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The name Clausewitz is familiar to most of us and belongs toa man whose influence on military thought has been pro-found. This article examines the relevance of his ideas inIight of today’s world.

L AST year marked the 200th anni- istrative director of the General War Col-versary of the birth of a man whose lege in Berlin. After serving in this posi-

work, like hardly any other, has occupied tion for 12 years, he was appointed chief ofmany a great mind and whose name IS staff of the Prussian Observation Army inknown today throughout the world: Karl Posen. Soon thereafter, in 1831, he died ofvon Clausewitz. cholera.

Colonel Walter von Hobe, Federal Republic of Germany Army

Here w 1 brief sketch of his life and h}shistorical position: Clausewltz, born In1780, the son of a Prussian ci~,il servant,

joined the army at the age of 12 and firstencountered war as a 13-year-old duringthe Rhine Campaign of the Prussian warsAs a staff captain, he witnessed the crush-ing defeat of the Prussian army at Auer-stedt. At the age of 30, he became an in-structor at the General War College inBerlin.

After the France-Prussian m]htary al-liance, he res]gned hm commission andfought in the Russian army against Nape.Icon. In 1815, he gained readmission totbe Prussian military service. Three yearslater, at the age of 38, holding the rank ofmajor general, he was appointed admin-

Clausewitz, a contemporary of otherwell-known persons like Hegel, Marx andEngels, lived In a period of revolutionarychanges, and his personal fate 1s a smallreflection of the acting forces of hm era.During his early years, Frederick theGreat and Maria Theresa, the Austrianqueen, were still vividly present. Kant,the famous philosopher, had published histhree “Critiques.” There were also im-pending changes in the field of technolo~the steam engine had already been in-vented and, still during h]s lifetime, tbefirst railway line was opened.

His span of life comprises concepts suchas linear tactics and national uprising, ca-tegorical imperative and social economics,manual labor and mechanical work. In

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his era into which he was born, Clause-witz felt destined for greater tasks thanthose assigned to him.

This brief sketch is meant to bring hometo the readers the fact that Clausewitz—just as we are today—was placed in themiddle of a rapidly changing environmentrealizing that current problems cannot besolved with the instruments of an earliertime. I would, therefore, like to attempt toanswer three questions:

● Is knowing Clausewitz, his life andhw, teachings still worthwhile today, andcan he still mean something to us?

● Is his statement concerning the inte-rrelation of politics and war still valid to-day?

● IS the science that the “defensive w astronger form of war than the offensive”still true?l

During combat operations, Clausewitzgained impressions and reflected by study-ing more than 120 conflicts on subjects suchas “the effects of the moral factors” on theconduct of war, on “man in war” and also onthe “integration and coalition with alliedtroops.”

With hls literary lifework, he left toposterity a military theory of war, the es-sential parts of which are combined in hisbook, On War. Its teachings have becomecommon knowledge of all who seriouslystudy the phenomenon of war. The bestknown topical statements are thefollowln~

● The science of organic connection be-tween war and politws, culminating in theoften quoted sentence: “War is a mere con-tinuation of policy by other means.”z

● The introduction of moral factors mtothe science of war.

J● The sc nce of the defense as “the

stronger p Ition with the negative pur-pose.”

In particular, it is the first sentencewhich has lately made Clausewitz and his

work the subject of historical, political andmilitary publications and discussions. Any-one leaving behind such a wide, diverse-ly written heritage with such a wealth ofideas is always prone to the danger that in-dividual quotations will be used to provewhatever is required without consideringthe overall context of his train of thought.

Many hold that the thesis above is ob-solete. They feel that it is incongruous withtoday’s Western strategy of preservation ofpeace and the POIICYof containment of con-flicts, Inanuclearage, the tendency towardthe last resort, which according to Clause-witz is inherent in war, is said to be incon-sistent with any sensible politicalobjective.

Certainly, the Clausewitzian thesis de- ‘veloped from the realm of thought and thepolitical and technological situation of hisperiod. In view of the state of weapon tech-nology of our age and the political andmoral conceptions of ~be Free World, it re-quires a more differentiated and accuratestudy.

It is true that we, today, can no longerregard war as arbitrarily available to po-litical calculus and thus a programmablemeans of political intention. But thatdoes not abolish war wh]ch is provedby the more than 120 armed conflicts whichhave occurred on our planet since theendofWorld War IL

In view of the geographical and politicalsituations in Western Europe, one cannotrule out the possibility of a war being forcedupon a nation, even with the nuclearpowers joining in. And it is at this verypoint that the Clausewitzian thesis hascontinued relevance—namely, that warmust not be more than an instrument ofpolicymaking. Politics, bowever, not onlydecides on tbe start and the purpose of awar, but also on the type of means to beused, in fact, in all its phases.

