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Insurgent Leader and Kingmaker Introduction By Michael Cole Muqtada al-Sadr is the scion of one of Iraq’s oldest clerical families. He asserts a hereditary claim to the pulpits of large mosques in Kufa and Baghdad, following his fa- mous father and brother who were murdered as dis- sidents by the Hussein re- gime in the 1980’s. Sadr follows the model of an activist and outspoken imam laid out by his uncle, a well-regarded philoso- pher of Shiite Islam who was also killed in prison during the Hussein regime. The Sadrs histori- cally represent one side of a centuries-old rivalry for leadership of Iraq’s Shiite Muslims, opposed princi- pally by the Hakim family that now leads the power- ful political party Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), represented by Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim. Sadr’s contemporary claim against the Hakims is that his family remained and died in Iraq throughout most of Saddam Hussein’s Shiite-persecutions while Hakim fled to live com- fortably abroad. Following the U.S. overthrow of Hussein in the spring of 2003, Sadr and his followers organized social services in Sadr City and southern Iraqi towns. Sadr City, the large ghetto adjoining Baghdad at its northeastern edge, is named after Muqtada’s father Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr. It was constructed on a modern grid-pattern by Iraq’s last king (a Sunni Muslim) to house poor Shi- ite laborers, and now houses approximately one tenth of all Iraqis (one mil- lion people). The Sadrites’ philanthropies not only replaced social services halted by the war, but filled long-ignored needs for or- phanages and care for widows that had been ne- SPRING 2006 CONFLICT RESOLUTION 501 - DR. C. ZELIZER PREPARED BY MICHAEL COLE 1 Moqtada al Sadr with followers at his head- quarters in Najaf, October 2005. MUQTADA AL SADR Individual Analytical Case Study

Muqtada al-Sadr - Insurgent and Kingmaker

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Although this paper is slightly outdated, some of its findings and recommendations have proven prescient now that Sadr is a part of Iraq's government. His power also indicates that the kind of meaningful conflict resolution I had in mind remains elusive.

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Page 1: Muqtada al-Sadr - Insurgent and Kingmaker

Insurgent Leader and KingmakerIntroductionBy Michael Cole

Muqtada al-Sadr is the scion of one of Iraq’s oldest clerical families. He asserts a hereditary claim to the pulpits of large mosques in Kufa and Baghdad, following his fa-mous father and brother who were murdered as dis-sidents by the Hussein re-gime in the 1980’s. Sadr follows the model of an activist and outspoken imam laid out by his uncle, a well-regarded philoso-pher of Shiite Islam who was also killed in prison during the Hussein regime.

The Sadrs histori-cally represent one side of a centuries-old rivalry for

leadership of Iraq’s Shiite Muslims, opposed princi-pally by the Hakim family that now leads the power-ful political party Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), represented by Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim. Sadr’s contemporary claim against the Hakims is that his family remained and died in Iraq throughout most of Saddam Hussein’s Shiite-persecutions while Hakim fled to live com-fortably abroad.

Following the U.S. overthrow of Hussein in the spring of 2003, Sadr and his followers organized

social services in Sadr City and southern Iraqi towns. Sadr City, the large ghetto adjoining Baghdad at its northeastern edge, is named after Muqtada’s father Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr. It was constructed on a modern grid-pattern by Iraq’s last king (a Sunni Muslim) to house poor Shi-ite laborers, and now houses approximately one tenth of all Iraqis (one mil-lion people). The Sadrites’ philanthropies not only replaced social services halted by the war, but filled long-ignored needs for or-phanages and care for widows that had been ne-

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Moqtada al Sadr with followers at his head-quarters in Najaf, October 2005.

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glected or forbidden by the Ba’athist government. Ini-tially, their work was ap-plauded by U.S. military commanders stationed in Sadr City, but Sadr has maintained a rigidly anti-American position.

Although he em-ploys nationalistic lan-guage and feeds the image of his SCIRI opposition as Iran-sympathizers, contacts in Iran constitute Muqtada al-Sadr’s most powerful affiliations, and are likely sources of his organiza-tions’ funding. He made useful connections among Iran’s Shiite clerical estab-lishment during years spent in exile in Qum, but he was briefly jailed by the government in Tehran. In the post-Hussein debate among Shiite religious leaders over whether Ira-nian pilgrims should be welcomed as visitors to Iraq’s important shrines or barred as possible spies, Sadr consistently empha-sizes principles of pan-Shiism to accomodate Ira-nian pilgrims. This is bal-anced by a hard line on issues related to Iraq’s po-litical sovereignty and ter-ritorial integrity.

Sadr uses his fam-ily’s connection by blood to the Prophet, his father’s reputation for Islamic scholarship, and his relig-ious training in Iran to claim a position among Iraq’s elite Shiite clerics. However, Sadr’s rejection as a young man by the Hauza (the famous Shiite divinity school attended by

his father) leads some to question his capacity for scholarship. Sadr’s stiff oratory style, and his use of the colloquial Iraqi Ara-bic dialect in sermons and statements, inspires jokes among Iraqis and other de-tractors who question his intelligence. Ayatolla Ali al-Sistani is believed to disapprove of Sadr’s po-litical activism and out-spokenness, and other tra-ditional clerics criticize his willingness to dissent from mainstream religious lead-ers’ examples.

