Multi-National Intervention as a Solution for the Kirkuk Impasse

8/6/2019 Multi-National Intervention as a Solution for the Kirkuk Impasse

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Multi-National Intervention as a Solution for the Kirkuk Impasse By Saeed Kakeyi

June 15, 2008Introduction

Kirkukan oil-rich with vast agricultural landshas been one of the principal impassesto a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in Iraq.Geographically, the Kirkuk Region straddles the strategic trade routes between Iran,Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. However, it was the discovery of vast quantities of oil that ledGreat Britain, in 1926, to append Kirkuk and the former Ottoman Wilayet of Mosul (ofwhich the Kirkuk region was a part) to the newly created state of Iraq. This new state,created in 1921, was under the Mandate of Great Britain. Ever since, and particularlyafter 1963, there have been continuous attempts by the central governments of Iraq to

Arabize Kirkuk.

A geo-historical synopsis of the Kirkuk GovernorateThe diamond-shaped Kirkuk region lies between the Zagros Mountains in the north-east, the Lower Zab and the Tigris Rivers in the north-west and west, the Hamrinmountain range in the south-west, and the Diyala (Sirwan) river in the south-east. Thisis the region and city known as Ara'pha to the ancient cultures and as Karkha dbethSilokh to the classical world (Talabany: 2000, 7). To Sassanians, this was theirgovernorate of Garmakn (Talabany: 2000, 7). By the medieval authors, the region wasknown as Garmiyn. This historic name still survives for the region in the common folk

language, while the classical Seleucid name of Kirkuk is reserved for the city alone.

Major trade routes pass through or touch on the borders of the Kirkuk Region. Tosafeguard these commercial and strategic crossings, Ottoman military forts wereestablished in the nearby cities of Kifri, Tuz-Khurmatu, Daquq, Perd as well as withinKirkuk city itself. The city of Kirkuk has served the area as its major hub since thebeginning of the 17th century (Talabany: 2000, 8).Speaking of the citys ethnic composition at the end of the 19th century, the Ottomanencyclopedic, Shamsadin Sami, states in his celebrated Qamusl al Aala'm that Threequarters of the inhabitants are Kurds and the rest are Turkmen, Arabs, and others. Aftervisiting the city of Kirkuk, he estimated the population to be between 12 and 15thousand, all Kurds except for 40 Armenian families (Talabany: 2000, 8).During the years of conflict between the Shiite Safawid Empire and the Sunni OttomanEmpire, the Kirkuk region, and Kurdistan in general, became a constant battleground(Amin Zaki: 1961, 164). Kirkuks strategic location led to its changing hands many timesand suffering a great deal of damage (Amin Zaki: 1961, 166).


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C.J. Edmonds describes the administration of the Kirkuk region during the last phase ofthe Ottoman rule thus: In the 18th century Kirkuk was the chief town of the Wilayet ofSharazur which included the modern [Iraqi] liwas of Kirkuk, Arbil and, nominally, ofSuleimani under a mutassallim. With the reforms of Midhat Pasha, Wali of Baghdadfrom 1869 to 1872, the name of Sharazur was given to the sanjak of Kirkuk,

corresponding to the present-day liwas of Kirkuk and Arbil, whereas the historicSharazur remained outside, in the new sanjak of Suleimani. The Wilayet of Mosul wasformed in 1879, and Kirkuk remained an important garrison town (Edmonds: 1957, 6).Under the renewed, direct, Ottoman rule the Wilayet of Mosul was divided into threegovernorates of Mosul, Kirkuk and Suleimani. Following the collapse of the OttomanEmpire in 1918, three districts (qada) situated to the north of the Lower Zab River weredetached from Kirkuk to form the governorate of Arbil. Under the Iraqi administration, in1925, Kirkuk became a governorate comprised of the four districts of Kirkuk Central,Kifri, Chamchamal and Tuz-Khurmatu (Talabany: 2000, 9).

