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15/3/11 10:37Our Morality: A Defense of Moral Objectivism | Philosophy Now

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Our Morality: A Defense of MoralObjectivismAfter our recent Death of Morality issue, Mitchell Silver replies to theamoralists.

Philosophers who aspire to describe reality without resort to myth, too often remainin thrall to the myth of absolute neutrality. Myths are not without their properuses, and belief in absolute neutrality can be a useful, even an indispensablepremise in the practices of science, jurisprudence, sports refereeing, and a host of other activities in which we want to discourage corrupting biases. Still, absolute neutrality is a myth, onememorably formulated by Thomas Nagel as the view from nowhere. There is no view from nowhere, andany philosophical practice which pretends to occupy that mythical perspective sows confusion.

In this article I will describe and defend my kind of moral viewpoint (not my specific viewpoint). The labelI will use for this kind of viewpoint is moral objectivism, because this creates a stark contrast with moralsubjectivism and moral relativism the views that no coherent morality is better than any othercoherent morality, which along with moral nihilism the denial of any morality present the mostphilosophically popular moral perspectives that are not of my kind.

Moral objectivism, as I use the term, is the view that a single set of principles determines the permissibility of any action, and the correctness of any judgment regarding an actions permissibility . Doesthis view deserve the label moral objectivism? I think it does. Although it doesnt claim that moralprinciples exist independent of the people who hold them, or that moral properties such as justice existindependently of moral principles, it forthr ig ht ly s ta tes that some actions are right and some are wrong,regardless of the judgments others may make about them. In making that claim, I am in conflict with therelativists and nihilists, both of whom assert th at moral objectivism is poorly grounded compared toalternative metaethics. (A metaethic is a vie w about the nature of morality. It is not a particular moralview.) These philosophers maintain that moral objectivism requires that we can only validate an actions

moral status or a judgments moral correctness by resorting to some beyond-human authority somemoral reality external to people which serves as the source of whatever set of principles a moral objectivistbelieves determines moral values and correctness. These relativists and nihilists claim that objectivismn eeds some thing like God, bu t th ey disbelieve ther e is anything like God, so they conclude that moralobjectivism requires something which does not exist.

I share the relativist/nihilist rejection of any form of supernaturalism. I do not believe in God, or in anyother external authority that grounds moral objectivism. Indeed, I do not think morality can be groundedin any external source. Yet I am a moral objectivist, and I think there is a good chance you are too. Inwhat follows I do not defend the content of my moral beliefs, nor make any presumptions about thecontent of yours. I do, however presume that many of you take the content your moral beliefs as seriouslyas I do mine. I will seek to persuade you that moral o bjectivism is at least as rational, as well-grounded,and as consistent with reality, as any alternative metaethic. The fundamental error of relativist and nihilistarguments against objectivism is the implicit claim that morality can be judged from nowhere.

Categorical Permissibility Rules: The Form of MoralityThe nature of motivation is the province of psychologists, who study it empirically. However, withoutstirring from our armchairs, we can safely say that people are sometimes motivated by rules that theyhave accepted, such as move chess bishops only along the diagonals, or floss daily. Acceptance of a rulecan, in part, constitute motives for actions.

Not only can rules motivate actions, they also influence judgments about the correctness of actions. Therule about chess bishops underlies my judgment that it is incorrect to move a bishop along the horizontal.While there are no precise criteria for whether or not a person has accepted a rule, or for measuring thedegree of acceptance, acceptance implies that the rule has some motivational force and influence on

judgments. It would be nonsensical to say, Silver accepts the rule forbidding moving bishops horizontally,although he is not in the least inclined to follow the rule, nor does he see anything at all incorrect aboutmoving bishops horizontally.

Among the rules that can motivate actions and determine judgments are those that classify all possibleactions as either permissible or impermissible. I call such rules categorical permissibility rules (henceforth,simply permissibility rules). Common examples of permissibility rules include: it is always impermissibleto act in a way that will not increase overall happiness or reduce overall suffering (John Stuart Millpromoted that one); it is always impermissible to treat someone merely as a means (a favorite of
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Immanuel Kants); never do to others that which is hateful to you (the Talmudic version of a commonplacein religious ethics); always obey whatever the priest tells you God has commanded (another commonplacein religious traditions); and, never act against self-interest (Ayn Rand). Less common, but equally possiblepermissibility rules include: never run for a bus (Mel Brooks); and, never act against Mitchell Silversinterests (no one, alas). There are an endless number of possible permissibility rules.