In addition to Sadr’s philanthropic en-deavors, his organization heads a loosely-organized militia whose membership is estimated at fifteen thou-sand fighters. It is com-posed of volunteers col-lected in cells at the com-munity level and joined by a network of community leaders to Sadr’s cadre of advisors at offices in Kufa, Sadr City, and Kadhimiya (another historic Shiite neighborhood in Baghad). The loose network permits militiamen to appear when called upon by mosques and then disperse into communities where they are undetectable by Ameri-can forces. However, it also permits unassociated criminal gangs to pose as Sadrites and commit vio-lence beyond the militia’s objectives. The militia has access to arms second in quantity only to the Kurdish Pesh Merga mili-tia’s stockpiles, but Sadr

militiamen are almost to-tally untrained. It is said that one need only scratch the soil in Iraq to uncover weapons above the oil.

Sadr’s constitu-ency is overwhelmingly poor, young, and urban. Years of U.N. sanctions imposed economic hard-ship that fell largely upon Shiite communities; gov-ernment mismanagement left Iraq indebted and un-derdeveloped; Iraq’s long war with Iran left a genera-tion of hundreds of thou-sands of fatherless young men; and economic stagna-tion leaves them unem-ployed while lingering so-cial structures cement their disadvantages.

Muqtada Sadr’s followers are attracted to a message that Shiites need not be victims, as well as his example of identity-based politics combined with consistent opposition to the U.S. occupation. The Sadr militia is the only visible armed force in Iraq that is perceived to have “beaten” the U.S. military. One young Sadr militant told the reporter Rajiv Chandrsakaran, “I’m fight-ing for my country, my land and my honour.”

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The name al-Sadr is more common in modern Iran than in Iraq, but it is first noted by historians as the name of a fourth century castle of Byzantine design in modern Iraq. The modern Sadr family of Imams is traceable to the nineteenth century.

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Conflict TimelineCease-fires fail, political integration continues as violence becomes common and gruesome.

Spring 2003Coalition Forces depose Saddam Hussein. Iraqi Shiites are ini-tially supportive and leading clerics (including Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani) warily encourage fol-lowers to cooperate with sol-diers. Muqtada al-Sadr returns from exile in Iran and denounces Americans’ continued presence in Iraq.December 2003Iraqi courts issue an arrest war-rant for Sadr for arranging the murder of rival Ayatollah Majid al-Khoei.

Late March 2004U.S. 1st Cavalry closes Sadr’s private newspaper in Sadr City, saying its articles inflamed read-ers frustrated by poor living con-ditions and the U.S. occupation. Coalition Forces pursue him to enforce the Iraqi court’s warrant. Baghdad newspapers oppose the closure, citing the American Bill of Right’s Second Amendment.

Peaceful protesters march from Sadr City to the Baghdad Hilton and Marytr’s Mosque. Violence erupts in Sadr City.1 April 2004Four American employees of Blackwater Security are killed by a mob in Falluja. The corpses are burned, beaten, and hung from a bridge.11 April 2004Violence follows U.S. military response to murders in Falluja

and spreads to Baghdad and Na-jaf. Police stations are seized and U.S. tanks are set afire. Dr. Adnan Pachachi, a moderate on Iraq’s Governing Council (G.C.), denounces U.S. tactics to force a unilateral cease-fire, and G.C.-members go to Falluja to negotiate with insurgents.13 April 2004The Coalition Provisional Authority announces a plan to eliminate all militia in Iraq, bring

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July 2004The Green Zone Cafe, owned by a moderate Shiite member of the Baghdad’s Karkh District Council, was destroyed by a Sadrist’s suitcase bomb after the lunch-hour. The blast killed Shiite Iraqi waiters & missed Americans.

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their leaders into the political process, and integrate their members with the national army. 7 June is announced as the dead-line for demobilization.27 May 2004Ceasefire declared in Najaf and Falluja.G.C. members negotiate cease-fire with insurgent leaders who claim association with Sadr mili-tia (but remain masked through-out discussions).28 May 2004After seven weeks, the Shiite uprising appeard mostly over. Sadrites were seen packing cars to leave Najaf, but sporadic fighting continued in Sadr City. 3 June 2004Truce ends and fighting starts again in Kufa and Sadr City.4 June 2004New cease-fire agreed upon be-tween Sadr and G.C.-members, but fighting continues.7 June 2004Deadline for militias’ demobili-zation.Amb. Bremer signs an order bar-ring members of militia from holding office for three years af-ter leaving their illegal organiza-tions.11 June 2004Sadr endorses the new Iraqi gov-ernment and urged his followers to abide by the 3 June cease-fire (particularly in Sadr City) while maintaining opposition to the occupation and U.S. involvement in Iraq.12 June 2004In violation of the cease-fire, violence continues. Sadr militia take over police-stations, burn cars, empty jails, kidnap officials and police.

July 2004Sadr militia occupy the shrine and mosque of the Imam Ali in Najaf.

15 August 2004At a conference to select Iraq’s Interim National Assembly, delegates support Sadr and op-pose a government plan to vio-lently evict Sadr’s militia from the Shrine of Ali. Government policy is changed to attempt negotiation over eviction by force.16 August 2004At the suggestion of Sheikh Hussein al-Sadr, a distant relative and brother-in-law of Muqtada, the Assembly sends a delegation to Najaf to urge Sadr to disband the militia and enter the political process.19 August 2004After days of intense fighting against U.S. and Iraqi forces in the ancient Shiite cemeteries at Najaf, Sadr gives in to threats of increased military pressure. He agrees to terms set by the Na-tional Conference, but delays demobilization to orchestrate mi-litiamen’s unmolested return home. Sadr orders the militia to quit fighting the military but continue attacking Iraqi “collaborators” working for the new government.Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani is credited with brokering the deal.28 August 2004Sadr uses loudspeakers in the minarets of the Shrine of Ali to order militia forces to vacate the mosque. Gunmen are seen toss-ing AK-47s and RPG-launchers into carts. Ten dead prisoners are found behind the mosque’s walls.

