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Mobile Malware John Mitchell CS 155 Spring 2015

Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

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Page 1: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Mobile Malware

John Mitchell

CS 155 Spring 2015

Page 2: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Outline

• Mobile malware– Common cases involve command and control, information theft

• Identifying malware– Detect at app store rather than on platform

• Classification study of mobile web apps– Entire Google Play market as of 2014– 85% of approx 1 million apps use web interface

Page 3: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Mobile Malware

Page 4: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Some Trends

Page 5: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

iPhone: Operation Pawn Storm

• Trend Micro:– “an active economic and political cyber‐espionage operation that 

targets … military, governments, defense industries, and the media.”– Infects individuals to get to organizations

• Xagent– iOS 7: app icon is hidden, runs in background, restarts if terminated– iOS 8: app icon is visible; doesn’t automatically restart

• Apparently, iOS device needs to be jailbroken– Exact install process unknown– May require social engineering.

blog.trendmicro.com/.../pawn‐storm‐update‐ios‐espionage‐app‐found/

Page 6: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

XAgent app

• Collects user information– Collect text messages– Access contact lists, pictures, geo‐location data– Start voice recording, read WiFi status– Get a list of installed apps, list of processes

• Command and Control (C&C) Communication– HTTP POST request to send messages– GET request to receive commands

Page 7: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Android malware example

Page 8: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Install malicious “conference app”

Page 9: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Malware behavior triggered by C&C server (Chuli)

Page 10: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Outline

• Mobile malware– Common cases involve command and control, information theft

• Identifying malware– Detect at app store rather than on platform

• Classification study of mobile web apps– Entire Google Play market as of 2014– 85% of approx 1 million apps use web interface

Page 11: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

STAMP Admission System

Static

Dynamic

STAMP

Static AnalysisMore behaviors, fewer details

Dynamic AnalysisFewer behaviors, more details

Alex Aiken,John Mitchell,Saswat Anand,Jason FranklinOsbert Bastani,Lazaro Clapp,Patrick Mutchler,Manolis Papadakis

Page 12: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Abstract program execution

• States: mapping of variable names to values• Transitions: relation on pairs of states• Traces: sequence of states or state, transition pairs

Page 13: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

AnalysisConvert bytecode to intermediate

format (called Quads)Step 1

Compute call graph using Class Hierarchy Analysis

Step 2

Build an edge-labeled graph G by processing Quads of each classStep 3

Add new edges to G as per a set of rules until no rules applyStep 4

Page 14: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Data Flow Analysis

getLoc() sendSMS()

sendInet()

Source: Location Sink: SMS

Sink: Internet

Location SMS Location Internet

• Source-to-sink flows o Sources: Location, Calendar, Contacts, Device ID etc.o Sinks: Internet, SMS, Disk, etc.

Page 15: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Data Flow Analysis in Action

• Vulnerability Discovery

Privacy PolicyThis app collects your:ContactsPhone NumberAddress

FB API Send Internet

Source: FB_Data Sink: Internet

Web Source: Untrusted_Data SQL Stmt Sink: SQL

• Malware/Greyware Analysiso Data flow summaries enable enterprise-specific policies

• API Misuse and Data Theft Detection

• Automatic Generation of App Privacy Policieso Avoid liability, protect consumer privacy

Page 16: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Challenges• Android is 3.4M+ lines of complex code

o Uses reflection, callbacks, native code

• Scalability: Whole system analysis impractical

• Soundness: Avoid missing flows

• Precision: Minimize false positives

Page 17: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

STAMP Approach

• Model Android/Javao Sources and sinkso Data structureso Callbackso 500+ models

• Whole-program analysiso Context sensitive

Android

Models

App App

Too expensive!

OS

HW

Page 18: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Building Models

• 30k+ methods in Java/Android APIo 5 mins x 30k = 2500 hours

• Follow the permissionso 20 permissions for sensitive sources ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION (8 methods with source annotations) READ_PHONE_STATE - (9 methods)

o 4 permissions for sensitive sinks INTERNET, SEND_SMS, etc.

