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Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 1

Running head: MODESTY, AROGANCE AND HONESTY OF ACCOUNTS

Honesty doesn’t always pay - the role of honesty of accounts for success made in an

educational setting in inferences of modesty and arrogance.

Shlomo Hareli 1, Bernard Weiner 2 and Jennifer Yee 2

1 Graduate School of Business and Department of Human Services, University of Haifa,

Haifa, Israel

2 Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Shlomo Hareli, Graduate

School of Business and Department of Human Services, University of Haifa, Haifa

31905, Israel; e-mail: [email protected] or to Bernard Weiner, Department of

Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095-156304; e-mail:

[email protected]


Authors' biographical notes:

Shlomo Hareli is a Lecturer of Social Psychology in the School of Management and the

department of Human Services, University of Haifa. His areas of interest include, Social

Psychology, Psychology of Emotions, Attribution processes, Social Emotions and Social

Judgments as these are related to social settings and organizations.

Bernard Weiner is Distinguished Professor of Psychology at the University of

California, Los Angeles. Professor Weiner is a past recipient of the Donald T. Campbell

Distinguished Research Award from the American Psychological Association and the

Palmer Johnson Publication Award from the American Educational Research

Association. He holds honorary doctorates from the University of Bielefeld, Germany

and the University of Turku, Finland. Professor Weiner has research interests in

attribution theory, emotions, responsibility judgments, impression management, help

giving, achievement motivation, reactions to stigmatized, and theories of punishment.

Jennifer Yee – An undergraduate student at the Department of Psychology at the

University of California, Los Angeles.


Abstract

Previous research has documented that attributional information contained in

causal accounts for success induce impressions of arrogance and modesty. The research

further examined the role of accounts as well as level of success when perceivers know

the real reason for success. Two studies of university students revealed that honesty

strongly decreases arrogance and increases modesty in the case of effort accounts, and

not in situations of communicated ability. In addition, honesty was determined not only

by the truth value of an account but also by the extent to which the account induced

impressions of arrogance and modesty. The present findings provide further

understanding of the link between attributional information and social judgments.

Key words: attribution theory, social perception, achievement motivation, arrogance,

modesty, honesty


The study of achievement motivation has primarily focused on the prediction of

performance, such as grade point average and dropping out in a school setting, or output

and number of sales in an employment context. However, the interpersonal context of

most achievement strivings gives rise to a variety of other psychologically meaningful

phenomena in addition to achievement performance (see Hareli & Weiner, 2002). For

example, receiving a high grade in a course could elicit praise, admiration and flattery

from others or the person may be the object of envy and dislike. Furthermore, a failure

might elicit sympathy, anger, contempt, or even Schadenfreude (joy at the failure of

another). At times, these reactions from others may override the achievement itself in

psychological significance and in determining future behavior.

In addition, observers of an achievement also reach inferences about the aptitudes,

character, and personality of the achiever. For example, it might be concluded that the

achiever is smart, or dumb, or industrious, or lazy, all of which have important

psychological implications both for the actor and for the behavior of others toward that

person. In this paper, we focus on two personality inferences elicited in achievement

contexts that have important social and behavioral consequences, namely, arrogance and

modesty.

Arrogance and modesty

Arrogance and modesty are closely linked to the self-presentations of the

achiever. Carlston and Shovar (1983) documented when a performer makes attributions

for success that are internal to the self (e.g., ability or effort), then arrogance is inferred


and perceptions of modesty are reduced. Subsequently, Hareli and Weiner (2000) found

that public accounts ascribing personal success not only to internal causes but also to

causes that are stable, uncontrollable, and desirable (e.g., “I succeeded because I have

high math aptitude”) are particularly likely to elicit beliefs of arrogance. Hence, among

the internal causes, communications of aptitude (stable and uncontrollable) are more

linked to arrogance than are personal statements of effort expenditure (unstable and

controllable). This is in part because all can try hard, whereas having high aptitude is a

characteristic relatively few share and it is unavailable to those not having it.

These communications are important because research in the domain of

impression management and self-presentation has documented the positive social

consequences that modest as opposed to boastful or arrogant communications elicit (e.g.,

Levine & West, 1976; Robinson, Johnson, & Shields, 1995; Schlenker & Leary, 1982;

Wosinska, Dabul, Whetstone-Dion, & Cialdini, 1996). Modesty judgments are especially

desirable in that they help gain access to important social benefits (Carlston & Shovar,

1883; Feather, 1994). Furthermore, people who respond modestly to their achievements

are better liked than those who are boastful (see Stebbins, 1976; Wosinska et al., 1996).

There are, however, some contexts (work interviews for example) in which modesty as

opposed to arrogance does not pay in terms of chances to get the offered job (Wosinska et

al., 1996).

The present research further examines the antecedent conditions that elicit

perceptions of arrogance or modesty. Here we are concerned with how these inferences

are affected by an achiever’s communicated cause for success in conjunction with the


real cause known to the perceiver. In addition, we consider how the level of the success

involved may affect these social judgments. Thus, the present paper addresses the role

communicated causes for success have in inducing impressions of modesty and arrogance

and asks if the truth value of these communications and the level of success achieved

affect these personality inferences.

