MODERNIZATION OF CHINA

8/14/2019 MODERNIZATION OF CHINA

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MODERNISATION OF THE PLA


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RESTRUCTURING OF THE PLA

The PLA restructuring was an obvious fall out of the

changing doctrinal evolution. The two elements which guided therestructuring process where new military thinking and investing in

the advanced hardware. The understanding also dawned that it was

not sufficient to invest only in the land forces. The Navy and the

Air Force was an essential asset to take China into the twenty firstcentury as a military superpower. Thus began the downsizing o

the army and modernization of the PLA in totality. It would be

pertinent, when discussing the modernization of PLA, to include

the three armed forces, the aero space advancement, the

Information warfare and nuclear aspect. The restructuring was

carried out under the following principles :-


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The restructuring should help make the army capable of offensive

attack in depth.

The restructuring must be guided by the theory of combined

operations. It must place due emphasis on electronic warfare at the tactical

level.

It should prepare the combined units for both a high-techconventional war and a tactical nuclear war.8

RESTRUCTURING OF THE PLA


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THE BEGINNING The restructuring process of the PLA began in 1975 when MaoZedong entrusted Deng Xiaoping with the every day affairs of the CMC.

The CMC implanted a three year plan to reduce the force from 6.1million to 4.5 million. The army was reduced by 32 percent, thestrategic missile force by 27.2 percent and the staff itself by 32.2

percent.9 The second stage of reduction was delayed by the Tiananmenincident, which began in 1992. In this stage nearly 30 percent reduction

took place. In 1998 third major effort was taken to trim the PLA bynearly 50,000 officers. The purpose of these cutting were saving moneyand enhancing social stability.

Army modernization has the least priority amongst the three

services. The aim being, to reduce numbers and increase thetechnological enrichment of the Army. The manpower reduction willrestructure the force into:-


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A small number of hi-tech forces for flexible use in regionalcontingencies.

A large number of forces equipped with low-to-mediumtechnology weapons for internal security. A nuclear force to maintain a viable deterrent against othernuclear powers.10


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After the Sino Russian Bilateral Force Reduction Agreement in1998, the deployment of the army has focused on the Southeast areaof the mainland. The force level at present is 24 Group Armies (GA),divided into six Military Regions (MR),11 viz. Shenyang, Beijing,

Jinan, Nanjing, Chengdu and Lanzhou regions. The focus in themodernization process had been to modernize and train selectedformations, known as the Fist Units or Rapid ReactionFormations/Units. The rationale of forming these RRF/RRUs isdrawn from the fact that the emphasis in the new modernization

programme is on Quality Building. These units are being trained onthe following aspects :-

Surprise attacks on enemy command and control centres. Disrupt enemy supply lines and distribution system.

Interrupt enemy lines of communication. Perturb enemy lines of communication. Conduct armed reconnaissance behind enemy lines. Cooperate with tactical and operational air assault in the course of

Group Armies main engagement.


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Deploy forward observation teams to guide long range artillery

strikes and air support. Organise and coordinate guerilla activities with the militia.


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According to an OC 1993 Janes Defence Weekly report,

Chinas first step towards this was the converting the 15 Airborne

Armys three brigades into divisions to augment their rapid response

capability. The brigade sized forces were considered too small for

combat missions hence the upsizing to division sized forces. The

Chinese RRF is composed of airborne units and light infantry units. It

is equipped with light weapons and depends entirely upon air

transportation. The RRF is expected to react rapidly to border disputes,

minority rebellions and political violence.


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MODERNISATION OF INFANTRY WEAPONS

China has concentrated on indigenizing weapon manufacture.

The China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and China

Precision Machinery Export & Import Corporation (CPMEIC) with 157factories in China manufacture most of the infantry weapons as also

aspire to be a major exporter of weapons. The focus of modernization

was on improving battlefield survivability, enhanced firepower, targeting

systems, cross wind sensors and third generation night sights, The

earlier Soviet weapons were phased out. The 5.56 automatic rife M16A1

and the Schmel personal fuel-air-explosive (FAE) projectors were built.

The flame throwers gave a very potent rocket grenade against

emplacement.


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MODERNIZATION OF ARMOUR

China produces various tanks like T-54, T-59, T-69, T-79, T-80,

T-85 and T-90. Since 1997, China has been pursuing improvement in

the fire control systems in the BMP-3. NORINCO has developed theType 90 II tanks with reactive armour. The latest tank models also have

greater speed, endurance, improved accuracy and night vision

capabilities. The APC type 90 and WZ 551 have improved armour

plating, higher power to weight ratio and longer ranges. China has alsopurchased the Russian BMD-3 airborne infantry fighting vehicle.


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MODERNISATION OF ARTILLERY

NORINCO developed a Super Range Rocket which can fire

406 rockets with a range of 360 km in addition to howitzers of 122mm,

130 mm, 152 mm, 155 mm, and 203 mm calibers. The CPMEIC hasdeveloped multi-barrel rocket launchers like A 100 (300 mm) which can

fire 10 different rockets at ranges of 50-100 km in 60 seconds. The latest

acquisitions are the Smerch Multiple-Launch Rocket System and

Kitolov laser guided artillery round. It has also purchased the Tor-MI(SA-15) SAM system to enhance its air defence capability.


