Multiparty politics in Argentina? Electoral rules and changing patterns

Pergamon Electoral Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 477-495, 1996

Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved

0261-3794/96 $15.00+0.00 S0261-3794(96)00010-8

Multiparty Politics in Argentina? Electoral Rules and Changing Patterns

ERNEST() CABRERA

Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA

This article attempts to illuminate some institutional features of the past and the current electoral systems of Argentina and the problematic relationship between these characteristics and the trend of changes that the party system has been experiencing since the return of democracy in 1983. The focus is on the dangers of political stalemate that might have developed if the institutional arrangements implemented at the end of the military rule had not been reformed subsequently. The study has two objectives: (a) to demonstrate that there is a trend towards an increasing fractionalization of the Argentine party system; and (b) to show that the combination of an electoral college with a majority requirement, proportional representation to allocate presidential electors, malapportionment among districts, and this increasing process of pluralization in most provinces (where presidential elections were decided because of electoral college complexities) threatened the stability of democracy. Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd

After the b r e a k d o w n of the mil i tary d ic t a to r sh ip in 1982, Argent ina began a n e w pol i t ica l r eg ime based on free e lec t ions to se lec t g o v e r n m e n t officials. This n e w pol i t ical r eg ime has surv ived four mil i tary rebel l ions , t w o e x t r e m e hyper inf la t ion p rocesses , and t w o food riots. Some o f the pol i t ica l charac te r i s t i cs of this cu r ren t r eg ime make it ve ry di f ferent f rom p rev ious semi -democra t i c expe r i ences . A m o n g them, the largest de- legi t imizat ion of the mil i tary in history, and real e lec tora l compe t i t i on .

The A r g e n t i n e a n d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n p r o c e s s was at the co re of m u c h of the liter- a tu re on the Latin A m e r i c a n t r ans i t ion to d e m o c r a c y ( O ' D o n n e l l and Schmi t te r , 1986; O ' D o n n e l l et al., 1986; Baloyra, 1987; Malloy and Sel igson, 1987; D i a m o n d et aL, 1988). Analys ing the p r o b l e m s o f d e m o c r a t i c conso l ida t ion , many o f t hose s tud ies f ocused on fac tors e x t e r n a l to t he ins t i tu t iona l sys tem. A m o n g the ' ex te r - nal ' t h rea t s to the n e w d e m o c r a c i e s , the mil i tary, the e c o n o m i c p roces s , and el i te b e h a v i o u r r anked first. H o w e v e r , o t h e r l i t e ra tu re b a s e d on the s tudy of inst i tu- t ional f ea tu res o f o ld p o l y a r c h i e s was e x t e n d e d to the n e w d e m o c r a t i c r eg imes of Latin A m e r i c a (Lima, 1991; Mainwar ing , 1991, 1993; Jones , 1993; Ames, 1994; Linz and Valenzuela , 1994; Ma inwar ing and Scully, 1995). ~ These ins t i tu t iona l ana lyses no t on ly a l l ow a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f r eg ime fea tu res p r ev ious ly n e g l e c t e d by the Latin A m e r i c a n s c h o l a r s h i p bu t also have b r o a d e r c o m p a r a t i v e imp l i ca t i ons for o t h e r g e o g r a p h i c a l reg ions . This s tudy fo l lows tha t l ine o f inquiry. Here, the focus is on the dange r s o f po l i t i ca l s t a l ema te that migh t have d e v e l o p e d

478 Multiparty Politics in Argentina?

if the institutional arrangements implemented after the end of military rule had not been reformed subsequently.

This article attempts to illuminate some institutional features of the past and current electoral systems of Argentina and the problematic relationship between these characteristics and the trend of changes that the party system has been experiencing since the return of democracy in 1983. 2 After 10 years of democracy, Argentina went through a complex process of constitutional reform to modify a National Constitution from 1853. Among other important changes, the new Constitution (approved in 1994) reformed the rules for the presidential election; it abolished the old indirect system of electoral colleges (copied from the American Constitution) and established a new system of direct presidential elections.3

This study has two objectives: (1) to demonstrate that there is a trend towards an increasing fractionalization of the Argentine party system, and (2) to show that, beyond the bargaining of particular benefits for the two major parties (Peronists and Radicals), the elimination of the electoral-college system was a necessity because it was becoming a threat to institutional stability.

In other words, (1) the maintenance of three provincial multiparty systems, together with the slow weakening of the two traditional major parties in the largest districts and an explosion of local conservative parties in the medium-sized provinces, is sluggishly changing the national party system; and (2) the combination of an electoral college with a majority requirement, proportional representation to allocate presidential electors, malapportionment among districts, and this increasing process of pluralization in most provinces (where presidential elections were decided because of electoral-college complexities) threatened the stability of democracy. It was a Damocles' sword hanging over the institutional continuity of the republic.

A Br ie f S u m m a r y o f N a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n s

After the defeat in the Malvinas War in 1982, the military regime that had started with the coup of 1976 was completely delegitimized and began a rapid withdrawal that led to the establishment of a new political regime through free elections in 1983. National elections have been continuously held in 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, and 1995. Presidential elections were held in 1983, 1989, and in 1995.

The electoral triumph of the Radical presidential candidate, Rafil Alfonsin, who obtained the majority of the popular vote in 1983, was a turning point in Argentine politics and a shock for the traditionally unbeatable Peronism. It was the first national defeat of Peronism in clean elections. It meant the end of the image of an eternal Peronist majority and the beginning of an internal democratic reorganiza- tion of the Peronist party.

In 1987, elections for governors in the provinces produced the first democratic replacement of governors since 1962. In 1989, the Peronist presidential candidate, Carlos Menem, won the elections, producing the first democratic partisan turnover for the presidency since 1916. These two facts highlight the importance of the beginning of real electoral competition in the Argentine case.

In 1983, the Uni6n Civica Radical (UCR) obtained 52 per cent of the popular vote for its presidential candidate (Rafil Alfonsin), 48 per cent for its national deputies, and only 32 per cent of the governorships of the country. The Partido Justicialista (Peronism) got 40 per cent for president, 38 per cent for national deputies, but 54 per cent of the governorships.

ERNESTO CABRERA 479

Despite the fact that Alfonsin won the presidential election in 14 provinces, the UCR could only win elections for governors in seven provinces. In Corrientes, Neuqu~n, and San Juan, provincial parties obtained the governorships, while Alfonsin won the presidential elections. In Catamarca, La Pampa, San Luis and Santa Fe, Alfonsin won for president but the Peronist candidates obtained the governorships.

