Moscow Defense BriefYour Professional Guide Inside # 4, 2010

India Rising

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 1

#4 (22), 2010

PUBLISHER

CAST Director & PublisherRuslan Pukhov

Editor-in-Chief Mikhail Barabanov

Advisory EditorsKonstantin Makienko

Alexey Pokolyavin

ResearchersRuslan Aliev

Polina Temerina

Dmitry Vasiliev

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Translated by: Ivan Khokhotva

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Cover Photo: Dr. A. Sivathanu Pillai, a distinguished scientist and Chief

Controller, R&D, DRDO is also the Chief Executive Officer and Managing

Director of BrahMos Aerospace. Dr. Pillai evolved the unique concept of the

most successful Russian-Indian joint venture BrahMos, which is a world

leader in the family of cruise missiles.

Photo by: BrahMos

© Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010

Printed in Russia

CONTENTSDefense IndustriesRussian-Indian Defense Industry Integration: a View from Russia 2

BrahMos Project – the Golden Standard of Russian-Indian Defense Cooperation 4

Arms TradeRussian Arms Trade with India: Looking for New Opportunities 6

Russian Arms Sales to China: Flat at Best 7

Military-Technical Cooperation between Russia and Central Asia 9

Russian Naval Exports Take Off 13

ProcurementEvolution of the Russian Defense Procurement System 15

Armed ForcesBears and Blackjacks Are Back. What Next? 19

Facts & FiguresRussian Armed Forces Abroad 24

Our Authors 27

Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief2Russian-Indian Defense Industry Integration:

a View from Russia

Defense Industries

Russian-Indian Defense Industry Integration: a View from RussiaKonstantin Makienko

Defense industries going transnationalIt is an undeniable fact that national defense markets

and industries around the globe are gradually merging into transnational conglomerations. That fundamental shift is manifesting itself in the following ways:

• Leading countries are pooling their efforts to pursue bilateral and multilateral programs of development, manufacture, procurement and marketing of complex and expensive weapons systems. These programs include the JSF/F-35 fighter, Eurofighter/Typhoon, the Franco-Italian FREMM frigate, and several others.

• Leading defense contractors are merging into bi-national and multinational defense conglomerates, such as the pan-European giants EADS, Thales, MBDA and Eurocopter.

• The national identity of some leading independent contractors is becoming blurred. Britain’s BAE Systems and Rolls Royce, for example, derive most of their revenues from the US defense market and have even considered moving their headquarters to the United States. Both have essentially become British-American companies rather than purely British.

• In another sign of gradual merger between the national defense markets, arms technology transfer regimes are becoming more liberal. Some nations have formed relations of privileged partnership in mutual arms trade.There are several major reasons for the defense

industries and markets going transnational: • The European defense markets are stagnating and in

some cases even shrinking. US defense spending is also likely to fall in the coming years. Most of the growth will therefore come from the developing countries, especially China, India and Russia.

• The cost of developing new weapons systems is skyrocketing. The unit cost of each complex system such as a multirole fighter jet or a warship is also rising all the time.

• Falling defense spending means that fewer units of each system are being ordered, pushing the per-unit costs higher. In a vicious circle, escalating unit costs drive the number of units sold down, which in turn pushes the unit costs up.

As the defense markets are shrinking, the cost of developing new weapons systems is going up. The industry has responded by increasingly going transnational. That increases the size of the market (which now stretches across national borders) and allows financial and technical risks to be spread among several partners. The result is big transnational defense conglomerations which could well end up turning into common defense markets.

Anglo-American and European conglomerations

The two most closely knit conglomerations are the Anglo-American (trans-Atlantic or, in the wider sense, Anglo-Saxon) and the continental European.

The former is manifested in the uniquely privileged position of British defense companies on the US market, and of the American companies on the British market. In the financial year of 2008 British corporations won 14.4bn dollars worth of Pentagon contracts, which is about 10 per cent of the US defense procurement budget. In 2010 London and Washington signed an agreement that significantly eases the transfer of sensitive military technologies between the two countries. That will provide further impetus to the integration of the two countries’ defense industries and increase their mutual market presence. What is more, the British-American defense conglomeration is becoming the focus of a wider, albeit looser Anglo-Saxon conglomeration, which includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand and to some extent South Africa. It is also becoming the center of gravity for some continental European nations, such as the Netherlands, Sweden and Spain, plus Japan, a traditional military-political satellite of the United States.

Europe, meanwhile, is pushing forward with the initiative to create a common defense market of the European Union. Brussels insists that all the national markets of EU member states should be opened to all European defense contractors. It wants to get rid of national protectionism and introduce uniform procurement procedures. It is also trying to step up joint weapons development and procurement programs under EU auspices. There are two main bodies spearheading that effort. One is the European

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 3Russian-Indian Defense Industry Integration:

a View from Russia

Defense Industries

Defense Agency (EDA), which was formed in 2004 and now includes all EU members except Denmark. The other is the Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR). The latter is involved in several joint European projects, including the A400M, Tiger, Boxer, FREMM, Aster SAM system, etc. The EDA, meanwhile, overseas joint R&D in areas such as countermeasures against improvised explosive devices, news methods of WMD detection, and information network systems. The formation of the common European defense market is in its early stages. But there is a lot of political will in Brussels to speed up that process, which is certain to bring another wave of integration and mergers in the European defense industry.

It is important to note that in both of the examples above the increasingly transnational nature of the defense industries and markets is underpinned by special political relations between the countries involved. The Anglo-Saxon conglomeration is based on the special military and political relationship between Britain and America, while the European conglomeration is a product of integration within the EU.

Russia looking for partnersThe modest size of the Russian economy will inevitably

force the country to seek partnership with other countries on big defense projects. In some areas that partnership is already happening. Russian defense contractors have started to fit imported systems onto their aircraft and armor platforms exported to third countries. There have also been one-off weapons imports for the needs of the Russian armed forces. But if Russia wants to remain an important player in the international arms trade, it will have to either join one of the existing defense industry alliances or build a new one. If it were to choose the former option, the most logical course of action would be to step up the existing contacts with some European nations, primarily France and Italy. But Russia is entirely unlikely ever to become a full partner in the nascent European defense conglomeration. The political

preconditions for such partnership are simply not there. Defense industry alliances are always underpinned by formal or informal military-political unions. Even the closest of Russia’s contacts in Europe are at best partners, but certainly not allies.

Meanwhile, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) countries cannot be viewed as promising defense industry partners. They have neither the required technology, nor the resources to develop it, and their national defense markets are too small anyway. Military these countries are a strategic liability for Russian rather than an asset, and consumers of security rather than producers.

It appears, therefore, that the only realistic partner for defense industry integration with Russia is India.

First, the two countries are not military allies in the formal sense – but their military-political interests coincide completely. Both want to contain the rapidly growing China, and both want to prevent the expansion of fundamentalist Islamic extremism.

Second, Russia and India already have a lot of experience of defense industry cooperation. Some of their joint projects have certainly been more successful than others. The heavy long-range supersonic BrahMos missile has become a big hit, whereas the medium transport aircraft (MTA) project is languishing. But India’s decision to join the Russian fifth-generation fighter program has been a major milestone. This is the first joint project in which the two sides are full partners and fully share all the risks.

Finally, India and Russia have very similar administrative and business cultures. That may not be such a blessing in terms of the efficiency of their joint projects – but at least the two partners will better understand each other’s inner workings.

India’s defense market is very open to competition, and the policy of its government is not to rely too much on any single supplier. The task of creating a common Russian-Indian defense market is therefore very complex – possibly to the point of being unrealistic. But for now, India remains the best and, very likely, the only possible candidate for the role of Russia’s strategic defense industry partner.

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief4

Defense Industries

BrahMos Project – the Golden Standard of Russian-Indian Defense Cooperation

BrahMos Project – the Golden Standard of Russian-Indian Defense CooperationRuslan Pukhov

Russia and India have two joint defense projects under their proverbial belt. One is BrahMos, a jointly designed,

manufactured and marketed advanced heavy medium range supersonic anti-ship missile. The other is MTA, a multirole medium-range transport aircraft. The third big project was launched in December 2010 during President Medvedev’s visit to India, when the two countries signed a contract to design the Indian version of the fifth-generation FGFA fighter jet. On the MTA program precious little progress has been made so far. BrahMos, on the other hand, has been an unqualified success. The numerous benefits it has already yielded include:

• Commercial profit for both partners; • A tangible improvement in the fighting ability of the

Indian Army, Navy and Air Force; • Development of new technologies, which has been

especially important to the Indians; • A chance for Russia’s NPO Mashinostroeniya corporation

to put its potential for innovation to good use; • Valuable experience of overcoming various legal,

organizational and financial hurdles, which will be invaluable during the implementation of other bilateral programs, including of course the FGFA project.

For India, BrahMos has become one of the first standardized weapons systems which can be deployed by all three armed services – the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The Indian Navy was the initial customer for the new missile, which can be carried by a variety of naval platforms. These include the majority of the existing and future surface ships. The first ships to be equipped with BrahMos were Project 61ME (Kashin-Mod class) destroyers. Two of them, the Ranvir and the Ranvijay, will also be fitted with 8-missile vertical launch systems. Other ships that will carry BrahMos include three Project 15A (Kolkata class) destroyers now being built in India, the future Project 15B destroyers, future Project 17A frigates and three Project 11356M (Talwar class Batch 2) frigates now being built for India at the Yantar Shipyards in Kaliningrad. The future Talwar class Batch 3 frigates will also be equipped with the new missile, regardless of where they will be built. In addition to surface ships, the Indian Navy plans to deploy BrahMos on submarines and possibly on land-based patrol aircraft. The suitable airborne

carriers include the Russian Il-38SD ASW aircraft and, in a few years’ time, the Boeing P-8I Poseidon ASW aircraft which India has already ordered in the United States.

The Indian Army has bought hundreds BrahMos missiles in the mobile land-based configuration. They will be used not only against ships but also as a high-precision weapon against land targets such as command posts and key infrastructure facilities (the Block II LACM version). The Indian Army has ordered 134 mobile anti-ship land-based BrahMos Block I missiles in 2006-2009 and another 240 land-attack BrahMos Block II in 2010, for a total of about 3bn dollars.

Meanwhile, the Indian Air Force is awaiting the completion of the development of an air-launched version of BrahMos, to be deployed primarily with the Su-30MKI fighters. The Su-30MKI-BrahMos weapons system will be a truly lethal combination. First deliveries are expected in 2012. At some point the Indian Air Force will also receive the BrahMos Block II version, which is designed to engage land targets. It is quite likely that the 126 medium multirole fighters for which India has announced a contract will also be fitted with BrahMos missiles. The F/A-18, Rafale and Typhoon fighters can all serve as carries.

The missile’s ability to be launched from a wide range of platforms and engage a variety of targets has generated very large sales. At present the demand of the Indian armed forces is estimated at 1,000 such missiles at the very least. In fact, the need to fulfill the Indian orders is holding back exports to other countries. The most conservative estimate for the size of the market for BrahMos throughout the life of the project is 2,000 missiles, worth over 10bn dollars.