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THE PLA NAVY (PLAN)

In the 1990s Admiral Liu Huaqing outlined his expansive

maritime vision, including advocacy of access to the Indian Ocean, and

especially propagating his thesis of China building a sea faring bluewater Navy. An aircraft carrier force was described by Liu as extremely

necessary to guard Chinas sea lanes as it emerged as a major trading

country and this had to come to symbolize Chinas blue water

ambitions13. This resulted in a protracted and inward-looking land-

warfare-centreed strategy based on mobilization of society to a new

thinking and strategy of forward deployment, employing smaller forces

which were to be trained to operate in areas remote from the Chinese

mainland.


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Under this expansive vision of Admiral Liu, Chinas navy was

expected to develop a green-water first-island-chain operational reach

by 2000, blue-water second-island-chain by 2020, and develop a

world-class fleet by 2049, the twenty first century maritime visionwas underlined by Admiral Shi Yunsheng, by highlighting that, in the

new era, Chinas naval priorities will be to develop :-

An offshore defence strategy. A strong navy with science and technology.

More advanced weapons systems.Well trained and more qualified personnel.


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The PLAN Naval AF, 7000 marines and 40,000 conscripts.

PLAN has to protect 18000 km of coastline, 32 ports, sea lanes of

communication (SLOC), maritime interest, and project power in

pursuance of National interest of China. PLAN is controlled through

Naval HQ, which is subordinate to the CMC through the General StaffDepartment. Many naval elements appear to be under dual

subordination, necessitating inter-services co-ordination. The PLA is

organized into three fleets (North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet and South

Sea Fleet), Marines and the PLANAF. The headquarters of the fleetsexercises operational control in their respective areas, overall afloat

forces, naval air units, and the shore elements of coastal defence

including base, shipyard and training facilities.


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UPGRADATION OF EQUIPMENT

Submarines China has acquired four kilo class conventionalsubmarines from Russia, including two of the most advanced version ofthe kilo class project 636, which have advanced stealth features,advanced technology in torpedoes, sonar quieting counter measures, andhull construction. Combat Ships

Acquisition of 2 x Russian Sovremenny class destroyersfitted with SSN 22 (Sunburn) SSMs, which will be PLANslargest ships. These would enhance Chinas long rangeoffensive and sea denial capability. 4 x Jiang Wei frigates have replaced Jianghu classfrigates. Two more frigates are under induction. New Houjien and Houxian missile patrol crafts and Dayun class re-

supply vessels have joined the fleet. Designed to specialize in antisurface warfare in closecooperation with submarines, Sovermenny/kilo team operating inconjunction with Air Force fighters and AWACS wouldsignificantly increase PLANs ability to blockade any littoral

island state.


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Naval Cruise Missiles. Alongwith the Sovermeny class

destroyers, PLAN has acquired about 30-50 missiles of SSN-22

(Sunburn) SSMs. The 162-mile version has the capability to manoeuvre,

which would make it difficult for the point defence phalanx gun systemto intercept. It is also capable of low level, high speed evasive

maneuvers. Marines. The Marines have the capability of amphibious

combat and high mobility. Establishment of the Chinese Marine Corps

signaled the PLAs quest for a power projection capability. The Corps

was at its peak in 1998 with strength of 56,000 before it was

mysteriously and drastically reduced. The Marine Corps has routinely

participated in combined training on islands in the Western Pacific and

South China Sea. One refueling on reserves the Marine strength willincrease to 8 divisions (including 24 infantry, 8 tank and 8 artillery

regiments). Two tank regiments and Army divisions have also been

assigned the amphibious role.


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Naval Doctrine. The PLAN doctrine flows out of the National

Doctrine of Active Defence. It provides for Defence Close to the

Ocean replacing the earlier doctrine of Defence Close to the Coast. It

necessitates improved firepower in an offshore conflict, maintenance ofeffective control over SLOC, and the conduct of warfare in waters

adjacent to Chinese territory.


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PRESENT AND FUTURE PLANS The PLA Navy is the third largest in the world and the largest

maritime force in Asia with a total of 2,68,000 personnel, 1350 surface

combatants, more than 100 submarine and about 500 aircraft whichconstitute this navy. However, the fleet is unbalanced. Its major vessels

(S/Ms and major combatants) make up only 10% of the total. The

remainder consists of Patrol Craft, Mine-warfare vessels and amphibious

ships.

China is divided into seven Military Area Commands (MAC).

The geographic extant of each of these zones is such that each covers a

single particular (perceived) threat area. Similarly the PLA-N fleet

disposition is organised such that each is responsible for a particular

geographic threat area.


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MODERNISATION OF SUBMARINE FORCES

Conventional Submarines. The modernisation of the PLA-Ns

conventional submarine force includes: -

Series production of the indigenously developed Type039 Song class submarines, capable of launching C-801/C-802

series of anti-ship missiles (ASMs). Acquisition of a further two Russian-built Project 636

Kilo class submarines to complement the current fourKilo class

boats in service. Nuclear Attack Submarines. In 1997 the United States

Department of Defence reported that a new SSN, known as the Type

093, was reported under construction. It was reported that the first of

class would be in service by 2005, and a second vessel by 2007. TheType 093 is expected to be an improved version of the current Han class

and be capable of firing ASMs.