At the national level of government, the UCR obtained the presidency and a narrow majority in the Chamber of National Deputies (129 representatives out of 254). Having won in more provinces than the Radicals at the provincial level of the elections, the Peronists received a plurality in the Chamber of Senators (21 out of 46) and obtained an important veto power (the Radicals obtained only 18 senators).,

In 1985, elections for renewal of half of the Chamber of National Deputies wcrc held, and the UCR reconfirmed its electoral power. Despite a decline in popular votes (from 48 to 43 per cent), the Radicals won the elections nationally, and the Peronists, divided by the 1983 surprising defeat and immersed in an internal struggle, obtained only 34 per cent of the votes.5 As a result, the Radicals maintained their majority of 129 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

The 1987 provincial and national legislative elections proved to be the Radical's turn to be surprised. Their defeat was much deeper than expected. Historically strong provincial parties retained the governorships of Corrientes, San Juan, and Ncuqudn. The Peronists (already recuperated from their internal split and struggle, and led by the 'Renovadores') not only retained control over the provinces won in 1983 but also added to their count five of the seven districts won by the Radicals in the previous elections for governors. The Peronists got control of 17 provincial governments and the Radicals only retained two, C6rdoba and Rio Negro. As a consequence of the Peronist sweep of the provinces, the Peronist party took control of the Senate. For national deputies, the UCR declined to 37 per cent, whereas the Peronists climbed to 41 per cent (see Table 1). As a consequence, the Radicals lost control of the Chamber of Deputies. They decreased from 129 to 113 scats (out of a total of 254).

In 1988, the Pcronist party organized democratic and direct internal elections to select its presidential candidate for the first time in its history. Carlos Menem, the governor of La Rioja, a small province in the northwest, defeated Antonio Cafiero, the governor of Buenos Aires, the largest and richest Argentine province and the historical bastion of Peronism. In the 1989 presidential and legislative elections, the UCR continued losing electoral support. Menem won the presidential elections obtaining 47 per cent of the popular votes (and the required majority of electoral votes in the electoral college) against 37 per cent of the Radical presidential candidate, Eduardo Angeloz, governor of C6rdoba. For national deputies, the UCR declined to 29 per cent, while the Peronists ascended from 41 to 45 per cent (sec Table 1). The Peronist party did not obtain thc majority of representatives in the Chamber of Deputies, but the seven votes needed to get that majority could be negotiated with minor parties historically allied to Peronism. The Senate remained completely under the control of the Peronist party.

President Menem's inauguration, originally scheduled for December, was advanced to July due to the sharp economic crisis. The outbreak of hyperinflation forced President Aifonsin to resign 5 months before the end of his term. The new Peronist President, from whom expansionist policies were expected, committed himself to economic stabilization. After a second hyperinflationary experience in 1990, he was able to reduce inflation to low levels.


TABLE 1. Trend of vote de-concentrat ion

Percentages 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995

UCR total votes for president 52 - - - - 32 - - - - 17 PJ total votes for president 40 - - - - 47 - - - - 50 UCR+PJ total votes for 92 - - - - 79 - - - - 67 president

UCR total votes for national 48 44 37 29 29 30 22 deputies PJ total votes for national 38 35 41 45 41 42 43 deputies UCR+PJ total votes for 86 79 78 74 70 72 65 national deputies

UCR+PJ votes for national 90 78 83 75 67 74 69 deputies (Buenos Aires) UCR+PJ votes for governor 92 - - 87 - - 70 - - 74 (Buenos Aires)

UCR+PJ votes for national 73 68 63 60 69 62 43 deputies (Federal Capital)

UCR+PJ votes for national 91 90 60 52 53 62 50 deputies (Tucum~n) UCR+PJ votes for governor 89 - - 79 - - 54 - - 50 (Tucumfin)

UCR+PJ votes for national 94 92 95 83 58 61 72 deputies (Chaco) UCR+PJ votes for governor 94 - - 96 - - 59 - - - - (Chaco)

UCR+PJ votes for national 81 58 78 58 60 63 50 deputies (Jujuy)

UCR+PJ votes for national 87 70 78 66 44 57 47 deputies (Salta)

UCR+PJ votes for national 57 44 43 57 48 48 46 deputies (Corrientes)

UCR+PJ votes for national 61 64 40 60 44 56 39 deputies (Neuquen)

UCR+PJ votes for national 68 72 63 43 40 35 52 deputies (San Juan)

In 1991, t h e first e l e c t i o n u n d e r a P e r o n i s t p r e s i d e n t s i nce 1983 s a w a smal l

d e c l i n e fo r t h e Pe ron i s t s , w h o r e c e i v e d 41 p e r c e n t o f t h e v o t e fo r na t i ona l legis-

la tors , w h i l e t h e Radica ls m a i n t a i n e d t h e i r 29 p e r cen t . T h e 4 1 - p e r - c e n t - v o t e plural-

i ty o b t a i n e d b y t h e P e r o n i s t s w a s i n t e r p r e t e d as an e n d o r s e m e n t to M e n e m ' s

e c o n o m i c po l i c i e s . P e r o n i s t sea ts i n c r e a s e d to 124 ( o n l y t h r e e less t h a n a major -

ity, a l t h o u g h e i g h t o f t h e m w e r e in c o m p l e t e o p p o s i t i o n to t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l

po l i c i e s ) . T h e P e r o n i s t s los t c o n t r o l o f t h r e e p r o v i n c e s . In t w o o f t h e m ( C h a c o

a n d Salta) a loca l par ty , a n d in t h e t h i rd ( C h u b u t ) t h e Radicals , w o n t h e gove r -

n o r s h i p s .

O n 3 O c t o b e r 1993 A r g e n t i n e a n s v o t e d in m i d - t e r m e l e c t i o n s fo r t he C h a m b e r

o f Na t iona l D e p u t i e s fo r t h e s e c o n d t i m e s ince t h e i n a u g u r a t i o n o f t h e M e n e m

ERNESTO CABRERA 481

admin is t ra t ion in July 1989. The i n c u m b e n t Peron is t pa r ty (PJ) o b t a i n e d 42 p e r cen t of the vo tes (65 seats) and inc reased the i r share o f seats to 127 ou t o f 257; its main con tende r , the Radical pa r ty (UCR) of f o rmer Pres iden t Rafil Alfonsin, s e c u re d 30 p e r cen t of the vo tes (41 seats). The Peronis t s w o n in 18 ou t of 24 distr icts .

P res iden t M e n e m c o n s i d e r e d the resul ts as a ma nda t e to re fo rm the Cons t i tu t ion and t h e r e b y a l low him to seek re-e lec t ion (exp l ic i t ly fo rb idden in the h is tor ic text) . Two- th i rds of the C h a m b e r of Nat ional Depu t i e s and the Senate was necessa ry to call for a Cons t i tu t iona l Conven t ion . Radical vo tes w e r e n e e d e d to reach that majority, bu t the Radicals w e r e very re luc tan t to s u p p o r t the P res iden t ' s re-e lec t ion aspira-

tions. However , M e n e m a n n o u n c e d that hc was cons ide r ing cal l ing a p leb i sc i t e to s h o w

the p o p u l a r s u p p o r t for a cons t i tu t iona l a m e n d m e n t . Unde r this p ressu re and the m e n a c e of a n e w and ha rde r e lec tora l col lapse , Alfonsin, p r e s i d e n t of the Radical party, began a ser ies of talks b e t w e e n the t w o majo r par t ies that e n d e d in a pac t to p r e s e n t a c o m m o n p r o g r a m to re fo rm the cons t i tu t ion . As a c onse que nc e , the necess i ty of a cons t i tu t iona l r e fo rm was a p p r o v e d by the legislat ive p o w e r , and an e lec t ion of na t iona l r ep resen ta t ives to a cons t i tu t iona l c o n v e n t i o n was ca l led and