For Russia, the success of BrahMos has improved the chances of winning Indian contracts for aviation and naval platforms. It is usually the exports of platforms that normally drive the sales of weapons to be fitted onto those platforms. But in the case of BrahMos, it is the other way around: the missile is driving the sales of aircraft and submarines that can carry it. For example, the Rubin design bureau is working on a special version of the new Russian Project 677 (Amur class) sub that uses the anti-ship version of BrahMos as its main weapon. The sub has a good chance of winning the recently announced 10bn-dollar Indian contract for six new submarines.

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 5BrahMos Project – the Golden Standard of Russian-Indian

Defense Cooperation

Defense Industries

Perhaps most importantly, the BrahMos Aerospace Ltd. joint venture has become a vehicle for future implementation of other Russian-Indian projects, on an even large scale and with greater Indian participation. The company is known to

be already working on new hypersonic missile. But the unique experience accumulated as part of the BrahMos program since 1998 has paved the way for even more ambitious goals, including new strategic ballistic and cruise missiles.

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief6Russian Arms Trade with India: Looking for New Opportunities

Arms Trade

Russian Arms Trade with India: Looking for New OpportunitiesKonstantin Makienko

The Indian defense market is growing at a rapid pace – but competition for Indian contracts is also becoming more

heated. Back in the 1960s and 1970s the Soviet Union was almost the sole player on that market. But then in the 1980s India placed a large order for French Mirage 2000 fighter jets and German Project 209 submarines. In the 1990s some big Indian contracts were awarded to Israel. Finally, in recent years the United States entered the Indian market with their C-130J and C-17 transports, as well as the P-8I Poseidon anti-submarine aircraft. The American presence looks set to continue to grow, meaning that all the large international arms exporters except for China are now competing for Indian custom.

In this increasingly crowded market Russia should respond by moving from straight arms sales to joint projects with Indian companies. It should also start looking for new niches where Russian defense contractors would face very little competition.

The most promising and lucrative of these niches where Russia could reign uncontested is sub-strategic weapons systems and the building of a proper nuclear triad, which the Indian nuclear forces currently lack. Cooperation on sub-strategic systems is already taking place. Russia is about to deliver to India a multipurpose nuclear-powered Project 971I submarine for a 10-year lease. Further cooperation in this area would undoubtedly be in the two countries’ mutual interest. Russia has a mothballed frame of another Project 971I sub sitting at the Amur shipyard. If that sub were to be completed and handed over to the Indian Navy, the country would find itself in possession of a pair of very capable submarines, far superior to anything China has got. As Beijing continues to improve its aircraft-carrying capability, India will need more nuclear-powered submarines armed with advanced anti-ship missiles. It is in Russia’s commercial and military-political interests to offer the Indian Navy all the assistance

it requires, from building submarines (Project 971 or the aircraft-carrier hunters of Project 949) at Russian shipyards to helping the Indians build indigenously designed subs in their own country.

Very attractive commercial opportunities would open up if Russia were to become fully involved in the development of a proper naval component of Indian’s nuclear deterrent. Russian designers and manufacturers could take part in developing and building high-precision intermediate range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) capable of taking out not only cities but also heavily protected military command and infrastructure facilities. Russia could also help India develop the required submarine platforms, i.e. SLBM carriers.

The two could also work together on a new medium-range ground-based ballistic missile. If such a project were to be implemented, India would receive an extremely effective instrument of deterrence against China. Russia, meanwhile, is bound by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and is not allowed to deploy such weapons – but at the very least it could restore the requisite engineering skills and expertise.

Finally, India and Russia could make use of the existing experience of cooperation between their aerospace industries on projects such as the Su-30MKI and FGFA. In the longer time frame, they could partner on a future long-range aircraft (the PAK DA program). In Russia PAK DA could replace the Tu-160 missile carriers. For India such an aircraft could become the third element of the nuclear triad and a platform for conventional high-precision airborne weapons. The project could realistically begin some time in 2020. By that time both countries will have accumulated useful experience of cooperation on the FGFA program, while their economies will have become strong enough to finance such a complex and expensive venture.

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 7Russian Arms Sales to China:

Flat at Best

Arms Trade

Russian Arms Sales to China: Flat at BestKonstantin Makienko

Chinese orders for Russian weapons have been in steady decline over the past five years. The last contract for

Russian military aircraft – 34 Il-76 transports and 4 Il-78MK aerial refueling tankers – was signed back in 2005, but the deal then fell through. The last large naval contract, for two Project 956EM destroyers and eight Project 636M submarines, was signed in 2002. Deliveries were completed in 2006. Since then the Chinese Navy custom was limited to ship-based SAM systems and deck helicopters.

In 2007 China lost to India its position as Russia’s biggest defense customer in terms of weapons transfers. In terms of new orders placed, it is now fourth of even fifth behind India, Venezuela, Algeria and, in the last year or two, Vietnam. Russian defense contractors have complained that the Chinese are driving a very hard bargain when discussing new contracts, and seem to have lost all interest in pursuing closer defense industry ties with Russia.

Nevertheless, some Russian officials claim that the decline in Chinese orders was nothing more than a lull, which they say is about to end. They have been especially optimistic following Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov’s visit to Beijing in November 2010, where he took part in a meeting of the Russian-Chinese intergovernmental commission for defense industry cooperation. It was reported that the Chinese had expressed interest in buying new Russian aviation engines codenamed “product 117S”, as well as S-400 SAM systems and Il-476 transports. The atmosphere at the negotiations has also improved: after five years of cold aloofness, the Chinese have suddenly become friendly and cooperative.

In our opinion, however, that friendlier atmosphere at the talks is so far the only sign – and a rather inconsequential one – of the supposed new era in defense industry cooperation between the two countries. The fundamental reasons that are making said cooperation less attractive to both sides not only remain strong but are actually becoming even more compelling. One of these reasons is the steady growth in Russia’s domestic arms procurement programs. Another is the rapid diversification of Russian arms exports over the past five years. The Russian defense industry has at least 40bn dollars worth of outstanding export contracts to fulfill, in addition to orders from Russia’s own armed forces. The Chinese are no longer the only game in town, and Russia can now afford to be very cautious about transferring advanced

weapons technologies, even if that caution costs it a sale or two. Meanwhile, China’s own defense industry has made great progress over the past five years. It is now more than capable of satisfying almost all the needs of the Chinese armed forces. Furthermore, it has become internationally competitive in several key market segments, including fighter and trainer jets, military transports, frigates and destroyers.

Detailed analysis of China’s arms imports requirements also leaves no room for optimism about any large new Chinese contracts for the Russian defense industry. Speaking about aircraft engines one has to remember that the Chinese have kept buying them even after 2005. The latest contract was signed in January 2009, when China bought 122 AL-31 FN engines for its J-10 fighters. Beijing also continues to buy the RD-33 engines for the FC-1 fighter jets. That means that any new sales generated by “product 117S” are unlikely to lead to any radical increase in Russian exports to China. At the very best, Beijing will continue to buy 100-120 engines once every two or three years for the heavier versions of its J-10 and J-11 fighters. And it is far from clear that letting the Chinese anywhere near the 117S engine, which was developed for the Russian fifth-generator fighter program, would actually be in Russia’s national interest.

Sales of SAM systems to Beijing have also remained steady after 2005. Last deliveries on recent contracts were made in 2010, when China received the last few of the fifteen S-300PMU-2 batteries it had ordered a few years previously. It is highly unlikely that any S-400 SAM systems will be sold to China until 2015 at the earliest. The Russian supplier is working flat out to fulfill the orders of the Russian MoD and has no spare capacity for any export contracts. The S-400 is in high demand internationally, so even when exports commence, China will not necessarily be the first country to get hold of this weapon.

Finally, the reported Chinese interest in the Il-476 transports is not in itself a clear evidence of a breakthrough in Russian-Chinese defense industry cooperation. Russia is the only country that can supply the strategic military transports the Chinese Air Force needs, and Il-476 is the only suitable model. The problem is, prospects for the launch of production of this plane in Ulyanovsk remain highly uncertain. The first prototype of the Il-476 has yet to take off for its maiden flight, meaning that mass production is at least five to seven years away.

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief8

The “lull” in the flow of Chinese arms contracts began after China stopped buying big and expensive aviation and naval platforms, such as the Su-30 fighter jets, surface ships and submarines. That lull can only end if and when large new contracts are signed for other big and expensive

platforms such as the Su-35 fighter jet or the deck-based Su-33 fighters. Any new orders for aircraft engines, assault landing helicopters or airborne weapons will be enough merely to keep the volume of Chinese arms contracts from shrinking even further.

Russian Arms Sales to China: Flat at Best

Arms Trade

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 9Russian Arms Sales to China:

Flat at Best

Arms Trade

Military-Technical Cooperation between Russia and Central AsiaMikhail Barabanov

The nature of Russia’s military relations with the five Central Asian nations (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan) can best be described as postcolonial. Russia plays the role of a rich and developed former colonial master, and the Central Asian states of the poor and benighted former provinces. As part of this relationship, Russia helps the republics build their national armies by transferring new and used military hardware; providing various military supplies, as well as repair and maintenance services; training military specialists; and in a some cases propping up the weakest and poorest states (Tajikistan and, to a lesser extent, Kyrgyzstan) by keeping Russian troops there. Russia has maintained its military presence, in some shape of form, in each of the five Central Asian nations. That in itself is a form of Russian military aide to these countries, which brings them substantial security benefits.

The precise nature of Moscow’s relations with each of the five republics is different. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, both poor and internally unstable, are heavily dependent on Russian help in building up their military capability. The authoritarian Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan try to pursue an independent defense policy, maneuvering between Russia and the West. Both have some independent capability to develop their own armed forces, and the money to buy new weapons. That is especially true of the oil and gas-rich Turkmenistan. Finally, Kazakhstan, with its half-Slavic population and traditional links with Russia, is forced to stick to a pro-Russian (“integrationist”) defense and foreign policy course. But at the same time Astana is trying to build up partnership with other countries, and moving cautiously towards greater independence from Moscow. It also has the financial and industrial capability to buy and upgrade weapons without relying entirely on Russia.

Meanwhile, Moscow continues to view Central Asia as its own back yard. But the region is on the periphery of Russia’s interests, and the Kremlin is clearly trying not to get too involved in any regional conflicts there. These two conflicting motivations translate into a clear lack of direction in Russia’s foreign policy in the region.

Militarily, the main Russian policy instrument in Central Asia is the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This military-political alliance was set up by several

CIS nations who signed the Collective Security Treaty in Tashkent on May 15, 1992. Of the five Central Asian states, only Turkmenistan, which has declared a policy of “neutrality”, is not a member. Uzbekistan suspended its membership in 1999, but then became a full member once again in 2006. CSTO is also a mechanism for defense industry cooperation. As part of this arrangement, Russia supplies new and used military hardware to members of the alliance at discount prices (i.e. the prices charged by the manufacturers to Russia’s own armed forces). It also offers repair, maintenance and training services. The main threat, both internal and foreign, faced by the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union is Islamic extremism. That threat is the main reason why these countries are keen to have Russia’s support.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, four of the five newly independent Central Asian republics (all except Tajikistan) inherited the Soviet army units stationed on their territory. These units were transferred under the jurisdiction of the new national governments, and became the core of the new national armed forces. However, the numbers of soldiers and hardware inherited by three of the four republics (all except Uzbekistan) was clearly in excess of their actual needs. As a result, for many years these three countries did not have any real need for military procurement programs. Their requirements were amply served by the fragments of the Soviet military machine they inherited. It is only very recently that the two richest republics, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, have begun to upgrade or replace their aged and obsolete Soviet military hardware. Meanwhile, Tajikistan, which was essentially in a state of civil war in 1992, had to build its armed forces almost from scratch, relying heavily on Russian assistance.

