Lieutenant Colonel Edward C. Smith, US Army

Although the mortar has been a useful weapon for a long time.its reputation now seems to be on the decline as other systemsgain in popu[arit~. The author rerierrs past contributions of thentortar and explains u,h.y that particular u,eapon system shouldremain a part of the in farztry ’s arsenal. $

T HE infantry fights with the support the Vietnam War, has tended to set asideof a variety of weapons to win the mortar, one of its old reliable battle-

battles. Unfortunately, tbe US Army, in field killers. It has also undertaken

its drive to develop, field end use new studies proposing elimination of the

weapon systems, as well as the tech- system altogether and emphasizing mex-

nologicaf advances made during and since imum use of close-in fire support by

1981 29

MILITARY REVIEW

artillery, tactical air and attack heli-

copter. 1I believe, however, that the needfor the mortar to remein with the infantryis vitrd to the infantry’s survival.

It is surprising that the recorded anddocumented value of mortars in theArmy’s history during World War II andthe Korean War has been convenientlyforgotten. Let us review a few pastactions.

During the Sicilian Campaign in 1943,our 4.2-inch mortars stopped a number ofenemy counterattacks and forcsd tanketo withdraw to a range where artilleryand naval gunfire could destroy them.’

During the city fighting in ~rest,France, in September 1944, US units used60mm, 81mm and 4.2-inch mortars effec-tively in house-hy-house fighting. Theywere able to fire over high buildings anddown into relatively narrow open spaces.The mortzms’ capabilities ranged fromdiscouraging sniper fire to the destru~tion of defensive strongpoints.’

In the Battle of the Rhinehmd, hun-dreds of 81mm mortars were used toneutralize Germany’s &eat west whll offortifications.’ And numerous combat ac-tions in the Pacific Campaign reflectsimilar incidents.’

Later, the Korean War contained nu-merous successful mortar crew actions.Included are the Pusan Perimeter de-fenses and the finrd outpost battles)

I hope that the documented accounts ofthe October 1973 Arab and Israeli fight-ing along the Bar-Lev line have been re-viewed by US leaders. During the firstminutes of that fighting, Egyptian sr-tillery and heavy mortars delivered10,500 shells on Israeli positions.’ This re-cent use of threat doctrine by Egyptianforces should give US military leaders an

. updated view of the type of indirect firepreparation that can be expected in theinitial minutes of a threat attack against

our forces in Germany.Apparently, though, some military

leaders seem to be stilf under the in-fluence of the permissive environment ofthe Vietnam War years. During thattime, there was such an abundance ofother fire support systems that they feltthey could do without mortars. It was notan uncommon occurrence, for example, tofind infantry companies going into com-bat in Vietnam without taking rdong asingle mortar tube.’

If US forces are subjected to a threatattack in Centraf Europe, we can expectthat the overwhelming volume of threatartillery available for suppression of USartillery will cause friendly support ar-tillery to devote most of ite aseets to acounterfire role.’ US artillery will be hard-pressed to respond to all crdls for close-insupport of infantry task force com-manders. Close tactical sir support assetswill be directed toward the attainment of10CSIair superiority and tactical interdietion missions. As a result, they may notbe bvailable to support infantry air re-quests. ”

Attack helicopters working against anenemy with a highly sophisticated sirdefense system will not be committedaway from killing threat tanks unless thetarget and circumstances justify theiruse,,L These problems can be offset. by

reliance on a proper balance of organicmortar support to the units’ overafl in-tegrated fire support plan. This eupportshould be left under the control of theunit commanders.

With alternate fire support means com-mitted to other tasks, the task force com-mander’s conduct of a successful activedefense will be most difficult in the firststages of hostilities. He will be out-numbered and outgunned. Operating on awide front, he will find himself with a cor-responding degradation of fire support

.,

NEED FOR MORTARS

‘a

endcommuncation systsms while engag-ing the lm-ge number of enemy groundtargets in ,@s defeneive sector.

The need is evident for an organic,readily available and responsive fire support syetem to provide the close-in firesupport, ’emoke and illumination a taskforce commander requires. Organic mor-tars fill that requirement.’z

The short minimum range of US mortarsystems makes them particularly well--suited for close-in protective fires againstassaulting enemy and for block-fightingin cities.i$ The proximity of mortars tothe supported units makes commut@ca-tion by wire, runner or other means feas-ible when enemy electronic warfare condi-

tions prohibit or eeverely limit radio con-tact with artilfery systems.” The employ-ment of mortars under direct control ofthe maneuver commander makes themone of his most responsive, maneuverableand versatile weapon systems.

