Modern Philology Arthur O. Lovejoy -- The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality

8/12/2019 Modern Philology Arthur O. Lovejoy -- The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality

1/23

The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's "Discourse on Inequality"Author(s): Arthur O. LovejoyReviewed work(s):Source: Modern Philology, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Nov., 1923), pp. 165-186Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/433742.

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2/23

THE SUPPOSED

PRIMITIVISM

OF ROUSSEAU'S

DISCOURSE

ON

INEQUALITY

The

notion hat Rousseau's

Discourse

n

nequality

was

essentially

a

glorification

f

the state

of natureand

that its influence

ended

wholly

or

chiefly

o

promote

"primitivism"

s one

of

the

most

persistent f historical rrors. Many examplesof t mightbe cited;

I

limit

myself

o

one,

chosennot

only

because

it is the

most

recent,

but

also because it

is

found

n

what

s

likely

o be

for

manyyears

to

come the

standard

English

reatise

n

the

history

f

political heories,

a

monumental

work

by

a scholar of

admirable

learning.

In

the

Discourse

n

Inequality,

wrote he

ate

ProfessorW.

A.

Dunning:

The natural

manwas first

he

olitaryavage,

iving

he

happy,

arefree

lifeof

the brute.

The

steps

by

whichmen

merged

rom heir

rimitive

state redepicted ith ascinatingrt,

ut he uthor's

egret

t their uccess

pervades

he

picture.

...

Throughout

hefluctuationsf his

usage,

ne

idea'

lone

ppeared

nmistakable,iz.,

that

the

natural tate

of

man was

vastly

referable

o the ocial

or

civil

tate,

nd must urnishhenorm

y

which o

test

nd correct

t.'

This

is

an

exceptionally

moderate

statement

f

the traditional

view

of the

Second

Discourse;

but it

appears

to

me to be

highly

mis-

leading,

specially

n what t

implies

s to the sort

of

deas

which hat

writing

ended

to

encourage

n

Rousseau's

contemporaries.

The

actual doctrine ftheDiscourse, ts relation o otherconceptions f

the

state

of

nature,

he

character

f

the

nfluence

pon

opinion

which

it

must

have had

in

its

time,

and

the features

f it which

must be

regarded

s

constituting

ts

chiefhistoric

ignificance,

shall

attempt

to show

n what

follows.

As

in

so

many

other

cases,

confusion

as

arisen

n this matter

partly

hrough neglect

o note

the

ambiguity

f

the

terms

mployed

in the discussion. The term "state of nature" has at least three

easily

distinguishable

enses. It

may

have

a

merely

hronological

signification

nd

refer o the

primeval

condition

f

man,

whatever

I

History of

Political

Theories,

II

(1920),

pp.

8-9.

[MODERN

PHILOFOGT,

November,

19231

165


3/23

166

ARTHUR

O.

LOVEJOY

its characteristics.

n the

terminology

f

political

theory

t

means

the

status

of human ndividualsor

groups

who

in

their

relations

o

one

another

are

not

subject

to

the

authority

f

any government.

Finally,

t

may

be

used-and

in

the

eighteenth

entury

was

often

used-in

what

may

be called

a

cultural

ense,

to

designate

he state

in which

the

arts

and

sciences-civilization

n

its

non-political

le-

ments-had

made least

progress.

These

three senses were

not

necessarily

dentical

n

denotation.

It

was, indeed,usually

assumed

that

the earliest

tage

was

a

pre-political

ne;

but

it

did not

follow

that the

primitivetage,

n the cultural

ense,

was coextensivewith

the

pre-political

tage.

The

period

preceding

he

organization

f

the

political

tate

might

havebeen

a

very

ongone,

n

the course

f which

mankind

might

have

departed

very

widely-whether

for better

or

worse--from

ts

primeval

condition.

The

confusion f

these senses

is,

indeed,

n old

one. Pufendorf's

efinition,

or

xample,

ombines

the

cultural

with

the

juristic

criteria;

the "state of

nature,"

in

contrast

with

the

"adventitious

tate,"

is forhim

not

only

"such

a

state as we may conceiveman to be placed in by his bare nativity,

abstracting

rom

ll rulesand

institutions,

hether

f

human

nven-

tion

or

of

the

nspiration

rrevelation

f

heaven";

it

is also "a

state

in

which

the divers

sorts

of

arts,

with

all the

commodities f

life

in

general,"

are

lacking.'

In

Locke,

on

the other

hand,

the con-

ception

of "the

natural

state ofmankind"

is

mainly

a

juristic

one.

It

was,

moreover,

commonplace

f

political

philosophy

n

these

centuries

hat

the

juristic

"state

of

nature -whether

or

not it had

ever ctually xistedn thepast, n therelations etweenndividuals-

certainly

xisted

at that

very

time

in the relations

o one

another

of

sovereign

states

having

no common aw or

government.

This

obviously

mplies

nothing

s to the cultural ondition

f the

countries

concerned.

The

oddly

neglected

acts which wish to

point out,

with

regard

to

Rousseau's

Discourse,

re

that

the

juristic

state of

nature--the

period prior

to

the

establishment

f

civil

government-was

by

him

divided ntofourdistinct ultural tages, ll ofthemof ongduration;

that

in

his

terminology

n

this

writing

he

term

"state of

nature"

usually

refers,

ot

to the

pre-political

tate as

a

whole,

but

to

the

first

I

Law

of

Nature and

of

Nations,

Book

I, chap.

i.


4/23

RoUSSEAU'S

"

DISCOURSE

ON

INEQUALITY" 167

of

these cultural

tages;

that

thisfirst

tage--the

"state

of

nature"

in

his own

sense-is

not

regarded

y

him as

an

ideal

state;

that the

third

stage,

which is forhim no more

primitive

ulturally

han

chronologically,

s

the condition

n which

he

regrets

hat

mankind

did

not

remain;

that

he cannot

properly

e said

to

maintain

the

excellence

f the state

of nature n the

purely

uristic

ense,

nasmuch

as

that

state, according

o his

argument,

nevitably

works

tself

ut

into

a final

tage

of intolerable

onflict

nd

disorder;

and

that

the

Discourse n

general

represents

movement

ather

way

from

han

toward

primitivism.

shall also show

that

the

characteristics

f

three fthese

tages closely

orrespondo,

and are

probably

orrowed

from,

hreedifferent

states of

nature"

described

by

earlier

writers:

thathis first

tage,

namely,

s similar o the

state of

nature f

Voltaire

and

substantially

denticalwith

that

of

Pufendorf;

that

the

third

stage

is,

n its cultural

haracteristics,

pproximately

he

same

as

the

state of nature

of

Montaigne

and of

Pope;

and that

the

fourth

stage

is

the state of

nature of

Hobbes.

That the

first

hase

of

human

history,

he

life of

man

tel

qu'il

a

d?

sortir es mainsde la

nature,

was

not for

Rousseau

an

ideal

condi-

tion

s

evident,

n

the

first

lace,

from

he

picture

which

he

gives

of t.

