Mun of San Fernando La Union v Firme

8/2/2015 G.R.No.L52179

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/apr1991/gr_l_52179_1991.html 1/4

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RepublicofthePhilippinesSUPREMECOURT

Manila

FIRSTDIVISION

G.R.No.L52179April8,1991

MUNICIPALITYOFSANFERNANDO,LAUNION,petitionervs.HON.JUDGEROMEON.FIRME,JUANARIMANDOBANIA,IAUREANOBANIA,JR.,SORMARIETABANIA,MONTANOBANIA,ORJABANIA,ANDLYDIAR.BANIA,respondents.

MauroC.Cabading,Jr.forpetitioner.SimeonG.Hipolforprivaterespondent.

MEDIALDEA,J.:

ThisisapetitionforcertiorariwithprayerfortheissuanceofawritofpreliminarymandatoryinjunctionseekingthenullificationormodificationoftheproceedingsandtheordersissuedbytherespondentJudgeRomeoN.Firme,inhiscapacityasthepresidingjudgeoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofLaUnion,SecondJudicialDistrict,BranchIV,Bauang,LaUnioninCivilCaseNo.107BG,entitled"JuanaRimandoBania,etal.vs.MacarioNieveras,etal."datedNovember4,1975July13,1976August23,1976February23,1977March16,1977July26,1979September7,1979November7,1979andDecember3,1979andthedecisiondatedOctober10,1979orderingdefendantsMunicipalityofSanFernando,LaUnionandAlfredoBisligtopay,jointlyandseverally,theplaintiffsforfuneralexpenses,actualdamagesconsistingofthelossofearningcapacityofthedeceased,attorney'sfeesandcostsofsuitanddismissingthecomplaintagainsttheEstateofMacarioNieverasandBernardoBalagot.

Theantecedentfactsareasfollows:

PetitionerMunicipalityofSanFernando,LaUnion isamunicipal corporationexistingunderand inaccordancewiththelawsoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.RespondentHonorableJudgeRomeoN.FirmeisimpleadedinhisofficialcapacityasthepresidingjudgeoftheCourtofFirst InstanceofLaUnion,BranchIV,Bauang,LaUnion.WhileprivaterespondentsJuanaRimandoBania,LaureanoBania,Jr.,SorMariettaBania,MontanoBania,OrjaBaniaandLydiaR.BaniaareheirsofthedeceasedLaureanoBaniaSr.andplaintiffsinCivilCaseNo.107Bgbeforetheaforesaidcourt.

At about 7 o'clock in themorning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepneydrivenbyBernardoBalagotandownedbytheEstateofMacarioNieveras,agravelandsandtruckdrivenbyJoseManandegandownedbyTanquilinoVelasquezandadumptruckoftheMunicipalityofSanFernando,LaUnionanddrivenbyAlfredoBislig.Duetotheimpact,severalpassengersofthejeepneyincludingLaureanoBaniaSr.diedasaresultoftheinjuriestheysustainedandfour(4)otherssufferedvaryingdegreesofphysicalinjuries.

OnDecember11,1966,theprivaterespondentsinstitutedacompliantfordamagesagainsttheEstateofMacarioNieverasandBernardoBalagot,owneranddriver, respectively,of thepassenger jeepney,whichwasdocketedCivilCaseNo.2183intheCourtofFirstInstanceofLaUnion,BranchI,SanFernando,LaUnion.However,theaforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck ofpetitioner.

Thereafter, the casewas subsequently transferred to Branch IV, presided over by respondent judge andwassubsequently docketed as Civil Case No. 107Bg. By virtue of a court order dated May 7, 1975, the privaterespondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig wereimpleadedforthefirsttimeasdefendants.Petitionerfileditsanswerandraisedaffirmativedefensessuchaslackofcauseofaction,nonsuabilityoftheState,prescriptionofcauseofactionandthenegligenceoftheowneranddriverofthepassengerjeepneyastheproximatecauseofthecollision.

