Module 6 Export - Amazon Web Services Implementation Toolkit | Module 6 | Export 6 An end‐use/user certification process may require the submission of an end‐user certificate,

ATTImplementationToolkit|Module6|Export

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Arms Trade Treaty Implementation Toolkit

Module 6 Export

Available on: www.un.org/disarmament/ATT


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I.Introduction

AnycountryjoiningtheArmsTradeTreaty(ATT)commitstoputtinginplaceeffectivemeasurestoimplementtheTreaty.

EachStatewilldecidewhichmeasuresitneedsinordertocarryoutitsobligationsundertheATT.Thesemeasuresmayvaryfromcountrytocountry.

Thissixthmodule,Exportofconventionalweapons,ammunitions,partsandcomponents,providesStateswithpracticalinformationtoconsiderwhenestablishingandmaintaininganationalexportcontrolsystem.Inparticular,thismodulewilldiscusshowtoconductanexportassessment.

II.Nationalexportcontrolsystem

Anationalexportcontrolsystemcomprisestheinstitutionalarrangementsandmechanisms,laws,regulations,policies,proceduresandprocessesthroughwhichgovernmentexercisescontrolovertheexportofcertainproducts,technologyandservices.Normally,thenationalcontrolsystemregulates,assesses,monitors,authorizesand/ordeniestheexportofthosegoods,technologyorservicesfromterritoryunderthejurisdictionoftheStateinquestion.UndertheATT,StatesPartiesshallestablishandmaintainanationalcontrolsystemtoimplementtheprovisionsoftheTreaty.1StatesPartiesshallauthorizeorprohibittheexportofconventionalarms,ammunition/munitions,partsandcomponentspursuanttotheexportassessmentconductedbytheirnationalcontrolsystem.2

Throughanationalexportcontrolsystem,StatesPartiescaneffectively:

-ComplywiththeirobligationsundertheATT;

-ControltheconditionsunderwhichitemsareexportedfromterritoryunderthejurisdictionoftheauthorizingStatePartytoanothercountry(regardlessiftheimportingcountryisaStatePartytotheATT);

-Preventtheexportofitemsundercertainconditionsandcircumstances;

-Reducetheriskthattheexporteditemswillbedivertedtounauthorizedusers;

-Keeptrackoftransfersoriginatingfromterritoriesundertheirjurisdictions.

1.ElementsofanationalexportcontrolsystemundertheATT1.1.Nationallegislationandnationalcontrollists

Thenationallegislationshouldclearlystate:

1 Article 5 (2). 2 Article 7.


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a.Whichitemsaresubjecttoexportcontrol(nationalcontrollist);

b.Whichgovernmentministries,departmentsandagenciesareresponsibleforregulatingandcontrollingexportsofitems(nationalauthorities);c.Processesforgrantingorrefusingexportauthorizations(regulatoryprocedures);d.Thelegaland/oradministrativeactionsthatwouldbeappliedincaseofexportoffences(e.g.,enforcementmeasures,mechanisms,prosecutionandpunishment).

StatesPartiesarerequiredtomaintainandestablishanationalcontrollist.3Ataminimum,thenationalcontrollistshallcontainnationaldefinitionsoftheeightcategoriesofweaponslistedinArticle2(1).Thelistcouldalsoincludeammunition/munitions4aswellaspartsandcomponentsthataresubjecttoexportcontrol.5Inaddition,StatesPartiesmaywishtocontrolpartsandequipmentsuchastransporthelicopters,tankeraircraft,trucks,assaultboats,electronics,opticalequipment,radar,andmanyothers.Anationalcontrollistmaybeasinglelistcoveringallitemssubjecttoexportcontrolsoracollectionoflists,eachcoveringdifferentcategories/typesofitemssubjecttoexportcontrol.Anationalcontrollistshouldbeupdatedonaregularbasistoensurethatitcoverstechnicaldevelopmentsandemergingtechnologiesthatshouldbesubjecttoexportcontrol.StatesPartiesshallprovidetheirnationalcontrolliststotheATTSecretariat,whichshallmakethemavailabletootherStatesParties.6StatesPartiesareencouragedtomaketheircontrollistspubliclyavailable.Inparticularthoseinvolvedinthemanufacture,exportorimportofarmsorammunitionorinthearmstrade,includingauthorizedbrokers,shouldbeabletoaccessthelist(s).StatesPartiesmaychoosetoapplya“catch‐all”provision7onitemsthatarenot,inprinciple,subjecttomandatoryexportauthorization.

1.2.Nationalauthorities

StatesPartieshavetodesignatecompetentnationalauthoritiestoensuretheeffectiveandtransparentnationalcontrolandregulationovertheexportofitemscoveredundertheATT.8

TherequirementtoestablishanexportcontrolsystemappliestoallStatesParties,includingthosethataremainlyimportersandonlyoccasionallyprocessatransferofitemsfromitsterritorytothatofanotherState.Typically,Stateswithlittleornoarmsexportsmaynotneedanelaboratesystem.

3 Article 5 (2). 4 Article 3. 5 Article 4. 6 Article 5 (4). 7 Many peripheral items that are not listed on the national control lists may still enhance the weapons’ effectiveness, or contribute to weapons development/enhancement/production programmes. It may be difficult or impractical to attempt to include all those items in the list. Instead, a “catch-all” provision requires government’s authorization to export unlisted items when there is a reason to believe that the item may be intended for undesirable end use and/or end-user. 8 Article 5 (5).


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Itisanationalprerogativetodecidewhichgovernmententitiesareinvolvedinthelicensingandauthorizationprocess.Considerationsregardingwhichentitiesneedtobeinvolvedincludetheamountoftrade,theexistenceofadomesticdefenceindustry,andthestrategicimportanceoftheitems.Insomecountries,certaingovernmentministries,suchastheministryofforeignaffairs,carryoutpoliticalassessmentsand/orprovideguidancetobeconsideredintheassessmentsundertakenbythenationalexportcontrolauthoritiesattheadministrativelevel.Thedesignatednationalauthoritiesshouldbeabletoconsiderstrategic,militaryandforeign‐policyimplications,includinghumanrightsconsiderations,oftheproposedexports.Again,suchconsiderationsshouldbeguidedbydirectivesorguidelinesemanatingfromhighgovernmentallevels.Thedesignatednationalauthoritiesshouldadministertheregulatoryregimeandimplementcontrolsthroughanexportauthorizationprocess.Insomecountries,thenationalauthorityissubjecttoanoversightmechanism(e.g.bythelegislativebody).

Taskstobeundertakenbytheauthorizationagencymayinclude:

a.Grantingpermission/licencetoengageininternationalarmstrade;b.Receivingandreviewingexportapplications;c.Ensuringcompliancewiththenationallawsandthecountry’sobligationsunderinternationallaw,includingArticle6oftheATT;d.ConductingtheexportassessmentrequiredunderArticle7oftheATT;e.Issuingordenyingexportauthorizationsand,inthecaseofthelatter,ensuringfullcompliancethroughinter‐agencycooperation;f.Ensuringthatalldocumentationandapprovalsfortheexportofconventionalarmsanditemsaredetailedandissuedpriortotheauthorizationg.Keepingrecordsofexportlicences/authorizations;h.Makingavailableappropriateinformationaboutanauthorization,uponrequest,totheimportingStateandtotransitortrans‐shipmentStates,ifapplicableandsubjecttoitsnationallaws,policiesandpractices;i.Coordinatingwithotherministriesanddepartmentsinvolvedintheexportauthorizationprocess;j.Reportingtotheoversightbody,whereapplicableandinaccordancewithnationallaws;k.Conductingawareness‐raisingprogrammesandoutreachtoindustry,includingprovidinginformationtofamiliarizeindustrywiththerelevantlawsandprocedures;

l.Assessingtheinternalcompliancesystems/programsofexportingcompanies.

