Modernist and postmodernist metaphors of the policy process

7/27/2019 Modernist and postmodernist metaphors of the policy process

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Modernist and Postmodernist Metaphors of the Policy Process: Control and Stability vs. Chaosand Reflexive UnderstandingAuthor(s): Laurent DobuzinskisSource: Policy Sciences, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Nov., 1992), pp. 355-380Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4532268 .

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356evaluation.More theoreticalbut still policy-relevant ields of inquiry, n-cludingpublicadministration, oliticalscience andsociology,have also beeninfluencedby cyberneticsandsystemstheory n varyingdegrees.Butover theyears,as the theoreticalquestionsaddressedby systems heoristschanged, hemetaphors heyhavecraftedhave become more diverseandmore difficult oreconcile.1(Not all systems theorists would be content to describe theirmodels simplyas metaphors,2 ut one can assume thatthey must at least bemetaphorsn thestrongsensedefinedabove.)In fact, we have reached the point now where fundamentaldivergencesexist.To put it succinctly, here are two conflictingsystems-theoretic isions,although hey are not alwaysrecognizedas such. On the one hand,there aremodels that emphasize stability, ontrol,and/or homeostasis, n the contextof a deterministic niverse. notherwords,an assortmentof concepts expres-sing the typicallymodern3 idea that knowledge is power - the power toimpose a preconceived(i.e., 'rational')order on nature and society.On theotherhand,therearemodels thatemphasizeevolutionarydynamics,chaoticfluctuation,autonomyandspontaneousadjustmentsn the contextof a moreor less explicitlynon-deterministic niverse, tself madeup of culturallyandindividually onstructedworlds.While theelementsof the former, op-down,approachesare well knownto policyscientists, he moreopen-endedaspectsof the latterhaveonlybegunto receivemore attention.4This paradigmatic hiftsignalsa move awayfromtechnocraticcertaintiesand a recognition hat societalactors at every evel haveimportantnsights ocontribute o the policyprocess.The new metaphorsarepostmodernat leastin the sense that they point to the paradoxical, .e., 'tangled'or 'nested'character of the hierarchicalrelationshipsthat develop between policyanalystsandpolicy-makers, n the one hand,and a multitudeof socialagentsor groups,on theother.Postmodernism urnsradicalor Cartesiandoubt backupon itself,5 nsistingthat reason itself is dependenton the very processeswhich it is supposedto judge,such as social practicesand linguisticconven-tions.To illustrate hiscircularity,t would seem thatstateelites often end upclaimingexpertise n relation o the verysamepolicyareasand societalprob-lems that new social movements(e.g., environmentalism)eek to define inreactionagainst he traditionaldiscourseof power.Thusthenewdynamicsofagenda-settingpolitics is typicallyunstableandunpredictable.We need newconceptsto make senseof it.

Systems-theoreticmodels, of course, are not the only kind of metaphorused by policy analysts.There are two reasons why this paper focusesprimarilyon these models and not on others.The first is thatthese modelshave hada particularlyorceful mpacton policyanalysis,evenif their mpacton the social sciencesin generalhas been more limited.Indeed,the literatureon systemsanalysis,rationalplanningand controlmanagements too exten-sive to be comprehensively urveyedhere. The second reasonis that a com-parisonbetweenfirst and second generationsystems-theoreticmodels leadsone to addressproblemsthat resonate n interestingwayswiththe questions



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357posed,and thedivergentanswerssuggested,by severalotherapproaches, .g.,market-orientedmodels in the 'Austrian'radition,hermeneuticalmethods,Habermasiancriticaltheory,and even deconstructionism. t is almost as ifmost contemporarymethodologicaldebates and reflectionswere concernedwith differentaspectsof the sameproblematique:What are the promisesandpitfallsattendantto the abandonmentof positivistcertaintiesand the newpost-positivistpreoccupationwith the social constructionof publicmanage-mentandpolicyproblems?6The first sectionbrieflysketchesout systemsmodelsbuiltuponthe notionsof correctivefeedback,control, and rationalplanning.The second sectionexaminesalternativemethodologies hat view homeostaticstrategiesas beingdysfunctionaln complex open systemscapableof restructuringheiropera-tions. The thirdsection dealswiththeemergenceof a moreradicalcritiqueofearliercyberneticmodels and the articulation f a new systemsmetaphor nwhichcontrol is an altogetherdispensableconcept.In the final section, thequestionof whether there are meritsin retainingsome elementsof the firstmetaphor s discussed:How far can we, and shouldwe, venturebeyondthehorizonsetbymodelsemphasizing ontroland rationalplanning?

Control:AcontestablemetaphorThe term 'control'conveys manydifferent deas andimages.The connotationI attach o thisterm hereis thenotionof guidanceor steering or thepurposeof achieving ntendedconditionsor reachinga desiredgoal.A more technicaldefinitionwould consist in equatingcontrol with operationsthat maintainspecific parameters(e.g., temperature,altitude,etc.) at a pre-set value, oroptimize these parametersunder a given set of constraints.Cybernetics,whichwas definedin 1948 by NorbertWieneras 'the scienceof communica-tion and controlin the animalandthe machine,'demonstrates hatpurpose-fulness can be accountedfor by formal models in which corrective eedbackloops have been built.Controls,then, are hierarchicallytructurednforma-tion processing operationswhich resultin correctiveaction undertaken orthe purposeof reducingthe perceiveddisparitybetween actual and desiredperformance. n the words of Miller,Galanter and Pribram,Action is ini-tiatedby an"incongruity"etween the stateof theorganismand the statethatis beingtestedfor,and the actionpersistsuntil the incongruity i.e.,the prox-imal stimulus) s removed'(1960: p. 26). Therefore,control subsystems n-clude mechanisms orobtainingnformationi.e.,sensors), orcomparingt topre-setnorms(i.e., comparators), nd for effectingthe requiredadjustments(i.e., effectors).In order to remove any ambiguity,a semantic obstacle must be clearedaway.Control and'regulation' re often used interchangeablyn the literatureon publicpolicy.Forexample,most authors andthemedia)write ndifferent-ly aboutprice controls,rent controlsor pollutioncontrols,on the one hand,



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358and about economic regulationor environmentalregulation,on the otherhand.'Regulation,' s in these examples,refersperhapsto controlsthat arebroader n scope,butthatis not a veryclear-cutdistinction.By contrast, romthe standpointof engineering,there exists a significantdifference between'control'and 'regulation.'The former refersto the operationsof an identi-fiablecontrollingdevice whichis not partof the structure t controls(e.g.,athermostatmonitoringthe temperatureof a gas or fluid).The latter,oftendescribedas 'dynamic egulation,'ppliesto a rangeof interactions nternal oa systemand by means of whichthatsystems managesto reach certaingoalstates.This is vaguely analogousto the concept of diffused'social control'foundin the sociological iterature. n this section,I am concernedonly withmetaphorsbasedupontheconceptof control ntheengineering ense.Approximatelyromthe late 1950s to the early 1970s, cyberneticmodelsin terms of informationflows, negativefeedback loops and controls wereappliedfrequently o a broadrangeof problems n a varietyof disciplines.Atthe most elementary evel of analysis,models of complexorganizations e.g.,large corporations,governmentagencies, internationalorganizations)havebeen worked out on the general assumptionthat the art of management sabove all a capacityto handle informationeffectively.The veryfirstmodelswerederived rom a techniqueknownasOperationsResearch Churchmantal., 1957). In a more metaphoricaland less mechanisticvein, StaffordBeerwrote a series of seminal books on this topic (1959, 1966, 1981; see alsoClemson, 1984). Many other authors have applied systems-theoreticandcyberneticconcepts to organization heory, using either 'soft' that is moreself-consciouslymetaphorical(e.g., Checkland,1981), or 'hard,' .e., morepositivistic,approaches(e.g., Churchman,1968; Clelandand King, 1968);Coyle,1978;Forrester,1961, 1968;Singleton,1974;Wilson,1990).Typically(especiallyin the 'harder'versions),an organization s desribedas a systemunder the control of a decision center that defines strategiesand targets;searches for optimal means of reachingthem by evaluatingthe availableoptions on the basis of rigorousscientificanalyses;and initiatescorrectiveactionswhennecessary.From systemsmanagement, hese ideas spreadto publicpolicy.Sectoralplanningbecamea fashionableconceptfor a shortwhile as the PlanningPro-gramming and Budgeting System was implemented, first in the U.S.Departmentof Defense, andthen in many urisdiction hroughout he world.Here againone can discernthe model of a controller,usuallyidentifiedasbeinga 'decision-maker' r a 'policy-maker,' lanninga policy courseon thebasis of sophisticated analyses of the cost-effectivenessratio attachedtovariousoptions (e.g.,Quade and Boucher, 1969; Hovey, 1968; De Greene,1973). Buildingon these experimentsas well as on the successof Keynesianmacro-economicmanagement, he conception of a 'rational'approachtopolicyformulation e.g.,Quade, 1982) seemedfor a while on the wayto dis-place the 'incremental'approach defended, for example, by Lindblom.Withoutfearof being contradicted,AmitaiEtzioni could writein 1968 that