S f C b Th PLA N i f ll i k


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Surface Combatants. The PLA Navy is following a two-trackapproach in order to modernise its operational capabilities. This two-track approach comprises: -

Training. The PLA-N has increased emphasis its training

programmes, especially joint warfare programmes, so as tomaximise the effectiveness of its existing equipment. It has also

begun to operate farther away from home waters and hasembarked on goodwill cruises to the United States, the

Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Thailand andPakistan. Acquisition and Construction of New Platforms. Nomatter how much training is conducted, the PLA-N will belimited if it does not update its current force of surface

combatants. The purchase of an additional four Sovremennyclass destroyers from Russia will go someway towards achievinga balanced fleet, however these purchases must be complemented

by further development of theLuhu andLuhai classes if she is toachieve a creditable deterrence against the United States, Taiwan

or Japan..

A O S A A


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AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

Ships. While scaling down its older classes of amphibious vessels,

China commissioned nine Yutingclass tank-landing ships in the 1990s.

These 4,800 ton (full load) ships have the capacity to carry 250 troops,10 tanks and each carry four Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel. The

rationale behind the continuing modernisation of Chinas amphibious

forces is that China must maintain a creditable force with which she

could invade Taiwan, should Taiwan ever declared her independence. Manpower. PLA manpower available for amphibious operations

has been enhanced since the mid-1990s. Apart from the 5,000-strong

No.1 Marine Brigade (based in Yulin), the PLA has three divisions

trained in amphibious operations, thus making a total of 30,000 troops

available for amphibious operations. With a lift capacity of under10,000 troops, it would be expected that Chinas merchant fleet would be

available to augment the PLA-N. Such a force would require

considerable escort, a task currently beyond the capability of the PLA-N.


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THE PLA AIR FORCE (PLAAF)

MODERNISATION OF EQUIPMENT OF PLAAF


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MODERNISATION OF EQUIPMENT OF PLAAF

Chinas acquisition of Russian combat aircrafts and Israelicombat air technology is pushing Chinas Air Force (PLAAF) closer to

the goal of all weather, power projection Air Force. China has emergedout as third largest aircraft produced in the world producing six types ofaircraft.

MODERN FIGHTERS AND ATTACK AIR CRAFTS


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In 1996 China purchased 22 additional SU 27s from Russian ie.in addition to the 24 purchased earlier in 1991.

Deal contracted with Russia to co-produce SU 27s. This willenhance PLAFF combat capabilities sharply. Approx 150 SU-27s are tobe produced in Shenyang at the rate of 10-15 ac per year. SU 27s have been fitted with two Sarbtisya ECM pods that canautomatically detect and jam hostile radar signals. The electronic sub

systems are being improved. China is pursuing a major domestic fighter development

programme, the most ambitions being the J-10 multi role fighter. Flighttests had begun in Mar 1998. Approx 300 such aircrafts will be builteventually. Deal contracted with Russia to co-produce SU 27s. This

will enhance PLAFF combat capabilities sharply. Approx 150 SU-27sare to be produced in Shenyang at the rate of 10-15 ac per year.



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China is discarding J-5, J-6, IL-28 and other older aircraft toinduct J-7, J-8, A-5, H-6, (TU-16) aircrafts. China is undertaking

indigenous development of super-7, FC-1, FC-1 (CCA), F-8, XJ stealthfighter, B-7 FGA, and SU-27 aircrafts. China is pursuing a major domestic fighter development

programme, the most ambitions being the J-10 multi role fighter. Flighttests had begun in Mar 1998. Approx 300 such aircrafts will be built

eventually. Deal contracted with Russia to co-produce SU 27s. Thiswill enhance PLAFF combat capabilities sharply. Approx 150 SU-27sare to be produced in Shenyang at the rate of 10-15 ac per year. China is discarding J-5, J-6, IL-28 and other older aircraft to

induct J-7, J-8, A-5, H-6, (TU-16) aircrafts. China is undertakingindigenous development of super-7, FC-1, FC-1 (CCA), F-8, XJ stealth

fighter, B-7 FGA, and SU-27 aircrafts.


ADVANCED MISSILES AND MUNITIONS


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Along with SU 27s, China has also acquired the Vympel

(AA-11) R-73 air to air missile. This confers a 120 degree field of view,

helmet mounted sight, and a range of 18.6 miles. Development of helmet mounted sight to guide PL-9 air to air

missile has been completed. This would be fitted on J-7, and

subsequently on other fighters.

ADVANCED MISSILES AND MUNITIONS


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Air to Air Refueling. Initially China had modified H-6 bombersto enable refueling of J-8 II fighters, thereby extending their range from

430 miles to 630 miles. In 1998 China has procured 4 x IL 76 refuelingtankers which can refuel the SU 30s and extend their radius from 932miles to 1615 miles. At a 600 miles radius IL 76 can carry enough fuelto refuel at least 6 x SU 27s or SU 30s. This capability will giveadditional operating range to her fighter and bomber aricrafts, which

will be able to threaten land targets upto Ambala and Patna, our islandterritory and SLOC, as well as pose nuclear threats to mainland of Indiausing strategic bombers. Transport Fleet. In 1996 China purchased additional 12 x IL76 to boost up its existing strength of 10 x IL 76 and 10 x TU 154

Transport ac. The fleet is considered insufficient to move a large armyformation and its equipment.

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). China hasprocured six to eight Search Water airborne early warning radar systemsfor fitting it on its J-8 transport aircraft, which at higher altitudes wouldgive the radar a range of 200 miles. Two Y-8s (AN-12) have been

modified for Airborne Early Warning. PLAAF is also planning tomodify four IL-76s in Israel, which would be fitted with PhalconRadome System.