If

he had

really

ntended o

set

up

whathe

called

the

"state

of

nature"

as a

norm,

r

as "the

age

at

whichone

could

have

wished

the

race

had

remained,"

his

ideal

would

have

been

explicitly

hat

of

a

purely

animal

existence;

his

gospel

would

have been

that

t

would

be

better

for

the featherless

iped

if

he

lived the

life

of a

solitary

wild beast.

For

the Discourse

maintains

with

ll

possible

definiteness

hat

n

the

true

state

of

nature

man

differed

rom

other

animals,

not

at all

in

his

actual

mode

of

ife,

ut

only

n

his

yet

undeveloped

otentialities.

L'homme

auvage

commencera

ar

les

fonctions

urement

nimales.

Apercevoir

t

sentir

era

son

premier

tat,

qui

lui

sera

commun

vec

tous

es

animaux.

His

life,

n

short,

was

"that

of an

animal

limited

at

first o

mere

ensation,

carcely

rofiting

y

the

gifts

which

nature

held

out

to

him,

nd not even

dreaming

f

eizing nything

rom

er."

He

lived

only

in

and for

the

moment,having

almost

no

power

of

forethought,

s

little

memory,

nd

consequently

o

ability

to

learn

from

xperience.

He

possessed

no

language

and had

no

use of

tools

or

weapons.

No

social

bonds

united

men;

not

even

the

herd,

o

say


5/23

168

ARTHUR

O.

LOVEJOY

nothing

f the

family,

s

yet

existed.

The

young

remainedfor

a

relatively

rief

period compared

with

the

prolongedhelplessness

f

children

nder

civilization)

with the

mother,

ut once

strong

nough

to

forage

or

themselves,

hey

efther and

were thereafter nable to

recognize

ven

this

tie

of

kinship.

The

individual,

n

short,

ived

a

life

oisive,

rrante

t

vagabonde,

eveloping nly

"those faculties

which

were needed

in

attack

or

defense,

ither

o

overcome

his

prey

or

to

protect

himself

rom

ecoming

he

prey

of

other

nimals

-a

danger

always

at

hand.

And

lest

there

be

any

doubt

about

his

meaning,

Rousseau

expressly

ontends

(Note 10)

that

the

gorilla

and

the

chimpanzee,'

whosemanner

fexistence

ad been

described

y

travel-

ers

in

Africa,

re

probably portion

f the human

species

who

still

remain

dans

l'6tat

primitif

e

nature,

re

"veritable

savage

men

whose

race,

dispersed

t some

early period

n

the

forest,

as never

had occasion

to

develop

any

of ts atent

faculties."

The

only

differ-

ence,

indeed,

between

primitive

man and

the

gorilla

discoverable

in Rousseau's

pages

is favorable

to the latter

animal, since,

as

describedby Rousseau's authorities,t represents stage definitely

higher

han

the

trulyprimeval

condition

f

mankind,

s

described

by

Rousseau

himself.

Those who

set

forth the

doctrine

of the

Discourse

n

the

manner

tillusual

n

histories f

iterature,

hilosophy,

and

political

heory,

must be

supposed

to

have

neglected

o

read,

or

to have

entirely orgotten,

ousseau's

Note 10. In this

same

note,

it

is

worth

emarking,

ousseau

appears

as the

herald

of

the science

of

anthropology.

He

laments

that

the

knowledge

f

his

day

con-

cerning othgorillas nd savage tribes s derivedmainlyfrom ravel-

ers'

tales and the

relations

f

missionaries;

he

formerre

proverbially

mendacious,

and

the

missionaries,

however

well-intentioned,

re

scarcely

bons

observateurs;

for

the

study

of

man

there re

requisite

gifts

which

are

not

always

the

portion

of

the

saints."

Rousseau

therefore

alls

upon

the

scientific

cademies

to send

expeditions

om-

posed

of trained

and

genuinely "philosophical"

observers

to "all

savage

countries,"

n order

hat,

upon

their

eturn,

uch

nvestigators

1 t is clearly to these animals that Rousseau refers, hough he supposes them to be

the same

as

"the animals called

orang-outangs

n

the

East

Indies."

His

knowledge

of

these

African

apes

is

derived

from

the

original

description

of

them

by

the

English

sailor

Battel,

given

in

Purchas

his

Pilgrimes

(1614)

and

reproduced

in

the

Histoire

gdndrale

des

voyages.


6/23

ROUSSEAU'S

"DIscOuRsE

ON

INEQUALITY"

169

"may

compose

at leisure

an

histoire

aturelle,

morale t

politique

f

what

they

have

seen."

By

such

a

study

a

whole

"new

world,"

he

declares,

would

be

disclosed,

nd

by

means

of

it

we

should "learn to

understand ur

own."''

It

was,

then,

a

primary

bject

of the Discourseto

identify

he

state of

nature

with

he tateofthebrute. The sketch f

the

manners

and customs

fthe naturalman drawn

by

Rousseau

s,

when

nalyzed,

no

more

ttractive han

that

given

n the

principal

arly

eighteenth-

century

atire

upon

primitivism,

oltaire'sLe

Mondain

(1736):

Quand a nature taitdans onenfance,

Nos

bons

ieux

vivaient

ans

l'ignorance,

Ne connaissant

i e tien i

e mien:

Qu'auraient-ils

u

connattre

ils

n'avaient

ien

..

11

eur

manquait

'industrie

t

l'aisance:

Est-ce

ertu

c'4tait

ure gnorance

..

Le

repas ait,

ls

dormentur a

dure:

Voil&

l'6tat

e

la

pure

nature.

Rousseau's

etat

primitif

iffered

rom

his

only

n

that

it

was

a

still

more brutish ondition. It is almost denticalwiththeunfavorable

picture

f

the state

of

nature

presented

y Pufendorf,

f

the

French

translation

f whose work

a new

edition had

appeared

only

a few

years

before.2

Many philosophers,

s

Rousseau

justlyenough

points

out,

had

arrived t their

onception

f

man

in

the

state of

nature

by

1

Note 10

and much more of

the same

kind

throughout

the

Discourse

seem

to

me fatal

to

a

view

expressed

by

M. Durkheim

(Rev.

de

Mitaphysique,

XXV,

4)

and

apparently

given

some

support by

Mr.

Vaughan-viz.,

that

Rousseau

was

not

attempting

a

hypo-

thetical

reconstruction

of

the

early history

of

civilization,

and

was

therefore

ot interested

in

historicalfacts,

but

was

merely presenting

n

a

picturesque way

a

psychological analysis

of certain

permanent

factors

n human life. The

term

" state

of

nature

"

according

to

this

view,

does not

designate

a

stage

in

social

evolution;

it is an

expression

for

"

those

elements

of

human

nature

which derive

directly

from the

psychological

constitution

of

the indi-

vidual"

in

contrast

with

those

which

are of social

origin.

The

only

evidence for

this

is

the

passage

near

the

beginning

in

which

Rousseau disclaims

any

pretension

to offer

veritds

historiques.

The

context, however,

shows that

this

disclaimer

is

merely

the

usual

lightning-rod

gainst

ecclesiastical

thunderbolts;

it

would,

says

Rousseau,

be

inadmissible

to

regard

the state

of

nature

as

a fact "because

it

is

evident from

a

reading

of

the sacred

books

that the

firstman

was

not

in

this

state,"

etc. In

reality,

Rousseau

was

keenly

interested

in

tracing

the succession of

phases through

which

man's

intellectual and

social

life

has

passed;

but

he

recognized

that the

knowledge

of his time

permitted only

raisonne-

ments

hypothitiques

n the

subject.

