Republic of the PhilippinesSANDIGANBAYAN

Quezon City

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,

SB-16-CRM-0077 -0084For: Falsification of Public

Documents and Violation ofSec. 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019

JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY,JR. ET AL..,

Accused.X-- --- ---- ---- ---- -------- ----- ---- ----X Present:

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.MARTIRES, J.,FERNANDEZ, J.

For resolution are the following:

1. Accused Lorenza P. Amores' Motion for Reconsideration(Re: Hold Departure Order dated February 26) 2016) datedMarch 30, 201~ ~

, p. 4, Vol. IV, ",rom (SB-16-CRM-0077) ~

RESOLUTIONPeople YS. Binay, et al.SB-16-CRM-0077-0084

2. Accused Manolito N. Uyaco's Motion for Reconsideration(Re: Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 2016) datedMarch 31,2016;2

3. Accused Cecilio P. Lim's Motion for Reconsideration (Re:Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 20 16) dated March 30,2016.3,

4. Accused Nelia A. Barlis' Motion for Reconsideration (Re:Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 20 16) dated March 31,2016.4,

5. Accused Rodel R. Nayve's Motion for Reconsideration (Re:Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 20 16) dated March 30,2016.5 and,

6. Accused Eleno M. Mendoza, Jr.'s Motion forReconsideration (Re: Hold Departure Order dated February 26,2016) dated March 31, 2016;6

THE ACCUSED-MOVANTS' MOTIONS FORRECONSIDERATION

Accused-movants pray for the reconsideration and liftingof the Court's Hold Departure Order (HDO) dated February 26,2016. They uniformly allege that the Court should have beenmore circumspect in issuing the HDO considering that itrestricts their right to travel guaranteed no less by the 1987Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights andthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Theyclaim that their right to travel cannot be restricted simply"because there is a pending criminal case against [them]."Accused-movants further claim that the allowable restrictionsto their right to travel under Section 6, Article III of the 1987Constitution, i.e., interest of national security, public safety orpublic health, as may be provided for by law, are not present inthese cases. They all claim that although they are currentlyindicted in these criminal cases, they are still presumedinnocent until proven otherwise. Thus, their freedom to traveleven outside the country should not be unduly restricte~

2p.10,id / ~J p. 109, Vol. I, RCi'Ord (SB~16-CRlvI-0080)·p.115,id .5 p. 122, id /'(,p. 135, Vol. I, ful'ord (SB-16-CR!.vl-0084) fP

"~I

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Binay, et at.SB-16-CRM-OOn -0084

otherwise, their "right to be presumed innocent UJillbe negatedas early as now."7

Accused-movants likewise claim that the ex-parteissuance of the HDO violated their right to due process becausethey were not given the opportunity to be heard prior to itsissuance and due to the absence of any of the recognizedexceptions under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.They also assert that the doctrinal pronounceUlents of theSupreme Court in Silverio vs. Court of AppealsB andSantiago vs. VasqueZ3 are inapplicable herein allegedlybecause the factual circumstances of the said cases are notsimilar to these cases; and, that there is no compelling reasonto issue the HDO against them since they have all the intentionto attend the hearings when required to do so by the Court.While they are charged with falsification of public documentsand violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,these are not heinous crimes that carry with them the penaltyof life imprisonment or its equivalent. Accused-movants allclaim that they have already submitted to the jurisdiction of theCourt and had posted the required bail bond for theirprovisional liberties; hence, there is no further reason to restrict

•their movement and curtail their freedom to travel abroad. 10

Finally, the accused-movants assert that they are notflight risks considering that all the people they hold dear,including their assets, are here in the country. 11

THE CONSOLIDATED OPPOSITIONOF THE PROSECUTION

The prosecution argues for the outright denial of thesubject motions in its Consolidated Opposition dated April 15,2016.12 According to the prosecution, it is now settled that aperson's right to travel is subject to the usual constraintsimposedby the verynecessityof safeguardingthe system/-?