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Helicopters. 25 x Z-8 (Super Feion) and Z-9 (Daulphin) are being

produced indigenously. 24 x MI 17 acquired from Russian. 24 x S-70 C (Sikorsky) Black Hawak helicopters have

been acquired. Air Defence. PLA has procured 144 missiles with launchers of

SA-10 Grumble (S-300P), and raised one AD Brigade

NEW EQUIPMENT IN THE PIPELINE


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NEW EQUIPMENT IN THE PIPELINE. 100 x SU27 fighter aircraft in knocked down condition, and 150

x SU 27 to be manufactured under license. Agreement for purchase of 50 x SU-30 fighter aircraft signed in

Apr 97. D-4 RPV, B2 Radio controlled target Drones. Z-5 Multipurpose

RPVs and turbojet powered unmanned aircraft Changkong IC (CKIC). Phazotron Radars-200. China claims to have developed OTH-B

radar and acquired AN/ UPD-4 Ground mapping radar. Argus -2000 radar is to be fitted on IL-76 by UK to convert it as

AWACS. Air to air refueling aircraft technology/kits-unspecified quantity.

3 x IL-76 were modified in 1995. Now 5 x Y -8 ac have beenmodified for the same. J-10 AND Super-7 (FC-1 being developed indigenously by

Chengdu Aircraft Industry. Production of F-10, a multi role aircraft, is

likely to commence by 2003

AIR CRAFT CARRIER PLANS


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AIR CRAFT CARRIER PLANS

The exact progress of Chinas aircraft carrier progress is

unknown. Reports over the last ten years that China intends to build an

aircraft carrier have proved unfounded. And while some commentatorsargue that the construction of the 9,700-ton multi-role ship Shichang is

an indicator of future plans for an aircraft carrier, its limited aviation

facilities belie this rumour. Nevertheless, if China wishes to achieve her

goals of a blue-water navy with global reach, an aircraft carrier must

form part of the equation. Noting Chinas small step-by-step progress in

warship production thus far, it would be unlikely that China would jump

straight to the big time and construct a 50,000 to 60,000 ton ship. It is

more likely that a smaller design would be chosen, and the fact that the

president of the Spanish shipbuilder Bazan (builders of Thai Navyscarrier) was unsuccessful in his sales pitch to PLA-N officials would to

indicate that China does not, in the near term, wish to acquire an aircraft

carrier.


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CHINAS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

DELIVERY SYSTEMS


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DELIVERY SYSTEMS

China is the only developing nation to have developed the

complete triad of Nuclear Weapons delivery stems. She has of

late began concentrating her effort on developing a survivablesubmarine based strike capability, however she has been troubled

by extremely slow progress in the development of her indigenous

nuclear submarine.17

STRATEGIC FORCES


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STRATEGIC FORCES

The Chinese strategic forces comprise the following :- ICBMs. The Chinese have a maximum of thirty ICBMs

which are silo-based. Under development is a mobile MIRVvehicle launched ICBM. Besides this they have approximately a

hundred IRBMs and MRBMs. Strategic Bombers. The Chinese have 120 H-6s and

some TU-4 bombers. These are old slow-flying and vulnerableair craft of Soviet origin. However if at least one of these aircraft

will be able to survive the enemy air defence cover, the aim

would have been achieved. The newly procured Su-27 provides

a more potent threat with their 2000 km reach.

Submarines. The Chinese have one nuclear powered

Xia class submarine which carries 12 SLBMs of 2000 kms

range. A program to develop a better variant is on.

TACTICAL FORCES


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TACTICAL FORCES

The Chinese have developed small tactical warheads which can

be fitted to aircraft bombs, to artillery shells or small SSMs. The exact

number of tactical nuclear warheads is not known.

CLASSIFICATION OF MISSILES


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CLASSIFICATION OF MISSILES

China classifies her missiles as per a system different from that

followed by the rest of the world. This has enabled her to twist the

provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime to her

advantage18. The Chinese system is as under:- Short range. Range less than 1000 kms.Medium range. Range from 1000 to 3000 kms.

Long Range. From 3000 to 8000 kms. Intercontinental. Exceeding 8000 kms.

STRATEGIC MISSILES


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The Chinese have developed and deployed four classes ob

ballistic missiles and are currently developing the fifth type. These have

been given the generic name of Dong Feng (meaning East Wind) by theChinese and CSS (meaning Chinese Surface to Surface) by the West.

STRATEGIC MISSILES

SSMs


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China has also developed a number of tactical ballistic missiles.

While these have the capability of delivering a nuclear warhead and

while China has developed very low yield nuclear warheads, there are noreports of the two being integrated. This missiles series is referred to in

the West as the M series. The operational versions are known as M7,

M9, M11 and M12. Their details are as under :-

M7. Also called CSS-8, it delivers 190 kg warhead for 150kms. It has been supplied to Iran.M9. This missile is similar to the Soviet SS-23, delivers a

single warhead of approx 500 kg over a range of 600 kms and is

carried on its own Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL). It has

been supplied to Syria.M11. The M11 is an M9 variant having a range of 290 to 300

kms. This missile is analogous to our Prithvi but carries an 800

kg warhead. It has been supplied to Pakistan.

SSMs

SSMs


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M12. This missile is a solid propellant missile similar to the M11

but has a range of 120 kms only. This may be an improvement of the

M7 class. M18. Nothing is known of this missile except that it is under

development.