Culturally, the armies of all five Central Asian republics stick close to the Soviet/Russian military tradition and follow Russian military standards. That means that Russia has an inherent advantage whenever Central Asian defense contracts are up for grabs. Moscow is set to retain for a long time to come its dominant position on the weapons markets of the entire former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, even its closest allies among the CIS states will gradually move towards greater diversification in their defense procurement in an effort to avoid total dependence on Russia. This means that even under the most favorable circumstances Moscow will have to work hard if it wants to retain its dominant positions on

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief10Military-Technical Cooperation between

Russia and Central Asia

Arms Trade

the arms markets of Central Asia and especially Kazakhstan, the richest of the five republics.

It must be said that Russia’s arms trade with the Central Asian states is a difficult subject to analyze. Information released to the public domain is scant. The authoritarian and traditionalist Central Asian states tend to be very secretive where military matters are involved. Only Kazakhstan is a bit more open with its arms imports statistics. Information from Russian sources is also scarce – most of it comes from individual defense companies which have won Central Asian contracts. Some data can be gleaned from Russia’s annual reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, although these reports are clearly incomplete. Deliveries agreed as part of the CSTO arrangements are also kept secret more often than not; that is especially true of used hardware transfers and maintenance contracts. As a result, the picture of Russian arms supplies to Central Asia often relies on circumstantial evidence and is necessarily fragmented, patchy and incomplete.

KazakhstanKazakhstan is a member of the CSTO and maintains

very close military relations with Russia. President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has kept a firm grip on the country ever since independence, is well aware of Kazakhstan’s ethnic composition and geopolitical situation. He pursues a careful and well-balanced policy, always trying not to alienate Moscow. The main potential threat the republic is facing is the possibility of ethnic strife between the ethnic Kazakhs and Russians. Growing production of oil and gas in recent years has buoyed the Kazakh economy and enabled Astana to spend more on its armed forces.

The Kazakh Armed Forces was created in 1992, when the government of the newly independent republic took under its jurisdiction units of the Soviet Turkestan Military District stationed on its territory, including most of the strength of the 40th Army. Kazakhstan also inherited the 78th Tank Division and the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, the Turkestan District Military Training Center, three non-deployed motorized rifle divisions, and several smaller formations. In addition, the country was left with large numbers of heavy Soviet weaponry removed from the European part of the Soviet Union to Kazakhstan in 1989-1990 ahead of the signing of the CFE Treaty. As a result, Kazakhstan found itself in possession of 3,700 main battle tanks (T-72, T-64 and T-62), 4,700 armored combat vehicles and 8,100 pieces of artillery. Such a large surplus of weaponry meant that Astana did not have to worry about procurement for a very long time. The country had also inherited a large chunk of the Soviet Air Force, including most of the strength of the 73rd Air Army and 40 Tu-95MS Bear-H strategic bombers based in Semipalatinsk.

In 1994 Kazakhstan agreed to transfer these 40 bombers to Russia, along with 240 Kh-55 (AS-15) airborne cruise missiles. In return, over the period of 1995-2002 Astana received from Moscow 21 MiG-29 fighters, 38 Su-27 fighters, 14 Su-25 ground attack aircraft, 17 L-39 trainer jets, plus one each of the Il-76MD, Tu-134Sh and Tu-154B planes. As part of the exchange, Russia also gave Kazakhstan some other modern weaponry, including the 300mm Smerch MRL systems, which the country did not have at all. In 1996 Kazakhstan also received, on a commercial basis, a battalion of S-300PMU (SA-10) SAM systems, which was previously stationed in East Germany and returned to the Soviet Union in 1990. In 2000 Astana signed a contract for eight battalions of S-300PS and S-300PM systems from the Russian army stock. These were delivered free of charge, as compensation for all the military hardware (mostly the strategic bombers) removed from Kazakhstan to Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union.

After the Kazakh economy started to improve in 2001 the country stepped up weapons upgrade and procurement programs. In view of the shortage of wheeled armored vehicles, the Kazakh MoD placed an order in Russia for 146 BTR-80A armored personnel carriers (first deliveries made in 2004), one BTR-80 and 35 new Vystrel armored wheeled vehicles made by KamAZ (deliveries began in 2007). Meanwhile, the Kazakh Interior Ministry bought a batch of Tigr light armored vehicles; first deliveries were made in 2009.

Starting from 2002 the country has placed an order for 29 new Mi-17 helicopters and three new Ansat-U training helicopters. It has also contracted Russian companies to repair and upgrade 10 MiG-31 fighters. Astana plans to buy more of the Mi-17 helicopters, and has shown interest in the new Mi-28NE attack helicopters. It has been in talks with Russia about buying two battalions of S-300PMU-2 (SA-20) SAM systems, and reportedly intends to acquire S-400 (SA-21) SAM systems at some point in the future. A shipyard in the Kazakh river port of Uralsk has begun building Russian-designed patrol gunboats for the Kazakh Navy and planned build two Russian-designed Project 20970 Katran class fast attack missile craft in 2011-2012. There are also plans to place an order for larger ships to be built in Russia itself.

At the same time, Kazakhstan is trying to secure other sources of modern weaponry. It has worked to establish contacts in this area with the United States and European countries, Turkey, Israel, Singapore and South Korea, as well as Belarus and Ukraine.

KyrgyzstanKyrgyzstan, a sparsely populated country and poor

even by the local standards, suffers from chronic political

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 11Military-Technical Cooperation between

Russia and Central Asia

Arms Trade

instability, which is compounded by internal regional divisions and border disputes with the neighboring Uzbekistan. The country has also seen some armed Islamic extremist activity on its territory. Kyrgyz security policy is closely coordinated with Russia. The republic is a member of the CSTO, and its government has been increasingly keen to secure Russian military support and assistance. There is a Russian airbase near the Kyrgyz town of Kant. The government in Bishkek has also allowed the United States and other NATO members the use of its military bases for the operation in Afghanistan.

The core of the Kyrgyz army is made of the former Soviet units of the Turkestan Military District stationed on its territory. That includes the 8th Guard Motorized Rifle Division, the 68th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 5th Central Training Facility of the Soviet Air Force, which trained foreign air force pilots. The country has proved unable properly to maintain all this armed strength. The fighting ability of its armed forces is clearly inadequate, and Bishkek is heavily reliant on Moscow’s military assistance. Some Russian weapons have been supplied to Kyrgyzstan as a gift of aid, including three Mi-8MTV helicopters. Russia has also upgraded several Kyrgyz S-125M (SA-3B) SAM systems free of charge. Bishkek has received some military aid from the United States in return for allowing the Americans the use of its military bases. The country has neither the financial resources nor the industrial capability to maintain or upgrade its armed forces. It will therefore remain dependent on handouts from other countries, mainly Russia.

TajikistanTajikistan, the weakest and poorest of all the former

Soviet republics, was plunged into civil war between the government and Islamist insurgents after the fall of the Soviet Union. That war had gradually fizzled out only by the mid-1990s. Because of the civil war, the Soviet 201st Motorized Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan was taken under Russian jurisdiction after the fall of the Soviet Union. It remains in Tajikistan as a Russian military base and the most powerful military force in the country. Tajikistan’s own army coalesced during the war from sundry disjointed armed formations, which were later merged into a single force with the former insurgents as part of the national reconciliation program. As a result, the Tajik army remains a loosely linked collection of relatively weak military formations.

The country is entirely dependent on Russia for weapons and military training. Russia is gradually handing over to the Tajik army some of the hardware of the former 201st Division. It has also supplied helicopters (10 Mi-8MTV utility helicopters in the 1990s), small arms and ammunition. It has restored several Tajik S-125M SAM systems, which are

gradually being upgraded. In 2006 Russia gave Tajikistan two Mi-24P attack helicopters, another two Mi-8MTV helicopters and four L-39 trainer jets. The Tajik army’s fighting ability is expected to continue its slow improvement as Russia gradually hands over the remaining ageing hardware of the former 201st Division. Tajikistan is a member of the CSTO. It is not expected to change its pro-Russian course any time soon, and will likely remain heavily dependent on military assistance from Moscow.

TurkmenistanAfter independence the oil and gas-rich Turkmenistan

became the personal fief of its president, Saparmurat Niyazov, who tried to turn the republic into an eastern emirate. The hallmark of Niyazov’s rule was extreme isolationism. In foreign policy it translated into the declaration of “neutrality”. Domestically the regime cracked down on any dissent and discouraged any contacts with the rest of the world. It tried to distance the country from Russia and minimize any foreign influence. After Niyazov’s death in 2006 his successors have pursued a more moderate line. They have begun gradually to dismantle the more odious policies of the previous government and to pursue closer ties with Russia, including military cooperation.

The core of the Turkmen armed forces was created from several large formations of the Soviet Union’s Turkestan Military District stationed on the republic’s territory. That included the 5th and 53rd Motorized Rifle Divisions, the District Training Center, one non-deployed motorized rifle division and a large force of combat aviation. The Turkmen armed forces has therefore felt no lack of hardware. But Niyazov’s isolationist policies have led to a serious degradation of the republic’s armed forces, compounded by the widespread practice of using soldiers as free labor at state-owned farms and plants. In an effort to avoid any dependence on Russia the former president chose Ukraine as the country’s main supplier of military hardware.

In the last few years before the death of Niyazov his country’s arms trade with Russia was limited to maintenance contracts and supplies of spare parts. But the change of course since 2006, as well as the growing obsolescence of the Turkmen army’s old Soviet-made hardware, have brought Russian defense contractors more Turkmen custom.

The new Turkmen leaders who took over in 2007 have signed several contracts for modern Russian-made weaponry. They have placed an order for 10 T-90S main battle tanks, six 300mm Smerch MRL systems, a batch of BMP-3 armored fighting vehicles and BTR-80A armored personnel carriers, and two Project 12418 (Tarantul V class) light missile corvettes ant two Project 12200 patrol boats. They have also bought a used Project 12421 light missile corvette.

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief12

Arms Trade

Military-Technical Cooperation between Russia and Central Asia

Russian companies have been involved in upgrading the Turkmen army’s S-125 SAM systems. There have also been reports that Turkmenistan has shown interest in the new Russian Mi-28NE attack helicopter. It is safe to assume that more contracts are in the pipeline.

