Peace Depot Working Paper No.2 E

Missile Defense Operations of US Aegis Ships

Based in Japan

Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI

1 Missile Defense Response to the July 5, 2006 North Korean Missile Test by US Naval Vessels Home-ported at Yokosuka ------- 1

2 US Navy Set Missile Defense Operations Area in the Sea of

Japan, 190 Kilometers West of Okushiri : Japan as a Base for the Defense of the US Homeland --------------------------------------- 35

April, 2007

Peace Depot, Inc. 102-3-3-1 Minowa-cho, Kohoku-ku, Yokohama, 223-0051 Japan

phone: 81-45-563-5101 fax: 81-45-563-9907 web: http://www.peacedepot.org e-mail: office@peacedepot.org

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Missile Defense Response to the July 5, 2006 North Korean Missile Test by US Naval Vessels Home-ported at Yokosuka

by Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI

Peace Depot Summary For many years, Peace Depot has studied US Navy internal documents, and over the past year, one research theme has been the activities of Aegis-equipped ships based in Yokosuka engaged in missile defense duties. This analysis of the activities of the US 7th Fleet around the time of the July 5, 2006 North Korean missile tests is part of this work. This study draws together the results of analysis from the US Navy command histories and deck logs. The command histories, together with the Congressional testimony of the head of the US Missile Defense Agency, demonstrate that US Navy Aegis-equipped ship patrols in the Sea of Japan after October 1, 2004 are a part of US national missile defense operations that assume the possibility of a North Korean missile attack on the American mainland – specifically long range surveillance and tracking of missiles. These records clearly show that the USS Curtis Wilbur and the USS Fitzgerald were the first and second ships respectively designated with this duty. For the first time, the command histories clearly specify the purpose of these patrols. The results of the survey of the deck logs of the three Aegis-equipped ships home-ported at Yokosuka – the Curtis Wilbur, the Fitzgerald and the John S. McCain (hereafter, McCain) – show that the three ships were engaged in duties related to the July 5th North Korean missile tests. The records reveal for the first time that the US Navy established Ballistic Missile Defense Operation Areas in both the Sea of Japan (East Sea) and in the Pacific Ocean. These Operation Areas are located on an almost direct line with the US X-Band radar deployed at the Shariki Communications Base, Tsugaru City, Aomori. The Sea of Japan BMD Operation Area is approximately 285 km west of the Matsumae Peninsula in Hokkaido, and the Pacific BMD Operation Area is about 270 km east of Kujikaigan in Iwate Prefecture. The Aegis ships were on standby in two extremely small maritime zones about 30 kilometers across. Although the ships were on station for about three weeks, they finished the launch monitoring duty in the middle of the night next day of the launch. So for the first time the location and duration of BMD duty of these Aegis-equipped vessels has been clearly identified in this study. This deck log data corroborates the evidence from Congressional testimony and from the command histories that the purpose of these interconnected BMD missions across the northern tip of Honshu, Japan is for the missile defense of the United States proper. The specific formation of this deployment is consistent with an assumption by the US military of a possible North Korean targeting of Hawaii with a Taepodong-2 missile. These operations by US naval vessels home-ported in Yokosuka tasked with direct

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defense of the US itself are an absolutely new development, one not provided for under the Japan-USA Mutual Security Treaty. This matter must be fully discussed from the viewpoint of the “rule of law” of military activities under the international treaty. Research Method A request for inspection of documents was made to the US Naval Historical Center in Washington DC. The research took place on the period from November 2005 to October 2006. The deck logs discussed here were obtained in October 2006. Command histories are required statements recording the important activities and events of a ship in the preceding year. Notwithstanding the fact that writing the command history is a specified responsibility of the ship’s commander, there are many cases where a ship’s command history is missing. Details of a ship’s location in latitude and longitude are recorded in the deck log three times a day (0800, 1200, and 2000). In addition, the logs contain information about the ship’s navigation, its contacts with other ships, and any accidents etc. on board. Discoveries from the Command Histories The 2004 command histories of the Curtis Wilbur and the Fitzgerald were obtained. The command history for the Curtis Wilbur recorded the ship’s careful preparations as the US Navy’s “first active Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ship” (see Attachment 1). It stated that “in mid-July after months of strenuous installations and training CURTIS WILBUR put to sea to test its BMD equipment and theory”, and following another two months of BMD preparations moved to the Sea of Japan to begin “the first ever BMD patrol”. “October 1st found CURTIS WILBUR on station and radiating its modified SPY-1D radar over North Korea in defense of the United States.” Similarly, the Fitzgerald 2004 command history stated that from January to March 2004 the ship was in its homeport of San Diego undergoing refitting for BMD-capability, and in September moved to its new homeport in Yokosuka. The command history then records that through its patrols in the Sea of Japan in November and December, the Fitzgerald became “the second ship to participate in the national Ballistic Missile Defense Limited Defense Operations (LDO)” (see Attachment 2). This information from the command histories closely corresponds with Congressional testimony given in May 2005 by the Director of the Missile Defense Agency Henry A. Obering III, Lieutenant-General U.S. Air Force. In brief, Obering stated that the Aegis ships started deployment in the Sea of Japan to establish “a limited defense capability for the United States against a long-range North Korea missile threat” and “to provide long-range surveillance and tracking data to their (our) battle management system” (See Attachment 3). Together with the corroborating evidence of this testimony, the annual record by the commanders of the ships that actually carried out the missile defense duty from Yokosuka proves that Japan has been made into a stronghold for operations directly in defense of the United States itself. Also the command history confirmed the names of the first and second ship for the duty. (As our earlier study showed, these ships were also followed by the third ship, the McCain.1)

1 See the second article of this working paper.

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We should naturally anticipate that this basic duty would also be carried out in June-July 2006 at the time of the Taepodong 2 missile launch by North Korea. Deck Logs Information 1. Voyages/Cruises On June 10th, all Aegis destroyers based in Yokosuka with the exception of the USS Stethem, which was undergoing repairs at the time, left Yokosuka as part of the Kitty Hawk Strike Group, heading for waters off Guam. The Fitzgerald deck log for June 11th records that the ship “is steaming with the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63), USS Cowpens (CG-63), the USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG-59), the USS Lassen (DDG-82), USS John S.McCain (DDG-56)” (see

Attachment 42).

