MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATION - Commission of Railway · PDF filethe Ministry of Civil Aviation of the Government of India, deals with matters pertaining ... 114 of the Railways Act 1989

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GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATION COMMISSION OF RAILWAY SAFETY

ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004-2005

BY

CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF RAILWAY SAFETY

LUCKNOW

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CHAPTER - I FUNCTIONS AND ORGANISATION OF THE COMMISSION OF RAILWAY SAFETY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The Commission of Railway Safety, working under the administrative control of the Ministry of Civil Aviation of the Government of India, deals with matters pertaining to safety of rail travel and train operation and also performs such statutory functions as laid down in the Railways Act (1989), which are of an inspectorial, investigatory and advisory in nature. The Commission functions according to the rules framed under the Railways Act and various executive instructions issued. The most important duty of the Commission is to ensure that any new Railway line to be opened for passenger traffic conforms to the standards and specifications prescribed by the Ministry of Railways and also the new line is safe in all respects for carrying of passenger traffic. This is also applicable to other works such as gauge conversion, doubling of lines and electrification of existing lines. The Commission also conducts statutory inquiries into serious train accidents occurring on the Indian Railways and makes recommendations for improving safety on the Railways in India. Delhi Metro is governed by Delhi Metro Railway (O&M) Act, 2002. The annual Report for the period 2005-06 giving full Account of activities under Section 12 and 13 of the above act is placed at appendix VI.

1.2 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

1.2.1 The Commission is headed by a Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety (CCRS), at Lucknow, who acts as the Principal Technical Advisor to the Central Government in all matters with which the Commission is concerned. Working under the administrative control of CCRS are nine Commissioners of Railway Safety (CRS), exercising jurisdiction over the Zonal Railways. In addition, some of them have additional jurisdiction over railway establishments other than Zonal Railways viz (i) Metro Railway, Kolkata, (ii) DMRC, Delhi, (iii) MRTP, Chennai and (iv) Konkan Railway. There are five Deputy Commissioners of Railway Safety posted in the Headquarters at Lucknow for assisting the CCRS. In addition, there are two field Deputy Commissioners, one each in Mumbai and Kolkata, to assist the Commissioners of Railway Safety in matters concerning the Signaling and Telecommunication discipline.

1.2.2 In Appendix I , at the end of this Report, given is an Organizational Chart of the Commission of Railway Safety. A brief narrative on the history and functions of the organization, which dates back to the 19th century, is contained in Appendix II.

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1.3 JURISDICTION

The route kilometrages of the Railway Administrations under the jurisdiction of each circle, as on 31st March, 2005 were as under:-

____________________________________________________________________ NAME OF CIRCLE HEADQUARTERS ROUTE KM. PRINCIPAL RAILWAYS ____________________________________________________________________

Central Circle Mumbai 7483.410 Central/W.C. Rly.

Eastern Circle Kolkata 5836.735 Eastern &

East-Central Rly.

Northern Circle New Delhi 6972.090 Northern Rly.

North Eastern Circle Lucknow 6490.495 NorthEastern/

North Central

Northeast Frontier Circle Kolkata 3781.910 Northeast Frontier &

Metro Rly.,Kolkata.

Southern Circle Bangalore 8317.420 Southern/South

Western Railway

South Central Circle Secunderabad 5743.420 South Central

South Eastern Circle Kolkata 7468.310 South Eastern/

S.E.C. Rly/

East Coast

Western Circle Mumbai 11985.262 Western &

North-Western

Note: In addition to the Principal Railways, the Commissioners exercise jurisdiction over Konkan Railway Corporation, various Metropolitan Rail Transport Projects, Delhi Metro and Port Trust Railways, if any, located within their circles.

1.4 POSITION OF VACANCIES IN THE COMMISSION

As on 31.3.2006 the actual strength of the Commissioners was 7 against the sanctioned posts of 9. The strength of Deputy Commissioners was 7 and there was no vacancy. The Details are at Appendix-I.

*******

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CHAPTER-II

ANALYSIS OF TRENDS OF ACCIDENTS

2.1 TRAIN ACCIDENTS:

The term „train accidents‟ discussed in this Report has the following definitions:-

2.1.1 Consequential train accidents - are all accidents occurring to trains in the course of working of a Railway and include Collisions, Derailments, Fires in Trains and Running into obstructions or road traffic at Level Crossings.

2.1.2 Section 113 Accidents - are those railway accidents, referred to in Section 113 of the Railways Act 1989, which occur in the course of working a Railway and are attended with loss of human life or with grievous hurt (as defined in the Indian Penal Code) or with serious injury to property. They also include any collision between trains of which one is a train carrying passengers, derailment of a train carrying passengers, any accident of a description usually attended with loss of human life, grievous hurt or serious damage to property and accident of any other type which the Central Government may notify in the official Gazette.

2.1.3 Reportable Accidents - are the same as those referred to in Section 113 of the Railways Act 1989.

2.1.4 Serious Train Accidents - are those accidents requiring a Statutory Inquiry to be conducted by the Commission of Railway Safety in terms of Section 114 of the Railways Act 1989 and include every accident to a train carrying passengers, which is attended with loss of human life, or with grievous hurt (as defined in the Indian Penal Code) to a passenger or passengers in the train or with serious damage to railway property of value exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs. Any other accident which, in the opinion of the Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety or the Commissioner of Railway Safety, requires the holding of an inquiry, shall be deemed to be an accident of this category.

2.2 TRENDS IN CONSEQUENTIAL TRAIN ACCIDENTS

2.2.1 The incidence of consequential train accidents (both Goods and passenger trains) and passenger fatalities in passenger train accidents in the past 10 years from 1995-96 to 2004-2005 are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively*. The details relating to the total number of consequential train accidents, with the break-up of goods train accidents and passenger train accidents, are shown in Figure 1. There is sharp decrease in no. of passenger train accidents during 2004-05. The total number of consequential train accidents per million train-kilometers and the number of passenger fatalities in passenger train accidents are shown in Table 1 in para 2.2.2 below. The fatalities in passenger train accidents is shown in Figure 2.