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359'Westernnations havegainedconfidencein theircapacity o control societalprocesseswith the wide use of Keynesianand other controls for preventingwild inflations and deep depressions and for spurringeconomic growth'(1968:p. 10).The social and intellectualcontext withinwhichthese ideasgainedgroundwas markedby the realization hat industrializednationswere experiencingwhat Donal Schon has called'the loss of the stablestate'(1971:pp. 9-30). In-creasingsocietalcomplexityandaccelerating echnologicalchangeare trendsthat are impossible to ignore. The hope that sophisticated analyticalandmanagerial echniquescould be instrumentaln bringingback a measureofstabilityplayeda partin the generalizedacceptanceof controltheoryandofits applications. t is indeed difficultto think of otherexplanations or state-ments such as: theproblemsof hierarchical rganizations re of universalandfundamental ignificance, nd ... we must learn much moreabout theiroriginand evolution f we are to claimany ability o rationally ontrolthe complexi-ties of survivalwhich we now face'(Pattee,1973:pp. xi-xii); or '[thesystemsapproach s] an intellectualdisciplinefor mobilizingscience and technologyto attackcomplex... problemsin an objective,logical, complete and thor-oughlyprofessionalway'(Ramo,1969;pp.v-vi). Significantly, amo went asfar as claiming hat the systems approachwas no less than 'a curefor chaos'(1969:p. x).The models andapproaches o whichI havejustalluded aremarkedlyesspopulartoday,but the overallsystemof beliefs and attitudes rom whichtheyoriginated tillpermeatesocial andpolitical nstitutions Hawkesworth, 988:pp. 14-20). Cyberneticmetaphorsandthe idealof findingscientificsolutionsto socialproblemshave turned nto clich6s,yet theycontinue to underliethethinkingof many 'experts'and managers n publicor privateorganizations.Most elected officialsand thepublicatlarge,on the otherhand,have becomeconsiderablymoresceptical.The basic tenet of thisenduringpositivisticandtechnocraticoutlookis a conviction hat

just as the natural sciences have provided men with a certain kind ofknowledge by which they can control their naturalenvironment, herebymaking t more hospitableand productive,so also the knowledgegainedfrom social science will enable men to control their social environment,thereby makingit more harmonious and congruentwith the needs andwantsof its members Fay,1976:p. 19,cited inHealy,1986:p. 383).7

Of course,the notion thatcentralistplanning s a progressive rendwasneversharedby the entirecommunityof politicaleconomistsandpolicy observers(fora critiqueof planning,see Hayek,1944, 1982;Wildavsky,1973).Duringthe last 10 to 15 years,however, he criticalattackshave become more sys-tematic andinsistent.A loud chorus of disparatevoices can be heardragingagainst he excesses of the administrativetate,theineptitudeof 'experts,' ndthepretensesof the social sciences.Butthese voices speak n several ongues.



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360Some preach n the languageof ideology.Othersuse a moreepistemologicalor methodologicaldiscourse.

On the ideologicalfront,a resoundingbacklashagainst he administrativestate occurred duringthe 1980s in many countries, after years of steadygrowth n the size and functiionsof the publicsector.Deregulation, ontract-ing out and privatizationhave been the buzz words of the last few yearsthroughouthe industrializedword(not to mention,of course,the evenmoredramatic ransformationsakingplace in muchof whatused to be the Com-munisticbloc).The so-calledReaganrevolutionbest illustrates hisphenom-enon. It was orchestratedby a multitudeof thinktanks,manyof whichwerenew on the scene, and given credibilityby a bevy of inventiveand entrepre-neurialeconomistswho successfullypopularizedat leastone of the tenetsofpublicchoice theory,namely, hat the state cannotbe disinterestedand effi-cientregulator i.e.,'controller'n termsof thecyberneticmetaphor).Accord-ing to the new publicwisdom,governmentofficials areessentiallymotivatedby the prospect of achieving private gains and enter for that purpose intovariousarrangementswithspecialinterestgroupspursuingnarrowobjectivesat the expense of the public at large. Consequently,market-oriented olicyoptionsarepreferable o existingor contemplated tatecontrols.Whether heactualchangesthat resulted rom all that sound andfuryweresubstantial ndreallydeserveto be regardedas a revolution s a moot point.8All thesame,itis clear that the imageof the reformiststate as a benevolentagentof socialchange,working n more or less close cooperationwithtechnocraticbusinesselites,hasbeen severely arnished.Conceptual,methodologicalandepistemological hiftshave takenplaceinmany disciplines,and not just in politicaleconomywhere,evidently,publicchoice theoryhas had a considerable mpactin recentyears.The interdisci-plinarysearch(both withinand without the systems-theoreticradition) oralternativeso the hierarchical ontrol model hasbeen motivatedby two dis-tinct criticismsof its shortcomings.Somecritiquesare aimedprimarily t theinsufficientlyexaminedrelationshipbetween control and social or politicalpower.Otheranalysesaremore concernedwith the inadequacy f the knowl-edge basewhichplannersaresupposedto have accessto, and,moregeneral-ly, with the indeterminacyand paradoxicalnatureof societal interactions.Severalauthorshavepursued hese two linesof attacksimultaneously.In a controlledsystem,the effectorsblindly carryout the commandstheyreceive from the controller.However,in spite of Karl Deutsch'sefforts todescribegovernmentagenciesas self-guidedmissiles (1966: pp. 183, 187),the metaphorbreaks down as soon as it is appliedto social systems(Glan-ville, 1987). Humanagents are capableof subverting he instructions heyreceive romtheirhierarchicaluperiors Dobuzinskis,1987:pp.39-45). Thecritiqueof the command-and-control pproachto policy-makinghas beenexpressedin waysthat reflect different deologicalunderstandings f powerrelations in society. On the political 'right' advocates of market-orientedpolicyapproaches amongwhom most publicchoice theoristscan be found)