2Droit de la Nature et des Gens (6th ed., 1750), Book II, chap. i, ?2. The similarity

has been

pointed

out

by

Morel,

Ann. de la

Soc.

J.-J.

Rousseau

(1909),

p.

163.

Pufen-

dorf,

however,

is

less

thorough

and

consistent

than

Rousseau

in

the

recognition

of

the

pure

animality

of

man in this

state.

"L'usage

de

la

raison,"

he

writes

n

a later

passage,

is

"ins6parable

de

l'6tat

de nature"

(ibid.,

?9).


7/23

170

ARTHUR

.

LOVEJOY

a

pure

process

of

idealization,

had

conceived

of him as

"himself a

philosopheriscovering

naided

he most ublime

ruths."

Rousseau

prides

himself

pon

his

adherence o a

morerealistic

method,

pon

a

morefaithful

nd

less

flatteringicture

f the

genuinely

atural

and

truly primitive.

And

such

a

picture

shows

us,

not the

benignant

primeval

age

animated

by

maximesde

justice

et

de

raison

tires

de

l'amour

de

l'ordre

n

gne'ral;

showsus

not

even

beings

ike Mon-

taigne's

"Cannibals,"

who

were "less barbarouss

han

we,

eu

esgard

aux

regles

de

la

raison";

it

shows

us,

says

Rousseau,

creatures

characterized ythe astdegree

f

pesanteurt tupidit6,

nd destitute

of

moral deas

of

any

kind.

True,

Rousseau

points

out certain

very

real

advantages

enjoyed

by

the

human

species

n

this

nitial

phase

of

ts evolution.

If

primi-

tive

man

was

merely lazy

and

stupid

animal,

he

was

at least

a

healthy,

a

happy,

and

a

comparatively

harmless animal. It

is

when

rhapsodizing

ver the

physical uperiority

f

early

man that

Rousseau

falls into the

often-quotedanguage

which

probably

has

done most to give hasty readersthe impression hat he identifies

the

state

of nature

withthe ideal state.

After

racing

he

physical

disorders

of

modern mankind

to the luxuriesand artificialities

f

civilization,

ousseau

continues:

Such

s the

melancholy

vidence

hatwe

might

ave avoided lmost

ll

the

lls

we

suffer

rom,

f we had

kept

o

the

imple, niform,

nd

solitary

existence

rescribed

o

us

by

nature.

If she

ntended s to be

healthy,

venture

lmost

o affirmhatthe

stateof reflections a state

contrary

o

nature

nd

that

heman

who

hinks

midite)

s a man

depraved.

But

the

proposition,

t must be

noted,

s

hypothetical,

nd

in

the

final

umming-up

ousseau does not

assert

the

hypothesis;

he

does

not

hold

that

physical

health

s the sole

or

chief nd

of

nature

with

regard

to

man.

That the sentences

uoted

refer

only

to

physical

well-being

s made certain

y

Rousseau's

ownremark t the end of

the

passage:

"I

have thus

far

been

considering nly

'homme

hysique."

Primitive

man

was

also

happier

than

his

civilized

successors,

Rousseau undeniablymaintains. He maintains t on the grounds

on

which

many

would

still

maintain

that

the animals in

general

experience

ess

suffering

han

man.

The

primeval

ete

umaine,

iving

in

the

moment,

was untroubled

ither

y

regrets

r

by

fears

f

coming


8/23

ROUSSEAU'S

"DISCOURSE

ON

INEQUALITY"

171

evil.

His

powers

and

satisfactions,

hough

few and

meager,

were

commensuratewith

his few

and

simple

desires.

Since

self-esteem

had

not

yet

waked

n

him,

t

was

his

body

alone

that

was

vulnerable;

he

knew

nothing

f the

deeper

nd

more

eptic

wounds

of

vanity,

r

of

the

torment

f

unsatisfied

mbition.

Having

no

ideas

of

moral

obligation,

e

was

as

little

ubject

o the

reproaches

f

conscience

s he

was

disturbed

by

its

incitements.

Having

no

affections,

e was

untouched

by

sorrow. There is

nothingparticularly

paradoxical

about

this.

That men

are,

n Rousseau's

sense,

ess

happy

than

dogs

or

sheep,

is

a

familiar,

lmost

a

platitudinous,onjecture,

nd

not

lacking

in

plausibility, hough

omewhatdifficult

f

proof.

Rous-

seau's

thesis bout the

happiness

fthe state of

nature

has

essentially

the

same

meaning.

And

just

as

the admission

of the

former

on-

jecture

does not

imply

that one

would,

on

the

whole,

prefer

o be

a

dog

or

a

sheep,

so Rousseau's

thesis does not

necessarily

mply

a

preference

orthe

condition

f the

truly

natural

man.

Later in

the

Discoursehe

expressly

eclares

hat forman

"to

place

himself

n

the

level

of the

beasts,

which

are

the

slaves

of

instinct,"

would be to

"degrade

his

nature."

True

it

is, also,

that Rousseau

asserts he

"goodness"

of

man in

his

primitive

tate;

but how

little

this

means

has

been shown

by

others,

otablyby

Professor

chinz.'

That

in

the

tate of

nature

man

has

not

the status

of

a

moral

agent,

Rousseau

plainly

tells us:

les

hommes

ans

cet tat

n'ayant

ntre ux aucune

sorte e

relation

morale

ni de

devoirs

onnus.

The

doctrine

f

a

bonte

aturelle,

o far

s

the

Second

Discourse s

concerned,

ould

best be expressedn Englishby

the

proposition

hat

man was

originally

non-moral

ut

good-natured

brute.

He

was

not

mechant,

ot

malicious

nor

wantonly

cruel.

Against

Hobbes's assertion hat

"all

men

n

the

state

of

nature

have

a

desire and

will

to

hurt,"

Rousseau maintains

hat

primitive

man

(like

some other

nimals)

had

"an

innate

repugnance

o

see others f

his kind

suffer."2

n

the

course

of

social

development,

Rousseau

finds,

f man

has

learnedmoreabout the

natureof the

good,

he

has

I

A.

Schinz,

"La

Notion

de vertu

dans

le

Premier

Discours de

J.-J.

Rousseau,"Mercurede

France,

XCVII

(ler. juin, 1912),

532-55;

cf. also

"La

Theorie

de

la

bontd

naturelle

de

l'homme

chez

Rousseau,"

Revue

du

X VIIIe

aiscle,

I

(Oct.-dcc.,

1913),

433-47.

2

As

will

be

shown

below,

however,

Rousseau does not

really

join

issue with

Hobbes

here,

for

he

was

not

dealing

with

the

same

"state

of

nature."


9/23

172 ARTHUR . LOVEJOY

lost

much

of

his

primitive ood

nature;

his

progress

n

moral

knowl-

edge

has

been

accompanied

by

a

weakening

f

his

animal

nstinct

f

sympathy-and

the former as

unhappily,

Rousseau is

persuaded,

proved

less

efficacious

eans

of

preventing

men

from

njuring

heir

fellows.