took p lace in 1994. Alfonsln 's s u d d e n dec i s ion to s top Radical s t rong o p p o s i t i o n to M e n e m ' s re-

e l ec t ion and to nego t i a te the cons t i tu t iona l re form p r o d u c e d t w o consequences . On the one hand, the Radical pa r ty e n t e r e d into a b i t t e r in ternal s t ruggle b e t w e e n fact ions suppo r t i ng and o p p o s i n g the reform. On the o t h e r hand, an al l iance of Peronis t d iss idents w h o had left the Just icial is ta par ty , w i th social is ts and o t h c r exp re s s ions of the left (Fren te Grande ) ga ined m o r e space as the o p p o s i t i o n to the gove rnmen t . Wi th a major i ty of Peronis t and Radical conven t iona l delegates , the

cons t i tu t iona l re form was a c c e p t e d and the nego t i a t ed c o m m o n p r o g r a m was app roved . Essentially, the p res iden t ia l re-elect ion, favoured by the Peronists , and the i nco rpo ra t i on o f a th i rd sena to r for the s e c o n d pa r ty in each p rov ince , w a n t e d by the Radicals, w e r e i n t r o d u c e d in the n e w Const i tu t ion . The rules for the president ia l e lec t ions w e r e changed . The e lec tora l co l lege was abo l i shed and an in tense nego t i a t ion b e t w e e n Peronis ts and Radicals t ook p lace to dec ide the e lec tora l formula for the p res iden t ia l e l ec t ion / ,

In 1995, finally, p res ident ia l and nat ional legislative e lec t ions w e r e he ld unde r the n e w Const i tu t ion inaugura ted in 1994. Pres ident M e n e m ob ta ined his re-elect ion wi th a lmost 50 p e r cen t of the votes and the UCR s h o w e d one of its poo res t performances in its history. The Radical p res ident ia l candida te , Horac io Massaccessi , Gove rno r of Rio Negro, ob ta ined only 17 p e r cen t of the votes and was surpassed by Jos~ Bord6n (a diss ident f rom the Peronis t par ty and candida te of a cen t r e - l e f t al l iance o f different par t ies and factions, FREPASO), w h o c a p t u r e d a lmost 30 pe r cen t of the votes. The Peronis ts r ece ived 43 p e r cen t of the votes for nat ional representatives, ob ta in ing 72 seats to form a major i ty in the C h a m b e r o f National Deput ies for the first t ime s ince 1983. The Radical pa r ty ob ta ined 22 p e r cen t of the votes and 28 seats to sum up 69 nat ional r epresen ta t ives in the Chamber .

P a r t y System and F r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n

Most analysts have ident i f ied the Argen t ine pol i t ica l sys tem s ince 1983 as e i the r an emerg ing two-par ty sys tem or an emerg ing mul t ipa r ty sys tem highly 'polarized" b e t w e e n the t w o major par t ies (Radicals and Peronists) . 7 In this sec t ion I s h o w that,


despite the continued historical dominance of the two major parties in national elections, there is a continuous process of weakening of the two traditional parties (Peronist and Radical) whose pace differs, on the one hand, on national and provincial level of analyses, and on the other hand, on legislative and executive elections. 8

Elections in Argentina have been showing a slow but steady process of pluralization. Since 1983, there has been a continuous decrease in the concentration of votes around the Radical and Peronist parties and a slight but steady trend towards multipartyism.9 What appeared to be a small process of fractionalization of the party system at the national level of analysis reveals itself as much more important when it is observed and disaggregated by provinces.

Three different features of the institutional system either hide, discourage, or enhance the process of increasing electoral dispersion: centralism hides, concurrence of executive and legislative elections discourages, and proportional representation enhances this process of raising fractionalization.

Centralism. Since the phenomenon is much more dramatic and important in medium-size provinces than in the largest districts (especially Buenos Aires province and the Federal Capital), it has been underestimated, at least until 1991 elections. The central pole of the country, Buenos Aires city and province, contains a third of the country 's population but political, economic, social, and cultural national activity is heavily concentrated on it. This fact produces an overestima- tion of the importance of the political activity in the nation's core and an under- estimation of the less important political development in the hinterlands. Nevertheless, this is contrary to the fact that the electoral system produces an under-representation of the largest four districts (for legislative seats and presidential college electors) and an over-representation of all the rest of them as we shall see in the next section.

Concurrent elections. Presidential elections are held every 6 years, national legislative elections every 2 years, 10 and elections for governors every 4 years) 1 In 1983 all posts were elected. In 1985, the elections were held mainly to select only national representatives. In 1983, 1989, and 1995 both presidential and legislative elections were held together, and in 1983, 1987, 1991, and 1995 both national legislative and gubernatorial elections coincided. Since executive offices (president and governors) cannot be distributed by proportional representation and therefore the essence of their corresponding elections is winner-takes-all,~2 the concentration of votes on the Radical and Peronist candidates in these concurrent elections tends to be higher and their correspondent level of fractionalization lower than that of simple proportional representation 'non-concurrent ' elections. This is why, when legislative elections coincide with executive-office elections, and the legislative candidates run for office on the coattails of their corresponding presidential or gubernatorial candidate, the concurrence of elections enhances the concentration of votes on the Radical and Peronist candidates and diminishes the process of increasing fractionalization.t3 Nonetheless, concurrent elections lessen the process of fractionalization but cannot obstruct it, as observed in Table 1.

Proport ional representation is evidently one of the encouraging elements for the process of expanding fractionalization. After the old debate around Duverger's law ("simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system...proportional representation favors multipartyism"), the broadest conclusion is that although the electoral system cannot be considered a deterministic cause for a specific type of party system, it is "...usually an accelerator or a brake..." of the development of the

ERNESTO CABRERA 483

party system (Duverger, 1986; Sartori, 1986). Regardless of whether proportional representation is accelerating the fractionalization or not, there is no doubt that, if not increasing, it is at least allowing the continuous decrease in the combined vote shares of the Justicialista and the Radical parties from 1983 onwards. 14

The process of increasing competitiveness may be observed in two ways: analysing national electoral results as a whole, and disaggregating them by provinces. Taking into account the national results as a whole, the trend of increasing weakening of the monopoly of representation of the two strongest traditional parties may be observed using two different indiccs.

Rae's index o f f ract ional izat ion: t5 the index continuously increases for national legislative elections from 1983 to 1995. In 1983 fractionalization was 0.62, in 1991 0.72, and in 1995 0.74. The emerging party system is continuously diverging from a classical two-party system (F=0.5).