1 September 2004Negotiations to stop violence in Sadr City continue without suc-cess in Baghdad. The Coalition calls not for a ceasefire, but for Sadr to fore-swear violence.

15 October 2005New permanent constitution rati-fied.15 December 2005Election Day.20 December 2005Sadr-supported candidates for national and local office are suc-cessful in elections.

22 January 2006Sadr visits Iran and meets the Foreign Minister.29 January 2006Sadr travels to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj and is greeted as an offi-cial. 12 February 2006Sadr’s pick for Prime Minister, Ibrahim al-Jafari beats Iyad Alawi. 25 April 2006Both the Badr Corps and the Sadr militia have sent fighters to assert Shiite presence in Kirkuk, and protect mosques in the area following a terrorist attack on Askariya Shrine.PresentThe Sadr militia is growing. Its tactics and resources are increas-ingly sophisticated and lethal. Reports indicate increasing re-ligiosity among Sadr’s followers. Violent parties are distinguished by religious affiliation. Violence and kidnappings occur in public, and factions complain of forced displacement from homes. Sadr’s remains popular and ef-fective. P.M. Nuri al-Maliki is assembling a cabinet.

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Analysis:An Applied Conflict Framework & Avenues to Resolution

Transformation of the conflict between Muqtada Sadr and his fol-lowers, and Coalition forces and the Iraqi government into constructive re-lationships for peace and development requires:1. a comprehensive conceptual frame-work that makes the conflict easily understandable and identifies compo-nents relevant to resolution, and 2. a dialogue-based peace-plan that acknowledges the conflict’s root causes, and the parties’ needs, and which can be activated at all levels of the society.! The analysis adheres loosely to Christopher Mitchell’s

S.P.I.T.C.E.R.O.W. model. The con-flict’s resolution rests on Louis Kries-ber’s example of conflict escalation, de-escalation, and settlement, and con-siders John Paul Lederach’s example of integrative and structure-responsive plans to develop peace through rela-tionships. ! However, the necessary place-ment of the Sadr-Coalition conflict in the larger context of Iraq’s present vio-lence and underdevelopment makes clear that the success of targeted peace-processes depends upon wider initiatives to create security, rebuild, and heal.

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Election Day 2004 A family is able to walk on Abu Hanifa Street in Western Baghdad due to increased election day security. The street is called Sniper Alley by US soldiers.

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Muqtada al-Sadr and the SadritesMuqtada al-Sadr has an extensive follow-

ing among Iraqi Shiites, especially the poor in Baghdad, Najaf, Kufa, Amara, and the edges of Sunni-dominated cities such as Kirkuk and Falluja. Shiites compose approximately sixty per cent of Iraq’s population. Media reports estimate that up to half of them now follow Sadr and a larger, multi-denominational group approves of him.

Sadr’s political organization participates in elections as a part of the United Iraqi Alliance, Shi-ite partisan consortium that also coopted SCIRI and is led by Hakim. It is difficult to characterize Sadr’s leadership within his close circle of advi-sors. His militia has continued violence after his order to cease firing on many occasions, but gen-eral violence and specific attacks appear to com-mence at his command.

The Sadr movement alludes to Shiite the-ology and history to distinguish Shiite Iraqis from others and motivate large groups to violent, politi-cal, or philanthropic action. Iraqi Shiites have been at the center of the Sunni-Shiite Muslim schism since the eighth century; the Persian Em-pire persecuted them for their Arab ethnicity; and the Ottoman and British Empires formalized the class structure in which Iraqi Sunnis rule a Shiite majority. Despite regular intermarriage and long periods of peace, the structure of inequality per-sists.

By calling itself the Mahdi Army, the Sadr militia identifies itself with the Shiite belief that a redeemer associated with Ali (a son-in-law of the Prophet who Shiites believe was the legitimate Imam and God’s intended recipient of the Koran from the angel Gabriel) will return to vanquish their earthly enemies. The Mahdi is uniquely Shi-ite, and the reference suggests the insurgency has a divine purpose.

The Sadr militia grew from traditional corps of guards of mosque-guards from Baghdad and Kufa, and now claims approximately 15,000 fighters out of an estimated 70,000 nation-wide. It is composed of young, poor, mostly unemployed men with little training. Community-based militia-organizers rally insurgents when called upon and the loose organization allows fighters to easily melt back into neighborhoods. Like most of the country, the militia is equipped with inexpensive and inaccurate Russian-made automatic and semi-

Parties

automatic weapons. Militias’ lethality comes less from skill than from their numbers and guerrilla tactics.Coalition Forces! The U.S.-led coalition of countries that en-tered Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein’s government in March 2003 was divided into the civilian Coali-tion Provisional Authority and the armed Coalition Forces until the transfer of civilian political author-ity in June 2004. The present civilian administra-tion, under the Iraqi Reconstruction and Manage-ment Organization and the U.S. Embassy, has a narrower mandate to gradually cede administrative and political power to the Iraqi government.

Although the occupation is criticized for its failure to clearly define its goals, consistent objec-tives are to reconstruct Iraq’s civil and economic infrastructures, develop a stable political environ-ment, and institute of a new Iraqi government. The Coalition has deviated little from its goal to build a democracy, but early resolve to institute secular politics gave way to the Governing Council’s insis-tence on identifying Islam as a source of law in the Transitional Administrative Law (June 2004—Oc-tober 2005).