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361haveattacked ocietalplanningandgovernmentmanagement f theeconomybecause of (what they perceive as) the inherentlycoercive natureof suchprojects.9On the 'left, criticswho are close to CriticalTheory or Foucaultarguethat the properalternative o the elitist command-and-controlmodelshould take the form of a moreparticipatory emocracy(Dryzek,1989; Pal,1990;Torgerson,1986;Jackson,1991).1'Turningnow to the critiqueof the scientificstatusof the policysciences,itis not difficult o gleana richharvestof commentarieson the failureof thesedisciplinesto secure a solid and 'objective'basis for themselves.These criti-cisms echo the broaderpostmodernist hallenge o the Cartesianuniversalistparadigm.The assaultagainstobjectivismn policy analysishas been directedagainstthree targets:the facts/values dichotomy;the insufficientattentionpaid to the uncertaintysurrounding,and multi-dimensionality f, policyissues;andthecognitive imitationsof individualanalysts.The fallacyinvolvedin the idea that the factual and normativeaspectsofpolicy questions can be neatly separated is now acknowledged by mosttheoristsandevenby a growingnumberof practitioners.Whether his aware-ness and a willingness o makeone's value commitmentsmoreexplicit s suffi-cient to extirpate he analyst romthe contradictionsof positivism s open toquestion- suchgrudgingmoves are probablybetterinterpretedas attemptsto replacenaivepositivismby a moresophisticatedneo-positivism Hawkes-worth,1988:pp.57-67).Even more disastrous or the control model of policy-makings theobser-vation thatif societalrealitycan be easily apprehendedby policyanalystsandfitted into deterministic chemata,there is no need for planningor control:social dynamicswill simply follow its natural course. Inversely, f societalrealitiesare complex, ambiguousand multi-dimensional,hen planningorcontrol become futile exercises (Masuch, 1986). Having recognized thisproblem,several authorshave noted, and in some cases contributedto, atrend toward interpretivestrategies- strategiesthat obviously would nolonger lend credence to technocraticpractices(Feldman, 1989; Forrester,1989;Jennings,1983, 1987; Kelly, 1986, 1988, Gregwareand Kelly,1990;Healy, 1986). As for the practitioners, hey have not alwaysfully endorsedthis trend.Some concede, however, hat theirexpertise s a kindof 'knowing-in-practice'(Schon, 1983: p. viii) rather than the masteryof an objectivescience. And even if they did not acknowledge t - indeed many resist itbecause such an admissiondirectly hreatens heirprofessionalprestige theinformedpublicseems to have realizedmorefullynowthe extentto whichthethinkingof experts s 'impaired,'o use Lindblom's erm(1990), byall sortsofbiases.In brief,the controlmodel is now largelydiscredited.Thus one mightbetempted to ask:Why flog a dead horse? But it is not quite dead yet. Theproblemis thatwe still lack metaphors hat could providecoherenceto thediscoursesof publicchoice theoristscepticalof government ntervention; fcritical theorists sensitiveto the excessiveweightof hierarchiesand bureau-



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362cracies;andof postmodernist heorists ascinatedwith the collapseof all andevery credibleepistemological oundationsupon which the scholarlypolicysciences,or analysescarriedout routinely n governmentdepartments,hinktanks,andinstitutionalized ressuregroups,could be grounded. 'Coherence'here is not meant to imply a levelingof all differencesbut a clearer under-standing of what these differences are about, and of how they can beaddressed n a meaningfulway by all parties n the debate.)In the followingsections,I attempt o evaluateconceptsandimagesdrawn romrecent scien-tific theories in terms of their potentialcontribution o the articulationofresearchdesignsthatmightfacilitatecommunications mongthesedisparateschools of thought,and perhapseven beyond the confinescontrivedby thelatter.

The new science of chaos and the paradoxesof order far romequilibrium'Exclusive preoccupationwith negative (i.e., corrective)feedback and therestorationof steady state conditions has often prevented analysts fromlooking beyondshort term variations n the performanceof a predeterminedtask.The paradox s that,in the long run,everything lse in a systemhas tochange- in ways that are not always anticipatedor necessarilybenign- ifsome aspect of it must by all means be maintainedconstant;e.g., in thedeterioratingphysiologyof the drugaddict,the only thingthatremainscon-stantover time is the continuousabsorptionof toxic substances Dell, 1982:p. 28). It is becoming ncreasingly ifficult o retainsuch a limitingperspectivewhendealingwithcomplexsocial systems.Thereis a nascentconsensusthatirreversiblechanges are occurring at an accelerating pace in the socio-economicandpoliticalstructureswe haveinherited romthe post-warera,aswell as in our relationshipwith the biosphere.At the very least, simulationmodels and other less formal representationsof complex policy problemsshould pay equal attentionto positive (i.e., deviationamplifying) eedbackloops as they do to negativefeedbackloops (Maruyama,1968). But policyanalystsin searchof novel ways of attacking his puzzlingcombinationofforces pullinga system in severaldirections at once can also look towardmore radicalandoriginalmetaphorsuponwhichto basetheiranalyses.Ilya Prigogine's hermodynamics f open systemsin 'farfromequilibriumconditions' alsocalled'dissipative tructures'),he mathematics f non-lineardynamicsystems,andparallelresearchesnto the logicof chaoticphenomenain a varietyof domains,e.g.,from weatherpatterns o the stockmarket,areallpartsof a new paradigm n whichempirical,mathematical, pistemologicalandmetaphorical onceptsare combined n intriguingways.1Thesetheoreti-cal innovationshave enabled researcherso studyproblems hatuntilrecentlyhad been largely gnoredor simplifiedbeyond recognitionbecause they in-volvefuzzydefinitions,complexandunpredictable elationships, nd randomvariations.While a detailed analysisof the content of these theorieswould



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363takeus too farawayfrom our topic, three essentialcharacteristics eed to beunderlined.First,these models areconcernedwithphenomema hat arehigh-ly dependenton intitialconditions.Veryslightchanges n these initialcondi-tionsproducecompletelydifferentsystemsovertime.Inotherwords,there isno such thingas a ceterisparibusor context-independent ituation.Second,these phenomenaare dynamic.Equilibrium ituations are only temporary,and are subjectto destabilizing luctuations.While the occurrenceof thesefluctuationor'catastrophes' an be predicted hencethe phrase'determinis-tic chaos'- theiroutcome is not knowablea priori.Whatcan be said,how-ever, is that in moving awayfrom the equilibriumpoint, a system reachessome'bifurcations'longanevolutionarypathway.Often,thesecrucial ransi-tions result n the emergenceof new andmoreadaptive tructures.As one ofthe pioneersof thethermodynamics f open systemsputsit,'non-equilibriumsystemsachievesome kindof autonomyand freedomwhichmeansthattheybecome"creative,"enerating tructureandcomplexity.The pricewe payforthis, however, s a loss of "predictability"'Allen, 1988:p. 102).Finally, hesephenomenaarecharacterized y theirirreversibility.n contrast o the (New-tonian)control paradigm, he new paradigm s concerned with transforma-tions thatcannotbe reversed.

The implicationsof this paradigmaticvision for the modelingof socialproblems n general,andforpolicy analysis n particular, reverychallenging.The attentionpaidto unique nitialconditions andto the 'non-average'har-acteristicsof complex systemsshould serve to remindanalysts hatindivid-ualsandextraordinaryventsalmostalways nfluence heoutcomeof a policy(Kiel, 1991:p. 436). Admittedly, hisis not a newinsight.MichelCrozierandErhardFriedberg, or example,havepersuasivelyargued hatorganizationalchangeshould not be analyzed separately rom the opportunisticstrategiespursued by individual actors (1980). What the metaphor of order fromchaotic disorderprovidesis a technique or studying hese interactionsas awelldefinedproblem.The indeterminacy f socialsystems s a matterof almostdailyexperience.Professional orecasts often turn out to be wrongbecause they extrapolatetrendsthat are continuallyshiftingor, in the vocabularyof the Prigogineanmodel, 'bifurcating.' n particular,when groups that have suffered fromvariousformsof exclusionfor a long timefinallysucceedin movingcloser topower centers, sudden reversalsof long establishedpolicies or new depar-tures can be observed. The civil rightsmovementof the early 1960s in theUnited Statesor the suddenmove after 1989 of nativerights o the top of theagendaof constitutionalreformin Canada'2come to mind in this respect.Even in the absence of suchupheavals,t is becomingmore andmore evidentthat'interdependence mpliesthat whateverpolicies areadopted,both posi-tiveandnegativeexternalitiesarelikelyto occur'(Brewer,1975:p. 207), andthiscan only add to the complexityandfluidityof policy-makingn the post-industrialage.So much so that,as Donald Schonhas noted, 'i]t has becomecommonplace for managersto speak of the "turbulent" nvironments n



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364which problems do not lend themselves to the techniquesof benefit-costanalysisor to probabilistic easoning'Schon,1983:p. 239).