SSMs

THE CHINESE MISSILE PROGRAMME


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THE CHINESE MISSILE PROGRAMME

The Chinese began work on delivery systems along with the

development of Nuclear Weapons systems. In the fifties and early

sixties the US and later the USSR could target any point the Chinesemainland whereas the Chinese did not even have a nuclear Weapon. The

Chinese decided to develop the complete triad of delivery systems-

namely, the ICBM, the SLBM and the aircraft. Accordingly the CMC

established the Fifth Academy to conduct research and development in

rocketry sciences. By 1960 the Chinese had developed a short range

ballistic missile and by 1964 they had the Nuclear Weapon.

MODERNISATION PROGRAMME FOR MISSILES


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MODERNISATION PROGRAMME FOR MISSILES

Second Artillery Corps. A sustained modernization programme for the PLA

strategic forces continues, with a view to improve their accuracy and survivability.

New Cruise, ballistic and anti missile systems are being developed.

Ballistic Missile. China is presently modernizing its ICBM forceestimated to consist of 4 to 18,8000 km range DF-5 liquid fuel ICBMs. DF-41

with a range of 12000 km and 800 kg payload is likely to replace DF-5. DF-31

with an 8000 km range and 700 kg payload is also expected to be operational

soon. Both of these missiles are likely to incorporate multiple independently

targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology. Amongst the tactical ballisticmissiles systems DF 25 with a range of 1700 km is being improved to 2000

km with a payload of 2000kgs. Other tactical missiles include DF-15/M-9

with 600km range and DF-11/M-11. Cruise Missiles. The second Artillery Corps and PLA are not yet

armed with strategic cruise missiles. However land attack cruise missile fortheatre and strategic missions have high priority for development. China is know to be trying out combined GPS/Inertial, and Tercom

guidance system for cruise missiles.


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Anti Missile, Anti Satellite & Space Warfare. China has

produced HQ-9 surface-to air missile. This missile would be useful

against cruise missiles and may at least have a potential for limited anti-

tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capability. China has shown interest inthe improved S-300 PMU2 Favosit, which features a longer-range

missile. Longer range phased array radar, improved ECCM, and the

ability to hit both cruise and ballistic missiles is being developed. China

has also invested heavily in anti satellite and space warfare programmes. The Ballistic Missile Theater Ballistic Missile Defence

Imbroglio. There is a far cruder, but very specific, way in which China

is attempting to ensure its relevance in regional security. The PLA

excels in very few warfare areas, but one of them is its arsenal of short-

and medium-range ballistic missiles-primarily (but not necessarily)tipped with conventional warheads. China has offered almost every conceivable argument against the

development and deployment of theater ballistic missile defence

(TBMD).

OREA: SEEING DOUBLE AND ENJOYING THE VIE


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Chinese leaders are cautious about the process of change on theKorean Peninsula and the implications of that impending change forChina. Despite outward composure, Beijing is increasingly concerned

by the developments in North Korea, a concern undoubtedly intensifiedby the history of disruptions to Chinas security and stability that haveoriginated in Korea. Chinese leaders are troubled that Pyongyangremains deaf to its suggestions for reform and more rational conduct-advice given with Asian gentility in the hope that it can be acceptedmore readily than if delivered with Western bluntness. Delicately Balanced Dual Relations. Beijing has been

particularly attentive to, and ingenious in, its relationships with its twonear neighbors, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) and

the Republic of Korea (ROK). Nuclear Weapons in Korea and the Japan Link.Chinese officials say that China wants a stable, nonnuclear KoreanPeninsula. Beijing has expressed a preference for a Korean Peninsulanuclear-free zone. It wants a peninsula void of weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them.



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Learning to Like Multilateralism. In April 1996, Seoul and

Washington proposed talks to include North Korea, South Korea, China,

and the United States. Beijing was initially quite reticent about theseFour-Party Talks, as they came to be known. Eventually, Chinese

leaders urged a reluctant Pyongyang to accept the proposal and agreed to

participate themselves.

Prognosis. China expects to enter the next century with a dividedKorea composed of a crippled North and an economically recovering

South. It expects that the Chinese economy will continue to benefit

from trade and investment from South Korea. Taiwan Complications Intrude Again. As in so many other

aspects of Chinas regional security situation in the coming years, the

issue of Taiwan is inescapable. If the Taiwan issue remains unresolved,

and especially if it remains volatile.

PLA CAPABILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY :


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PLA CAPABILITIES IN THE 21 CENTURY :

HOW DOES CHINA ASSESS ITS FUTURE SECURITY NEEDS ?

With the Asian financial crisis and the floods in China. It hardly seems urgentto address the future war fighting capabilities of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA).

But Chinas military planners are patient, long-term strategic thinkers, so despite thecurrent problems, I will still provide some comments on the topic. This chapter isdivided into six sections. Its purpose is to present a net assessment of how Chinamay see its future military capabilities. Section One continues a discussion, begun in the introductions, about errors to

be avoided in estimating future Chinese military capabilities. Section Two describesthe way that the open sources of information available in China assess the futuresecurity environment, including the likelihood of war and the future trends in militarycapabilities of the major powers. Section Three narrows the focus of this chapter toChinas quantitative estimates of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) for 2010 and2020, based on books by the Academy of Military Science and the Academy of SocialScience, including a discussion of why some Chinese analysts claim these national

power scores can predict the outcome of future warfare. Section Four identifies

debates among the Chinese military about long-term modernization goals. Section Fivelists Chinas military investment allocation priorities and attempts to link some of theseinvestment decisions to the defence debate, suggesting that the shape of the PLA by2020 can be affected a great deal by the debate among the three schools. Section Sixdescribes how Chinese military authors assess future American military capabilities todefend South Korea and Taiwan and to pursue a potential Revolution in MilitaryAffairs (RMA). Easily offended or highly nationalistic American readers should skip

this section.