The Turkman population in the Kirkuk Governorate

To better control the area, the Ottomans encouraged their more loyal subjects andmilitary personnel to settle in the cities and townsof Tel Afar and Mosul in the north,Arbil, Kirkuk and Kifri in central north and Khanaqin and Mandali on the present Iraq-Iran borderswhich dotted the trade routes in the Mosul Wilayet (Talabany: 2000, 11).The Iraqi historian Abdul-Razzaq Al-Hassani asserts that the Turkmen of this inclinedregion are a part of the forces of Sultan Murat IV who recaptured Iraq from the SafawidPersians in 1638 and remained in these parts to protect this route between the southernand northern Ottoman Wilayets (Talabany: 2000, 11).Many Turkman military personnel who settled permanently in the above mentionedcities subsequently engaged in commerce and other professions. The earliest traces ofIraqi Turkmen are, perhaps, to be found in the Turkman soldiers who served in theregion under the flags of the Abbasid caliphs and, eventually, the Ottomans (Khasbak:1973, 211). The Turkmen themselves maintain that they migrated to Iraq during theUmayyad and Abbasid caliphates to lend their military talent to those dynasties.Estimates of the number of Turkmen made public during the 1920s and 30s put them at2.1% to 2.4% of the total population of Iraq (Ismail: 1993, 22). In the official Iraqi censusof 1957 which is, until now, considered to be the only valid census, this approximateproportion was basically reconfirmed and the results revealed that Turkmen made up2.16% of the total population (Talabany: 2000, 14) However, this percentage decreasedin later censuses partly because the Iraqi regime deliberately muddled the ethnicity ofthe Turkmen and classed many of them as Arab. By the time of the 1977 census, theTurkman share of the Iraqi population was recorded as a mere 1.15 % of the total statepopulation (Talabany: 2000, 14). The fall in percentages was recorded for Kirkuk as forthe other governorates where Turkmen resided.


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Relations between Kurds, Arabs and TurkmansAs a way of promoting Turkman dominance in the last years of Ottoman rule, the rightto extract petroleum in a primitive way from the Baba-Gurgur oil fields near the city andto sell it for local consumption was granted to the Turkman family of Nafitchizada

(Talabany: 2000, 17). Despite this, the Ottomans did not expel the Kurds from the city,nor did they deny the ethnic make-up of the city as being one in which a Kurdishmajority co-existed with Turkmen and other ethnic groups. Monarchical Iraq followed thesame general policy, but they awarded sensitive positions, such as that of ProvincialGovernor or General in Command of Iraqs Second Army Division stationed in Kirkuk,mostly to Arabs. This in turn encouraged many Arab families to migrate to Kirkuk regionto be employed with the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) early in the twentieth century(Talabany: 2000, 23).Meanwhile, throughout the monarchical period, two-thirds of the members representingthe Kirkuk governorate in the Iraqi Parliament were Kurds and the other one-third was

Turkmen and only sometimes, during forty years of monarchical rule, was there one ortwo Arab representatives. This representation in the Iraqi Parliament reflected, to agreat extent, the ethnic composition of the governorate before the policy of extensiveArabization began in the early 1960s (Talabany: 2000, 18).In general, however, most cabinets of monarchical Iraq encouraged Arabs to settle inKirkuk. For instance, the cabinet of Yasin Al-Hashimi in 1935 embarked on settlinggroups of the Arab Ubaid tribe in the Hawija district of Kirkuk (Talabany: 2000, 24). Afterthe coming to power in Iraq of the Baath Party in 1963, played a prom inent role in theIraqi governments efforts to Arabize the city of Kirkuk, their descendants readily joinedthe Ba'ath party and were rewarded with sensitive civil service jobs.