Previous research and discussion of self-presentation tactics in the context of

achievement success has considered some aspects of the complex relations between

causal accuracy, self-enhancement, and perceived humility (see e.g. Schlenker & Leary,

1982; Vonk, 1999). Among other things, this research indicates understatements of

performance enhance perceptions of modesty, whereas exaggerations of

accomplishments increase perceptions of arrogance (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Thus,

there are indications that perceptions of modesty and arrogance are sensitive to the extent

that the communications of the presenter match reality.

While it has been reported that personal statements of ability are regarded arrogant,

is this also the case when ability in fact is the real cause? It is known individuals prefer

honest communications (Schlenker, 1975), so perhaps a true claim of high ability will not

be regarded arrogant. In a similar manner, perhaps a true claim that success was due to an

external, unstable, and uncontrollable cause (e.g., good luck) will not be regarded as

modest. These examples lead to the prediction that accurate or honest communications

mitigate impressions of arrogance and modesty. On the other hand, as already intimated,

prior research has suggested that decreased inferences of arrogance and increased

inferences of modesty follow when an achiever downplays a personal causal role in a


positive performance by, for example, explaining success by referring to luck or help

from others (external causes). That is, the honesty of communications may be irrelevant

to perceptions of arrogance or modesty.

In the first study reported here information about the communicated causes of

success (ability, effort, help from others, and luck) and the real causes (the same four) are

varied in a factorial design. Ratings of arrogance, modesty, and honesty are assessed.

Previous research has not considered how true versus communicated causes for success

interact in determining inferences about the achiever, or which has greater impact on

inferences about others. In the second study, we replicate the design of the first

investigation using a different context of achievement and also manipulating the level of

success. Prior research examining the relation between accounts for success and the

inferences in question failed to find any effect of level of success on perceptions of

arrogance and modesty (Hareli & Weiner, 2000). However, in prior research the real

cause for success was unknown to the perceiver. Here we tested the possibility that the

importance of the success does affect arrogance and modesty perceptions when the

perceiver knows if the achiever is telling the truth or lying about how the success came

about. Considering that communications understating or exaggerating performance do

affect perceptions of modesty and arrogance (Schlenker & Leary, 1982), it is possible

that variations in level of actual success affect the perceptions in question. For example,

fabricated accounts of ability may have a different impact on perceived arrogance and/or

modesty as the level of achievement varies. This may be so because greater achievements

are expected to also be perceived as more important and hence lies may be considered


less leniently than in the case of achievements of lower significance. This difference in

attitudes toward lies may also be reflected in perceptions of arrogance and modesty.

Study 1

Method

Subjects were 66 undergraduate psychology students at the University of California,

Los Angeles (UCLA) who received course credit for participating. They were asked for

their voluntary participation during an introductory class. The participants first read a

story about a person who achieved success in a school setting. This was followed by l6

combinations of information regarding the cause for success (4 communicated causes X 4

real causes). The four communicated and real causes were high ability, effort

expenditure, help from others, and good luck. Approximately one-half of the subjects (N

= 28) reported their inferences about the arrogance and honesty of the achiever, while the

others (N = 38) reported their beliefs about modesty and honesty. Judgments of modesty

and arrogance were assessed between-subjects to avoid any mutual influences between

the ratings that do not necessarily reflect the actual relation between the two judgments

but rather a stereotypical view that these are opposites. All ratings were made on seven-

point scales anchored at the extremes, ranging from (1) “not at all” to (7) “very much.”

The arrogance (or modesty) and honesty ratings were paired after each information

combination. Within each group, half the participants first rated arrogance (or modesty

depending on the condition) and then honesty, while for the other half these ratings

appeared in the reverse order. Thus, overall each participant rated 16 pairs of judgments

(honesty and arrogance or modesty). Causes appeared in a format of a table in which in


each raw a specific combination of the communicated account appeared. First in order of

appearance was the real cause followed by the reported one. A Latin Square design was

used such that there were 16 different orders of the paired causal information within each

group (participants rating modesty versus those rating arrogance). No more than two

participants within each group received the same order of information.

Results

Arrogance. Arrogance ratings were analyzed using a 4X4 within-subjects analysis of

variance with real causes and stated causes as the independent variables. All effects were

tested using the Wilks' lambda (Λ) (the same procedure is also used in all subsequent

within-subjects ANOVA analyses in Studies 1 and 2). A main effect emerged for the

stated cause of success, Λ =.19, F (3, 20) = 28.76, p < .01, η2 = .81; (see Figure 1).

Newman-Keuls post hoc analyses performed at the level of p=.05 served to explore these

effects (the same method was used also for subsequent post-hoc tests). These tests

revealed that communication of the two internal causes (for ability, M = 4.73; SD = .35;

and for effort, M = 3.29; SD = .26) is regarded as more arrogant than communicating the

external causes (for luck, M = 2.65; SD = .21 and for help, M = 1.78; SD = .18). In

addition, among the internal causes, public statements regarding ability are seen as more

arrogant than are statements of effort expenditure, while among the external causes, luck

is a more arrogant communication than is help from others.