It is, therefore, governments and parlia-

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ment.s which, by way of their policy, haveto decide on the preservation of peace, onthe individual steps of escalation intimes of tension and, finally, on thenecessity of defense through war, In thisprocess, the armed forces are no more thanone of the manifold instruments.

It is certainly beyond all doubt thatthe moral factors which Clausewitz listsas pertaining to war—namely, allpsychic forces such as courage, audac.ity, perseverance and strength of charac-ter—are of decisive importance in allwartime activities. The same factors arealso pertinent in peacetime and, in addi-tion to formation of character, educa-tion, tolerance and r]ghteozzs thinking,form part of the principles governingleadership,

Clausewltz could not and would notoffer pat solutions for every conceivablecase. Therefore, many a conflicting andapparently contradictory idea is boundto come up in the diversity of his thoughts.One should not forget that his book waswritten more than 150 years ago. And,consequently, we did foresee the develop-ment from wars waged by authoritariangovernments in the 17th and 18th cen-tuzves to the great wara of the times thatcame after him. Even the principles of thewar of national liberation by partisansand subversive elements taught andencouraged today by the Soviets andespecially by Mao Zedong have alreadybeen written down by Clausewitz.3

In the light of this, it is of no importancewhatsoever that Clauaewitz only knewland warfare and only distinguished be-tween three arms. Broadly speaking,all branches of service and types ofweapons are in the last resort in supportof the soldier at the front without whomfinal decisions are inconceivable even inan age of rockets and missiles.

In the sixth book of his main work,

Clausewitz deals with defense and evolvedthe thesis “Defense is the stronger formof making war.”d It is quite worthwhilestudyiizg the book on defense. Naturally,defense is not automatically the strongesttype of combat, and this statement isnot meant to be absolute, but relatiue.But, as a look at the history of wars willshow, it can boast the optimum chance ofsuccess.

It was not only the Battle of the Marnem 1914, but also the German Campaignagainst Russia in 1917, and in the Westin 1918, wh]ch were won from a defensiveposture. Still more convincingly do theevents of World War 11 plead the de-fense as the stronger type of combat. Inregard to the war in Russia, Clausewitzsaid, as a result of the lessons learnedin 1812, that it is often in the midst ofone’s own country where one is in thestrongest position.

Just consider what he says in his bookon defense:

If we awazt the eaemy wzthtn our owntheater of war, however near the frontcerthe declszon may take place, this theater ofwar w Ill nevertheless always be entered bythe enemy force, which must entail somesacrlfzce on its part.

And he goes on:If we wwh to fight a defenszue battle and

zf we, therefore, leave zts determination andthe chozce of time for It to the enemy, it maybe that he remazns for some time in oc-cupation of the piece of territory and thetzme zuhmh . he allows us to gain w znthat way pazd for by US.5

Dealing with offensive operations with-in a defensive war, C1ausewitz wrote:

We can, therefore, in a defensive cam-paign fight offensively, in a defensive bat-tle we may use some divwzons for offensivepurposes, and lastly, while simply re-maining in position awaiting the enemy’sonslaught, we still send offensive bullets

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(today rockets) into his ranks to meet him.eThis pi+ssage will sound very familiar

to us, but it is also meant to give us foodfor thought. Another thing to be learnedfrom this is to utilize terrain as a“natural ally.” One often has the impres-sion that we, today, let ourselves be hyp-notized in a highly technical army bymechanical devices and weapon systemsand, consequently, lose our natural in-stinct for utilization of terrain

A third aspect is that defense includesthe element of maneuver, by defense,Clausewitz understands dynam w action,only that ]t is deferred in time. “Defenseis composed of waiting and acting,” hestates exphcitly. It can be assumed thatthis stntement refers, rather, to strategicand political action than to tactical action.

The thesis of the “suspension of mili-tary activity” has absolutely topical rele.vance In NATO strategy. History teachestime and time again, says Clausewitz, thatin war an interruption of mutual militaryactlwt y w]1I occur and thus the opposingsides are, in a way, inactively confrontingeach other. Both opponents bide their time,the one because he feels that an attack at alater point of time would be more appro-priate, the other in a feeling of inferlorit y.