1.3.Regulatoryproceduresforconventionalarmsexports

1.3.1.Sequencingprocedures


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Thenationalexportcontrolsystemshouldindicatethesequencingprocedurestobefollowedinexportinganyconventionalweaponsorrelateditemsincludedinthenationalcontrollist.

Typically,thesequencingprocedureswillentail:

Pre‐requisite–PermissionfromtheGovernmentfortheexporterandotheractorsinvolvedinthetransfertoengageininternationalarmstrade(inStateswheresuchpermissionisrequired).

Step1‐Exporterobtainsfromtheimporteranimportauthorization,ifapplicableorfeasible,end‐use/userdocumentationandotherrelevantdocuments.TheexportingStateverifiestheauthenticityofrelevantdocuments.Thebrokerinvolvedinthetransfer,ifany,obtainsbrokeringauthorization.

Step2‐Exporterappliesforexportauthorization.

Step3‐Exportassessmentisconductedbynationalexportcontrolauthorities.

Step4‐Exportauthorizationisgranted/deniedbynationalauthorizationagency.

Step4bis.–IfanexportingStatePartybecomesawareofnewrelevantinformation,exportauthorizationisre‐assessedafterconsultations,ifappropriate,withtheimportingState.

Step5‐Transit/trans‐shipmentauthorizationisobtainedfromtransit/trans‐shipmentState.

Figure1‐Sequencingprocedure

Operatinglicence(onlyifrequiredbynationallaw)

StatesParties,accordingtotheirnationallaws,mayestablishanexportlicensingsystemwherebyonlytheholdersofavalidoperatinglicencecanapplyforanexportauthorization.Insuchcases,theoperatinglicenceisapre‐requisiteforapplyingforanexportauthorization.Normally,anauthorizationwouldberequiredforeachseparatetransaction.


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Applicationforanoperatinglicence(onlyifanoperatinglicenceisrequiredbynationallaws)

Applicantsforoperatinglicencesshouldberequiredtomeetthecriteriasetforthbynationalregulations.Anapplicationforanoperatinglicenceshouldberefusedif:

a.Theapplicantfailstomeetthelicensingcriteriaestablishedbynationalregulations.

b.Thereisevidenceofpastinvolvementbytheapplicantinillicittradeofweapons.

c.Informationsubmittedinsupportoftheapplicationisfalse,inaccurateorincomplete.

d.TheapplicanthasbeenrefusedanoperatinglicenceinanotherStateongroundsthatwouldalsoapplyintheStateconsideringtheapplication.

e.Theapplicanthasacriminalrecord.

Expirationoftheoperatinglicence(onlyifanoperatinglicenceisrequiredbynationallaws)

Whereexportlicencesareissued,thevalidityoflicencesshouldbelimitedintime.Thesedocumentsshouldhaveanexpirationdateafterwhichtheyarenolongervalid.Theexpirationdateshouldbeclearlymarkedonoperatinglicences.Thenationalauthoritycoulddistributetheinformationonexpirationdatestootherauthoritiesinvolvedinexportcontrol,especiallycustoms.

Obtainingandverifyingnecessarydocuments

Whenapplyingforanexportauthorization,theexportershouldberequiredtosubmitrelevantdocumentstoaccompanyitsapplication.ThenationalauthorityoftheexportingStatePartyshouldreviewandverifytheauthenticityofthedocumentssubmittedaswellasthetruthfulnessandaccuracyofinformationcontainedtherein.Examplesofrelevantdocumentsinclude:

a.Importauthorization;

b.End‐use/userdocumentation;

c.Brokeringauthorization.

Step1‐ImportauthorizationIfapplicable,theexportermayobtainanimportauthorizationfromtheimportingStatepriortoapplyingforanexportauthorization.However,notallcountriesissueimportauthorizations.

End‐use/userdocuments

Thenationalexportcontrolauthoritiesmayrequirethesubmissionofend‐use/userdocumentation.End‐use/userdocumentscanhavedifferentnamesdependingonthecountryorwhethertheend‐userisagovernmentalentityorprivateentity(e.g.,end‐usercertificates,end‐usestatements).


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Anend‐use/usercertificationprocessmayrequirethesubmissionofanend‐usercertificate,end‐use/userstatementorassuranceorotherdocumentsthatproviderelevantinformationabouttheend‐use/user.TheexportingStatemayturntoothersourcesinordertoobtainadditionalinformationthatwouldcorroboratetheveracityorreliabilityofdocumentsprovidedbytheimporterandoftheend‐userandimporterthemselves.Thereisnointernationallyagreedstandardformatforend‐use/userdocuments,includingend‐usercertificates.9Thesedocumentsmostfrequentlycontain:10

a.Dateofissuance;

b.Contractnumber;

c.Detailsoftheexporter(name,address);

d.Detailsoftheend‐user(name,address);

e.Detailsoftheconsignees,brokersorotherpartiesinvolvedinthetransfer,ifapplicable(name,address);

f.Countryoffinaldestination;

g.Descriptionofthegoods;

h.Quantity;

i.Value;

j.Statedend‐useofthegoods;

k.Nonre‐exportclause;

l.Fullnameofpersonauthorizedtosignend‐usercertificate,signatureofsaidperson;

m.SealofcompanyorGovernment.Itshouldbenotedthattheshifttowardselectronicapplicationsmaybringaboutnewformsofauthenticationotherthanwatermarksandembossedstampsorseals.However,suchtraditionalmethodscontinuetoservetheirpurposewhereelectronicsystemsarenotinplaceorwherehardcopiesarerequiredinadditiontoelectronicapplications.11

Authenticationofend‐use/userdocuments

Authenticationofend‐use/userdocumentsisalegalformalitybywhichtheauthoritiesofimportingStatescertifytheauthenticityofsignaturesaffixedtothedocuments,thecapacityinwhich

9 Some regional or other organizations, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU) have produced best practice guidelines that elaborate on the types of information and assurance that should be contained in end-user certificates. 10 Also, exporting States often have specific legal requirements for contents or may provide templates to be utilized or completed by the importers. 11 Some electronic applications systems still require the submission of an original, hard-copy EUC.


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thesignatoriesareactingand,ifapplicable,theauthenticityofthesealorstampaffixedtothedocument.Uponrequest,importingStatesshouldassistexportingStatesinend‐use/userverificationprocesses,includinginauthenticatinganddeterminingthevalidityandreliabilityofend‐userdocuments.Thisassistancecouldbeprovidedthroughembassiesorconsularagents,ifpossibleandappropriate.Forexample,thedeliveryofend‐use/userdocumentscouldbecarriedoutthroughdiplomaticchannels.Intheirend‐use/userverificationprocesses,thenationalexportcontrolauthoritiescanuseavarietyofsourcesofinformation,includingchecksagainstopensourceinformationsuchastelephoneandbusinessdirectories,internetsources,nationalcontactpointsandanyothersourcesavailabletotherelevantauthoritiesintheexportingStates.12

Step2‐ApplyingforexportauthorizationsExportauthorizationsshallberequiredforalltransfersofconventionalarms,ammunition/munitionsandpartsandcomponents,regardlessofwhethertheimporterisaStateoranon‐Stateentity.Therefore,exportauthorizationsarerequiredfor:

a.State‐to‐Statetransfers;13

b.State‐to‐privatetransfers;14

c.Private‐to‐Statetransfers;

d.Commercialsales(private‐to‐private).