The combined vote share o f the two strongest part ies (Peronists and Radicals): for national legislative elections, the national combined vote share continuously decreased from 86 per cent in 1983 to 79 per cent in 1985, 78 per cent in 1987, 74 per cent in 1989, 70 per cent in 1991, 72 per cent in 1993, and 65 per cent in 1995 (see Table 1). Other parties have increased their strength from only 14 per cent in 1983 to 30 per cent in 1991 and 35 per cent in 1995. If we compare presidential elections, the combined vote share has decreased from almost 9 per cent in 1983, when Radical Rat~l Alfonsin defeated Peronist Italo Luder (and became the first democratic President after the military regime), to 80 per cent in 1989 when Peronist Carlos Menem became the new President by defeating Radical Eduardo Angeloz, and to 67 per cent in 1995 (Table 1).

If we disaggregate the national electoral results by province, the pattern of decline of the combined vote share for national deputies of the two strongest parties is regularly observed in every province except Catamarca, Entre Rios, Formosa, La Pampa, La Rioja, and San Luis. The process of including new parties, increasing competition, and the weakening of the quasi two-party system can bc properly disaggrcgated by province and therefore seen much more in detail and in its deeper dimension.

The Argentine electoral map can be divided into three different kinds of electoral districts according to their size: (1) the four largest districts, Buenos Mres, Capital Federal, C6rdoba and Santa Fe, with more than half the population of the country, elect more than half of the national representatives; (2) the medium-sized districts (Corrientes, Chaco, Entre Rios, Jujuy, Mendoza, Misiones, Salta, San Juan, Santiago dcl Estero, and Tucum~in) elect between six and ten representatives each; (3) the ten remaining smaller districts together elect less than a fifth of the national representatives (see Table 2). Even more complex (and due to important historical factors) two of the medium-size districts (Corrientes and San Juan) and one of thc smallest districts (Neuqu6n) must be studied in a separate way. They form a fourth category because, exceptionally, strong local parties were, historically, extremely important in them.

The development of the party system since 1983 has taken different forms in each of these four categories of districts. In the largest districts, there is a process of increasing fractionalization that is related to the electoral weakening of the Peronist and Radical parties and to the strengthening (or appearance) of rightist and leftist national parties) 6 In the Federal Capital (already the most highly fraction- alized district in the first elections of 1983) fractionalization climbed from 0.69 in


TABLE 2. National deputies and presidential electors per district

District Inhabitants (%) National Presidential (%) deputies electors

(A) Distribution according to the 1980 Census used in 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, and 1995 national elections Cap. Fed. 2,922,829 10.4 25 54 9 Bs. As. 10,865,408 38.8 70 144 24 Catamarca 207,717 0.7 5 14 2.3 C6rdoba 2,407,754 8.6 18 40 6.7 Corrientes 661,454 2.4 7 18 3 Chaco 701,392 2.5 7 18 3 Chubut 263,116 0.9 5 14 2.3 Entre Rios 908,313 3.3 9 22 3.7 Formosa 295,887 1.1 5 14 2.3 Jujuy 410,008 1.5 6 16 2.7 La Pampa 208,260 0.7 5 14 2.3 La Rioja 164,267 0.6 5 14 2.3 Mendoza 1,196,228 4.3 10 24 4 Misione s 588,977 2.1 7 18 3 Neuqu~n 243,850 0.9 5 14 2.3 Rio Negro 383,354 1.4 5 14 2.3 Salta 662,870 2.4 7 18 3 San Juan 465,976 1.7 6 16 2.7 San Luis 214,416 0.8 5 14 2.3 Sata Cruz 114,941 0.4 5 14 2.3 Santa Fe 2,465,546 8.8 19 42 7 Sgo. d. Estero 594,920 2.1 7 18 3 Tucum~n 972,655 3.5 9 22 3.7 T.del Fuego 29,392 O. 1 2 4 0.7 Total 27,949,480 1 O0 254 600 99.9

(B) Distribution according to the 1991 Census Cap. Fed. 2,995,002 9.2 25 54 8.3 Bs. As. 12,538,007 38.7 81 166 25.5 Catamarca 264,940 O. 8 5 14 2.1 C6rdoba 2,761,067 8.5 20 44 6.7 Corrientes 780,778 2.4 8 20 3.1 Chaco 799,302 2.5 8 20 3.1 Chubut 324,582 1 5 14 2.1 Entre Rios 1,O21,042 3.1 9 36 5.5 Formosa 380,205 1.2 5 14 2.1 Jujuy 513,213 1.6 6 16 2.4 La Pampa 258,334 0.8 5 14 2.1 La Rioja 220,910 0.7 5 14 2.1 Mendoza 1,400,142 4.3 12 28 4.3 Misiones 779,O89 2.4 8 20 3.1 Neuqu~n 385,606 1.2 5 14 2.1 Rio Negro 506,314 1.6 5 14 2.1 Salta 863,688 2.7 8 20 3.1 San Juan 526,263 1.6 6 16 2.4 San Luis 272,896 0.8 5 14 2.1 Sata Cruz 159,726 0.5 5 14 2.1 Santa Fe 2,782,809 8.6 20 44 6.7 Sgo. d. Estero 670,388 2 7 18 2.8 Tucum~n 1,136,545 3.5 10 24 3.7 T.del Fuego 69,450 0.2 5 14 2.1 Total 32,370,298 1 O0 278 652 100

ERNESTO CABRERA 485

1983 to 0.74 in 1991 and 0.78 in 1995. In this district, Peronists and Radicals together received 91 per cent of the votes in the 1983 presidential elections but only 67 per cent in the 1989 election for president (see Table 1). In the following presidential election in 1995, a centre-left alliance among different factions of Peronist dissidents, socialists and other social-democrats and leftist groups (Frcntc Pals Solidario, FREPASO) won the election in the district with 44 per cent of the votes. Radicals and Peronists together only reached 52 per cent. For national representatives, while the Peronists and Radicals together were descending their percentage from 73 in 1983 to 60 in 1989, and finally, 43 in 1995, the Uni6n de Centro Democrfitico (UCeDe), a rightist party, got 18 per cent in 1987 and 22 per cent in 1989, and the Frente Grande, a centre-left group obtained almost 14 per cent of the votes in 1993, won the elections for the Constitutional Convention in the district in 1994, and also won the election (through a wider alliance, FREPASO) in 1995 with 35 per cent.

In Buenos Aires province the decline in the combined vote share of Peronists and Radicals was from 93 (1983) to 79 (1989) and 66 per cent (1995) in presidential elections. Fractionalization increased from 0.59 in 1983 to 0.68 in 1989 and to 0.73 in 1991. In elections for governor in Buenos Aires, Peronists and Radicals together received 92 per cent of the vote in 1983 (when Radical Armendariz became governor in the historical bastion of Peronism), 87 per cent in 1987 (when Peronist Cafiero recovered the province for his party), and only 70 per cent in 1991. For legislative elections the decline in the combined vote share of the two strongest parties went down from 89 in 1983 to 68 in 1991 and 70 per cent in 1995 (see Table 1).

In Santa Fc, Peronists and Radicals together obtained 88 per cent of the votes for national deputies in the 1983 elections and only 62 per cent in 1991 when a coalition of socialist parties obtained 17 per cent. Fractionalization increased cvcn further in 1995 when FREPASO obtained 28 per cent and Democracia Progresista 9 per cent. Radicals and Peronists together only reached 51 per cent.