UzbekistanThe Soviet armed formations which Uzbekistan had

inherited after independence included the 108th Motorized Rifle Division of the Turkestan Military District, the incomplete 105th Airborne Division, and a large Air Force group. The country also took over some of the hardware removed from the European part of the Soviet Union in 1989-1990 ahead of the signing of the CFE treaty. Overall the republic was left with 2,200 main battle tanks, 1,600 armored fighting vehicles, and 1,100 pieces of artillery. But these numbers were not seen as superfluous to Uzbekistan’s needs, given its large population and territory. Rather than cutting the Soviet forces it had inherited, the country began to build them up.

The government of this most populous Central Asian republic, led by President Islam Karimov, initially tried to pursue an independent foreign policy. It distanced itself from Russia and sought closer ties with the West. For a time the country also cultivated relations with Ukraine, based on shared anti-Russian sentiment. In 1999 Uzbekistan suspended its membership of the CSTO, and after 2001 it

allowed Washington the use of its military bases for the operation in Afghanistan. But rapprochement between the authoritarian Uzbekistan and Western democracies soon reached its natural limits, pushing the Karimov regime back into Moscow’s embrace. In 2005 Uzbekistan told the Americans to pull out their bases, resumed active participation in the CIS, and in 2006 once again became a full member of the CSTO.

The main threat Uzbekistan continues to face is Islamic extremism, which has the potential to destabilize the republic. New weapons procurement programs have been very small-scale, owing primarily to financial constraints. The biggest outlay the Uzbek army has been able to afford is the purchase of 220 BTR-80 armored personnel carriers from Russia over the period of 1992-2002. Moscow has also supplied small arms, infantry weapons and spare parts, as well as repair and maintenance services. The republic has received limited military assistance from the United States. It has also made attempts to develop cooperation with Western countries on a commercial basis. France’s Sagem, in partnership with Russian defense contractors, upgraded 12 Mi-24P attack helicopters and another 12 Mi-8MTV helicopters for the Uzbek Air Force.

Uzbekistan’s decision to resume membership of the CSTO has translated into closer military ties with Moscow. Russia has upgraded several S-125 SAM systems for Uzbekistan and supplied two Su-25 ground attack aircraft. There have also been reports that Tashkent intends to buy Mi-24 and Mi-17 helicopters from Russia.

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 13Russian Naval Exports Take Off

Arms Trade

Russian Naval Exports Take OffRuslan Pukhov

After years of steady growth, Russian naval exports have surged upwards since the beginning of 2010. According

to Rosoboronexport projections, exports of Russian weapons will hit another record high of over 10bn dollars this year. Deliveries of navy ships and naval armaments will account for a large chunk of that figure.

Since January Russia has delivered finished ships and naval armaments under several large contracts. More deliveries are to follow before the year’s end. Under Russian accounting rules the entire value of these contracts will be added to the 2010 tally.

The overall value of the Russian deliveries of navy ships and equipment (including spare parts, armaments, components, etc) could reach 2.6bn dollars in 2010. That is about 25 per cent of the entire Russian arms exports. In 2009 the figure was only about 9 per cent (770m dollars), according to Rosoboronexport. The main part of Russia’s 2009 naval exports fell under the categories of repair and upgrade contracts and naval equipment and armament sales (some of those naval armaments were delivered to India and China).

After a large surge in deliveries in 2010 the Russian shipbuilders still have plenty of orders in the pipeline to keep naval exports figures high for the next several years.

Sevmash Company in Severodvinsk is working on a 2004 contract to refit and rebuild the Admiral flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov, a former Soviet Project 11434 heavy aircraft carrying cruiser, into the Vikramaditya aircraft carrier for the Indian Navy. The contract is worth 2.3bn dollars, with a new delivery date in 2012.

India is building a series of warships (Project 15A destroyers and Project 17 frigates) designed with Russian assistance. Russia will also supply components, weapons and equipment under this contract. Russian companies have also made deliveries of equipment and weapons for several ships being built in China.

The recent surge in Russian naval exports is part of an underlying trend that began some 15 years ago. Despite the economic hardships after the fall of the Soviet Union and a sharp drop in Russian defense procurement in the 1990s, the Russian shipbuilders have scored some impressive achievements on the world markets during the post-Soviet period. Russia has become one of the world leaders in the exports of newly-built surface ships and submarines for the world’s navies.

Russia is the world leader in terms of the tonnage of the battle ships of the main classes and submarines it

has built since 1992 under export contracts. The Russian defense industry has implemented several unique programs which have no precedent on the world market. The Admiral Gorshkov, which is being refitted for the Indian Navy, will become the largest battle ship ever to have been sold to a foreign country. The four Project 956E and 956EM (Sovrmenny class) destroyers built for China are the largest non-aircraft-carrying warships to have been supplied under exports contracts since the dreadnoughts built in Britain and the US for Latin American countries in the early 20th century.

Russia’s achievements on the world naval markets have largely been based on Soviet technology. Most of the ships and naval systems exported since 1992 were designed in Soviet times. That includes the most successful Russian naval export, the Project 877/636 (Kilo class) large diesel-electric submarines. But the Russian shipbuilders have also demonstrated their ability to keep up with the latest developments. Their first foray into new technology was designing and building the Project 11356 (Talwar class) frigates for the Indian Navy. These ships, delivered in 2003-2004, have proved to be exceptionally well-engineered and very powerful. Their hulls use a Soviet design, but they carry new weapons and electronic systems. After that “transitional” stage, the Russian ship design bureaus have created an entirely new generation of ships since 2000, including the Project 22350 frigate, the Project 20380 corvette, and the Project 21631/21632 guided missile light corvettes, which are being built for the Russian Navy and offered to the foreign navies. The industry is now working on a new large amphibious tank landing ship (Project 11711) and minehunter (Project 12700), plus a whole range of small boats. After lengthy trials, the first of the new Project 677 (Lada class) conventional submarines entered service with the Russian Navy in 2010.

The Navy will shortly announce a contract for a new corvette design. That will become a powerful stimulus for the development in Russia of a new generation of ships of this class, which is one of the most active segments of the world shipbuilding market. Leading Russian design bureaus will develop a whole range of corvettes, which will be offered to foreign buyers regardless of their success with Russia’s own navy.

The recent merger of the largest Russian shipyards and ship design bureaus into the United Shipbuilding Corporation (OSK) will make Russia an even more powerful player on the world naval markets. This merger will facilitate more efficient

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief14

Arms Trade

Russian Naval Exports Take Off

restructuring and modernization of the sector, including the introduction of the latest shipbuilding technologies and the construction of new shipyards.

Designing a modern navy ship is very expensive. Many of the small independent design bureaus have been unable to obtain financing for new projects, which has resulted in the paucity of Russian proposals on the world markets. The recent incorporation of these bureaus into OSK goes a long way towards addressing that problem. The corporation can subsidize the development of new ships for the Russian Navy and for exports. It can reduce duplication between the various design bureaus and bring their offerings into a single shop front for a full range of products. It can provide the means for continued development of the existing projects. It can launch a big program to develop several new projects of ships and boats aimed specifically at export markets. In other words, the creation of OSK is a major step towards keeping the Russian naval shipbuilding internationally competitive. It will enable Russia to maintain the impressive share of the world naval technology market it has earned over the past two decades.

The results of OSK’s efforts to present a full range of products and to promote new projects on the world markets were visible at the Euronaval 2010 international naval exhibition held in late October 2010 in Le Bourget, Paris. Rosoboronexport presented more than 50 projects of ships, boats and various naval equipment offered by the Russian defense industry. Several of the Russian ship projects unveiled at the show are completely new and equipped with the latest weapons systems.

For example, Severnoye Design Bureau brought to the show its new Project 22356 frigate design, which is the export version of the new-generation Project 22350. Two of the Project 22350 ships (Admiral flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov and Admiral flota Kasatonov) are now being built for the Russian Navy at the Severnaya Shipyards. Unlike the version for the Russian Navy, Project 22356 will not be equipped with the newest Poliment-Redut naval SAM system with 9M96 missiles. Instead, it can be fitted with the tried and tested Shtil-1 (SA-N-12) or Rif-M (SA-N-20) naval SAM systems (whichever the customer prefers) with a vertical launch system. Severnoye Design Bureau also presented the well-known Project 11356M frigate (several are being built for the Indian and Russian navies), as well as the Project 22160 patrol ship, Project 22500 corvette and Project 22300 patrol ship.

Almaz Central Naval Design Bureau unveiled its new Project 20382 (Tigr class) corvette design, which is an export version of Project 20380 corvettes now being built at the Severnaya Shipyards for the Russian Navy. The earlier version of Project 20382 had the same specifications as the first Project 20380 ship, the Steregushchiy, which entered service with the Russian Navy in 2008. The new version of Project 20382, meanwhile, follows the specification of the second ship of the series, the Soobrazitelnyy, which was launched in 2010. It is equipped with the new Redut naval SAM system with 9M96 missiles. Almaz Design Bureau also displayed its well-known Project 12418 (Tarantul V class) guided missile light corvette.

Zelenodolskoye Design Bureau brought to the show the latest modification of its Project 11541 (Korsar class) frigate design, which is the export version of the well-known Project 11540 (Neustrashymy class) frigate. It also displayed several versions of the Project 11661E (Gepard class) light frigate design. The company also brought the Project 1124M2 corvette and patrol vessel design, which is based on the hull of the well-known Project 1124M (Grisha V class) anti-submarine corvette. Another interesting design displayed at the show by Zelenodolskoye Design Bureau was the Project 21632 (Tornado) guided missile light corvettes in several versions.

In addition, Rosoboronexport had a full range of escorts and amphibious landing boats of various sizes on display, as well as export versions of the new-generation Project 677 (Lada/Amur class) conventional submarine. Foreign observers were also expressing great interest in the standardized Club-K (containerized) and Club-M (mobile) missile systems (SS-N-27), as well as the Bastion-P mobile coastal defense missile system armed with the Yakhont anti-ship missiles.

In February 2010 Rosoboronexport signed a contract with Kazakhstan to begin licensed assembly next year of two Project 20970 (Katran class) fast-attack missile craft at Zenit Plant in Uralsk, with an option for another four. It has also proposed a joint program to build Project 1124M2 and 22300 patrol vessels and Project 21632 guided missile light corvettes.

With all these projects in the pipeline, it is safe to say that the record export earnings raked in by Russia’s shipbuilders in 2010 were not just a blip. They have a large portfolio of export contracts, with good chances of winning even more custom from foreign navies. For the next few years at least they have little to worry about.

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 15

Procurement

Evolution of the Russian Defense Procurement System

Evolution of the Russian Defense Procurement SystemAleksey Nikolsky, Vedomosti newspaper reporter

The defense procurement system Russia inherited after the fall of the Soviet Union included government agencies

overseeing the defense industry as well as procurement departments within the uniformed ministries (Ministry of Defense, Interior Ministry, etc.). This article focuses on the evolution of the procurement departments in the ministries over the past decade. In 1990s the system of state administration of the rapidly crumbling defense sector underwent several rounds of reorganization and restructuring – all of which had ultimately proved pointless. They included the merger of the former Soviet agencies overseeing the defense sector into the Ministry of Defense Industry. At some point, these agencies were resurrected and subordinated to the Ministry of Industrial Policy. Meanwhile, the MoD department in charge of procurement, the Chief of Armaments Directorate (UNV), had remained largely intact since Soviet times up until the early 2000s. The successive heads of the department also traditionally retained the post of deputy defense minister. In 1994-2001 the UNV was led by Gen Anatoliy Sitnov. He was succeeded by Gen Aleksey Moskovskiy, who served until 2007. Moskovskiy’s appointment coincided with the arrival of Sergey Ivanov as the new defense minister. Prior to the MoD job Ivanov was the head of the Security Council; Moskovskiy served as his deputy.