Perhapsthe most profoundinsightthatpolicy analystscan gainfrom thestudy of non-equilibrium ystems is that social dynamicsis no more (andprobablyeven less) reversible han thermodynamics.A planner's ime runsbackward, n a sense, from rationallydeterminedobjectives back to thepresent,as if the social fabriccould be folded and unfoldedeffortlessly.Butjustas entropymovesin onlyone direction,historicalprocessesfollow a one-way path that generally deviates from the pre-determinedend-states forwhichplannersaim.'3Explicit applicationsof chaos theoryto policy analysisare still relativelyuncommon. One reason might be that most social scientists and policyanalystsare more familiarwith linear thanwith non-linearmodels.But thislimitatioins alreadybeingovercome n a numberof fields. Urbangeographyprovideda fertilegroundfor the firstexperimentswith this approach Kiel,1991:p. 434; Allen, 1981, 1982; Dyke, 1989:ch. 9). In morerecentyears,abroader range of problemshas been addressed,from the managementoffisheries(AllenandMcGlade,1986) to financialmarketsand businesscycles(Brock, 1988) to themodelingof theglobal economy(Holland,1988),and soon.'4Economists seem to have taken the lead in this respect;some of themare alreadyengagedin the processof developingand testingtheirown gen-eralizedtheories of chaoticeconomicprocesses (e.g.,BaumolandBenhabib,1989;Mirowski,1990;BrockandBaek, 1991).While it wouldbe difficult indeedprobably mpossible- to tagan ideo-logical label on these innovativetechnicaldevelopments,some libertarianeconomists have given them an interesting deological 'spin.'It is certainlytempting o drawparallelsbetweenthe metaphorsof orderfromchaoticfluc-tuations and dynamic self-organization,on the one hand, and 'Austrianeconomics,'on the other hand. James Buchanan and Viktor Vanberg,forexample,havefoundin chaos theorya valuablesourceof argumentsn sup-port of laissez-faire(1991). The neo-classicalcritiqueof socialistplanningand control can only suggestthatthese interventionist racticeswill result ndysfunctionalallocationsof resources. FriedrichHayek and IsraelKirzner,however,have arguedthat the effects of these practiceswill be even moredevastatingbecause the market s not only an allocativeprocess,but also anirreplaceable creative process. According to Buchanan and Vanberg, adescriptionof marketmechanismsas instancesof self-organizing issipativestructures,whichis indeednot an inadequatemetaphor,'5 dds considerablestrength o this (typically Austrian')rgument. n a similarvein,Don Lavoiesees in the'newscience' thepromiseof a new synthesisof the humanisticandscientific traditions.Humanemancipation whichLavoieinterprets n termsof the emancipationfrom Big Government)and structuralconstraintsarereconciled n the idea of spontaneously elf-organizing rderin natureandinsocio-economic realm(1989). Otherinterpretations, owever,are plausible.Some authorsdiscern a potential or moreintelligentplanning n theconcept



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365of bifurcation:nsteadof attemptingnvain to steersocietalrelationships n amore or less continuousbasis,policy-makers ould- and should- limittheirinterventions o those situationswhere a radicalbreakin existingpatterns son thevergeof happeningn orderto avoidtheleast desirablescenarios, .e.,asuddenregression o a less adaptiveor sustainable ystemicstate(e.g.,Laszlo,1987:chs.7,9).There are two waysof revealing,and acting upon, the limitations nherentin any givenparadigmatic erspective.One is to build an antitheticalperspec-tive; the other is to move beyond the horizon set by the problemwhich iscommon to both the originalparadigmand its alternative.The models dis-cussed above are exampleof the firststrategy:n reaction to the notions ofstability,equilibriumand control, they emphasize disequilibrium nd spon-taneousself-organization.The models to which I now turn reflect a differentinterpretation f the controlparadigm:heytreat t as irrelevant.

Autonomyand reflexiveunderstandingHavingarguedpreviously hatcyberneticsdoes not yield an adequate mageof social institutionsandstructures,t mayseemincongruous o returnnowtothisparadigm.Criticscouldargue hat t is nottheplaceinwhichto search oralternatives o the lingeringpositivismand technocraticbiases inherentinmuch of contemporarypolicy analysis.But 'second order'cybernetics,alsoknown as 'thecyberneticsof cybernetics,' as progressed arawayfromearlypreoccupationswith feedbackcontrolled devices.In fact, it proposesa radi-cally differentarrayof concepts for analyzing he production,reproductionand evolutionof livingand social systems.Self-referenceoccupies a centralplaceinthis newconceptualarsenal.

As in the case of the familiarvisualexperiment n which the backgroundsuddenlymoves to theforegroundandvice-versa,revealing hidden mage,aGestaltshifthas to takeplacebeforeone cangrasp heimplication f thisper-spective.The questionof the originof controllinghierarchicalmechanismshas so far been hiddenin the background, s it were.It is this questionthatmodels concerned with processes of self-production(i.e., 'autopoiesis'),autonomousdevelopmentandidentity ormationareaddressing.We aredealinghere witha classof systemswhoseonlystructural eferenceis to themselves.They are the productof their own productions.The con-trollingmechanismsan externalobservermightdiscern within such systemsmayappearto be the sourceof structured elationships ndinternal tability,but these controllingmechanismsare dependentfor theirexistenceand re-newalon the outcomes of theiroperations.Whatwe encounterhereis a situa-tion that can be describedas 'organizationalor operational) losure' Verela,1979). Whilean organizationally losed systemis not isolated fromthe out-side world, and does in fact exchangeenergy inputs and outputs with itsenvironment, t is closed in the crucialsense thatits existenceas a coherentunityhasno originother thantheprocessesthat defineit in thefirstplace.



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366Livingsystems- e.g.,a unicellularorganism arearchetypical utopoieticsystems.Provided hattheyhaveaccessto sourcesof energy(light, ood, etc.),

living organismsmaintain heirintegrity,heir self-referentialdentityas self-sustainingand self-reproducingtructuresn a numberof waysand at differ-ent levels of complexity.First,at the mostelementary evel,the physiologyoflife is a cyclicalproductionof a system'scomponentsby its owncomponents.Ina sense,livingsystemsarecontrolledby something hat s (metaphorically)calleda geneticcode. But thegeneticprogramhas thepeculiarityhat t needsits own products to be executed: 'every step of DNA maintenance andtranscription s mediated by proteins,which is preciselywhat is encoded'(Dupuy and Varela, 1992: p. 4). Similarly, t might appearto an externalobserver that a living organism'scognitive functions react to informationreceived from outside sources and that this information s fed into controlcenters(e.g.,the nervoussystem).But all sense experiencesare equallyself-referential:heorganism knows'nothingother than its internal tates and themanner n whichthey are influencedand occasionallymore or less severelyperturbedby external orces.All perceptionsare in-formedbytheorganism'sownattributes.The autopoieticmodelstands n sharpcontrastwith the com-puter-as-brainmodelof cognition. It is closer to the reversemetaphorof thecomputer-as-neural-networkhichhas receivedmuchattention atelyin theArtificial Intelligencecommunity.)From the standpointof organizationalclosure, the brain does not contain representationsof the externalworldagainstwhich incoming (pre-formed) nformationcan be matched.Rather,the nervoussystem s constantlyengaged n the processof preservingts owncoherence.Canthe conceptof autopoiesisor self-productionbe used to describesys-tems other thanlivingsystems?Enthusiasm or thismodel mustbe temperedby a realization hat the notion of (self-)productionn a societal context isambiguous. Francisco Varela who, together with Humberto Maturana,pioneeredthis approachhimselfwarnedagainstthe premature xtensionofthe conceptof autopoiesisperse to societalsystems.He advocates he use ofa less specificconceptat thatlevel,namely autonomy' beingdefinedhere astheconsequenceof organizational losure).Maturana, n the otherhand,hasbeen less intransigentn this respect.In any case, severalsocial theoristsorpolicy analystshave adopted this metaphorand have used it to investigatestrategicplanningn organizations,hecentrality f communication rocessesin the structuring f societalorder, heautonomyof law andlegalinstitutions,and marketsand economic life, amongothertopics (e.g.,Beer, 1980; Broek-stra, 1991a, 1991b; Dupuy, 1989; Heller, 1988; Luhmann,1990; Morgan,1986; Teubner,1988). While this new approachis still unknownto manypolicy analysts, t alreadyhas generatedsome measureof controversyanddebate(e.g.,Zolo, 1991).Before I take a more detailed look at the implicationsof the autopoieticmodelfor the policysciences,a briefexegesisof its fundamental ssumptionsis in order.Accordingto FrederickSteier,control,properlyunderstood, s a