Contentsofapplicationsforexportauthorizations

EachStatedecidesontheformatandcontentoftheapplicationformforauthorizationsregardingexportsofconventionalarmsandrelateditemsthatareincludedonthenationalcontrollist.Theapplicationformcouldrequestthefollowinginformation:

a. Nameandcontactdetailsoftheapplicantfortheauthorization;

b. Applicant’soperatinglicencenumber,ifapplicable;

c. Detaileddescriptions(type,modelname,modelnumber,quantity,etc.)ofitemsforexport;

d. Detailsofthetransfer(value,dateoftransfer,etc.);

e. Countries/portsoftransitand/ortrans‐shipment,ifapplicableandknownatthetimeofapplication;

12 For more on end-use and end-user control systems: www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/OccasionalPapers/PDF/OP21.pdf 13 In this particular context, the term “State” refers to government entities, such as armed forces and law enforcement institutions. 14 In this context, the term “private” refers to any non-State entity, including, but not limited to, private individuals and organizations.


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f. Namesandcontactdetailsofbrokers,intermediaries,importer,consigneesoranyotherpartiesinvolvedinthetransfer;

g. Detailsofthetransportroute,includingthemeansoftransporttobeusedforeachsegment,ifknownatthetimeofapplication;

h. Countryofimport;

i. Intendeduseoftheitemsbeingexported;

j. Nameandcontactdetailsoftheauthorizedend‐user.

Adulyfilledapplicationformshouldbeaccompaniedbyanyotherrequireddocuments(importauthorization,end‐use/userdocumentation,etc.)andshouldbesubmittedtothenationalauthorizationagencyviaprescribedmethodsdeterminedbythenationallaw.

Step3‐UndertakingtheexportassessmentUponreceiptofdulyfilledapplicationsforexportauthorizationandallotherrequireddocuments,theauthorizationauthoritiesshouldassesstheapplications,takingintoaccountthefollowingprinciples:

a.Non‐discriminationExportassessmentsshallbecarriedoutinanon‐discriminatorymanner.

b.ObjectivityEachStatePartyshallimplementtheATTinanobjectivemanner.Inordertoensureobjectivity,exportassessmentsbemadeonthebasisofasetofclearandpre‐definedcriteriainaccordancewithnationallegislationandpolicies.

c.TransparencyProceduresforexportauthorizationshouldbewelldefinedinrelevantlawsorregulations,andbeapplicabletoallexportauthorizationprocesses,unlessotherwisestipulatedbylawsorregulations.Inordertoensuremaximumtransparency,generalinformationonassessmentproceduresshouldbepubliclyavailableandtheresultsofparticularexportassessmentsshouldbeaccessibletothepartiesconcerned.


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Figure2‐Conductinganexportassessment15

a. Preliminaryassessment

Theauthorizationagencyshouldpre‐screenapplicationstodetermineif:

-Allnecessarydocumentation(e.g,end‐use/userdocumentation,importauthorizationifapplicable)isdulycompleted;

-Eligibilityconditionsconcerningtheexporter/manufactureraremet(e.g.,doestheexporterhaveanoperatinglicence?Istheexporterotherwisequalifiedtoapplyforanexportauthorization?Istheexporter/manufacturernotbarredduetoapriorviolationorsomeotherreason?).

b. Assessmentonprohibitionsoftransfers16

TheauthorizationagencyhastoassesswhethertheproposedexportisnotprohibitedunderArticle6oftheATT.

Tothatend,theauthorizationauthoritiesshallassess:

15 This diagram aims to reflect the order of the relevant articles of the ATT, hence it begins with an assessment of the prohibitions (Article 6), followed by the assessment of the risks listed in Article 7, which is in turn followed by an assessment of the risk of diversion (Article 11). In practice, national authorities may not necessarily follow this sequence and may choose to cover all the steps in a single assessment. 16 For a detailed analysis on Article 6 (Prohibitions) of the ATT, see module 5.


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IftheproposedexportwouldviolatetheState’sobligationsundermeasuresadoptedbytheSecurityCouncilactingunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharter,inparticulararmsembargoes;

IftheproposedexportwouldviolatetheState’srelevantinternationalobligationsunderinternationalagreementstowhichitisaParty,inparticularthoserelatingtothetransferof,orillicittraffickingin,conventionalarms;

IftheStatehasanyknowledgethatthearmsoritemstobeexportedwouldbeusedinthecommissionofgenocide,crimesagainsthumanity,gravebreachesoftheGenevaConventionsof1949,attacksdirectedagainstcivilianobjectsorciviliansprotectedassuch,orotherwarcrimesasdefinedbyinternationalagreementstowhichitisaParty.

Ifitisfoundthattheexportwouldleadtoanyoftheviolationsmentionedabove,theexportingStateshalldenytheexportauthorization.

Statesmayalsoestablishadditionalcriteriaintheirnationallawstoprohibitexportauthorizationsofconventionalarms,ammunition,partsandcomponents.

Incarryingouttheassessment,theauthorizationagencyshouldseekinformationandinputsfromotherrelevantgovernmententitiesaswellasothersources,includingopensources.

c. Riskassessment

IfitisfoundthattheexportwouldnotviolatetheprohibitionssetforthinArticle6oftheATT,then,theexportingStatePartyshallassessiftheexportwouldcarryanyoftheriskslistedunderArticle7oftheTreaty.

Tothatend,theexportingStateshallassess:

Thepotentialthattheconventionalweaponsoritemswouldcontributetoorunderminepeaceandsecurity.17Itisnotedthattheuseof“would”inArticle7(1)(a)setsahigherthresholdforcertaintythanthatofArticle7(1)(b),which,instead,usestheword“could”.

Inmakingthisassessment,thenationalauthoritiesshouldidentifyandweighthepositiveandnegativeconsequencesstemmingfromtheexportofitemscoveredbyArticles2(1),3and4.Ifthoseauthoritiesdeterminethatanexportislikelytocontributetopeaceandsecurity(apositiveoutcome),theyshouldaddthisfindingtothelistoffactorsfavouringtheauthorizationoftheexport.Ifthenationalauthoritiesfindthatanexportislikelytounderminepeaceandsecurity(anegativeoutcome),theyshouldaddthisrisktothelistoffactorsthatpointtowardstheneedforconsiderationofmitigatingmeasuresoradenialoftheexport.

Theriskthattheconventionalweaponsoritemscouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanitarianlaw.18

17 Article 7 (1) (a). 18 Article 7 (1) (b) (i).


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Whatisaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanitarianlaw?19

Aseriousviolationofinternationalhumanitarianlawisawarcrime.Suchaviolationcantakeplaceininternationalornon‐internationalarmedconflicts.

Aviolationisserious,ifitendangersprotectedpersons(e.g.civilians,prisonersofwar,thewoundedandsick)orobjects(e.g.civilianobjectsorinfrastructure)orifitbreachesimportantvalues.

Themajorityofwarcrimesinvolvedeath,injury,destructionorunlawfultakingofproperty.Actscanamounttowarcrimesbecausetheybreachimportantuniversalvalues,evenwithoutphysicallyendangeringpersonsorobjectsdirectly.Theseinclude,forexample,abusingdeadbodiesandrecruitingchildrenwhoareunder15yearsofageintothearmedforces.

Seriousviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaware:

•GravebreachesasspecifiedunderthefourGenevaConventionsof1949;20

•GravebreachesasspecifiedunderAdditionalProtocolIof1977;21

•WarcrimesasspecifiedunderArticle8oftheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt;

•Otherwarcrimesininternationalandnon‐internationalarmedconflictsincustomaryinternationalhumanitarianlaw.