Oil and the Arabization of KirkukThe City of Kirkuk has been known to have oil long before the Ottoman occupation ofKurdistan. However, since 1639, the Ottomans used primitive methods to extract it forlocal consumption (Talabany: 2000, 22). Nonetheless, the systematic and organizedexploitation of the Kirkuk oil fields only began seven years after the British occupation ofpresent-day Iraq in 1918. Whether or not the initial intention of the Colonial Britain in theaftermath of the World War I was to help the minorities of the defeated Ottoman Empireto establish their own nation-states, the discovery of enormous oil reserves in Kurdistanled to a fundamental change in British policy towards the Kurdish self-determinationissue.At first, there was a tendency among some British officers to favour the creation of aKurdish state that would extend northward to Lake Van and southward along the ridgesof Hamreen Mountains in current Iraq. Kurds were trying to persuade the Westerncountries to implement the terms of the Treaty of Sevres, signed on August 10, 1920.The Treaty stipulated the establishment of a Kurdish state in Ottoman Kurdistan. Thiswas first proposed by Captain Noel, a British political officer who had traveled


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throughout Kurdistan. Then the policy changed to one of working actively for theannexation of the former Kurdish populated Ottoman Wilayet of Mosul to the newlyestablished British Mandate of Iraq which, until then, was comprised of the formerWilayets of Baghdad and Basra alone (Talabany: 1999, 35).The British Mandate authorities for Iraq and Kurdistan organized a referendum in 1921on the accession of Emir Faisal bin Hussein as king of the new state of Iraq. The greatmajority of the people of the Kirkuk region rejected this proposal. Other Kurdish regions,such as the Suleimani, refused even to take part in the referendum. Kirkuk later becamea part of the Iraqi kingdom when the League of Nations, at its 37th Assembly in Geneva,on December 16, 1924, decreed that all the land below the Brussels Line (the currentIraqi-Turkish border) should be incorporated into Iraq (Talabany: 2000, 20). Later, however, successive Iraqi governments tried with varying degrees of intensity tochange the ethnic character of the Kirkuk region and perpetually appointed Arabs to thekey positions. From the outset, in co-operation with the British oil company operating in

Kirkuk, the central government in Baghdad brought large numbers of workers from otherparts of Iraq to work in the company and then to settle in the city. The company broughtin a large number of skilled Arab and Assyrian workers from other parts of Iraq(Talabany: 2000, 21).

The establishment of the petroleum industry in Kirkuk brought about a significantchange in the citys social and ethnic character. The new neighbourhoods, near the oilcompanys facilities, housed mostly Assyrians and Arabs. So, from the beginning, theKurds felt resentful that, in spite of their numerical majority in the city and governorate ofKirkuk, so few of them were employed by the oil company. This influx of workers fromother areas into the city marked the beginning of the process of Arabization there.Following this earliest example, the process of changing the ethnic character of Kirkukbecame a permanent undertaking by all the subsequent governments that have ruledIraq since the coup of February 8, 1963.The resumption of the fighting in Kurdistan in June 1963 between the KurdishPeshmerga Forces (freedom fighters) led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) andthe Baathist pan-Arab Iraqi regime, with the aid of most Turkmen, intensified theArabization of Kirkuk governorate and other Kurdish cities and towns in thegovernorates of Mosul, Arbil and Diyala. Among the many measures taken by theorganizers of the February 1963 coup were: The deportation of Kurds, the destruction oftheir towns and villages, the demolition of their neighbourhoods in the city of Kirkuk withthe consequent displacement of many, and the transfer of Kurdish civil servants andworkers to southern and central Iraq. Accordingly, Arabization became a well-established policy of all Iraqi regimes from 1963 to 1968.The Arabization of Kirkuk from 1968 to the 1991 Desert Storm The Arab Baath Socialist Party returned to power in a military coup on July 17, 1968.Leading Baathists were appointed as governors of Kirkuk and granted wide and