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367propertyof a systemin its entirety.Thereare no 'controlling' r 'controlled'parts in a complex, autonomous, self-organizingsystem. 'Cyberneticallyseeing (sic),' therefore, 'no things get "controlled."'He adds: 'The term"understanding"s a moremodest and apt descriptorof whatcyberneticiansareengaged n';buthe judiciouslyobservesthatunderstandinghouldnot bedefined as a process bearingon somethingwhollyexternal o it. He concludesthat cybernetics is best characterizedas 'the art and science of reflexiveunderstanding'Steier,1988:p. 8).Thus Maturanaasks:if control means steering,whatis it that the skipperdoes when he or she steers a ship?Weusually hinkof theskipper's ob atthehelm as that of controlling he course of the ship.Maturana ontends,how-ever, that the 'phenomenonof control exists only in the discourse of theobserveras a metaphorof what the skipperdoes, not as a featureof how thecourse of the ship is constitutedas the ship moves under the skipper.'Adescriptionof the situation n a manner hat is moreconsistentwith the actualexperienceof the skipperwouldstressthat whatthe latterdoes is 'to makehisor herunderstanding'f the situation as it is constitutedby himself,or her-self, and by the ship, the winds, the currents,etc. - 'partof the domain ofinteractionsof the ship,thusmakingthe drift of the ship contingent' o thatveryunderstandingMaturana, 988:p. 7).Fromthe standpointof organizational losure,the cognitive unctionsof aself-organizing ystemare not specificto a controlling ub-systemwhichsup-posedlyreceivesunmediatednformation rom its environment.The environ-mentdoes not specify changes n the system; hatis, a systemdoes not receivedatafrom the externalworldwhichwouldthen be matchedagainstanoptimalrepresentation f that environmentand acted upon in order to correctanyperceiveddiscrepancy.Informationdoesn't exist "outthere,"waitingto bepickedup'(Luhmann,1990: p. 4). The systemas a whole preserves ts inter-nal coherenceby integratingwhateverchangesare causedby external nflu-ences into the overall patternsit itself has establishedas the basis for itsautonomy. implybybeing tself,butalsoin theprocessof learningromexpe-rience,an autopoieticsystem brings ortha world'withinwhichit actsas thecentralpointof referenceMaturanandVarela,1987:p. 26).Itknowsno otherworld.Thestartling onclusionone can draw rom thisinsight s that asystem'sinteractionwith its "environment"s reallya reflectionand partof its ownorganization. ... Its environment is ... a part of itself' (Morgan, 1986: p. 236).

Complex autonomous systems define common cognitive domains, i.e.,shared constructionsof theirmutualworlds,by entering nto manifoldrela-tions with other systems.The architectsof the theoryof autopoiesisrefertothis phenomenonas 'structural oupling'(Maturanaand Varela,1987: pp.75-80, 244-250). As opportunities or structural oupling ncrease,we findmore and more levels of realitynestedwithineach other,including anguageas far as societal systemsare concerned.When the linguisticdimensionisintroduced,the metaphorof on-goingconversationsbranchingoff in unex-pecteddirectionssuggests tselfas a muchmoreappropriate haracterization



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368of interactionsamong societal actors and groups than that of informationprocessing.It is important o stressthatindividualactorswho constitutethenodes in these communicativenetworksexercise some measureof choice,and thuspower,overtheir lives.Socialreality s constructedandregeneratedinthevery processof itsbeinganalyzedandarguedabout.A shiftfroma controlperspective o one thatpositstheautonomyof socialsystems has significantmethodologicalconsequencesfor privateor publicsector management includingpolicy implementation)and policy formula-tion/development.As far as management ndpolicyimplementation recon-cerned, organizational losure reminds us that institutionscreate their ownnorms.Analystswho have realizedthe significanceof this premisecan nolongertake rationalityas a given.They mustseek to understand he contin-gentandimmanentrationalities f theorganizationswithwhichtheyare con-cerned.While their membersdo not alwaysrealizeit, 'organizationsnteractwithprojectionsof themselves' Morgan,1986:p. 241).Thatis, organizations on-struct images of the situationsfacing them which are shaped by both thesocietalculturewithinwhichthey happento operate,and by the subculturewhich is peculiarto the organizationtself.Examplesof these organizationalcultures ncludethe open, innovationorientedmanagement tyleof HewlettPackard, he quasi-militarytyleof the CanadianPost Office,or the techno-cratic and 'can-do'style of the ArmyCorpsof Engineers.This kind of self-centeredness s unavoidable.To the extent that it allows the organization oexist at all, it is a positivefactor.Butit can also be source of weakness nsofaras it createsa tendencyto inertia.Under thosecircumstances,headoptionofnew managerialor strategicobjectives s likelyto be resisted untilfinally, nsome kindof a quantum ump,the organizationadoptsa new imageof itselfand begins to experimentwith new ways of running ts affairs(Broekstra,1991a:p. 123).An organizationally losed, self-organizing, ystemis not unableto reflectupon the adequacyof its identityand the coherence of its actionsover time.This is preciselywhywe can speakof reflexiveunderstandingo characterizethe new cybernetics'view of what earliercyberneticmodels triedto expressthrough heconceptof control.But theessentialdifference s thattheanalyti-cal process,itselfonly an aspectof the decision-makingprocess,now entersinto the definition of the problemunder study.As G. Probstputs it, 'Themanager s part of the managerial ystem;he is introducinghimself to theorganizational esignandcontrol'(Probst,1984:p. 131).Whenmanagementrecognizes hatknowledgeof the situationat handrequires,n part,a formofintrospection, hen the 'organization an explore possible identitiesand theconditionsunderwhichtheycanbe realized' Morgan,1986:p. 245). Admin-istrativereorganizations ften are the chosen means of renewingan agency'sidentity.As S. Maynard-Moody nd D. Stull note in the conclusionof theirstudyof the 1983 reorganization f the KansasDepartmentof HealthandEnvironment,'reorganizationscommunicate to policy implementersthe