Primitive

man killed

when

necessary

o

procure

ood or

in

self-defense;

but

he

invented

no

instruments

f

torture

and he

waged

no wars.

In

spite

of

these desirable

spects

of

the state of

nature,

t

would

be

scarcely

onceivable-even

if

we

had no

direct

tatement

f Rous-

seau's

upon

the

point-that

he

should

have wished his

readers to

understand

hat he

regarded

s the deal

existence orman

a

state of

virtual

idiocy--the

ife of

a

completely

nintelligent,

nsocial,

and

non-moral

though

good-naturedbeast,

such as

was

realistically

portrayed

n

his

version

f the natural state of

man.'

Jean-Jacques

was doubtless

more

or less

mad,

but

he was

not so mad as

that;

and

if

he

had

been,

it

is

certain hat no such

teaching

would

have been

taken

seriously

y

his

contemporaries.

The

Discourse,

t

is

true,

is

characterized

by

a

great

deal

of

wavering

between

conflicting

endencies. There

was,

on

the

one

hand,

the

tendency

which

had been

dominant,

though

not

un-

challenged,

or ome two centuries

mong

thinkers

mancipated

rom

theological

radition)

o

employ

he

adjective

"natural"

as

the term

of

highest

ossible

eulogy,

nd

to assume that man

"as

he came from

the

hands

of nature"

must have

been

the model of what

"nature"

intended,

being

of

uncorrupted

ationality, nowing

ntuitively

ll

essentialmoraland religious ruths,

nd

completely urnished or ll

good

works:

Nor

think

n

Nature's

tate

hey lindly

rod;

The State

of

Nature

was

the

reign

fGod:

Self-love

nd

social

t her

birth

egan,

Union

he

bond f ll

things,

nd of

man.2

This

sort

of

philosophy

f

history

was of

the

essence

of

deism:

no

religious

eliefs

ould

be

true,

r

at all events

none

could be

impor-

tant, whichcould not be supposed to have been evident to man

I

Since

writing

he above

I

find hat M.

Lanson

has

made

substantially

he

same

remark:

"If

we are

to

conceive

f

the

man

of

nature

s

resembling

he

orang-outang,

can

we

suppose

that Rousseau

seriously

esired

o make

us

retrogress

o

that

point

"

(Ann.

de

la

Soc. J.-J.

Rousseau,

VIII

[1912],

12).

2

Pope,

Essay

on

Man, III,

147-50.


10/23

ROUSSEAU'S

"

DIscOURSE

ON

INEQUALITY

"

173

from

he

beginning.

This

was

the

meaning

of

the

thesis

embodied

in

Tindal's

title:

"IChristianity,"

dentified ith

natural

religion,

as

"as

Old as

the

Creation,"

i.e.,

known to the earliest

men;

it

would not

have been

"naturPl"

if t had not been.

The idea

of the

"noble

savage,"

whether

rimitive

r

contemporary,

as a natural

and

usually

recognized

corollary

from this

assumption.

Now

Rousseau,

even

when

writing

f his first

tage,

was not unaffected

by

this

tradition,

hough

he was

working

imself ree rom

t;

though

his "state of nature" was

essentially

ifferentrom he oldercon-

ception,

nd was not

likely

to be taken

seriously y

anyone

as

an

ideal,

he was not

yet wholly

emancipated

from he

assumption

f

the

excellence

f the "natural" as such. And

thus,

with his char-

acteristic

agerness

o

put

the

point

he is

at

the moment

making

s

forcibly

s

possibly,

he sometimeswrites

what,

taken

apart

from

their

general

ontext,

ound ike

enthusiastic

ulogies

f

the

primitive

state.

The

opposition

etween his and the

contrary

endency

on-

sequently

ometimes

pproaches,

erhaps

n

one

passage

in the

pre-

amble

reaches,

he

point

of actual contradiction. But the

historian

of

ideas

has

performed

ut

a small

part

of

his

task

when he

points

out

such

an

opposition

f

tendencies,

r

even

a

direct

ontradiction,

in

a

historicallymportant

writing.

What is

essential

s

to see

from

what

nfluences

nd

prepossessions

he

opposing

trains

n

the

author's

thought rose;

to

observe their

often

complex nterplay;

to

note

which was the

prevailing

nd more

characteristic

endency;

above

all,

to

determine

when

the

author s

merely epeating

urrent

omi-

monplaces,

nd

whenhe

is

expressing

ew

insights

ot

yetperfectly

disentangled

rom raditional deas.

It

is,

in

short,

needful

o

know

not

only

where

writer

tands,

but

in

whichdirection e

is

heading.

Now

it was

the

primitivistic

trainthat

was

(contrary

o

the

usual

supposition)

he

traditional

nd

imitative ide of

the

content

f

the

Discourse.

The

relatively

nnovating

ide of

t

consisted

n a

repaint-

ing

of the

portrait

f

the

true

child of nature o

that

he

appeared

n

a

much

ess

pleasingguise,

ven

though

few

of the

old

featureswere

left.

How far

from

dyllic

s

Rousseau's

picture

f

the state

of

nature

may

be

seen,

finally,

rom

is

account

of

the

causes

which

brought

his

phase

of

the

history

four

race to

an

end.

The

explanation

s couched

in

somewhat

Darwinian

terms,

hundred

years

beforeDarwin. As


11/23

174

ARTHUR

.

LOVEJOY

the

species

increased

n

numbers,

Rousseau

observes,

there

arose

between

t and other

pecies

formidable

truggle

or

xistence. He

clearly

distinguished

he three

aspects

of such

a

concurrenceitale:

the

growing

nsufficiency

f

readily

ccessible

food-supply,

he

com-

petition

f

other

animals,

both

frugivorous

nd

carnivorous,

or

the

means

of subsistence

which

they

shared

with

man,

and

the direct

attacks

of carnivorous nimals.

This

struggle,

ousseau

intimates,

might

have

ended

in the elimination

f

our

species,

f man had

been

able

to

fight nly

with

tooth

and

claw. But

under

the

pressure

f

necessity,

nother

endowment,

which

is le

caractere pecifique

e

l'espece

humaine, egan

to

manifest

tself-intelligence,

n

its several

elements and

manifestations;

a

power

which, meager

enough

at

first,

s

yet

capable

of

an "almost

unlimited"

development.

Because

it is

thus

the

distinguishing

haracter

of man

among

the

animals,

and because

its

unfolding

s

gradual

and

progressive,

ousseau

calls

it

the

faculte

de se

perfectionner,

r,

for

short,

"perfectibility."

At

the outset ts

functions ere

purely

ractical;

it

was

simply

means

of

survival. It enabled man to inventprimitiveweapons and

rudi-

mentary

ools,

o

discover

he art

of

making

ire,

nd to

adapt

himself

to

diversities

f

climate

nd

food

n

the new environments

o

which

he

was forced

y

ncrease

f

population

o

migrate.

Thus

themoment

at

which

man firstmanifested

he

previously

atent attribute

dis-

tinctive

fthenature

f

his

pecies

was,

n

Rousseau's

terminology,

he

moment

t

which

his

emergence

rom

he

state of nature

began.