PLA CAPABILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY :


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PLA CAPABILITIES IN THE 21 CENTURY :

HOW DOES CHINA ASSESS ITS FUTURE SECURITY NEEDS ?

What are some of the key issues in understanding what Chinas military

capabilities may be in the first 2 decades of the 21

st

century? In spite of the hazards ostraight-line projections of Chinas current forces to 2010 or 2020, many still use thisestimative methods to arrive at a picture of future capabilities. This chapter argues thatit is also important to know in detail the objectives that Chinas leaders seek to pursuethrough military modernization. Happily, Western analysts of the Chinese military mayhave a better chance to get right the issue of Chinas modernization goals than whether

Chinas military technology programs will succeed. After all, China leaders continueto proclaim the validity of Sun Tzu and to repeat Deng Xiaopings guidance tao guangyang hui (conceal our capabilities and bide our time). China is unlikely to raise itslevel of transparency by inviting the U.S. defence attach to visit the research anddevelopment (R&D) programs in fields such as counter-stealth radar, laser weapons,electro dynamic railguns, anti-satellite interceptors, precision guided missiles, and

many other weapons designed to focus on U.S. vulnerabilities. I believe that its isrelatively easy to determine that China lacks items on the Military CriticalTechnologies List, but by paying attention to Chinese open sources, especially booksand professional journals that deal with long-term future modernization goals, we canmake some sound judgments about Chinas Military future.

CHOOSING AMONG ESTIMATIVE METHODS


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FOR CHINAS FUTURE CAPABILITY This chapter concludes that Chinas future military capabilities will be basedon factors that are impossible to estimate beyond 2010. Some of these factors cannot

even be estimated accurately today. They include quantitative estimates of thefundamentals of military power such as the future size of Chinas defence budget, itsfuture industrial base, its access to advanced military technology, and non-equipmentfactors such as the quality of its future officer corps. Of course, it is possible toestimate that a certain specific Chinese force structure may come into existence by2010 by using straight-line projection. Even though this is and error-prone estimative

method, it is quick and simple and perhaps can fool the gullible who have no idea howtheir own nation makes defence modernization decisions. For example, an intelligenceanalyst could simply use the current numbers of Chinese ships, tanks, aircraft, andother key indicators, then multiply these units by Chinas growth rate (say, 8 percent ayear), perhaps adding a few new weapons systems known to be in development andretiring a few judged to be obsolete by 2010. Indeed, some in the U.S. intelligencecommunity used such an approach on the Soviet Union for many years, even when it

produced incorrect results. The erroneous assumption is that China is on autopilot inpursuing its military modernization. A more likely assumption is that Chinas leaderswill debate and adjust their military programs (perhaps many times) between now and2020. If so, then we must try to understand these debates and these adjustments rather

than straight lining, or making up long lists of obstacles that the Chinese can neverovercome.



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In a book published in 1998, a much better and more realistic

approach than straight-lining has been suggested by John Culver who

wisely points out that most prudent analysts of the Chinese military rule

out very few scenarios.2 Culvers recommended approach proceeds

from two important facts. First, he states that,

. . . a survey of analytical documents prepared by the U.S. intelligence

community over the past decade reveals a tendency towards optimistic

assessments of developmental weapons programs or changes in the force

structure of the Chinese military.


FOR CHINAS FUTURE CAPABILITY



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FOR CHINAS FUTURE CAPABILITYIn other words, American analysts have tended to overestimate

Chinas capability to improve its forces and should be cautious not to

repeat this mistake. This chapter argues that one factor in Chinas slowmodernization has been a debate among the military leaders about theirgoals, a debate that includes at least three schools of thought, three setsof scenarios for future warfare China may face, and three corresponding

preferences for defence allocations. Unfortunately, in spite of theevidence of these Chinese schools, some specialists continue to impute

unified rational actor decision-making to China as if Graham Allison,the Kennedy School of Government, and the seminal book, Essence oecision, never existed.

I also agree completely with John Culvers second point, namelythat,. . . in the course of examining the spectrum of development possibilities

of the Chinese military in the next 10 to 20 years, two possibilities at theextreme end of the spectrum stand out: China could continue to makehalting progress. . . or, China could break completely with the past anexhibit unprecedented abilities to integrate a new level of technologyinto its military. Either of these development trends is possible ( as areany number of alternatives failing between these points on thedevelopment spectrum. . .



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FOR CHINAS FUTURE CAPABILITY

Culvers prudent view of the range of choice that China faces

suggests a potential policy challenge. The United States and other major

powers (especially Japan and Russia) will have influence ( if they wish

to apply it ) to shape Chinas future military capability. Along with

Henry Kissinger, Culver and I and many others are impressed by the

wide range of future Chinese military capabilities that may

hypothetically develop in the next 10 to 20 years. Kissinger recently pointed that American options will not be lost by failing to confront

China soon:

Undoubtedly, if China continues to grow at the rate of the past 20 years,

it will become perhaps the most powerful country in Asia. Its impact onits neighbors would magnify. But do we really want a showdown now . .