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369changing tatusof differentgroupsandassumptionsabout theirwork'(1987:p. 263). By bringingup to the surfacethese importantbut somewhathiddensymbolicdimensions,the organizational losure model makes it clear thatpolicy changesare often better understoodas shifts in the implementationprocessrather han aschanges n theactualcontentof programs.Policy development s anotherexampleof reflexiveunderstandingvenif itis usuallydescribedas a problem-solving xerciseguided by rationalconsid-erations.An approachbasedon thepremisesoutlinedabovewouldunderlinethe extent to which the institutions,groups and social systemswith whichanalysts concerned belong to a universe shaped in large measure byautonomouscommunicationnetworks.This autonomy s a necessarycondi-tion for the possibilityof analysis n the firstplace,but is also theveryreasonwhynew policies are developedin order to bringaboutchangesthatreflectnewinterpretations f the effectsof these autonomousnetworksover time.Inother words,organizational losurepoints towardmethodologicalprescrip-tions rathersimilar o hermeneutics.But does it contributeconceptionsthatwere not already mplicitin the interpretivistmethodsadvocatedby severalpolicy studies scholars(e.g.,Healy, 1986; Jennings,1987)? The answer canonlybe tentative nsofaras organizationallosure s anapproach hat s stillinits early stage of development.At the very least, organizationalclosurestronglysuggeststhat the paradoxesof self-referenceof the kindfrequentlyencounteredby policy analystsare not an aberration ypicalof insufficientlydeveloped methodsof social analysiswhichmight finallybe resolved whenthe policy sciences will have fulfilledtheir promise;they are, rather,mani-festations of a more universalcognitive strategy nherent n all systems (e.g.,livingsystems,social systems,etc.) which establish communciation inkagesamongthemselves. n contrast o thehermeneutical raditionwhichoften hadoveremphasizedthe differences between the social and naturalworlds,'6organizational losuresuggests hat constructivisms relevant o the articula-tion of all forms of knowledge,frombasic sense perceptionto fundamentaltheoreticalresearch o socialpractice.A growingnumberof authorsnow believe thatpolicyanalysis s essentiallya processof interpretation, rgumentation nd refutationn a social context.To some extent, the interpretation f events and data by policy analysts sunconsciousand reflectsbuilt-inbiases(Lindblom,1990).To some extent,itis inevitable,even deliberate:analysts akeinto account currentpolicies andprograms,he relativepoliticalweightof competing nterests, heexpectationsof their hierarchical uperiorsandof elected officials,and/or discount nfor-mationthey cannotreconcile withtheirunderstanding f whatis relevant otheproblemat hand(Feldman,1989).However,policyanalystsoftenpracticeinterpretation s MoliereMonsieurJourdain pokeprosewithoutknowing t.As MarthaFeldmanpointsout, policy analystsworkin an institutional on-text thatlimits theirabilityto takea critical ook at their own contributionnisolationfrom what other actorsin the systemdo; furthermore,hey do notexercisecontrolover theuses to which their researchareput(1989: pp. 145-146).



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370However,withoutrisking o usurptheprerogatives f their clients of politi-cal masters,policy analystscould find in the metaphorof organizational

closure a useful tool for better articulating he dilemmasexperienced bypolicy-'makers'who sense that they are not 'in control' of situationswhereautonomoussocial subsystemsare emergingor where existingones showsigns of becoming increasinglyresilient to attempts at controlling'fromabove.'Analystswhose own preferencesor those of their clients or hierarchi-cal superiorscome closer to the 'progressive'pole of the ideologicalconti-nuumcould emphasizethe relationshipsbetweenself-organization,nterpre-tativeapproachesand policies aimed at empoweringcitizens and communi-ties through initiatives such as community-basedeconomic developmentplanning. Linkages of this sort have indeed been explored in the policystudies literature Jennings,1983; Healy, 1986; Bobrowand Dryzek, 1987;Dryzek, 1989).17 Moreover,even governments hat do not subscribe to a'progressive'deology are movingtowardparticipatorydemocraticsolutionsin certainpolicyareas,mostnotablypoliciesdirected owardnativegroupsor'nations'(e.g.,Alaska natives [Dryzek,1989] or Canadaaboriginalpeopleswho, in 1992, cameveryclose to achievingconstitutional ecognitionof their'inherent ight o self-government'ndwillprobablymakefurthergains n theforeseeable uture).Self-organization hroughorganizational losure can also serve to recasttraditionallyconservativethemes like economic laissez-faireand judicialrestraint n a slightlydifferentlight, thus yieldingnew insights.Economicpolicy analystscan find in the Austrian'traditionof economic theorizingarichsource of ideas that could be creativelycombined with the paradigmoforganizational losure in ways that may speak to the imaginationof policy-makersand the attentivepublic.(At the sametime,an emphasison the meta-phoricalnatureof these argumentscould be instrumentaln smoothingoutsome of the dogmaticasperitiesof market-oriented conomicpolicy recom-mendations.)The benefits that could be derivedfroman articulation f suchmodels would include a betterunderstanding f the implicationsof the com-plexityof contemporary conomicsystems.The pioneeringworks of the lateF. A. Hayek,who waskeenlyinterested n theoreticalresearchon self-organi-zation(Hayek,1988:p. 9), offerinteresting luesto that effect.His argumentsabout the obstacles standingin the way of economic planningon a com-prehensiveor evenon a sectoralbasis are well knownandneed not occupyushere. The importantunderlying dea that analystscould use to capturetheimaginationof theirclients or hierarchical uperiors s that the economyis acomplex self-organizing ystemthat cannot be knownfrom an outside thatdoes not exist- it mustbe explored romwithin,as itwere.Competitionplaysa crucialrole in thatrespect: t is, as Hayekpointsout,'adiscoveryprocedure'(1979: pp.67-70).The questionof the autonomyof law warrantsa few more explanations.Central to Hayek'sapproach s the distinctionbetween'law,'as a systemofrulespossessinganinherent ogic,and'legislation,'.e.,'thedeliberatemaking



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371of law' (1979: p. 72). Law is the productof social evolution; t was never'invented.'Now 'grownaw,to continueto useHayek's erms,needs to be cor-rected periodicallyby legislation(1979: p. 88). However,when legislatorsresortextensivelyto social legislationto achievepolicy goals that bear littlerelationship o the evolutionary ogic of the legal systemitself (andof juris-prudence n particular), nd is aidedin thatpursuitby powerfulbureaucraciesexercisingconsiderable egislativepower by meansof regulatorynstruments,a delicate balanceis broken.The law's nherentcoherenceis destroyed. It isnot difficultto discern here an echo of the earlierdebate about the flaws ofthe 'control'model.)Of course,this thesis whichis conventionallyknownaslegalformalism, s not sharedby all legalscholars.Indeed,it has been undersevereattacks,both fromthe 'right'by the lawand economicsmovement,andfrom the 'left'by the CriticalLegalStudiesmovement.But recently he thesisthat law is best understood as an internallycoherentphenomenonhas re-ceived renewed attention,in particularon the part of scholarswho makeexplicit use of the conceptual frameworkassociated with the theory ofautopoietic systems(Teubner,1983; 1987, ed.).18They too see a risk in thecontinual nvasionof the autonomous,organizationallylosed domain of lawby legislation.Whilesome of the theoreticalarguments hat enter into these discussionsborderon the esoteric and neednot concernus here,theyattestto the fecun-dityof themetaphorof organizationallosure ndealingwiththe multifacetedproblemsfaced by the interventionistwelfarestatein the late twentiethcen-tury.It providesa set of concepts and representationshat could unifythespecific concerns of analystsattemptingto evaluate the merits of variousgoverning nstrumentsor influencingor communicatingwith societal struc-turesthat,like ethnic or local communities,marketeconomies,andlegal sys-tems,havedevelopedtheirowninternalcoherence.

Beyondcontrol?I haveattemptedso far to draw attentionto the wide rangeof applications,frommanagementand organization heoryto policyanalysis,and from eco-nomicsto law whichcan be givento post-positivistmetaphorical erspectiveswhich transcend the cyberneticcontrol model. Policy scientistsshould beadvised,however,against ettisoningmodels derived from traditional nter-pretationsof cybernetic principles.And this is true in spite of the seriousflaws which were mentionedearlier,and in spite of the obviouslysuperiorheuristicvalue of the alternativemetaphors.I see at least two reasonsforretainingsome elementsof the modernistmetaphorof control. The first ismerelyan intuition hatneeds to be furtherexplored; he second is basedonmore rationaland empiricalconsiderations.Both have in common thattheysupportthe complementarity rinciple, .e., the notion that it is not advisableto lean too heavilyon any singletheoretical oundation,at leastwithrespectto complex systems.