From

this ccount

of

the

first

tage

alone

it is

easy

to see

that

the

Discourse, o farfrom trengtheningheprimitivisticllusion, ended

to weaken

t.

Though

t shows

ufficientlylain vestiges

f

the

older

habit

of

mind,

t nevertheless

nsists that the

historian

f

mankind

must

begin

by supposing

he

human

race

in a

state,

not

of

primitive

perfection

romwhich

t

has

degenerated,

ut

in a state of

pure

animality,

with

all its

lumieres,

oth

moral

and

intellectual,

till

to

attain,

through

n

immensely ong,

slow

process,

due

primarily

o

environmental

necessities

working

upon

an

originally

dormant

capacityfor the exerciseof ntelligence. Thus to the conviction f

the

undesirability

f the

true state of

nature,

already

found

in

Voltaire nd

Pufendorf,

as

added

the

dea

of

a law

of

necessary

nd

gradual

progress

through

natural

causes.

This

combination

of


12/23

ROUSSEAU'S

"DISCOURSE

ON

INEQUALITY"

175

ideas

was

not

new

in

1755.

It

had,

indeed,

been

the central ssue

n

a

celebrated

ontroversy

hich

had

lately gitated

he earned

world,

the

affair

f

the

Abb6 de

Prades;

and,

as M.

Morel

has well

shown,'

Rousseau

in

this

part

of

the

Discourse s

simply

developing oncep-

tions

presented

y

Diderot

n

his

Apl1ogie

de

l'Abbe

de

Prades,

1752,

and

in

the

Pensees

sur

'interpretation

e la

nature,

754.

What was

significant

n

the

Discourse was that

through

t

Rousseau

aligned

himself

ith

he

partisans

f a

new

movement,

veritable

hilosophie

nouvelle,

s Diderot

had

called

t-a

movement

ssentially

ntagonistic

to the current rimitivisms well as to religious rthodoxy. The

Discourse,

n

short,

s

chiefly

otable

in

the

history

f

ideas

as

an

early

contribution

o the formulationnd

diffusion

fan

evolutionary

conception

f human

history.

It

has

other

aspects,

some

of

them

partly

ncongruous

with

this;

but this

is

obviously

the

most

sig-

nificant,

ince

it

was a manifestation

f a

new

tendency

which

was

destined o revolutionizemodern

hought.

That

the

Discourse

helped

to undermine he

primitivistic

re-

possessionntheminds f ighteenth-centuryeadersmaybegathered

from

ome

of

the commentsmade

upon

it

by

Mme

de

Stall

in

1788.

"With how much

finesse,"

he

exclaims,

does

Rousseau

follow

he

progress

f man's

ideas

How he

inspires

us with

admiration

for

the first

teps

of the human mind "

That

his own

admiration id

not extend

o

the

later

steps,

Mme

de Stadl

notes;

but

she

intimates

that thiswas

an

inconsistencyrising

rom

peculiarity

fRousseau's

temperament,

ot a

consequence

f

the

principles

which

he

adopted.

"Rousseau oughtperhapsto have acknowledged hat this ardorto

know and

to

understand

was also a

natural

feeling, gift

f

heaven,

like

all

other

facultiesof

men;

means

of

happiness

when

they

are

exercised,

torment

when

they

re

condemned o

inactivity."2

The

term

"perfectibility"

o

which-though

t was

apparently

nvented

1

Ann. de

la

Soc.

J.-J.

Rousseau

(1909),

pp.

135-38.

Lettres

ur

les dcrits

de

Rousseau,

1788:

(Euvres, (1820),

15 A

still

better

illus-

tration

of this

aspect

of

Rousseau's

influence,

noted

since

the

foregoing

was

written,

s

to

be

seen in

one

of

the

earliest British

Rousseau

enthusiasts,

James

Burnet,

Lord

Mon-

boddo. In his Origin and Progress of Language, I, p. iii (1773), he says that the only

philosopher

who

seems

really

to

know

anything

of

the state

of nature

is

"Mr.

Rousseau,

a

very

great genius,

in

my

judgment";

and,

expressly

following

Rousseau,

the

Scottish

writer

asserts our

descent

from the

orang-outang,

and

attempts

to

trace

the

gradual

evolution

of

man's

intelligence

and

language

from the

purely

animal

stage.

On

this I

hope

shortly

to

write

more

fully

elsewhere.


13/23

176

ARTHUR

O.

LOVEJOY

by

Turgot

in 1750-Rousseau

probably

did more than

anyone

else

to

givecurrency,

ecame

the catchword f Condorcet nd other

ub-

sequent

believers n the

reality,

ecessity,

nd

desirability

f

human

progress

hrough

fixed

equence

of

stages,

n

both

past

and

future.

Rousseau's

own

thought,

however,

s

more

complex

and

many-

sided

than

that

of his successors

who

drew

from

hese

conceptions

an amiable

confidence

n

the

speedy

"perfecting

f

the

species."

For,

in

addition

o the

two

conflicting

endencies

lready

noted,

here

is

in

the

Discourse third

train

which

modifies

nd deflects oth the

others

n a curious

way,

o

which

Rousseau's commentators

ave

given

too

little

attention.

This

was the

influence

f

Hobbes's

conception

of human

nature,

and

in

particular

his

account

of

the

"passion

"

which

s dominant

n

and distinctive f

man.

Hobbes finds

that

the

object

of our

characteristically

uman

esires,

he sole

"pleasure

of

the mind"

(as

distinct

from

hose

of

the

senses,

which

he sums

up

under

the word

"conveniences"),

"is

either

glory

or

to have

a

good

opinion

of

oneself),

r

refers

o

glory

n

the

end";

and

glory

"consists in comparison

nd

precellence."

"All

the pleasure

and

jollity

of

the

mind,"

he

writes

gain,

"consists

in

this,

even

to

get

some

with

whom

comparing,

t

may

find

somewhat

wherewith

o

triumph

nd vaunt

itself."

It

is

this

cravingchiefly

which

makes

men

social

animals.

"Men

delight

n

each

other's

company"

that

they

may

"receive

some

honor r

profit

rom

t,"

may

"pass

the more

current

n

their

own

opinion"

or "leave behind them

some esteem

and honor

with

those with

whom

they

have been conversant."

"All society," n short, is either orgain,or forglory; that s, not

so

much

for ove

of our

fellows s for

ove

of

ourselves."'

But

while

"vain

glory"

thus

engenders

kind

of

elf-seeking

nd even

malicious

sociability,

t is

also the

most

frequent

ause

of

quarrel mong

men.

While

conflicts

etween

ndividuals

r nations ometimes rise from

actual

oppositions

of

material

interest,

hey

arise

much

oftener,

Hobbes

thought,

rom

his

passion

of

self-esteem,

hich

causes

men

to

attack

one

another

for

trifles,

s

a

word,

smile,

different

pin-

ion,or any other ignofundervaluing,itherdirect n theirpersons

or

by

reflection

n

their

kindred,

heir

friends,

heir

nation,

their

profession,

heirname."

I

Leviathan,

chap.

xiii;

Philosophical

Rudiments

concerning

Government,

hap.

i;

in

Woodbridge's

The

Philosophy of

Hobbes

in

Extracts,

pp.