The UNV department of the Ministry of Defense was the central element of the whole defense procurement system. Each armed service had its own subsidiary procurement department. Similar departments also existed in each of the uniformed agencies, including the Interior Ministry, the FSB and the Emergencies Ministry. All these departments collected the requirements of the armed forces or the respective uniformed agencies and then compiled

procurement requests for R&D, new weapons purchases or repair and upgrade services. The requests were then submitted for the vetting of the Defense Industry Department (DID) of the Economics Ministry (renamed into the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade). The DID, the successor of the defense industry directorates of the old Gosplan (the Soviet state planning agency), would bring these requests in line with the state of the country’s economy and pass them on to the Finance Ministry and the Cabinet, which allocated budget funding. Finally, the procurement decisions needed the approval of the Cabinet and the president before being submitted to the Duma.

It has to be said that this lengthy procedure, for all the diligent work of the agencies involved, remained rather pointless until that time when Russia actually found itself in possession of some money to spend on weapons. Let us recall that the country got its first proper budget only in 1996 – that is when the official budget document was first approved by the Duma before the beginning of the financial year. The period of 1992-1995 was an era of budget chaos in Russia, with the whole country living hand-to-mouth. In many cases the actual spending decisions would receive formal approval after the money had already been spent. In these circumstances the financing of defense procurement programs was slashed to almost nothing. The few exceptions required hard lobbying for the moneys to be disbursed on schedule. One of these exceptions is the Topol-M (SS-27) intercontinental ballistic missile, which was developed during those difficult years.

Defense procurement financing hovered just above zero throughout the late 1990s. Funds were made available for only a handful of programs, including the purchase of Su-33 carrier-based fighters, the completion of the Project 11442

Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Defense procurement, bn roubles

52 79 117 137 186.6 236.7 302 365 500

Including contracts for mass-produced weapons, bn roubles

112 115.5 145 200.8 280

Source: Russian state budget, http://www.periscope2.ru/?digest_id=17165.

Table 1. Russian defense procurement spending in 2001-2009

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief16Evolution of the Russian Defense Procurement System

Procurement

Petr Velikiy nuclear-powered guided missile battlecruiser and several nuclear-powered submarines, and the development of the Topol-M and Iskander (SS-26) missile systems.

The situation began to change only in 2000, the year when a semblance of order was restored in the budget process, and when the Russian economy started to feel the effects of growing oil prices.

As soon as defense spending picked up, attempts began to restructure and rationalize the procurement system. The first was made in March 2003, when the government created the State Committee for Defense Procurement (Gosoboronzakaz) under the Russian Defense Ministry. The committee’s first chairman was Georgiy Matyukhin, former head of the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI), which had just been abolished as part of the reform of the Russian secret services. The committee was supposed to coordinate and monitor price formation during weapons purchases for all the uniformed agencies. The actual signing of contracts was not part of its remit. But it was soon decided that the committee would oversee only the purchases of cars and trucks (since all the uniformed agencies used more or less the same models). In practice, however, the committee never got down to real work – simply put, that would not have been in the interests of the existing procurement departments of all the uniformed agencies.

The same fate later befell the Federal Agency for Weapons and Special Equipment Supplies. In 2007-2010 the agency was led by another former secret service chief, Viktor Cherkesov, who headed the Federal Drugs Agency (FSKN) before falling out of favor with the powers that be. Just like the Gosoboronzakaz before it, the new agency failed to make its presence felt in any way. Both outfits had succeeded only as sinecures for “good guys” who could not just be turned out into the street.

The ineffectual Gosoboronzakaz, meanwhile, started to transform itself following the arrival of new management in the spring of 20041. As part of government reshuffles after President Vladimir Putin’s re-election for a second term, Matyukhin was retired and replaced by the former director-general of Rosoboronexport, Andrey Belyaninov. Unlike his predecessor, the new chairman of Gosoboronzakaz, who holds a degree in finance, was one of President Putin’s men. He had served at the KGB office in East Germany together with the future Russian president. He was replaced at the helm of Rosoboronexport by his deputy Sergey Chemezov, another man from Putin’s cohort who had served in East Germany. Gosoboronzakaz itself was renamed into the Federal Service for Defense Procurement (Rosoboronzakaz) as part of the administrative reform launched in the summer of 2004. Belyaninov immediately proceeded to replace the old guard at the agency with his own men, and launched some practical efforts at analyzing the state of the defense procurement

system, monitoring the bidding process and overseeing deliveries on procurement programs. Rosoboronzakaz did not have any direct influence on the allocation of contracts – that was not part of the agency’s remit. But it produced recommendations for people in charge of reforming the defense procurement system. It also passed on certain information about the shenanigans it had uncovered to the military prosecutor’s office, although there have been no reports of any prosecutions launched specifically at the initiative of Rosoboronzakaz. Speaking at a news briefing in 2005, Belyaninov said he was “dumbfounded” when he found out about the defense industry’s and the MoD’s price-setting practices. But despite the political weight of the agency’s new chief, it took quite a bit of time and effort for Rosoboronzakaz to persuade the government that it should be given greater powers. The new “Provision on Rosoboronzakaz” was signed only in January 2005, just a few months before Belyaninov’s departure.

In May 2006 the country saw a mini political crisis. Several prominent businessmen were arrested and a number of senior officers at the FSB and the Prosecutor-General’s Office sacked for their part in the smuggling of furniture for the Tri Kita retailer. Belyaninov was promoted to director of the Federal Customs Service. He was succeeded at Rosoboronzakaz by Col Gen Sergey Mayev2, the former head of the Auto & Tanks Main Directorate (GABTU) at the MoD, who had already served for two years as first deputy under Matyukhin and then Belyaninov. With Belyaninov and then Mayev at its helm, Rosoboronzakaz turned into a supervision and licensing body. Following the adoption of Law No 94 on state procurement in 2006 the agency took over the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service’s remit of overseeing defense procurement contracts. And in 2008, following the abolition of the Federal Agency for Industry (Rosprom), it took over the licensing of the development, manufacture and repair of weapons and ammunition.

In March 2006 the government initiated another reshuffle in the defense procurement system. It appointed Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov as the new head of the Government Commission for the Defense Industry3. Ivanov had actually been the government minister in charge of the defense sector since November 2005, when he got the deputy prime minister’s job. The commission itself was then renamed the Defense Industry Commission under the aegis of the Russian Cabinet and given the status of a standing body with its own staff. The Defense Industry Commission of the Soviet Council of Ministers was transformed after the fall of the Soviet Union into the defense industry commission of the Russian government. It was always chaired by the sitting prime minister. The old Soviet commission was a powerful body with offices in the Kremlin itself (hence the rumors after Ivanov’s appointment that the commission would be relocated back to the Kremlin).

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 17Evolution of the Russian Defense Procurement System

Procurement

Its successor in the Russian government, however, had a very limited remit. Formally, its approval was required for key decisions on new weapons development. For example, it is that commission which in 2002 designated the Sukhoi Design Bureau as the lead developer of Russia’s next generation fighter program, the PAK FA. But it could not actually issue any orders to any of the Russian defense companies or the defense industry as a whole. In fact, it did not even have its own organization. Even under its new chief, Sergey Ivanov, the commission failed to become a truly influential body, although the number of its sittings and resolutions rose sharply. In 2007 the commission was given its own secretariat in the form of the former defense industry department of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. The former head of that department, Gen Vladislav Putilin4 (who had previously served as deputy head of the General Staff), was appointed head of the commission’s secretariat and given a ministerial rank.

After changing the status of the Defense Industry Commission in 2006, the government also considered setting up another agency to manage the actual defense companies, which had already been given the status of Federal State-Owned Unitary Companies (FGUP). The plan was that this agency would be created from the defense industry department of the Russian Agency for Industry (Rosprom). But the idea was then abandoned after the government decided gradually to transform FGUPs into joint-stock companies and incorporate them into vertically-integrated holdings. The new plan, put on the agenda in early 2006, was to set up the Federal Agency for Weapons Procurement (Rosoboronpostavka) under the Cabinet. The presidential decree on setting up this agency, modeled on France’s Direction Generale de l’Armement (DGA), was signed in early 2007. Its first head was the former deputy director of the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation, Aleksandr Denisov.

The idea behind the creation of this chiefly civilian body was that its remit would include the actual contracting of all weapons procurement for the armed forces and uniformed agencies. As a result, the Defense Industry Commission would be responsible for developing and adopting strategy, Rosoboronpostavka for implementing it, and Rosoboronzakaz would monitor and oversee the whole process5.

In practice, however, the fate that befell the newly created Rosoboronpostavka was unprecedented even by the dismal standards of Russian bureaucracy. The agency was announced with great fanfare – but then forgotten so utterly that for the first two years of its existence it didn’t even have any premises in which to set up shop.

There were two main reasons for such an unusual situation. The first was the agency’s head, Viktor Cherkesov, who led the Federal Anti-Drugs Agency (FSKN) before his

appointment to Rosoboronpostavka in 2008. He had very little political clout left after the brief “war of the secret services”6. That war, triggered by the Tri Kita contraband scandal, broke out between Cherkesov and the leadership of the FSB, the Federal Secret Service. The FSB had put pressure on the Investigations Committee under the Prosecutor-General’s Office to launch a criminal case against a close ally of Cherkesov, Gen Aleksandr Bulbov, who headed the Department of Operations at the FSKN. Cherkesov retaliated by going to the press (the Kommersant newspaper) and making the whole thing public. That sealed his fate – shortly after the presidential election he was exiled to a comfortable sinecure at Rosoboronpostavka before being sent into retirement two years later.

Eve n m o re d a m a g i n g t o t h e p ro s p e c t s o f Rosoboronpostavka, which had hoped to become “Russia’s DGA”, was the appointment of Anatoliy Serdyukov as the new defense minister in February 2007. His predecessor Sergey Ivanov had formally retained the defense industry portfolio. But it quickly became clear that procurement policy would be taken over by the new minister and his allies from the Federal Tax Service, which Serdyukov had decided to make use of to resolve various financial issues in his ministry. It appears that at first, the minister did not have a clear idea of how to reform the procurement system. But Aleksey Moskovskiy, who had been in charge of that system at the MoD for many years, was one of the first to be let go by Serdyukov, just three months after his arrival. He was replaced in the spring of 2007 by the future chief of the General Staff, Gen Nikolay Makarov, who was succeeded a year later by Vladimir Popovkin, the former commander of the Space Troops. It is safe to assume that it took Serdyukov almost two years to conduct a detailed audit of the procurement situation in his ministry. During that period, the government set up yet another contender for the privilege of managing the procurement process, the Rostekhnologii corporation, which was created in the summer of 2007. The following autumn the corporation’s director-general, Sergey Chemezov, offered the MoD his company’s services in dealing with the suppliers. The offer was turned down.