* All Figures are placed at the end of Chapter-II

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2.2.2 TABLE 1

COMPARATIVE FIGURES OF CONSEQUENTIAL

TRAIN ACCIDENTS IN THE PAST TEN YEARS

(Refer Figure 1)

_________________________________________________________________________________

Item 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-2000 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05

_________________________________________________________________________________

1. Total No. of 398 377 396 397 463 473 414 351 325 234 Consequential Train Accidents

2. No. of 186 160 175 199 210 261 218 216 214 154 Passenger Train Accidents (out of 1 above)

3. No. of Goods 212 217 221 198 253 212 196 135 111 80 Train Accidents (out of 1 above)

4. Total no. of 0.61 0.56 0.60 0.58 0.65 0.67 0.55 0.44 0.41 0.30 consequential train accidents per million train- kilometers

5. No. of 427 110 182 295 374 63 99 186 139 55 Passenger Fatalities including Railway crew in serious Train Accidents

_________________________________________________________________________________ Note. - Best figures have been underlined.

2.2.3 It would be seen from Table 1 that the no. of consequential train accidents has decreased from 325 in 2003-2004 to 234 in 2004-05. This decrease is about 28%. The number of goods train accidents has also decreased from 111 in 2003-04 to 80 in 2004-2005. This decrease is 27.92%. The Passenger train accidents have decreased by 28.03%. (C.f. 2003-2004).

2.2.4 Most of the consequential train accidents result in minor consequences, such as minor damage or derailment to Rolling Stock. However, there are some consequential train accidents which come under the category of Sec. 113 accidents. These Section 113 Accidents include the serious train accidents requiring Statutory Inquiry by the Commission of Railway Safety. The trends of serious consequential train accidents are analysed in Para 2.3 below.

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2.3 TRENDS IN SECTION 113 ACCIDENTS & SERIOUS TRAIN ACCIDENTS

2.3.1 The figures of total number of consequential train accidents, Sec. 113 accidents, serious train accidents including train accidents resulting in fatalities to passengers (including Railway Staff) travelling in trains (as distinct from other fatalities, such as, those occurring among trespassers, Level Crossing Road users etc.) for the last 5 years are compared in Table 2 below :

TABLE 2

Sr. Year Total No.of Sec.113 Serious Serious Total

No. consequential Accidents Train Train No.of

train Accidents Accidents Passenger

accidents requiring resulting in fatalities Statutory passenger inquiry fatalities ___________________________________________________________________________________

1. 2000-2001 473 302 38 06 63

2. 2001-2002 414 275 30 14 99

3. 2002-2003 351 265 36 13 186

4. 2003-2004 325 253 34 16 139

5. 2004-2005 234 176 19 04 55

Average for 5 years 359.4 254.2 31.4 10.6 108.4

___________________________________________________________________________________

Note: (Best figures underlined)

2.3.2 Section 113 accidents have decreased by 30.43% in 2004-2005. The number of serious train accidents requiring statutory enquiry has also decreased to 19 in 2004-05 as compared to 34 in 2003-04. The number of serious train accidents resulting in passenger fatalities has decreased to 04 in 2004-2005 against 16 in the year 2003-04. In 2004-05 no. of fatalities has decreased to 55 from 139 in 2003-04.

2.4 RAILWAY-WISE TRENDS OF CONSEQUENTIAL AND SECTION 113 ACCIDENTS

2.4.1 The number of consequential and Sec 113 accidents which occurred in each zonal railway in the years 2003-04 and 2004-2005 is shown in Table 3 below:

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TABLE 3

___________________________________________________________________________________ Railway Total No. of Consequen- Total No. of Section tial train accidents 113 train accidents ___________________________________________________________________________________ 2003-2004 2004-2005 2003-2004 2004-2005 ___________________________________________________________________________________ 1. Central 17 20 8 16 2. Eastern 14 14 14 9 3. East Central 23 18 16 12 4. East Coast 12 14 11 7 5. Northern 49 47 44 40 6. North Central 11 10 11 7 7. North Eastern 28 15 26 15 8. Northeast Frontier 30 12 18 11 9. North Western 20 14 13 10 10. Southern 24 8 23 8 11. South Central 28 16 19 10 12. South East Central 14 11 12 10 13. South Eastern 7 3 6 2 14. South Western 14 7 4 5 15. Western 20 16 14 11 16. West Central 9 7 9 1 17. Kolkata Metro - - - - 18. Konkan Rly. Corp. 5 2 5 2 19. Delhi Metro - - - -

________________________________________________________________________________

Total 325 234 253 176

___________________________________________________________________________________

2.5 ANALYSIS OF TYPES OF CONSEQUENTIAL TRAIN ACCIDENTS

Figure 3 depicts a chart showing the break-up of total number of consequential train accidents in the years 2003-2004 & 2004-2005 into various types of accidents. It would be seen that derailments accounts for a lion‟s share of the total number of consequential train accidents, being 58.97% in 2004-2005 against 62.15% in 2003-04. Level crossing accidents are next accounting for 29.91% in

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2004-2005 against 29.23% in 2003-2004. Collisions account for 5.55% in 2004-2005 against 2.77% in 2003-2004. Fires account for 4.27% accidents in 2004-2005. Number of other accidents (Miscellaneous Accidents) also account for 1.28% of the total accidents in 2004-2005.

2.6 CAUSE-WISE ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS TYPES OF TRAIN ACCIDENTS

2.6.1 CAUSE-WISE ANALYSIS OF DERAILMENTS

At figure 4 is shown a cause-wise analysis of the total number of derailments in the years 2004-2005 & 2003-2004. Rolling Stock defects and Failure of Workshop, Carriage & Wagon and Loco Maintenance Staff account for 3.63% derailments in 2004-2005 as compared to 16.34% in the year 2003-2004. Track defects & Failure of Permanent Way Staff caused derailment accidents accounting for 26.81% in 2004-2005 as against 26.73% in 2003-2004. Other causes also account for 57.97% in 2004-2005. Errors by Drivers including Motormen caused 7.24% of derail-ments in 2004-2005 against 3.96% in 2003-2004. Sabotage accounted for 2.89% in 2004-2005 against 8.91% in 2003-2004. Signalling Equipment defects and failure of Signalling Maintenance Staff are responsible for 1.45% in 2004-2005 which was 3.47% in 2003-2004.