The first to record the BMD duty in this time period was the Fitzge ald. The ship returned to Yokosuka with rudder damage, and immediately after leaving port at 14:25 on June 14

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th, the deck log recorded the ship as sailing “From Yokosuka, to BMD” (see Attachment 5). After this the Fitzgerald transited the Tsugaru Strait, proceeding straight for the Sea of Japan, and on June 16th entered what was to be identified as the Japan Sea BMD Operation Area. The Fitzgerald remained on station in this Operation Area (often with its engines stopped), from this time until very early morning of July 7th, the night after the North Korean missile test, when it departed for its homeport of Yokosuka. The Fitzgerald was thus on station in the Operation Area for 21 days. Attachment 6 shows the location of the ship as recorded in the deck log. On June 15th, the day after the Fitzgerald left Yokosuka for BMD duty, the Curtis Wilbur deck log records the ship as traveling from “Modloc [Modular Location] FDM, To BMD”, meaning it was moving from the Farallon de Medinilla Target Range (FDM)3 Modular Location [Modloc] Operation Area just north of Guam to BMD duties (see Attachment 7). Perhaps the two ships received BMD deployment orders about the same time. On June 18th 03:20 the deck log recorded “Enter BMD Box” as the ship entered the BMD Operation Area, the location later identified as the BMD Pacific Operation Area (See Attachment 8). On June 26 the Curtis Wilbur deck log recorded that the ship was moving “From BMD to New BMD”, traversing the Tsugaru Strait and entering the Japan Sea BMD Operation Area (see Attachment 9). The ship then stayed on this station until July 6th, and headed for Yokosuka the next morning. The chart in Attachment 10 shows the Curtis Wilbur’s path. The McCain, previously also in waters off Guam, arrived in the Pacific Operation Area just as the Curtis Wilbur left that area for the Japan Sea Operation Area. Early on the morning of June 24th, the McCain’s deck log recorded the ship moving “From Guam OPAREA [Operation Area], Entering Tsugaru Straits” (see Attachment 11). The McCain entered the Pacific Operation Area (sometimes recorded as “the Tsugaru straits”, or as “waters near the entrance to the Tsugaru straits” in spite of the fact that the location is more than 300 km distant from Tsugaru Strait) on June 26th and remained in the area until it departed for Yokosuka early on the morning of July 7th. The chart in Attachment 12 shows the track of the McCain’s voyage. With this rotation, the Curtis Wilbur and the McCain were on station for a total of 19 2 The deck log then erroneously states “currently operating in the sea of Japan.” The coordinates given place the ship in the pacific. 3 The Farallon de Medinilla, an uninhabited island, is the Pacific Fleet’s only U.S.-controlled range located 150 miles north of Guam.

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days in the Pacific BMD Operation Area. The Lassen’s deck logs showed that it did not participate in BMD operations. After its activities with the Kitty Hawk Strike Group in waters near Guam the Lassen headed for Sasebo, which is close to the Korean Peninsula, and arrived there on June 29th. But even though no North Korean test launch had yet taken place, it left Sasebo for Yokosuka the next day, and remained there until July 8th. To make these comings and goings more readily understandable, summary data from the deck logs is set out in Attachment 13: “Deck log summaries for missile defense duty in response to North Korean missile launch: June 11th, 2006 – July 8th, 2006.” 2. Operation Areas When the latitude and longitude of the daily positions of ships are plotted on a map, it immediately becomes clear that the ships on BMD duties stayed within very narrow areas. These locations are generally recorded in the deck logs as “BMD Op. [Operational] Area” (sometimes “Station”, “Box”, or “Modloc”). To specify these locations more clearly, detailed charts showing the plotted paths of the ships on station have been arranged in separate charts for three successive periods: between June 15th and July 7th.

a. Detailed Chart I (Attachment 14), covering the period June 15th - June 25th, shows the paths of the Fitzgerald and the Curtis Wilbur. b. Detailed Chart II (Attachment 15), covering the period from June 26th to 06:00 on July 5th, just after the launch of the Taepodong II at 5 am, shows the McCain as well as the Fitzgerald and the Curtis Wilbur together on station. c. Detailed Chart III (Attachment 16) covers the brief period following confirmation of the Taepodong II launch from 06:00 on July 5th to July 7th, the end of the BMD mission.

Two very concentrated Operation Areas can be defined in Detailed Charts I and II as shown below. Although the daily plotted positions overlap each other and may be a little difficult to follow, it is remarkable to see how densely those plotted ship positions are concentrated in the two narrow sea areas over a 20-day period. One can see some short trips from those concentrated area to slightly separated locations: these were for underway replenishment and other unidentified activities at separate rendezvous points.

1. BMD Japan Sea Operation Area 41o28’ north, 136o32’ east. About 30 km across. About 285 km west of the west coast of the Matsumae Peninsula, Hokkaido.

2. BMD Pacific Operation Area

40o12’ north, 145o00’ east About 30 km across. About 270 km east of the coast of Kuji, Iwate prefecture.

A third area can also be identified. Immediately following the launch of the Taepodong II at about five in the morning of July 5th the Curtis Wilbur and the Fitzgerald concentrated on a small area in the Japan Sea about 40 km east of the center of the

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above Japan Sea Operation Area, at 41o25’ north, 137o00’ east. This was probably related to a certain after action measure, for instance to avoid troubles with any possible violation of the EEZ mid-point line between Japan and Russia. The Japan Sea and Pacific Operation Areas are almost on a direct line that transects the Shariki Communications Base, Tsugaru City, Aomori Prefecture where the US X-band radar has been deployed, about 320 km and 400 km from Shariki respectively. The US X-band radar at Shariki, established for BMD purposes according to the agreement between Japan and the US in the recent negotiations on the US Forces realignment, reportedly began operations in June, sooner than schedule, to respond the anticipated North Korean missile launch. 3. The records for July 5th. Since deck logs are not records of mission objectives, there is almost no mention of BMD activity in relation to the July 5th North Korean missile launch. However, at 5 am, that is, at the time of the third missile launch, the Taepodong II launch, there was the following series of entries in the Fitzgerald’s deck log (see Attachment 17):

05:00 IR [infra-red] data received. 05:03 North Korean missile launched. 05:04 Missile exploded 40 seconds after launch.