Military forces are almost wholly Ameri-can. There are approximatey 135,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq charged with quelling the Iraqi and foreign insurgency, stemming terrorism, and training a new Iraqi army and police force to replace U.S. soldiers and maintain security. Joint U.S. and Iraqi forces have engaged the Mahdi Army since initial conflicts in Najaf in 2004.

The first item in Sadr’s list of demands is that all Americans leave the country, and he refuses to meet with Coalition civilians or soldiers.New Iraqi Government The Iraqi constitution was written between August 2004 and August 2005 by a national as-sembly of representatives appointed by interim provincial governments using the Transitional Administrative Law as a foundation (written by U.S. advisors and the interim Governing Council, effective June 2004-October 2005). It establishes a democratic and federal system, identifies Iraq as an Islamic and Arab country with religious free-dom and prohibitions against ethnic and religious persecution, and It specifies political, economic and political rights.! Elections emplaced a government domi-nated by Arab Shiites and Islamists, and months of negotiations among the winning parties to select a prime minister displaced Sunni-allied Ibrahim al-Jafari for SCIRI and Sadr-supported Adnan al-Maliki. Officials quoted in the press expressed discomfort with Jafari because of his past-association with the Ba’athist Party security appa-ratus.

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PositionsMuqtada al-Sadr

Sadr desires an elevated position in the Iraqi Shiite clerical hierarchy. He asserts a right to maintain his militia; he supports political candidates who want to institute Islamic law, including an expanded role for the religious establishment to mete justice and enforce law; and his politics are nationalistic, populist, and anti-American.

Sadr’s Baghdad office released a list of fourteen demands, including: a timetable for Ameri-can soldiers’ withdrawal from Iraq, deferral of any decision to recog-nize autonomous regions within Iraq, more and faster releases of prisoners from U.S.-military pris-ons, and opposition to plans for a Kurdish repatriation to Kirkuk.

His followers are a part of the growing sectarian, factional, and ethnic tensions. They oppose

Sunni control in politics, security forces, and social structures, as well as Iran-related Shiite factions such as S.C.I.R.I.The United States The U.S. intends to main-tain control of Iraq until some level of stability, reconstruction, and democratization is achieved. In addition, the U.S. emphasizes the importance of secularism, free-markets, and proportional repre-sentation (over direct democracy). The extent to which these must develop before Americans with-draw remains unclear.

The Coalition invited Sadr to join the political process before the June 2004 transfer of power. While continuing to fight militia, it grudgingly accepts participation of militia-supported parties and Isla-mists, preferring the status quo to their non-participation.The Iraqi Government! The government position in the conflict with Sadr will change according to office-

holders’ political alignments. The government presently opposes all non-state militia, courts and law-enforcement. It opposes aggres-sive American military action in which civilians may be harmed, and Iraqis’ extended detention without formal charges. Its oppo-sition to the creation of more autonomous regions is supported by the constitution, but opposed by some officials. Coalition government and deeply divided politics make gov-ernment positions difficult to dis-tinguish and generally unreliable indicators of genuine objectives. Except in the few issue-areas on which their positions diverge, gov-ernment position-statements are drawn to agree with Coalition po-sitions. Government positions must be distinguished from party-positions, which often claim to speak for the government. In addi-tion, government weakness leads to divergent positions and behav-ior.

InterestsMuqtada al-Sadr

The Sadr family is noted for its anti-Ba’athist positions and independence from Iranian power (compared to the Hakims and S.C.I.R.I.). Iraqi Shiites’ major crises in recent decades were caused by the abuses of Saddam Hussein’s regime, disproportionate Shiite losses in the Iran-Iraq War, and Sunni-antagonism (perceived and real) since the U.S. occupation.

Muqtada al-Sadr raises issues from Shiites’ history of op-pression in Iraq to argue that it is in their interest to lead the country according to their particular values and goals. He suggests that Shiites majority enables them to dominate Iraq’s democratic transition, so par-

ticipation in politics is in their in-terests. The United States

Most Americans in Iraq – who are predominantly soldiers, diplomats, and journalists - accept the Bush Administration’s position that the U.S. has strategic security and economic interests in Iraq’s stability and democratization. Their reasons for being there tend to reflect a combination of profes-sional interest and humanitarian concern, but their work in Iraq is done to promote Western interests.The Iraqi Government

As a newly instituted gov-ernment with no shortage of adver-saries, the Iraqi government’s inter-est is in survival. Therefore, it must succeed in developing public security, gaining control of affairs within the country’s borders, effec-

tively administering government agencies, and maintaining a degree of legitimacy. The government’s support by both the West and the Iraqi public depend on perceptions of its legitimacy, and it gains a minimal amount of public legiti-macy from elections and by operat-ing under a constitution. However, it must balance the demands of for-eign powers and religious parties to maintain international cooperation as well as public support.

It remains to be seen whether the government’s interests are the same as those of the class of officials who populate it. Whereas they may receive the most power from divisive politics, government spokesmen suggest the country’s interest and the government’s inter-est is in unity.

NeedsSadr! The Iraqi poor who com-pose a large part of Sadr’s political base need security and basic mate-rial goods such as food, clean water and electricity. Membership in Sadr’s partisan faction satisfies Shiites’ need for a feeling of be-longing and engenders a self-image that suggests agency, power, and potential.The United States

! The U.S. needs domestic security and security conditions for Americans in Iraq to conduct their part of the country’s reconstruction. Above all, it needs to be satisfied that Iraq does not constitute a threat to its own security. Domestic poli-tics and war’s inherent challenges produce a conflicting need to sat-isfy the security dilemma quickly and economically.The Iraqi Government The government needs security to survive and function. Iraqis need the government to pro-

vide security to rebuild the country and their lives, and if it is unable to do so they will allow a competitor to satisfy their needs.