Inthecourseoftheproceedings,therespondentjudgeissuedthefollowingquestionedorders,towit:
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(1)OrderdatedNovember4,1975dismissingthecrossclaimagainstBernardoBalagot

(2) Order dated July 13, 1976 admitting the Amended Answer of theMunicipality of San Fernando, LaUnionandBisligandsettingthehearingontheaffirmativedefensesonlywithrespecttothesupposedlackofjurisdiction

(3)OrderdatedAugust23,1976deferring thereresolutionof thegroundsfor theMotion toDismissuntilthetrial

(4)OrderdatedFebruary23,1977denying themotion for reconsiderationof theorderof July13,1976filedbytheMunicipalityandBisligforhavingbeenfiledoutoftime

(5)OrderdatedMarch16,1977reiteratingthedenialofthemotionforreconsiderationoftheorderofJuly13,1976

(6)OrderdatedJuly26,1979declaringthecasedeemedsubmittedfordecision itappearingthatpartieshavenotyetsubmittedtheirrespectivememorandadespitethecourt'sdirectionand

(7) Order dated September 7, 1979 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or order torecallprosecutionwitnessesforcrossexamination.

OnOctober10,1979thetrialcourtrenderedadecision,thedispositiveportionishereunderquotedasfollows:

IN VIEW OF ALL OF (sic) THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs, anddefendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly andseverally, plaintiffs Juana RimandoBania, Mrs. Priscilla B. Surell, Laureano Bania Jr., Sor MariettaBania,Mrs.FeB.Soriano,MontanoBania,OrjaBaniaandLydiaB.BaniathesumsofP1,500.00asfuneral expenses and P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of the late Laureano Bania Sr.,P30,000.00asmoraldamages,andP2,500.00asattorney'sfees.Costsagainstsaiddefendants.

TheComplaintisdismissedastodefendantsEstateofMacarioNieverasandBernardoBalagot.

SOORDERED.(Rollo,p.30)

Petitionerfiledamotionforreconsiderationandforanewtrialwithoutprejudicetoanothermotionwhichwasthenpending. However, respondent judge issued another order dated November 7, 1979 denying the motion forreconsiderationoftheorderofSeptember7,1979forhavingbeenfiledoutoftime.

Finally, therespondent judgeissuedanorderdatedDecember3,1979providingthat ifdefendantsmunicipalityandBisligfurtherwishtopursuethematterdisposedofintheorderofJuly26,1979,suchshouldbeelevatedtoahighercourtinaccordancewiththeRulesofCourt.Hence,thispetition.

Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess ofjurisdictioninissuingtheaforesaidordersandinrenderingadecision.Furthermore,petitionerassertsthatwhileappealofthedecisionmaybeavailable,thesameisnotthespeedyandadequateremedyintheordinarycourseoflaw.

On the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of the petitioner and allege that the petition isdevoid ofmerit, utterly lacking the good faithwhich is indispensable in a petition for certiorari and prohibition.(Rollo, p. 42.) In addition, the private respondents stress that petitioner has not considered that every court,includingrespondentcourt,hastheinherentpowertoamendandcontrol itsprocessandorderssoastomakethemconformabletolawandjustice.(Rollo,p.43.)

Thecontroversyboilsdowntothemainissueofwhetherornottherespondentcourtcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionwhen it deferredand failed to resolve thedefenseof nonsuability of theStateamounting to lackofjurisdictioninamotiontodismiss.

In the case at bar, the respondent judge deferred the resolution of the defense of nonsuability of the Stateamounting to lack of jurisdiction until trial. However, said respondent judge failed to resolve such defense,proceededwiththetrialandthereafterrenderedadecisionagainstthemunicipalityanditsdriver.

Therespondentjudgedidnotcommitgraveabuseofdiscretionwhenintheexerciseofitsjudgmentitarbitrarilyfailedtoresolvethevital issueofnonsuabilityoftheStateintheguiseofthemunicipality.However,saidjudgeactedinexcessofhisjurisdictionwheninhisdecisiondatedOctober10,1979heheldthemunicipalityliableforthequasidelictcommittedbyitsregularemployee.

ThedoctrineofnonsuabilityoftheStateisexpresslyprovidedforinArticleXVI,Section3oftheConstitution,towit:"theStatemaynotbesuedwithoutitsconsent."
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Statedinsimpleparlance,thegeneralruleisthattheStatemaynotbesuedexceptwhenitgivesconsenttobesued.Consenttakestheformofexpressorimpliedconsent.

Expressconsentmaybeembodied inageneral laworaspecial law.Thestandingconsentof theState tobesuedincaseofmoneyclaimsinvolvingliabilityarisingfromcontractsisfoundinActNo.3083.Aspeciallawmaybepassedtoenableapersontosuethegovernmentforanallegedquasidelict,asinMerrittv.GovernmentofthePhilippineIslands(34Phil311).(seeUnitedStatesofAmericav.Guinto,G.R.No.76607,February26,1990,182SCRA644,654.)