This description confirms very interesting fact that the Aegis ship was connected to a direct satellite data and communication link while on station and could know not only launch but also explosion almost instantaneously. 4. Liaison with the Self Defense Forces. The deck logs mention link-ups with the JMSDF (Japan Maritime Self Defense Force) refueling vessel Hamana (AOE424) and the JMSDF Aegis-equipped destroyer Kongo (DD173). The Hamana carried out underway replenishment of the Curtis Wilbur on two occasions. The first was on the night before the Curtis Wilbur moved from the Pacific Operation Area to the Japan Sea Operation Area, over three hours from 18:44 to 21:59 on June 25th (see Attachment 18). The deck log records “From BMD To RAS with HANAMA” [RAS = Replenishment at Sea]4. The second replenishment took place on June 27th in the Japan Sea Operation Area, over two hours from 18:54 to 20:51. There is a question as to whether or not these replenishment activities are violations of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement [ACSA]5. The Kongo linked-up with the Fitzgerald early on the morning of June 20th in the Japan Sea Operation Area. Chief Operations Specialist Madott was moved from the Kongo to the Fitzgerald (see Attachment 19). 4 The deck log misrecords “Hanama” for “Hamana.” The JMSDF was recorded as “JDF.” 5 The Japan-US ACSA amended in 1999 and 2004 allows logistical mutual provision and cross-service between the two armed forces only under circumstances such as joint exercises, UN PKOs and legally defined situations such as armed attacks against Japan and significant situations in areas surrounding Japan.

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05:39 Boat deck manned and ready. 05:40 Saber is in the water [“Saber” = name of an assault craft] 05:44 Saber is away. 05:51 Saber is en route to Kongo for pax transfer - OSC Madott. 05.56 Saber is alongside Kongo. 05.59 Saber is disembarked. 06.05 Saber is alongside. 06.07 Saber is at the rail, OSC Madott is onboard. 06.09 Saber in the skids

This is a concrete example of the Kongo working and communicating together precisely with the Fit gerald. Most likely MSDF personnel were receiving one-on-one operational technical training.

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Conclusions. One extremely interesting analytical issue is the basis for the establishment of the Japan Sea and Pacific BMD Operation Areas. Geography is part of the reason, but not the complete explanation. But a reliable analysis is possible by taking into consideration the Curtis Wilbur and Fitzgerald command histories and their corroboration by the 2005 Congressional testimony of the head of the Missile Defense Agency, Henry A. Obering III, and the operational activities of the Aegis ships shown in their deck logs. The chart in Attachment 20 shows the location of the two Operation Areas, their alignment with Shariki, and also shows the Great Circle route from the North Korean Musudanri missile base to Honolulu, as well as the splashdown point for the 1998 Taepodong I launch. The chart in Attachment 21 shows the Great Circle routes from Musudanri and Kittaeryong to other potential US and Okinawan targets, as well as the splashdown area for the missiles other than Taepodong II that were tested on July 5, 2006. 1. Missile Course The two Operation Areas in the Japan Sea and the Pacific make sense in relation to the possible defense of Hawaii. The three radars – Shariki, together with the Aegis ships in the two Operation Areas – together cover the Great Circle route to Hawaii, especially at points where a long-range missile from North Korea is still in the second stage or third stage acceleration, when interception is theoretically more likely. The three Aegis ships on station were carrying out long-range surveillance and tracking duties, even though at present they lack intercept capacity. The important point to understand is that this formation of radar sites is the source of data supplied for the missile defense of the United States proper/mainland, and consequently is tied to the entire combat system (see Obering’s testimony in Attachment 3). By supplying missile trajectory data to the Shariki radar base, the Japan Sea and Pacific Aegis ship deployments were intended the Shariki X-band radar facility’s very high capacity for missile discrimination extend for the longest period possible. The flight path of the 1998 Taepodong I launch could be an important reference. There was a possibility of a southward curving trajectory for the missile launch to due east, as happened on the occasion of the Taepodong I launch, or launch test pretending to be satellite launch. 2. Position

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In the event of an attack towards the US west coast, deployment in the Japan Sea in the most westerly position possible is desirable. But, given the position of the mid-point line between Japanese and Russian EEZs, the Japan Sea Operation Area is at its most westerly possible location. It is possible the location of the Pacific Operation Area, exactly 400 km from the Shariki radar site in some way reflects the performance of the radar facilities, but this is not certain. Apart from these considerations, it is also important to consider the present locations from the point of view of intercept simulations. As already mentioned, although the three Aegis ships involved in the BMD duties only possessed long-range surveillance and tracking capacity, the US Navy Aegis cruiser USS Shiloh has since been deployed to Yokosuka, and it possesses an interception capacity. Also, there has been a report that two destroyers, Curtis Wilbur and Stethem, were to be upgraded to interception capability by the end of 2006. It is possible, therefore, that the US used the North Korean missile launch to train for an interception drill. In the standard understanding of missile defense, the possibility of interception is greatest in the boost phase and the second stage and third stage acceleration when the rocket is moving relatively slowly and the heat plume of its rocket motor is most visible. It is possible that this was a factor in deciding the location of the Operation Areas. 3. Rule of law It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the present missile defense arrangement, which covers only very northern tip of Honshu (Mainland Japan) with two MD operational sea areas on the western and eastern sides of the Shariki X-band radar, is intended for the missile defense of the US proper including Hawaii. That it is secondarily connected to the defense of Japan is just an excuse and does not alter this primary fact. Since this is even admitted in Congressional testimony, a plea of alternative interpretations is unpersuasive. There is in fact a recurring problem of the Japanese government failing to prevent, and indeed, permitting the US military in Japan violate the provisions of the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty, specifically Article 5 (the defense of the Japanese territorial area) and Article 6 (the Far East clause).6 There has been a series issue of US bases in Japan being developed into frontline bases and supply bases for Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf. However, this time the situation is different. The use of US bases in Japan directly for the defense of the United States proper is something quite new. Strict rule of law must be followed in relation to the military, and particularly in case of a foreign military using the territory of an independent state. This is the foundation of civilian control. The government and the Diet should not ignore the implications of this research. After North Korean nuclear test in October 2006, there is a political atmosphere in Japan that Japan should not demand anything inconvenient to the US military force in Japan 6 Treaty Of Mutual Cooperation And Security Between Japan And The United States Of America, Article V: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.” Article VI: “For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.”