The first major change to the procurement system introduced under Serdyukov in late 2008 was to strip the Chief of Armaments’ Service, the subsidiary armament services and departments within the MoD (GRAU, GABTU, and others) of their power to sign weapons contracts. But these powers were not transferred to Rosoboronpostavka, as was the plan under the previous minister, Sergey Ivanov. That agency remained firmly in suspended animation. Instead, Serdyukov set up the new MoD Procurement Directorate and appointed as its chief Margarita Andreyeva, the former deputy head of the Tax Service for procurement. The old procurement departments at the MoD were left with the sole remit of drawing up the lists of specifications and

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief18Evolution of the Russian Defense Procurement System

Procurement

requirements for the equipment being bought by the army. Starting from March 2009, the MoD Procurement Directorate is the buying customer party on all weapons contracts. In May 2010 the head of Rosoboronpostavka, Viktor Cherkesov, was finally sent into long-expected retirement. The move signaled the resurrection of his moribund agency. President Medvedev signed a decree subordinating Rosoboronpostavka to the MoD rather than the Cabinet and appointing Nadezhda Sinikova, another former deputy head of the Tax Service, as the agency’s new chief. The decree also set the agency’s staff number at 1,100 people. Most of them will be transferred from the arms procurement departments at the MoD, the Interior Ministry, the FSB, FSKN and FSO. The procurement departments at these agencies themselves will remain in charge of buying supplies such as food, uniforms and fuel. But it seems likely that Rosoboronpostavka will gradually take over the arms contracting remit from the MoD Procurement Directorate.

The latest round of reform of the arms procurement system was concluded in June, when the chief of armaments at the MoD, Vladimir Popovkin, was appointed first deputy minister in charge of arms procurement. As such, he is now

the chief of the Main Armaments Directorate, GABTU, GRAU and several other MoD departments. He will be making decisions on defense technology policy and defining the look of the new weapons. But the actual contracting and other economic issues will remain within the remit of Rosoboronpostavka, which is now subordinated to the MoD.

Summarizing all the reforms since 2003, it has to be said that for all the new agencies that have been set up and for all the reshuffling of their respective remits, the country still lacks a coherent arms procurement system. Starting from 2007-2008 there has been a significant increase in procurement spending. But it is recognized by the country’s leadership and the defense minister that the procurement policy remains inefficient and insufficiently transparent. Nevertheless, by the summer of 2010 the institutional reform of that system was largely completed. The task now is to achieve an improvement within the framework of the existing system. But one can never rule out new twists and turns in this long saga, or the appearance of new contenders for the privilege of managing the cash-rich arms procurement process.

1 K. Lantratov. The President reinforces the arms procurement system / Kommersant, 12 April 2004.2 Sergey Mayev appointed director of Rosoboronzakaz / Vedomosti, 23 June 2006.3 V. Kashin, R.Akhmedova. Heads of procurement / Vedomosti, 29 March 2006.4 Y. Gavrilov. General-minister (interview with Vladislav Putilin) / Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 22 March 2006.5 I. Konovalov. President introduces new department at MoD / Kommersant, 18 May 2010.6 V. Cherkesov. We cannot allow soldiers to turn into traders / Kommersant, 9 October 2007.

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 19Bears and Blackjacks Are Back.

What Next?

Armed Forces

Bears and Blackjacks Are Back. What Next?Alexander Stukalin, Kommersant Publishing House

They are comingThree years ago Russian strategic bombers resumed

their regular patrols off the coast of the United States, Canada and the UK. On August 17, 2007, as many as 17 long-range aircraft took off from the airfields in Olenegorsk, Vorkuta, Monchegorsk, Tiksi, Anadyr, Engels and Shaykovka. They clocked in a combined 165 flight hours that day. Each pair of the supersonic Tu-160 Blackjacks and the turboprop Tu-95MS Bear-H bombers headed for its own patrol area in the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Naturally, all that activity did not go unnoticed. Norway, for instance, reported that over a period of 14 hours, 11 Russian planes had appeared near its western borders. ‘’We haven’t seen that kind of activity in a very long time. Not since the early 1990s. It was quite impressive to see,” Brig. Gen. Ole Asak, chief of the Norwegian Joint Air Operations Center, said in an interview with the Associated Press news agency. In the United States it was reported that a pair of Tu-95MS bombers had approached the island of Guam, for the first time since the end of the Cold War.

Russia’s explanation was not long in coming. President Vladimir Putin, who observed the ‘Peaceful Mission’ – 2007 military exercise on that day, outlined the Kremlin’s official line right at the Chebarkul training range. “In 1992, Russia unilaterally suspended its long-range strategic aviation patrols,” Putin said. “Unfortunately, not everybody followed our example, and other countries have carried on with their own strategic aviation patrols. That poses certain problems for Russia’s security. That is why the decision has been made to resume Russian strategic aviation patrols on a permanent basis.”

It was just a matter of timeThe Russian president did not specify whose strategic

aviation was posing a problem for Russia’s security, and how. But the Kremlin’s decision, and the sharp rise in the activity of Russian strategic aviation, was not unexpected. In fact, it was quite predictable, given all the trends in the previous years. The former commander of the Russian Air Force,

Gen Anatoliy Kornukov, listed the resumption of patrols “in combat-designated areas” as one of his key achievements back in 2002. And in 2006 his successor, Army General Vladimir Mikhaylov, was musing about “resuming patrols in parts of the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic oceans”.

Both generals had good reasons to make such predictions. Suffice is to recall that back in the summer of 1999, during the West-99 strategic command staff exercise, two Tu-160 bombers of the 121st Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment (TBAP) took off from the Engels airbase for a 12-hour flight to the GIUK gap in the Atlantic. In the autumn of the same year, a pair of Tu-95MS aircraft of the 182nd TBAP based in Ukrainka conducted a one-off patrol off the Aleut Islands. The Western military should have taken notice: the sharp drop in the activity of Russian strategic aviation, which had started in 1992, had essentially come to an end as early as 1998.

The traditional explanation for that drop in Russia itself is that the new democratic government and the bogeyman Yeltsin did not care about military aviation and forced it to survive on a bare pittance. But things aren’t that simple.

As a matter of fact, Russia had almost no modern strategic aviation left after the collapse of the Soviet Union, apart from the twenty Tu-95MS bombers of the 182nd TBAP in Mozdok. In 1992, Moscow had yet to claw back the forty Tu-95MS bombers that had been left in Kazakhstan after the republic’s independence. It then had to retrain the pilots, who had only had experience with the older Tu-95K version. And it was only just beginning to form a new Tu-160 regiment in Engels. However, Russia’s first simultaneous launches of two air-launched cruise missiles by a pair of Tu-160 bombers came as early as October 1992. In 1996 crews of the Tu-95MS bombers of the 79th TBAP (Ukrainka airbase) and the 182nd TBAP also commenced practical missile launches.* The number of launches was rising every year. In 2000-2007, the 37th Air Army of the Supreme Command (which incorporated all Russian long-range aviation in 1998) was making an average of 10 missile launches every year.

At the same time Russian strategic aviation pilots were resurrecting the largely lost skill of aerial refueling using the Il-78 Midas aerial refueling tankers. In the spring of

* The 182nd Regiment went through three relocations (Mozdok to Engels to Mozdok and finally back to Engels) in 1992-1994 due to the instability in the North Caucasus.

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief20Bears and Blackjacks Are Back.

What Next?

Armed Forces

1995, aerial refueling was performed by a Russian Tu-95MS bomber flying non-stop along the Ukrainka-Anadyr-Northern Ocean-Engels route. The following year, crews of the 182nd TBAP also resumed aerial refueling. The Tu-160 pilots had to learn that skill from scratch. In the former Soviet Union the maneuver was performed only a few times in 1987 by elite test pilots. The first routine daytime aerial refueling of a pair of Tu-160 bombers of the 121st TBAP was performed in 2002. The first night-time refueling followed in 2003. At about the same time Russian strategic aviation resumed the regular use of the northern staging airfields. In 2000, after a 10-year pause, the 182nd Regiment (which had already been transferred to Ukrainka) resumed the use of the Tiksi airbase for flights to the North Pole. In 2001, crews of the 184th Regiment (which was relocated back to Engels in 2000) began making use of the operational airfield in Vorkuta.

In 1999-2000 the 37th Air Army received three Tu-95MS aircraft and eight Tu-160 bombers, which had been sitting on the airfields in Ukraine since the fall of the Soviet Union. One new Tu-160 bomber was delivered by the manufacturer, the Kazan Aviation Plant (KAPO). That completed the formation of the Russian strategic aviation fleet – no new aircraft have entered service since then. Also in 2000 the fuel quotas allocated to the strategic aviation fleet for patrol flights began to increase. The frequency of such flights grew accordingly, and the bombers started venturing beyond the Russian and CIS borders* with increasing regularity. In 2001 and 2002, pairs of Tu-160 bombers conducted another two patrol flights off the UK coast. In May 2003, two Tu-160 bombers and four Tu-96MS aircraft of the 184th Regiment tested the limits of their range, flying more than 10,000 km in over 12 hours on a training mission over Indian Ocean. In August of the same year a pair of Tu-160 bombers and several Tu-96MS aircraft took off from several airfields in the Far East and conducted patrol flights over a large area from the Arctic Ocean and the Chukchi Peninsula along the coast of Canada and on to the Aleut Islands in the Sea of Japan.

Flights to the coasts of the United States, Canada, the UK and Norway continued in the following three years. In 2006 the total number of long-range patrol missions surpassed 100. The vast majority of them stayed close to the Russian territory. But in many cases several planes would take off simultaneously from several airfields and head in several different directions. For example, in the autumn of 2006 a pair of Tu-160 and another pair of Tu-95MS took off from the Engels airfield and conducted a 13-hour patrol over the Atlantic, with one aerial refueling. Almost simultaneously, other planes conducted live firing exercises over the Pemboy training range in the north. Meanwhile, several Tu-95MS bombers took off from the Ukrainka airbase in the east of

the country. Some of them headed for the Aleut Islands in the Pacific, while others launched two missiles over the northern training range of Khalmer-Yurt. In March 2007 two Tu-95MS bombers of the 184th Regiment flew to the north on a mission that included two aerial refuelings – one near Kotlas, another near Engels. And in July, Russia essentially conducted a somewhat truncated dress rehearsal of a triumphal return of its bombers to “world politics”. Pairs of Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers took off from Vorkuta and flew towards Norway, then on to Denmark, the UK and Iceland. Another two Tu-160 bombers took the Engels-North Pole-Baykal route, and several Tu-95MS planes from the Ukrainka airbase flew along their usual routes over the Pacific Ocean. After that flurry of activity, the appearance in August 2007 of 11 Russian long-range bombers off the coast of Norway hardly came as any surprise.