Suggestedindicatorstoassesstheriskthattheexportofcovereditemscouldbeusedinthecommissionofaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanitarianlaw22,23

-Whethertheimporterorend‐userhascommittedseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw;

-Whetherornottheimporterorend‐userhasaidedorabettedseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw;

-WhetherornottheimportingState24hastakenallfeasiblemeasurestopreventviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaworcausethemtocease,includingbypunishingthoseresponsible;

-WhetherornottheimportingStatehasmadeaformalcommitmenttoapplyrulesofinternationalhumanitarianlawandtakenappropriatemeasuresfortheirimplementation;

-WhetherornottheimportingStatehasinplacethelegal,judicialandadministrativemeasuresnecessaryfortherepressionofseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw;

19 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Explanatory Note What are “serious violations of international humanitarian law”?, available at www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2012/att-what-are-serious-violations-of-ihl-icrc.pdf. 20 Articles 50, 51, 130, 147 of Conventions I, II, III and IV respectively. 21 Articles 11 and 85. 22 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Arms transfer decisions: Applying international humanitarian law criteria – A practical guide (2007), in particular pages 5-15. Available at www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0916.htm 23 The proposed indicators listed herein are to be understood as a non-exhaustive list of suggestions. Except for the indicators that correspond to the criteria or factors stipulated in the ATT, particularly in Articles 6 and 7, it is up to each State Party to decide which indicators would be most appropriate for use in its export assessments. 24 Transfers to non-State entities that are not under the control or jurisdiction of a State must also be subject to the prohibitions and risk assessments provided in Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT.


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-WhetherornottheimportingStatedisseminatesinternationalhumanitarianlaw,inparticulartothearmedforcesandotherarmsbearers,andhasintegratedinternationalhumanitarianlawintoitsmilitarydoctrine,manualsandinstructions;

-WhetherornottheimportingStatehastakenstepstopreventtherecruitmentofchildrenintothearmedforcesorarmedgroupsandtheirparticipationinhostilities;

-WhetherornottheimportingStatehasestablishedaccountableauthoritystructureswiththecapacityandwilltoensurerespectforinternationalhumanitarianlaw;

-Whetherornotthearmsandmilitaryequipmentrequestedarecommensuratewiththeend‐useand/ortheoperationalrequirementsandcapacitiesofthestatedend‐user;

-WhetherornottheimportingStatemaintainsstrictandeffectivecontroloveritsarmsandmilitaryequipmentandtheirfurthertransfers.

Theriskthattheconventionalweaponsoritemscouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanrightslaw25

Whatisaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanrightslaw?

Whileallhumanrightsviolationsareunacceptable,theATTaddressesonly“serious”violationsofinternationalhumanrightslaw.ThestandardadoptedinArticle7(1)(b)(ii)indicatesthatonlyviolationsofgreatconcerntotheinternationalcommunityshouldpreventtheexportingStatefromauthorizingatransferofcovereditems.Thisstandardunderlinesthehumanrightsconsequencesofarmstransfers.

Thisstandardshouldincorporatetheduediligencestandardinhumanrightslaw.

TheduediligencestandardrequiresthatexportingStatesengageinaneffectiveinquiryinordertomakeareasoneddeterminationastowhethertheproposedexportcarriesasubstantialriskoffacilitatingseriousviolations.

Whilehumanrightscanbeviolatedwithorwithoutweapons,transfersofarmstohumanrightsviolatorscanfacilitateorexacerbateviolations.

Whilethereisnointernationallyagreeddefinitionofwhatconstitutesaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanrightslaw,StatesPartiesmaywishtoconsiderthefollowingfactorsindeterminingwhatconstitutesaseriousviolation:

-Thenatureoftherightviolated;

-Themagnitudeoftheviolation;

-Thetypeofvictim(vulnerability);

-Theimpactoftheviolation.26

25 Article 7 (1) (b) (ii). 26 “What constitutes ‘a serious violations of human rights law’?” Geneva Academy, Academy Briefing No. 6. www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/publications/Briefings%20and%20In%20breifs/Briefing%206%20What%20is%20a%20serious%20violation%20of%20human%20rights%20law_Academy%20Briefing%20No%206.pdf


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Violationsofhumanrightsarealsoseriouswhentheyarepersistent,systematicand/orwidespread.

Examplesofseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanrightslawinclude,butarenotlimitedto:systematicmurder,rape,forceddisplacement,attacksagainstcivilianpopulations,excessiveuseofforce,ill‐treatmentbymilitaryandsecurityforces,disappearances,torture,gender‐basedviolence,andextra‐judicialkillings.

Suggestedindicatorstoassesstheriskthattheexportofcovereditemscouldbeusedinthecommissionofaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanrightslaw

-WhetherornottherecipientStateisapartytointernationalandregionalhumanrightsinstruments;

-Whetherornottheimporterorend‐userhasaidedorabettedaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanrightslaw;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasadoptednationallegislationandregulationtoimplementinternationalandregionalhumanrightsinstruments;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehaslegislationandeffectiveproceduresfortheinvestigationofhumanrightsabusesandviolations,includingthosecommittedbytheStateoritsagents;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasaccountablestructureswiththeauthority,capacityandthewilltoensurerespectforinternationalhumanrightslaw;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasacompetent,independent,impartialandfunctioningjudiciarywiththecapacityandwilltoprosecuteserioushumanrightsviolations;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatedisseminatesinternationalhumanrightslaw,inparticulartothesecurityandpoliceforcesandotherarmsbearers,andhasintegratedinternationalhumanrightslawintoitstraining,manualsandinstructions;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasindependentmonitoringbodiesandnationalinstitutionsforthepromotionofinternationalhumanrightslaw;

-WhetherthereisarecordofimpunityforhumanrightsviolatorsintherecipientState;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasmechanismsformonitoringandinvestigatingallegedseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanrightslaw;

-WhetherornotthereisevidencethatthetypeofarmsdescribedintheexportauthorizationapplicationorasimilartypeisorhasbeenusedforseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanrightslawintherecipientState;

-Whetherornotthearmsandmilitaryequipmentrequestedarecommensuratewiththeoperationalrequirementsandcapacitiesofthestatedend‐user;

-Whetherornottheconductofthestatedend‐userinrespectinginternationalhumanrightslawhasbeensubjectofsubstantialconcernbyUNhumanrightsmonitoringbodies,regionalhumanrightsmonitoringbodies,nationalhumanrightscommissions;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatemaintainsstrictandeffectivecontroloveritsarmsandmilitaryequipmentandtheirfurthertransfers.