However, it is in the medium-size provinces where the phenomenon of increasing electoral dispersion and emergence of third local and rightist parties have had the most dramatic effect. In Chaco, Salta, Tucumfin, and Jujuy, local political parties with linkages to the past military regime have appeared and won important places in the political spectrum. Helped by the critical economic situation of the provinces and friction with the central government, in Chaco, Mianza Acci6n Chaquefia, led by an ex-major of the capital city during the dictatorship, became the first party in 1991. In Tucumfin, Fuerza Republicana, lcd by Gcneral Bussi, an ex-military-gover- nor, obtained 35 per cent in 1989 and 44 per cent in 1991, and won the provincial elections in 1995 becoming the first party in the province and gaining the governorship for Bussi for the first time. In Jujuy, a traditional local part)-, Movimiento Popular Jujefio (MPJ) grew from 15 per cent in the 1983 legislative elections to 27 per cent in the 1991 corresponding elections and, at the same time, Fuerza Republicana also appeared receiving around 10 per cent of the votes in the 1989 and 1991 elections. Both parties repeated their electoral performances in 1993 and 1995. In Salta, the Renovador party, currently led by another military officer, grew from a mere 6 per cent in 1983 to a majority of the vote (57 per cent) in 1991. For national representatives, it obtained 34 per cent of the votes in 1993 and 1995. In Mendoza, the historical Partido Democrata maintained its 15 per cent through the 12-year period.


Only in the small districts in general, has there not been a process of increasing fractionalization. The Peronist and Radical parties maintain their dominance in most of the small districts. Besides historical, socio-economic, and political reasons, there is an institutional impediment: in these small districts of only five seats, every 2 years an election distributes two or three national seats in the district. The proportional representation electoral formula cannot proportionally allocate this small quantity of seats with efficacy and it becomes a 'de-facto' non-proportional formula. 17 Third parties are very discouraged to participate in national elections in these districts. Usually, the strongest party gets one or two seats and the second most voted party gets the remaining seat regardless of their vote shares, the differ- ence in votes, and the vote share of the third party.

In Corrientes, San Juan, and Neuqu6n, an historically important provincial party has maintained its strength during all elections. As in previous electoral periods, beginning in 1983 and from then on, the party systems of these provinces have been neither an emerging two-party system nor multiparty systems highly concentrated on the Peronists and Radicals. Corrientes', San Juan's, and Neuqu6n's party systems are clearly three-party systems, as they were in 1983. At that time, although Alfonsin's overwhelming electoral power permitted him to obtain a victory in the elections for president in each of these three provinces, the UCR could not prevent Pacto Autonomista-Liberal (PAL), Movimiento Popular Neuquino (MPN) and Bloquismo from winning the elections at the provincial level and obtaining the governorships and the national senators in Corrientes, Neuqu6n, and San Juan, respectively. The three parties have oscillated between 30 and 60 per cent during all elections. Peronists and Radicals together received less than 50 per cent of the vote in each province in legislative elections in 1991 (Table 1). t8

The combination of (a) the maintenance of electoral power of three old historical provincial parties, (b) a slow electoral dispersion in the largest districts in favour of 'national' left and right, and (c) an explosion of local extremely conservative parties in the medium-sized districts is silently and relentlessly forging a slightly different party system.

Even though there was a slow tendency towards a decrease in vote concentration on Peronism and Radicalism, nation-wide political challenges to the two historically strongest parties had not appeared until 1995.19 In May 1995, FREPASO, a centre-left alliance, obtained 22 per cent of the vote. It still has to be seen whether the alliance can develop towards becoming a national third party and an alternative to traditional national politics. Moreover, a more difficult task for the FREPASO alliance would be to expand its electoral strength from large urban districts to less densely populated areas and medium-sized and small provinces, z0

Electoral College, Proportional Representation, and Fractionalization: A Damocles' Sword

The Argentine electoral system was not very well prepared to deal with that increasing pluralization. In this section, I show that the studied increasing fractionalization might have become a threat to the stability of the new political regime in the light of a complex electoral system that was not very well prepared to deal with it. Increasing fractionalization augmented the possibilities of occurrence of two very problematic outcomes that could emerge due to the strange combination of presidential electoral college and proportional representation: (1) the

ERNESTO CABRERA 487

paradox of a majority (or plurality) winner of the popular votes that could lose the presidential election in electoral votes; or (2) a complicated electoral deadlock. An electoral college created the possibility of the paradox (a 'losing majority winner'); proportional representation (and over-representation of minor districts) not only increased that possibility but also developed the second possible trouble- some outcome, an electoral deadlock. If the combination of a presidential electoral college and proportional representation was risky, then the addition of a sluggish, but effective, process of fractionalization and pluralization converted this combination into a latent source of conflicts for the institutional continuity of democracy. If fractionalization continued evolving and there was no majority winner (of the electoral votes) in the electoral college, the combination of the three features would have immensely complicated the presidential election.

Electoral College

Until 1994, the president in Argentina was elected through the indirect system of an electoral college. Based on the American Constitution, the Argentine National Constitution of 1853 introduced a set of electoral colleges (one per electoral district) to select the president.

The collapse of the military regime in 1982 and the return to elections marked the beginning of the current democratic political regime. Different from the preced- ing dictatorship's retreat in 1973, when direct presidential elections were organized altering the constitution, in 1983, the following transition was carried as a complete return to constitutional rule.

Therefore, when people voted in the presidential elections of 1983 and 1989, they did not directly vote for a presidential candidate but for a party list of presidential electors who, then, voted for president. The 1853 constitution (Art. 83) required a majority of electoral votes for a candidate to become president (if there was no majority, the decision had to be made by the Congress). This process of formation of electoral colleges and indirect decision created a lot of theoretical problems in the presidential elections. Among them, the most important was thc artificially created possibility that a party could win a majority of the popular w)te in the nation and still could lose the election in the electoral college. How could this happen?

In both Argentina and the US there was not only one national electoral college but as many electoral colleges as electoral districts. Although there was a proportional procedure to allocate presidential electors among the districts (state or provinces), the number of electors that corresponded to each district did not exactly reflect the real weight of the district in the nation (as a population percentage in relation to the total population, see Table 2). The number of electors that corresponded to each district is the sum of the number of representatives and senators of that district in the US, and it was the double of that sum in the Argentine case. Although the national representatives were proportionally distributed per district, the addition of electors (corresponding to the number of senators of each district), four in the Argentine case, clearly favoured the less populated districts over-representing them in the electoral college (Table 2). 21 Second, and more importantly, the presidential electors were not elected based on the national percentages of votes of each party in the nation as a whole (one national districO but according to the percentages of votes obtained in each individual (provinciaD district. 22 Therefore, for the presidential ambitions of a


particular political party, the distribution of the popular votes among these districts was as much or more important than the national vote total.

Both factors made possible the paradox that a presidential candidate might obtain the majority (or plurality) of popular votes in the country but still not obtain the majority (or plurality) of electoral votes in the electoral college due to a specific distribution of his votes among the districts. While in the US, plurality electoral system (winner-takes-all) in most districts facilitates the formation of a majority of electors, making this paradox a remote possibility, in Argentina, due to proportional representation this paradox was much more likely to occur, x5

Electoral College Plus Proportional Representation

Article 81 of the Argentine National Constitution of 1853 established that the election of presidential electors to form the electoral colleges had to be held under the same conditions and rules that the elections for national deputies were held. When returning to constitutional law, Argentina also returned to proportional representation which has been used since 1963.

On 23 June and 12 July 1983, with the consensus of the main opposition parties, the last military president, General Bignone issued the decrees 22,838 and 22,847, by which essential electoral rules were established. These two decrees are still the current electoral law in Argentina and have never been reformed by the Congress.

Decree 22,838 instituted the d 'Hont electoral formula of proportional representation. Decree 22,847/83 transformed the magnitude of the electoral districts. The National Constitution of 1853 regulated the number of representatives corresponding to each electoral district according to its population (to be determined every 10 years through a national census). Decree 22,847 arbitrarily added three representatives to the number corresponding to each electoral district and instituted a minimum representation of five national deputies per district. 24 This trans- formation of the magnitude of the electoral districts immediately produced a phenomenon of under-representation of the four largest districts and over-representation of the rest of the provinces (Table 2).

The malapportionment among different districts produced by the decree 22,847 in the election of national deputies was directly translated and enlarged for the election of presidential electors. This happened because the number of presidential electors of each district had to be the double of the sum of representatives and senators corresponding to that district. The established minimum of five representatives instantaneously produced a minimum of 14 electors for the smallest districts (two times the sum of five representatives and two senators). The additional three representatives per district produced six electors more per district, but these six electors were much more important as a percentage of the total electors per district in the medium-size districts than in the largest ones (Table 2).

Therefore, the repercussion for the presidential election was a huge dispropor- tionality between the number of presidential electors and the size of the electoral districts (see Table 2). In Buenos Aires province, more than 10 million inhabitants (38.8 per cent) elected 144 presidential electors (24 per cent), whereas in Santa Cruz, only 114,941 inhabitants (0.4 per cent) had four electoral votes (2.3 per cent). In the 1983 and 1989 presidential elections, in the Southern province of Santa Cruz voters had approximately nine times more electoral power than voters in Buenos Aires (the largest district, see Table 2) (Molinelli, 1989). a5

ERNEST() CABRERA 489

The over-representation of districts (decree 22,847) increased the likelihood of the paradox of a candidate winning the elections through popular votes but unable to obtain the required majority of the electoral votes, and therefore losing the presidency. On the other hand, the general increase in the number of electors per district (decree 22,847) enhances the efficiency of proportional representation, since electoral formula efficacy depends largely on district magnitude.

Finally, if the proportional representation electoral formula more efficiently tended to produce proportional results, the rigorous requirement of obtaining a majority (not plurality) of electoral votes to choose the president was theoretically much more difficult to flllfil. 26 If proportional representation worked efficiently, together with the over-representation of districts, it made it much more difficult to obtain a majority of presidential electors. If no party obtained a majority of electoral votes, the process was open to the solicitation for electors' votes in order to form a majority in the electoral college. If no majority was obtained in the electoral- college vote, the decision had to be made by the Congress. In any case, the fact that no party had obtained a majority would have greatly complicated the presidential election and would have led to any of the following three situations (either in the electoral college or in Congress afterwards), all of them extremely danger- ous for the institutional continuity.

(1) The second, third, and other minor parties, individually or together, could have accepted the plurality winner as the legitimate president helping him to form majority (or abstaining) to give him the presidency. This was the 'Chilean' solution of 1970. The Congress elected Allende for president, but the opposition (mainly the Christian-Democrats), never accepted the consequences of their own option.

(2) Some of these losing parties could have allied to form a majority that would 'overthrow' the plurality winner and place their own negotiated candidate. This was the Bolivian solution of 1989, when Sfinchez de Losada (MNR) won a plurality in the elections but could not obtain a majority. An alliance between the second party (Banzer's ADN) and the third one (MIR) elected in the Congress the latter party's candidate, Paz Zamora as president. The acceptance of this type of solution by the population at large seemed to be very difficult in the Argentine case, where a high 'polarization' between Peronists and Radicals and a history of treacherous political manipulation existed.

(3) A complete deadlock. This is what happened in Bolivia in 1979, when Siles Suazo won the elections but his lack of majority threw the presidential election to the Congress where a compromise was built. However, the weak basis of this kind of pact brought a series of military interventions and resulted in new stalemates.

It has been shown that the bizarre combination of an indirect presidential election (through electoral colleges), a majority requirement in the electoral college, proportional representation to distribute the electoral votes, and an important malapportionment among districts drastically complicated the presidential elections, at least at the theoretical level of analysis.

Electoral College Plus Proportional Representation Plus Increasing Fractionalization

This theoretical dilemma, originated in the institutional system, had never disrupted the presidential election process in Argentina. When there had been presidential


elections, there had always been a majority solution in the corresponding electoral college and the elected president has always been either the majority or plurality- winner of the popular votes. Why have the analyzed theoretical puzzles never occurred? First, electoral systems cannot create results. Political raw material, parties, and elections are the decisive input. No election can be completely turned upside down by a specific electoral system. 27 In this sense, Argentine current- century history of a political hegemony of a dominant party until 1983 (Radicalism until 1945, Peronism until 1983) and an emerging quasi-two-party system in 1983, helped to satisfy the stringent condition of a majority in the electoral college. Second, proportional representation was only incorporated in 1963 and only three presidential elections (1963, 1983, and 1989) were held with the peculiar combination of a required majority in the electoral college and proportional representation to allocate electors in every district.

In all 10 electoral-college presidential elections since 1916 (with the exception of 1963, when dominant Peronism was proscribed), the winner got more than 45 per cent of the popular vote and that rendered more than 53 per cent of the electoral votes. Only in 1916 and 1963 did the plurality-winner of the presidential election need extra-electors to obtain the required majority. In 1916, Hip61ito Yrigoyen, with 46 per cent of the popular vote, got 44 per cent of the electors and needed the support of Radical dissidents of Santa Fe to reach a majority in the electoral college. With proportional representation, Peronism proscribed, and around 25 per cent of blank votes in 1963, president Illia also needed the support of electors of other political parties to obtain a majority in electoral votes.

Nevertheless, on the one hand, electoral laws may exert an important effect upon electoral outcomes (as it has been indirectly shown in this section), and on the other hand, the important process of increasing fractionalization that has been taking place in Argentina since 1983 could have become the detonator of a complex institutional impasse. To complicate the presidential election and to obtain a mind- boggling electoral deadlock, it was not necessary that a third nationally strong party appeared. Because of the bizarre combination of proportional representation, electoral college, and malapportionment among districts, small increases in fractionalization in the large districts combined with explosive appearances of third local parties in medium-size provinces and the maintenance of the already existing provincial three-party systems could become a threat to a peaceful resolution of the presidential election.

Only 24 electoral votes out of 600 did not belong to either the Peronist or Radical candidates in the 1983 presidential elections when Alfonsin became president. Six years later, in 1989, when Menem won the presidential elections, 86 electors were neither Radicals nor Peronists. However, with the described process of increasing fractionalization (which increased still more in 1991), the distribution of presidential electors could have been still more uneven in the future. If fractionallzation increased only to the extent that the presidential winner could not obtain his own majority of electoral votes, real electoral competition would contradictorily become a menace to the stability of the institutional system. TM

C o n c l u s i o n

I have shown here that a contemporary process of increasing fractionalization of the electoral competition was not only a reinforcing feature of democracy, but

ERNEST() CABRERA 491

could also contradictor i ly b e c o m e a menace to the stability of the inst i tut ional system.

The combina t ion of electoral college wi th majority rule, p ropor t iona l represen-

tat ion to allocate president ial electors, ma lappor t ionmen t , and increas ing fractionalization of the political compe t i t ion (especially at the provincial level) was placing the stability and con t inu i ty of the democra t ic regime at risk.

It was in this f ramework that the inst i tut ional analysis was impor tan t and the

Const i tut ional Conven t ion abolished the electoral college in 1994. To rely on insti- tut ional ' eng ineer ing ' as the main hope and factor in assuring the cont inu i ty of democracy wou ld have b e e n very naive, as m u c h as it w ou l d also be i ngenuous to

expla in democracy and stability in the deve loped countr ies only by inst i tut ional at t r ibutes (Dahl, 1957).

Nonetheless, neglect ing the inst i tut ional traits that could enhance or damage the

possibilities of the existing polyarchy could have been lethal. The analysis has shown that the combina t ion of increasing political compet i t ion ( through rising fractional-

ization), presidential electoral college, and a propor t ional representa t ion electoral

system was an explosive mixture that jeopardized the Argentine polyarchy itself.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the Universi ty of Pi t tsburgh and Fundac i6n Antorchas for financial

suppor t and to Mark Jones, Michael Kulisheck, Scott Mainwaring, James Malloy,

Victoria Murillo, Jorge Papadopulos, Mitchell Seligson, Kurt Von Met tenhe im and an a n o n y m o u s reviewer for c o m m e n t s on earlier versions.

Notes

1. The emphasis on the institutional dimension of politics was already present in the influ- ential work of Soares (1973), Valenzuela (1972) and Santos (1986).

2. A caveat is necessary. The institutional emphasis of this article does not attempt to ignore the importance of other factors that have been thoroughly analysed by the literature on Latin American politics and transitions. I rely on that literature to compensate for the narrow focus of this study. However I believe that a careful analysis of electoral systems and institutions is necessary to enhance a better understanding of Latin American politics and the new emerging regimes.

3. The electoral rule used in this election is neither a plurality nor a majority formula. The winner becomes president if either (a) s/he obtained more than 45 per cent of the votes, or (b) s/he obtains more than 40 per cent of the votes and the percentage is at least 10 per cent larger than the second candidate's percentage. Otherwise, a second-round election between the two most-voted candidates must take place.

4. Senators were indirectly elected by provincial legislatures according to the old Constitution.

5. In some provinces (mainly in Buenos Aires) Peronism split into two different factions and ran on two different tickets. After the 1983 national defeat, some Peronist leaders (the 'Renovadores') began to openly disagree with the old-fashioned organization of the party, blaming it for the defeat. They attempted a renewal of the traditional language and symbols of Peronism adapting them to the new times of liberal-democracy. Having been blocked from the access to places in the official party structure, the Renovadores ran in the elections under the banner of minor allied parties and in general obtained more votes than the 'official' Peronist ticket. They tested their strength, and from 1985 onwards it was recognized as their electoral superior.

6. Presuming that Carlos Menem was going to win the election, the Peronists wanted to estab- lish plurality as the rule to win the presidency, while the Radicals wanted a majority


formula with a second-round election to allow the opposition to have a second chance to compete more effectively for the Presidency. The final result was the middle-point solution already described in note 3.

7. An anonymous reviewer correctly pointed out that these analyses were "mostly writ ten during the 1980s, w h e n the trend was less clear than it is now". Nevertheless, the trend already existed and most Argentine analysts did not perceive it because their analyses were (and still are) closer to the glamour of presidential elections and Buenos Aires politics than to a 'nuts and bolts ' analysis and disaggregation of electoral results through- out the country. Today they would accept much more comfortably the existence of this t rend only because of the last presidential elect ion results. My point here is that the increasing fractionalization of the party system is a tendency that can be and must be traced to legislative elections and results in the provinces and it exists with or without an alternative third presidential candidate.

8. An earlier version of this article was writ ten for a conference in 1993, before the national elections of 1993, 1994, and 1995. My initial observation of this weakening of the traditional two parties has been confirmed by those following electoral results. The article has been revised and updated to take account of electoral data up to 1995. After these last three elections, more political analysts became aware of the deterioration of the two- party system. Nevertheless, based on the particularly bad performance of the Radicals in these elections (especially in the 1995 presidential elections), their major quest ion is whe the r the Radicals would be replaced as the second party or not. Influenced by the electoral victories of the Peronist party, they tend to ignore that the tendency of increasing fractionalization is general.

9. In Argentina, this process is referred to as 'depolarization' (e.g. De Riz and Adrogue, 1991) because of the historical division in public opinion be tween two political 'poles': Peronism and Anti-Peronism (e.g. the description of the ' impossible game', O'Donnell , 1973). I will avoid using the word 'depolarization' in this article because the concept 'polarization', at least since Sartori's classic work on political parties (1976), carries a strong connotat ion of an increase in ideological distance. Of course, ideological distance is a concept that is very difficult to define and measure in a political environment constructed around 'catch-all parties' and 'national-populist ' movements.

10. The National Chamber of Deputies is r enewed by halves. 11. Provincial legislators, city majors and city representatives are usually elected every 2

years in elections that coincide with major national elections. However it may vary in each province.

12. I say ' the essence' , because party campaign and popular vote treated the election for president as a direct contest be tween candidates for an office. However , in reality, the presidential elect ion was until 1994 an indirect compet i t ion through provincial electoral colleges. Presidential electors were elected in each province by means of proportional representation.

13. The ballot is only one per party including execut ive and legislative candidates together for each level of elections: national, provincial, and municipal. Thus, it is necessary to physically cut the ballot to combine a vote for a presidential candidate of one party and a legislative candidate of another party for example. This feature enhances presidential coattails and discourages split vote (and therefore fractionalization at the legislative level). Despite exceptions, there is a historical tendency towards a straight ticket vote (within each level of elections).

14. The striking irony is that the combinat ion of proport ional representation and real electoral compet i t ion during 10 years is producing changes in the party system, whereas dictatorships and proscriptions (despite their attempts to transform politics and to smash populism) only froze the political situation and party system for some years. Elaborating from Rokkan's classical party cleavages definitions, Morlino (1987) suggests this 'freez- ing effect ' of some Latin American military regimes.

15. Rae's (1971) original concep t of fractionalization measures (a) the number of party shares and (b) the relative equality of these shares.