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The Parties’ TacticsSadr! Successful movements in Iraq necessitate military as well as political tactics. Much of the Sadr-movement’s rise extends from his successful maneuvers to elevate his personal status as a mul-lah because it earns broad credibility among Mus-lims and provides leverage against Ayatollah Sis-tani and the Iraqi Shiite establishment. Following the return to Iraq and assassination of Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim, his brother Abdul Aziz inherited the leadership of SCIRI but could lacked the credentials and willingness to compete with Sistani. Sadr positioned himself to challenge Sistani for the leadership of Iraq’s Shiites, and his antiestablishment politicking remains an effective tactic. Sadr collects and exerts political power by supporting candidates for office, and simultane-ously collects political power by denouncing

members of government as tools of Iran and the U.S.

The Mahdi Army’s tactics for violence grew from what appeared to be individual shoot-ings in various poor communities to riots, and fi-nally organized militancy. During the protests that followed the Coalition’s closing of Sadr’s Baghdad newspaper in March 2004, his support-ers carried signs, chanted, and fired rifles into the air. Soon thereafter, gaurds and Sadr-supporters clashed at a protest in front of Baghdad’s City Hall (the Amanat). Protestors threw rocks and disrupted the downtown business district. The movement spread within weeks, co-opting simi-larly aggrieved communities nationwide. Tactics were oriented around disruption: Sadrites (a name that gained currency around this time) over-whelmed and took control of police-stations; they forcibly closed alcohol shops and taunted “West-ernized” women; and they barricaded gates and roads to buildings frequently visited by Coalition staff.! The U.S. has effectively dissuaded the Mahdi Army from direct engagement, but not de-feated it. The Mahdi Army’s tactics do not inten-tionally bring Sadr militants into conflict with U.S. soldiers, but it has reorganized to operate as an underground group and redirected activities to target Sunnis and their allies. Media report that armed Shiites have entered the Sunnis’ homes and killed the men who live there, and the wealthy neighborhoods like Baghdad’s (mostly Sunni) Al-Mansour are quickly being emptied. Groups of as many as twenty-five Sunni men have been found bound and executed. American authorities sus-pect Sadr and other hard-line Shiite groups are ordering the killings.The U.S.! The U.S. and the Coalition have engaged Sadr and the Mahdi Army militarily and politi-cally. Before the formal transfer of political authority in June 2004, the U.S. worked carefully to earn Ayatollah Sistani’s support as an ally against Sadr’s militarism. Sistani intervened to end violence in Najaf and throughout Iraq. Al-though Sadr denounced the political process be-fore the transfer of power, he was persuaded with Sistani’s assistance to enter the political process after the transition. Within the political process, the party system and institutional restraints de-

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signed to advantage the Iraqi government and Coalition configure Sadr’s behavior and balance it against other parties’ interests. As Sadr refuses to work directly with the U.S., the Coalition com-municates with him and his supporters through intermediaries and media.

The U.S. encountered urban and guerrilla warfare when it engaged Sadr’s militia conven-tionally. For example, the Shiite cemetery at Na-jaf was a strategically challenging setting for a battle given the parties’ unequal familiarity with the area’s layout, and isolating the Sadr militia in cities while minimizing harm to non-combatants was extremely difficult. Clashes between the Mahdi Army and the U.S. military left hundreds of militiamen dead, and the loss weakened Sadr’s capacity to forcibly affect change.

U.S. tactics include regular military pa-trols and ongoing development projects, using the reasoning that people who benefit from alliance with one side are less inclined to fight for the other. Although the military remains unable to produce security, regular U.S. presence prohibits insurgents from disrupting daily life as they did during the spring 2004 Shiite revolt, but it forces them “underground.” Development projects to deliver clean water, rebuild sewerage, and con-struct orphanages, schools and clinics are concen-trated in communities where anti-Coalition and anti-government sentiment is strong.The Iraqi Government! The government’s tactics consist of daily government functions not fulfilled by the Coali-tion advisors and forces, such as re-issuance of Iraqi passports and payment of salaries to gov-ernment employees. Its activities are intended to complement the U.S. strategy to create stability and rebuild by developing trust in government and a sense of normalcy.

However, the government reflects Iraq’s fractures more effectively than it represents its unity. Actors within the government undermine stability-oriented tactics by using public resources and authority for private ends. For example, po-litical parties with members in ministerial posi-tions (including those led by Hakim, Kurdish and Shiite separatists, and former Ba’ath Party mem-bers) inherit security forces with their ministries and use them as to enforce party decisions inde-pendent of government directives.

Change Over TimeEnlargement &

Escalation! The conflict between Muqtada Sadr and

his supporters and the United States will not be re-solved if it is viewed as independent from the larger war in Iraq. However, dissecting the conflict as an element of the larger war will bring into view com-ponents and processes relevant to the comprehension and resolution of both. Louis Kriesberg’s description of conflict escalation is instructive when applied to the Sadr-U.S. conflict, and it indicates potential ave-nues to resolution. Kriesberg explains, “The trajec-tory of a conflict depends on the conflict parties’ identities, grievances, goals, and beliefs about their ability to attain their goals. As the content of those conflict components change, so does the course of the conflict” (Kriesberg 317).