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TheriskthattheconventionalweaponsoritemscouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateanactconstitutinganoffenceunderinternationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtoterrorismtowhichtheexportingStateisaParty.27

Internationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtoterrorism-ConventiononOffencesandCertainOtherActsCommittedOnBoardAircraftof1963;-ConventionfortheSuppressionofUnlawfulSeizureofAircraftof1970anditsProtocolthereto

of2010;28-ConventionfortheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsagainsttheSafetyofCivilAviationof1971and

itsProtocoltheretoof1988;29-ConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentofCrimesAgainstInternationallyProtected

Personsof1973;30-InternationalConventionagainsttheTakingofHostagesof1979;31-ConventiononthePhysicalProtectionofNuclearMaterialof1980anditsamendments;32-ConventionfortheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsagainsttheSafetyofMaritimeNavigationof

1988anditsProtocoltheretoof2005anditsProtocoltheretoof1988,anditsProtocoltotheProtocolfortheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsagainsttheSafetyofFixedPlatformsLocatedontheContinentalShelfof2005;33

-ConventionontheMarkingofPlasticExplosivesforthePurposeofDetectionof1991;34-InternationalConventionfortheSuppressionofTerroristBombingsof1997;35-InternationalConventionfortheSuppressionoftheFinancingofTerrorismof1999;36-InternationalConventionfortheSuppressionofActsofNuclearTerrorismof2005;37-ConventionontheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsRelatingtoInternationalCivilAviationof

2010.38

Suggestedindicatorstoassesstheriskthattheexportofcovereditemscouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateterroristacts

-WhetherornottherecipientStateisapartytointernationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtoterrorism;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasadoptednationallegislationandregulationstoimplementinternationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtoterrorism;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehaslegislationandeffectiveproceduresforinvestigatingoffencesunderinternationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtoterrorism;

27 Article 7 (1) (b) (iii). 28 www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Docs/beijing_protocol_multi.pdf. 29 www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Lists/Current%20lists%20of%20parties/AllItems.aspx. 30 www.unodc.org/tldb/en/1973_Convention_Internationally%20Protected%20Persons.html. 31 www.unodc.org/tldb/en/1979_Convention_Hostage%20Taking.html. 32 www.iaea.org/publications/documents/conventions/convention-physical-protection-nuclear-material. 33 www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx. 34 www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?d=2822. 35www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/Special/1997%20International%20Convention%20for%20the%20Suppression%20of%20Terrorist.pdf. 36www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/Special/1999%20International%20Convention%20for%20the%20Suppression%20of%20the%20Financing%20of%20Terrorism.pdf. 37 www-ns.iaea.org/security/nuclear_terrorism_convention.asp. 38 www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Docs/beijing_convention_multi.pdf.


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-WhetherornotaccountabletherecipientStatehasstructureswiththeauthority,capacityandthewilltoensurerespectforinternationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtoterrorism;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasacompetent,independent,impartialandfunctioningjudiciarywiththecapacityandthewilltoprosecuteoffencesunderinternationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtoterrorism;

-Whetherornottheimporter,end‐userorrecipientStatefinancesorsponsorsterroristgroups;

-Whetherornottheimporterorend‐userhasaidedorabettedviolationsofinternationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtoterrorism;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasarecordofprosecutingorextraditingoffendersthatarebroughtintoitscustody;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasassistedotherStatesinconnectionwithcriminalproceedingsbroughtunderanyinternationalconventionorprotocolrelatingtoterrorism;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasarecordofimpunityforperpetratorsofterroristacts;

-WhetherornottherecipientStateexercisesstrictandeffectivecontroloveritsarms,ammunitionandpartsandcomponentswithinitsjurisdiction.

TheriskthattheconventionalweaponsoritemscouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateanactconstitutinganoffenceunderinternationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtotransnationalorganizedcrimetowhichtheexportingStateisaParty39OffencesunderinternationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtotransnationalorganizedcrimeOrganizedcrimeisathreattopeaceandhumansecurity.Itviolateshumanrightsandunderminesthepolitical,socio‐economic,civilandculturaldevelopmentofStates.OffencesundertheUNConventionagainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime(UNTOC)StatespartiestotheConventionshallestablishthecriminaloffencesof:-participatinginanorganizedcrimegroup;-moneylaundering;-corruption;-obstructionofjustice.UnderthethreesupplementaryProtocolsofUNTOC–onTraffickinginPersons,SmugglingofMigrantsandTraffickingofFirearms–StatesPartiestotheProtocolshavetocriminalize:-traffickinginpersons;-attemptstocommitahumantraffickingoffence;-participationasanaccompliceinahumantraffickingoffence;-organizingordirectingotherstocommithumantrafficking;-smugglingofmigrants;-enablingapersontoremaininacountryillegally;-aggravatingcircumstancesthatendangerlivesorsafety,orentailinhumanordegradingtreatmentofmigrants;

39 Article 7 (1) (b) (iv).


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-illicitmanufacturingofandtraffickinginfirearms.

Suggestedindicatorstoassesstheriskthattheexportofcovereditemscouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateanactconstitutinganoffenceunderinternationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtotransnationalorganizedcrime

-WhetherornottherecipientStateisapartytointernationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtotransnationalorganizedcrime;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehaslegislationandeffectiveprocedurestoinvestigateoffencesunderinternationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtotransnationalorganizedcrime;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasaccountablestructureswiththeauthority,capacityandthewilltoensurerespectforinternationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtotransnationalorganizedcrime;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatefinancesorsponsorstransnationalorganizedcriminalgroups;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasarecordofprosecutingorextraditingoffendersthatarebroughtintoitscustody;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasassistedotherStatesinconnectionwithcriminalproceedingsbroughtunderanyinternationalconventionorprotocolrelatingtotransnationalorganizedcrime;

-Whetherornotthereisarecordofimpunityforparticipantsinorganizedcriminalactivities,humantraffickers,smugglersofmigrants,money‐launderers,corruptofficials,firearmstraffickersintherecipientState;

-WhetherornotthereisevidencethatthetypeofarmsdescribedintheexportauthorizationapplicationorasimilartypeisorhasbeenfrequentlyusedfororganizedcrimeintherecipientState;

-Whetherornotthearmsandmilitaryequipmentrequestedarecommensuratewiththeend‐useoroperationalrequirementsandcapacitiesofthestatedend‐user;

-WhetherornottherecipientStateexercisesstrictandeffectivecontroloverarms,ammunitionandpartsandcomponentswithinitsjurisdiction.

Sourcesofinformation

ExportingStatesmayconsultavarietyofinformationsources,astheydeemrelevant,inordertoconductexportassessments.Sourcescouldinclude:a.ThecurrentlistofSecurityCouncilarmsembargoesinforce;

b.ImplementationassistancenoticesissuedbytheSecurityCouncilCommittees;

c.DocumentationfromUNhumanrightsbodiesandinternationaltribunals;

d.IntelligenceandotherinformationavailabletotheStatePartythroughbilateralorregionalinformationexchangesmechanisms;

e.InformationexchangedwithotherStatesPartiestotheATT;


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f.Documentationfromotherinternationalandregionalhumanrightsmonitoringbodies;

g.Reportsfromcrediblenationalhumanrightsinstitutions,internationalandnationalNGOsandthemedia.

RoleofimportingStatesintheexportassessment

AnimportingStatesshallprovideappropriateandrelevantinformation,uponrequest,totheexportingStateinaccordancewiththeimportingState’snationallaws.Suchinformationcouldinclude:

a.Declarationofintendeduseofthetransferredweapons;

b.Officialundertaking/assurance/guaranteenottore‐exportinamannerthatwouldruncountertotheprovisionsoftheATTornottouseforunintendedpurposes;c.Informationonthecountry’simportsystem,itsmeasurestoenhanceweaponscontrol,storage,andpreventdiversion.

Mitigationmeasures40

IfitisdeterminedthattheproposedexportcarriesanyoftheriskslistedinArticle7(1)(a)or7(1)(b),theexportingStateshallconsiderwhethertherearemeasuresthatcouldbeundertakentomitigatetherisksidentified.Suchmitigationmeasurescouldinclude:

-Confidence‐buildingmeasures;

-JointlydevelopedandagreedprogrammesbytheexportingandimportingStates.

Confidence‐buildingmeasures

Confidence‐buildingmeasures(CBMs)enhancethereliabilityofimportingStatesregardingtheobservanceofrelevantinternationallawandtheexerciseofcontrolovertransferredweaponsoritems,soastopreventunauthorizeduseordiversion.WhiletherearemanypossibleformsofCBMs,examplescouldinclude:

UndertakingbytheimportingStatenottore‐exportorre‐transferinamannerthatwouldruncountertotheprovisionsoftheATT;

DeclarationbytheimportingStateofintendeduseofthetransferredweaponsoritems,accompaniedbytheundertaking/assurance/guaranteenottousethemforotherpurposes;

Provisionofinformationonweaponsoritemsstolen,lostorotherwiseunaccountedfor;

DisclosurebytheimportingStateofitsrecordsregardingobservationofrelevantinternationalhumanrightslaw,internationalhumanitarianlaw,internationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtoterrorismandtotransnationalorganizedcrime;

Enhancementoftransparencyonmilitarymatters.

40 Article 7 (3).


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Jointlydevelopedandagreedprogramme

InadditiontoCBMs,exportingandimportingStatescouldagreeonjointlydevelopedprogrammestomitigatetherisksofnegativeconsequencesoftheweaponsexport,suchas:

Post‐deliverymonitoring/cooperationprogrammes;

JointprogrammestoenhancetheimplementationbyimportingStateof,andcompliancewith,relevantinternationalhumanrightslaw,internationalhumanitarianlaw,internationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtoterrorismandtotransnationalorganizedcrime.

JointprogrammestoenhancethecapacityofimportingStatestocontrolweaponsandpreventtheirdiversion.

Overridingrisk41

Afterconductingtheassessment,theexportingStateshalldecidewhetherornottograntanexportauthorization.TheexportingStateshallalsoconsiderwhethertherearemeasurestomitigateanyoftheriskslistedinArticle7(a)and(b).If,afterconductingtheassessmentandconsideringmitigatingmeasures,theexportingStatePartydeterminesthatthereisanoverridingriskofanyofthenegativeconsequencesidentifiedbytheexportassessment,theexportingStatePartyshalldenytheexportauthorization.

Whatisanoverridingrisk?

DuringtheATTnegotiationstherewasnoagreementastotheprecisemeaningoftheconceptof

“overridingrisk”orhowtoapplyitinpractice.42

Theword“overriding”presupposesthattherisksaretobeweighedagainstsomething.

OnepossibleinterpretationofArticle7(3)isthattheexportingState,afterconductingitsassessmentandconsideringmitigationmeasures,shouldweightheriskofnegativeconsequencesagainstexpectedpositiveconsequencesoftheexport.Inthisinterpretation,iftheriskofnegativeconsequencesoutweighsthelikelihoodofpositiveconsequences,theexportingStateshouldnotauthorizetheexport.

TheATTdoesprovideguidanceastowhatconstitutepositiveconsequencesofanexport:thetransfercontributingtopeaceandsecurity.43ItisuptoeachauthorizingStatetoweighwhetheratransferismorelikelytocontributetopeaceandsecuritythantoengendernegativeconsequences.

AnotherinterpretationcouldbethattheexportingStateshoulddeterminewhethertheriskofnegativeconsequencesoutweighsthelikelihoodthatthoseconsequenceswouldnotoccur.

41 Article 7 (3). 42 For comparative purposes, see the “risk” standard (e.g. article 2.5 (b), article 2.7) and “clear risk” standard (e.g. article 2.2 (a), article 2.2 (c), article 2.4) in European Union Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008E0944&from=EN. 43 Article 7 (1)(a).


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Regardlessoftheinterpretationgiventothe“overridingrisk”standard,whenconductingassessmentsanddecidingonwhetherornottoauthorizeexports,StatePartiesareexpectedtoactinamannerthatisfullyconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheATT.

Thedeterminationofanoverridingriskshouldbeshouldbetheproductofabalancedconsiderationofalltherelevantfacts,basedonanobjectivelyinformedconclusionreachedthroughthesystematicapplicationofcriteriasetbytheATTandusingreliableandcrediblesourcesofinformation.

Riskofdiversion

Seemodule10.

Gender‐basedviolenceTheexportingStateParty,inmakingtheexportassessment,shalltakeintoaccounttheriskoftheconventionalweaponsoritemsbeingusedtocommitorfacilitateseriousactsofgender‐basedviolenceorseriousactsofviolenceagainstchildren.44

Seriousactsofgender‐basedviolenceandseriousactsofviolenceagainstwomenandchildren

Actsofgender‐basedviolenceorseriousactsofviolenceagainstwomenandchildrenconstituteseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaworseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanrightslaw.TheymayalsobeoffencesunderinternationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtoterrorismortransnationalorganizedcrimetowhichtheexportingStateisaparty.

TheConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(CEDAW)establishesthenormsandstandardstopreventandeliminateallformsofdiscriminationagainstwomen,protectandpromotewomen’shumanrightsandensuregenderequality.45

Gender‐basedviolenceimpairsornullifiestheenjoymentbywomenofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedomsundergeneralinternationallaworunderhumanrightsconventions.Itisviolencethatisdisproportionatelydirectedagainstawomanbecausesheisawomanor

44 Article 7 (4). 45 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/.


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thataffectswomendisproportionately.Itincludesactsthatinflictphysical,mentalorsexualharmorsuffering,threatsofsuchacts,coercionandotherdeprivationsofliberty.46

TheConventionontheRightsoftheChild(CRC)providesthelegalstandardstoprotectchildrenfromallformsofviolenceandtopreventviolenceagainstchildren.47

Achildiseveryhumanbeingundertheageof18yearsunless,underthelawapplicabletothechild,majority isattainedearlier.

TheCRChasthreeoptionalprotocols.

Suggestedindicatorstoassesstheriskofconventionalweaponsoritemsbeingusedtocommitorfacilitateseriousactsofgender‐basedviolenceorseriousactsofviolenceagainstwomenandchildren

-WhetherornottherecipientStateimplementsitsobligationsundertheSecurityCouncilresolutions1325and1820;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehaslegislationandeffectiveproceduresinplacetoinvestigateseriousactsofgender‐basedviolenceandseriousactsofviolenceagainstwomenandchildrencommittedbytheStateoritsagents;

-Whetherornotaccountableauthoritystructuresexistwiththecapacityandwilltoensurerespectforinternationalhumanrightslawpertainingtowomenrightsandchildrenrights;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatedisseminatesinternationalhumanrightslawregardingwomenrightsandchildrenrights,inparticularwithinarmedforcesandlawenforcement,andhasintegratedinternationalhumanrightslawonwomen’srightsandchildren’srightsintoitstraining,manualsandinstructions;

-Whetherornotthereisarecordofimpunityforoffenderswhocommittedseriousactsofgender‐basedviolenceand/orseriousactsofviolenceagainstwomenandchildrenintherecipientState;

-Whetherornottherearepatternsofgender‐basedviolenceintherecipientState;

-Whetherornotthereisevidencethatthetypeofarmsdescribedintheexportauthorizationapplicationorasimilartypehasbeenusedrepeatedlyinthecommissionofseriousactsofviolenceagainstwomenorseriousactsofgender‐basedviolence,orthecommissionofseriousactsofviolenceagainstchildren,inparticularrecruitmentofchildsoldiers,intherecipientState.

46 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 19 (1992), www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#top. 47 http://www.unicef.org/crc/.


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Step4‐Denialofexportauthorization/issuanceofexportauthorization

Denialofauthorization

Conditionsfordenial

Theexportshallbedeniedwhen:

a. TheapplicationrelatestoanexportthatshouldbeprohibitedinaccordancewithArticle6;

b. Theexportwouldunderminepeaceandsecurity;

c. TheitemscouldbeleadtothenegativeconsequencescontainedinArticle7;

Theexportshouldalsobedeniedwhentheapplicationcontainswronginformationorforgedsupplementingdocuments.

Notificationofdenialofauthorization

Denialofauthorizationshouldbecommunicatedinwrittenformtotheapplicant.Inordertoensureproceduraltransparency,thenotificationshouldincludeinformationaboutthereasonfordenial.Sharinginformationondenialofauthorizationisofparticularuseinpreventingthediversionofitemstoillicitmarkets.ThiswouldbeconsistentwiththeATTprovisionsonthepreventionofdiversion(Article(11)).

Issuanceofexportauthorizations

IftheproposedexportisnotprohibitedunderArticle6andtheexportassessmentdoesnothaveanegativeoutcome,theauthorizationagencycanissuetheexportauthorization.

Informationtobecontainedintheauthorization

Exportauthorizationsshouldbedetailedandspecific.48Thesedocumentscouldincludethefollowinginformation:

a.Recordidentifier/exportauthorizationnumber;

b.Dateofissuance;

c.Nameandsealofnationalauthorityissuingtheauthorization;

d.Signature,printednameandpositionofthedesignatedofficialoftheauthorityissuingtheauthorization(someoftheseelementsmaynotapplyinthecaseofelectronicapplications,whichmayrequiredifferentelements);

e.Nameandcontactdetailsoftherecipientoftheauthorization;

f.Detaileddescriptions(type,modelname,modelnumber,quantity,etc.)ofitemsauthorizedforexport;

g.Dateofexpirationofauthorization;

48 Article 7 (5).


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h.Countries/portsoftransitand/ortrans‐shipment,ifapplicable;

i.Namesandcontactdetailsofbrokers,intermediaries,consigneesoranyotherpartiesinvolvedinthetransfer;

j.Detailsofthetransportroute,includingthemeansoftransporttobeusedforeachsegment;

k.Countryofimport;

l.Intendeduseoftheitemsbeingexported;

m.Nameandcontactdetailsoftheauthorizedend‐user.

Notificationofexportauthorizations

Notificationofexportauthorizationsshouldbeprovidedtotheexportingcompanyorindividualandrelevantnationalauthoritiesinvolvedinexportcontrol. AStateParty’sannualnationalreportshallcontaininformationonactualexportsoronauthorizedexport.IfaStatechoosesthelatter,exportauthorizationsshallbecommunicatedtotheATTSecretariatthroughtheannualreport,whichwillbesharedwithotherStatesPartiestotheATT.

Step5‐ReassessmentofauthorizationIfaftertheexportauthorizationisissued,theexportingStatebecomesawareofnewrelevantcircumstances,itisencouragedtoreassesstheauthorization.Whenappropriate,thisreassessmentshouldbeconductedafterconsultationswiththeimportingState.49ReasonsforreassessmentStatesareencouragedtoreassesstheauthorizationsif:

a. theybecomeawareofnewrelevantinformationthatmightrequireareviewofthepreviousassessment,particularlywithregardtotherisksaddressedinArticles6and7oftheATT;

b. informationintheapplicationwasfoundtobeforged,incorrectorobsolete;

c. newcircumstanceshavearisenwithrespecttotheend‐user,importingState,thetransitandtrans‐shipmentStates;

d. thereisachangeinthetransitrouteortransportationarrangement;

e. confidence‐buildingmeasures,jointprogrammesandothermitigationmeasuresagreedbetweenexportingandimportingStateshavenotbeenimplementedorrespected.

Proceduresforreassessment

Thereassessmentmayfollowthesamecomprehensiveproceduresfortheinitialexportassessment,ormayfocusonthenewrelevantinformationthatemergedanditsimplications;

Proceduresforreassessmentshouldbeestablishedbylaw.

49 Article 7 (7).


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Resultofreassessment

Reassessmentmayresultin:

a. Authorization/re‐authorizationunderthesameconditions;

b. Authorizationundermodifiedconditions;

c. Temporaryfreeze/suspensionofauthorization;

d. Revocationofauthorization.

1.3Exportofitems

Oncethenecessaryauthorizationshavebeenobtained,theexportercanproceedwiththeexport.

Statesareencouragedtoexchangeinformationamongrelevantgovernmentaldepartmentsandagencies,on:

a. Issuanceofexportauthorization;

b. Departureoftheitemsfromitsterritory/custom;

c. Achangeinthetransferroute,dateortransportationarrangement.

1.3.1.Recordkeepingofexportedweapons

EachStatePartyshallmaintainnationalrecordsofitsexportauthorizationsoritsactualexportsoftheconventionalarmscoveredinArticle2(1).50Therecordsshouldbeasdetailed,accurateandcomprehensiveaspossibleandpreferablyenteredinapre‐determinedformat/template.Recordsshallbekeptforaminimumoftenyears.51Statesareencouragedtorequiremanufacturers–throughlegislation–tomaintainrecordsofactualexportsandreportperiodicallytotheGovernmentonactualexports.TheATTdoesnotrequireStatesPartiestokeeprecordsoftheirexportsofammunitionorpartandcomponents.EachStatePartyisfreetoadoptnationalrecord‐keepingrequirementsthatwouldalsocovertheseitems.

ContentsofrecordslistedintheATT

StatesPartiesareencouragedtoincludeintheirrecords:52

a. Quantity;

b. Value;

50 Article 12 (1). 51 Article 12 (4). 52 Article 12 (3).


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c. Model/type/serialnumber;

d. Export/import/transitauthorizationnumber/date;

e. DetailsofexportingState(s);

f. DetailsofimportingState(s);

g. Detailsoftransitandtrans‐shipmentState(s);

h. Informationaboutend‐users.

Additionalcontentsthatcouldbeincluded

a. Uniqueauthorizationidentifier(e.g.,licencenumber);

b. Issuingagency;

c. Issuedateandexpirydate;

d. Nameandcontactdetailsofrecipient;

e. Yearofmanufacture;

f. Informationonimportand/orexportmarkingifavailable;

g. Copyorscannedcopyofauthorizationdocuments,end‐use/userdocumentationandotherrelevantdocuments;

h. Informationonbroker/intermediary(ifapplicable);

i. Conditionsonexport/import(ifapplicable)(e.g.prohibitiononre‐transfer);

j. Otherinformation,suchasintendeduse.

Maintenanceofrecords

Thechoiceofmethodsforrecordkeepingisanationalprerogative.Agoodrecord‐keepingsystemshouldbeup‐to‐date,easilysearchable,andaccessibleonlytoauthorizedofficials.

Traditionalpaper‐basedrecord‐keepingsystemsareinprincipleasusefulaselectronicsystems.

Use,applicationandsharingofrecords

GoodrecordkeepingisacriticalmeasureforaneffectiveandtransparentsystemforregulatingthetransferofconventionalarmsanditemscoveredunderArticle3and4,inlinewithArticle5(5).Therecordscouldbeusedto:

a. Informexportassessmentsandexportauthorization;

b. Provideinformationneededforinvestigationsofcasesofbreachesofexportcontrollawsandregulations;

c. PreparereportsrequiredbytheATT,theUNRegisteronConventionalArms,andrelevantregionalcommitments;


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d. Preparereportstooversightbodies,suchasparliament,ifrequiredbyrelevantnationallawsandregulations;

e. SharewithimportingState,transit/trans‐shipmentStatesandotherStatesParties,inaccordancewithnationallaws.