A main effect also was found for the real cause of success, Λ =.50, F (3, 20) = 6.70,

p < .01, η2 = .50;. However, real causes have a weaker effect on arrogance inferences

than do communicated causes, as reflected in their differential levels of effect (η2 = .50


versus η2 = .81, respectively). Further post-hoc analyses revealed that when ability is the

actual cause (the left most bar graph in all four groupings), inferences of arrogance are

reduced in comparison to the other three causes, which do not significantly differ from

one another (for ability, effort, luck, and help, respectively, M = 2.52; SD = .19; M =

3.23; SD = .24; M = 3.37; SD = .24; M = 3.34; SD = .24).

These main effects are qualified by a Stated Cause X Real Cause interaction, Λ

=.17, F (9, 14) = 7.76, p < .001, η2 = .83 (see Figure 1, and upper left section of Table 11).

Further post-hoc analyses revealed that when ability is the stated (communicated) cause,

then inferences of arrogance are relatively high and do not significantly differ as a

function of the real cause. Thus, contrary to some beliefs, honesty does not mitigate

perceptions of arrogance when ability is the stated cause. Turning to the other internal

cause of success, when effort is the communicated cause, arrogance beliefs are

dramatically augmented when the real causes are external to the achiever (help and luck).

Thus, unlike ability, in the case of effort honesty does mitigate perceptions of arrogance.

Level of perceived arrogance in the case of a valid account of effort is also significantly

lower than in the case of the valid account of ability.

Concerning the external causes of success, inferences of arrogance are low except

in the case when luck is claimed although effort expenditure is the real cause. Perhaps in

this instance luck is interpreted as a characteristic of the person and regarded an internal,

stable, and uncontrollable cause, rather than being construed external to the individual

and unstable, as is chance. This belief also contributes to the finding that luck is regarded 1 In describing results of interactions across the paper we stress only major findings relevant to hypotheses. Table 1 serves to describe the full pattern of the results.


a more arrogant communication than help from others. Finally, stating success was

caused by help from others results in low inferences of arrogance, regardless of the real

cause.

Modesty. For modesty, a within-Subjects two-way ANOVA again revealed a main effect

for the stated cause of success, Λ =.36, F (3, 25) = 15.08, p < .001, η2 = .64 (see Figure 2;

for ability, effort, luck and help respectively, M = 5.05; SD = .20; M = 4.40; SD = .24; M

= 3.34; SD = .20; and M = 3.63; SD = .19. Further post-hoc analyses revealed that

statements of external causes of success were regarded more modest than were internal

causal communications, and among the internal causes, effort was a more modest public

statement than ability. In contrast to beliefs about arrogance, luck and help did not

differentially affect modesty judgments and effort was considered as less modest than

luck.

A main effect also was found for the real cause of success, Λ =.13, F (3, 25) =

56.26, p < .001, η2 = .87, revealing the effect of the real cause is greater for modesty than

for arrogance judgments for ability, effort, luck and help respectively, M = 2.42; SD =

.20; M = 3.88; SD = .20; M = 5.20; SD = .19; and M = 4.90; SD = .23, see Figure 2).

Further analyses show that when the real cause is internal to the achiever, then one is

regarded as more modest than when the real cause is external (compare the two left-most

bar graphs with the two right bar graphs within each of the stated causes). Also,

considering the two internal causes, reporting any cause in the context of really having

ability is more modest than reporting any cause in the context of really investing effort

(compare the first and second bar graphs across the four stated causes). Concerning real


external causes in the context of success, there is no difference between these causes

regarding perceived modesty.


=.29, F (9, 19) = 5.16, p < .01, η2 = .71 (see again Figure 2 and second left section of

Table 1). Post-hoc analyses indicate that, as in the case of arrogance, honesty regarding

ability does not mitigate impressions of lack of modesty; that is, stating one succeeded

because of ability when this is true nevertheless elicits inferences of lack of modesty. As

in the case of arrogance, but unlike honest accounts of ability, honest accounts of effort

do induce relative higher impression of modesty. The fact that honesty did augmented

perceptions of modesty for the valid account of effort but not the valid statements of

ability is also apparent from the fact that the effort led to a significantly higher level of

perceived modesty in comparison with ability. Level of modesty when effort was stated

but ability was the real cause was also similarly high. On the other hand, statements of

effort as causal in the context of luck or help as the real causes decrease the likelihood

that the communicator is perceived as modest. External accounts led to relative high level

of perceived modesty regardless of the real cause for success. Unlike in the context of

arrogance, reports of luck when effort is the real cause did not decrease modesty.

Honesty. A mixed-factors three way ANOVA was computed for the honesty ratings with

type of questionnaire (rating modesty versus arrogance) as a between-subjects factor and

real as well as stated causes as within-subjects factors. There were no effects for

questionnaire type, thus indicating that honesty ratings were not affected by which of the

two social inferences participants were asked to rate (all p’s > .19).


There was a relatively weak main effect for the stated cause for success on

honesty, Λ =.63, F (3, 50) = 9.83, p < .001, η2 = .37 (see Figure 3). Further post-hoc

analyses show that ability as the stated cause was perceived as the most honest account

followed by effort. Luck and help led to similarly low levels of perceived honesty (for

ability, effort, luck and help respectively, (for ability, M = 4.08; SD. = .15; for effort, M =

4.11; SD = .14; for luck, M = 3.39; SD = .14; for help, M = 3.65; SD = .15). In sum,

ability as the stated cause relatively reduces perceived honesty.