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372The intuitivereason is that the dynamicand evolutionarymodels alludedto aboveformonly one componentof a new synthesis n the natural ciences

from whichmeaningfulparallelswith the policysciences can be derived.Theother componentwhich social scientists and policy analystsmightuse as asource of equallychallengingand suggestivemetaphors s quantumphysics(Yates,1987; Becker,1991).Oneof thebuildingblocksof quantumphysics sprecisely he complementarity rinciple.As Sam Overmannotes,'Exclusivityis simplynot a viable logic in contemporarypublic policy and the moderndemocratic state'(1991: p. 155). That is due in largemeasure to the inter-penetrating of values and rational considerations in policy analysis.Moreover, n highly pluralistic postmodern' ocieties, there is no firmcon-sensuson mostof the salient ssues.Even apparentlyrreconcilablepositionssuch as external controls and the spontaneous emergence of order fromwithincomplexsystemsmustbe examinedas partsof a broader ieldof rela-tionships, ustas physicistscanhold on to boththeparticleand waveexplana-tions of the natureof light.There is room fora thirdpositionthatemphasizesdialogueand dualities(Braten, 1986). It is all the morenecessaryto thinkintermsof complementarities ince thereare,in fact, severaldefinitionsof thenotion of cyberneticcontrol(or of complexsystems,for that matter[Flood,1990:pp. 148-155]). Althoughthe standard ersion(describedpreviously)sthe best known, less mechanicist versions can also be found. In WilliamPowers'psycho-behavioralworks,for example,one can discern an echo ofthe idea of organizational losure:for Powerscontrol systemscontrol theirown inputs, that is the signals they generatein response to environmentalchanges,but not the externalvariablesdirectly.Thus, in humanorganismsaction and perceptionarepartof a closed controlloop. Metaphorically,t isalso possibleto speakof communicationsoops in societalsystemswhere themessageand its content,the source and the destination,are interdependent(Powers,1973, 1989; McPhail,1991). Or, according o George Richardson(1991), themethodologyof systemdynamicshas found answers o the limita-tions inherent n traditional yberneticconcepts.The other reason has to do with the danger nherent n anykindof meta-phoricaldiscourse.In order to avoid Whitehead'sfalacyof misplacedcon-creteness,'analystsshould be preparedto use a varietyof complementaryapproaches.Repeatedcomparisonsamongalternativemodels are means ofguardingoneself against the illusion that one's preferredmethodologicaloption is not only more adequatethan others but is actuallyan accuraterepresentation f reality tself.Evenif it serves no otherpurposethanbeingaconvenient, albeit uninspiringcounterpoint, control theory adds to ourunderstanding f the depth,but also of the limitations,of self-organizationtheory.19n any case, common sense suggeststhat some socio-economicorpoliticalcontexts are more appropriately onceived in terms of self-organ-izing structuresthan others. We owe to Hayek an insightfuldistinctionbetween 'spontaneousorders' and 'organizations' 1973: pp. 46-52). Theformer,whichcan be described n termsof the modelspreviouslydiscussed,



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373are typicallymultifunctionalystemsthatdo not serveany specificpurpose;the latter,by contrast,havebeen designedto perform designatedfunctionsand to serve specific purposes.Therefore,contraryto spontaneousorders,theycan be theoreticallyanalyzedandmanaged n practiceby means of com-mand-and-controlmodels. Corporationsand governmentsare examplesoffunctionallyspecific organizations.Markets and the law,as well as scienceand liberal democracy (DiZerega, 1989), are spontaneous orders (otherexampleswould include a varietyof socialinstitutions,romfamilies o ethniccommunities).But this distinction should not be taken too literally.As wehaveseen, and as GarethMorganhas convincinglyargued(1986: pp. 233-272), atleast sometypesof organizations anadvantageously e conceivedasautopoietic systems. Consideringthat policy-makings like a seamlesswebextendingfrom policy implementationand micro-leveldecision-making opolicy developmenton a societal scale, it would be inappropriateo draw asharpline between strictlymechanicalorganizationsand open-endedspon-taneous orders.By the sametoken,it probablymakes littlepractical ense tostartfrom the metaphorsemphasizing pontaneously elf-organizingystemsin dealingwithlaw enforcement,correctional nstitutionsand otherproblemsituationswhere the use of coercivepoweris of central mportance.Even inincreasingly omplexsocieties,therestillare somepolicyareaswhere a tradi-tionalcontrolperspectives not altogetherrrelevant.Ockham's azorcertain-lybelongsto thepolicyanalyst's agof tools!Moreover,complex,self-organizingystemssometimesproduceexternali-ties thatpublicofficialsmustattempt o controlauthoritatively,f forno otherreasonthanpublicopinion expectsimmediateaction,evenif froma theoreti-cal standpoint more indirect, non-hierarchical,participatoryor market-oriented approachescould be shown to producebetter resultsin the longterm.Industrialpollution s probably he bestexample n thisregard.Besides,democratic,decentralized institutionalalternativesto bureaucraticheavy-handednessmay themselvessufferfrom certaintypes of social pathologiesthatneed to be corrected rom above.'As DavidBayleynotes,

Peerpressuremaybe both moreintense andmoreextensivethan those ofthe state.Neitherdoes a distribution f sanctioningnfavorof intermediategroups automatically nhancefreedom,for such groupsmaybe as cruel,capriciousandexploitativeas sanctionersat anyother level (Bayley,1985:p. 91).

And just as insidiousformsof social controlcan emergethe communitiesofvariouskinds, 'free'marketsare not completelyimmune to coercivepowerrelations,as Lindblom(1977) has ratherconvincinglyargued.So, in the end,there s a limitbeyondwhichtheperspectiveopenedupbythemetaphorsdis-cussed earlier cease to be illuminating.n other words,policies such as de-regulation,decentralizationand communityempowermentcan themselvesproduce perverseeffects. What these limits are cannot be assessed solely



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374throughrationalanalyticalmethodologies,however.They can be determinedonly througha genuinelypoliticalprocess.20

ConclusionWhile the complexityof mostcontemporarypolicyissuesperplexes heoristsand practitionersalike, the discourse of policy analysisstill fails to reflectthese preoccupationsadequately.Too often it conveys the image of policy-'makers' irmly n controlof their environments.But this imageis becomingless andless credible.I have suggestedthat recent theoreticaldevelopments n scientific disci-plinesthat areconcernedwithcomplexsystems end themselves o the articu-lation of powerfulalternativemetaphors.Suchmetaphorsare usedalreadybya growingnumberof social scientistsandpolicyanalysts,but more oftenthannot the originalityof the paradigmatic erspective nherent n these works isobscuredby highly echnicalmethodologies especially n the case of applica-tions of chaos theory) or by a seeminglyesoteric vocabulary.While someanalystsmightbenefitfrominvesting n the masteryof these techniques, hereal meritsof thesenewapproachess thatthey suggestwaysof tyingtogethera widerangeof disparatedeason how to dealwithproblemsituationswherethere is insufficientknowledgeabout cause and effect relations,and wheresocietal actors are capable of actingin unpredictableways.Some of theseideas are inspiredby the theoryof participatorydemocracy;other reflect astrongpreference or market-oriented olutions.Thesedivergentorientationscannot,and indeed need not, be merged nto a single perspective.However,the metaphorsoutlined in this paper offer clues on how such normativechoices can be translatedinto consistent problem definitions and policyoptions which can generateinterestand supportfrom the growingranksofpoliticalactorswhodistrust echnocraticdiscourse.At the sametime,therearereasonsfor continuing o employthe languageof feedbackcontrol n specificcircumstances. artlybecause there areno uni-versallyapplicableparadigms n the social sciences:for post-positiviststoargueotherwisewould be to fall back into positivism!And partlybecausetheremaynot alwaysexistpolitically easiblealternatives o coercivecontrols.To conclude, the searchfor an illuminatingmetaphor applicableto themanagementof large organizationor to policy formulationhas been greatlyfacilitated n recentyearsby new perspectiveson complexity n the naturalsciences.The typicallymodernistnotionof correctivecontrolassociatedwitha somewhatnaiveor scientisticbelief in the potential capacityof the policysciencies to identifythe correctpath towardwell defined societalgoals hasgiven way to more self-referential nd relativisticperspectives.The uses towhich these postmodernmetaphorscan be put will depend on a varietyofcontingentsocial and political factors;but whether they are fitted into aparticipationist r libertarianramework,he resultwill in both cases meana