233-37,

240-48.


14/23

ROUSSEAU'S

"DISCOURSE ON

INEQUALITY

177

This

social

psychology

f

Hobbes,

with

its

implication

of the

inherent

mechancete

f

man,

we

have seen

Rousseau

rejecting,

o

long

as

he

is

describing

he

pur

etatde nature. The

original

gorilla

was

not

interested

n

nor conscious

f the ort f

figure

e

cut n

the

eyes

of

other

nimals

of

his kindnor n that

which,

n

comparison

with

thers,

he

cut

in

his own.

But the

"pure

state of nature" for

Rousseau,

t

must

be

remembered,

s

precisely

he

stage

in which that

which

s

distinctive f human nature has not

yet

manifested tself.

When,

however,

man becomes differentiated

romthe other

animals,

his

rulingpassion

and his

generaldisposition,ccording

o the

Discourse,

are

precisely

uch as the

philosopher

f

Malmesbury

had described.

Rousseau's

theory

of human nature

here,

n

short,

s

identicalwith

and

manifestly

erived from hat of Hobbes. "It is

easy

to

see,"

he

too

declares,

"that

all our labors are

directed

upon

two

objects

only,

namely,

for

oneself,

he commodities

f

ife,

nd

consideration

on

the

part

of others."

Amour-propre-"a

sentiment

which takes

its source

n

comparison-is

"not to be

confused

with

l'amour

de

soi-meme." The latter

s a

natural concern

or

one's own

interest,

which

s

common

o

man and other

nimals;

the

former

s

a

"facti-

tious

feeling,

risingonly

n

society,

which eads

each man

to think

more

highly

of himself han

of

any

other."

This

passion

began

to

show tselfwith

the firstmoment

f

human

elf-consciousness,

hich

was

also

that

of

the

first

tep

of human

progress:

s

he

emerged

rom

the state

of

nature,

man

came

to

feel

racial

pride

n

his

superiority

over the

other animals.

C'est

ainsi

que

le

premieregardu'ilporta

ur

ui-meme

produisit

e

premier ouvement'orgueil; 'estainsique,sachant ncore peinedis-

tinguer

es

rangs,

t se

contemplant

u

premier

ar

on

spece,

l

se

pr6paroit

de

loin

y pr6tendre

ar

on ndividu.

The same

passion

has ever

since

been,

nd still

s,

Rousseau

declares,

the

principal

ource

of all that s

most

characteristicf

us,

both

good

and

bad-but

chiefly

ad.

It is

to

this

niversalesire

or

eputation,

onors,

nd

preferment,

hich

devours s

all,

....

this rdor o make neself

alked

bout,

his

ury

o

be

distinguished,

hatweowewhat s best ndworst

n

men--our

irtues

nd

ourvices, ur ciencesnd our rrors,ur onquerorsnd ourphilosophers-

in

short,

vast

number

fevil

things

nd a small

numberf

good.

It

is

this,

Rousseau in

one

passage

goes

so far

as

to

say,

"which

inspires

men

to

all

the evils

which

they

nflict

pon

one

another."


15/23

178

ARTHUR

O.

LovEJOY

It

is

the

cause

of the

boundlessness

of human

desires;

for

while

thenormal esires

or

commodities,"

ormeans

of

ensuous

gratifica-

tion,

are

limited,

he

craving

for

"distinction,"

for

that

whichwill

feed

the

individual's

sense

of

importance,

pre-eminence,

ower,

s

insatiable,

nd

infiniten the

variety

of

the

forms n

which t mani-

fests

tself. Man-once

he becomes

truly

man-is thus

by

his own

constitution

so long

as he fails

to

become

aware of

and to restrain

this

impulse)

condemned

o endless

dissatisfaction,

o

a ceaseless

pursuit

f

goals

which

when ttained

eave

him no more

content

han

before.

Finally, I'amour-propre

s

the source

of

that

insincerity

which

Rousseau

finds

especially

odious

in

the emotional

ife

and

behavior

of civilized

men-the

elaborate

structure

f

pretense

nd

accommodation,

keeping

up

appearances,"

simulated

good

will

or

admiration,

he

tribute

which

he

vanity

of

one

leads

him to

pay

to

the

vanity

of

another,

n

order

hat he

may

receive

return

n

kind.

Through

this

exclusively

human

type

of

desire,

men

have

finally

developed

strange

ortof

mutual

parasitism

n

their

nner

xistence;

theyhave

come

to be

beings

who

savent

tre eureux

t contents

'eux-

m~mes

ur

le

t6moignage

'autrui

plut6t

que

de leur

propre.

"The

savage

has

his lifewithin

himself;

social

man

outside

himself,

n

the

opinion

of others."'

It

is

therefore

s true o

say

that

Rousseau

teaches

the

mechancete

naturelle,

s

to

say

that he teaches

the

bont6

aturelle,

f

man;

and

the

former

eaching

s the more

significant

f

the

two,

since t alone

relates

to what

s

distinctive

n man's nature. It

is

thus

evident

hat

the doctrine f the Discourse s almostcompletely ontrary o that

which

Professor

rving

Babbitt

sets forth

as

characteristic

f

Rousseau:

He

puts

he

blame

f he onflictnd division f

which

e s

conscious

n

himself

pon

he

ocial

onventionshat

et bounds o his

temperament

nd

impulses;

nce

get

rid f

hese

urely

rtificial

istinctions,

nd

he

feels

hat

he

will

be

one

with

imself

nd

nature.2

The

real

source

of

our evils

Rousseau here

finds n

human nature

itself,

nd

in

the most

characteristic

f

ts

propensities.

But

though

1

This

idea

has been

wittily

laborated

by

Henry

James n

his

short

tory,

The

Private Life."

One of

Its

characters,

hough

master f

all

the

social

graces,

had

no

private

ife;

he

ceased to

exist

ltogether

hen

not n

society-when

no

longer

n

object

of

the

admiring

ttention

f others.

S

Rousseau

and

Romanticism,

p.

79.


16/23

ROUSSEAU'S

DISCOURSE

ON

INEQUALITY"

179

he holds that

intellect

nd

iniquity

made

their

d6but

together

nd

have

since

developed ogether,

e does not

represent

hem

s

develop-

ing

pari passu.

In the

earlier

stages

of

cultural

evolution,

fter

men's

emergence

rom

he

state

of

nature,

their

animal

instinct

f

sympathy

was

still

relatively trong,

heir

amour-propre

elatively

weak,

or

lacking

in means

of

expression;

so

that

the

progress

n

knowledge

nd

power

made

possible by

man's

intellectual

perfecti-

bility

was

only

slightly

ffset

y

the effects

f his

egotism.

The

characteristics

f these

stages,

s

Rousseau

pictures

hem,

must

now

be

recalled.

The

second

stage

in

his Outline

f History

s a

long

transitional

period-covering,

he

says,

a

"multitude

of

centuries

-in

the course

of

which

men ittle

by

little

earnedthe use

of

the

simpler

ools

and

weapons,

united

in

herds

for

mutual

protection

nd for

procuring

food,

invented

anguage,

finallydeveloped

the

permanent

family,

and

with

t

a first nd

very

imited

tage

of

the nstitution f

property

-in

the

form

of

recognized wnership

by

each

individual of

his

weapons

and

other

personalbelongings,

nd

by

each

family

of

its

own cabin.