7 pp. 4-5, pp. 11-12, Vol. IV, Ruord(SB-16-CRl\I-0077); pp. 109-110, pp 115-116, pp. 122-123, Vol. I, Record(SB-16-CRM-0080), pp. 135-137, Vol. I, Ivxord (SB-16-CRlVI-0084)8195 SCRA 760 (1991)9 217 SCRA 633 (1993)10 pp. 5-7, pp. 12-14, V.01. IV, Record (SB-16-CRM-0077); pp. 111-113, pp. 117-119, pp. 124-127, Vol. I, Recor~.(SB-16-CRM-0080), pp. 137-139, Vol. I, Record (SB-16-CRl\I-0084)11 p. 8. p. 14, Vol. I V, Rewrd (SB-16-CRM-0077); p 113, P 119, P 127, Vol. I, Retord (SB-1G-CRM-0080), p 139,Vol. I, Record (SB-16-CRlvI-0084)12 p. 102, Vol. IV, Record (SB-16-CRM-0077) /

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Binay. et al.SB-16-CRM -0077 -0084X ------------ --------- ------ - ------ - --- ---- ----- - X

justice13 and that courts have the inherent power to issue anHDO. It asserts that the issuance by the Court of the assailedHDO was within its inherent power to ensure that the accusedin these cases are always within its reach. "Protecting theinterest of the people is far more important than simply trustingthe claims of the accused that they have no intention of leavingthe country and evading the criminal cases against them."14

After considering all the arguments of the parties, thepertinent laws and relevant jurisprudence, the Court DENIESthe accused-movants' motions for reconsideration for reasonshereunder discussed.

I. The right to trave Z is notabsolute; there are recognizedlimitations thereto.

It is conceded that the right to travel or n~e freedom ofmovement is one of the rights guaranteed not only under ourBill of Rights but also under international law.

Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights(UDHR)emphatically declares that:

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement andresidence within the borders of each state.

(2)Everyone has the right to leave any country, including hisown, and to return to his country.

It is worthy to note, however, that at the time of theadoption of the UDHR, the general consensus among themember states of the United Nations (UN)was that the UDHRwas not intended to be considered a law. In fact, right after theadoption of the UDHR by the UN General Assembly, it was theexplicit position of the government of the United States ofAmerica that the said declaration is "not a treaty,)) or ((a~

13 Citing Reyes vs. C~'urtof Appeals, 606 SeRA 580 (2009) / (J"J.JH P". 6, p. 3, C""5dD,,d 0Pf''''''·' p. 104, VoLIV, R""d (SB16-CRM0077) ff M

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Binay, et at.SB-16-CRM-0077-0084

international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be astatement of law or of a legal obligation. "15

Thus, to be of binding character in international law, thedeclarations made under the UDHR needed to be converted intointernational covenants or treaties. The conversion of theseavowed declarations into the level of an international covenantstarted in 1966 with the conclusion of the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and which cameinto force on March 23, 1976, pursuant to its Article 49.16 ThePhilippines became a state party to the ICCPR in 1986.17

Among the rights guaranteed under the ICCPR is the rightof a person to liberty of movement and freedom to choosehis/her residence. Article 12 thereof provides:

Article 121. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, withinthat territory, have the right to liberty of movement andfreedom to choose his residence.2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including hisown.3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to anyrestrictions except those which are provided by law, arenecessary to protect national security, public order (ordrepublic), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms ofothers, and are consistent with the other rights recognized inthe present Covenant.4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter hisown country.

As can be readily seen from the above-quoted Article 12 ofthe ICCPR, the right to liberty of movement is not absolute. It issubject to certain permissible limitations spelled out inparagraph 3 thereof, i.e., if there is a law providing for itslimitation, if such restriction is necessary to protect nationalsecurity, public order, public health or morals or the rights andfreedoms of others and are consistent with the rights recognizedintheICCP~

15 19 Dep't. State Bulletin 751 (1948) (raken from the remarks of Eleanor Roosevelt, then a U.S. delegate to theGeneral Assembly); hltps:/ /lvww2.gwu.edu/ -erpapers/ dotuments/ displaydoc4nl?_I=speedles&_dotid=spt057137; viewed On J"nu"ry 12, 201716 b/tp:/ / www.obt·hr.org/ell/professionalill/erest/pages/ apr.alpx; viewed on J anualY 12, 201717 http://indicator.r.obchr.org/;viewed on JanUar)f 12, 2017

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Binay, el at.SB-16-CRM-0077-0084X------ - --- -------- - -- - - ---- - -- - ----- -- - ----- -- -- X

Within the domestic sphere, a person's right to travel islikewise guaranteed under Section 6, Article III of the 1987Constitution, to wit:

SgCTION 6. The liberty of abode and of changing thesame within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impairedexcept upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the rightto travel be impaired except in the interest of nationalsecurity, public safety, or public health, as may beprovided by law. 18

However, just like Article 12 of the ICCPR, the right totravel guaranteed under the afore-quoted Section 6, Article IIIof the 1987 Constitution is not absolute. The State may validlyimpair it in the interest of national security, public safety orpublic health, as may be provided by law.