This main effect was qualified by a Stated Cause X Real Cause interaction, Λ =.21,

F (9, 44) = 18.86, p < .001, η2 = .79 (see Figure 3 and third left section of Table 1). Post-

hoc analyses show, as expected, that in all conditions where the stated cause matches the

real cause, the communicator is perceived as most honest. Conversely, the combination

of stating ability as the cause when the real causes are external to the achiever is the

pattern that results in the communication being regarded as least honest. Likewise,

reporting effort when luck is the real reason is also seen as an account expressing

minimal honesty. Overall this indicates that all lies are not the same in deciding about

honesty.

Discussion

Taken together, the results concerning both personality inferences and honesty lead

to the conclusion that, although others have suggested truthfulness is preferred in

communications (e.g., Schlenker, 1975), honesty does not mitigate inferences of

arrogance in the case of ability self-statements. Consistent with this conclusion, being


least honest (communicating ability when external causes are real) does not significantly

increase inferences of arrogance.

In a similar manner, impressions of modesty are not reduced merely because the

achiever is telling the truth. For example, when success is due to help from others or luck

and this is stated, one nevertheless is considered modest. Finally, honesty ratings are

sensitive not only to the mere question of whether one is telling the truth but also reflect

the extent to which the person is seen as arrogant or modest. Situations in which lies lead

to decreased arrogance or increased modesty (e.g., stating help when ability or effort was

the cause) are seen as more honest than lies that result in higher arrogance and/or lower

modesty (e.g., stating ability or effort when help was the cause). This implies honesty

inferences are not merely determined by a communication’s truth value but also by the

perceived motivation of the communicator. Given that modesty is socially desirable

whereas arrogance is socially undesirable, lies in the service of a socially desirable

impression hurt perceived honesty less than lies inducing a less socially desirable

impression.

In addition, the data suggest that arrogance and modesty are to a great extent

determined by statements made by the achiever, although real causes do play a

supporting role in these inferences. One question that arises in regard to this pattern of

data is whether arrogance and modesty are mere opposites or does each have some

unique features not shared by the other? In support of the position that arrogance and

modesty are not mere opposites, real causes play a greater role in judgments of modesty

than of arrogance. If one has little ability, then there is a reduced opportunity to be


perceived as modest. That is, not everyone has the characteristics that permit or facilitate

modesty inferences. On the other hand, one can always be regarded arrogant regardless of

the truth. Additional support for the belief that arrogance and modesty are not just

opposites is the complex effort/luck relation in judgments of arrogance (stating luck was

the cause when in fact it was effort increases arrogance), which was not evident for

modesty.

On the other hand, it also is the case that arrogance and modesty judgments share

much in common. For example, stating ability as the cause of success promotes

perceptions of arrogance, whereas not using a causal presentation of ability evokes

inferences of modesty. Also, honest statements of effort both decrease inferences of

arrogance and increase inferences of modesty. Further discussion of these data is delayed

until the presentation of Study 2.

The first experiment indicated that perceptions of arrogance and modesty are

mainly influenced by an achiever’s causal communications, although under some

circumstances these inferences are sensitive to the question of the truth value of the

account. In the second experiment we focus on the question of whether the level of one’s

achievement affects the perceptions in question. Prior research indicates that perceptions

of arrogance and modesty are insensitive to the level of an account giver’s achievement.

What determines these perceptions is the achiever’s explanation of success, regardless of

the importance or significance of the achievement (Hareli & Weiner, 2000). However, in

previous research the honesty of the account giver was unknown to the perceiver. In the

present study, we examine the possibility that when a perceiver knows the real reason for


success, modesty and arrogance inferences are sensitive to the importance of the

achievement. That is, lies about how minor achievements came about are not considered

modest and/or arrogant to the same extent as lies about the causes of significant

achievements. Likewise, honest accounts explaining minor achievements may affect

modesty and/or arrogance differently than when explaining more significant

accomplishments. Experiment 2 provides the opportunity to replicate findings from Study

1 using a somewhat different context of achievement, i.e., the success of a university

professor and a somewhat different cultural context (Israel).

Study 2

Method

Subjects were 79 (55 female, 17 male, 7 didn’t specify their gender) undergraduate

psychology students at the University of Haifa, Israel. They were asked for their

voluntary participation during an introductory class. The design was identical to that of

Study 1. However, the level of achievement also was manipulated so that within each of

the groups, about half the participants read about a Professor who conducted an

experiment whose results confirmed his hypotheses. This served as the condition of a low

level of success (total N=35; for arrogance rating group N=20, and for modesty rating

group N=15). The other participants read a description about a Professor from their

school awarded the Nobel Prize for a scientific breakthrough. This was the high level of

success condition (total N=44; for arrogance rating group N=19, and for modesty rating

group N=25). A Latin Square design was used such that there were 16 different orders of

the paired causal information within each group (participants rating modesty versus those


rating arrogance). No more than two participants within each of these groups received the

same order of information.

Results

An independent-samples t-test revealed the manipulation of level of achievement

was successful, t (37) = 2.74, p<.01, η2 =.17 although not as strong as desired. The Nobel

Prize award was seen as a higher achievement (M=5.95; SD=.97) than a successful

experiment (M=4.95; SD=1.28).

Arrogance. For arrogance, a mixed-factors ANOVA with real and stated causes as

within-subjects variables and level of success as a between-subjects variable found a

main effect for the stated cause of success, Λ =.19, F (3, 32) = 46.31, p < .001, η2 = .81

(see Figure 4). Further analyses revealed that communicating the two internal causes (for

ability, M = 4.88; SD = .19 and for effort, M = 3.57; SD = .14) is regarded as more

arrogant than communicating the external causes (for luck, M = 2.00; SD = .16 and for

help M = 1.78; SD = .16). In addition, among the internal causes, public statements

regarding ability are considered more arrogant than are statements of effort expenditure,

while among the external causes, luck is not considered a more arrogant communication

than is help from others.

A main effect also was found for the real cause of success, Λ =.32, F (3, 32) = 22.64,

p < .001, η2 = .68. Similarly to Study 1, real causes have a somewhat weaker effect on

arrogance inferences than do communicated causes, as reflected in their differential levels

of effect (partial η2 = .81 versus partial η2 = .68, respectively). Further analyses revealed

that when internal causes are the actual causes, inferences of arrogance are reduced in


comparison to the situations that involve actual external causes (for ability, effort, luck,

and help, respectively, M = 2.35; SD = .15; M = 2.43; SD = .14; M = 3.69; SD = .14; M

= 3.76; SD = .16). There are no significant differences between ability and effort and

between luck and help.

These effects were qualified by a Stated Cause X Real Cause interaction, Λ =.68,

F (9, 26) = 16.48, p < .001, η2 = .85 (see again Figure 4 and upper right section of Table

1). Further analyses show that arrogance level was highest when ability was

communicated as the cause of success and either luck or help was the real cause. A

somewhat lower level of perceived arrogance emerged when the account of ability was

and when effort was the real cause. Thus, unlike in Study 1, honesty did decrease to some

extent perceived arrogance. In both cases level of perceived arrogance was still higher

than that in the case of any other valid account, and also higher than any account

communicating an external cause or accounts communicating effort when the real cause

is external.

Turning to communications of effort, when effort is the communicated cause,

arrogance beliefs are strongly augmented when the real causes are external to the

achiever (help and luck). Thus, like in Study 1, and in the case of the valid account of

ability, a valid effort account mitigates perceptions of arrogance. Mitigation of

perceptions of arrogance in the case of a valid account of ability is significantly lower

than in the case of the valid account of effort. Thus, although in the present study honesty

mitigated perceptions of arrogance when the account of ability was valid, it did so to a

lesser extent than in the case of a valid account of effort.


Concerning communicated external causes of success, inferences of arrogance are

low except in the case when luck is claimed although help is the real cause. This

replicates the finding from Study 1.

Finally, level of achievement had no effect on perceived arrogance (all p's > .26).

Modesty. For modesty, a mixed-factors ANOVA with real and stated causes as within-

subjects variables and level of success as a between-subjects variable revealed a main

effect for the stated cause of success, Λ =.18, F (3, 31) = 27.72, p < .001, η2 = .73 (for

ability, effort, luck and help respectively, M = 2.64; SD = .17; M = 3.62; SD = .17; M =

5.30; SD = .14; and M = 5.45; SD = .17, see Figure 5). Further analyses show that, as

expected, statements of external causes of success were regarded as more modest than

were internal causal communications, and among the internal causes, effort was

considered a more modest public statement than was ability. Luck and help did not

differentially affect modesty judgments. These results replicate the findings of Study 1.

A main effect also was found for the real cause of success, Λ =.27, F (3, 31) =

46.14, p < .001, η2 = .82, (for ability, effort, luck and help respectively, M = 5.26; SD =

.18; M = 4.81; SD = .14; M = 3.58; SD = .15; and M = 3.36; SD = .15). This effect

reflected the fact that when the real cause is internal to the achiever, then one is regarded

as more modest than when the real cause is external. Also, considering the two internal

causes, reporting any cause in the context of really having ability is more modest than

reporting any cause in the context of really investing effort. Concerning real external

causes in the context of success, there is no difference between these causes regarding

perceived modesty. These findings also replicate the findings of Study 1.



=.41, F (9, 25) = 3.99, p < .01, η2 = .59 (see again Figure 5). As apparent in Figure 5 and

the middle right section of Table 1, relative low levels of perceived modesty are

expressed in the context of statements of ability regardless of the real cause for success.

Nevertheless, when the real cause for success is either ability or effort, level of perceived

modesty is somewhat increased. These findings mirror the effects of these accounts in the

context of arrogance. Statements of effort lead to relative high levels of modesty when

the real cause is internal. However, when the real cause is external, statements of effort

are not seen as modest. Again, this mirrors the results in the context of arrogance.