The culmination

f

this

process

is

Rousseau's third

period,

which

he calls

the

stage

of

societenaissante

and

(as

I

have

indicated)

clearly

and

repeatedly

distinguishes

rom

the

pre-social

"state

of

nature."'

It

is the

patriarchal

tage

of human

society;

the

only

government

was that

of the

family.

Men

lived

in

loose,

unorganized

illage

groups,gaining

heir

ubsistence

by

hunting

r

fishing

nd

from he

natural

fruits f the

earth,

and

finding

heir

amusement

n

spontaneous atherings

or

ong

and

dance. That so

many

learned

historians

f literature nd of

political

thought,

nd

even

writers

f works

n

Rousseau,

have

failed

to

point

out that this

third

stage,

and

not the

state of

nature,

was

regardedby

him

as

the

most

desirable,

s rather

mazing,

ince

he

is

perfectly

xplicit

n

the

point.2

The

passage

ought

to be the most

familiar

n

the

Dis-

1

There

is,

however,

some

variation

in

Rousseau's

use

of

diat

de

nature,

which is

doubt-

less

partly

responsible

for

the

common

misinterpretation.

I

have

counted

forty-four

instances of

the term in the

Discourse;

in

twenty-nine

of

these

it

designates

exclusively

the

first

tage,

that

of

complete

animality;

in

four

t

is used

in

the

merely uristic

sense,

without reference to any distinction of cultural stages; in two it covers the firstthree

stages,

and

in

nine cases

the context does not

permit

a certain

determination

of

the

meaning.

2

It

should

be

said,

however,

that

Professor

Dunning

(op.

cit.)

mentions

this,

but

treats

it

as

a mere

contradiction

of

the

dominant

contention

of

the Discourse.

The fact

is

duly

recognized

by

Mr.

Vaughan.

The

original

misconception

is well

exemplified

by

Voltaire's

famous

letter to Rousseau on

receiving

the

Discourse

(Moland

ed.,

XXXVIII,

446-50).


17/23

180

ARTHUR

O. LOVEJOY

course;

but

as it is

usually

neglected,

t

seems

needful

o

recall it

here:

Though

men

had

now ess

endurance,

nd

though

atural

ympathy

(pitid)

had

suffered

ome

diminution,

his

period

f the

development

f

human

aculties,

olding

just

mean

between he

ndolence

f

the

primitive

state

nd

the

etulant

ctivity

f ur

elf-esteem,

ust

ave

been

he

happiest

and

the

most

asting

poch.

The

more ne reflects

pon

t,

the more ne

perceives

hat

t

was the tate

east

ubject

o

revolutions,

he

best tate

for

man;

and

that

he

can

have

departed

rom

t

only

y

some

nhappy

hance,

which

nthe nterest

f he

general

ood

(utilitY)

ught

ever

ohave

ccurred.

The

example

f the

savages,

whoare

nearly

ll

found

o be

at

this

point,seems oaffordurthervidencehat his tate s theveritable

outh

fthe

world;

nd

that

ll

subsequent

dvances ave

been,

n

appearance

o

many

steps

owards

he

perfection

f he

ndividual,

n

reality

owards

he

decrepi-

tude

ofthe

pecies.

It

is to

be borne

n

mind,

however,

hat this

patriarchal

nd

com-

munistic

ociety,

upposed

to

correspond

o the cultural condition

of

existing

avage

tribes,

was what

a

number

f writers

eforeRous-

seau

had

meant

by

the "state

of

nature."

Rousseau's

account of

t

is

not

very

dissimilar

o the

passage--quoted

n

part by

Shakespeare

in The

Tempest-in

which

Montaigne

describes he

pleasant

ife f

the

"Cannibals

"-i.e.,

theCarib

Indians-except

for

he

anthropophagy.

which

Montaigne

treats

as

a

trifling

eccadillo

of

his

children

of

nature.

Pope's

"state

of

nature,"

though

it

confusedlymingles

several

stages

which

Rousseau

definitely istinguishes,

n

the

main

also

corresponds

roadly

to Rousseau's third

stage.

It

may, therefore, erhaps appear

at

first hat the

distinction

between

Rousseau's

view

and that

of such

precursors

s

merely

terminological--that

is ideal

is what

they

alled

the state

of

nature,

though

he

prefers

o

apply

that

expression

o

another

condition

f

human

life.

And

it

is,

indeed,

true

that

in

his

praise

of

the third

stage

Rousseau

is

merely

inging

n old

song,

which

all

the

long

line

of sentimental

ulogists

of the

noble

savage

had

sung

before

him.

Yet

the distinction

etween his

position

and

theirs

s much

more

than

verbal.

What

the Discourse

asserted

was

that

this best

condition

f

mankind

was

not

primitive

nd

was

not,

properly peak-

ing,

"of

nature,"

but

was

the

product

f

art,

.e.,

of

a

conscious xer-

cise

of

man's

contriving

ntelligence,

n

its

slow

and arduous

develop-


18/23

ROUSSEAU'S

"

DISCOURSE

ON

INEQUALITY"

181

ment.

The

third

stage

was not invested

with

the

glamour

f

the

sacred

adjective "natural";

you

could

not

say

of

it,

as

Montaigne

had

said of

the

savage

moeurs

whichhe so

enthusiastically epicted,

Hos natura

modos

rimum

edit.

For

Rousseau,

in

short,

man's

good

lay

in

departing

rom

his

"natu-

ral"

state--but

not

too

much;

"perfectibility"

p

to

a

certain

point

was

desirable,

though

beyond

that

point

an evil.

Not

its

infancy

but

its

eunesse

was the best

age

of the human

race. The

distinction

etween

such a view and

a

thoroughgoing rimitivism

mayseemto us slight nough; but in themid-eighteenthenturyt

amounted

to an

abandonment

f

the

stronghold

f

the

primitivistic

position.

Nor is this the

whole

of

the

difference.

As

compared

with the

then-conventional

ictures

of the

savage

state,

Rousseau's

account

even

of his

third

tage

is

far

ess

idyllic;

and

it is

so because

of his

fundamental

nfavorable

iew

ofhuman

nature

ud

human.

Though

the

coloring

s not

uniform,

here

s a

large

admixture

f

black

n his

picture; his savages are quiteunlikeDryden's ndians-

Guiltless

men,

hatdanced

way

heir

ime,

Fresh s their roves nd happy s their

lime--

or

Mrs.

Aphra

Behn's

natives of

Surinam

who

"represented to

her]

an

absolute

dea

of

the

first

tate of

nnocence,

efore

man knew

how

to

sin."

The men in

Rousseau's

"nascent

society"

had

dejd

bien

des

querelles

t

des

combats;

'amour

propre

was

already

manifest

n

them,

as

a

necessaryconsequence

of

theirtranscendence f the

purely

nimal

stage;

and

slights

r

affronts

ere

consequently

isited

with

vengeances

erribles.

Already,

too-from

the same

motive--

men

had

begun

to

desire

bjects,

not for

heir eal

utility,

ut

merely

to

feel

the

pride

of

possession;

objects,

herefore,

privation

f which

was

much

more cruelthan

the

possession

f

them

was

enjoyable."