Page 19: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Identifying Sensitive Data

• Returns device IMEI in String• Requires permission GET_PHONE_STATE

@STAMP( SRC ="$GET_PHONE_STATE.deviceid", SINK ="@return"

)

android.Telephony.TelephonyManager: String getDeviceId()

Page 20: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Data We Track (Sources)

• Account data• Audio• Calendar• Call log• Camera• Contacts• Device Id• Location• Photos (Geotags)• SD card data• SMS

30+ types of sensitive data

Page 21: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Data Destinations (Sinks)

• Internet (socket)• SMS• Email• System Logs• Webview/Browser• File System• Broadcast Message

10+ types of exit points

Page 22: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Currently Detectable Flow Types

Unique Flow Types = Sources x Sink

396 Flow Types

Page 23: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Example Analysis

Contact Sync for Facebook (unofficial)

Description:This application allows you to synchronize

your Facebook contacts on Android.

IMPORTANT:* "Facebook does not allow [sic] to export phone

numbers or emails. Only names, pictures and statuses are synced."

* "Facebook users have the option to block one or all apps. If they opt for that, they will be EXCLUDED from your friends list."

Privacy Policy: (page not found)

Page 24: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Chuli source-to-sink flows

Page 25: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Contact Sync PermissionsCategory Permission Description

Your Accounts AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS Act as an account authenticator

MANAGE_ACCOUNTS Manage accounts list

USE_CREDENTIALS Use authentication credentials

Network Communication INTERNET Full Internet access

ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE View network state

Your Personal Information READ_CONTACTS Read contact data

WRITE_CONTACTS Write contact data

System Tools WRITE_SETTINGS Modify global system settings

WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS Write sync settings (e.g. Contact sync)

READ_SYNC_SETTINGS Read whether sync is enabled

READ_SYNC_STATS Read history of syncs

Your Accounts GET_ACCOUNTS Discover known accounts

Extra/Custom WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS Modify secure system settings

Page 26: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Possible Flows from Permissions

Sources Sinks

INTERNETREAD_CONTACTS

WRITE_SETTINGSREAD_SYNC_SETTINGS

WRITE_CONTACTSREAD_SYNC_STATS

GET_ACCOUNTS WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS

WRITE_SETTINGSINTERNET

Page 27: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Expected Flows

Sources Sinks

INTERNETREAD_CONTACTS

WRITE_SETTINGSREAD_SYNC_SETTINGS

WRITE_CONTACTSREAD_SYNC_STATS

GET_ACCOUNTS WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS

WRITE_SETTINGSINTERNET

Page 28: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Observed Flows

FB APIWrite

Contacts

Send Internet

Source: FB_Data

Sink: Contact_Book

Sink: InternetRead Contacts

Source: Contacts

Page 29: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Outline

• Mobile malware– Common cases involve command and control, information theft

• Identifying malware– Detect at app store rather than on platform

• Classification study of mobile web apps– Entire Google Play market as of 2014– 85% of approx 1 million apps use web interface– 28% have at least one vulnerability

Page 30: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

A Large-Scale Study of Mobile Web App Security

Patrick Mutchler, Adam Doupe, John Mitchell, Chris Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna

Page 31: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Mobile Apps

Page 32: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Mobile Apps

Page 33: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Mobile Apps

Page 34: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

• Mobile web app: embeds a fully functional web browser as a UI element

Mobile Web Apps

Page 35: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Obj foo = new Object();addJavascriptInterface(foo, ‘f’);

JavaScript Bridge

JavaJavaScript

Page 36: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

JavaScript Bridge

JavaJavaScript

f.bar();

Page 37: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Why?

• Full‐featured mobile web apps

• Expose phone functionality to JavaScript

Page 38: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Security Concerns

• Who can access the bridge?

– Everyone

Page 39: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Complete Isolation

Page 40: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Java

JavaScript

f.bar();

Page 41: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

JavaJavaScript

f.bar();

Page 42: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Static Analysis

• How many mobile web apps?

• How many use JavaScript Bridge?