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so as to give them freer-hand to protect Japan. However, it is more necessary than ever in this circumstance to reaffirm the importance of keeping the military strictly within the rule of law. Acknowledgement The English version of this paper was only possible by the kind translation from Japanese and precious comments by Richard Tanter, Nautilus Institute, Australia. The author expresses his deepest thanks. Charts were drawn with kind assistance of Reiko YUBU of the Peace Depot.

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Attachment 1

9

10

Attachment 2

11

12

Attachment 3

Congressional testimony (exerpts) by the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Lt-Gen. Henry A. Obering III, USAF

House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. March 15, 2005

Missile Defense Approach—Layered Defense With the initial fielding last year of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense and Aegis surveillance and track capabilities of this integrated system, we are establishing a limited defensive capability for the United States against a long-range North Korean missile threat. At the same time, we are building up our inventory of mobile interceptors to protect coalition forces, allies and friends against shorter-range threats. With the cooperation of our allies and friends, we plan to evolve this defensive capability to improve defenses against all ranges of threats in all phases of flight and expand it over time with additional interceptors, sensors, and defensive layers. . . Initial Fielding of Block 2004 We stated last year that, by the end of 2004, we would begin fielding the initial elements of our integrated ballistic missile defense system. We have met nearly all of our objectives. We have installed six ground-based interceptors in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska and two at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. We completed the upgrade of the Cobra Dane radar in Alaska and the modification of six Aegis ships for long-range surveillance and tracking support. These elements have been fully connected to the fire control system and are supported by an extensive command, control, battle management and communications infrastructure. . . Since October 2004, we have been in a “shakedown” or check-out period similar to that used as part of the commissioning of a U.S. Navy ship before it enters the operational fleet. We work closely with U.S. Strategic Command and the Combatant Commanders to certify missile defense crews at all echelons to ensure that they can operate the ballistic missile defense system if called upon to do so. We have exercised the command, fire control, battle management and communication capabilities critical to the operation of the system. The Aegis ships have been periodically put on station in the Sea of Japan to provide long-range surveillance and tracking data to our battle management system.

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Attachment 4

14

Attachment 5

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130 135 140 145 155150

40

35

30

25

20

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　　Fitzgerald (DDG62）Cruise Track (Jun. 11 - Jul. 8, 2006)

°E

°N

6.1112:00

6.158:00

6.168:00

6.1520:00

7.720:00

Attachment 6

ChinaRussia

DPRK

ROK

Sasebo

Pusan

Yokosuka

Japan

Sea of Japan(Eastern Sea)

Tsugaru Strait

Pacific Ocean

Guam

Okinawa

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Attachment 7

17

Attachment 8

18

Attachment 9

19

140 145 150135

40

35

30

25

20

15

130 155°E

°N

6.268:00

7.712:00 6.18～25

6.1720:00

7.88:00

6.1112:00

6.1320:00

6.15 12:00

Attachment 10

Curtis Wilbur (DDG54) Cruise Track (Jun. 11 - Jul. 8, 2006)

ChinaRussia

DPRK

ROK

Pusan

Yokosuka

Okinawa

Guam

Tsugaru Strait

Sea of Japan

(Eastern Sea)

Pacific Ocean

Japan

Sasebo

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Attachment 11

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130 135 140 145 155150

40

35

30

25

20

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John S. McCain (DDG56）Cruise Track (Jun. 11 - Jul. 8, 2006)

°N

6.2612:00

6.2520:00

7.720:00

6.118:00

6.2420:00

6:1320:00

Attachment 12

ChinaRussia

DPRK

ROK

Pusan

Sasebo

Yokosuka

Japan

Tsugaru Strait

Sea of Japan

(Eastern Sea)

Pacific Ocean

Okinawa

Guam

°E

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Attachment 13

Deck log summaries for missile defense duty in response to North Korean missile launch

June 11th, 2006 – July 8th, 2006 Date Curtis Wilbur Fitzgerald John S. McCain Lassen

06.11 To waters off Guam as part of Kitty Hawk Strike Group

Part of Kitty Hawk Strike Group; returns to Yokosuka with rudder damage

To waters off Guam as part of Kitty Hawk Strike Group

To waters off Guam as part of Kitty Hawk Strike Group

21:55 anchored at anchorage A-11, Yokosuka

06.12 08:36 moored to Yokosuka Berth 6

06.13 06.14 13:25 underway 00:00 “At Guam

Op Area” 00.00 “At Guam Op Area”

14:25 First entry of “To BMD”

06.15 16:44 “Modloc [Modular Location] FDM, To BMD”

06.16 13:04 “At BMD Op Area”

06.17 06.18 03:20 “Enter BMD

Box”

06.19 06.20 Link-up with

MSDF ship “Kongo”; passenger transfer

06.21 In company with Kitty Hawk, Lassen, and Cowpens

06.22 06.23 06.24 04:01 “From Guam

Op Area To entrance to Tsugaru Straits”

07:53 “From Guam Op Area To Sasebo”

06.25 Replenishment from MSDF ship Hamana

06.26 02:35 “From BMD To New BMD”

00:00 “At Tsugaru Straits” (*)

14:20 “At BMD Japan Sea TSP”

06.27 Replenishment 00:00 “In Vicinity

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from MSDF ship Hamana

of entrance to Tsugaru Straits” (*)

06.28 06.29 07:49 moored at

Sasebo 06.30 09:46 underway to

Yokosuka 07.01 07.02 10:37 moored to

Yokosuka Berth 8 07.03 Replenishment

from USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO199)

Replenishment from USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO199)

19:30 Link-up with Curtis Wilbur; passenger transfer

07.04 07.05 05:00 “Received IR

data”

05:03 “North Korean missile launch”

05:04 “Missile exploded 40 seconds after launch”

07.06 07.07 04:30 “From BMD

To Yokosuka” 02:35 “From BMD To Yokosuka”

00.00 “To Yokosuka”

07.08 12:39 moored to Yokosuka Berth 3

10:10 moored to Yokosuka Berth 10

00.00 “From Tsugaru Strait To Yokosuka”

08:37 underway to Kure

10:14 moored to Yokosuka Berth 8

07.09 07.10 underway, for a

Search & Rescue drill

07.11 07.12 Underway to

nearby waters

Notes: Darker shading = Pacific Operational Area Lighter shading = Japan Sea Operational Area Underlined times are the starting times of the deck log pages where quoted entries appear. Op Area = Operational Area FDM Training Area = Farallon de Medinilla Target Range TSP = Tracking and surveillance post/position

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* Log keepers of McCain constantly use “Tsugaru Straits” to describe the BMD station in spite of the fact that the location is far east of the Tsugaru straits.