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Arab tribes from southern and central governorates to settle in the Kirkuk governorate,but it gave them agricultural land, granted them numerous privileges and armed them. Itsimultaneously destroyed hundreds of Kurdish villages and some counties where theywere not suitable for settling Arab nomad tribes. Entire populations of these villageswere placed in concentration camps in other counties, districts and governorates where

they barely had the means to survive and were kept under constant surveillance by thesecurity services. No one was allowed to enter or leave without official approval. Thesecamps were a grim reminder of those run by the Nazis and fascists during the SecondWorld War. They had all been given Arab names such as Al-Sumud, Al-Quds, andAl-Qadissiyah, (Talabany: 2000; Ali: 2008).The Arabization of Kirkuk from 1991 to 2003Following the 1991 mass Kurdish uprising in Iraq, the government forcibly expelled over120,000 Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians from their homes in the region of Kirkuk andneighbouring towns and villages. Over the past twelve years, entire families belonging

to these ethnic minorities have been obliged to relocate, leaving behind virtually all theirpossessions, properties, and means of livelihood. Most of them sought refuge in theprovinces of Arbil and Suleimani controlled by the KDP and the Patriotic Union ofKurdistan (PUK) respectively. A smaller number were relocated to government-controlled areas in central and southern Iraq. This systematic forcible transfer of Kurdsand other was the last phase of the Arabization of Kirkuk region (OLeary: 2008, 2). After the liberation of Iraq by the coalition of the willing nations led by the UnitedStatesin 2003, many Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrians returned to Kirkuk hoping to gainback their confiscated homes and properties. Many of these people have been able togo back to their homes and properties left behind by the escaped Arab settlers. Othersare still waiting to claim back their titles which are dependent on the disputed status ofthe region between the KRG and the newly established fragile government of Iraq.In 2003, the US led Coalition Forces (CF) deposed the authoritarian regime of SaddamHussein. Shortly thereafter, the US setup the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) toengage in nation-building and reconstructing Iraq. While the CF was tasked to providesecurity to the people of Iraq on the one hand, and fight the emerging insurgency on theother hand, the CPA (May 2003-June 28 2004) was able to draw a peaceful resolutionfor the status of Kirkuk and the other disputed Kurdish areas. According to article 58 ofits Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), the CPA recognized profound demographicand boundary manipulations by the Baathist regime which transgressed human rights,political rights and the rights of nationalities and ethnic minorities. It proposed measuresto rectify these injustices expeditiously. However, the CPA and the subsequent Iraqitransitional government (June 28 2004-January 31 2005) failed to rectify the relevantinjustices expeditiously on excuses of heightened insurgency and the regionalinterference on the one hand, and the questionable legitimacy of the TAL written by aninternationally recognized occupation authority on the other (OLeary: 2008, 3).


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To offset these arguments, the makers of Iraqs permanent constitutionpassed by anextraordinary voting referendum by the Iraqi people in October 2005reemphasizedthe political status of the governorate of Kirkuk, and other disputed territories in Article140 and scheduled them to be formally resolved by the end of December 2007. Despitelittle progress, unfortunately, the elected government of Iraq was not able solve the

issue. Hence, the prospective referendum affecting the status of Kirkuk governoratewas, by agreement, postponed for six months, until the summer of 2008 (OLeary: 2008,1). The KRG and all Kurds within it ardently want to unify with the relevant disputedterritories, either by political agreement or by violent means (Kurdistani Nwe: 2008). For now, the constitutional obligation to fulfill Article 140 remains a constitutionalimperative, and the KRG and the people of the Kurdistan Region are able to block anyproposed amendment to Iraqs constitution, which would modify Article 140.Furthermore, Kurds are capable of blocking any unconstitutional mechanisms that may

jeopardize their position on Kirkuk. For instance, as the Iraqi Council of Representatives(ICR) passed the Provincial Elections Law (PEL) on 22 July, 2008, thereby weakening