1.4.Enforcementmeasures

StatesPartiesshallputinplacemechanismstoenforcelawsandregulationsrelatedtoexport

controls.53Enforcementmechanismsmayentail:

- Identifyingcompetentenforcementagenciesandbestowingthemwithpowerstoenforceexportcontrollegislation;

- Establishingpenalties;

- Inter‐departmentalcooperationbycustomsofficials,policeforces,judiciary;

- Compliancewithexportcontrollawsbyindustry.

1.4.1.Establishmentofpenalties

Penaltiesshouldbeestablishedtodissuadeandpunishviolationsofnationalexportcontrollawsandregulations.Suchpenaltiescouldinclude:

- Fines;

- Administrativesanctions(suspensionorrevocationoflicencesand/orauthorizations;barringviolatorsfromapplyingforlicencesorauthorizationsforcertainlengthsoftime;placingadditionalburdensorimposingrestrictiveconditionsforsubsequentapplicationoflicencesorauthorizations);

- Imprisonment.

1.4.2.Inter‐agencycooperationtoenforcenationalexportcontrollawsandregulations

Effectiveenforcementoflawsandregulationsrequirestheinvolvementofmultiplegovernmentagenciesorservices.WhiledifferentStatesprovidedifferentdutiesforagencies/services,typicallythefollowingcouldbeinvolved:

- Authorizationagency;

- Othernationalauthoritiesinvolvedinlicensing/authorizationprocess;

- Customsandbordercontrol;

- Policeandotherrelevantlawenforcementagencies;

- Intelligenceagencies;

53 Article 14.


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- Judiciary.

Closeinter‐agencycooperationisessentialtoensuretheeffectiveenforcementofnationalexportcontrols.

Customsandbordercontrol

Customandborderpoliceplayanimportantroleinenforcinglawsandregulationsonarmstransfers.Atthebordercheckpoint,customsofficialsshoulddeterminethat:

a.Theshipmentofweapons,ammunitionand/orpartsandcomponentsisaccompaniedbyallrequiredauthorizationsanddocumentation,suchasexport/import/transitauthorizations;

b.Therequireddocumentationisauthenticandaccurate;

c.Thecontentoftheshipmentmatchesthedescriptionintheauthorizations.

Policeandotherlawenforcementagencies

Policeandotherlawenforcementagencies,whereapplicable,shouldbeprovidedwiththenecessaryauthority,investigativeskillsandcapacitytodealwithenforcementofnationalexportcontrollawsandregulations.

Judiciary

Statesmaydevelopacadreofprosecutorsandjudgesspecializedinnationalexportcontrol,tofacilitateexpeditiousprocessingofrelevantcases.

1.4.3.Industry

Statesareencouragedtoplaceobligationsoncompaniesandindividualsinvolvedinthemanufactureandexportofweapons,inparticularregardingrecord‐keeping,reportingofexportsofitemscoveredbytheATT,andcooperationwithenforcementagencies.Companiesandindividualsinvolvedinthemanufactureandexportofweaponsshouldfamiliarisethemselveswithexportcontrollaws,regulationsandproceduressoastofacilitatecompliance.Industrymayestablishnationallyaconsultativebodyorforumtohelpenhanceindustrycompliancetonationalexportcontrollawsandregulation.


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III.Internationalcooperationandassistance

1.Internationalcooperationonsharingofinformation

StatesPartiesshallcooperatewitheachother,consistentwiththeirrespectivesecurityinterestsandnationallaws,toeffectivelyimplementtheATT.54StatesPartiesshouldcooperate,inaccordancewiththeirnationallaw,toassistnationalimplementationoftheTreaty,includingthroughsharinginformationonillicitactivitiesoractors.55Informationprovidedcouldbelimitedbynationallawsonprotectionofpersonaldata,commercialconfidentialityandStates’securityconsiderations.StatesPartiesareencouragedtocooperateinthevalidationofrelevantdocumentsforscreeningthelegitimacyofallpartiesinvolvedinaproposedtransferofitems.StatesPartiesshouldconsidercooperatinginlawenforcementeffortstoinvestigateillicittransferactivities.StatesPartiesshouldengageinbilateralormultilateralcooperationpertainingtotheinvestigationandprosecutionofanyindividualorlegalentityallegedlyinvolvedinillicittransferactivities.StatesPartiescouldconcludebilateralandmultilateralarrangementsormakeuseofexistingarrangementsforsharinginformationonillicittransferactivities.ContactbetweennationalpointsofcontactontheATTisanobviousfirststeptoestablishbilateralcooperationonsharinginformation.56

2.Internationalassistance

StatesPartiesmayseekassistance(technical,legal,financialandothersupport)toregulatearmsexportactivities.StatesPartiesinapositiontoofferassistanceareencouragedtodosowhenarequesthasbeenmade.StatesPartiesshouldexplorepossibilitiesofstrengtheningcapacity‐buildinginpreventingandcombatingillicitbrokeringactivities,including(e.g.throughtheWorldCustomsOrganization(WCO)SAFEframework).57WCO’sColumbusProgrammeaimsatfullimplementationoftheSAFEFrameworkofStandardsandotherWCOconventionsandinstruments.58Whererelevant,StatesPartiesshouldworkwithINTERPOLonoperationalizingaccesstoandefficientuseofINTERPOLdatabases,including:

‐theINTERPOLFirearmsReferenceTable(IFRT)59‐theINTERPOLBallisticInformationNetwork(IBIN)60

54 Article 15 (1). 55 Article 15 (4). 56 See Article 5 (6), and module 4 of this toolkit. 57 www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-tools/tools/safe_package.aspx. 58www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/wco-secretariat/the-directorates/~/link.aspx?_id=D581386AEDDA4B328142E78D89F76536&_z=z 59 www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Firearms/INTERPOL-Firearms-Reference-Table-IFRT. 60 www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Firearms/INTERPOL-Ballistic-Information-Network-IBIN.


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‐theINTERPOLIllicitArmsRecordsandtracingManagementSystem(iARMS)61‐theINTERPOLStolenAdministrativeDocuments(SAD)database‐theINTERPOLStolenandLostTravelDocumentsdatabase(SLTD)62‐theINTERPOLCounterfeitDocumentsdatabase63‐theINTERPOLComparisonofGenuineandFakeDocumentsdatabase64‐theINTERPOLMaritimePiracydatabase.65

NotethatallrelevantINTERPOLdatabasesareaccessiblereal‐timethroughtheI‐24/7networkwhichconnectsallINTERPOLNationalCentralBureaus(NCBs).66INTERPOLencouragesNCBstoextendI‐24/7accesstoadditionalauthorizedlawenforcemententities,suchasbordercontrolunitsandcustomsofficials.INTERPOLcontinuestoprovidetechnicalassistanceandsupporttofurtherextendingitsI‐24/7systemtoadditionalauthorizedlaw‐enforcementorganizations.INTERPOL’sIntegratedBorderManagementTaskForceisthecentralpointofcontactandcoordinationforinternationalborder‐securityactivitiesatINTERPOL.TheTaskForcesupportslawenforcementofficersworkingatthefrontlineofbordersecuritybyprovidingthemwithaccesstoINTERPOLtoolsandservices,deliveringcapacitybuildingandtrainingcourses,andcoordinatingoperationalactivities.67

61 www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Firearms/INTERPOL-Illicit-Arms-Records-and-tracing-Management-System-iARMS. 62 www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Border-management/SLTD-Database. 63 www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Databases. 64 www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Databases. 65 www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Databases. 66 www.INTERPOL.int/Public/Region/Default.asp 67 www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Border-management.