.? (W)ere Beijing, at whatever juncture, to pursue hegemonistic policies

it would have to contend around its borders with many states of

considerable strength. A wise America could forge a determined

resistance among them.

TWO COMMON ERRORS IN ESTIMATIVE


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METHODS

Unfortunately, Culvers views are not universally held, inside or outside the U.S. Government.

Many analysts of Chinese capabilities are overly ( perhaps obsessively) concerned with identifying theobstacles that China faces in developing its future military capabilities to the exclusion of finding factors that

will help Chinas military modernization. It sometimes seems to me that some analysts of the Chinese

military try to outdo each other to see who can imagine the most potent obstacles that China cannot possibly

overcome for decades. Strangely, perhaps for half-conscious ideological reasons, these same analysts shy

away from considering even the most obvious benefits and advantages that China may enjoy as a

technological latecomer. They seem to ignore that Japan, in the economic field in the 1950s and 1960s, benefited from catching up from behind. Excessively dwelling on the obstacles that China faces and

ignoring Chinas advantages as a technological later comer is a serious error. Analysts who doubt that

obstacles can be overcome should read General Mi Zhenyus book, National Defence Development Strategy,

which lists the latecomers advantages and urges China to exploit them. It seems to me rather strange for

some analysts to display an almost cocky certainty that they can identify so well the obstacles to Chinas

modernization and can identify so few advantages, especially in light of Chinas well-known secrecy aboutmilitary affairs. As Ambassador James Lilley told the Senate Intelligence Committee on September 18, 1997:

The other thing that clouds the issue is the Chinese superb practice of deception-when capable, feign

incapacity. This is the way they operate. Theyll throw up smoke screens. Theyll take your to backward

factories. Theyll lead you down the garden path, and youll always get some gullible person coming back

saying their military is backward. For example theyll use obsolete tanks. Thats because thats what the

Chinese wanted them to see.



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Analysts of the Chinese military who make long lists of obstacles

are bad enough, but I fear more those analysts who neglect or evencompletely ignore the intentions and policy preferences of the Chinesemilitary leadership. To estimate Chinas future military capabilities, itseems to me that a basis starting point should be to understand whatChinas leaders think they ought to try to develop. There is an especially

perverse version of this error. It is committed by analysts who

apparently assume the Chinese leadership to be robots in lockstep,incapable of disagreeing with each other about what goals for militarymodernization should be pursued. In one of the most useful analyticalfindings in many years, Dennis Blasko pointed out in 1996 that thereseemed to be no Chinese Doctrine of Local War, in spite of the fact that

quite a few Western analysts had been proclaiming a new doctrine oLocal War for a decade. A similar major contribution was made by EllisJoffe in The Chinese Army After Mao, when he shrewdly warnedanalysts of the Chinese military that there had been no formaltermination or epitaph for Chairman Maos doctrine of Peoples War, butthat it had evolved in a very Chinese manner into something quite

different.


METHODS



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What is the solution to the shortcomings of estimative methods?

Are straight-line projections the only solution? Should we keep piling up

examples of obstacles? Can we ever learn what doctrine and goals are

guiding Chinas military modernization? Despite Chinas veil of secrecy,

two modest steps may be worth consideration: greater example of open

sources and greater comparison of China with other cases, includinghistorical cases.


METHODS

SECTION ONE: U.S. DEFENCE DEPARTMENT


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NET ASSESSMENT

What is strategic or net assessment? Does China do it differently

than the United States? Net assessment is sometimes confused withintelligence analysis of foreign forces and international trends. The

difference is that net or strategic assessment is an analysis of the

interaction of two or more national security establishments both in

peacetime and in war, usually ourselves and a potential enemy. It is theinteraction of the two belligerents that is the central concept, not an

assessment of one side alone. A number of lessons form U.S. experience may help understand

how China performs strategic assessment. They practice of strategic

assessment in the U.S. Department of Defence in the past 25 years has

been dived into the following six categories of studies and analyses: efforts to measure and forecast trends in various military

balance such as the maritime balance, the Northeast Asian

balance, the power-projection balance, etc.;



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Assessments focused on weapons and force comparisons with

efforts to produce judgments about military effectiveness ; Historical evaluations of lessons of the past; Analyses of the role of perceptions of foreign decision-makers and

even the process by which foreign institutions make strategic

assessments; The search for quantitative analytical tools; and Identifying competitive advantages and distinctive competencies

of each sides military force posture, highlighting important trends that

may change a long-term balance, identifying future opportunities andrisks in the military competition, and appraising the strengths and

weaknesses of U.S. Forces in light of long-term shifts in the security

environment. This sixth form of study is the net assessment approach.


NET ASSESSMENT

SOURCES OF ERRORS IN STRATEGIC


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ASSESSMENT In historical analysis, it is possible to examine what the senior

leaders on each side did to assess the outcome and nature of thecoming wars in the time prior to their outbreak. In fact, a widely praisedexplanation for the causes of war is precisely that the strategicassessments of opposing sides where in conflict prior to the initiation ocombat- one side seldom starts a war believing in advance it will lose.Thus, we may presume there are almost always miscalculations instrategic assessments according to the nature of the national leadershipthat made the assessment . China may make its own miscalculations, andwe should be alert to this possibility. An insightful set of seven historical examples of strategicassessment in 1938-1940, which was produced for the Office of NetAssessment of the Office of the Secretary of Defence, has identified anumber of serious assessment errors in Britain, Nazi Germany, Italy,France, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan. A number olessons drawn from these examples are relevant to any effort tounderstand how the Chinese leadership conducts strategic assessment o

its future security environment.