the Kurdish stand on the status of Kirkuk, the very next day, President Jalal Talabani aKurdand his Vice President Adil Abdil-Mahdian Arab Shiiteboth vetoed the PELas unconstitutional. Then, after a week of heated debate in the ICR over amending thePEL, the Iraqi lawmakers were not able to get a consensus over the issue and agreedto postpone it to their next parliamentary season to start in September 2008.At this turning point in the historical making of Iraq, what is happening behind thescene? From a Kurdish perspective, Kirkuk and their other disputed territories are theprinciple demands for the making of their unique national identity within the state ofIraq. Throughout their modern Iraqi history, Kurds have been engaging in on-again off-again fighting with the consecutive governments of Iraq, mainly, because of theirconsistent claim to Kirkuks Kurdistani identity; and, therefore, their rights to govern itand have an equal share of its oil-rich resources with the rest of Iraq. In contrast, Iraqwith the rest of the regional powers, especially Turkey, Iran and Syria, fear thathonouring the Kurds the title of governing Kirkuk and the other oil-rich territories wouldempower them to establish their independent Kurdish state.Although the Kurds have all the rights to declare their independent state, they have notdone so. The geopolitics of the Middle East would not allow the development of aKurdish state for as long as the authoritarian mindset is the dominant decision-makingin the region. The Kurds do recognize this dilemma very well. Hence, claims of Kurdishindependent drive conspiracy in the region are unfounded. Rather, all they want is thereversal of the Arabization policies of Baghdad and their constitutional rights to governthemselves within the federal state of Iraq. Also, Kurds, indeed, do not want to causemore interstate warslet along the intrastate fights--for Iraq. In fact, they have beenactive in reminding the seasonal new Iraqi politicians that Iraqs eight years of war withIran (1980-1988) was, indirectly, a consequence for not agreeing with the Kurds in 1974on the status of Kirkuk and the other disputed territories (Kurdistani New: 2008).


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Unfortunately, however, amateur Iraqi politicians, motivated by the agendas of theregional powers, are driving Iraq yet for another catastrophic situation. In their alliancewith the former Baathist lawmakers in the ICR, these radical lawmakersShiites andSunni Arabsare setting Iraq for an ongoing devastations and a regional turmoil by notacting according to their constitutional obligations. To add more to the dilemma, the US

government, under domestic and regional pressures, is not playing its powerbroker rolein Iraq. Instead, it has left the Kirkuk impasse to inexperienced diplomats coupled withlow ranking military officers working in Baghdad to handle it with much carelessnessand ill-thoughts of non-interference.

The Peshmarga forcesheavily participated in the US Surge to bring security to thequarters of Baghdad and northern areas of the Diyala Province in 2007have beendisgracefully asked by newly formed Iraq Security Forces (ISF) led by former Baathistofficers to retreat to Kurdistan Region. Moreover, these officers are also trying toinstigate troubles with Kurdish authorities by sending their troops to the trouble-freeKurdish towns and villages in order to exacerbate the politically charged situation in the

disputed territories of Khanaqeen near the Iraqi central eastern borders with Iran(Kurdistani Nwe: 2008). The issuance of 24 hours of notice to the 34th Brigade of thePeshmarga forces to leave its area of operation on August 10, 2008, is a cleardemonstration for the ill wishes of Iraqs Nuri Al-Maliki government. This in turntriggered the KRG to retreat its Peshmargas from the town of Jalawla (30 kilometerssouthwest of Khanaqeen) and position them in the town of Khanaqeen with three extrabrigades of Peshmargas brought from elsewhere ready to engage the IA in any minute. The least to say about these ISF trouble instigations is that another US betrayal of theKurds is just around the corner. The uncalculated aerial, logistical and advisory supportthat the 1st and the 5th Iraqi Army (IA) divisions are getting from the US army for theirinsurgency fights in the province of Diyala is backfiring. Instead of eradicating theinsurgency in other parts of Diyala, Nuri Al-Malikis government is trying to arm twist theKurds with the US military backing.What is the next facing the Kurds?In light of the developments in the Diyala province, the KRG is preparing to have apossible show down in the disputed territories of Mosul, if the Al-Maliki governmentrepeats its miscalculated actions while getting ready to deploy more IA forces to theMosul area early in October, 2008. Moreover, if the heightening tensions between theKRG and the Al-Maliki government do not subside; and, if the international communitydoes not actively engage in the negotiations over the implementation of the Article 140of the Iraqi constitution relating to the Kirkuk and the other disputed regions by the endof 2008, then a spoiled armed conflict would be inevitable.Turkey has been itching to see the downfall of the KRG. Its military leaders, also knownas the deep-state actors, would love to claim victory over Kurdish aspirations for.However, attacking the KRG forces under the pretext of securing Turkeys nationalinterests would certainly diminish Turkeys chances to join the European Union.