Summarlzmg the Clausewitzian aspecton defense, he sees advantages on thedefender’s side: the advantage of ground,surprise—normally only expected withthe attacker—tountertire or even counter-attack from several sides, the assistanceof the theater of war, the support of thepeople and the utilization of great moralfOrces.7

How topical a~d relevant Clausewitz’steachings still are today does, at th]sstage, hardly require any further explana-tion. In the beginning, some questionshave been raised as to whether we canstill profit today from Clausewitz andhis book and whether his statements have

continued relevance.It should be clear by now that “Clause-

yitz, in a manner more topical than anyother, has made statements which un-reservedly apply to the officer capable ofindependent thinking.

The voluminous book, On War, can-not be studied and utilized as if it were aservice regulation. One very quicklyencounters basic questions of philosophyand politics and social life in general.

Officers see themselves confronted to-day with two challenges to stand the testas soldiers in peacetime and, like Clause-witz, to be ready to continuously checktheir own position.

This requires flexible thinking,especially the arr]val at logical conclu-sions. In particular, it is this attitudewhich must precede any experiment oftrying out something new, especially inrapidly changing times. Leadership la ofundisputed importance in war and intimes of peace, In both cases, however, dif-ferent basic conditions prevail. The con-flicts of our age have a confusing multi-tude of outward appearances. One mustbe molded by the will to lead and by areadiness to “grasp the moral forceswhich are involved.”

Clausewitz did not devise complicatedsystems and patterns remote from every-day life, but, based on lessons learned, hereasoned out actzon. Clear, sound think-ing, not emotional vagueness, purpose-ful acquiring of knowledge and experi-ence, and determination are the qualitiesdemanded today. Life itself will providefriction. It need not be ar~ificially initiatedby complicated trains of thought andoversubtle language intelligible to theexpert only.

Finally, and in conclusion, a thought-provoking quote from Clausewitz, ‘W isfriction which makes that which appearseasy in reality dif!lcult.”s

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NOTES

1 Karl “ml C,a”sewdz 0. war t,ens(.tm b“ 0 J Mattiw,$ 4 fb,O !300” S,, Chap,,, , SeCt,0”2 P3,9JO!le, In fan!ry Jour.., Press, W.,h,nq,on DC 1950 BOON S,, 5 lbtd Bmh SIx Ch.rJter Vlll 0345Chm!terl,, D326 6 fb,O BOOk S,x Ch.Dte, l P3,7

2 lb,a Bwk O”e Ch,P,erl S,,1,,”24 D ,6 7 lbfO B.Ok St” Chmle,!ll 113233 Ib,d, Book S,. Chapter XXVl S ILvd Book One ChaD,WVl, D55

Colonel Wal(m uon Hobe t, the German lm.SO. offmr, LrSACGSC 1{? (d(cnd,d the JeMttCollege m Bad Godesbcrg and M ugradualeofJ’lc,mburg CO1lC,W, [h,, German Gerwral SmffCollege and the US Armwi Fw..,A s,aff~o[.lqw Hehassc,r[ cda~clzlefi G3Pla?L,\ and Operatm,zs, at Headquders. Northern Army Group,US command, n~ “ffzmr of Arttt/ery Balla[~on155, andczs cxccutme officer to the commandmg

offlc@rof the Genc,ral ArmY Offwc

Army Extends Basic Training. Longer andtougher basic training(BT) will soon face individuals coming into the Army. Plans foratougher eight-week program instead of the current seven weeks havebeen announced by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC),

The plans call for more demandmg physical conditioning, train-ing in additional soldier skills and the raising of standards for coursesat all training installations. The new program will go into effect atsome training installations in Fiscal Year (FY) 1981 and will inc!udealltraining installations bythe end of FY 1982.

The revamped BT program’ leans heavily on the belief that aphysically fit Army begins with tough, demanding standards estab-lished in BT and continues through all phases of a soldier’s profes-sional growth. Increased emphasis will be placed on basic soldierskills. New technical subject materials include map reading andcommunications.

The changes are aimed at developing better trained and moredisciplined soldiers who, after assignment to their new units, cancontribute more quickly to Army unit effectiveness.

There are 308 hours in the current BT program of instruction(POI). The new POI will contain 405 hours, an increaae of 97 hours.The 97 hours contain new subjects, subjects taught in the past butnot formally documented, and additional hours on subjects nowtaught. -

The increased training will include physical training, weaponsfamiliarization and qualification, individual tactical training, march-es and bivouac and basic rifle marksmanship. Newsubjects in thePOI will be communications, map reading, identification of opposingforces and obstacle courses for confidence and conditioning.

Plans also call for the combat arms oriented One Station UnitTrainin~ courses to be expanded by one week in FY 1982.

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