Honesty mitigated perceived modesty both for statements of effort and ability

nevertheless mitigation was stronger in the case of effort. This replicates the findings of

Study 1. Like in Study 1, highest levels of modesty are expressed when external causes

are stated but internal ones are actually the reasons for success. Similarly relatively high

levels of modesty also emerged for all valid causes except for ability but some of these

accounts did not differ from some of the lies that involve external accounts (e.g., reports

of help when luck was the actual reason for success). Overall, these results again indicate

that honesty does not mitigate inferences of modesty. Statements of luck in the context of

success due to help leads to somewhat lower levels of modesty. Like the case of

arrogance, there was no effect for the level of success (all p's > .09).

Honesty. A mixed-factors ANOVA was computed for the honesty ratings with type of

questionnaire (rating modesty versus arrogance) and achievement level as between-

subjects factors and real as well as stated causes as within-subjects factors. There were no


effects for questionnaire type and level of achievement, thus indicating that honesty

ratings were not affected by which of the two social inferences participants were asked to

rate and the level of the achievement involved (all p’s > .10).

There was a main effect for the stated cause for success on honesty, F (3, 198) =

22.72, p < .0001, partial η2 = .26 (see Figure 6). Further Newman-Keuls post-hoc

analyses performed at the level of p=.05 show that, regardless of the real cause, all stated

causes differed from each other in terms of perceived honesty with ability as the least

honest account followed by effort then luck and most honest help (for ability, effort, luck

and help respectively, M = 3.60; SD = .08; M = 3.80; SD = .09; M = 4.12; SD = .11; and

M = 4.37; SD = .10). This replicates the findings of Study 1. In addition, there was a

main effect on honesty for the real cause of success, F (3, 198) = 47.19, p < .0001, partial

η2 = .42. Further Newman-Keuls post-hoc analyses performed at the level of p=.05 reveal

that, regardless of the stated cause for success, when the real cause of success is internal,

the communicator is regarded as more honest than when the real cause of success is

external (for ability, M = 4.51; SD. = .11; for effort, M = 4.40; SD = .11; for luck, M =

3.54; SD = .10; for help, M = 3.43; SD = .09). In sum, ability and effort as stated causes

reduce perceived honesty, whereas ability and effort as real causes relatively increase

perceived honesty.

These effects were qualified by a Stated Cause X Real Cause interaction, F (9, 594)

= 135.84, p <.0001, partial η2 = .67 (see Figure 6 and lower right section of Table 1). As

expected, in all conditions where the stated cause matches the real cause, the

communicator is perceived as most honest. However, within these conditions, a valid


account of help seems somewhat more honest than a valid account of luck. Conversely,

the combination of stating ability or effort as the cause when the real causes are external

to the achiever is the pattern that results in the communication being regarded as least

honest. Finally, reporting effort while ability is the real cause is perceived as more honest

than stating effort while having real external causes for success. Likewise, reporting luck

when help is the real cause for success seems less honest than reporting luck when

internal causes are the real causes for success. These findings stand in accord with our

results in Study 1 and indicate again that all lies are not the same in deciding about

honesty. Overall, in the present experiment we replicated our main findings in Study 1

using a different context of achievement and participants from a different culture. We

failed to find any effect for the level of achievement on arrogance and modesty like in

prior research (Hareli & Weiner, 2000) or honesty.

General discussion

In the present paper, we tested the interplay between the truthfulness of causal

accounts for success and the nature of these causes in determining inferences of modesty,

arrogance and honesty. As previous research in the field of impression formation (e.g.,

Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Vonk, 1999), this research shows that the accuracy of self-

presentations is not the dominant factor in determining the created impression. In two

studies, using different achievement settings, it was evident that honesty does not

necessarily mitigate impressions of modesty and arrogance. To the contrary, some false

accounts increase perceived modesty and decrease perceived arrogance. This finding

stands in contrast to the view holding that higher levels of perceived modesty are


expected when one reports an accurate picture of her/his achievements than a false one

(Ben-Ze’ev, 1993). These findings mirror evidence that exaggerations of achievements

lead to increased perceptions of arrogance while understatements of performance enhance

perceptions of modesty (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). The fact that claiming high ability

produces a relatively high impression of arrogance even when it is accurate goes along

with other findings showing the socially undesirable communications affect other's

impressions regardless of the question of whether it is valid or not. For example, Reeder

and Spores (1983) found that immoral behavior is seen as immoral regardless of its

causes. Likewise, Parkinson (1999) showed that people may experience guilt caused by

others' blaming them even if they do not see themselves responsible for what they are

blamed for. Finally, Hareli (in prep.) found that false feedback given by others for one's

performance is still hurtful even when both the achiever and the person that

communicated that feedback know the information is invalid. Thus it seems that validity

plays a relatively little role in the case of communicating information that has socially

undesirable implications. This idea is further supported by the fact that valid reports of

effort do not lead to similar results despite the fact that communications of effort can lead

to impressions of arrogance if they are reported in the context of success due to external

causes.

The present research also indicates that inferences of modesty and arrogance are

sensitive to the type of the communicated account as well as to the real cause for the

outcome, assuming this is known to the perceiver. For example, whereas accounts of

effort lead to increased impressions of arrogance and decreased impressions of modesty


when perceivers know the actual cause for one’s success was external to the achiever,

stated accounts of effort in the context of internal real causes for success mitigate the

impressions in question. In contrast, statements of ability are less sensitive to the real

cause.