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First, it is a mistake to examine static, side-by-side, force-on-

force comparisons of numbers of weapons and military units withouttrying to analyze the way these weapons and units would actuallyinteract in future combat. The static use of counting numbers and unitswas at fault in the French military assessment of potential Germanattack in 1939. The military balance, measured in quantitative terms

between the German forces opposite France and the French forcesinvolved in that theater, was almost equal, even slightly favoring France.The armored fire power of France and its allies exceeded that of the

Germans by one-third. Force-on-force comparisons used by the Frenchbefore the war did not reveal that (1) that Germans would achieve a four-to-one advantage by massing forces in the sector in which they achieved

a break through, (2) the Germans couldmake rapid, deep penetrations to destroy rear areas in France, and (3) theGerman air force would completed neutralize French air power andachieve absolute air superiority. Only a strategic assessment focusing onthe qualities of the interaction of the two belligerents would give any

indication of the outcome of the war.

ASSESSMENT



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Second, the failure to define correctly who will be a friend and

who a foe in wartime is critical to the outcome. Therefore, the questionof international alignments or alliances cannot be ignored. ProfessorPaul Kennedy points out that Britains pre-war planning completely

failed to identify the role the Soviet Union could play as a second frontin the war against Hitler. The French error was similar : French securitythinkers failed to consider the scenario that Germany might first conquerFrances East European allies, eliminating Frances alliance, before

attacking France directly.

ASSESSMENT



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Third, it is a mistake to deduce from an opponents peacetime

training exercises, published military doctrines, and peacetime militarydeployments what may be the way forces actually conduct themselvesin a protracted war that goes beyond the original plan of war because

the longer a war, the more time for factors involving the entire nationalsociety and economy to be brought into play and the less important the

initial deployments, doctrines, and plans. Professor Stephen Rosen oHarvard University had found that, between August 1939 and June 1940,the U.U. Navy senior leaderships strategic assessments of the adequacy

of U.S. Military capabilities paid little attention to how a future war

might unfold. It mainly satisfied U.S. Navy peacetime criteria, usingsimple comparisons of the number of U.S. Navy and Imperial Japanese

Navy ships. . . (with) no sense of the possible wartime interaction

between the two fleets let alone between the two nations.

ASSESSMENT



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Fourth, it is mistake to mirror image the assumptions of

other nations. As Andrew Marshall wrote in 1982 aboutassessing the former Soviet Union. A major component of any assessment of the adequacy of thestrategic balance should be our best approximation of a soviet-style assessment of the strategic balance. But this must not be

the standard U.S. calculations done with slightly differentassumptions . . . rather it should be, to the extent possible, anassessment structured as the Soviets would structure it, usingthose scenarios they see as most likely and their criteria and waysof measuring outcomes. . . the Soviet calculations are likely tomake different assumptions about scenarios and objectives, focusattention upon different variables, include both long-range antheater forces (conventional as well as nuclear), and may at thetechnical assessment level, perform different calculations, usedifferent measures of effectiveness, and perhaps use differentassessments may substantially differ from Americanassessments.

ASSESSMENT



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A fifth mistake is geographic scope or big picture problems.U.S. errors in the period between the two world wars were big picture

problems. Although the United States eventually developed firealternative scenarios (RAINBOW I to V ), it initially mistakenly

believed it had only one potential enemy in the Pacific (Japan) andtherefore assumed that, because of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1904,the United States might be forced to fight England in the Atlantic. Thenwith the rise of Hitler, 15 years of American assessments had to bediscarded when the strategic focus shifted to winning first in Europe,while staying on the defensive in the Pacific. A sixth mistake may be to neglect open sources. The mostrelevant comparison for better understanding China from among these

pre-World War II case studies may be the study of the secretive SovietUnion of 1940. As Professor Earl Ziemke describes Soviet secrecy in1940:The Soviet net assessment process cannot be directly observed. Like adark object in outer space, its probable nature can be discerned only

from interactions with visible surrounding. Fortunately, its rigidly secret environment has been somewhat subject to countervailing

conditions . . . . Tukhachevsky and his associates conducted relativelyopen discussion in print.

ASSESSMENT



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Ziemkes description of the Soviet assessment process resemblesin a few ways the Chinese process, including the open discussion in

print of some assessment issues. It is apparent from Ziemkes accountof the way in which Soviet strategic assessment was performed in the1930s that a number of similarities, at least in institutional roles and theocabulary of Marxism-Leninism, can also be seen in contemporary

China. The leader of the Soviet Communist Party publicly presented a

global strategic assessment to periodic Communist Party Congresses.The authors of the military portions of the assessment came from twoinstitutions which have counterparts in Beijing today and were

prominent in Moscow in the 1930sl the General Staff Academy and the National War College. Another similarity was that the SovieCommunist Party leader chaired a defence council or main military

committee and, in these capacities, attended peacetime military exercisesand was involved in deciding the details of military strategy, weaponsacquisition, and war planning. As the leader of a party based onscientific socialism, the leader was expected to pronounce openly thePartys official assessment of the future. Sensitive details obviously had

ASSESSMENT

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MODERNIZATION OF CHINA