Here,

once

more,

t

is

true,

there

s

in

Rousseau

a conflict f

tendencies

which

approaches

elf-contradiction.

ut here

also it

is

not

difficult

ither to

determinewhichtendency

s

the more dis-

tinctive,

r

to

see

how,

n

a

measure,

he

reconciles he

conflict.

It is

the

dark

part

of

the

picture,

esulting

rom

is

assumption

f a radi-

cally

evil

element

n

human

nature,

which

s

the

exceptional

nd

sig-


19/23

182

ARTHUR

0.

LOVEJOY

nificant

spect

of his

account

of the third

stage;

the other

part

represents

more conventional

train

of

eighteenth-century

hought.

And the

reason

why

he

regards

his

stage

not as

perfect

ut as the

best

actually

attainable condition

of human

life

is

that the

two

characteristic

ssumptions

of

the Discourse

forced

him

to

a

com-

promise.

Those

assumptions,

s

we have

seen,

are

that

primitive

man

was

healthy,

placid,

and

good-natured,

ut

absolutely tupid,

non-social,

nd

non-moral;

and that

civilized

man

is

highly

ntelli-

gent

and

morally

responsible,

but

profoundly

mechant,

nsincere,

restless,

nd

unhappy.

Rousseau

could

not

bring

himself o

accept

either xtreme

s his

ideal;

the

obvious

way

out,

therefore,

as to

regard

the mean between

these

extremes

s

the best

state

possible.

In

the

third

tage,

men were

ess

good-natured

nd less

placid

than

in

the

state of

nature,

but

were

also less

stupid

and less

unsocial;

they

were ess

intelligent

nd

had

less

power

over nature than civil-

ized

man,

but

were

also

less

malicious and less

unhappy.

In

thus

regarding

he state

of

savagery,

which

ome had called

the "state of

nature,"

not

as a

kind of natural

perfection,

n

absolute

norm,

ut as

a

mixed

condition,

intermediatebetween

two extremes

equally

undesirable,

Rousseau once more differed

rofoundly

romhis

primi-

tivistic

predecessors.

With

the causes

which

brought

he

third

tage

to a

close we

are

not concerned

ere; Rousseau,

as

everyone

nows,

ound

hem

n the

introduction

f

agriculture

nd

metallurgy,

hich ed

to

the

establish-

mentof

private

property

n

land,

to the accumulation

f

capital,

and

to an ever increasing nequality

n

the

wealth and

power

of

indi-

viduals.

What

is

pertinent

o the theme of this

paper

is to

point

out that

his

fourth

hase

ofhuman

evolution,

hus

unhappily

shered

in,

was

in essentials

he

same

as the "natural condition

f

mankind"

which

had been

described

by

Hobbes.

Rousseau

differed rom

Hobbes

merely

n

holding

hat this

condition

was

not

primitive;

n

tracing

he

gradual process

hrough

which

mankindhad

come

nto

t;

and

in

definitely lacing

it

after the

invention

of

agriculture

nd

thebeginning fprivateproperty. But

these were

minor onsidera-

tionsfrom

Hobbes's

point

of

view;

his

essential

ontention

was that

the state

mmediately

receding

he establishment

f

political

society

through

social

compact-the

state

into

which

any

civilized

ociety


20/23

ROUSSEAU'S

"DISCOURSE

ON

INEQUALITY"

183

would

revert f

ll law

and

government

ere

removed-is one

n

which

men,

animated

by

"a

mutual

will

of

hurting,"

would

necessarily

e

involved n

universal

conflict,

atent

or

overt-in a

bellum

mnium

contra

mnes.

Similarly

Rousseau tells us

that in

the

fourth,

r

last

pre-political,

tage,

"devouring

mbition,

agerness

o

improve

heir

relative

fortune,

ess

through

eal

need than

to

make

themselves

superior

o

others,"

nspired

n

all

men

un

noir

penchant

se

nuire

mutuellement.

The

state

of nascent

society

gave

place

to

a

most

horrible

tate

of

war,"

in

which

"none,

whether

ich

or

poor,

found

any security."

The

implications,

n

short,

of the

conception

of

human

nature which Rousseau

had

learned from

Hobbes become

fully

vident

only

n his

description

f his

fourth

tage; they

have

hitherto,

o

to

say,

been held

n

abeyance,

but

are now

permitted

o

work

themselves

ut,

with the

natural

consequence

hat we have

in

this

part

of

the Discourse

ittle more

than

a

replica

of

the state

of

nature

pictured

n

the

Leviathan.

In

the

end, then,

t

is

this

Hobbesian and

Mandevillian

social

psychology

hat

--even

more

than

the

primitivistic

radition

epre-

sented

by Montaigne

and

Pope--prevented

he

evolutionistic

end-

ency

in

the

thought

of the

Discourse

from

ssuing

n

a

doctrine

f

universal

progress,

n

a faith

n

perfectibilite.

Man

being

the kind

of

creature hat he

is,

the

inevitableculmination f

the

process

of

social

development

s

a

state

of

intolerable

vil.

For

the

violence

and universal

insecurity

characteristic

f

the fourth

stage,

the

political

state

was,

says

Rousseau,

invented as a

remedy.

But

it

was

not

invented

n

good faith;

it

was a

trickof

therich,designed

merely

o

protect

heir

property

nd

still

further

xtend

heir

power.

Its

final

ffect

as

to add

political

nequality,

nd thus

new

occasions

of

rivalry

nd

conflict

etween

classes,

to

the

economic

nequality

already

existing-a

consistentdeduction

from

Hobbes's

premises,

though

very

different

rom

Hobbes's

own.

The

remedy,

n

short,

Rousseau

held,

served

only

to

aggravate

the disease. Such

is

the

pessimistic

onclusion

f

the

Discourse.

But in his

next

writing

n

the

subject-the Contratocial, especially he

first

raft

f

t,which

according

o

Vaughan,

"probably goes

back

to

a

date

shortly

efore

or

shortly

fter

the

Discourse

-the

evolutionary

onceptions

on-

spicuous

in

the

latter,

but

there

entangled

with

incongruous

end-


21/23

184

ARTHUR

. LOVEJOY

encies,

reach clear

and

unqualified

xpression.

Never n

the

past,

Rousseau

now

declares,

has

there

been

an

ideal

condition

f

human

society:

La douce

voixde la nature

'est

plus pour

nous

un

guide nfaillible,

i

l'ind~pendance

ue

nous avons

reque

d'elle,

un

tat

d6sirable;

a

paix

et

l'innocence

ous

nt

6chappe

our

amais,

vant

ue

nous

n

ussions

oute

es

delices.

Insensible

ux

stupides

ommes

es

premiers

emps, chappde

ux

hommes

clair6s es

temps

ost~rieurs,

'heureuse

ie

de

'dge

'or

ut

oujours

un

dtat

tranger

la

race

humaine.'

No

exception,

t will

be

observed,

s

made even

for he

third

tage

of

the Discourseon Inequality. As forthe state of nature-already

repudiat

Documents

Modern Philology Arthur O. Lovejoy -- The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality