Multi-Nationalism, Democracy and “Asymmetrical Federalism” · 2007-06-10 · 2 Multi-Nationalism, Democracy and “Asymmetrical Federalism” “the six long-standing democracies

Alfred Stepan 1

“The great risk is thatfederal arrange-ments can offer op-portunities for non-democratic ethnicnationalists to mobi-lize their resources.”

WO

RK

ING

PAPER

Technical Advisory Network of Burma

Multi-Nationalism, Democracy and“Asymmetrical Federalism”

(With Some TentativeComparative Reflections on Burma)

Introduction

For those of us interested in the spread and consolidation ofdemocracy, whether as policy makers, human rights activists, politicalanalysts, or democratic theorists, there is a greater need now thanever before to reconsider the potential risks and benefits offederalism.

The great risk is that federal arrangements can offer opportunitiesfor non-democratic ethnic nationalists to mobilize their resources.This risk is especially grave when elections are introduced in thesub-units of a formerly non-democratic federal polity—as they werein the USSR and the former Yugoslavia—prior to democraticcountrywide elections and in the absence of democratic countrywideparties.1 Of the nine states that once made up communist Europe,six were unitary and three were federal. The six unitary states arenow five states (East Germany has reunited with the FederalRepublic), while the three federal states — Yugoslavia, the USSR,and Czechoslovakia — are now 22 independent states. Most of post-communist Europe’s ethnocracies and ethnic bloodshed has occurredwithin these post-federal states.

Yet in spite of these potential problems, federal rather than unitaryis the form most often associated with multinational democracies.Federal states are also associated with large populations, extensiveterritories, and democracies with territorially based linguisticfragmentation. In fact, every single long-standing democracy in aterritorially based multilingual and multinational polity is a federalstate.2

Although there are many multinational polities in the world, few ofthem are democracies. Those multinational democracies that doexist, however (Canada, Belgium, Spain and India), are all federal.Although all these democracies have had problems managing theirmultinational polities (and even multicultural Switzerland had theSonderbund War, the secession of the Catholic cantons in 1848),they remain reasonably stable. By contrast, Sri Lanka, a territoriallybased multilingual and multinational unitary state that feared the“slippery slope” of federalism, could not cope with its ethnic divisionsand plunged headlong into a bloody civil war that has lasted morethan 15 years.

Multi-Nationalism, Democracy and “Asymmetrical Federalism”2

“the six long-standingdemocracies thatscore highest on anindex of linguistic andethnic diversity — In-dia, Canada, Bel-gium, Switzerland,Spain and the UnitedStates — are all fed-eral states.”

In addition to the strong association between multinationaldemocracies and federalism, the six long-standing democracies thatscore highest on an index of linguistic and ethnic diversity — India,Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain and the United States — areall federal states. The fact that these nations chose to adopt a federalsystem does not prove anything; it does, however, suggest thatfederalism may help these countries manage the problems thatcome with ethnic and linguistic diversity. In fact, in my judgment, ifcountries such as Indonesia, Russia, Nigeria, China and Burma areever to become stable democracies, they will have to craft workablefederal systems that allow cultural diversity, a robust capacity forsocioeconomic development, and a general standard of equalityamong their citizens.

Consider the case of Indonesia, for example. It seems to meet allthe indicators for a federal state. It has a population of over 200million, and its territory is spread across more than 2,000 inhabitedislands. It has great linguistic and ethnic fragmentation and manyreligions. Thus it is near the top in virtually all the categoriesassociated with federalism. If Indonesia is to become a democracy,one would think that it would have to address the question offederalism or decentralization. Yet at a meeting of Indonesianpolitical, military, religious and intellectual leaders that I attendedafter the fall of Suharto, most of the participants (especially thosefrom the military) rejected federalism out of hand because ofsecessionist conflicts at the end of Dutch colonial rule. Indonesiashould have at least considered what I call afederacy to deal withspecial jurisdictions like Aceh or Irian Jaya.

A federacy is the only variation between unitary states and federalstates. It is a political system in which an otherwise unitary statedevelops a federal relationship with a territorially, ethnically orculturally distinct community, while all the other parts of the stateremain under unitary rule. Denmark has such a relationship withGreenland, and Finland with the Aaland Islands. It would havehelped the Indonesian transition if before the transition the conceptof a “federacy” had been discussed among not only among civilsociety activists, but potential constitution makers, and even themilitary. An analogous situation may be true for the concept of“asymmetrical federalism” in relation to Burma. Let me first explorewhat I mean by this concept.

Asymmetrical Federalism

To begin the discussion of asymmetrical federalism let me first tryto make a distinction between multinational and mono-nationalstates. I will call a state multinational if(1) it has more than oneterritorially based linguistic majority (often compounded with ethnicand/or religious and/or cultural identities) in the state, and (2) thereare significant political groups who would like to build political

Alfred Stepan 3

“However, in a demo-cratic asymmetricalfederal system theconstitution makers,in order to “hold to-gether” the polity inone peaceful democ-racy, may give consti-tutionally embeddedspecial rights for dis-tinct members of thefederation.”

sovereignties, or an independent state or states, around theseterritorially based cultural differences.

If we use this definition of multinational states, of the eleven federalstates with at least ten years of democratic rule at the moment,Canada, Spain, Belgium and India are multinational. Democraticfederations that may be multicultural, and which may have significantindigenous populations, but which are not multi-national as I havedefined the term, are Austria, Australia, the USA, Germany,Argentina and Brazil.

Paradoxically, the country that is the most difficult to classify as towhether it is actually multinational or not is Switzerland. Manyanalysts refer of course to Switzerland as multinational becausemost of the cantons are (exclusively) French, German or Italianspeaking. However, my argument against calling Switzerlandmultinational is that Protestant and Catholic differences arelinguistically crosscutting rather than compounding. Most importantly,none of the parties that have been in the “magic formula” fourparty power sharing coalition that has ruled Switzerland since 1958is built around a single language or nation, and no significant partyadvocates secession. Linz and I thus believe it makes more analyticand political sense to call Switzerland a “state-nation”, than to call ita “multinational state”.

If we employ the definitions I have just advanced, we can create,for analytic purposes, a dichotomy between multinational statesand mono-national states.

We can also divide the universe of democratic federal states intoconstitutionally symmetrical federal states, and constitutionallyasymmetrical federal states.

In a constitutionally symmetrical federal system, as found in theUSA, Germany, Austria, Australia, Switzerland, Argentina and Brazil,each full member (canton, state, autonomla, province or lander)has exactly the same constitutionally embedded obligations andrights.

However, in a democratic asymmetrical federal system theconstitution makers, in order to “hold together” the polity in onepeaceful democracy, may give constitutionally embedded specialrights for distinct members of the federation.

For example, in Canada in 1867, constitution makers decided thatpolitical integration between English speaking Upper Canada andFrench speaking Lower Canada would be best served if the Canadianpolity shifted from a unitary state to a federal state. Moreover, ratherthan insist on Canada wide “symmetrical federalism” in which Anglo-Saxon common law, English language and the very marginal role


i

“Eventually most ofthe mil i tary ac-cepted “asymmetri-cal federalism” as anecessary instru-ment for maintain-ing the integrity ofthe Spanish state.”

of the Catholic Church would be the law of the land in each province,it was decided that Canada would have a better chance to “holdtogether” if the Napoleonic code and the French language wereconstitutionally embedded as having a legitimate place in Quebec,and also if the Catholic Church was given greater recognition andstatus in Quebec than anywhere else in Canada.

At the end of the Franco regime in Spain, most of the military —and probably most of the Spanish population—would have preferredthat Spain remain a unitary state. However, constitution makerscame to the decision (later ratified by a referendum in everyconstituent part of the country) to become a federal state. Thedecision to federalize was made so that some of the aspirant nationssuch as Catalonia and the Basques could have greater culturalautonomy but remain an integral part of the Spanish state. Afterthe referendum ratified the constitution, negotiations began, in eachconstituent part of the federation, with the center. The agreementsthat were eventually arrived at by elected officials at the center withelected officials in what came to be called the “autonomías”, were inturn submitted to a individual referendum in each autonomía .Allthe autonomías, including Catalonia and the Basque country,approved their separate and asymmetrical agreements.

As in Canada, the constitution makers decided that Spain had abetter chance to avoid violence and conflict if Catalonia and theBasque County could give a special legal status to their languages.Such agreements were to be constitutionally embedded (and thusprotected by the courts, and requiring exceptional majorities inboth houses of the federal legislature and in the autonomías beforethey could possibly be changed). Furthermore, some historicprivileges (taxes in the case of the Basque County, and having to dowith the police in Catalonia) were constitutionally embedded. Multipleand complimentary identities were facilitated by such agreements.In fact in numerous public opinion polls the most frequent self-attribution on a five point scale that ranged from (1) “I am onlyCatalan”(2) “I am more Catalan than Spanish”(3) “I am equallyCatalan and Spanish”(4) “I am more Spanish than Catalan” to (5) “Iam only Spanish” the modal (most frequently chosen) responsewas (3)—” I am equally Catalan and Spanish”.