The term „other causes‟ includes failure of station staff, commercial staff in charge of loading wagons, natural causes like floods and falling boulders, crossing of track by animals, combination of failure of staff of more than one Department, other than Railway staff and those under investigation.

The comparative number of derailments are as follows:-

2003-2004 202

2004-2005 138

There is a 31.68% decrease in the number of derailments in 2004-2005 compared to 2003-2004.

2.6.2 CAUSE-WISE ANALYSIS OF COLLISIONS

Figure 5 shows the cause-wise analysis of the collisions during 2003-2004 & 2004-2005. Failures of Drivers, including Motormen, accounted for 38.47% of the collisions in 2004-2005 against 22.22% in 2003-2004. Failures of station staff accounted for 7.69% in 2004-2005 against 11.11% in 2003-2004. Failures of other staff (Carriage and Wagon) accounted for 7.69% in 2004-2005 against 11.11% cases in 2003-2004. The combination of factor other than those above also contributed 7.69% to collisions.

The comparative number of collisions are as follows:-

2003-2004 09

2004-2005 13

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There is a 44.44% increase in the number of collisions in 2004-2005 as compared to the year 2003-2004.

2.6.3 ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENTS AT LEVEL CROSSINGS

Shown in Figure 6 is the cause-wise analysis of train accidents at level crossings in the years 2003-2004 & 2004-2005. There were 70 no. of accidents on level crossings during the year 2004-2005 against 95 in 2003-2004. Failure of railway staff accounted for 5.72% of the accidents in 2004-2005 against 8.92% in 2003-2004, while failure of road users was responsible for 94.28% of the accidents in 2004-2005 as against 91.58% in 2003-2004.

The principal cause of accidents at level crossings, however, continues to be the negligence of road users at level crossings.

2.6.4 CAUSE-WISE ANALYSIS OF FIRES IN TRAINS

Figure 7 shows the cause-wise analysis of fire accidents in trains during 2003-2004 & 2004-2005. During 2004-2005, there were 10 fire accidents in trains, 4 being attributed to negligence of Railway Staff. 4 cases are due to Passenger & outsider negligence, 2 cases are due to the failure of Electric Equipment. In the year 2003-2004 there were 14 cases of fire accidents in the trains, thus there was decrease in five cases by 28.6% in 2004.05.

2.7 INCIDENCE OF HUMAN FAILURE IN TRAIN ACCIDENTS

2.7.1 The incidence of human failure (both Railway and other than Railway Staff) in the consequential train accidents is reflected in Table 4 :-

TABLE - 4

___________________________________________________________________________________

S. No. Item 2003-2004 2004-2005

___________________________________________________________________________________

1. Total No. of consequential Train Accidents 325 234

2. No. of Consequential train accidents due to failure of Railway Staff. 161 119

3. No. of consequential train accidents due to failure of other than 107 78

Railway Staff.

4. No. of consequential train accidents due to human failure (2+3) 268 197

5. % of consequential train accidents due to failure of Railway Staff 49.54 50.85

(2 divided by 1)

6. % of consequential train accidents due to Human failure 82.46 84.18

(both Railway and other than Railway Staff) (4 divided by 1) ___________________________________________________________________________________

2.7.2 It would be seen from Table 4 that the no. of consequential train accidents has decreased by 28%. The percentage of consequential train accidents, attributable to failure of Railway Staff, has increased to 50.85% in 2004-2005 from 49.54% in 2003-2004. The failure of human element comprising both Railway Staff as well as other than Railway Staff such as road users, passengers, miscreants etc., was responsible for 84.18% of

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consequential train accidents in 2004-2005 against 82.86% in 2003-2004. The failure of human element thus continues to be the largest single cause of accidents.

2.7.3 The term „Failure of Railway Staff‟ refers to Failure of various categories of staff in charge of both train operation and maintenance. The break-up of such staff responsible for the consequential train accidents in 2004-2005 is shown in Table 5 below:-

TABLE 5

__________________________________________________________________________________

S.No. Type of Staff Consequential train accidents

attributable to Railway staff

_____ ____________________________________

Nos. Percentage of total no. of

Consequential train accidents.

_________________________________________________________________________________

1. Permanent Way Maintenance Staff 33 14.10

2. Driving Crew (including Motormen) 15 6.41

3. Workshop, Carriage and Wagon 20 8.55

and Loco Maintenance Staff.

4. Station Staff 10 4.27

5. Signalling Maintenance Staff 2 0.85

6. Other Staff (Commercial Staff in 2 0.85

charge of loading, Guards and others)

7. Combination of failures of Staff 37 15.82

_________________________________________________________________________________

Total 119 50.85

____________________________________________________________________________

2.7.4 The figures in Table 5 above reveal that the Permanent Way Maintenance staff was singly responsible for the largest number of consequential train accidents due to failure of Railway Staff, at 33 (14.10% of total consequential train accidents). Combination of Staff accounted for 37 accidents i.e.15.82% of consequential accidents. Driving Crew caused 15 (6.41%) accidents. Workshop, Carriage and Wagon and Loco Maintenance Staff were responsible for 20 (8.55%) accidents, station staff were responsible for 10 (4.27%) accidents while Signalling Staff caused 5 (1.54%) accidents. Other Staff accounted for 2 (0.62%) accidents.

2.8 LOSS OF RAILWAY ASSETS IN ACCIDENTS:

The total estimated cost of damage to railway assets resulting from all consequential train accidents was Rs.173.80 crores in the year 2004-2005 as compared to Rs.51.78 crores in the year 2003-2004.

-o-0-o-

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CHAPTER – III

INVESTIGATION INTO ACCIDENTS

3.1 PREAMBLE

Among the statutory duties carried out by the Commissioners of Railway Safety, one of the main duty is the statutory investigation into railway accidents. The rules for the guidance of officers of the Commission of Railway Safety in holding Inquiries into railway accidents are contained in „Statutory Investigation into Railway Accidents Rules 1998‟ notified by the Ministry of Civil Aviation. Extracts of the rules and procedures for holding statutory investigations are contained in Appendix III.

3.2 STATUTORY INQUIRIES HELD IN 2005-2006 3.2.1 During the year, 23 serious accidents required inquiry by the Commission in

terms of Section 114 of the Railways Act 1989 which are detailed in Appendix IV. Out of these 23 accidents, 4 were collisions between trains, 6 were derailments, 5 involved collision of trains with road vehicles at Level Crossings and 3 were unusual occurrences , 4 were due to fire in the train and 1 was due to explosion in train.

3.2.2 Of the 23 accidents, the following accidents attracted considerable attention of

the media :-

a) Para 1.04 of Appendix iv. Collision of 9198 Up Sabarmati Express with Up JNPT Conraj Goods train at Samlaya Jn station on Vadodra Division of Western Railway on 21.04.2005. In this accident 16 passenger was killed 40 were grievously injured and 110 had simple injuries.

b) Para 1.16 of Appendix iv. Derailment of 1108 DN Bundelkhan Express

between stations Datia-Songir on Jhansi Division of North Central Railway on 03.10.2005. In this accident 13 passenger were killed, 11 were grievously injured and 25 had simple injuries

c) Para 1.17 of Appendix iv. Unusual occurrence leading to derailment of 415

up Repalle-Secunderabad Delta Fast Passenger train between block station Ramannapet and Valigonda at bridge no. 61 of Guntur Division of South Central Railway on 29.10.2005. In this accident 116 passengers were killed, 26 were grievously injured and 78 had simple injuries.

3.2.3 Brief details of the 19 accidents inquired into by the Commission during

2004-2005 alongwith important recommendations made, are at Appendix - IV.

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CHAPTER - IV

INSPECTION AND OTHER FIELD DUTIES

4.1 INSPECTION OF NEW LINES :

During the year 2004-2005, the Commissioners of Railway Safety carried out inspections of new lines and other works, prior to authorising them for public carriage of passengers, as detailed below :

a) New Lines 185.454 km

b) Diversions 9.600 km.

c) Doublings 294.527 km.

d) Conversion of Gauge 721.803 km.

e) Initiation of electric traction 598.695 km.

A list of these works appears at Appendix V.

4.2 NEW MINOR WORKS :

4.2.1 Structural works affecting the safety of trains on running lines, such as, provision of additional bridges, rebuilding or re-girdering of existing bridges, re-modeling of station yards, re-signaling works etc. can only be carried out after duly obtaining the sanction of the Commissioner of Railway Safety. Such works, after being sanctioned by the Commission, are executed by the Railway Administration and opened to traffic under safety certificates signed by the concerned railway officers, unless the Commissioner of Railway Safety decides to inspect them before being commissioned.

4.2.2 During the year, 3341 such works were sanctioned by the Commission of Railway Safety.

4.3 WORKS INVOLVING INFRINGEMENTS OF STANDARD DIMENSIONS:

Certain minimum and maximum dimensions for location of structures near railway lines and maximum and minimum dimensions in respect of rolling stock have been prescribed and are laid down in a publication called “Schedule of

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Dimensions”. The Railways can not deviate from these dimensions without obtaining the sanction of the Railway Board or Commissioners of Railway Safety. During the year under review, 27 cases for condonation of infringements to the Schedule of Dimensions were recommended by the Commission for sanction of the Railway Board. 4 cases which were within the powers of the Commissioners of Railway Safety were sanctioned by the Commissioners themselves.

4.4 MOVEMENT OF OVER-DIMENSIONED CONSIGNMENTS :

The railways have sometimes to transport various types of heavy machinery the dimensions of which are in excess of the prescribed maximum moving dimensions. Movements of some of these consignments require the sanction of the Commissioner of Railway Safety. During the year, transport of 22 over-dimensioned consignments was authorized for movement by the Commissioners of Railway Safety after due scrutiny, subject to observance of such conditions and speed restrictions as were considered necessary.

4.5 NEW TYPES OF LOCOMOTIVES AND ROLLING STOCK :

According to Section 27 of Railways Act, 1989, new rolling stock, such as, locomotives, coaches and wagons can only be used after prior sanction by the Railway Board. During the year, 15 new types of locomotives and other rolling stock were recommended by the Commission, in various sections, for sanction by the Railway Board. According to extant rules, the Commissioners of Railway Safety can authorize movement of new rolling stock on sections of the railway provided the previous sanction of the Railway Board has been obtained for their movement anywhere in the Railway system. During the year, 165 such cases were sanctioned by the Commissioners under their powers.

4.6 PERIODIC INSPECTIONS :

During the year, the Commissioners carried out periodical inspections of 13,536.72 kms. of Govt. railways either on their own or in the company of the Zonal Railway General Managers. Significant defects and deficiencies noticed during inspections were discussed with the Railway Officers during such periodic inspections and inspection reports were issued.

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2004-05

CHAPTER-V

REMARKS ON SOME IMPORTANT ISSUES

5.0 PREAMBLE

(i) More than 50 issues relating to safety in train operation have been raised by the Commission through its Annual Reports of last 10 years. While Ministry of Railways had taken positive action on some of the issues, others are not addressed up to a desired level. In the Annual Report of 2003-04, 8 issues were detailed and comments of Ministry of Railways were received which were included in the report. The Commission is not satisfied with the Ministry of Railway‟s comments in respect of majority of these cases and its views have been so reflected therein. The Commission feels that two of the issues discussed in the Annual Report of 2003-04 need to be further highlighted this year which are given in paragraphs 5.1 & 5.2.

(ii) Two new issues have been included in this year‟s Report as per paragraphs 5.3 to 5.4

5.1 FOUNDATION DETAILS AND COMPLETION DRAWINGS OF

BRIDGES: (Item initially raised in the Annual Report for the year 2002-03) Views of the Commission

Various aspects of railway bridges were highlighted in the Annual Report of the Commission for the year 2000-01, which covered rehabilitation, under-water inspection, rebuilding of MG bridges strengthened for retention after conversion and rechecking of waterway of bridges in case of doubling and gauge conversion projects. Railway Board in its comments had stated that there are about 1.2 lakh bridges on Indian Railway system out of which 44% are more than 100 years old and 74% are more than 60 years old. Railway Board though highlighted that the life of a bridge is determined on age-cum-physical condition and that action is taken to rehabilitate/rebuild the bridge when it shows signs of distress. It was also brought out in the Railway Board‟s comments that Rs.1, 530 crores out of SRSF have been earmarked for the rehabilitation/rebuilding of distressed bridges, cast iron pile bridges and early steel bridges in the first instance over the next 5 to 6 years. The provisions of IRS Bridges Substructure and Foundation Code were also mentioned in regard to

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allowable stresses, etc., required for checking the substructure for introduction of new types of locomotives, rolling stocks, train composition and gauge conversion, etc. In regard to the need for rebuilding of MG bridges retained during gauge conversion, the Railway Board advised that a committee comprising of four Executive Directors of Railway Board was constituted to review all the gauge converted sections or sanctioned gauge conversion projects with respect to their fitness of running of BOXN traffic, heavier WDG-2 locomotives and in some cases even for heavier brake down cranes. The Commission‟s views were that old bridges which were overstressed or distressed should be rebuilt. It was also suggested that those old bridges whose substructure is not available for visual inspection or whose completion drawings are missing should also be rebuilt, as in such cases it is not possible to certify adequacy of these structures under Clauses-5.16.2.2 and 5.16.2.3 of IRS Substructure and Foundation Code. It was also suggested that effective means of underwater examination to find out the soundness of the substructure of bridges is brought in force without any more delay. It is a fact that foundation details and completion drawings of a vast majority of railway bridges are not available with Zonal Railways. The foundation and substructure of large number of bridges remain underwater round the year and their integrity is suspect as no satisfactory means are available for their inspection. Heavier locomotives and wagons are being introduced in the system and 100 kmph freight trains are already running. The Zonal Railways are certifying the safety of bridges without any rationale or calculations, while approaching the Commissioners of Railway Safety for sanction of running of this rolling stock. They are not doing enough to retrieve the Completion details of the bridges either through physical verification or by making sincere search for the Completion Drawings. After the unfortunate accident of 6602 Mangalore-Chennai Central Mail on Bridge No.924 in Southern Railway near Kadalundi on 22nd June 2001, where 52 passengers lost their lives and more than 300 were injured, the Railway Board realized the importance of underwater inspection of bridges and mapping of unknown foundations. Railway Board then sanctioned 4 pilot projects in association with foreign specialist firms as follows:- 1. Southern Railway Pilot Project for underwater inspection

in association with M/s. Wilbur Smith & Associate, USA.

2. North Central Railway Pilot project for underwater inspection in association with M/s. Ramboll, Denmark.

3. Central Railway Pilot project for underwater inspection

in association with M/s.Collins Engineers, USA.

4. Northern Railway Mapping of unknown foundations and

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integrity testing in association with M/s. Olson Engineers, USA.

The Railway Board advised that on successful completion of the pilot projects, the procedures will be adopted all over the Indian Railways and the techniques of NDT developed abroad on mapping of unknown foundations and integrity testing of foundations will be utilized. Railway Board also advised that

(i) The Zonal Railways have started getting underwater inspections of

critical bridges done through local expertise available. (ii) Zonal Railways have been directed to have complete database of

availability of completion drawings and foundation drawings of bridges and to make all out effort to locate old completion drawings from records/archives.

(iii) Zonal Railways will collect details from existing structures,

wherever possible.

On the apprehension of the Commission that how could a Bridge Certificate be given by the Zonal Railways for introduction of heavier axle loads and higher speeds in a section without the help of completion drawings of bridges, the Railway Board replied that the detailed procedure for sanction of running of new rolling stock has been issued by RDSO. However, it is not understood by the Commission as to how can a procedure prescribed by RDSO for running rolling stock over a bridge, be helpful when the foundation details are not available because without knowing the structural details and the dimensions of various components of the bridge, the stress calculations, etc., cannot be made. The outcome of the Committee or four Executive Directors set up by Railway Board is also not known.

Though alarmed by the tragedy that occurred due to the collapse of Kadalundi bridge on 22nd June 2001, Ministry of Railways sanctioned certain pilot projects more than 2 years ago, the progress made in this endeavour appears to be quite slow. Over the last few years, Ministry of Railways, has permitted overloading of wagons over and above the carrying capacity for which the wagons were initially designed and cleared for running, without following the laid down procedure and without a speed certificate from RDSO, making the old bridges which were designed for much lighter loadings, all the more vulnerable. The Commission therefore reiterates its earlier suggestion that Ministry of Railways should take urgent action for rebuilding of those over-100 years old bridges, whose foundation details and condition of substructure below water level is not known and whose visual inspection is not feasible, nor it is being carried out.

Comments of the Ministry of Railways –

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Railway Board is already seized of the matter. Detailed remarks on subject were furnished in response to CCRS views in Annual Report 2003-04. It is fact that completion drawings are not available with zonal railways for some of old bridges constructed more than 100 years back. Efforts are made by Zonal Railways to locate completion drawings of bridges and reconstruct missing drawings. Procedure for sanction of running of newer rolling stock on bridges has been finalized within RDSO. The certification of bridges for which drawings are not available are being made by zonal railways as per Para 5.16.2.4 of Code Practice for the design of sub-structure and foundation of bridges. The extracts of relevant Para is as under: - “Wherever it is not possible to carry out theoretical checks, running of locomotives and rolling stock with heavier tractive force/braking force may be permitted subject to physical condition being certified and bridges being kept under close observation, as considered necessary by the Chief Engineer. In such case, the increase of tractive and/or braking forces shall not be more than 20% over bridges above the level of tractive and braking forces running over the bridges for the past one year or so.”

2. A Committee consisting of four Executive Directors of Railway Board was

constituted to review all the gauge conversion carried out or sanctioned with regard to their standards of construction, the immediate traffic requirements, the likely perspective traffic requirements & give recommendations on the following: -

(i) Upgradation required in completed gauge conversions and their priority.

Where the upgradation would be required necessarily by a particular date, the same should also be mentioned.

(ii) Identify the sanctioned gauge conversions where requirements of traffic

would need upgradation of the standards provided for in the sanctioned estimate.

The Committee, after detailed deliberations, interalia recommended on 23.01.2002 that:

(i) It should be possible to run trains with WDG2 locomotives on all

the gauge converted sections. In case of weak bridges, the drivers will be instructed to operate at maximum of 5th notch while passing on the vulnerable beidges. In case any train comes to stop with the loco on the bridge, driver will try to start the train without exceeding the 5th notch position. If for any reason the driver is not able to start the train on 5th notch he will ask for a relief loco. This instruction will be issued to the driver through the shed notice book. In case of lower standard of rails on two sections of South Central Railway, the same should be replaced at the first opportunity under track renewal programme.

3. Developing drawings for underground structures & assessing their

integrity otherwise is a stupendous task. For the time being the procedure prescribed by RDSO is being followed based on performance of already

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running rolling stock and physical condition of bridges. Realizing the importance of Underwater Inspection of bridges and mapping of unknown foundations, following four pilot projects have already been completed over various Zonal Railways.

a) Pilot Project in the area of Acoustic Emission Testing of Railway

Bridges over Northern Railway by M/s. TISEC INC Canada. b) Pilot Project in the area of Fatigue Testing & Residual life analysis

of steel bridge structure over Western Railway by M/s. TTCI.

c) Pilot Project in the area of Under Water Inspection & Non-Destruction Testing of Bridges over Central Railway by M/s. Ramboll, Denmark.

d) Pilot Project in the area of Fatigue Testing & Residual life analysis

of steel bridges structure over North Western Railway by M/s. Sharma & Associates Inc. USA.

Besides, following three sanctioned Pilot Projects are also scheduled to be completed by 31.03.2006.

a) Pilot Project in the area of Acoustic Emission Testing of Railway

Bridges over Western Railway by M/s. Dungan, USA. b) Pilot Project in the area of Strain Gauging & Cost Rating over

Western Railway by Bridge Diagnostics, USA.

c) Pilot Project in the area of Mapping of Unknown foundation & Integrity Testing over Northern Railway by M/s Olson Engineers, USA.

In these completed pilot project officers, supervisors and staff from other Zonal Railways also were associated for taking up such works in their Railway.

4. As far as underwater inspection is concerned some work has already

been done with the help of local expertise. Underwater inspection of nearly 300 Bridges has already been done on various Zonal Railways. A pilot project in the field of underwater inspection has already been completed on Central Railway with foreign specialized agencies which included training of engineers and supervisors of Indian Railway. Meanwhile , the best available local expertise is being used for underwater inspection and guidelines for underwater inspection has already been issued by RDSO.

5. Regarding enhancement of the carrying capacity of wagons, it is to be

stated that BOXN wagon was introduced on Indian Railways in 1982. Due procedure was followed at the time of introduction of BOXN wagons. Since then track and rolling stock technology and maintenance practices have improved considerably. A detailed analysis of rail stresses shows that there are many grey areas in calculations. Value of track modulus is

19

very old and is of CST – 9 track. It is seen that although old bridges were designed to old standards, yet they continue to be in good physical condition and giving good service. This is because of various factors such as availability of reserve strength due to higher factors of safety used, good initial quality of construction and several other reasons. Taking advantage of improved technology and maintenance practices, in past also Railway had been increasing the loading capacity of wagons from time to time. The permissible carrying capacity of BOXN was enhanced by 2 T in July 1997 and in addition 2 T loading tolerance was provided for loose commodities in BOXN. A slight increase in carrying capacity was considered not tantamounting to operation of a new wagon, therefore, procedure as specified for running of a new rolling stock was not adopted and Railway Board took a conscious decision to enhance carrying capacity of BOXN wagons to CC+8+2. However, as a matter of abundant precaution this was taken up as a Pilot Project on selected iron ore routes only.

During the pilot project, the bridges would be first thoroughly inspected before showing higher axle load wagons and thereafter, kept under observation and selected bridges instrumented for a thorough evaluation of stresses and deflections. Those bridges as requiring strengthening are taken up for strengthening/rebuilding.

To sort out the various issues raised by CCRS vide his letter No.M-14011/1/2005-RS dated 16.05.05, a meeting was held in Railway Board on 07.10.2005 between CCRS and Board Member (ME, MM & MT). In the meeting Board apprised CCRS about the status of CC+8+2 T trains on Indian Railway. It was explained that more emphasis is being given on physical condition of the bridges. All the bridges on CC+8+2 T routes have been physically inspected and vulnerable bridges are kept under observations. Action being taken to provide instrumentation on selected bridges which will give insight knowledge regarding stress dispersion in bridges. The project is being monitored by a multi-disciplinary core group comprising of PHODs of Zonal Railways under GM. During the meeting, it was agreed that RDSO would issue Provisional Speed Certificate, based on which Railway will process for Railway Board‟s approval through CRS/CCRS. Provisional Speed Certificates has been issued by RDSO‟s letter No.MW/SPD/BG/BOXN/PROV dated 28.10.2005 and South Eastern Railway‟s proposal for post-facto approval for running of these wagons have been received in Railway Board‟s office through CCRS and is under process. Approval is being communicated separately. Meanwhile, RDSO has completed oscillation trial of BOXN wagons with CC+8+2 T and wagon performance is found to be satisfactory up to a speed of 70 kmph. Accordingly, vide RDSO‟s letter No.MW/Overloading dated 19.01.06. RDSO has issued a Final Speed Certificate for BOXN for speed upto 60 kmph.

Further Comments of the Commission: -

The efforts being made by the Railways to find suitable dignostic techniques, available world over for monitoring the health of various components of old bridges is appreciated. However, the need for

20

hurriedness with which the higher loading, over & above the designed carrying capacity of wagons, has been introduced, without ensuring the implementation of the conditions prescribed by the Ministry of Railways for bridges in the field, is not understood. Also bypassing the Commission in the first instance while taking such a decision is a serious matter. Ministry of Railways is advised to exercise caution and avoid such violation of time tested rules & procedures.

5.2. ROLE OF COMMISSIONER OF RAILWAY SAFETY IN OPENING OF RAILWAY LINE FOR GOODS TRAFFIC

(Item initially raised in the Annual Report of 2003-04)

Views of the Commission

This issue was raised because of the provisions in Section-27 of the Railways Act, 1989, Indian Railways Schedule of Dimensions, Indian Railways Manual of AC Traction and the explanation given under Rule-3 of Statutory Investigation into Railway Accidents Rules 1998, etc., which give a hint that the CRS sanction needs to be taken even for opening a railway line which is built only for goods traffic. The Commission‟s view is that inspection of such a line by the CRS may not be obligatory but his sanction based on submission of documents as required for opening of a Railway line for public carriage of passengers and the Joint Safety Certificate signed by the concerned Principal Head of Departments, is necessary before regular commercial goods services start operating on such a section. Ministry of Railways in its comments has supported the present delegation of powers for opening a new line for goods traffic to the CE/Construction and has stated that the instances cited by the Commission are indirect references whereas the provisions of the Engineering Code is direct and implicit unambiguous reference. The Ministry of Railways‟ contention hinges on the following main points.

(i) If CRS sanction is made mandatory for starting even the freight

operation, then it may lead to delays, which would not be in the interest of Indian Railways.

(ii) Even carrying the construction materials by the completed line

would be very much difficult and would often get delayed if the argument forwarded by the Commission is accepted.

(iii) It has been further clarified in Board‟s letter No.92/CEDO/SR/0

dated 12.12.1994 that the section actually is a Railway. Therefore, if that be so, any rolling stock if already running over the Railway can also run on the new line constructed on that Railway without requiring permission of the CRS.

(iv) Inspection for permitting the line to be used for freight traffic would

entail inspection by CRS twice diverting attention from other important works, which is not desirable.

The comments of the Commission on these points are as under:-

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(a) In regard to items (i) and (IV) above, nowhere it has been

suggested that opening of a line for freight operation should require CRS inspection. Rather, it has been mentioned that the inspection by CRS of a section to be opened only for goods traffic may not be obligatory and the sanction by the CRS may be given based on the submission of opening documents and Joint Safety Certificate signed by the concerned Principal Heads of Department etc. The observation of the Ministry of Railways that obtaining CRS sanction may lead to delays is not acceptable to the Commission as the cases of opening of lines are dealt by the Commission with utmost urgency.

(b) It is nowhere suggested that even material trains cannot run

without CRS sanction. The whole issue is whether the regular commercial goods services can be introduced without CRS sanction.

(c) Railway Board‟s letter dated 12.12.94 referred to by the Ministry

of Railways nowhere mentions that a rolling stock already running over a Railway can be run on the new line constructed on that Railway without the sanction of the CRS. Rather, it says that the Railway Board‟s sanction is required only for one section and for others the concerned CRS can be approached for giving sanction. Para 8 of Policy Circular No.6 issued by Railway Board vide letter No.92/CEDO/SR/4/0 Pt. dated 23.12.1999 provides as under-

“SANCTION FOR THE USE OF ROLLING STOCK ALREADY RUNNING ON ANY SECTION(S) OF A RAILWAY –

In the case of rolling stock already running on any section(s) of a Railway, the sanction can be accorded by the Commissioner of Railway Safety on the submission of safety certificates as per Annexure A, B and C. A preformed for sanction is given in Annexure F”. Therefore, it is still ambiguous as to what extent the Commission is involved in the matter of Railway lines to be opened or already opened for goods traffic only. Will CRS sanction be required for carrying out new minor works, rebuilding of bridges, Level Crossings, Road Over/Under bridges, signaling works, etc. on such goods lines and whether provisions of Schedule of Dimensions will be applicable to these lines as well? These issues still need to be clarified, if the sanction of CRS is considered not necessary for opening of goods lines for running of regular commercial freight trains.


New Rules for Railway Opening for Public Carriage of Passenger Rules, 2000 clearly stipulates under Chapter II Rule 1(3) “Where the General

22

manager of Zonal Railway or the Chief Executive of a non-Government railway is of the opinion that any railway or part thereof is required to be opened for public carriage of passengers, he shall refer the matter to the Commissioner for inspection and report on the safety of that Railway.” From the above, it is amply clear that reference is to be made to the Commissioner by the Railway only for opening the line for public carriage of passengers. This is also clear from the title of the Rules itself. Intention is that carrying the public by the Railways entails certain definite legal liability on the Railway for which the sanction of the Commissioner of Safety is required under the Indian Railway Act, 1989. For goods train, this liability is not that important and also by running the goods train. Railway comes to know the teething problem of the section and carries out necessary works required to running the passenger trains. Therefore, it is felt that no further instructions are required to be issued in this regard.


In the context of Ministry of Railways view that for running the goods train, the legal liability on the Railway is not as important as for carrying the public by the Railways, it is pointed out that as per Ministry of Railways own provisions, sanction of Commissioner of Railway Safety is required for electrification and for introduction of electric traction on a line which is open only for goods traffic. Therefore, when viewed in the light of provisions of different rules, codes & manual, the justification advanced by the Ministry of Railways does not appear logical. However, as the Ministry of Railways is unwilling to remove the existing ambiguity in the present provisions, the matter is not being pursued further.

5.3 Level Crossings

(New Item)

Views of the Commission The rising trend in level crossing accidents & fatalities has been witnessed in recent years. The on going expansion & strengthening of road network has created enhanced pressure on manned level crossings and unmanned gates now have increased potential for accident.

The various safety issued related to level crossings have been raised by Commission from time to time. These are basically concerned with manning and interlocking of LCs and elimination of rail-road surface crossings by means of grade separation. The following issued require urgent attention in this regard: -

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a) Policy guidelines for classification of manned level crossings and their incorporation in IRPWM and other relevant manuals.

b) The pace of manning should not be at the cost of maintenance of

the Railway assets. The proper creation of gatemen‟s posts, their requirements and training are pre-conditions for effective manning of LCs. The detailed policy guidelines in this regard also need to be issued by Railway Board to replace adhoc manning by withdrawing manpower from existing staff strength.

c) Apart from not de-manning of existing level crossings and not

constructing new unmanned LCs during new construction, the safety devices like ACD and TAWDs should be installed on programmed basis on all unmanned LC gates to warn Road Users suitably.

d) The Commission strongly recommends that grade separation

should be provided on new lines/gauge conversion/doubling/multiplexing/ strengthening works under RVNL as well as on existing lines. The availability of funds has been critical feature of these projects. Commission, therefore, feels that mechanism for cost sharing, availability of funds need to be evolved for safer operation of Railway System.

