Upload
john-robert-sam-juan
View
133
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
DESCRIPTION
mosquedo case about aerial spraying
Citation preview
POSITION PAPER
PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS AND EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION INC.
The Court Appeals is correct in ruling that Ordinance 0309-07 constituted an
unreasonable exercise of police power.
There is no question that it is within the power of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Davao City to enact such ordinance (Section 16 or the General
Welfare Clause, and under Section 458 of the Local Government Code) as such
involves a measure with a lawful subject, that is, the protection of the public health
and the environment against the alleged harmful effects of aerial spraying of
pesticides and fungicides. However, in the exercise of such power, the means
employed must also be reasonable. It must not unduly be oppressive to
individuals. In this case, it has been shown as will be discussed below that such
means is unreasonable and unduly oppressive to individuals, particularly our
client, the Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters.
I. Section 5 of the Ordinance requiring a period of 3 months to shift from aerial
spraying to ground spraying is “unreasonable, oppressive and impossible to
comply with”
Section 5 of the Ordinance is unreasonable because in effect it criminalizes
aerial spraying even as it would be physically impossible for the banana growers
to be able to configure their banana plantations for ground spraying within such
insufficient period of 3 months. As correctly ruled by the respondent Court of
Appeals, “[I}n view of the infrastructural requirements, it was physically be
impossible for petitioners-appellants (banana growers) to carry out a carefully
planned configuration of vast hectares of banana plantations and be able to
actually adopt truck-mounted boom spraying within 3 months. To compel
petitioners-appellants (banana growers) to abandon aerial spraying in favor of
manual or backpack spraying or sprinkler spraying within 3 months puts
petitioners-appellants (banana growers) in a vicious dilemma between protecting
its investments and the health of its workers, on the one hand, and the threat of
prosecution if they refuse to comply with the imposition”
Furthermore “the 3-month transition period is insufficient not only in
acquiring and gearing up the plantation workers and safety appurtenances, nut
more importantly in reviewing safety procedures for manual or backpack spraying
and in training such workers for the purpose. Also, the engineering works for a
sprinkler system in vast hectares of banana plantations could not possibly be
1
completed within such period, considering that safety and efficient factors need to
be considered in structure re-designing.”
Section 5 also, in effect, compels petitioners-appellants (banana growers) to
abandon aerial spraying without affording them enough time to convert to other
spraying practices. This would petitioners-appellants (banana growers) from being
able to fertilize their plantation with essential vitamins and minerals, aside from
applying the needed pesticides and fungicides to control if not eliminate the threat
of plant diseases. Such the would prejudice the operation of plantations, and the
economic repercussions thereof may lead to shutting down the venture of
petitioners-appellants (banana growers).
II. Even assuming arguendo that it was physically possible for the petitioners-
appellants (banana growers) to shift to other modes of spraying, still the
Ordinance in question is invalid because there is no scientific basis for banning
aerial spraying
There is no scientific basis that aerial spraying of pesticides or fungicides
poses a serious threat to the health and livelihood of people and to the
environment. The oppositors argue that since the Court of Appeals ruled that the
issue of aerial spraying as inimical to public health and livelihood has not been
factually settled, then the presumption of validity must be applied. This is
untenable. The presumption of validity is inapplicable in this case. Legislation
must be based on hard facts. Inasmuch as it would prejudice petitioners-appellants
(banana growers) if such Ordinance is not based on hard evidence to show that
aerial spraying is inimical to public safety, then the burden of proof is on the
Sanggunian to prove otherwise.
III. The Ordinance violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
The Ordinance violates the equal protection clause because it is a sweeping
importation against the aerial spraying of all forms of substances, not only
pesticides or fungicides but including water and all forms of chemicals, regardless
of its elements, composition or degree of safety. As the Court of Appeals
correctly held, “[It] does not classify which substances are prohibited from being
aerially even as reasonable distinctions would be made in terms of the hazards,
safety or beneficial effects of liquid substances to the public health, livelihood and
the environment. The measure also fails to differentiate among classes of
pesticides or fungicides, and does not distinguish levels of concentration of such
2
substances when aerially sprayed, such that even substances which are beneficial
to and enhance agricultural production are covered by the ban.
IV. The means employed provided for in the Ordinance has no relation to the
purpose sought to be achieved
The means to enforce the ordinance has no reasonable relation to the evil
sought to be avoided, which is the alleged harmful effects of pesticides on public
health and the environment, because instead of regulation the substances sprayed,
the measure bans aerial spraying which is the means to achieve the purpose, hence,
only a method of application.
In effect, the Ordinance forbids the aerial spraying even of vitamins or
other substances like water which are commonly known as safe and which
normally enhance the growth and harvest thereby compromising agricultural
productivity. This amounts to an arbitrary intrusion into the banana growers’ and
exporters’ prerogatives in pursuing a lawful endeavor and in protecting its
investments, exceeding what must be fairly required by the legitimate demands of
public welfare
V. The Ordinance is tantamount to confiscation of property without due process of
law
Section 6 of the Ordinance provides that “all agricultural entities must
provide fro a 30-meter buffer zone within the boundaries of their agricultural
farms / plantations.” This is an unreasonable police measure as it violates the due
process clause in that it is tantamount to confiscation of property without due
process of law.
The requirement under Section 6 apparently makes no fair distinction as to
the area or size of the plantation over which the buffer zone would be established.
It imposes a fixed 30-meter buffer zone without regard to the size of the
landholdings or plantations. Owners of farms, even those with areas of perhaps 1
or 2 hectares, or maybe lesser, which could meagerly accommodate a low-budget
activity, would then cede portions thereof for such purpose, downsizing the area to
be cultivated and constricting further the viability of their farmlands for profitable
endeavors. Thus the requirement violates due process because it unreasonably
deprives plantation owners of the lawful and beneficial use of such areas to be
ceded, without just compensation.
Moreover, the area to be ceded is not noxious property or has not been used
for noxious purpose. Farms and banana plantations per se are not noxious to the
3
public welfare. Hence, police power cannot be invoked to justify a compulsion for
plantation owners to cede a portion of their property as a buffer zone without the
payment of just compensation. So, Section 6 constitute unlawful taking without
due process.
BALISI, REODY ANTHONY M.
PINEDA, GIULIA FRANCESCA
4