Another conclusion from the present research is that when perceivers know the

real cause for success, the relative impact of specific types of the accounts to others on

modesty and arrogance are sensitive to the different circumstances in which they are

reported. For example, previous studies showed that accounts of ability lead to higher

degrees of arrogance and lowest degrees of modesty in comparison to accounts of effort

and luck (Hareli & Weiner, 2000). In the present research, however, communications of

ability did not emerge as more arrogant and less modest than effort and luck under all

conditions. The relative impact of these accounts was sensitive to the real causes that led

to the achievement. Taken together, it is possible that perceivers weigh the reported cause

of success against the background of information concerning the real cause for it to infer

the intentions of the speaker. Among other things, the perceiver may infer that the

speaker wants to express an advantage over others (i.e., arrogance) or conceal an

advantage to protect others' self image (i.e., modesty). This possibility should be tested in

further research by measuring perceived intentions of the communicator. Finally, on a

more general level, this raises the possibility that the validity of attributional information

is an important factor that may have a significant effect also in other contexts in which

causal attributions play an important role. Prior research of attribution mostly ignored this

factor.


Considering perceptions of honesty, the present research indicated honesty is not

just a function of the truth of one’s communication but also is dependent on whether that

communication is arrogant or modest. Honesty was strongly determined by the truth

value of the account but across both studies accounts that led to higher levels of

arrogance and lower levels of modesty also were judged less honest. This effect on

honesty is in line with previous studies that found a correlation between modesty and

honesty (Robinson et al., 1995).

In the present research, unlike previous studies, participants were aware to the

true reason of success. Hence, modesty or arrogance have an impact on honesty above

and beyond any possible impact on perceived truthfulness of a person’s account. One

explanation for this effect is that modest impressions are associated with accounts

depicting an individual relatively less able. Communications of a state or trait low in

social desirability increase one’s impression of honesty. That is, it is easier to be honest

about desirable things than undesirable or less desirable ones. Hence, people who tell the

truth when that is costly in social terms are considered more honest. This is less the case

when perceiver’s do not know the real reason for success. In such instances self

depreciative accounts do not increase perceptions of honesty and even may reduce such

perceptions (Robinson et al., 1995; Vonk, 1999).

Given that we used vignettes and self reports to study social perceptions, our

findings are susceptible to influence by the participant’s naïve theories related to the

perceptions in questions. The fact that both studies involved a within-subjects design

further increases the potential effect of naïve theories on the response of the participants.


Indeed, recent discussions exploring the question of the extent to which self reports made

in the context of hypothetical scenarios reflect actual experience suggest that such reports

are most likely to represent participant’s beliefs about such situations rather than actual

experiences (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Nevertheless, this view also indicates that the

same beliefs that are reflected in self reports are also likely to determine long-term

reactions to the events under question. Given that perceptions of arrogance and modesty

may have also longer term implications on person perception, the present results are more

likely to represent such reactions. Nevertheless, these do not necessarily have to be

different than the more immediate reactions. It is therefore important to test our

hypotheses with methodologies that go beyond written descriptions of the situations

involved and self-reports.


References

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Quarterly, 30, 235–246.

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Social Psychology, 32, 1030-1037.

Schlenker, B. R., & Leary,M. R. (1982). Audiences’ reactions to self-enhancing,

self-denigrating, and accurate self-presentations. Journal of Experimental Social

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Vonk, R. (1999). Impression formation and impression management: Motives,

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Wosinska, W., Dabul, A. J., Whetstone-Dion, R., & Cialdini, R. B. (1996). Self-

presentational responses to success in the organization: The costs and benefits of

modesty. Basic & Applied Social Psychology, 18, 229–242.

Tabl

e 1

Perc

eive

d A

rrog

ance

, Mod

esty

and

Hon

esty

as a

func

tion

of S

tate

d an

d R

eal C

ause

for S

ucce

ss

Not

e. S

ubsc

ripts

bas

ed o

n N

ewm

an-K

euls

test

s at p

< .0

5. R

atin

gs w

ere

mad

e on

7-p

oint

scal

es. H

ighe

r num

bers

repr

esen

t gre

ater

mod

esty

, ar

roga

nce

and

hone

sty.

Num

bers

with

diff

eren

t sub

scrip

ts d

iffer

at p

< .0

5.

Stud

y 2

St

udy

1

R

eal c

ause

Rea

l cau

se

help

lu

ck

effo

rt ab

ility

help

lu

ck

effo

rt ab

ility

St

ated

cau

se

M

=5.5

3 a

SD=2

.08

M=5

.92

a SD

=1.5

7 M

=4.3

1 b

SD=1

.72

M=3

.69

b

SD=1

.85

M

=5.2

6 a

SD=2

.32

M=4

.87

a SD

=2.3

6 M

=4.1

3 a

SD=2

.40

M=4

.65

a SD

=2.1

7 ab

ility

A

rrog

ance

M=5

.08

a SD

=1.7

6 M

=5.2

2 a

SD=1

.59

M=1

.89

d

SD=1

.28

M=2

.11

d SD

=1.4

7

M=4

.52

a SD

=2.1

5 M

=4.6

5 a

SD=2

.12

M=1

.87

b SD

=1.6

3 M

=2.1

3 b

SD=1

.42

effo

rt

M=2

.92

c SD

=1.8

7 M

=1.4

4 d

SD=.