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Attachment 17

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od

on

g I O

bje

ct B

in 1

99

8 L

au

nch

Gre

at C

ircle

Route

fro

m M

usudanri to H

onolu

lu

BM

D J

apan S

ea

Opera

tion A

rea

° N

°E

32

130° 140° 150°

40°

30°

20°

10,746km

1,411km

3,318km

2,625km

E

N

Attachment 21

Great Circle Routes from North Korea Missile Launch Sites

The shaded sea area is estimated splashdown points for DPRK missiles, other than Taepodong Ⅱ, launched on July 5, 2006

to Guam

KadenaOkinawa

Sasebo

Yokosuka

Japan

ROK

DPRK

China

Russia

to Washington to Anchorage

Musudanri

to

Kittaeryong

Pusan

Sea of Japan Pacific Ocean

to Honolulu

to Los Angeles

7,179km

9,209km

33

（This page is intentionally blank.）

34

2

US Navy Set Missile Defense Operations Area in the Sea of Japan 190 Kilometers West of Okushiri:

Japan as a Base for the Defense of the US Homeland.7

by Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI A survey conducted by Peace Depot has established for the first time the actual patrol patterns of the U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers in the Sea of Japan engaged in missile defense duties. These patrols are not conducted by moving over the whole of the Sea of Japan. Instead a maritime area designated as a “Ballistic Missile Defense Operations Area (BMD Op Area or BMD Station)” has been established, within which the US Navy carries out intensive on-station surveillance and tracking activities. That Operations Area is 190 kilometers west of the Japanese island of Okushiri, off the southwest coast of Hokkaido. But far from being a permanent station, this operations area is clearly still only at an experimental stage. The key source for this research has been the daily deck logs of the Arleigh Burke class Aegis destroyers, USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62), and USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), all of which have Yokosuka as their homeport. Patrol Routes On October 1st 2004 the United States Navy acknowledged it was beginning surveillance and tracking operations in the Sea of Japan in preparation for expected North Korean missile launchings.8 That same day Associated Press reported that US naval sources confirmed the Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur, home-ported in Yokosuka, Japan, was to be the first to take up such duty, to be followed by the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain.9

The author examined the deck logs of the three ships in the Naval Historical Center in Washington DC, and traced the path of their voyages, and thus surveyed the actual patrol patterns in the Japan Sea. In addition to the deck logs, the 2004 Command Histories of the USS Curtis Wilbur and USS Fitzgerald were also studied. First, let us look at the results of this survey. Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54) The logs for the USS Curtis Wilbur were examined for the five months from September 1st, 2004 to January 31st, 2005. The Curtis Wilbur headed north from Yokosuka on September 27th, with the deck log specifying the destination as “the Sea of Japan” (Attachment 3). On Sept 30th the deck log entry recorded the first mention of missile defense: “00:00; Underway as before in the Sea of Japan in support of BMD.” At 00:01 on October 1st the deck log again recorded: “Assumed the watch. Underway as before in 7 First appeared in the Nautilus Institute SPECIAL REPORT 06-42A May 30th, 2006. 8 Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, US DOD News Transcript, October 1, 2004. 9 “U.S. Ship Patrols Sea of Japan,” CBSNEWS.COM Tokyo, October 1, 2004

35

the Sea of Japan in support of BMD.” When the ship moved to the Tsushima Straits on October 9th, the log used the term “BMD Station” for the first time, where it reads “from BMD station to the Tsushima Straits.” “Station” here is generally a term referring to a specified operations area.10 While the time duration for the ship’s BMD operation is not described specifically in the deck logs, for reasons we will discuss below, it is safe to conclude that Curtis Wilbur was on station in the BMD Operations Area for about 10 days from September 29th to October 8th. (See the calendar in Table 1, and the track recorded on the map in Chart 1). At first glance, the map of the ship’s voyage in Chart 1 seems to show a backwards and forwards patrol pattern in the Sea of Japan, but this is not the case. On October 9th, Typhoon 22 proceeded north-north-east off the Kii Peninsula. In order to avoid the typhoon, the ship moved up and down the Japan Sea. On October 16th, the Curtis Wilbur put in to Sasebo, and on October 26th returned to Yokosuka. Afterwards, the ship took part in training exercises in the Okinawa Operations Area and the Philippines Operations Area. After again returning to Yokosuka, following 10 days of repairs and maintenance the Curtis Wilbur headed for Kagoshima. On December 9th it returned to Yokosuka for repairs and maintenance and the Christmas break. Until the end of January 2005 the Curtis Wilbur basically remained in Yokosuka. This understanding of the Curtis Wilbur’s part in BMD operations is confirmed by the 2004 Command History of the Curtis Wilbur. “October 1st, 2004 found CURIIS WILBUR on station and radiating its modified SPY-1D radar over North Korea in defense of the United States. Through two weeks of this proof of concept patrol CURTIS WILBUR avoided the swipes of both the BMD critics and two typhoons to provide the best possible coverage for this new mission.”11 (Attachment 1)

Fitzgerald (DDG 62) The logs for the Fitzgerald for the five months from October 1st to February 28th were examined. Records for the following three months were not yet available. Until the Fitzgerald departed Yokosuka on November 29th, the ship basically remained in Yokosuka. When it left port on the 29th its destination was recorded as “BMD station” (Attachment 4). The log for December 1st records the ship’s destination as “BMD OP AREA (Operations Area)”.12

Accordingly, at midnight on the same day, the log stated “00:00 Continued the watch. Underway ise [independently] in the Sea of Japan en route to BMD station,” and late on the following night at 23:00 recorded: “Continued the watch. Underway ise in the Sea of Japan. Currently at BMD station.” In the case of the Fitzgerald, the BMD activity seemed to be carried out over a wider range than the operations area that we will specify in the later discussion. It is possible that there is more than one such specified operational area. Including time spent in that broader area, the Fitzgerald carried out about nine days of BMD Operations Area

10 “BMD station” is often entered as “MODLOC” [modular location]. While this word is also a frequent entry in the logs, it is used not just for BMD-related matters but more widely to refer to a constantly used maritime operation area. 11 Command History for 2004, USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), 20 Mar 05 12 These two terms refer to the same thing.