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Irans ambition to dominate the Persian Gulf region requires the US withdrawal not onlyfrom Iraq, but also from the entire Arab Gulf states. To achieve this goal, the nuclearambitious Iran would not hesitate in fully supporting the Iraqi Shiite governmentsactions against the Kurds.Finally, Syria would love to support Iraq against the Kurds in exchange for a greaterBaathist influence over the Iraqi Sunni population. Inevitably, Israels position in theregion would be weakened; and the national interests of the United States in the MiddleEast would face enormous challenges, particularly by the growing Islamic radical trends.Moreover, such foreseeable scenario would position China as well as Russia to havegreater influences over politics in the Middle East. Last but not the least, the Americandemocratization of the Middle East and North Africa would be kissed goodbye.How to prevent this scenario from happening?Since Iraq is still under the US occupation, it is the responsibility of the United States tomake sure that Iraq is building its democratic institutions throughout its transitionaldeveloping phases. Although Iraq has passed the dangers of outright civil war justrecently, it has a long way to go from slipping back into the hands of the former BaathistGenerals who are now commanding the IA operations throughout Iraq.The US government needs to understand that the Iraqi military segment has beendeeply amerced in the culture of instigating troubles and government overthrowing. Infact, since 1941, IA Generals have been involved in at least ten coup d'tats with fivesuccessful ones. Therefore, it is critical not let the Iraqi force generation and forcemoderation processes be solely handled by the US and Iraqi army generals. Civiliansfrom both sides must involve in such strategic planning.The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) leads 14 divisions manned by 264,000soldiers. Only 2.5% of this force is of Kurdish origin (Kurdistani New: 2008). Comparedto the 23% of Kurdish population in Iraq, this low percentage raises real fears withKurdish elites who are challenged to keep their lightly armed 100,000 Peshmergas, letalong training and modernizing them. In generating forces, the US diplomats and armyplanners in Iraq should have decentralized the IGFC by setting up three regionalcommands: one in the North to lead 60,000 Peshmergas, one in the center to lead60,000 Sunni Arab soldiers, and one in the south to command 150,000 Shiite Arabsoldiers. This initial separate diversification of the IGFC would, in the long run, createprofessional soldiers and eliminate any chances or attempts to grab power byundemocratic means. In addition, the Al-Maliki government critically needs to generateethnically diverse forces to operate in the disputed areas with joint Iraqi and Kurdishcommand. Such need will ease the primordial animosities between the IA and thePeshmerga leaderships.In reorganizing and diversifying the IA into three regional commands, the Al-Malikigovernment would be saved from pitfalls of victory sensationsbeen enjoyed in recent


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monthsdue to the defeat of the elusive insurgency. In so doing, the Al-Malikigovernment would have a better chance to demonstrate its wiliness to meet theconstitutional obligations toward the Kurds. In contrast, if Article 140 remains atimpasse, then Al-Maliki government needs to layout its best alternative solution thatwould be negotiable by the KRG. Respectively, the US government as well as the UN

needs to step in and propose a solution that addresses all sides core concern s withoutcrossing their existential red lines (ICG: 2006). For example, the reversal of allArabization abuses by previous regimes in the disputed areas so their population candecide either to join the KRG or remain within their repective governorates; an equitablefederated city-power-sharing limited to the boundaries of the City of Kirkuk; and theaccession of former Kirkuk districtswhere Kurds constituted the majority of thepopulation according to the 1957 censusby the KRG.Regionally, the US needs to exert more pressure on Turkey not to interfere in Iraqsinternal affairs, especially with regard to the Kirkuk issue. Also, the US needs to deploysome of its forces along the Turkish-KRG borders for two reasons: Confidence building