Consent is impliedwhen thegovernmententers intobusinesscontracts, therebydescending to the levelof theothercontractingparty,andalsowhentheStatefilesacomplaint,thusopeningitselftoacounterclaim.(Ibid)

Municipalcorporations,forexample,likeprovincesandcities,areagenciesoftheStatewhentheyareengagedingovernmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they aresubjecttosuitevenintheperformanceofsuchfunctionsbecausetheircharterprovidedthattheycansueandbesued.(Cruz,PhilippinePoliticalLaw,1987Edition,p.39)

Adistinctionshouldfirstbemadebetweensuabilityandliability."Suabilitydependsontheconsentofthestatetobesued,liabilityontheapplicablelawandtheestablishedfacts.Thecircumstancethatastateissuabledoesnotnecessarilymeanthat it is liableon theotherhand, itcanneverbeheld liable if itdoesnot firstconsent tobesued.Liabilityisnotconcededbythemerefactthatthestatehasalloweditselftobesued.Whenthestatedoeswaive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant isliable."(UnitedStatesofAmericavs.Guinto,supra,p.659660)

Anent the issueofwhether or not themunicipality is liable for the torts committedby its employee, the test ofliabilityofthemunicipalitydependsonwhetherornotthedriver,actinginbehalfofthemunicipality,isperforminggovernmental or proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla (G.R. No. L29993,October23,1978.85SCRA599,606),thedistinctionofpowersbecomesimportantforpurposesofdeterminingtheliabilityofthemunicipalityfortheactsofitsagentswhichresultinaninjurytothirdpersons.

Another statement of the test is given inCity ofKokomovs. Loy, decidedby theSupremeCourt of Indiana in1916,thus:

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they exercise therightspringing fromsovereignty,andwhile in theperformanceof thedutiespertaining thereto, theiractsarepoliticalandgovernmental.Theirofficersandagentsinsuchcapacity,thoughelectedorappointedbythem, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers,agents,andservantsofthestate.Intheothercapacitythemunicipalitiesexerciseaprivate,proprietaryorcorporateright,arisingfromtheirexistenceaslegalpersonsandnotaspublicagencies.Theirofficersandagentsintheperformanceofsuchfunctionsactinbehalfofthemunicipalitiesintheircorporateorindividualcapacity,andnotforthestateorsovereignpower."(112N.E.,994995)(Ibid,pp.605606.)

It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them thecompetence tosueandbesued.Nevertheless, theyaregenerallynot liable for tortscommittedby them in thedischargeofgovernmentalfunctionsandcanbeheldanswerableonlyifitcanbeshownthattheywereactinginaproprietarycapacity.Inpermittingsuchentitiestobesued,theStatemerelygivestheclaimanttherighttoshowthat thedefendantwasnotacting in itsgovernmentalcapacitywhen the injurywascommittedor that thecasecomesundertheexceptionsrecognizedbylaw.Failingthis,theclaimantcannotrecover.(Cruz,supra,p.44.)

Inthecaseatbar,thedriverofthedumptruckofthemunicipalityinsiststhat"hewasonhiswaytotheNaguilianrivertogetaloadofsandandgravelfortherepairofSanFernando'smunicipalstreets."(Rollo,p.29.)

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumedpursuanttoSection3(m)ofRule131oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.Hence,Werulethatthedriverofthedumptruckwasperformingdutiesortaskspertainingtohisoffice.

We already stressed in the case ofPalafox, et. al. vs. Province of IlocosNorte, theDistrict Engineer, and theProvincialTreasurer (102Phil1186) that "theconstructionormaintenanceof roads inwhich the truckand thedriverworkedatthetimeoftheaccidentareadmittedlygovernmentalactivities."

Afteracarefulexaminationofexisting lawsand jurisprudence,Wearriveat theconclusion that themunicipalitycannotbeheldliableforthetortscommittedbyitsregularemployee,whowasthenengagedinthedischargeofgovernmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be imposedonthemunicipalitynodutytopaymonetarycompensation.

All premisesconsidered, theCourt is convinced that the respondent judge'sdereliction in failing to resolve theissueofnonsuabilitydidnotamounttograveabuseofdiscretion.Butsaidjudgeexceededhisjurisdictionwhenit
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ruledontheissueofliability.

ACCORDINGLY,thepetitionisGRANTEDandthedecisionoftherespondentcourtisherebymodified,absolvingthepetitionermunicipalityofanyliabilityinfavorofprivaterespondents.

SOORDERED.

Narvasa,Cruz,GancaycoandGrioAquino,JJ.,concur.

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Mun of San Fernando La Union v Firme