Infantry mortars in the past have madesubstantial contributions in conventionefbattles. In view of the requirements thatwould face US infantry task force com-manders in the event of combat in theCentral Region of Europe, the need formortws is obvious. These weapone canprovide the fastest and most responsiveclose-in fiie support to US infantry unitsin future hostilities end increase thelikelihood of survivaf on the battlefield.

NOTES

1 Ctose support Study Group II, Department of combat tkvelocme.ls. us Arm, Freld Arwl.w school Fort S!!1, Okla, IFebimry 198o

2 Captain Earl. J Townsend F[rst Ro.no on TarQet, ComoalFomes Jo.m81, Oecemoer >952,..0 Albert N Garw’d ..0 Howard

McGrew S!mth, The U S Army m World V/w II, MeatterraneanTheatw of Operallon, Sfc,ly ..0 me S.rrenaer of 11.?? Depart

me.! of the Army, Washington, D C. 1965 m 166 169 170 and 1713 Comoe: After A.tr.n ReDom A!lted Fm.e. .eaaw.rlem, 28

October 19444 John K!rk and Robert Y.””Q, Great We8Po”9 of WO,!O War!l

Walker & co, N Y, 19815 Colonel M E Barker. The 42.mch Mortar went to War.’ }

M,,,,(,,. 8..<,,4 No”ember 1947.021, Mortars t“ Ju”gle, l“f.”tr”

Jo.;;;!, i.gisi 1944, p 33, ..0 neavy Mortar. I. D-S l. fanf,y

Journal, AuOUSt 1944. D 206 Roy E A@3rna., w S Army t. me Km... War, ,So.m 0!

the Nanto.g Norlh m me Y.1. Department of the Army,Washington, DC, 1%1, DD 396.436, ..6 Walter G Hermes u S

Army 1. !he Korea” war, Truce Tent a.o Flgntmg Front. Depart

rnent of me army, Wasnl.uto. DC. IW6. DP 37578.392 ..a ~

7 Tr.vor N DUPUY, El.,,.. VICIOV The Arab W..,! Wars.

,9477974 Ha,.,, & ROW Publ,sher$ lnc N Y 1978, 041>

8 L,eutena;l G.”,,.! Julta” J Ewell anti Major General Ika AH“”? Jr Snarlm”$”g [he Comb.! EO@, V@fnem Sr”O,.S, DeparI.

ment of me Army, Wasn, ”gmn D C, 1974. P 92

9 C N Dcmnelky, ,. T.ct, c.al Problems Facing the S0.(.1 Army:lntemetmnctl Defense Rev,,.. Volume 11, Number 9, 1978, D 1471.

Oiler.t Kurt Ho$ma” The BatW?lmcd 0+ the 7980 s,. IPternaf!on.1

De f?”se !+,,,,., Volume 10 J“”, 1977, w 43135, and F8eldM...., (FM) 30102 ODPOS,.g Forces E.rwe. DeD.rIment of the

Atmy W.sh, ngton, D C 1977 PP 14.9 and 14.10m FM 620, ftre s.pcort,. Combmeu Arms Obwraho.s, Depart

rnent d the Army, waw,ngton, D C 1977, P D 8

11 Lt..te. ant Colon.t E.wne H Gmvson Jr ..6 L$e.te. a.tColon., G,... R A,,.”, Aitack Het,c;DterS to, a S“c.essfutDefense, Umt.o stales AmW A.tatm. D,ge$f, November 1979. PP. . . .7.. !.,

72 Map Genera, D.w5 E Grange Jr, .Ynla.try man and H!,

Mortar: {nla”rv, Mar.h APr, f 1980, D 313 speccah Text 7280. T.ct(c.l Emplowem of Mortars, Corn

nmrm ..0 T.cIIc$ Dermrtment US Amy Infantry SM..!, Fort Benn,n& G. 1978, PP F.2 .“0 G ?

14 Grange w ,,,

>LicutenarttColonelEdwzrd C Smith M wzth

r

the Ptibhc .4 ffaws Office, Headquarters,Fm t.. .

\ fJSArmy. Fort Meade.MarylandHe asa grad-uate of Western Reserue Umuersitj and the

.4 !*=tjf VSACGSC He has serued as W Ist Battaho%

.2d Infantry (Mecba?uzedl, 1st Dwisto6 Fort. . ,=k=.

$%

Rzley, Kansas, as associate professor ofmditary. .

b ./>science at the University of Dayto& as a public

&

affa~rs officer in Vzetnam and okinaw~ and asan instructor at the US Army Infantry Schooland editor of Infantry magazine at Fort Ben-ning,Georgia .. I

1981 31