sic in emo tion ter ms . Th is is und erst andable.Wh at could be simpler than the idea that we describe music in emotion terms because music is in some way connected with emotion? However, this step should seem far less obvious if we bear in mind that we also describe nature in emotion terms. For example, we talk of proud rocks, shy flowers, or angry clouds. Since this is so, it is clear that there is no general link between the prevalence ofemotion descriptions and the possession, expres- sion, or representation of emotion. For inanimate The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65:4 Fall 2007