If you accept, or stand ready to accept either implicitly or explicitly, a set of permissibility rules asdetermining the correctness of all possible actions, then you are a moral objectivist. Someone who accepts,say, the permissibility rule everyone should pursue wealth above all else and judges all people andactions accordingly, relates to that rule as moral people relate to morality. It has the form of a moral rule,and anyone who accepts it is a moral objectivist, for she accepts a specific permissibility rule. For any

objectivist, the content of her permissibility rules constitutes what she takes to be morality. Someone whoaccepts t he everyone should pursue wealth above all else rule thereby takes the pursuit of wealth to bethe essence of morality. I do not accept that rule, so I judge it a mistake to believe that it has moralauthority. I judge those who accept that rule to be in moral error; but still, they are, like me, moralobjectivists.

Of course, you dont have to know you are an objectivist to be one. Perhaps you simply have neverindulged in metaethics, or perhaps you are self-deceived, or lack self-knowledge, and do not realize thatyou accept a specific set of permissibility rules.

Clearly, many people do accept categorical permissibility rules, including me, maybe you, and very likelyyour mother. Permissibility rules exist, and anyone who has genuinely accepted a specific set of them mustthus judge that morality exists. Moreover, the acceptance of permissibility rules (and thus morality) is anatural phenomenon. There is nothing mysterious or spooky about the rules, their acceptance by people,or about the motivational forces they produce. Accepting a permissibility rule is compatible with all of thefollowing: understanding the scientific explanations of the causes of ones acceptance; believing that you

do not understand all of the implications of the rule you have accepted; believing that you could come toreform or abandon the rule you currently accept; failing sometimes, maybe often, and perhaps always, toact in accordance with the rule; and finally, knowing that others adhere to different permissibility rules.

Explaining Morality

The acceptance of permissibility rules has many causes, as does determination of the specific content of the rules. Among the most notable causes of content are other peoples permissibility rules, and otherpeoples reactions to yours. Its easier to live with those who agree with you about the rules of permissiblebehavior. Moreover, we are influenced by what others, such as our parents, promote as the basic rules. Inaddition, most of us wish to be seen by others as decent members of society, who abide by commonly-accepted permissibility rules (ie, standards). Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) vividly pointed out that we allwant to prosper, and we all represent a threat to each other, therefore, as prudent, self-interestedanimals, we naturally seek enforceable rules to promote prosperity and reduce the mutual threat. Otherphilosophers have argued that the most acceptable rules likely to emerge from this human condition will

enshrine fairness and equality at their center. The social and life sciences have also weighed in:economists have shown how permissibility rules grease commerce, psychologists how they emerge fromour emotions, sociologists how they stabilize communities, and evolutionary biologists how they enhancefitness.

The drive to organize our judgments of actions into a logical structure, the urge to rationalize or justifythem, is surely one significant explanation of the existence of permissibility rules. Those who value reasonand psychic harmony will likely be attracted to rules that justify their gut feelings. If you feel that bull-fighting is wrong, and you like to have reasons for your feelings, you will be open to a rule that impliesbull-fighting is wrong. But the causal chain can also go in the opposite direction. An inclination for rationalorderliness may cause your moral feelings to align with your current theoretical commitments. Some whohave no pre-theoretical moral dislike of bull-fighting may well come to have a moral dislike of it because arule they accept brands it as wrong. Many a philosopher has become a vegetarian not out of any sympathyfor animals, but from a love of consistency and acceptance of a permissibility rule that forbids causinggratuitous suffering.

Justifying Moral JudgmentsAn explanation provides an account of what something is or how something came about, and in theoryanything can be explained; but an explanation is not a justification: a justification gives an account of whysomething is right, or why its right to believe something. Little Marys belief that she will receive aChristmas gift is explained by her belief in Santa, but it is justified by her parents reliable generosity.Similarly, the above considerations go a long way to explaining the widespread acceptance of certain kindsof permissibility rules, but none of them justifies any permissibility rule. My charitable acts, such as theyare, are explained by my upbringing; but if the acts are justified, it is due to a principle that recommendscharity, or at least allows it. Only some things, such as beliefs, statements and actions, are candidates for

justification. Explanations too are candidates for justification, for an explanation can be right or wrong.Since explanations can be justified, and justifications can be explained, it is easy to conflate the two.Nevertheless, explanation and justification are separate (albeit overlapping) processes, and by itself noamount of explanation ever justifies anything.