36

activity (Chart 2). On December 17th, the Fitzgerald put into Pusan, leaving for its home port in Yokosuka on December 22nd. The ship basically remained in Yokosuka until February 7th. That day it left port for Maizuru on the Sea of Japan coast, and after putting into Maizuru on February 10th, headed for the Okinawa Operations Area four days later. On February 18th, the Fitzgerald sailed from the Okinawa Operations Area for Hong Kong, which it reached on the 21st. On February 25th it left Hong Kong to return to the Okinawa Operations Area. Although Maizuru is on the Sea of Japan, and there was no BMD surveillance and tracking mission capable U.S. ship deployed in the Sea of Japan when the Fitzgerald was at Maizuru, it did not spend additional time in the Sea of Japan, and the ship’s log makes no further mention of the BMD Operations Area. Again, the description of this period in the 2004 Command History of the Fitzgerald is consistent with this study’s account of its BMD role. “At the close of November and through 19 December FITZGERALD was the second ship to participate in the national Ballistic Missile Defense Limited Defense Operations (BMD LDO). For weeks FITZGERALD kept vigilant guard and remained undetected while helping refine the navy’s role and experience in BMD LDO.”13 (Attachment 2)

John S. McCain (DDG 56) The logs for the USS John S. McCain were examined for the six months from October 1st, 2004 until March 31st, 2005.14

On October 21st, 2004, the McCain left Yokosuka for exercises in Okinawa and the East China Sea, returning on November 22nd. As can be seen from Table 1, in this period, the McCain could have taken the place of Curtis Wilbur on BMD duty, but did not. This means that currently the US Navy does not have a plan to station some ships permanently or more frequently in the Sea of Japan for BMD patrols. After returning from the East China Sea, the McCain remained in Yokosuka. Then, on January 13th, the ship headed for Sasebo. Next day, en route to Sasebo, it confirmed the mission by recording its destination as “BMD station” (Attachment 5). Putting into Sasebo on the 16th, and leaving on the 17th, again its destination was clearly specified as “BMD station”. Leaving Sasebo, the McCain headed straight to the BMD station, but for some reason it redirected to an RAS (Replenishment at Sea) station off Pohang, South Korea, where the ship rendezvoused with a supply ship to take supplies. This explains the irregular cruise track in the Sea of Japan that is seen on the chart of its patrol route (Chart 3). While the term “BMD Operations Area” does not appear in the McCain’s log again, as discussed below, it was engaged in operations in a narrow sea area in the northern part of the Sea of Japan conforming exactly to a “BMD Operations Area” as identified in this study. The period of this engagement was relatively short, just five days. Immediately after, the McCain headed for Yokosuka, returning on January 29th. After stopping at Yokosuka for several days, the McCain headed for Otaru in Hokkaido, 13 Command History for 2004, USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62), April 21, 2005 14 Records for April and after were not yet available.

37

staying there from February 5th – 9th. The ship then left Otaru and traveled in the Sea of Japan straight to the South Korean port of Jinhae, arriving there on February 11th. It is to be noted that there is no sign either in the log entries or in the derived cruise chart to suggest that the McCain was engaged in the BMD surveillance and tracking duty in this deployment. Therefore, the McCain’s port call at Otaru is considered to have no direct connection with such duties. Lake Erie (CG 70) Just a word here about the Aegis cruiser Lake Erie. It is known that this ship has been used to conduct test firing of the Standard-3 (SM3) missile to be used for mid-course missile defense. The Lake Erie visited Yokosuka US Naval base on September 22nd, 2004, and put into Niigata on October 11th. We might speculate that the ship was deployed in the Sea of Japan on missile defense duties from October 1st. But after examining the Lake Erie’s logs, the author’s conclusion is that, unlike the three Aegis-class destroyers deployed in the Sea of Japan from the start of October 2004, the Lake Erie was not carrying out BMD surveillance and tracking duty. However, the possibility cannot be excluded that its port call at Niigata was a practice in preparation for future BMD roles in the Sea of Japan, and that it may in some way have involved missile defense joint exercises in the Sea of Japan with the Curtis Wilbur, which was on BMD station at the time. According to the US Navy, the immediate purpose for the Lake Erie’s deployment was to take part in large-scale exercises in the Okinawa and Philippines regions. In fact it eventually participated in such exercises after leaving Niigata. “BMD Operations Area” The three Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyers were each deployed in turn for a period to be engaged in BMD surveillance and tracking duty in the Sea of Japan. The cruise tracks for the three ships are shown in Charts 1-3. The charts were constructed by plotting the latitude and longitude of the ships as recorded three times a day in the logs. The charts clearly show that the three Aegis ships stayed in a defined zone west of Okushiri Island while they were engaged in BMD surveillance and tracking duty. And this area was itself labeled in the logs as “BMD Op Area” or “BMD station.” The cruise tracks within this operations area are shown in detail in Chart 4. This chart was drawn by plotting the positions of the ships in latitude and longitude given in the logs in the same way as in Charts 1-3, but on a larger scale. This area is about 190 kilometers west of Okushiri, roughly 80 kilometers in radius centered on latitude 40o 05’ North and 137o

06’ East. The fact that the US Navy has set up a specific “BMD Operations Area” is an important new finding. The significance of this finding is that while cruising in the Sea of Japan these patrol deployments do not in fact involve patrolling operational activity, but rather surveillance and tracking duty within a designated zone. As will be explained below, this is consistent with the congressional testimony of the head of the Missile Defense Agency. Rotation To make the rotation periods of the three ships clearer, Table 1 sets out the daily itinerary of the three ships in parallel. There was a roughly 45-day period from when the

38

Curtis Wilbur left its station in the BMD Operations Area to when the Fitzgerald entered the area. The Command History of the Fitzgerald says that it was the second ship for BMD duty deployment.15