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375loss of powerandinfluenceon the partof professionalexperts.Their knowl-edge base will increasinglybe challenged by a multiplicityof stakeholdersforming complex and shiftingnetworks.This is not to say,however, hat alltraditionalmanagerial tructures ndpolicyinstrumentswillcease to be rele-vant.Butpolicymakerswillbejudgedon theirability o articulatemagesandsymbolsaroundwhich creativeresponsesfrom these interlockingnetworkscan coalescerather han on theircompetence n providingsolutions' o prob-lems thatwillremain rustratingly ifficult o defineprecisely.

Notes1. On the history of, and diversityof approaches within, systems theory, see Flood (1990: ch. 6).2. For a discussion of the difference between metaphorical and more engineering-orienteduses of the concept of feedback, for example, see Richardson (1991: pp. x, 92-168).3. I use here the term 'modern' in a very broad sense to refer to the worldview first articulated

by Bacon and Descartes, which remained dominant until the early decades of the 20thcentury. Its central tenet is the capacity of human reason, aided by empirical observation,to establish a basis for intersubjective agreement concerning the universal laws governingobjective reality.4. On the difference between 'katascopic, i.e., from the top down, and the 'anascopic,' i.e.,from the bottom up, approaches, see Geyer and van der Zouwen (1986: p. 3).5. If the modern age was Cartesian, the postmodern age is Nietzschean. The literature onpostmodernism is too extensive to be summarized here, but any definition of the scope andmeaning of postmodernism should begin with a mention of the works of Jacques Derrida,Michel Foucault, Ihab Hassan, Frederic Jameson, and Jean-Francois Lyotard;the parallelsand differences between the literary postmodernism of these authors and the scientifictheories from which the metaphors discussed in this paper are drawn are analyzed byAlexander J. Argyros (1991) and J.-P.Dupuy and F Varela (1992).6. I am grateful to my colleage Michael Howlett for having brought to my attention the extentto which the sociology of public policy-making has become central to the concerns of somany apparently unrelated schools of thought.7. See also Berman (1990). Actually, the rapid development of computer technology and thebroadening range of its applications from financial service to the delivery of social assis-tance, from opinion research and marketing to political campaigning, from health manage-ment to policing, etc., have produced a control technology that transcends the distinctionbetween the natural sciences and the social/policy sciences.8. For the view that, in practice, deregulation did not go very far in the United States, seeLemak (1985), Daneke (1985), Hughes (1991). Besides, economic development initiativeshave been actively pursued at the state level in recent years, in apparent contradiction withthe trend observed at the federal level (Brace and Mucciaroni, 1990). On the other hand,in countries where formerly publicly owned and now privatized corporations used tooccupy a much larger and central place in the economic and social life than in the UnitedStates, e.g., Great Britain, Canada, France, the impact of the 1980s might well be deeperand longer lasting.9. The 'right'has also denounced the inordinate and illegitimate (or so we are told) influenceacquired during the 1960s and 1970s by a New Class of social scientists, bureaucrats andpublic interest group activists (Goldwin, ed., 1980).10. Not all critics of the mechanistic control model who have addressed the question of powerrelationships in organizations and/or in socio-political institutions can be easily fitted onthe left-right continuum; this is notably the case with Gareth Morgan (1986: ch. 9) andGeoffrey Vickers (1965, 1983).



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37611. See PrigogineandStengers 1984), Nicolis andPrigogine 1989), Gleick(1987), Gao andCharlwood 1991). All scientificparadigms, ncluding he Newtonianparadigm,are theproductof a combinationof ideas thatbelongto differentrealms.Butwhat s noteworthyabout the newparadigms the self-consciousmanner n which t has beenconstructedanddefendedas a philosophical ision,andnotmerelyas a set of isolatedtheories,e.g.,Prigo-gineandStengers 1984).12. Admittedly,he proposedconstitutional eformwas defeated n a nationalreferendum n1992,butthe issueof nativerightsremainshighlyvisible.13. The (re-)discovery f the directionality f social interactionshas implicationsalso for the(outdated)Newtonianperspectiveof non-interventionist eo-classicaleconomics. Theconceptsof longtermequilibrium eveloped by Alfred Marshalland,evenmoresystem-atically,by LeonWalrasnowmorethaneverappears o havebeen a misguidedmetaphor.Since the 1970s, economists are payingmore attention to phenomenathat make more

sense when envisionedfrom the perspectiveof irreversibility.xamples ncluderigiditiesandlags,sometimesreferredo ascasesof 'hysteresis,which s actuallyanelectromagneticmetaphor,e.g., the 'stagflation' f the late 1970s when inflationpersistedeven thoughunemploymentwasrising; he limitsto growth,or at least to lineargrowth,dueto environ-mental constraints;and the role of information n investmentdecisions as new tech-nologiescomeon streamcreatingunforeseenopportunity osts andtherebycomplexifyingthe criterionof utilitymaximizationBoyeret al., 1991:pp. 18-19). These new perspec-tivescan onlybe strengthened ndrefinedby the search or new models thatbuildon theprogress already achieved in the natural sciences on the subject of non-equilibriumsystems Dosi andMetcalfe,1991).

14. A bibliographicalearchof recent articleson chaos and economicsproducedmore thanfortytitles. Not all of them,of course,use 'chaos' n the technicalsense that this termhasacquiredwithinchaostheory,butmany(morethancanbe citedhere)do in factapplythatmethodology.15. See also Pullen 1988).16. Thiscontrastmayno longerbe very sharpconsidering hat some advocatesof hermeneu-tics haverecentlydemonstrated hatthismethod s not specificto the humanities ndthesocialsciences,as early proponentsof hermeneuticalmethodsof analysis nsistedwas thecase(e.g.,Heelan,1983).17. While I agreewith Feldman's riticismof Dryzek'sgoals of turningpolicy analysts nto(self-appointed)ocialcritics(Feldman,1989:p. 145),policy analystswho areemployedby social democraticgovernmentsace a set of incentivessuchthat an emphasison em-powermentand decentralizationmightmatch theirpoliticalmasters'currentdisillusion-mentwithdirectstate nterventions.18. Weinrib 1988) defendsa not unsimilarpositionbut withoutalluding o autopoiesisorself-organization.19. This is a precautionhat the proponentsof the theoryof autopoiesis,andH. Maturananparticular, avefailed to observe.While these authorsproposea constructivistheoryofcognition, hey paradoxicallyreatself-reference s a fundamentalruth,or as anobjectivestructure f reality e.g.,Dell, 1982:39;for a contrary iew seeZolo, 1990).

20. Of course,thepoliticalprocess tselfentailsa constantuse of rhetoricalpracticesandsym-bolic exchanges,and so does its interpretation. ome would see here a sort of infiniteregress,and it must be admittedthat this possibilityexists. Nevertheless,democraticpoliticsis a far moreopen andcomplex processthanthe analyticalprocessand,at leastinthis respect,standsin some sort of hierarchical elationto it. Thus when certain ssuesmove to the center of the politicalarenathey can be settled in a more real sense thanthroughheanalytical rocess.



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Modernist and postmodernist metaphors of the policy process