! The emphasis placed by Iraqis on ethnic and denominational difference in the public dis-course, political associations, and interpersonal rela-tionships has grown since the U.S. and Coalition oc-cupation began. Although each of the many groups with which Iraqis identify themselves contain internal divisions, the distinctions relevant to emerging violent conflict fall mainly along the lines between Arabs and Kurds, and Shiites and Sunnis. The diminishing number of groups salient to individuals’ self-identification indicates of the conflict’s escalation.

! Iraq’s national politics during the occu-pation period was dominated by an ethnically and denominationally diverse group of figures. For ex-ample, the Sunni Adnan Pachachi, the Shiite Ahmed Chalabi, the Sunni Kurd Ibrahim al-Jafari, and the Arab Shiite Ayatollah Sistani each enjoyed broad ap-proval and served important political functions at key junctures. Public statements and political image-making utilized sources of identity as means to iden-tify with particular constituencies, but dissenting op-ponents’ ethnic and religious backgrounds to gain comparative advantage was widely viewed as crass and irresponsible. Of these four figures, only Ayatol-lah Sistani may be considered powerful throughout Iraq, and none enjoys broad popularity. Each re-mains active in politics only by appealing to particu-lar, similarly identified constituencies.

! Signs of Iraq’s identity-based loyalties emerged immediately after the U.S. and Coalition invasion, but each group indicated through its leaders that national unity and peace would assume priority. The contrast between early suppression of particular

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Kurdish and Shiite identities for wider Iraqi interests and Iraq’s present identity-politics illustrates the growing importance of identity. Kurds between Tur-key, Iran, and Iraq have sought a nation-state since World War I (and perhaps longer), and Iraq’s imme-diate post-War disarray provided opportunities to maneuver and carve a Kurdish state from northern Iraq. Nationalists and the Kurdish Pesh Merga army agitated for immediate separation from Arab Iraq, but influential figures such as Ibrahim al-Jafari and Jalal Talabani led Kurds to participate in Iraqi poli-tics. Upon his return from Iran in March 2003, the Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim was accompa-nied by thousands of Iraqi Shiites from the border to Najaf. Hakim and Sistani together could have led their followers to organize according to their sectar-ian identity to demand political power, but Sistani instead issued a fatwa ordering Shiites to cooperate with the Coalition.

The country’s social interactions and politics have been steadily reoriented away from national unity. The call for a Kurdish state has moved Kurds to re-populate Kurdish villages and forcibly displace Arabs moved there by Hussein’s program for “Arabization” and Kurds’ departures for jobs in cities and abroad. The predominantly Arab Shiite Mahdi Army and Badr Corps (S.C.I.R.I.) have moved militiamen into the oil-rich Kurdish city of Kirkuk to combat separa-tists’ influence and assert Shiite dominance among the denominationally diverse Kurds. Iraq’s political alignments have coalesced along ethnic and religious lines, as well. Parties that emerged at the beginning of the occupation in the spring of 2003 – such as the transnational Da’wa Party, a revived Communist party, and broad-based Islamic parties – failed to produce either attractive platforms or tickets, and have been replaced by identity-specific parties. As many as five hundred parties were organized on the last two elections’ ballots under “lists” dominated by one faction or another. Similar disintegration is evi-dent in the composition of Iraq’s communities, as Shiites and Sunnis move away from formerly mixed neighborhoods to safer, more homogenous areas.

The process of Iriqis’ alignment by identity is accompanied by the emergence of stereotypes rooted in the ancient Sunni-Shiite schism. Sunnis are seen as interlopers who intrude upon the practice of Islam as the Prophet and his rightful descendants intended; abuse by the twentieth century’s Sunni governments is attributed to their purported inclination for vio-lence; and the Sunni community is accused of com-plicity in ongoing terrorism by al-Qaeda in Iraq and Ba’ath Party loyalists. Similarly, Shiites are seen as

backward and idolatrous perverters of the faith for sanctifying Ali and ascribing religious significance to holidays and rituals unmentioned in the Qur’an; their historical servitude is attributed to weakness of character; and Shiite communities are blamed for the Mahdi Army’s disruptions, and increasingly, for Sunni murders by night-time death-squads attributed to Sadr and Hakim. Centuries of collected animosity is raised to explain present unrest, and the most ex-treme characterizations of each side are gaining cur-rency.

The conflict between Sadr and the U.S. occurs in the midst of increasing tension between Iraqis. The polarization of Iraqi identity requires Americans to adapt political strategies to achieve their own goals, and rising violence imposes new strains on the mili-tary apparatus to maintain security. Americans’ fail-ure to anticipate Sadr’s emergence, his seemingly an-tagonistic positions, and the vitriol he directs toward Americans, their Iraqi allies, and increasingly toward Sunnis has caused Americans to villainize Sadr. He is seen as an interloper in an otherwise successful recon-struction process, and a roadblock to progress. Em-phasis is placed on possible self-seeking motivations of his populist tactics instead of the underlying reasons for his popularity.

Each party in Iraq collects grievances as the con-flict progresses, and their addition to historical griev-ances contributes to the expansion of violence by building upon the logic of the conflict and introduc-ing newly aggrieved individuals. Historical inequity and abuses shade relationships between Iraq’s Shiite and Sunni, and the Shiite increasingly employ the historical narrative to clarify grievances and assert their relevance to the conflict. Whereas early terror-ism and killings are attributed to Sunni loyalists to Hussein and foreign fighters, it is now clear that Shi-ite “death-squads” have formed, thereby providing Sunni communities with grievances. Feelings of vic-timization at the community level are felt more in-tensely by individuals as more Iraqis witness and lose acquaintances to violence.