It was then about another 45 days until the McCain took up station. It is not impossible that other ships besides these three were on station in the BMD Operations Zone during these intervals, but it is highly unlikely. Only a limited number of Aegis-ships have the capability for long range missile surveillance and tracking, and there is no information of other such warships entering Japanese ports. As already noted, even when one of the three ships was available to fill an apparent vacancy at the Op Area, none was assigned to such duty. Accordingly, only three ships were rotationally engaged in missile surveillance and tracking during the period studied, though there is probably not a strict meaning to the 45 day period, and there were long periods without any ships on station at the BMD Op Area. In short, it is quite clear from our study results that the US missile defense patrol arrangement is at an extremely limited experimental stage. It is a long way from reaching the condition of a permanent station. Analysis of the Present State of Play What then do these survey results tell us concerning the purpose of the ships activities? On March 15, 2005 the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Lt-Gen. Henry A. Obering III, USAF testified to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. Parts of his testimony have an important bearing on the results of this study (Attachment 5). After explaining the evolutionary development and spiral testing approach to missile defense, Obering clearly stated that the objective of the initial fielding of the developing missile defense capacity is to defend the United States homeland against a missile attack from North Korea and that the Aegis surveillance and track capabilities are an integral part of this homeland defense capacity: “With the initial fielding last year of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense and Aegis surveillance and track capabilities of this integrated system, we are establishing a limited defensive capability for the United States against a long-range North Korean missile threat.”16 The Command History of the Curtis Wilbur reiterated this statement in more direct military terms when, as cited above, it stated “(Curtis Wilbur radiated) its modified SPY-1D radar over North Korea in defense of the United States.”17 On the other hand, Obering stated, the defense of allied countries and US forces in Japan and South Korea is being dealt with by “building up our inventory of mobile interceptors.” This refers to the Patriot (PAC-3) missile units being deployed to South Korea and introduced into Japan. Furthermore, Obering’s testimony suggests that the long-range surveillance and tracking support activities by Aegis ships in the Sea of Japan from October 1st, 2004 were conducted in accordance with specific interceptor launch scenarios based on launching of ground-based interceptors from Fort Greely, Alaska and from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Obering mentioned three elements of ground-based interceptors, Cobra Dane radar, and Aegis ships long-range surveillance and tracking support, and then stated, “These elements have been fully connected to the fire control 15 Command History for 2004, USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62). 16 Congressional testimony by the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Lt-Gen. Henry A. Obering III, USAF. House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. March 15, 2005 See Attachment for further details. 17 Command History for 2004, USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), op. cit.

39

system,” and “the Aegis ships have been periodically put on station in the Sea of Japan to provide long-range surveillance and tracking data to our battle management system.” This means that the plan is to integrate Aegis ships long-range surveillance and tracking data in the Sea of Japan, the interceptor missile launch control system and the battle management system. Accordingly, rather than being an ongoing surveillance and tracking activity, the current periodic Japan Sea patrols should be regarded as part of a “proof of concept”, and as part of a joint training process integrating maritime surveillance and tracking deployments to the continental U.S. ground-based interceptor missile launch systems. That is to say, the Japan Sea patrols are a crucial component in exercises to develop the core of the whole integrated system US National Missile Defense system. When you consider such an objective, we can understand why that particular area of the Japan Sea was selected as the “BMD Operations Area”. This zone, 190 km west of the island of Okushiri, is positioned under the Great Circle path a Taepodong missile must traverse to reach Hawaii or Los Angeles (Chart 5). Again, this makes sense of periodic rotation for surveillance and tracking duty rather than permanent station. Yokosuka’s Role as a US Homeland Defense Base Amidst all this technical detail, the larger point to recognize here is that something new has been born within the US-Japan alliance. All three Aegis vessels were home-ported at Yokosuka when they conducted their missile defence patrols. The United States is using a US base in Japan directly for US homeland defense that is discrete from the defense of Japan. Such an activity is not permitted under the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, which limits the activities of the US Forces in Japan to defending Japan and to maintaining international peace and security in Far East by Articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty.18

Such limitation comes from the Peace Constitution of Japan. At the very least a fresh Diet debate is needed to face the changing character of the alliance, and to focus attention on these uses of US bases in Japan in violation of the provisions of the Mutual Security Treaty. We should sound the tocsin because recently politicians and mass media figures in Japan seem to have forgotten that military activities should be controlled strictly under the rule of law, and always under Japanese civilian control. Postscript: The deck logs of all three ships up to mid-April 2005 subsequently became available for study. According to those logs, none of the three visited the Sea of Japan, and none mentioned the BMD Op Area. This means that at least for eighty days there was no BMD-related deployment to the Sea of Japan. This long hiatus is consistent with findings in this study, and further suggests that as a result of system integration 18 The relevant parts of these articles in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960 are as follows: Article V Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. . . Article VI For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan…

40

experiments meeting difficulty, the Japan Sea patrol was paused. Acknowledgements: I would like to express my gratitude to Reiko Yabu who helped in dealing with the great volume of data and with the charts. I would also like to thank Kiminori Hayashi who helped with part of the survey and Richard Tanter for his help in translating the article in Japanese into English. I would also like to thank the staff of the Naval Historical Center.

41

(Attachment 1)

42

43

（Attachment 2）

44

45

(Attachment 3)

46

47

48

49

(Attachment 4)

50

51

52

(Attachment 5)

53

54

(Attachment 6) Excerpts from Congressional testimony by the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Lt-Gen.

Henry A. Obering III, USAF. House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.