The permissibility rules you accept are for you neither justified nor unjustified: they justify. As the sourcesof moral justification, permissibility rules are similar to the sources of non-moral justification: no adequatereason can be given for accepting or rejecting the sources that does not beg the question. We can justifybeliefs; but we can justify the principles we employ to justify beliefs only with circular reasoning. Likewise,


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we can justify actions, but we cannot without circularity or indefinite regress justify the principles weemploy to justify actions. The justification of principles would require a resort to other justifying principles,which would themselves be unjustified. As Hume taught us, the belief that the future will resemble thepast is unjustifiable, but we label those who disbelieve the sun will rise tomorrow irrational. For most of us, inductive reasoning [reasoning from experience, eg of rising suns] is an essential tool for justifyingbeliefs. It does a fairly good job of justifying beliefs we feel ought to be justified, in spite of the fact thatits implications are not always clear or beyond dispute. Moreover, the principle of induction is compatiblewith the other principles most of us have in our belief-justifying-tool-kit. Of course there are those whoreject the entire tool-kit. We call them mad, or illogical. Analogously, we call those who truly reject ourcentral permissibility rules monstrous or morally obtuse. For example, without us having justified theunderlying moral principle which rationalizes the judgment, we label immoral those who disbelieve thatgenocide is wrong. This is not simple name-calling, it is categorization according to the epistemologicaland moral principles we accept.

As long as a set of permissibility rules does not require impossible actions (cure cancer, fly to Mars, eatyour cake and have it, never die), or posit non-existing entities (the tooth fairy, the Devil, the eternalincorporeal commander), there are no epistemic or practical reasons for rejecting or it, just as there arenone for accepting it. Hume famously, and correctly, said that you cannot derive ought from is. It isequally important to note that you cannot derive ought not to accept oughts from is. The rejection of allpermissibility rules has no more justification than the acceptance of a specific permissibility rule. Theconsequences of accepting or rejecting permissibility rules are another matter entirely; but whatever theyare, by themselves consequences cannot constitute a justification. Relativists and nihilists sometimesattempt to justify their anti-objectivism by invoking what they assert are the effects of belief in moralobjectivism: arrogance, smugness, intolerance, and widespread suffering. I dispute that those are thedominant effects of all objectivisms: a liberal, sensitive, egalitarian consequentialist (a species of objectivist), ever mindful of the fallibility of her judgments, can humbly try to foresee suffering, andminimize it. However, even granting the relativist/ nihilist assessment of the empirical effects of all andany objectivism, without a permissibility principle requiring avoidance of those effects, the relativist/nihilisthas provided no grounds for rejecting objectivism. Railing against objectivism for the harms it causes islike protesting that the Constitution is unconstitutional.

To say that a permissibility rule is unjustified is not to say that it is arbitrary, its only to say that it iscontingent that, like the historical and personal facts on which it is based, it might have been other thanwhat it is. No permissibility rule is true of necessity. If I wasnt who I am, I might well have had otherpermissibility rules, or none. But the fact that our permissibility rules are expressions of who we aremakes them the opposite of arbitrary not accidental attachments to us, but rather organic elements of us. Although we cannot justify them, we can be proud of them, loyal to them, and pleased with theireffects. We can note how well they perform certain functions, and we can be pleased that their acceptanceviolates no norms of knowledge nor requires belief in metaphysical oddities. Still, these feelings andobservations do not justify our rules.

Metaethics and Moral Disagreement

Although it brings all possible actions under a single standard, a permissibility rule can be complex, and itsapplication sensitive to circumstances. A permissibility rule may require that the time, place, effects, andthe nature of the people involved be considered when evaluating an action. It may even take into accountthe acceptance of different permissibility rules by other people. (Indeed, objectivity demands theincorporation of information from as many perspectives as possible.) Information about other peoples rules should shape a moral perspective, but it doesnt undermine its validity. For instance, I know thatthere are people who categorically accept the rule that one should never mistreat their holy scriptures. Iaccept no such rule, but my awareness of others acceptance of the rule, combined with a rule I do accept,that everyone should show respect for others feelings, results in me not mistreating others holyscriptures. I do not respect the holy scripture rule in itself; but I respect the holders of that rule, and indoing so I must often respect their rule. But this derivative respect for their permissibility rules does notmean I accept their rules to make my moral judgments.

Your metaethics depends on whether you genuinely accept a permissibility rule. If you have genuinelyaccepted specific permissibility rules, in accordance with that acceptance, then you must judge that there

are rules which categorize any actions permissibility, ie, its morality, and you are a moral objectivist. If inaddition you accept the same permissibility rules as I do, we agree about the essential substance of morality. Nonetheless, we may yet disagree about the correct classification of a particular action, or kindof action. These disagreements can stem from disputes about concepts (how shall we define pain?), facts(does an eighteen-week-old fetus feel pain?), or logic (does we ought not perform abortions follow from

we ought never inflict pain unnecessarily?). Common acceptance of specific permissibility rules leavesroom for differences of particular judgments.