The power asymmetry between Sadr and his supporters and the Coalition is clear, but each has developed grievances against the other. Strains of pride, xenophobia, and nationalism engender in the large Shiite underclass bitterness that the U.S. over-turned Saddam Hussein easily after many failed at-tempts by Iraqis. Three years of warfare between the U.S. and a combination of native and foreign Ameri-can foes have produced an unknown number civilian deaths. The war has provided occasion for instances of abuses against individuals, as wars always do, that

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assume qualities of communal grievance (at Abu Ghraib prison, in regular house-raids, in traffic acci-dents with armored Humvees, and everyday callous-nous made worse by the obvious inequality between a U.S. soldier and an Iraqi civilian). Coalition officials cite a history of broken promises for cooperation in its relationship with Muqtada al-Sadr, and the insur-gency he leads is blamed for halting much-needed reconstruction projects. Sadr’s support for continued violent opposition transforms Americans’ memory of security contractors’ grisley murders in Falluja and a growing number of U.S. soldiers’ deaths into a griev-ance.

Some of the goals articulated by the Sadrites and the Coalition are complementary, but each empha-sizes a greater number of divergent goals as its oppo-nent assumes greater prominence or gains advantage. Sadr has acquiesced to, and is well served by, the U.S. insistence on an Iraqi democracy. Although their reasons differ, the U.S. and Sadr each want to mini-mize the influence of would-be separatists, and each opposes the Sunni insurgency. However, the U.S. and Sadr each formulate the goals they pursue based on the other’s success. Whereas Sadr laid in obscurity and the U.S. chose not to enforce a warrant for his arrest following the murder of a moderate cleric al-lied with the Coalition, the U.S. made his capture a goal when riots and spreading violence proved Sadr’s appeal. Militia were a known problem, but the Coa-lition did not identity their abolition as a goal until the Mahdi Army presented a challenge. Similarly, Muqtada al-Sadr aimed to discourage Iran’s influ-ence in Iraq until the Mahdi Army’s losses against Coalition forces threatened to weaken his position and Iranian largesse enhanced competing factions’ positions. Each side expands the conflict by adapting its goals to accommodate advantage rather than reso-lution.

Although the Coalition is on the defensive in Iraq, and Muqtada al-Sadr is better positioned to influence post-War Iraq now than at any time since the Sadr-insurgency began, each evinces faith in its means to succeed. The emerging dynamic of chang-ing capacities – which favors Shiite Islamism, disem-powers minorities, and increases the likelihood of long-term American engagement – promises to shape conflict parties’ plans for the future. Negotiations in which Ayatollah Sistani persuaded Sadr to abandon the Shrine in Najaf and join others in the political process failed to disassemble the Mahdi Army, and enabled Sadr to play the statesman as well as the in-surgent. He gains legitimacy as a public figure by performing well in elections, and retains the capacity to control communities through violence. The com-bination of political and militant tactics will remain successful as long as conditions of poverty and inse-curity persist and provide Sadr with an effective plat-form. The Coalition and the Iraqi government con-tinue to develop the political path they believe will lead to stability and reconstruction. Each successful phase of the process appears to strengthen public support and essential institutions. Both parties are emboldened to proceed in the conflict by the belief that they retain means to achieve their ends.

Neither Muqtada al-Sadr and his forces nor the Coalition in Iraq has capitalized on the conflict-mitigating potential of the political process, and cease-fires negotiated to halt open violence have failed to bring together representatives from the par-ties as well as to address root causes of the parties’ conflict. Increased salience of identity to Iraqis’ as-sociations and conduct, the expansion of parties’ grievances and goals, and consistent belief on both sides of the conflict in their ability to attain goals combine to cause an escalation in the conflict.

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De-escalation and settlementA discourse-based resolution! The trajectory at which the conflict between U.S. and Coalition forces and Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army es-calates rose sharply in 2004, but it is not yet a protracted conflict. Further violence may still be alleviated. The parties should follow a process of de-escalation to pro-duce an agreement for the Mahdi Army’s demobilization (or integration into the Iraqi armed forces) and the United States’ departure from Iraq. As contention be-tween these parties perpetuates in the con-text of the larger Iraqi conflict – specifi-cally between quickly polarizing factions of Shiite and Sunni Iraqis – agreements between Sadr and the Coalition must emerge from a broader process of conflict de-escalation and country-wide dialogue between Iraqis.

! The sharp escalation of violence in Iraq began with the crisis of public secu-rity caused by the Mahdi Army’s 2004 in-surgency. Kriesberg explains,

A crisis denotes an increase in the severity of antagonistic interac-tions between two or more states, elevating the probability of mili-tary hostilities and destabilizing their relationship … A sense of crisis arises when the actions are viewed as a threat to basic values, as requiring a response in a limited time, and as increasing the likeli-hood that military means will need to be used in the response. Crises occur not only in relations between states, but also between a state and non-state actors ... For example,

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confrontations have sometimes escalated tragically as the members of a religious community and gov-ernment authorities reject the claims made by the other (210).

In Iraq, de-escalation of conflict will be promoted by the parties’ mutual commit-ment to empathy and non-violence in the short-term, and their long-term success at reframing the conflict, preventing provo-cation, and developing cross-cutting rela-tionships. The process will take longer than it would if it had begun early. The Coalition and Sadr should reach an agree-ment to outline the course of their de-escalation and build relationships for fu-ture engagement, and Iraqis must engage in dialogue to develop a shared commit-ment to non-violence, and a vision of the present conflict’s outcomes.

Negotiations between Sadr and the Coalition should begin privately between representatives from each side who may have already connected to stem the escala-tion of conflict without sacrificing Sadr’s public isolation from the United States. The discussions should become public but need not be totally transparent because they are most significant as a component of a broader movement to reconcile griev-ances between Iraqis, and should therefore not risk overshadowing the larger dis-course for peace.