March 15, 2005

Missile Defense Approach—Layered Defensei

With the initial fielding last year of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense and Aegis surveillance and track capabilities of this integrated system, we are establishing a limited defensive capability for the United States against a long-range North Korean missile threat. At the same time, we are building up our inventory of mobile interceptors to protect coalition forces, allies and friends against shorter-range threats. With the cooperation of our allies and friends, we plan to evolve this defensive capability to improve defenses against all ranges of threats in all phases of flight and expand it over time with additional interceptors, sensors, and defensive layers. . . Initial Fielding of Block 2004 We stated last year that, by the end of 2004, we would begin fielding the initial elements of our integrated ballistic missile defense system. We have met nearly all of our objectives. We have installed six ground-based interceptors in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska and two at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. We completed the upgrade of the Cobra Dane radar in Alaska and the modification of six Aegis ships for long-range surveillance and tracking support. These elements have been fully connected to the fire control system and are supported by an extensive command, control, battle management and communications infrastructure . . . Since October 2004, we have been in a “shakedown” or check-out period similar to that used as part of the commissioning of a U.S. Navy ship before it enters the operational fleet. We work closely with U.S. Strategic Command and the Combatant Commanders to certify missile defense crews at all echelons to ensure that they can operate the ballistic missile defense system if called upon to do so. We have exercised the command, fire control, battle management and communication capabilities critical to theoperation of the system. The Aegis ships have been periodically put on station in the Sea of Japan to provide long-range surveillance and tracking data to our battle management system. ( Emphasis added. http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/109thcongress/Strategic%20Forces/3-15-05OberingStatement.pdf)

55

(Table 1) Itinerary of Aegis Ships for MD Mission

（27 Sep. '04～31 Mar. '05）

Curtis Wilbur Fitzgerald John S.McCain

04.09.27

leave Yokosuka (northbound)

28

29

30 (Record starts on Oct.1 '04.) (Record starts on ct.1'04.) 10.01 berthed in Yokosuka berthed in Yokosuka 02

03

04

05

06 leave Yokosuka to near sea 07

08

BMD Op Area

return Yokosuka 09 to Yellow Sea

10-12 (evade typhoon)

13 (location not recorded)

14 BMD Op Area

15 to Sasebo

16 port call at Sasebo

17-18

19 leave Yokosuka to A12 & return

20

21 leave Sasebo to Yokosuka

22 leave Yokosuka to Okinawa 23-25

26 return Yokosuka 27 28 leave Yokosuka to Okinawa 29

30-31 (Okinawa Op Area) 11.01-08

09 port call at WB & leave to YKSK

10-13 (exercise in East China Sea) 14 (Philippine Op Area) (exercise in East China Sea)

15-18 (exercise in East China Sea) 19-21 to Yokosuka to Yokosuka

Curtis Wilbur Fitzgerald John S. McCain

22 return Yokosuka leave YKSK to Sagami-wan &

return to Sagami-wan & return YKSK

23-28

56

11.29 leave Yokosuka（northbound） 30

12.01 leave Yokosuka to Kagoshima

leave Yokosuka to Sagami-Wan

02 03 port call at kagoshima return Yokosuka 04

BMD Op Area

05 06 07 leave Kagoshima 08 09 return Yokosuka

around BMD Op Area

10-15

16 to Pusan, ROK 17 port call at Pusan

18-19 20 leave Pusan to Yokosuka 21 22 return Yokosuka

23-31 05.01-09

10 leave Yokosuka to A12 & return

11-12

13 leave Yokosuka（Southbound）

14-15 16 port call at Sasebo

18 leave YKSK to near sea & return

19-22 23 24 25 26 27

BMD Op Area

28

29 return Yokosuka 30-31 (berthed in Yokosuka)

02.01 (deck logs for Feb. not available)

Curtis Wilbur Fitzgerald John S. MaCain 02 03 leave Yokosuka to Otaru 04 05 port call at Otaru 06 07 leave Yokosuka to Maizuru

57

08

09 leave Otaru for Chinhae, ROK

10 port call at Maizuru 11 port call at Chinhae 12 leave Chinhae 13

14 leave Maizuru to Okinawa Op Area

15 port call at Pusan 16 17 leave Pusan to Sea of Japan 18 to Hong Kong 19 to Hong Kong 20 21 port call at Hong Kong

22-24 (port call at HK, no record of date)

25 leave HK to Okinawa Op Area

26-27

28 (underway Okinawa sea area)

03.01-04 (deck logs for Mar. not available)

05 port call at WB 04 leave WB to Chinhae

07-13 14 port call at Chinhae

15-17 18 leave Chinhae 19 port call at Pusan 20 leave Pusan to Yokosuka

21-27 28 return Yokosuka

29-30 31 (berthed Yokosuka)

YKSK = Yokosuka, Japan WB = White Beach, Okinawa HK = Hong Kong, China

58

横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀横須賀Russia

RussiaRussia

Russia

China

Hokkaido

Okinawa

Sea of Japan

Pacific Ocean

(Eastern Sea)

120°E 130°E 140°E

10°N

20°N

30°N

40°N

150°E140°E130°E120°E

Taiwan

ROK

Okushiri-

Japan

Yokosuka

Sasebo

DPRK

Curtis Wilbur Cruise Track（Sep. 27 - Oct. 26, 2004)

Pusan

to

(Chart 1)

59

Fitzgerald Cruise Track (Nov. 22 - Dec. 31, 2004)

横須賀横須賀横須賀

(Eastern Sea)

120 130°E 140°E

10°N

20°N

30°N

40°N

150°E140°E130°E120°E

°E

Taiwan

Okinawa

HokkaidoRussia

China

Sea of

Japan

Pacific Ocean

Okushiri-

DPRK

ROK

Japan

Yokosuka

Sasebo

Pusan

to

(Chart 2)

60

120 130°E 140°E

10°N

20°N

30°N

40°N

150°E140°E130°E120 °E

°E

DPRK

ROK

Sasebo

JapanYokosuka

Okushiri-

Russia

China

Hokkaido

Taiwan

Okinawa

Pusan

Sea of

Japan

Pacific Ocean

to

(Eastern Sea)

J. S. McCain Cruise Track (Jan.13 - 29, 2005)(Chart 3)

61

136°E 137°E 138°E43°N

42°N

41°N0 100km

Cruise Tracks in BMD Operation Area (Sep.27, '04 - Mar.31, '05)

Curtis Wilbur

Fitzgerald

J. S. McCain

Oct.14,'04

Dec.4,'04

Jan.27,'05

Sep.29,'04

Dec.1,'04

Oct.13,'04

Jan.1,'05

Oct.8,'04

(Chart 4)

62

Japan

Hokkaido

Okushiri-to

Russia

China

DPRK

ROK

Pusan

Yokosuka

Sea of Japan

(Eastern Sea)

Pacific Ocean

Sasebo

Taepodong

to Los Angeles

to Honolulu

130°E 140°E 150°E

40°N

30°N

20°N

(Chart 5)

63