Your specific permissibility rules constitute what you take to be morality, but they are likely to permitinconsistent courses of action: permission is not the same as direction. For example, a rule that impliesyou should not eat animals allows that the daily consumption of carrots is moral and that the refusal toever eat carrots is also moral. Indeed that rule permits you to starve yourself to death. You remain amoral objectivist even if the permissibility rule(s) you accept allow you to do almost anything. S omepermissibility rules allow an infinite number of morally permissible acts. The only requirement for yourmoral objectivist status is that the rules you accept classify some actions as morally out-of-bounds. Andobjectivism is not totalitarianism: even if you believe there are some things that no one ought to do, you

can believe that there are many ways to lead an overall good life, and many situations that permitdifferent courses of action. Hence a moral objectivist can be an ethical pluralist.

There may be people who share your permissibility rules, but also accept additional permissibility rules you


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do not accept. Maybe, like you, they think it immoral to eat animals, but unlike you, they also believe it isimmoral to eat carrots. What are you to make of these people? You must judge that these peoplemisclassify many actions as immoral. You must judge that they have mistaken what are matters of custom, convention, or personal taste, for matters of moral import. You may well judge that two parties,both of whom take themselves to be in serious moral conflict one says it is immoral to eat carrots, theother that it is immoral not to eat carrots are both correct that their preferred course of action is morally

permissible, and are both incorrect that the others preference is morally forbidden . Their passionate belief that they are in moral disagreement does not mean you must, from your perspective, take them to be inmoral disagreement.

Your assessment of other peoples morality depends on which specific permissibility rules you genuinely

accept. If you really accept as categorical a rule that permits carrot eating, then you must conclude thatothers are simply morally incorrect to judge carrot eating immoral. You are not doubting the sincerity of their judgment; but acknowledging their sincerity is not the same as acknowledging their correctness.

Now if your permissibility rules conflict with the rules I accept, we are both objectivists, but were infundamental moral conflict. To remain true to my acceptance of rules that allow but do not demand carroteating, I must conclude that you are mistaken to think eating carrots is immoral. True to your differentpermissibility rules, you must judge my moral indifference to carrot consumption morally incorrect. Anyonetempted to take a perspective above the fray will either have permissibility rules from which she can judgewhich of us is correct (if either), or she has not accepted any permissibility rules. If she has acceptedpermissibility rules, they will either allow or disallow carrot eating. She is an objectivist, just like us, andcan weigh in on our dispute. If she accepts no permissibility rules whatsoever, the very idea of moralpermissibility has no claim on her, and she has nothing relevant to offer those of us who do feel the pullof permissibility rules. She is not an objectivist, and both you and I (albeit by virtue of different rules)must conclude that she is without morals. Hardly someone we should ask to arbitrate our moral disputeover carrot eating.

Relativists, Nihilists, Amoralists and Objectivists

If you, dear reader, claim in perfectly good faith not to accept any permissibility rules, then I could inhaste judge that you are without morals. But not to worry; I believe that your moral nihilism is probablyonly a theoretical posture, inconsistent with your actual acceptance of permissibility rules, as reflected inyour actual judgments of particular actions. Although your acceptance of permissibility rules implies thatyou accept that those rules are applicable to all actions and judgments, including your own theoretical

judgments , your permissibility rules may allow you (as mine do me) to temporarily pretend that you donot accept them, in order to see what might in theory follow from their non-acceptance. But temporarilyplaying the amoralist in order to try and imagine how the world looks from that perspective, is not genuineamorality.

The assertion of a robust moral relativism means adopting a perspective from which all permissibility rulesare viewed as equally valid. It is important (and often difficult) to keep in mind that moral relativism is

not the descriptive claim that people have different and conflicting moral judgments; rather it is thenormative claim that no moral judgment is more or less correct than any other. To become a sinceremoral relativist one must abandon ones permissibility rules without embracing other permissibility rules. Arelativist could consistently act in accordance with any permissibility rule, but she cannot consistentlybelieve there are any justifications for these actions.

If you sincerely and fully, even if only in theory, accept, say, a rule that its immoral to torture people, arule that its immoral not to torture people, and another rule that torture is morally indifferent, thenyouve taken an incoherent theoretical position thats equivalent to the denial of morality moral nihilism.The other way to go, the non-acceptance of all permissibility rules, is not the mythical stance of neutrality,it is the particular viewpoint of amorality . It is not the discovery that no rules apply to all possible actions;it is a failure to apply any such rules. It is not an undistorted perspective which reveals moralitys non-existence: it is simply an amoral perspective. This is not how I see things, and I suspect it is not how yousee things. I am, and you probably are, a moral objectivist.

Moral objectivism requires only the acceptance of a set of permissibility rules. This involves nometaphysical delusions. Your permissibility rules may be tolerant, liberal, modest, tentative andundogmatic, or the opposite. So long as theyre truly yours, you are a moral objectivist. So are you?

Mitchell Silver 2011

Mitchell Silver is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts/Boston and the author of books on secular religious identity and secular understandings of theology. He is currently writing abook on moral objectivism.
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