measures between the Turkish troops and the Kurdish Peshmergas on the one hand,and to deny any cross-border insurgent activities on the other hand. This in turn will helpthe Turkish authorities to accept the legitimacy of the KRG and considerably reduceKurdish animosities on both sides of the border toward the Turkey. Furthermore, the USgovernment needs to work harder in its isolation policies toward Iran and Syria. Aregionally contained Iran and Syria will ensure greater stability in the Middle East.Isolating Iran and Syria with coercive diplomacy will lead to a successful and stabledemocratic Iraq. The US government needs to moderate and train the Peshmergaforces to prevent Iranian intelligence penetrations into the KRG in route to othergovernorates of Iraq to support radical insurgent elements.Failure by the US and the UN to act decisively could well lead to a rapid deterioration ofthe already charged situation. The result would be violent intrastate conflict, spreadingcivil war and, possibly, regional military intervention. It is doubtful that the post-2003 Iraqwould survive yet another major bloodshed in oil-rich areas where large Iraqi diversecommunities do live.In the event of all-out regional war, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mustintervene and play a dominant role in forming a Multi-National Military Force (MNMF) tosanction the warring parties. However, if sanctioning proves to be ineffective, the use offorce must become an option to stop the belligerent parties. Simultaneously, the MNMFhas to intervene in the Iraqi intrastate war by segregating the Kirkuk city andestablishing buffer zones between the warring factions. Once that achieved, the UNSChas to form a non-bias fact-finding mission to determine a best course of action for thestatus of Kirkuk. After establishing security to protect the civilians, the MNMF has todevelop a binding three phase resolution plan.The first phase should have a short-term plan by which institutional capacity buildinghas to take place in order to establish rule-of-law. The second phase should have atransitional med-term plan for initiating economic and political developments to the


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satisfaction of the contending parties. The last phase should sustain and improve theachievements gained through the previous phases where all sides recognize thecriticality of cooperation and democratic means to manage their communal affairspeacefully and harmonically.Conclusion

This paper attempted to provide a historical background for the Arabization of Kirkukand the other disputed regions between the post-2003 Iraqi government and the KRG.The author suggests that in the event of an impasse over the implementation of Article140 of the Iraqi constitution, parties to the issue must explore acceptable alternativesrather than resorting to fight. Also, in the event of possible war, the paper suggests thatthe United States and the international community must work together to contain it andeventually stop it by means of negotiation and capacity building measures.

Reference:1. Ali, Burhan, The deportation of Kurds and the Arabization of Kirkuk in the Baathdocuments. Suleimani: University of Suleimani, 20082. Amin Zaki, Muhammad. A Brief History of Kurds and Kurdistan. Arabic trans.Muhammad Ali Awni, (2nd Ed.) Baghdad: Baghdad House, 1961.

3. Edmonds, C.J., Kurds, Turks and Arabs: Politics, Travel and Research in NorthEastern Iraq, 1919-1925. Oxford: Oxford Press, 1957.

4. Ismail, Khalil. The geographic distribution of the Turkmans in Iraq. TheInternational Politics Journal, No. 8, Arbil, 1993, p. 22.5. Khesbak, Shaker, Northern Iraq. Baghdad: Shafiq Publishing, 1973.6. Kurdistani Nwe Daily Newspaper, issues No. 3451, 3453, 3456: August 11, 13,16, 2008. Suleimani: PUK Central Media Publishing.7. OLeary, B. and Bateman, D., Article 140: Iraqs Constitution, Kirkuk and theDisputed Territories, Paper for the Conference at Rayburn House, Washington D.C.May 9 2008.8. Talabany, Nouri. The Kurdish Question and International Law: Perspectives ofSouthern Kurdistan in a Regional and Supraregional Context. Berlin: The Centre forKurdish Studies in Germany, 1999.9. Talabany, Nouri. The Arabization of the Kirkuk Region (2nd Ed.) London: 2000.

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Multi-National Intervention as a Solution for the Kirkuk Impasse