94

M=1

.83

d SD

=1.3

4 M

=1.8

3 d

SD=1

.36

M

=2.3

0 b

SD=1

.69

M=1

.74

b SD

=1.6

3 M

=4.7

0 a

SD=2

.08

M=1

.87

b SD

=1.7

1 lu

ck

M=1

.44

d SD

=.99

M

=2.1

9 d

SD=1

.55

M=1

.72

d SD

=1.2

3 M

=1.7

8 d

SD=1

.51

M

=1.2

6 b

SD=.

54

M=2

.22

b SD

=1.5

7 M

=2.2

2 b

SD=1

.68

M=1

.43

b SD

=.99

he

lp

M

=2.0

3 g

SD=1

.71

M=1

.80

g SD

=1.2

8 M

=2.9

1 f

SD=1

.22

M=3

.83

e SD

=1.6

4

M=2

.14

ef

SD=1

.67

M=1

.96

f SD

=1.5

3 M

=2.6

8 ef

SD

=1.7

2 M

=2.8

9 ef

SD

=1.7

1 ab

ility

M

odes

ty

M

=2.1

4 fg

SD

=1.0

9 M

=2.6

3 fg

SD

=1.5

9 M

=4.7

1 bc

d SD

=1.8

2 M

=5.2

6 ab

c SD

=1.6

0

M=3

.07

e SD

=1.5

6 M

=2.7

1 ef

SD

=1.7

8 M

=4.7

5 c

SD=1

.73

M=5

.00

bc

SD=2

.07

effo

rt

M=3

.97 d

e SD

=1.4

0 M

=5.2

0 ab

c SD

=1.6

9 M

=6.1

1 a

SD=1

.08

M=6

.09

a SD

=1.5

6

M=4

.21

cd

SD=1

.66

M=4

.86

c SD

=1.9

8 M

=5.3

2 bc

SD

=1.6

8 M

=6.3

9 a

SD=.

88

luck

M=5

.57

ab

SD=1

.56

M=4

.54

cde

SD=1

.40

M=5

.77

a SD

=1.6

1 M

=5.9

7 a

SD=1

.67

M

=5.0

0 c

SD=1

.83

M=3

.82

d SD

=1.6

8 M

=4.8

6 c

SD=1

.82

M=5

.93

ab

SD=1

.39

help

M

=1.9

3 f

SD=1

.26

M=2

.17

f SD

=1.5

0 M

=3.9

3 c

d SD

=1.6

9 M

=6.3

6 ab

SD

=1.3

2

M=2

.46

cd

SD=1

.77

M=2

.20

d SD

=1.9

5 M

=3.5

2 b

SD=1

.82

M=5

.93

a SD

=1.8

1 ab

ility

H

ones

ty

Stud

y 1

M=2

.17

f SD

=1.2

2 M

=2.2

0 f

SD=1

.16

M=6

.46

ab

SD=1

.36

M=4

.33

c SD

=1.5

1

M=3

.00

bcd

SD=1

.76

M=2

.28

d SD

=1.6

2 M

=6.1

5 a

SD=1

.66

M=3

.96

b

SD=1

.98

effo

rt

M=2

.91

e SD

=1.5

6 M

=6.1

6 b

SD=1

.81

M=3

.57

d SD

=1.5

1 M

=3.7

9 d

SD=1

.62

M

=3.0

7 bc

d SD

=1.7

3 M

=6.0

9 a

SD=1

.89

M=3

.46

b SD

=1.7

3 M

=3.0

4 bc

d SD

=1.7

2 lu

ck

M=6

.80

a SD

=.53

M

=3.5

3 d

SD=1

.51

M=3

.61

d SD

=1.5

0 M

=3.5

1 d

SD=1

.53

M

=6.1

1 a

SD=1

.77

M=3

.00

bcd

SD=1

.55

M=3

.33

bc

SD=1

.79

M=3

.37

bc

SD=1

.71

help


Figures Caption

Figure 1. Arrogance ratings as a function of stated and real causes – Study 1

Figure 2. Modesty ratings as a function of stated and real causes – Study 1

Figure 3. Honesty ratings as a function of stated and real causes – Study 1

Figure 4. Arrogance ratings as a function of stated and real causes – Study 2

Figure 5. Modesty ratings as a function of stated and real causes – Study 2

Figure 6. Honesty ratings as a function of stated and real causes – Study 2


Figure 1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Ability Effort Luck HelpStated cause

Arr

ogan

ce AbilityEffortLuckHelp

Real cause


Figure 2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Ability Effort Luck Help

Stated cause

Mod

esty Ability

EffortLuckHelp

Real cause


Figure 3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7


Hon

esty Ability

EffortLuckHelp

Real cause


Figure 4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7


Arr

ogan

ce AbilityEffortLuckHelp

Real cause


Figure 5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7


Mod

esty Ability

EffortLuckHelp

Real cause


Figure 6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7


Hon

esty Ability

EffortLuckHelp

Real cause

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