Growing threatsAccording to official reports by the 37th Air Army

command, a total of 70 long-range patrols “to various parts of the globe” were conducted in 2007. Their average duration was 12-14 hours. In 2008, the number of such patrols had reached 40 by April 5 and 50 by August 5. During the rest of the year, only 15 more patrols were conducted, for a total of 65, with 662 flight-hours clocked in and 310 tonnes of fuel transferred during aerial refueling. These long-range flights had substantially boosted the average number of flight hours clocked in by the Russian Air Force pilots: from 30-40 hours in 2005-2006 to around 80 hours in 2007 and 100 hours in 2008.

According to the data released into the public domain (and for some reason the Air Force continues to be fairly secretive with this information), the typical long-range patrol flight lasts 12 hours without aerial refueling, or 15-20 hours with one refueling. The most common destinations (excluding the exotic flight of a pair of Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela in September 2008) remain unchanged since the Soviet times. Most of the time the Russian heavy bombers fly past Scandinavia towards the UK and Iceland and on to the North Atlantic, or via the Arctic towards Alaska and Canada, then on to the Pacific (including the Aleut Islands) and the Sea of Japan. Russia has two heavy bomber regiments stationed in the west of the country (armed with the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS aircraft) and another two in the east (both armed with the Tu-95MS bombers). The number of eastward and westward bound flights is roughly the same. That is confirmed by reports of Russian aircraft being intercepted by fighter aviation of the respective countries. Given that

* On several occasions over the past decade the Russian strategic bombers landed at airbases in Belarus; they also took part in CIS air defense exercises.

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Bears and Blackjacks Are Back. What Next?

each patrol is usually conducted by a pair of bombers, the figures for 2007 and 2008 translate into 30-35 patrol missions by pairs of bombers per year. The US NORAD Command reported 18 incidents in which Russian bombers were intercepted in 2007, 12 in 2008 and 17 in 2009.

In 2009-2010, Russian strategic aviation set several records for the duration and range of patrol flights along the so-called “Big Circle” route. The latest two records were set earlier this year. In June 2010, a pair of Tu-160 bombers spent about 24 hours in the air and covered 18,000 km along the route of the Arctic-Bering Strait-Alaskan coast-Japanese Islands-Russia’s southern borders-Engels. They were refueled in the air twice, over the Laptev Sea and near Komsomolsk-upon-Amur. In July 2010, a pair of Tu-95MS took off from Ukrainka and flew around the entire perimeter of the Russian borders and the adjacent seas. The flight lasted 42 hours and 17 minutes, covering a distance of about 30,000 km.

Another recent record was set in 2008, during the “Stability-2008” strategic command staff exercise, when a Tu-95MS bomber launched its full payload of six cruise missiles over the Pemboy training range in the north. In the former Soviet Union, such a volley missile launch was conducted in 1984 over the Sary-Shagan range as part of a joint exercise of the Soviet Air Force and Air Defense. Apart from the missiles, the Tu-95MS bombers are armed with 23mm guns. Their crews continue to train for defending against fighter jets using those guns. According to official reports of the 37th Air Army command, 35 tactical air battles were conducted during the exercises in 2008, and another 64 tactical firing practices with air targets.

The Russian Air Force has been using MiG-31 Foxbat interceptors, Su-27 Flanker fighters and A-50 Mainstay AEW aircraft as escorts for the long-range bombers in 2008-2010. New elements of the long-range patrols that have been introduced over the past three years include coordination with the Russian Navy and naval aviation. In February 2008 a pair of Tu-160 bombers took off for a maximum-range patrol mission over the Atlantic (towards the Hebrides and the Lofoten Islands), during which they coordinated their mission with a Northern Fleet strike group led by the Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov aircraft carrier and were escorted by six Su-33 carrier-based fighters. On several occasions pairs of Tu-160 bombers took off for patrols over the Atlantic simultaneously with the Tu-142M Bear-F long-range anti-submarine aircraft of the Northern Fleet aviation (Kipelovo airbase) as part of a common training scenario.

False threatSeveral Tu-95MS aircraft were involved in a tactical

exercise of the 37th Air Army in the Pacific in February 2008. Two of the bombers flew over the USS Nimitz,

forcing the Americans to launch four F/A-18 carrier-based interceptors. Washington later said that one of the Russian planes had conducted a low-altitude fly-by around the American aircraft carrier despite the interceptors. At about the same time, another pair of Tu-95MS bombers was intercepted by Japanese F-15J fighters. Tokyo later said the Russian planes had crossed into Japanese airspace near the Izu archipelago.

The activity of Russian strategic aviation near the borders of other countries in 2007-2010 triggered an angry diplomatic and political response by the respective parliaments, political parties and several officials - some of them fairly senior. But on the whole, they caused no major scandals. Attempts by some media outlets to portray the bomber patrol missions as an act of aggression were soon dampened by official statements saying that there were no violations of international borders, that the Russians were not showing any obvious signs of aggression, and that all their patrol missions were being kept in check. But the patrols did cause a few unpleasant surprises for the Western military and their governments, the fly-by around the USS Nimitz being one of them. Another recent incident came on August 24-25, when a pair of Tu-95MS bombers unexpectedly showed up about 30 miles off the Canadian border (near Inuvik, Northwest Territories). Interestingly, the Russian MoD had officially announced to the media shortly before the incident that its Tu-95MS aircraft would be heading eastwards for a long-range patrol, but the designated patrol area was the Aleut Islands. It therefore remains unclear whether it was the same pair of bombers. Theoretically this is possible, given that the duration of their mission was later said to have been 16 hours, with one aerial refueling. Alternatively, there could have been two different pairs of bombers, one heading for the Aleut Islands and another for the Canadian border, probably after taking off from the Ukrainka airbase.

Incidents like these have lent credence to those in the West who say that the Russian threat is growing and needs to be countered. But these claims fail to take into account the actual state of affairs in Russia. A lot can be said about the political expediency – or lack thereof – of sending Russian strategic bombers to the borders of the countries which are no longer considered to be Russia’s enemies. One can also argue about how comfortably these bomber patrols sit with Russia’s own declarations of a “reset” in its relations with the United States. But what is beyond any doubt is that there will be no further growth in the activity of the Russian Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers. They should not be seen as a growing threat. Russia’s strategic aviation has already reached the limit of its capabilities. Any further improvement of these capabilities is being held back by a number of very serious problems which are, to all intents and purposes, beyond Russia’s ability to fix.

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief22

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Bears and Blackjacks Are Back. What Next?

No aerial refueling tankersThe most serious problem that affects the operational

capabilities of Russian strategic aviation is the shortage of aerial refueling tankers. That shortage puts a strict limit on the number of patrol missions per year and on the number of bombers that can be involved in each individual mission. The 37th Air Army command has stated on several occasions that in order to be fully effective, the Russian strategic aviation fleet needs to have a 1:1 ratio between the bombers and the tankers. In other words, there should be a regiment of aerial refueling tankers for each regiment of heavy bombers. As of 2009, Russia had 78 operational heavy bombers (15 Tu-160 and 63 Tu-95MS aircraft in four regiments) and only 20 aerial refueling tankers (eight Il-78 and 12 Il-78M aircraft, all made before 1994) of the 203rd Air Tanker Aviation Regiment (APSZ). The technical state of these planes leaves much to be desired. When the 203rd APSZ Regiment was being relocated from Engels to the Dyagilevo airbase near Ryazan, only 13 of its 20 aircraft were airworthy. That proportion has increased lately, but some of the planes are always grounded for repairs, maintenance or refitting to extend their service life.

The 203rd APSZ is the only tanker regiment in the entire Russian Air Force. For that reason, some of its planes are often diverted for other uses, such as test flights and training missions involving front-line, fighter and naval aviation. At the very peak of the crisis in the Russian Air Force, which came in the mid-1990s, the number of the Tu-95MS missions that involved aerial refueling was in the single digits. But the tankers of the 203rd APSZ were quite busy refueling other types of aircraft. They performed 102 refueling missions in 1995 and more than 200 in 1996. In 2002-2003 an average aerial refueling tanker pilot had clocked in more than three times as many flight hours as an average bomber pilot. In recent years, the 203rd APSZ has been even busier. In 2010, Il-78 tankers were involved in a large number of tactical aviation exercises and training missions. These missions involved refueling Su-34 Fullback, Su-30 Flanker and Su-24M Fencer strike aircraft based at the Lipetsk airbase, Su-24M aircraft from the airbases in Voronezh, Morozovsk and Khurba, and Tu-142M long-range anti-submarine aircraft of the Naval Aviation squadron in Kipelovo. In this long line for aerial refueling services, strategic aviation usually comes last. Figures released to the public domain indicate that only two to four Il-78 tankers are usually involved in long-range strategic aviation missions. Only on one occasion, during the large exercise in February 2008, as many as eight tankers were taking part. Another thing to consider is that such heavy use of all the available Russian aerial refueling tankers brings the end of their service lives so much nearer – and there are no plans at the moment to buy new ones.

Nothing in the pipelineThe strategic bomber regiments are facing the same

problem, now that their planes spend more time in the air. All the Russian Tu-95MS bombers were made before 1994. The Tu-160 aircraft entered service over the period of 1986-2007. Speaking shortly after his appointment in 2002, the commander of the 37th Air Army, Maj. Gen. Igor Khvorov said that the Tu-95MS, Tu-160 and Il-78 fleets “can stay in the air at least until 2015”. It was also said that the bombers would be upgraded to extend their service life and to arm them with new high-precision non-nuclear weapons. But later on, Gen. Khvorov’s successors, as well as successive commanders of the entire Russian Air Force, changed their tune. They said the existing planes could serve for another 40 or 50 years, and stopped making promises about massive upgrade programs. The number of bombers that have actually been upgraded is in the single digits – these planes are essentially prototypes. For the Tu-160 aircraft, the actual term “upgrade” has been phased out in favor of “restorative maintenance”, which is performed on just one or two planes each year by the manufacturer in Kazan. For the Tu-95MS bombers, the new word is “modernization”. Both of these new terms essentially boil down to routine repairs and replacement of some components in the hope that one day the bombers will receive proper upgrades, including new weapons and avionics, especially targeting and navigation systems.

Meanwhile, analysis of the bomber fleet maintenance contracts announced by the MoD in 2007-2010 points to several worrying trends. Some of the Tu-160 planes (including one made in 1999) have developed cracks in the integral tank, and there is extensive corrosion damage in the leading-edge wing assembly. Some elements of the control systems require serious repairs to extend their service life, as do the struts of the main landing gear. The Tu-95MS fleet has also developed problems with the integral tanks, which need to be repaired or replaced entirely. The structure of the wing needs to be reinforced across the whole fleet.