11.The fact 'that accused-movantsare currently facing criminalcharges in court is a limitingcircumstance to their right totravel.

Accused-movants invoke the aforesaid prOVISIonsof theBill of Rights, the UDHR and ICCPR in claiming that the Courtimpaired their right to travel with the issuance of the assailedHDO. They all allege that none of the grounds stated underSection 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is present oravailing in this case; that they are not prominent public figureswhose acts can influence or affect the consciousness of thegeneral public,. to the detriment of national security or publicsafety; and, they are not suffering from any contagious diseasethat can affect public health; hence, the Court should not haveissued the assailed HDO against them.

Obviously, accused-movants overlook the fact that asidefrom the recognized constitutional limitations, there arestatutory and inherent limitations to the said right to tr~

M

R~SOLUTIONPeople vs. Binay, et at.SB-16-CRM-0077-0084

In Leave Division, Office of the A.dministrativeServices-Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) vs.Heusdens,19 the Supreme Court enunciated:

Nonetheless, granting that it is an issue, the exerciseof one's right to travel or the freedom to move from oneplace to another, as assured by the Constitution, is notabsolute. There are constitutional, statutory andinherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section6 itself provides that neither shall the right to travel beimpaired except in the interest of national security, publicsafety or public health, as may be provided by law. Some ofthese statutory limitations are the following:

1] The Human Security Act of 20 10 or Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9372. The law restricts the right to travel of an individualcharged with the crime of terrorism even though such personis out on bail.

2] The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or R.A. No. 8239.Pursuant to said law, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or hisauthorized consular officer may refuse the issuance of,restrict the use of, or withdraw, a passport of a Filipinocitizen.

3] The Anti- Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 or R.A.No. 9208. Pursuant to the provisions thereof, the Bureau ofImmigration, in order to manage migration and curbtrafficking in persons, issued Memorandum Order Radjr No.2011-011, allowing its Travel Control and Enforcement Unitto offload passengers with fraudulent travel documents,doubtful purpose of travel, including possible victims ofhuman trafficking from our ports.

4] The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of1995 or R. A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022. Inenforcement of said law, the Philippine OverseasEmployment Administration (POEA) may refuse to issuedeployment permit to a specific country that effectivelyprevents our migrant workers to enter such country.

5] The Act on Violence against Women and Children orR.A. No. 9262. The law restricts movement of an individualagainst whom the protection order is intended.

6] Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 8043.Pursuant t~ereto, the Inter-Country Adoption Board m'y?

19662 SCRA 126 (2011); Pleas~ refer also to the Di-fselltil1gOpinioll of Justice J\ntonio T. Carpio in Macapagal-Arroyo YS. De Lima, G.R. No. 199034, and Arroyo YS. De Lima, G.R. No. 199046, November 15, 2011; ~~bltp:// www.gov.ph/2011/11/15/ g!oria-macapaga!-arrryo-v-de-!ima-el-a!-g-r-1I0-199034jose-miguel-arroyo-v-de-!ima-et-a!-g-r-110-199046/; viewed on.J anuary 12, 2017

ff

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Binay, el al.SB-16-CRM -0077 -0084

issue rules restrictive of an adoptees right to travel to protectthe Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/ orsale or any' other practice in connection with adoption whichis harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the child.

Inherent limitations on the right to travel are thosethat naturally emanate from the source. These are verybasic and are built-in with the power. An example of suchinherent limitation is the power of the trial courts toprohibit persons charged with a crime to leave thecountry. In such a case, permission of the court is necessary.Another is the inherent power of the legislative department toconduct a congressional inquiry in aid of legislation. In theexercise of legislative inquiry, Congress has the power toissue a subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a witness inany part of the country, signed by the chairperson or actingchairperson and the Speaker or acting Speaker of the House;or in the case of the Senate, signed by its Chairman or in hisabsence by the Acting Chairman, and approved by the SenatePresiden t.20

Indeed, there are other well-recognized permissiblerestrictions to an individual's right to travel other those statedunder Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. For one,the right to travel of an individual facing a criminal charge isalways subject to, or circumscribed by, the exercise of the courtof its inherent power pursuant to the teachings of the SupremeCourt in Silverio vs. Court of Appeals:21

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should beinterpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may beimpaired ~ven without Court Order, the appropriate executiveofficers or administrative authorities are not armed witharbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can imposelimits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, orpublic health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitivephrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (TheConstitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition,1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travelimposed under the previous regime when there was a TravelProcessing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility totravel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs.Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April1980,97 SeRA 1~

20 Emphasis supplied; citations omitted21 Jttpra

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Binay, et at.SB-16-CRM-0077-0084

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitutionshould by no means be construed as delimiting theinherent power S!.f the Courts to use all means necessaryto carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pendingbefore them, When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Courtor judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other meansnecessary to carry it into effect may be employed by suchCourt or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).

Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bailbut has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appearbefore the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest havebeen issued. Those orders and processes would be renderednugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or toremain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confin~s of thecountry. Holding an accused in a criminal case within thereach of the Courts by preventing his departure from thePhilippines must be considered as a valid restriction onhis right ~o travel so that he may be dealt with inaccordance with law. The offended party in any criminalproceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to theirbest interest that criminal prosecutions should run theircourse and proceed to finality without undue delay, withan accused holding himself amenable at all times to CourtOrders and processes.22

The aforesaid rule was reiterated and expounded by theSupreme Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez,23 thus:

First, it is averred that the hold departure orderwasissued without notice and hearing. Much is made bypetitioner of the fact that there was no showing that a motionto issue a hold departure order was filed by the prosecutionand, instead, the same was issued ex mere motu by theSandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.

Courts possess certain inherent powers which maybe said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction,in addition to those expressly conferred on them. Theseinherent powers are such powers as are necessary for theordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or essential tothe existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well asto the due administration of justice; or are directlyappropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of theirgranted powers; and include the power to maintain the court'sjurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the iitiga~

22 Emphasis and w1derscoring supplied ~A'2.Jsupra rf

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Binay, el at.SB-16-CRM-0077-0084

Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted theincidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, agrant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation,implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essentialto effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws andconstitutional provisions, every regularly constituted courthas the pOpv"erto do all things that are reasonably necessaryfor the administration of justice within the scope of itsjurisdiction'. Hence, demands, matters, or questions ancillaryor incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, andcoming within the above principles, may be taken cognizanceof by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is inaid of its authority over the principal matter, even though thecourt may thus be called on to consider and decide matterswhich, as original causes of action, would not be within itscognizance.

Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to makeinterlocutory orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction. Suchbeing the case, with more reason may a party litigant besubjected to proper coercive measures where he disobeys aproper order, or commits a fraud on the court or the opposingparty, the result of which is that the jurisdiction of the courtwould be' ineffectual. What ought to be done depends uponthe particular circumstances.24

Thus, while the limitations provided for under Section 6,Article III of the 1987 Constitution are not present in thesecriminal cases, such fact does not render the Court powerlessto issue the assailed HDOs. The Court possesses the inherentpower to issue an HDO against a person who is facing a criminalcase before it to maintain its jurisdiction and render it effective.

Also, the fact that the Court issued the assailed HDOs exparte does not infringe on the accused-movants' right to dueprocess of law. As seen from the above-quoted portion ofSantiago, the"petitioner therein likewise assailed the issuanceof an ex parte HDO against her by the Court. The challenge,however, was brushed aside by the Supreme Court because theissuance thereof undeniably emanated from theSandiganbayan's inherent power to use all means necessaryto carry its orders into effect and to preserve and to maintainthe effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the cases filed before itand the pers~n of the accused brought befor~

RESOLUTlONPeople vs. Binay, et al.SB-16-CRM-0077 -0084x--- --- --- ----- ----- ------ ----- - - -- ------- --- ---- x

111. The issuance of the HDOsagainst accused-movantsdoes not negate thepresumption of innocence intheir favor.

Contrary to the accused-movants' claim, the issuance ofthe assailed HDOs against them does not amount to a negationof the presumption of innocence in their favor. To be sure, theonly officeof the HDO is to ensure and protect the exercise bythis Court of its jurisdiction to hear and try these cases. It hasabsolutely no bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accusedwhich can only be determined after trial. -

IV. The Court has the inherentpower tp effectuate andpreserve its jurisdictionwhich can be validlyexercised by the issuance ofthe assailed HDOs.

Accused-movants, knowing the doctrinal value of Silverioand Santiago in resolving their subject motions, assert thatsaid cases do not apply here allegedly because the factualbackdrop of the petitioners therein is not similar t9 these cases.

Conceding for the nonce that the factual circumstances ofthe herein accused-movants are far removed from those of thepetitioners in Silverio and Santiago, this circumstance doesnot foreclose the Court from issuing such processes as may benecessary to effectuate and preserve its jurisdiction.

Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court provides thatwhen by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicialofficer,all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessaryto carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.One (1)of these processes is the HDOwhich is issued to ensurethat the accused "may be dealt with in accordance with law."

The argument of accused-movants that there is nocompelling reason to issue the HDOagainst them because theyare charged with falsification of public documents and/ or

~.J ~!IJJI

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Binay. et at.SB-16-CRM-0077-0084

violations of Section 3 (e)of R.A.No. 3019 which are not heinouscrimes penalized with life imprisonment or its equivalent; and,that they are not flight risks since the people they hold dear,and their assets, are all here and they do not intend to flee thecountry just to evade the pending criminal cases against them,fails to persuade.

The issuance by the Court of an HOO against personscriminally charged before it is not contingent on any a prioridetermination of whether the said accused is a flight risk or not;or whether he / she is charged of a heinous crime; or thathis/her family member / s is/ are in the country; or whether theaccused has assets herein; or that he / she had evaded or defiedany issued writs and processes of the Court. Likewise, theissuance by the Court of HOOs does not depend qn whether anaccused has shown or displayed a tendency or propensity toevade or disobey any of its lawful orders and/ or writs.

Verily, the only condition to the issuance by the Court ofan HOO is the filing of the criminal Information before it whichthereby vests the Court with jurisdiction over the case. Once acomplaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of thecase such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of theaccused rests on the sound discretion of the court.25 It is thebest and sale judge on what to do with the case before it.26

Finally, all the herein accused-movants have been allowedto post bail. It is thus with more reason that' the Court mayrestrict their right to travel pursuant to the teachings of theSupreme Court in Santiago, where the Supreme Courtreiterated its ruling in Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals,27 thatcourts have the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail fromleaving the Philippines:

It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail whichwe have declared legally valid and complete despite theabsence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by reason ofthe peculiar circumstances and grounds hereinbeforeenunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the aforeciteddoctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligationsassumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herselfamenable at all times to the orders and processes of thecourt, she may legally be prohibited from leaving /7

25 Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SeRA 462 (1987) / I'J. /I J /26 id27142 seRA 149 (1986)

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Binay, et al.SB-16-CRM-0077-0084

country during the pendency of the case. This was theruling we handed down in Manotoc, Jr. us. Court of Appeals, etal., to the effect that:

A court has the power to prohibit aperson admitted to bail from leaving thePhilippines. This is a necessary consequence ofthe nature and function of a bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Courtdefines bail as the security required and given forthe release of a person who is in custody of thelaw, that he will appear before any court in whichhis appearance may be required as stipulated inthe bail bond or recognizance.

Its object is to relieve the accused ofimprisonment and the state of the burden ofkeeping him, pending the trial, and at the sametime, to put the accused as much under thepower of the court as if he were in custody of theproper officer, and to secure the appearance ofthe accused so as to answer the call of the courtand do what the law may require of him.

The condition imposed upon petitionerto make himself available at all timeswhenever the court requires his presenceoperates as a valid restriction on his right totravel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising,61 Phil. 404 (1935):

... the result of the obligationassumed by appellee (surety) to hold theaccused amenable at all times to theorders and processes of the lower court,was to prohibit said accused fromleaving the jurisdiction of thePhilippines, because, otherwise, saidorders and processes will be nugatory,.and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of thecourts from which they issued does notextend beyond that of the Philippinesthey would have no binding forceoutside of said jurisdiction.

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leavethe Philippines without sufficient reason, he maybe placed beyond the reach of the eour~

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Binay, el al.SB-16-CRM-0077-0084X------ ------- ------------- --------- - -- ----- - ----x

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit thefollowing:

1. accused Lorenza P. Amores' Motion for Reconsideration[Re: Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 2016J datedMarch 30,2016;

2. accused Manolito N. Dyaco's Motion for Reconsideration[Re: Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 2016J datedMarch 31, 201Q;

3. accused Cecilio P. Lim's Motion for Reconsideration [Re:Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 20 16Jdated March 30,2016;

4. accused Nelia A. Barlis' Motion for Reconsideration [Re:Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 2016] dated March 31,2016;

5. accused Rodel R. Nayve's Motion for Reconsideration [Re:Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 2016] dated March 30,2016; and

6. accused Eleno M. Mendoza, Jr.'s Motion forReconsideration IRe: Hold Departure Order dated February 26,2016] dated March 31,2016.

ARO M. CPresidi S Ice

Chairperson

UE ~~RTIRESAssociate Justice

E T. ANDEZAssociate Justice