• How many vulnerable?

Page 43: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Experimental Results

• 737,828 free apps from Google Play (Oct ’13)

• 563,109 apps embed a browser

• 219,404 use the JavaScript Bridge

• 107,974 have at least one security violation

Page 44: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Most significant vulnerabilities

1. Loading untrusted web content

2. Leaking URLs to foreign apps

3. Exposing state changing navigation to foreign apps

Page 45: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

1. Loading untrusted web content

2. Leaking URLs to foreign apps

3. Exposing state changing navigation to foreign apps

Page 46: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

“You should restrict the web-pages that can load inside your WebView with a whitelist.”

- Facebook

Page 47: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

“…only loading content from trusted sources into WebView will help protect users.”

- Adrian Ludwig, Google

Page 48: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

1. Navigate to untrusted content

Page 49: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

// In app codemyWebView.loadUrl(“foo.com”);

Page 50: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

<!‐‐ In HTML ‐‐><a href=“foo.com”>click!</a>

Page 51: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

<!‐‐ More HTML ‐‐><iframe src=“foo.com”/>

Page 52: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

// In JavaScriptwindow.location = “foo.com”;

Page 53: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

public boolean shouldOverrideUrlLoading(WebView view, String url){

// False ‐> Load URL in WebView// True  ‐> Prevent the URL load

}

Page 54: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

public boolean shouldOverrideUrlLoading(WebView view, String url){

String host = new URL(url).getHost();if(host.equals(“stanford.edu”))

return false;log(“Overrode URL: ” + url); return true;

}

Page 55: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

public boolean shouldOverrideUrlLoading(WebView view, String url){

String host = new URL(url).getHost();if(host.equals(“stanford.edu”))

return false;log(“Overrode URL: ” + url); return true;

}

Page 56: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Reach Untrusted Content?

• 40,084 apps with full URLs and use JavaScript 

Bridge

• 13,683 apps (34%) can reach untrusted 

content

Page 57: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

What does untrusted mean?

Page 58: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Use HTTPS?

• 152,706 apps with partially computed URLs• 87,968 apps (57%) with HTTP URLs

Page 59: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Handling SSL Errors

onReceivedSslError

1. handler.proceed()2. handler.cancel()3. view.loadUrl(...)

Page 60: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Mishandling SSL Errors

• 117,974 apps implement onReceivedSslError

• 29,652 apps (25%) must ignore errors

Page 61: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Results

Page 62: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Vulnerability % Relevant % Vulnerable

Unsafe Nav 15 34

HTTP 40 56

Unsafe HTTPS 27 29

Primary results

Page 63: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Popularity

Page 64: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Outdated Apps

Page 65: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

29% unsafe nav

Libraries

51% HTTP

53% unsafe HTTPS

Page 66: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Additional security issuesAnalyze 998,286 free web apps from June 2014

Page 67: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Takeaways

• Apps must not load untrusted content into WebViews

• Able to identify violating apps using static analysis

• Vulnerabilities are present in the entire app ecosystem

Page 68: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Outline

• Mobile malware– Common cases involve command and control, information theft

• Identifying malware– Detect at app store rather than on platform

• Classification study of mobile web apps– Entire Google Play market as of 2014– 85% of approx 1 million apps use web interface– 28% have at least one vulnerability

Page 69: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •
Page 70: Mobile Malware - Stanford University · – Common cases involve command and control, information theft • Identifying malware – Detect at app store rather than on platform •

Summary

• Analyze a dataset of 737,828 Android apps • Found large number of apps contain severe vulnerabilities • 37,418 apps are vulnerable to a remote code execution 

exploit when run on any Android device, because of security oversight in older versions and slow adoption of safe versions

• 45,689 apps are vulnerable to a remote code execution exploit when run on 73% of the in‐use Android devices. 

• Offer recommendations for developers who wish to avoid these vulnerabilities.


Security of Web Applications - University of Texas at Austinshmat/courses/cs380s_fall09/10... · • Attacks lead to malware installation (keyloggers, botnets), document theft, loss

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