Eventually most of the military accepted “asymmetrical federalism”as a necessary instrument for maintaining the integrity of the Spanishstate.3

India at independence was de facto a unitary state in terms of thecivil service and the legal system. However, India had more than 15languages spoken by at least 10 million people each, a large Muslimminority (now numbering over 120 million). India also had troubledareas in the Northeast that had never been sociologically or politicallyintegrated into India by Hinduism, or by the normal functioning of

Alfred Stepan 5

“Thus, for Belgium,despite some con-tinuing problems,Linz and I feel thatit makes politicalsense to say thatBelgium..... seemsto be “holding to-gether”, and evenslowly buildingmultiple butcomp lemen ta ry“state-nation” iden-tities in the last de-cade as an asym-metric federation.”

British rule, nor deep involvement with the Congress Partyindependence movement.

Given this significant potential for secessionists movements in newlyindependent India the constituent assembly in 1947-48 determinedthat the best way to try to “hold together” India as a peaceful anddemocratic state would be to become a federal system which allowedconstitutional asymmetry within its federal structures.

This constitutional structure allowed the Linguistic ReorganizationAct of 1956 in which most of the boundaries of Indian states wereredrawn so as to make linguistic boundaries and political boundariesmore over-lapping. This reorganization made political participationby the largely illiterate population (and the largely non-Hindispeaking and non-English speaking population) easier. This massivelinguistic reorganization is generally considered by democratictheorists to be the largest and most democratically successful caseof boundary redrawing ever accomplished. India’s “asymmetricalfederalism” also allowed the creation of new states out of Assam asa way to better manage the extremely difficult situation in theNortheast.

(Mainly Catholic) Belgium succeeded from (mainly Protestant)Holland in 1830. From about 1830 to 1900, Belgium tried to becomea French speaking “nation-state” despite the fact that in the northernhalf of Belgium Dutch speakers constituted the overwhelmingmajority of the population. As more non-elite actors entered politicsearly in the 20th century it was agreed that Dutch speakers shouldbe able to speak their language in parliament. Belgium thus becameofficially (as well as sociologically) bilingual, but Belgium stillremained a unitary state. However the differences in the desiresbetween the French speaking, and especially the Dutch speaking,populations concerning educational, cultural and hospital policiesbecame too great to handle in a unitary state. In the face of growingcultural conflicts —and some right wing secessionist sentiment inthe North—Belgium, in 1993, became an asymmetrical federal polity.Furthermore, according to two important recent public opinion pollsthat replicate some of the Spanish surveys that I have referred to,“multiple and complementary” identities are growing and secessionistsentiments are declining among respondents under forty years ofage.

Thus, for Belgium, despite some continuing problems, Linz and Ifeel that it makes political sense to say that Belgium pursued afailed “nation-state” model from 1830-1900, a failed unitary statemodel until 1990, but seems to be “holding together”, and evenslowly building multiple but complementary “state-nation” identitiesin the last decade as an asymmetric federation.

I believe I have now said enough about different types of federalism


that if we employ the definitions I have advanced, we can nowcreate, for analytic purposes, a dichotomy between “symmetricalfederalism” and “asymmetrical federalism.” When we combine thisdichotomy with our previously discussed dichotomy of “mono-national states” versus “multinational states”, this gives us thestandard foursquare depicted in Table 1.

A powerful pattern is clear in Table 1. All the long-standing (largely)mono-national federal democracies are constitutionally symmetrical.But all the long-standing (largely) multinational federal democraciesare constitutionally asymmetrical.

Table 1 Constitutional-legal arrangements of entire universe offederal systems that have been democracies since 1988 andrelationship to demos

Symmetrical Asymmetrical

Mon

o-na

tiona

l

Austria

Australia Argentina

Brazil Germany

Switzerland USA

Mul

tina

tion

al

Belgium Canada India Spain

Let me make a further observation. Russia is an asymmetrical federalsystem, however much of this asymmetry is not constitutionallyembedded, much of the Russian system, in complete contrast toSpain, was extra-constitutionally negotiated, and/or anti-constitutionally exercised. See Table 2.

Alfred Stepan 7

Table 2 Range of Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Federal Systems

Constitutionally largely

symmetrical

Some Asymmetrical differences

constitutionally embedded and implemented

Major asymmetrical differences constitutionally

embedded, extra-constitutionally negotiated, and/or anti-constitutionally

exercised. USA Australia Switzerland Germany Austria Brazil

Spain: Different autonomies have different prerogatives that are constitutionally embedded. All new arrangements must be public and be approved by both chambers of parliament. Both center and autonomies subject to binding decisions by Constitutional Court. India: Federacy relationship with Jammu Kashmir and numerous special linguistic and tribal arrangements. Belgium: Extensive constitutional provisions for different linguistic communities and use of consociational and non- territorial representation arrangements. Special status of Brussels and the small German speaking territory. Canada: French speaking Quebec has a number of prerogatives the English speaking provinces do not have in such areas as education, law, and immigration policies.

Russia: Constitutionally, republics have higher status as members of the Russian federation than do “territories”, “regions”, “federal cities," autonomous regions”, and “autonomous areas." classifications stem from Soviet federalsim. Russia: Extra-constitutionally, private treaties are negotiated between the executive of the center and the executives of the sub-units, often with special prerogatives or dispensations that were not voted upon by the Parliament or even widely known before they were signed. Russia: Anti-constitutionally, numerous provisions of the constitutions or statutes of the eighty-nine subjects of the federation are in contradiction with the 1993 Russian constitution. The Constitution Court does not make a ruling, and when it does make a ruling, it often is not implemented. No "common legal space” in Russia.

For the record, the 1947 Burmese Constitution had someasymmetrical characteristics. However, it appears that fewconstitutionally embedded safeguards and mechanisms, similar tothose found in the current Spanish federal system, had significantpresence or weight in Burma even in the 1947-1962 period beforefull military rule.


“ In comparativeterms this wouldappear to give theBurmese militaryregime substantialbargaining power ifand when the cur-rent talks shift to is-sues concerningdemocratization”

Some Comparative Reflections on Relative MilitaryPower, Democratization Precedents, andConstitutional Formulas in Burma

According to the International Crisis Group’s report, “Myanmar:The Role of Civil Society” (December 2001), “civil society is at itsweakest point in decades” in Burma. If this is true, then a possibledemocratic transition in Burma is starting with from a weakerposition, vis-à- viz the military regime, than any of the fifteen or sotransitions I have studied, observed and written about.

We did not explicitly state this in “How Burma Could Democratize” 4

, but a close reading of pages 98-102 should make clear that noneof the major factors that contributed to “militarized”, if not alwaysstrictly “military”, regimes leaving power in Greece, Brazil, Portugal,Uruguay, Spain, Argentina, Taiwan, Chile, and South Korea, appearto be robustly present in Burma.

In comparative terms this would appear to give the Burmese militaryregime substantial bargaining power if and when the current talksshift to issues concerning democratization, especially the issue offree elections, and the even more important issue of winners beingallowed to assume effective control of the government and thestate after free elections. At the moment, civil society and politicalsociety in Burma are still under such effective constraints that, inthe vocabulary of the literature on democratic transitions, Burma isin the early stages of what is called “ liberalization” and has not yetactually begun the first steps of what is normally called“democratization”.

The extremely unusual nature of federalism in the draftconstitution of Burmese exiles

Given the apparent unfortunate power balance between thedemocratic opposition and the military regime I have just discussed,any proposal by the democratic opposition that increases the willand unity of the military to oppose a democratic transition shouldbe looked at very carefully. The draft constitution of National Councilof Union of Burma, an exile umbrella organization of Burmeseopposition, is such a document

The draft constitution is entirely without precedent in the history ofany long-standing federal democracy in the world. It is also certainto stiffen military resolve to retain power.

We should explore whether some Burmese appropriate variant ofthe “asymmetrical federal” systems of India, Spain, Canada, andBelgium would achieve many of the desired goals of the democraticopposition but stimulate much less military resistance.

Alfred Stepan 9

“these three stipu-lations could possi-bly lead to a mas-sive under-repre-sentation of theseventy or so per-cent of the ethnicmajority populationcalled the “Bur-m a n s ” — w h omainly reside incentral Burma andwith whom mostmilitary and intelli-gence officers iden-tify”

Let me review what is unprecedented in the constitution of anylong-standing democratic federal constitution and show why it iscertain to make military extrication less, rather than more, likely.

1. The only federal constitutions that explicitly gave the right tosecede were those of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (and in boththe implicit assumption was that the communist party did the effectivesteering in the multinational state) and in Burma in the 1947constitution, probably based on the Soviet model.

2. If there had been a successful revolution, or if the militaryhad been defeated in an armed struggle, or if Burma did not haveArmed Forces, one of the proposed draft articles might be politicallyunderstandable. However since none of these conditions obtain,the language about the military is surprising. “The Federal ArmedForces units shall be drawn from the Member States on proportionalbasis”. The next sentence moreover gives each of the states a rightto provide at least “one commander” in the commanding staff, whichwill be rotating annually.

3. All of the long-standing multinational federal democraciesare, as we have seen, asymmetrically federal. Constitution draftersadopted the asymmetrical format in order to give the differentconstituent members of the new federation some special defensesor prerogatives for aspects of their multinational community thatmost affected them. At the time the constituent members weregiven rights, the rights were constitutionally embedded and thusprotected by the court system and by the federal legislature whichcould block any changes concerning these prerogatives unless bothhouses approved these changes by exceptional majorities. In thecase of Spain any changes of these prerogatives also requires theexplicit approval of the constituent unit, or units, affected.

The draft constitution of NCUB appears to me to be symmetrical.However, it attempts to defend states rights by three stipulationsand safeguards. First, the upper house is made a bit stronger thanthe lower house. All important executive positions are subject tothe approval of the upper house but not of the lower house. Second,the draft constitution stipulates that each state with a populationover 200,000 (as all of them presently have) will receive identicalrepresentation in the upper house. Third, no state can chair morethan one committee until every state chairs at least one committee.

Taken together these three stipulations could possibly lead to amassive under-representation of the seventy or so percent of theethnic majority population called the “Burmans”—who mainly residein central Burma and with whom most military and intelligenceofficers identify.

If for example “Ministerial Burma” is treated as one state as is


proposed in what I call scenario #1 (which on grounds of equalrepresentation of each nation some of the minority nationalitiesadvocate) Burma would have degrees of over and underrepresentation massively more extreme than that found in any federaldemocracy in the world. See Tables 3, 4, and 5.

Table 3 Population Burma

States Population % of TotalKayah State 246,000 0.45%Chin State 458,000 0.85%Kachin State 1,202,000 2.24%Kayin State 1,403,000 2.62%Mon State 2,337,000 4.36%Rakhine State 2,610,000 4.87%Shan State 4,629,000 8.64%Taninthayi Division 1,269,000 2.37%Magway Division 4,301,000 8.03%Bago Division 4,848,000 9.06%Sagaing Division 5,180,000 9.68%Yangon Division 5,295,000 9.89%Mandalay Division 6,188,000 11.56%Ayeyawady Division 13,566,593 25.34%

Total 53,532,593 100.00%

If we consider seven different divisions constitute a state of majorityBurman according to the proposed federal structure, the populationdistribution is the following:

States Population % of TotalKayah State 246,000 0.45%Chin State 458,000 0.85%Kachin State 1,202,000 2.24%Kayin State 1,403,000 2.62%Mon State 2,337,000 4.36%Rakhine State 2,610,000 4.87%Shan State 4,629,000 8.64%Burman State 40,647,593 75.90%

Total 53,532,593 100.00%

Source: www.myanmar.comDate: February 9, 2002

Alfred Stepan 11

Table 4 Mal-apportionment in Burma’s Upper House: Twodifference scenarios

Scenario #1: If the constitution assigns equal representation toeach of the eight states.

States % of % of Mal-apportionmentpopulation seats Index

Kayah 0.46 12.5 12.04Chin 0.86 12.5 11.64Kachin 2.25 12.5 10.25Kayin 2.62 12.5 9.88Mon 4.37 12.5 8.13Rakhine 4.88 12.5 7.62Shan 8.65 12.5 3.85“Ministerial Burma” 75.93 12.5 63.43Total 100.00 100.0 63.43

Scenario # 2: If the constitution assigns equal representation amongthe seven states and the seven divisions of “Ministerial Burma”.

States and Divisions % of % of Mal-apportionment population seats Index

Kayah 0.46 7.14 6.68Chin 0.86 7.14 6.28Kachin 2.25 7.14 4.89Kayin 2.62 7.14 4.52Mon 4.37 7.14 2.77Rakhine 4.88 7.14 2.26Shan 8.65 7.14 1.51Ayeyawady Division 25.34 7.14 18.20Bago Division 9.06 7.14 1.92Mandalay Division 11.56 7.14 4.42Magway Division 8.03 7.14 0.89Sagaing Division 9.68 7.14 2.54Taninthayi Division 2.37 7.14 4.77Yangon Division 9.89 7.14 2.75Total 100.00 99.96 32.20

Note: The Malapportionment index is computed as

½ S ? si - vi ? Where s i = % seats and vi = % of population. This calculation follows the formula proposed by David Samuelsand Richard Snyder in “The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment inComparative Perspective”, British Journal of Political Science, October2001. p. 655. Population data for Burma: www.myanrnar.com


“design and sup-port a democraticfederal system thatprotects their mostimportant culturaldesires, without atthe same time cre-ating incentives forthe military to blockdemocratization,and disincentivesfor the majority na-tionality- the Bur-mans- to supportdemocratization”

Conclusion

If I am partly right in my tentative observations about Burma Ithink we should seriously discuss the following five issues.

How could we help alter the balance of power by convincing themilitary to give more freedom of organization to the democraticopposition not only in civil society but in political society?

1. How best might the international community convince thedemocratic opposition, especially the non-Burman nationalities, totry to design and support a democratic federal system that protectstheir most important cultural desires, without at the same timecreating incentives for the military to block democratization, anddisincentives for the majority nationality- the Burmans- to supportdemocratization?

2. It is encouraging for the Burmese democrats to receiveassistance from German foundations for studying their federalism,which is a fascinating and creative system with arguably the mosteffective” inequality inducing” mechanisms of any democratic federalsystem. However Germany is a symmetrical federal system andthere is often a mixture of incomprehension and / or hostility to theconcept of asymmetrical federalism. Indeed, a German mission toRussia recently argued that the major problem with Russiandemocracy was that it was asymmetrically federal! So much fordemocratic Spain, Belgium, India, and Canada.

When I met with a group of non-Burman and Burman nationalleaders in Thailand in June 2001 they asked me to review all thefederal systems in the world’s democracies. Few of them had heardabout ways to protect minority rights -without the right of secession— found in asymmetrical federal systems. They were initially werequite skeptical. However after a day talking about power balancesbetween them and the military, and about the military discourseabout state integration, they became somewhat interested inasymmetrical federalism as a form of preventing state disintegrationin Spain, Belgium and India while also constitutionally embeddingthe rights of minority states.

Indeed, the international donors should help arrange for Burmanand non-Burman nationality groups to make study visits to Spainand Belgium. A visit to Belgium would be particularly useful becauseBelgium has become the leader in the world in developing a varietyof forms of “non- territorial representation,” often called “personalfederalism”, and also a variety of “consociational practices” that mightbe useful for many of Burma’s “minorities within minorities”situations such as those of Muslims and Hindus who are intermingledwith Arakanese.

Alfred Stepan 13

“Belgium has be-come the leader inthe world in devel-oping a variety offorms of “non- terri-torial representa-tion,” often called“personal federal-ism”, and also a va-riety of “consocia-tional practices”that might be usefulfor many of Burma’s“minorities withinminorities” situa-tions”

3. One of the big disincentives for military extrication in Burmais the electoral system we discussed in “How Burma CouldDemocratize”. Burma has always used the electoral system theyinherited from the days of British colonialism— single memberdistricts with the seat going to the candidate who receives a majorityor first plurality. As is well know such a system tends to over-represent majority parties and under-represent minority parties.

In the May 1990 elections in Burma the military associated partywas the minority party and received 20% of the votes and only 10seats. With pure proportional representation the military party wouldstill have been the minority party but they would have won about100 seats- - and possibly greater prospects of immunity for crimescommitted during the military dictatorship. However, with only tenseats the military never allowed the legislature to convene. Themilitary now proposes to gain greater representation after any futureelection by unilaterally appointing 25% of the members of bothfederal houses.


Table 5 A continuum of the degree of overrepresentationin the upper house of the entire universe of the elevenlong-standing federal democracies and in Burma: Scenario1 and Scenario 2

Malapportionment in Upper Houses1

Ratio of Best Represented to

Worst Represented

Federal Unit (on basis of

population)2

Percentage of Seats in Most

Overrepresented Decile3

Belgium 0.0150 Austria 1.5/1 Belgium 10.8

Austria 0.0301 Belgium 2/1 Austria 11.9 India 0.0747 Spain 10/1 India 15.4 Germany 0.2440 India 11/1 Spain 23.7 Spain 0.2853 Germany 13/1 Germany 24.0 Australia 0.2962 Australia 13/1 Australia 28.7

Burma # 2 0.3221 Canada 21/1 Canada 33.4 Canada 0.3400 Switzerland 40/1 Burma # 2 35.7

Switzerland 0.3448 Burma # 2 55/1 Switzerland 38.4 USA 0.3642 USA 66/1 USA 39.7 Brazil 0.4039 Argentina 85/1 Brazil 41.3 Argentina 0.4852 Brazil 144/1 Argentina 44.8 Burma # 1 0.6343 Burma # 1 165/1 Burma # 1 62.5

With the exception of Burma, the countries in italic are all currentlyasymmetrically federal democracies.

1 If there were perfect one-person, one-vote representation in theupper house the Index of Malapportionment would be zero. In theworst possible case, where the least populated state has all theseats in the upper chamber, the index would be 1. In the case ofAustria each state is represented in the upper chamber, but thetotal number of representatives is allocated almost according topopulation. In Germany, the 1949 Basic Law stipulates that all ofthe sub-units (or Lander) of the federation shall have at least threevotes, but that Lander with at least more than two million inhabitantsshall have four, Lander with more than six million inhabitants five,and Lander with more than six million inhabitants six. On theopposite end is Burma #1, where equal representation is given toall states, some of which have very small populations and one ofwhich has an extremely large population thus resulting in the mostmalapportioned upper house in the whole country set.

2 This ratio compares the value of a vote in the least populous sub-

Alfred Stepan 15

unit of the federation with the value of a vote in the most populoussub-unit. In Germany, the least populous Land in 1993 was Bremen,with a population of 686,000, which was allocated three votes inthe upper house. The most populous Land, North Rhine-Westphalia,had a population of 17,679,000 and was allocated six votes. Thus,one vote in Bremen was worth 13 votes in North Rhine-Westphalia.In the case of Burma scenario # 1, one vote in the Kayah State,with 246,000 inhabitants, would be worth 165 votes in “MinisterialBurma”, with a population of 40,647,593. In scenario # 1, Burma’spotential best to worst represented state ratio is thus 165/1, whichis fifteen times greater than the average of the world’s long standingasymmetric federal average which is 11/1. In scenario #2, Burma’sratio would still be higher than in any asymmetrical federal statebut decreases substantially as one vote in Kayah State would onlybe worth 55 votes in the Ayeyawady Division, where 13,566,593inhabitants live.

3 In scenario #1 in Burma, five states, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chinand Mon, constitute only 10.52% of Burma’s total population.However, under one NCUB constitutional proposal — in which“Ministerial Burma” is one, of the total of eight ethno-federal statesin the federation, each of which would receive 12.5% of the upperhouse seats —these five states would receive 62.5% of the seats inthe upper chamber and thus would constitute an overwhelming“blocking win-set” for any constitutional change and also a majorityin simple majority votes. In scenario # 2 in Burma, four states anda division, Kayah, Chin, Kachin, Taninthayi Division and Kayin, wouldconstitute 8.53% of the population and would receive 35.7% ofthe seats.

Notes: The Malapportionment index is computed as

½ S ? si - vi ? Where s i = % seats and vi = % of population.

This calculation follows the formula proposed by David Samuelsand Richard Snyder in “The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment inComparative Perspective”, British Journal of Political Science, 2001.The data for Burma comes from the county’s official web page:http://www.myanmar.com. The data for all other countries, includingthe alapportionment indexes for Canada and Belgium, comes fromAlfred Stepan, “Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism,(Multi)Nationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism”in Arguing Comparative Politics, (Oxford University Press, 2001),p. 334.


Endnotes

1 In sharp contrast, in Spain, polity-wide elections for the constituentassembly were held before regional elections were held. Becausepolity -wide power was at stake, polity- wide parties—not just localnationalist parties as in the USSR and Yugoslavia —participatedrobustly in the elections in every province. For more details seeJuan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “ Political Identities and ElectoralSequences: Spain, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia”, in AlfredStepan, Arguing comparative Politics (Oxford University Press:2001), pp. 200-212.

2 For more extensive references and documentation than can be putinto this working paper see my article “Toward a New ComparativePolitics of Federalism, (Multi) Nationalism, and Democracy: BeyondRikerian Federalism” in my Arguing Comparative Politics, pp.3 15-361; it is an outgrowth of an eight year project with my long termcolleague, Juan J. Linz, which will be published eventually asFederalism, Democracy and Nation.

3 For a chapter devoted to these issues in Spain see Juan J. Linz andAlfred Stepan, Problems in Democratic Transition and Consolidation:Southern Europe, South America and Post- Communist Europe (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), chapter 6.

4 Andrew Reynolds, Alfred Stepan, Zaw Oo & Stephen Levine, "HowBurma could democratize" Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 4,October 2001 .

Alfred Stepan 17

wkdif;&if;om;vlrsLd;pkHpepf/ 'Drkdua&pDpepfESifhtcsK;drJhzuf'&,fpepf

(jrefrmEkdifiHESifh ywfoufonhf ueOD; pOf;pm;csufrsm;)

ed'gef;

'Drkdua&pDukd vufrcHao;aom (rusifhokH;rD) wkdif;&if;om; vlrsKd;a&;0g'Drsm;onffzuf'&,frlukd ,if;wkd‹ tcGifhta&; rsm;tm; (rw&m;) awmif;qkdonfh ae&mwGifvufeufozG,f tokH;jyKEk difonfh tEW&,f ±S donf? qkdAD,ufjynfaxmifpk ESif h,l*kdqvm;AD;,m; EkdifiHrsm;. erlem ukd oifcef;pm ,lygu/ 'Drkdua&pD r&±Sdao;aomz,f'&,frljzifh zGJ‹pnf;xm;aom pepfrsm;wGif jynfaxmifpk tqifh (wEkdifiHvkH;tqifh)'Drk dua&pDa&G;aumufyG Jrsm; rusif;yao;cif/ jynfvkH;u|wf Ek difiHa&;ygwD=uD;rsm;rxlaxmifEk di fao;cif/ jynfe,ftqif h a&G;aumufyG Jrsm;uk d usif;yonfhtcgrvkdvm;tyfonhf (jynfe,ftcsif;csif; a0pkcGJonfh) jy\emrsm;ukd &ifqkdif=u&ayonf?,cif uGe f jrLepfpepf usi f hok H ;c J haom Oa&my wk dufwGi f E k di fi H 6 E k di fi Honfwjynfaxmifpepf usifhokH;cJhjyD;/ 3 EkdifiHonf zuf'&,fpepf ukd usifhokH;cJhonf? ,cktcg('Drkdua&pD pepfokd h ul;ajymif;jyD; oumv) ,if; wjynfaxmifpepf usifhokH;cJhaom 6EkdifiH onf *smr%D jynfaxmifpk orwEkdifiHESifh yl;aygif;oGm;aom ta±S‹ *smr%D rSty tm;vkH;onf wjynfaxmifpepf ukd qufvuf usifhokH;aom EkdifiH 5 EkdifiH tjzpfqufvuf &yfwnfcJhonf? zuf'&,f pepfukd usifhokH;cJhaom ,l*kdqvm;AD;,m;/qkdAD,ufjynfaxmifpk ESifh csufukdpvkd Am;uD;,m; - 3 EkdifiHwkd‹rSmrl vGwfvyfaomtcsKyftjcmtm%mykdif EkdifiH 22 EkdifiHtjzpfokd h tpdwfpdwf tr$mr$m uGJxGufcJhonf?qkd±S,fvpf acwfvGef Oa&ywkdufwGif trsm;qkH; jzpfyGm;cJ haom vlrsK d;a&;0g'ESif hvlrsKd;pkaoG;acsmif;pD;r_rsm;onf ,if; zuf'&,f acwfvGef wkdif;jynfrsm;wGif omjzpfcJhonf?

txufyg tEW&,frsm; ±S daomfjim;vnf; vlrsK d;pk H' Drk dua&pD wk di f;jynfrsm;onfwjynfaxmifpepfxuf zuf'&,fpepfukd om ykdrkd vufcHusifhokH;vm=uonf? pifppf/'Drkdua&pDpepfukd tcsdef=umjrifhpGm usifhokH;vmcJh=uonf bmompum;pkH/ wkdif;&if;om;pkHwkdif;jynfrsm;onf trsm;tm;jzifh z,f'&,fpepf ukd usifhokH;cJh=uonf?

wjynfaxmifpepfukd usifhokH;cJh=uaom wkdif;jynfrsm; taejzifh ,if;wkd hwkdif;jynftwGif;±Sda'owck/ wkdiff;&if;om;vlrsKd;pk wck/ ,Ofaus;r_wck owfowfrSwfrSwf jcm;em;aomvlxk&yf&Gm rsm;twGuf zuf'&,f uJhokd haom pDpOfr_rsm; jzifh tkyfcsKyfEkdif=uonf? ,if;okdhwjynfaxmifpepfESifh zuf'&,fpepf ESpfckt=um; pDpOfr_ukd zuf'a&pD [k ac:avonf?Oyrmtm;jzifh 'def;rwfEkdifiHonf *&if;vif;u|ef;ESifhvnf;aumif;/ zifvef EkdifiHonftmvefu|ef;ESifh vnf;aumif; zuf'a&pD pDpOfr_rsm; usifhokH;cJhonf? tif'kdeD;±Sm;EkdifiHwGif toGiful;ajymif;r_ rpcifu zuf'a&pDrlrsm; ukd pwif avhvm okH;oyfcJhygu(,ckjy\emrsm;ajz±Sif;a&;twGuf) taxmuftuljyKrnf jzpfonf? jrefrmEkdifiHtaetxm;rsm;ESifh rl tcsKd;rJhzuf'&,frl ukd pwif pOf;pm;okH;oyfEkdifygu tusKd;±Sdrnfjzpfonf?


tcsKd;rJhz,f'&,frl

tcsKd;rJh z,f'&,frl qkdonfrSm 'Drkdua&pDpepfw&yfwGif tajccHOya' a&;qGJolrsm;onfjynfaxmifpktwGif;±Sd toGifrwlaomjynfe,frsm;. oD;oef‹ txl;tcGifhta&;rsm;ukdjidrf;csrf;pGm/ at;twlyltr# xm0&vufwGJoGm;Ekdif&ef tvkd‹iSm zefwD;ay;Ekdifjcif;ukdqkdvkdonf? Oyrmtm;jzifh/ 1867 ckESpfwGif uae'gEkdifiHonf t*Fvdyfpum;ajymaomtxuf uae'gESifh jyifopfpum;ajymaom atmufuae'g wkd hukd wjynfaxmifpepfatmufwGif xm;±S d jcif;xuf/ z,f'&,frljzif h tkyfcsKyf&ef yk drk d oif hawmfrnf[kqkH;jzwfcJh=uonf? okd‹aomf/ t*Fvkd-qufpGef ykHpHjzpfaom tcsKd;nDz,f'&,frl jzifhrtkyfcsKyfcJhonf omru t*Fvdyfbmompum; trsm;okH;tjzpf todtrSwfjyKjyD;uufovdyfbk&m;ausmif; ukd uef‹owf xm;aom pepfukd wEkdifiHvkH; wajy;nDusifhokH;apjcif; ukdvnf; raqmif&GufcJhacs? Tae&mwGif wEkdifiHvkH;tm; xm0&vufwGJoGm;a&;uk d a±S ‹± SL aom tm;jzif h uG dbufjynfe,ftm; eyk dvD,Hxk H;xrf;jzif htkyfcsKyfcGifhjyKcJhjyD; jyifopfpum; ukdyg tajccHOya'ESifh tnD tokH; jyKcGifh txl;tcGifhta&;ay;tyfcJhonf? xkdenf;wl/ udGbufjynfe,f wGif tjcm;jynfe,frsm;ESif h rwlbJ/uufovdyf bk&m;ausmif;. =oZm ykdrkdcanmif;cJhonf?

uae'g uJhokd hyif/ pydef EdkifiHonf jynfwGif;ppfjyD;oGm;aomtcg/ umwmvkdeD,m ESifhbmhpf a'orsm;twGuf ,if;wk d ‹bmompum; qkdif&m txl;tcGif hta&;rsm;ukday;tyfjcif;jzifh aoG;ajrusrnfh yËdyuQrsm;tm; a±Smif±Sm;Ekdifrnf [k ,lqcJhonf?tajccHOya' a&;qGJolrsm;taejzifh ,if;tcGifhta&;ESifh pDpOfr_rsm;ukd tajccHOya'abmiftwGif;wGif oGwfoGif;owfrSwfxm;jyD;/ Oya'jyK v$wfawmf rsm;wGif ,if;ukdtvG,fwul jyifqifcGif h r±S dEk dif&ef owdxm;I jyXmef;cJ honf? ,if;pDpOfr_rsm;.xl;jcm;csufrSm jynfolrsm;wGif ukd,fykdif0daoo wckxufykdI xm;±SdvmEkdifjcif;/ ,if;rwlaom ukd,fykdif0daoorsm;onf vnf; wckESifhwck o[Zmw jzpfvmEkdifjcif; ponfhtusLd;aus;Zl;rsm;ukd jzpfxGef;apcJhonf? aemufqkH;Y pydefEkdifiH. tcsKyftjcmtm%mwnfjrJa&;ESifh e,fajr wnfwHha&; ukd vkdvm;aom ppfwyfu tcsKd;rJhz,f'&,fpepf ukdvkdtyfcsuf wck tjzpf vufcHcJh=uonf?

vGwfvyfa&;&jyD;p cJGxGufa&;tEW&,frsm;ESifh &ifqkdifcJh&aom tdENd, EkdifiHonfvnf;jidrf;csrf;aom 'Drkdua&pDEkdifiH w&yftjzpf &yfwnf oGm;Ekdif&ef taumif;qkH;vrf;rSmzuf'&,f pepf jzpfonf [k 1947-4* wkdif;jyKjynfjyK v$wfawmfrS qkH;jzpfcJ h jyD;wjynfaxmifpepf rS ajymif;vJcJ honf? ,if;okd‹ ajymif;vJr_wGif xm0&vufwGJoGm;Ek di fa&;uk d a±S‹±_I z,f'&,f pepftwGif;wGif tcsK d;rJ h jyXmef;csuf rsm;uk dcGifhjyKcJhavonf? 1956ckESpfwGif bmompum;tajccH jyefvnfzGJ‹pnf;a&; Oya' w&yfukd a&;qGJcJhjyD;/ okH;pGJ&m bmompum; tvkduf e,ferdwf owfrSwfr_rsm;ukd jyefvnfjyifqif cJhjyD;/ EkdifiHa&;e,ferdwf owfrSwfr_ESifh teD;pyfqkH; jzpf&ef aqmif±GufcJhonf?' Dr k dua&pD oDtk d& Dq&m=uD;rsm; twGuf tdE d N, E k di fi Haqmif± Gufc J haome,ferdwf jye fvnfa&;qG J owfr Swfc J h jci f ;onf E k di fi Hwumork di f ;wGi ftatmifjrifqk H;vkyf&yf jzpfcJ honf? tcsK d;rJ h z,f'&,fpepfukd usif hok H;cJ hojzif h /tmoHjynfwckxJrS jynfe,f topfrsm;ukd cGJxkwfzGJ‹pnf;ay;EkdifcJhjyD;/ jy\em tpkdiftcJjzpfaecJhaom ta±S‹ajrmufa'ota&;ukd ajyvnfpGm ukdifwG,f ajz±Sif;EkdifcJhonf?

Alfred Stepan 19

urBmay:±S d z,f'&,fjynfaxmifpkrsm; zG J ‹pnf;yk HE Si f h qufpyfI ta&;=uD;aomvrf;a=umif;=uD; ESpf&yfukd atmufygZ,m;wGif awG‹±Sd Ekdifavonf? t±SnfwnfwHhcJhaomvlrsK d;ruGJjym;onfh z,f'&,f 'Drk dua&pD wkdif; onf tajccHOya't& tcsK d;nDjzpfaeonf? xkd‹twl t±SnfwnfwHhcJhaom vlrsKd;pkH uGJjym;onfh z,f'&,f 'Drkdua&pDwkdif; onf tajccHOya't& tcsKd;rJh jzpfaeonf?

tcsKd;nDpepf tcsKd;rJhpepf

vlrsKd;

uGJjym

;r_r±Sdo

nfht

ajct

ae

=op=wD;,m; =opa=w;v#m; tm*sifwD;em;

b&mZD; *smr%D

qGpfZmvef tar&duefjynfaxmifpk

vlrsKd;

pkHuGJjym

;on

fh tajc

tae

b,fvf*sD,ef uae'g tENd, pydef

jrefrmEkdifiH±Sd ppfwyf. ESKdif f;,SOftm%m/ 'Drkdua&pDvrf;prsm;ESifhtajccHOya' azmfrsLvmrsm;qkdif&m ESKdif;,SOfavhvmokH;oyfcsuf?

u|efawmfwk d ‹a&;om;c J haom "jre frmE k di fi Htm; ' Dr k dua&pDpep fok d ‹ rnfok d ‹ajymif;vJEk di frnfenf;" pmwrf; pmrsufESm 98-102 rsm;wGif a&;om;cJ haomtcsufrsm;. qkdvkd&if;rSm urBmay:±Sd ppfwyfqefaomtpkd;&pepfrsm;/ ppftpkd;&pepfrsm;usifhokH;cJhaom wkdif;jynfrsm;jzpfonfh *&d/ b&mZD;/ ay:wl*D/ O±ka*G;/ pydef/ tm*sifwD;em;/wkdif0rf/ csDvD ESifh awmifukd;&D;,m; EkdifiHrsm;wGif ppfwyfu tm%mjyefvnfv$Jajymif;ay;oGm;Ekdifaom tajc taersm; ,ae‹ jrefrmEkdifiHwGif r±Sdao; [laom aumufcsufw&yfyif jzpfonf?

E_dif;,SOfr_a&csdeft&/ ,ckvuf±Sd pum;ajymr_rsm;om 'Drkdua&pD toGiful;ajymif;a&;tpDtpOfrsm;ta=umif; aqG;aEG;vmygu/ ppfwyfonf tay:pD;tm;omr_rsm; ±Sdaeonf?xkdokd‹ ppfwyfESifh 'Drkdua&pD twkduftcHrsm;t=um; tiftm;rnDr#r_rsm; ±Sdaeonfh=um;wGif 'Drkdua&pD twkduftcHtiftm;pkrsm; taejzifh ppfwyfukd ykdrkd pkpnf;ay;rnfh/tm%mpGJukdifr_ukd ckdifjrJapEkdifrnhf bufokd‹ rwGef;ykd‹ rdap&ef ta&;=uD;vSonf?


u|Ekfyftaejzifh t±SnfwnfwHhcJhaom z,f'&,f'Drkdua&pDrsm; . tajccHOya' ordkfif;wGifr± S dc J hao;aom (twk duftcHrsm; tqk d jy Kxm;onf h) atmufyg Oya'ta=umif;t&mrsm;onf ppfwyf tm%mpGef‹v$wfa&;ukd ykdI ykdI vrf;a0;oGm;aprnf[k wifjyvkdygonf?

(1) z,f'&,f zG J ‹pnf;y k HtajccHOya'rsm; wGi f qk DA D,uf jynfaxmifp kE Si f h,l*kdqvm;AD;,m; EkdifiHrsm;wGifom cGJxGufykdifcGifh jyXmef;csufukd xnfhoGif;cJhonf(vufawG ‹wGi f vlrs K d ;p k jynfe,frsm; tm; uGe f jrLep fygwDuomcsKyfukdifcJh=uonf)?

(2) "jynfaxmifpkwGif tjrJwr;fppfwyfukd jynfe,f rsm;rS tcsKd;us&,l&rnf/""ppfOD;pD;csKyfrsm;ukd jynfe,fwck vsif wOD;uspDjzifh zGJpnf;I tvSnfhus wGJzufumuG,fa&;OD;p D;cs Ky f tjzpf wm0efxrf;aqmifc Gi f h jyK&rnf" [laomtcsufrsm;onf ppfwyftm; vkH;0O\kH acsr_ef;jyD;rSom pOf;pm;I &Ekdifaom(vufawG‹rqefonhf) jyXmef;csuf rsKd;jzpfonf?

(3) txufwGi f wif jyc J honf htwk di f ; a&±SnfwnfwH H hc J haomz,f'&,f'Dr k dua&pDwk di f ;onf tcsK d ;r J h z,f'&,fpepf rsm; jzpfonf?,if;E d k di fi Hr sm;wGi f tajcc HOya' a&;qG J =uolrsm; onfjynfaxmifpktopfw&yfwGif yg0ifaom jynfe,f a'otoD;oD;twGufrwlnDaom (,if;wkd‹. vkdtyfcsufESifh qDavsmfonhf) txl;tcGifhta&;rsm;/oD;oef‹ &ykdifcGifhrsm; ukd jznfhqnf;Ekdifa&;twGuf tcsKd;rJhpepfukd usifhokH; cJh&onf?trsKd;om;aumifpD rS tqkdjyKxm;aom tajccHOya' rl=urf;rSm tcsKd;nDpepfjzpf[ef wlonf? xkd‹jyif/ jynfe,frsm;. (wlnDaom) tcGifhtm%m rsm;ukdatmufyg tcsuf ok H ;c suf jzi f h tumtuG,f jyKxm;onf? (u)txufv$wfawmf (jynfe,f v$wfawmf) ukd atmufv$wfawmf (jynfhol‹v$wfawmf) xuf y k dr k d tm%may;tyfxm;onf? ta&;=uD;aomtkyfcsKyfa&;qkdif&m wm0efay;r_rsm;onf txuf v$wfawmf rS qkH;jzwf&rnfjzpfjyD;/ atmufv$wfawmf Y tm%m r±Sdacs? (c) tajccHOya' rl=urf;t&/vlO D ;a& 2 ode f ; txuf±S daom rnfonh f jynfe,f rqk d (,ckvuf±Sdjynfe,fwkdif;onf ,if;vlOD;a&xuf ykdonf) txufv$wfawmf wGifwlnDaom ukd,fpm;jyKcGifh &±Sdrnf? (*) rnfhonfh jynfe,f rS aumfrwD w&yfxufykdI OuUX vkyfcGifh r±Sdacs? jynfe,f wkdif;onf tenf;qkH; aumfrwD w&yf .OuUX jzpf&rnf jzpfonf?

txufyg tqkdjyKcsufrsm;tygt0if wdwdusus owfrSwf ay;xm;aom jyXmef;csufokH;&yftwkdif; usifhokH;ygu/ vlOD;a&trsm;pk jzpfaom Arm rsm; twGuf =uD;rm;aomtcsKd;edrhfr_ ukd jzpfaprnf jzpfonf?

Oyrmtm;jzifh jynfrjrefrmjynf tm; jynfe,fwck tjzpf owfrSwfchJygu/ u|EkfyfuTjzpfpO fuk d jzp fE k di facsvrf;a=umif; 1 [k ac:a0:rnf/ (Tok d ‹,lqcsufr Smwkdif;&if;om;vlrsKd;pkrsm; awmif;qkd xm;onfh jynfe,fwkdif;wGif wlnDaom ukd,fpm;jyKr_±Sd&rnf [laom tcsufay: wGif tajccHygonf)? jzpfEkdifacsvrf;a=umif; 1 t&/jrefrmEkdifiHwGif ukd,fpm;jyKr_ tvGeftu|H enf;jcif;/ tvGeftu|H rsm;jcif;ponfhrnfonhf z,f'&,f 'Drkdua&pD wGif rS rawG‹&ao;aom tpGef;a&muf ukd,fpm;jyKr_rsm;

Alfred Stepan 21

jzpfvmrnf jzpfonf? ,if;tcsuf uk d atmufyg Z,m;rsm;ukd =unfhjcif;jzif hodEkdifayonf?

Z,m; (3) jrefrmEk di fi H. vlOD;a&

jynfe,frsm; vlOD;a& &mckdifE_ef; u,m;jynfe,f 246000 0³45µ csif;jynfe,f 458000 0³85µ ucsifjynfe,f 1202000 2³24µ u&ifjynfe,f 1403000 2³62µ rGefjynfe,f 2337000 4³36µ &ckdifjynfe,f 2610000 4³87µ ±Srf;jynfe,f 4629000 8³64µ weoFm&Dwkdif; 1269000 2³37µ rauG;wkdif; 4301000 8³03µ yJcl;wkdif; 4848000 9³06µ ppfukdif;wkdif; 5180000 9³68µ &efukefwkdif; 5295000 9³89µ rEWav;wkdif; 6188000 11³56µ {&m0wDwkdif; 13566593 25³34µ

pkpkaygif; 53532593 100³00µ

u|Ekfyfwkd‹onf tqkdjyKxm;aom z,f'&,fyk HpHt&/ wkdif; 7 wkdif;onf aygif;IArmjynfe,f wck jzp fvmrnf [k ,lq&aomf vlO D ;a& tcsK d ;tqonfatmufygtwkdif;jzpfoGm;rnf jzpfonf?

jynfe,frsm; vlOD;a& &mckdifE_ef; u,m;jynfe,f 246000 0³45µ csif;jynfe,f 458000 0³85µ ucsifjynfe,f 1202000 2³24µ u&ifjynfe,f 1403000 2³62µ rGefjynfe,f 2337000 4³36µ &ckdifjynfe,f 2610000 4³87µ ±Srf;jynfe,f 4629000 8³64µ Armjynfe,f 40647593 75³90µ

pkpkaygif; 53532593 100³00µ

&nfnGef;? www.myanmar.com azaz:0g&Dv 9 &uf/ 2002ckESpf?


Z , m ; ( 4 ) tem*w f j r e f r m E k d i f i H . txu fv $w f awm f w G i fuk d,fpm;jyKr_tcsK d ;rnDr#r_ udef;ajcrsm; - jzpfE k di facsvrf;a=umif; ESp fc kjzpfEkdifacsvrf;a=umif; 1? tu,fI tajccHOya'onf jynfe,f ±Spfcktm; nDwlnDr#ukd,fpm;jyKcGifh ay;xm;ygu/

jynfe,frsm; vlOD;a&&mckdifE_ef; uk d,fpm;vS,f OD;a&

&mck difE_ef;

uk d f,fpm; jyKr_

tcsK d;rus udef;ajc

u,m;jynfe,f 0³45µ 12³5µ 12³04 csif;jynfe,f 0³85µ 12³5µ 11³64 ucsif jynfe,f 2³24µ 12³5µ 10³25 u&ifjynfe,f 2³62µ 12³5µ 9³88 rGe f jynfe,f 4³36µ 12³5µ 8³13 &ck di f jynfe,f 4³87µ 12³5µ 7³62 ±Srf; jynfe,f 8³64µ 12³5µ 3³85 Armjynfe,f 75³90µ 12³5µ 63³43

pkpkaygif; 100³00µ 100³00µ 63³43

jzpfEkdifacsvrf;a=umif; 2? tu,fI tajccHOya'onf jynfe,f 7 jynfe,f ESifh(Armjynfe,f.) wkdif; 7 wkdif; tm; nDwlnDr# ukd,fpm;jyKcGifh ay;xm;ygu/

jynfe,frsm; &mckdifE_ef; ukd,fpm;vS,f OD;a&

&mckdifE_ef;

ukdf,fpm; jyKr_

tcsKd;rus udef;ajc

u,m;jynfe,f 0³45µ 7³14µ 6³68 csif;jynfe,f 0³85µ 7³14µ 6³28 ucsifjynfe,f 2³24µ 7³14µ 4³89 u&ifjynfe,f 2³62µ 7³14µ 4³77 rGefjynfe,f 4³36µ 7³14µ 4³52 &ckdifjynfe,f 4³87µ 7³14µ 2³77 ±Srf;jynfe,f 8³64µ 7³14µ 2³26 weoFm&Dwkdif; 2³37µ 7³14µ 0³89 rauG;wkdif; 8³03µ 7³14µ 1³51 yJcl;wkdif; 9³06µ 7³14µ 1³92 ppfukdif;wkdif; 9³68µ 7³14µ 2³54 &efukefwkdif; 9³89µ 7³14µ 2³75 rEWav;wkdif; 11³56µ 7³14µ 4³42 {&m0wDwkdif; 25³34µ 7³14µ 18³20

pkpkaygif; 100³00µ 99³96µ 32³21

Alfred Stepan 23

rSwfcsuf? ukd,fpm;jyKr_ tcsdK;rnDr#r_ udef;ajc ukd½ S ? si - vi ? Where si = % seats and v i = % of population twkdif;wGufcsufygonf? TwGufcsufr_rSm a';ApfqrfrsL&,f ESifh &pfcsufqEkdif'g wkd‹ a&;om;xm;aom “The Value of aVote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective”, British Journal of Political Science,October 2001. p. 655 ay:wGi f tajcc Hygonf? vlO D ;a&ESi f h ywfoufaom ude f ;*%ef;rsm;uk d r lwww.myanrnar.com rS&,lxm;ygonf?

ed*kH;

u|Ekfyfwifjyxm;aom txufyg tcsufrsm;om rSefygu (twkduftcH tiftm;pkrsm;utrSefwu,f pOf;pm;aeonf qkdygu) / atmufyg tcsuf ig;csuf ukd av;av;eufeufpOf;pm;&ef vkdygonf?

u|Ekfyfwkd‹ (,cktcsdefwGif) t"dupOf;pm;&rnfh tcsufrSm wyfrawmfu twkduftcH'Drkdua&pD tzGJ‹rsm;tm; vGwfvyfcGifh rsm;ay;vmjcif; tm;jzihf vlr_tzGJ‹tpnf;abmiftwGif;Yomru EkdifiHa&;tzGJ‹tpnf; abmiftwGif;Y EkdifiHa&; tm%m csdefcGifv#m ukdajymif;vJypfEkdifa&;ukd OD;wnfEkdif&ef jzpfonf?

o EkdifiHwumtzGJ‹tpnf;rsm;taejzifh 'Drkdua&pD twkduftcH tiftm;pkrsm;/txl;ojzifh Arm r[kwfaom wkdif;&if;om; vlrsKd;rsm;tm;/ 'Drkdua&pD z,f'&,fpepfukdtaumiftxnf azmf&ef =udK;pm; aomtcg ta&;ygaom vlr_,Ofaus;r_ qkdif&m&nfr Se f ;c sufrsm; uk d tmrcHcsufrsm;&E k di fa&; uk d O D ;pm;ay; oif ha =umif;wk dufwGe f;oGm;oif honf? xk denf;wl/ ppfwyfr S ' Dr k dua&pD vrf;a=umif;uk dydwfqkd‹vmEkdifaom rufvkH;rsm;/ EkdifiH. vlrsm;pk jzpfaom Armrsm;u raxmufcHEkdifaomawmif;qkd r_rsm;ukd rjyKrdap&efvnf; owday; oifhonf?o jrefrmtwk duftcHrsm;onf *smrefazmifa';±Si f;rsm; xHrS z,f'&,frlavhvma&;twGuf taxmuftul rsm; &±SdaeonfrSm tm;&p&m aumif;vSayonf?*smr%Dz,f'&,f pepfonf zefwD;r_tm;aumif;aom pepfw&yfjzpfjyD;/ tcsKfd;rr#r_ukdtrsm;qkH;jzpfaponfh z,f'&,fyk HpH jzpfapumrl tatmifjrifqkH;Ek difiH wckvnf;jzpfayonf? u|Ekfyfwkd‹ owdcsyf&efrSm *smr%Donf tcsKd;nD z,f'&,fpepf jzpfjyD;/ (,if;.Oya'ynm±Sifrsm;onf) tcsKd;rJh z,f'&,fpepftay: em;vnfr_ray;onfh tajctaersm;±Sdaeonf? Oyrm/ r=umao;rSDu ±k±S EkdifiHokd‹oGm;a&mufcJhaom *smrefrpf±Sif wcku±k±S'Drk dua&pD. jy\emrsm;. w&m;cHrSm tcsK d;rJ hz,f'&,fpepf [k (vGJrSm;pGm)aumufcsufcscJhonf? ,if;aumufcsufonf pydfef/ b,fvf*sD,H/ tdENd,ESifh uae'gEkdifiHwkd‹ (,if;wkd‹. tcsKd;rJh z,f'&,fpepf atmifjrifae&onfh tcsuf) tajctaersm;ESifhvGJaeonfukdum; owdjyK&rnf jzpfonf?2001 ckESpf ZGefvykdif;wGif u|Ekfyfonf jrefrmESifh jrefrm r[kwfaom twkdfuftcHacgif;aqmifrsm; awG‹qkHjyD; z,f'&,fa&;&mudpPrsm;ukd aqG;aEG; aomtcg/ acgif;aqmiftenf;i,fom tcsKd;rJh 'Drkdua&pD onf wkdif;&if;om;vlenf;pkwkd‹. tcGifh ta&;rsm;ukdcGJxGufa&;jyXmef;csuf ±Sd&effrvkdbJ/ tum tuG,f ay;xm;Ekdifa=umif; od±dSxm;onf?ueOD;wGif trsm;pkrSm tcsKd;rJh 'Drkdua&pDESifh ywfoufI r,kHr&J jzpfae=uonf? okd‹aomf/ppfwyfESifh &ifqkdifae&aom tm%m csdffefcGifv#mudpP/ ppfwyfrS tjrJajymqkd aeaomEkdifiHawmfnDnGwfa&;udpP/ pydef/ b,fvf*sD,H ESifh tdENd, wGif aqmif&Gufaeaom


z,f'&,fpep fr sm; uk d avhvmod± S dvmaom tcg tcs K d ;r J h z,f'&,fr l .tm;omcsufrsm;ukd em;vnf vmcJhonf?

pi fpp f E k di fi Hwum ulnDolrsm;taejzi f h jre frmE Si f h tjcm;jre frmr[kwfolwkdif;&if;om; ukd,fpm;vS,frsm; tm; pydefESif h b,fvf*sD,H uJhokd‹aomwkdif;jynfrsm;okd‹ avhvmc&D;pOfrsm; pDpOfay;oifhonf? txl;ojzifh b,fvf*sD,HonfurBmay:wGif pdwf0ifpm;p&m taumif;qkH; e,ferdwfukd tajcrcHaom ukd,fpm;jyKr_pepf okd‹r[kwf yk*~Kdvfa&;z,f'&,f pepf w&yfukd xlaxmifxm;onf jzpf&m/ jrefrmEkdifiHtwGif;±Sd vlenf;pkrsm;twGif;wGif vlenf;pkrsm;jzpfaeaom (Oyrm &ckdifjynfe,ftwGif;± S d vlenf;p k ± k d[if*sm r lqvifrsm;) tajctaersm;twGuf oif hawmfaomoabmxm;wlnDonfh tkyfpkrsm;zG J‹pnf;a&; qkdif&m oifcef;pmrsm; trsm;tjym;&±SdEkdifygonf?o u|Ek fy fwk d ‹. jre frmE k di fi Htm; ' Dr k dua&pD ajymi f ;vJa&; uk d rnfok d haqmif±Gufrnfenf; pmwef; wGif aqG;aEG; wifjycJhonfh twkdif; jrefrmEkdifiH. a±G;aumufyGJpepfonf ppfwyftm; EkdifiHa&;ukd qufvuf csKyfukdifae ap&ef wGef;tm;ay;ouJhodk‹jzpfaeonf? jAdwdo# pepfrS tarGqufcHcJhaom t&ifyef;0ifol Ekdifpwrf; pepfonfvlrsm;pk ygwD=uD;rsm;ukd ykdrkd tm;omapjyD;/ vlenf;pk ygwDtao;rsm; twGuf epfemr_rsm;±Sda=umif; avhvmod±SdjyD;jzpfonf?1990 ckESpf a&G;aumufyGJwGif ppfwyfESifh qufEG,fcJhaom (wpn) ygwDonf 20&mcd kifE_ef;cef‹ rJ&±S dcJ haomfvnf; q,fae&mom tEkdif&cJ honf? tu,fI om/tcsKd;usudk,fpm;jyK pepf a&G;aumufyGJ rsKd;om aqmif±GufcJhygu ,if;onf/ trwfae&m100 xufrenf; atmifjrifcJhrnf jzpfonf? xkdtcg ppfwyfrS pkd;&drfcsufrsm;ukd vnf;wenf;wzkH avsmhenf;aprnf jzpfonf? vufawG‹ wGif q,fae&m om &±SdcJhaomtcgygvDref tm; vkH;0 vkyfcGifh ray;awmhbJ xm;cJhonf? xkd‹jyif aemif ygvDrefrsm;twGiftrwfOD;a& pkpkaygif;. 25µ ukd tvkdtavsmuf &&rnf [k awmif;qkdvmcJhonf?

Z,m; (5) urBmay:±Sd ESpf±SnfwnfwHhcJhaom z,f'&,f EkdifiH 11 EkdifiH ESifh jrefrmEkdifiH(jzpfEk di facs vrf;oG,f 1 ESif h 2) . txufv$wfawmfrsm;wGif =uKHawG‹&aomukd,fpm;jyKr_ykdacsrsm; (±Sdoifhonfh ukd,fpm;jyKr_xuf ykdrkdI ukd,fpm;jyKaejcif;)?

Alfred Stepan 25

txufv$wfawmfwGif ukd,fpm;jyKr_ tcsKd;rusr_

nGefjyudef;ajc1

z,f'&,fpepf toD;oD;. taumif;qkH; ukd,fpm;jyKr_

,lepf ESifh tqkd;qkH; ukd,fpm;jyKr_ ,lepf wkd‹.

tcsKd; (vlOD;a&wGif tajccHonf) 2

ykdrkd ukd,fpm;jyKcGifh &onfh ,lepfwGif

yg±Sdonfh v$wfawmf rJqENe,f &mckdifE_ef; 3

b,fvf*sD,H 0³0150 =op=wD;,m; 1³5/1 b,fvf*sD,H 10³8 =op=wD;,m; 0³0301 b,fvf*sD,H 2/1 =op=wD;,m; 11³9 tdENd, 0³0747 pydef 10/1 tdENd, 15³4 *smr%D 0³2440 tdENd, 11/1 pydef 23³7 pydef 0³2853 *smr%D 13/1 *smr%D 24³0 =opa=wo# 0³2962 =opa=wo# 13/1 =opa=wo# 28³7 jrefrm 2 0³322 1 uae'g 21/1 uae'g 33³4 uae'g 0³3400 qGpfZmvef 40/1 jrefrm 2 35³7 qGpfZmvef 0³3448 jrefrm 2 55/1 qGpfZmvef 38³4 tar&duef 0³3642 tar&duef 66/1 tar&duef 39³7 b&mZD; 0³4039 tm*sifwD;em; 85/1 b&mZD; 41³3 tm*sifwD;em; 0³4852 b&mZD; 144/1 tm*sifwD;em; 44³8 jrefrm 1 0³6343 jrefrm 1 165/1 jrefrm 1 62³5

jrefrmEkdifiHrS ty pmvkH;apmif;rsm;jzifh a&;xm;onfh wkdif;jynfwkdif;onf tcsdK;rJ hz,f'&,fpepfukd usifhokH;aeonfh wkdif;&if;om;pkH 'Drkdua&pD w&yfjzpfonf?

tnGef; (1) tu,fI txufv$wfawmfwGif vlwOD;/ rJwrJ pepf om wdwdususaqmif&GufcJhygu/ txufv$wfawmf. ukd,fpm;jyKr_ tcsKd;rusr_ nGefjyr_udef;acs onfokHn jzpfvdrfhrnf? tu,fI ukd,fpm;jyKr_ tcsKd;rusr_ tqkd;qkH; tajctaewGifrl/vlOD;a& tenf;qkH; jynfe,fonf txufv$wfawmf wckvkH;pm ukd,fpm;jyKcGifh &rSmjzpfjyD;/ ukd,fpm;jyKr_ tcsKd;rusr_ udef;ajc onf wpf jzpfvdrfhrnf? =op=wD;,m; EkdifiHwGiftxufv$wfawmf Y jynfe,f wkdif;rS ukd,fpm;jyKcGifh ±Sdaomfvnf;/ ukd,fpm;jyKcGifhta&twGuf ukd vlOD;a& jzifh wGufcsufygonf? *smr%DEkdifiH wGifrl 1949 tajccHOya't& jynfe,f vef'g wkdif;onf tenf;qkH; rJ okH;rJ ay;cGifh ±Sd&rnf jzpfjyD;/ vlOD;a&2oef; ESifh txuf vef'gonf rJ av;rJ/ vlOD;a& 6 oef;ESifh txuf vef'gonf rJ 5rJ/ vlOD;a& q,foef; ESifh txuf vef'gonf rJ 6 rJ ponfjzifh vlOD;a&tcsKd;usukd,fpm;jyKcGif h ay;xm;avonf? jrefrmEkdifiH tajctaeY rl jzpfEk difacs 1 wGifjynfe,fwkdif;ukd wlnDaom ukd,fpm;jyKcGifh ay;xm;&m/ vlOD;a&enf;yg;aom jynfe,fESifh vlOD;a& tqrwefrsm;jym;aom jynfe,f rsm;onf wlnDaom ukd,fpm;jyKcGifh ±Sd&murBmay:wGif ukd,fpm;jyKr_ tcsKd;rusr_ tqkd;qkH; tajctae jzpfonf?

tnGef; (2) onf vlOD;a& tenf;qkH;jynfe,f wckwGif ±Sdaom rJwrJ . wefzkd;onfvlOD;a&trsm;qkH; jynfe,fwGif ±Sdaom rJwrJ. wefzkd;ESifh E_dif;,SOf avhvmxm;csufjzpfonf? *smr%DEkdifiH wGif b&Drifonf vlOD;a& tenf;qkH;jynfe,f jzpfjyD; 1993ckESpf p&if;t& vlOD;a& 686000 ±Sdonf? ajrmufykdif; &kdif;ESifh 0ufpfzDvD;,m; jynfe,f


onf vlOD;a& txlxyfqkH; jynfe,f jzpfjyD;/ vlOD;a& 1&oef;ausmf ±Sd&m txufv$wfawmftwGuf trwfOD;a& 6 ae&mcef‹ &avonf? okd‹jzpfI b&DrifwGif ay;aom rJwrJ .wefzkd;onf ajrmufykdif; &kdif;ESifh 0ufpfzDvD;,m; jynfe,fwGif rJ q,fhokH;rJ ESifh nDr#onf?jrefrmEkdifiH jzpfEkdifacs 1 taetxm;wGifrl vlOD;a&tenf;qkH; u,m;jynfe,f (246000vlOD;a&)wGif rJwrJonf jrefrmjynfe,f (wkdif; 7 wkdif;ukd aygif;xm;aom vlOD;a& oef;40 cef‹ ±Sdonfh) . rJ 165 rJ ESifh wlnDavonf? okd‹jzpfI jrefrmEkdifiH. taumif;qkH;ESifhtqkd;qkH; udk,fpm;jyKcGifh &onfh jynfe,frsm;. tcsKd;rSm 165§1 ±Sdonf [k ajymI&onf? ,if;tcsdK;rSm urBmay:±S d t±SnfwnfwHhcJ haom tcsdK;rJ h wkdif;&if;om;pk Hz,f'&,fpep fr sm;wGi f trsm;qk H ; jzp faeonf h tcs K d ; 11§1 xuf 15 qcef‹rsm;aeavonf? jrefrmEk difiH jzpfEk difacs vrf;oG,f 2 t&rl/ ukd,fpm;jyKr_tcsKd;rusr_onf avsmhenf;vmrnf jzpfjyD;/ u,m;jynfe,f. rJwrJonf vlOD;a& 13oef; cef‹ ±Sdonfh {&m0wDwkdif;. rJ 55 rJ ESifh nDr#rnf jzpfonf? ,if;onf vrf;oG,f1 xuf pmv#if tajctae aumif;vSaomfvnf; tjcm; z,f'&,f'Drkdua&pDrsm;ESifhpmv#ifrl tcsKd;rusr_ rsm;aeao;onf jzpfonf?

tnGef; (3) jrefrmEkdifiH jzpfEkdifacs vrf;oG,f 1 t&/ ucsif/ u,m;/ u&if/ csif; ESifhrGefjynfe,f 5 jynfe,fonf vlOD;a& tm;jzifh wEkdifiHvkH;. 10³52µ om ±Sdrnf?tu,fI trsKd;om;aumifpD tajccHOya' rl=urf;tvkdt& jynfe,fwdkif;wGif wlnDaomukd,fpm;jyKcGif hay;cJhygu/ wjynfe,f pDonf ukd,fpm;jyKcGifh 12³5µ &±SSdrnf jzpfjyD;/txufyg 5 jynfe,f pkpkaygif; taejzifh 62³5µ rJcef‹ ukd ukdifwG,fxm;rSm jzpfIv$wfawmfOya'rsm; twnfjyKa&;ESif h zG J ‹pnf;yk HOya' ajymif;vJa&; udpPrsm;ukdwm;qD;Ekdifaom ta&;=uD;onfh rJqENtkyfpk jzpfvmvdrfhrnf? jzpfEkdifacs vrf;oG,f 2t&rl vlOD;a& tenf;qkH; jynfe,frsm; jzpfaom u,m;/ csif;/ ucsif/ weoFm&D ESifhu&ifjynfe,frsm;onf vlOD;a& t& 8³53µ om ±Sdaomfvnf; rJay;cGifhukdrl 35³&µxd&±Sdrnf jzpfonf?

Alfred Stepan 27

The Author:

Alfred Stepan is Wallace S. Sayre Professor of Government at Columbia Uni-versity.

Documents

Multi-Nationalism, Democracy and “Asymmetrical Federalism” · 2007-06-10 · 2 Multi-Nationalism, Democracy and “Asymmetrical Federalism” “the six long-standing democracies