Negotiations should remain fo-cused on the parties’ complementary goals and avoid grievances or accusations that are not conducive to the de-escalation of conflict. Each desires a speedy with-drawal of Coalition military forces from Iraq and postponement of the decision to establish more autonomous zones; Sadr is planning to remain active in politics within institutions established by the Coalition; and the U.S. appears willing to acquiesce to the Iraqi public’s Islamist inclination. Discussions may establish a course of confidence-building measures to show the Coalition that the Mahdi Army is prepared to demobilize and cooperate with the Iraqi government, and that the U.S. is prepared

to scale troop-numbers to a minimum level established between the U.S. and Iraqi governments. The representatives should produce new images of their negotiating partners that will engender broader respect for the contributions each has made during the post-war period and establish grounds for future engagement.

Nearly all Shiite and Sunni fac-tions in Iraq are represented by public fig-ures, and each either supports a cadre of militants or maintains relationships with violent parties. The factions’ political rep-resentatives, whether inside or outside the government, must acknowledge Iraq’s in-creasing sectarian tensions and act to pre-vent further escalation of violence. They must make public note of the trend and the roles they have played, and direct their followers to reject sectarian and ethnic divisiveness as a means of defeating vio-lence, terrorism, and underdevelopment. In the absence of substantive political plat-forms independent of identity politics, or forums to construct shared identities for common interests, the political class must work to de-escalate the violence and come to agreements to shape their future rela-tionships.

Reforms and innovations within extant institutions will help to promote dialogue and mitigate divisions. Repre-sentative government does not appear suf-ficient to bring together Iraq’s leadership and produce peace. The government’s ministerial system divides the offices among factions who use public resources for partisan gain, and it provides no forum or mechanisms outside the legislatures where they must cooperate. Officials form a united public face and return to divided constituencies to participate in violence. By extending principles of representation to each level of government, crosscutting relationships in the public administration will diminish sectionalism, promote ac-countability, and encourage cooperation. In addition, government officials should participate in discussion groups to hear positions and discuss common goals from

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outside the highly Balkanized political party system, and public officials will do well to promote similarly constructive en-gagement throughout the broader public discourse.

Iraq needs forums explicitly in-tended to generate relationships across identity-based rifts. Kriesberg provides the example of “interreligious and in-terethnic dialogue groups” (215). Tribal councils, Islamic associations, and una-ligned social clubs operated in Iraqi cities as late as 2005, and they could serve as effective groups to host workshops for community leaders (e.g. clerics, sheiks, politicians, businessmen, militiamen). Transnational organizations such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Islamic Brotherhood, and the Arab League have offered expertise and re-sources to promote multi-denominational organizations in the Palestinian Territories and Egypt, and their regional reputations may lend prestige to de-escalation initia-tives.

The process by which a settlement is reached to produce peace and begin to resolve long-standing grievances need not take the form of a written, negotiated document. Determining what such a document would contain and who would sign it would generate new conflicts and provide an opportunity to impose punitive measures on groups. Kriesberg notes that non-negotiated endings to conflicts may be produced by one or several parties’ conversion or persuasion, or by “implicit bargaining,” in which parties’ actions indi-cate dwindling willingness to continue the fight. Iraqis’ tendency to follow strong leaders, of which there are many at pre-sent, will enable a non-negotiated settle-ment if leaders will choose peace and co-operation over revenge and advantage.

The objectives of a non-negotiated settlement should be limited and construc-tive. If it is possible given the disparate and asymmetrical advantages of status and wealth, and numbers and historical griev-ance between Sunnis and Shiites, respec-

tively, a settlement should take steps to solve problems without isolating and pun-ishing particular parties. Specifically, Iraqi Shiites labor under real systemic ine-quality, and grievances extending from unequal opportunity will produce further violence if a settlement does not acknowl-edge and remedy it. However, decades of poor governance and war make victims of most Iraqis in some fashion, and punitive measures in a settlement will only per-petuate social conflict. The settlement should balance the groups’ needs and al-low them to retain dignity.

A “nested” processes of de-escalation and settlement to resolve the continuing conflict between Muqtada al-Sadr and the U.S.-led Coalition in Iraq ac-counts for its appropriate placement within a larger context of conflict. The Sadr in-surgency cannot be isolated from the rest of the Iraq War, particularly long-standing sectarian religious conflict. This approach attempts to disaggregate the war’s compo-nent conflicts and make it intelligible to begin conflict resolution. Isolating the Shiite-Sunni schism and the U.S.-Sadr conflict from similarly challenging con-flicts – including the U.S. fight against foreign terrorists, between Arabs and Kurds, between Turks and Kurds, and be-tween the U.S. and nearly every group – offers advantages, but care should be taken to replace the conflict in a broader perspective.

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Bibliography

Feldman, Noah. What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building. Princeton: Princeton Uni-versity Press, 2004.

Hitti, Philip K. History of the Arabs. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002

Kriesberg, Louis. Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution. Oxford: Rowman and Little-field Publishers, 2003.

Muller, Edward N., Mitchell A. Seligson. “Inequality and Insurgency.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 2 (Jun., 1987), pp. 425-452.

Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse, Hugh Miall. Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 2nd ed. Cam-bridge: Polity Press, 2005.

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Saddam Hussein’s enourmous, unfin-ished mosque.

The Republican Palace and present US Embassy, for-mer site of the British occupation authority and home of King Faisal, in a sand-storm.

Hussein’s Parade FieldBaghdad, 2004

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