Another serious problem for both fleets is the engines, which are no longer in production. The service life of the Kuznetsov NK-32 turbofan engines (Tu-160) has now been extended to 21 years, and of the Kuznetsov NK-12MP turboprop engines (Tu-95MS) to 24 years. Analysis of the repair contracts announced by the MoD suggests that the engines are a much bigger headache than the rest of the planes. The NK-32 engines has serious issues with the blades, as well as with its numerous pumps, valves and filters. Apart from these ailments, which are typical for this model, the engines show increased vibration and consumption of oil; their rotors are out of balance, and their thrust vector guidance systems are failing or performing outside specification. All of this shows that the NK-32 engines are not going to last forever. In fact, this particular model suffers from numerous inherent

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 23

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Bears and Blackjacks Are Back. What Next?

weaknesses. The engine was allowed to enter service with the Air Force after the first stage of official trials; the problems identified during that first stage were never fixed. If Russia wants to keep the frequency of its long-range bomber patrol missions at the levels seen in 2007-2009, it will have to spend more and more on repairs and maintenance for the planes and especially their engines. Otherwise it risks losing the planes and their crews. There have already been several wake-up calls. In 2002 one of the engines of a Tu-95MS bomber belonging to the 184th TBAP cathes fire in mid-flight, but the crew managed to land the plane at its home airfield. In 2003, a Tu-160 aircraft made in 1992 crashed after its main integral tank disintegrated. Its entire crew was killed.

No rescueThe risk of one of the long-range bombers crashing is

another factor that has seriously affected Russia’s plans for the use of its strategic aviation fleet. If a plane goes down somewhere far away from the homeland, there is next to no chance of a successful rescue mission. Commanders of the 37th Air Army have often complained that there are not enough MSK rescue suits or unique Baklan diving suits that every Tu-160 crew member is supposed to have – but even that is not the main problem. The Soviet Union could afford to equip all the bomber crews with all the necessary rescue gear. But when Soviet planes (including Tu-95 and An-22 aircraft)

went down somewhere far out in the ocean, their crews were always lost. The latest incident involved a Tu-142MZ long-range anti-submarine aircraft of the Pacific Fleet Aviation, which was lost in the Tatar Strait in November 2009, only 20km away from the shore. None of its 11 crew members survived. The Tu-142MZ model has the same airframe and engines as the Tu-95MS bomber. Even if the crew (four people for Tu-160 and seven for Tu-95MS) survive the actual crash somewhere far in the Arctic, Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, they cannot expect swift rescue by the Russian Air Force or Navy. These services have never had the technical means or the overall capability to pull off such a rescue. The loss of even a single plane would lead to a long pause in long-range patrols until the causes are established – which is next to impossible to do with any degree of certainty when the plane and its crew disappear without a trace. Senior commanders would then be extremely cautious about ordering a resumption of such patrols.

It is therefore safe to assert that the Russian strategic aviation has restored only a small fraction of the capability once possessed by the Soviet Air Force. In Soviet times, Moscow could afford to send up to a squadron of Tu-95 bombers to the Atlantic or the US shores, and up to a whole regiment to the Soviet sector of the Arctic. It took Russia almost a whole decade to resume the small-scale and infrequent long-range patrol missions – and these patrols are in fact the limit of Moscow’s current capabilities. Any further progress will require a very radical increase in the Air Force funding and procurement programs.

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief24

Facts & Figures

Russian Armed Forces Abroad

Russian Armed Forces AbroadMikhail Barabanov

State Approximate number of Russian service

personnel

Structure Remarks

Abkhazia 3,800 military personnel, 1,500 FSB personnel

Army: 7th Guard Military Base (Gudauta), basis – 131st Independent Motorized Rifle BrigadeA short-range tactical ballistic missile Tochka-U battalion (Ochamchira)Two battalions of the Buk-M1 SAM systemSpecial forces subunits Air Force and Air Defense:Two battalions of the S-300PS SAM system (Gudauta and Agudzery) Two radar companiesNavy:Based in OchamchiraFSB Border Guards:The Border Guard HQ of the FSB in the Republic of Abkhazia (20 border posts, a maritime department)7 FSB Coast Guard patrol ships and boats

Under a 17 Feb 2010 agreement they are posted for 49 years

South Ossetia 3,000 military personnel, 1,000 FSB personnel

Army: 4th Guard Military Base (Tskhinvali and Dzhava), basis – 693rd Independent Motorized Rifle BrigadeA short-range tactical ballistic missile Tochka-U battalion Two battalions of the Buk-M1 SAM systemSpecial forces subunits Air Force and Air Defense:Two radar companiesFSB Border Guards:The Border Guard HQ of the FSB in the Republic of South Ossetia (20 border posts)

Under a 26 Aug 2008 agreement they are posted for 99 years

Azerbaijan 900 military personnel Space Forces: Independent Radar Unit (RO-7, Object 754) (Laki, Qabala) – Daryal radar EWS

Under a 25 Jan 2002 agreement these are rented for 10 years

Armenia 5,000 military personnel Army:102nd Military Base (Yerevan), made up of – 73rd Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade (Yerevan)76th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade (Gyumri)Air Force and Air Defense:3624th Air Base (Erebuni) – 16 MiG-29s, 2 MiG-29UBs998th SAM Regiment (Gyumri) – two S-300V SAM battalions700th Air-Traffic Control Point

Under a 16 March 1995 they were posted for 25 years, extended to 49 years in 2010

Belarus 850 military personnel Space Forces: Independent Radar Unit (Gantsiyevichi, Baranovichi) – Volga radar EWSNavy:43rd Communications Center (Vileyka)

Under a 6 Jan 1995 agreement they are posted for 25 years

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 25

Facts & Figures

Russian Armed Forces Abroad

State Approximate number of Russian service

personnel

Structure Remarks

Kazakhstan 5,000 military personnel Space forces: Independent Radar Unit (Balkhash-9, Object 1291, OS-2) (Gulshad, Sary-Shagan, Priozersk, Balkhash) – one Dnestr radar EWS and two Dnepr radars EWS5th State Testing Site (Baikonur Cosmodrome) (Kzyl-Orda Region) – since 2008 practically subordinate to the ‘Roskosmos’ (Russian Space Agency), military personnel are counted as on secondmentAir Force and Air Defense:171st Air Commandant Office (Karaganda)Facilities of the 929th State Flight Testing Centre – three test ranges (Atyrau and West-Kazakhstan Regions)Central Subordination to the Russian Defense Ministry:Facilities of the 4th State Central Joint Test Range – two test ranges (Sary-Shagan and Emba)

Posted under agreements of 14 Dec 1994 and 26 Nov 2005 on a rental basis for 10 years with an extension. Baikonur is rented under an agreement of 10 Dec 1994 for 20 years, extended in 2004 to 50 years.

Kyrgyzstan About 1,000 military personnel

Air Force and Air Defense:999th Air Base (Kant) – 4 Su-27s, 4 Su-25s, 1 Su-25UB, 1 An-26, 4 L-39s, 2 Mi-8sSubunits of paratroopers are periodically based there (up to two reinforced companies) as well as special forcesNavy:338th Communications Center (Kara-Balta, Chuy Region)954th Test Base for anti-submarine weapons (Karakol, Issyk-Kul Region)Central subordination to the Russian Defence Ministry:Automatised Seismic Station # 1 (Ichke-Suu, Issyk-Kul Region)Radio-Seismic Laboratory (autonomous seismic station) # 17 (Mayluu-Say)

Posted under agreements of 05 Jul 1993, 21 Jul 1994, 21 Oct 1994. The Kant air base is governed by agreements of 22 September 2003 and 11 August 2005.

Moldova 1,000 military personnel Army:The Operational Group of the Russian Forces in the Trans-Dnistrian Region of the Republic Moldova (Tiraspol, Trans-Dnistria) – 82nd and 113th Independent Motorized Rifle Battalions, and the one Guard and Service battalionOne of the motorized rifle battalions rotates into the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in the Trans-Dnistrian Region of the Republic MoldovaAir Force and Air Defense:Helicopter detachment

Posted without the agreement of the government of Moldova, but with the permission of the Trans-Dnistrian Moldovan Republic

Tajikistan 7,000 military personnel, up to 100 FSB personnel

Army:201st Military Base (Dushanbe) – 149th Guard Motorized Rifle Regiment (Kulyab)191st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Kurgan-Tyube)The latest information is that the 201st Military Base personnel are to be regrouped as the equivalent of one motorized rifle brigadeSpace Forces:1109th Nurek Independent Optical-Electronic Centre (Object 7680) (Nurek) – the Okno Optical-Electronic Space Surveillance SystemAir Force and Air Defense:6976th Air Base (Hissar) – 4 Su-25s, 1 Su-25UB, 4 Mi-24s, 4 Mi-8sFSB Border Guards:The Operational Group of the FSB of the Russian Federation in Tajikistan

Posted under agreement of 16 Oct 2004. The “Okno” Complex is governed by an agreement of 28 Jan 1994 for 49 years

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief26

Facts & Figures

Russian Armed Forces Abroad

State Approximate number of Russian service

personnel

Structure Remarks

Ukraine 14,000 military personnel Navy:The military naval base of the Black Sea Fleet (Sevastopol, Crimea) – the Staff of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation 30th Surface Ships Division (made up of the 11th ASW Ships Brigade and the 197th Landing Ships Brigade)41st Missile Craft Brigade68th Patrol Ships Brigade247th Submarine Detachment9th Auxiliary Vessels BrigadeThe Black Sea Fleet Air Force – 7057th Air Base (Kacha) 7059th Air Base (Gvardeyskoye)810th Independent Marine Regiment854th Independent Coastal Missile Regiment1096th SAM Regiment219th Independent Radio-Electronic Warfare Regiment31st Test Centre17th Arsenal, a Communications Centre, three communications hubs, the Onuk Training Ground Range and various military supply units and subunits

Posted under an agreement of 28 May 1997 on a rental basis for 20 years, and under an agreement of 21 April 2010 the period was extended another 25 years (until 2042)

Syria 150 military personnel Navy:720th Supply and Technical Provision Base (Tartus).Tartus has a constant rotation, which keeps a Black Sea Fleet repair ship

Posted under an agreement of 1971

# 4, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 27

Our AuthorsMikhail Barabanov. Graduated from the Moscow National University of Culture, then worked for the Moscow City Government. Editor-in-Chief of MDB since 2008. An expert on naval history and armaments.

Konstantin Makienko. Graduated from the Oriental Department of the Moscow National Institute for International Relations in 1995 and the French-Russian Masters’ School of Political Science and International Relations in 1996. He was head of a project on conventional armaments at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR-Center) in 1996-1997. Since September of 1997, he has been Deputy Director of CAST. He is the author of numerous articles on Russia’s military-technical cooperation with other countries.

Aleksey Nikolsky. Graduated from the Moscow National University of Economics, Statistics and Informatics in 1995. Worked as a reporter for several newspapers and for Vedomosti since 2001.

Ruslan Pukhov is director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) since 1997. In 1996 he graduated from the School of International Information of MGIMO University under the Russian Foreign Ministry. In 1996-1997 – postgraduate student of the French-Russian Master d’Etudes Internationales Sciences Po – MGIMO. In 1996-1997 – researcher for the Conventional Arms Project of the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center). Since 2007 Member of the PublicAdvisory Board of the Russian Defense Ministry.

Alexander Stukalin is a graduate of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University. Joined Kommersant, Russia’s leading broadsheet, in 1992 and became the newspaper’s editor-in-chief in 2004. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Russian Newsweek in 2005–2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Vedomosti newspaper in March-September 2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of Kommersant from October 2008 to date.