16. I call them 'national' parties not only because they are organized nationally but because their appeal is not focused on local issues. Localist parties have appeared and exist (in different degrees) in these districts but they have remained at the city level without even at tempting politics at the provincial level.

ERNESTO CABRERA 493

17. "...Any propor t iona l r ep resen ta t ion e lec t ion in small districts is in fact a plurality election. . . ' (Nohlen, 1984). '...Very small magni tudes of, say th ree seats, will t hwar t even the mos t precise P.R. formula in its pract ical effect... ' (Rae, 1971).

18. In Cor r i en tes the his tor ica l Pac to Autonomis ta-Libera l w i t h 47 p e r c en t of the p o p u l a r vo tes w o n the G o v e r n o r s h i p in 1983 (it also r ece ived 35 p e r c en t for na t iona l represen ta t ives in a h ighly po la r i zed na t iona l e lec t ion) . In 1985, its vo te share g r e w up to a lmost 50 p e r cent , and it m a i n t a i n e d the se resul t s in 1987 ob t a in ing the governor - sh ip again. It r e a c h e d these resul ts in 1987 ob t a in ing the g o v e r n o r s h i p again. It r e a c h e d more t han 40 p e r c en t of the vo tes in 1989, 1991, 1993, and 1995, obta in- ing a plurality. In Neuqu6n , a l t hough the Mov imien to Popula r N e u q u i n o w o n majority in the provinc ia l e l ec t ions in 1983, it cou ld no t avoid na t iona l ' po la r iza t ion ' and rece ived only 34.5 p e r c e n t of the vote for na t iona l r ep re sen t a t i ve s ( s e c o n d place) . Both in 1987 and in 1991, it w o n the g o v e r n o r s h i p again (w i th major i ty of votes in the s e c o n d case). 'Na t iona l iza t ion ' of the p rov inc ia l e l ec t ions and 'coat tai l effect ' cou ld no t damage it in 1991, 1993, and 1995, and MPN also w o n the e lec t ions for na t iona l r ep resen ta t ives . In San Juan, even dec reas ing in vo tes and hav ing lost the g o v e r n o r s h i p ob t a ined in 1983, the Bloquis ta par ty still have a lmost 25 pe r cen t of the votes.

19. In 1985 a b o o m of a lmost one mill ion votes (6 pe r cen t of the nat ional votes) made the leftist Partido In t rans igente (originally sp rung f rom UCR-UCRI) to b e c o m e a promis ing political party. In 1987, its s t rength had already decreased. In 1989, the rightist Alianza de Cent ro got almost 7 pe r cen t of the nat ional vote.

20. In February, 1996, the FREPASO president ial and vice-presidential candidates split. 21. In the Argent ine case the over - representa t ion was enlarged by the cu r ren t electoral law

descr ibed below. Table 2 shows the impor t an t d i spropor t ion among districts. The n u m b e r of votes requi red to obta in b o t h a represen ta t ive and a presidential e lec tor t h rough propor t iona l r epresen ta t ion was m u c h smaller in the over - represented p rov inces than in the four largest districts. As an example , theoretically, a vote for nat ional repre- sentat ives was 6.6 t imes more powerfu l in the small Southern province of Santa Cruz in the hardly popu la ted Patagonia than in Buenos Aires province.

22. Enlarging the possible d ispropor t ional i ty b e t w e e n popula r votes and n u m b e r of presidential electors, most states in the US allocate all e lectors to the plurality winner .

23. This pa radox might h a p p e n in b o t h Argent ina and the US. A candidate might lose in popu la r votes and still w in in electoral votes and reach the presidency. In 16 states of the US and in the District of Columbia the re are laws that compe l the e lectors to vote for the plurality w i n n e r of popu la r votes in the state. There is a deba te about the consti- tut ionali ty of these laws, w h i c h have neve r b e e n tested. In 1888, Cleveland w o n the popula r vote bu t was defeated by Harrison in electoral votes. In 1916, 3807 more votes for Hughes in California wou ld have given h im the p res idency despi te the fact that W o o d r o w Wilson ob ta ined a plurality of popu la r votes. In Argent ina this never happened . However , s ince 1963, p ropor t iona l r ep resen ta t ion made this paradoxical result more likely. Whereas no Pres ident of the US has ob ta ined less than 50 pe r cen t of electoral votes in this cen tury (he lped by 'winner-takes-all ' state electoral colleges), it h a p p e n e d twice in Argent ina in 1916 and 1963 (Molinelli, 1989).

24. The National Terri tory of Tierra dcl Fuego was exc luded from this m i n i m u m and given two seats.

25. I have studied the effect of this district magni tude t ransformat ion on the proport ional- ity of the electoral system for the legislative e lect ions (Cabrera, 1992).

26. This was one of the biggest dif ferences b e t w e e n the electoral college in the US and Argentina. In the US winner-takes-all electoral-votes plurality works, e n h a n c i n g the forma- t ion of a majority. In Argentina, p ropor t iona l r ep resen ta t ion was s o m e h o w in contra- d ic t ion wi th the s t r ingent r equ i r emen t of majori ty rule in the electoral college. It was the set t ing of two cont rad ic tory pr inciples of r ep resen ta t ion in the p rocess of select ion of pres ident . It was the hazardous resul t of the sociological c o n c e p t of Latin America as a ' living mus eum ' wi th in the inst i tut ional domain: the over lapp ing of two inconsis tent pr inciples of representa t ion , each one dominan t in a different historical period.

27. As stated by Rae (1971), the de-fractionalization effect of electoral laws u p o n the compet- itive posi t ions of political par t ies in legislatures is marginal by compar i son to the effect of e lec t ion outcomes.


28. An actual example will present the case more clearly. Corrientes, in the Argentine north- east, was the only province that still elected its governor through an electoral college. In 1991 elections for governor were held. The Pacto Autonomista-Liberal (PAL), a strong local alliance, won the elections. It obtained 13 electors (one less than a majority). The Peronists received nine electors and the Radicals four. There was a pact before the elections between Radicals and Peronists to vote together in the electoral college for the party most voted of the two. Despite the fact that the PAL was a clear winner in the elections, there was a tie in electoral votes, 13 going to each side. Because of the electoral deadlock, a set of complicated legal manoeuvres began. Corrientes Justice Court favoured PAL and the national Supreme Court supported the Peronists. No solution could be obtained and the central government intervened and designated an interim governor ('interventor'). Another election for governor was held in Corrientes in 1992. The PAL won the elections but, ironically, because of distribution of the votes among the constituencies (and the same analysed possible disproportion between popular and electoral votes), it obtained one elector less than the Peronists, who lost the election in popular votes but won it in the number of electors. However, again, no absolute majority of electoral votes was obtained: the PAL obtained 11 electors, the Peronists 12, and the Radicals the decisive four remaining electors. Another fatal stalemate, and a set of political and legal battles began again. No solution was obtained and a new federal inter- vention took place. In this example the national government solved the deadlock by intervening in the province. The question was, who would have solved the same institutional deadlock, had it appeared at the national level, in the presidential electoral college?

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