This progress has so far been slow.


As on 01.04.2005, there are total 16642 manned level crossings and

18490 unmanned level crossings (excluding canal and „D‟ class cattle crossings) on Indian Railways.

To improve the safety at level crossings busy manned level crossings are

being replaced by Raod Over/Under Bridges on cost sharing basis with concerned State Governments/local bodies. In 2004-05, total 19 ROBs/RUBs have been constructed on cost sharing basis on Indian Railway. Further, in 2005-06 total 11 ROBs have been completed till December, 2005. The replacement of busy level crossings by ROBs/RUBs is based on the proposals initiated by State Governments/local bodies for which they had to share 50% of cost of ROB. In addition to cost sharing basis works ROB/RUB works are also constructed by National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) on National Highways at their cost. Such works are also taken up on BOT basis by concerned State Governments.

To improve the safety at unmanned level crossings vulnerable level

crossings have been identified for manning as per laid down criteria. In 2004-05 total 190 unmanned level crossings have been manned and further 365 level crossings have been identified for manning in 2005-06 out of which 118 has been manned till December, 2005.

(a) Policy guidelines for classification of manned level crossings has been

already issued to all Railways vide Board‟s letter No.2001/CE-I/LX/AC/01

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(Data) dated 25.09.2002. In view of above Board‟s letter Correction Slips to Para 904 of IRPWM is under process in Board‟s office. After finalization of correction slips same shall be circulated to all Railways and CCRS.

(b) At present gate keeper posts are filled by taking options from willing

gangman out of the gang strength and resultant vacancies in gang are filled through normal recruitments. The gatekeepers are sent for refresher courses/trainings as per stipulated schedules. For creation of exclusive post of gate keeper‟s instructions already exists to create posts with matchning surrender.

(c) A pilot project of provision of Anti Collision Device (ACD) has been taken

up in Northeast Frontier Railway. The work of provision of ACD shall be taken up in other Railways after successful completion of this pilot project. ACD has in built system of TAWD for level crossings. The ACD work is targetted for completion on entire system by 2013-14 progressively.

(d) Efforts are made to provide grade separators wherever possible on new

line construction and to avoid level crossings. However, it is not possible to avoid level crossing altogether neither it is feasible to increase the cost of new line by providing grade separators where likely TVUs are going to be quite low for many years. As far as Gauge Conversions are concerned grade separators can be provided on cost sharing basis only as per the accepted criteria i.e. where TVUs is more than 1 Lakh. It is not feasible to charge the entire cost of grade separators on Railway account unless the funding support to Railway is increased proportionately from diesel cess fund. In case of doubling of lines the ROB/RUB can be provided on cost sharing basis only subject to the level of TVUs at these level crossings. It is neither feasible for practicable to provide ROB/RUB at all level crossings and to charge them fully to Railway Fund.

Railways are in dialogue with State Governments to replace as many level crossings by ROB/RUB on cost sharing basis. The possibility of charging the entire cost of ROB/RUB including approaches is being explored but shall require additional fund from diesel cess/alternate sources. At present there are about 452 ROB/RUB works sanctioned on cost sharing basis at total cost of Rs.5100 crore (approx.). Further there are still more than 1247 LCs with TVUs>1 lakh yet to be sanctioned. The total cost of such ROB/RUB would be Rs.15000 crore (approx.). If further, all LCs on Golden Quadrilaterals have also to be charged to Railway Fund then perhaps Railway would need total fund to the extent of Rs.40,000 crore in next five years. It will not be feasible also to replace all LCs by grade separators. However, Chief Secretaries of State Governments have been addressed by the Ministry vide ME‟s DO No.97/CE-I/BRO/158 (Policy)Pt. Dated 08.01.2005 in which State Governments have been requested to participate in joint efforts towards expeditious construction and completion of ROB/RUB works with an arrangement where part of State Government share towards cost of ROB/RUB would be set off against their receivable funds from the Railways on account of cost of GRP dues. State Governments are also requested to divert a part of fund received by them

25

from Central Road fund to the Railways. Under this arrangement full construction work including the bridge portion and approaches shall be done through single agency of a PSU under the Ministry of Railways. Consent of most of State Governments is still awaited. However, recently a proposal has been sent to Cabinet by Ministry of Railways for taking up entire work of ROB including approaches by Railway itself subject to increase in existing share of Railway from Central Road Fund and exemption of diesel cess payable by Railway. The Cabinet decision is still awaited.


Ministry of Railways is again requested not to permit demanning of existing manned level crossings, nor to construct any new unmanned level crossings, as more than 75% of level crossing accidents occur at unmanned level crossings.

5.4 Conflict of information conveyed to the driver of a train passing through a station where some temporary speed restriction due to engineering works exists.

(New Item)

The information regarding the potential speed of a train passing through a station or stopping at the station is conveyed to the driver through the signals in the approach of a station. The first such signal in the approach of a station is the warner or the distant signal. In terms of para 3.06 and 3.07 of GR, the following information are conveyed to the driver by different aspects of the warner or distant signals.

Sl. No.

Type of signal Position of the Signal

Information conveyed to the driver

1 Semaphore warner on a post by itself-Two aspect

On Proceed with caution and be prepared to stop at the next stop signal

2 - do - Off Proceed

3 Semaphore signal below the stop signal-Two aspect

Both stop signal and warner „on‟

Stop

4 - do - Stop signal „off‟ and warner signal „on‟

Proceed with caution and be prepared to stop at the next stop signal

5 - do- Stop signal and warner signal „off‟

Proceed

6 Colour light warner signal on a post by itself (two-aspect)

Green and red Proceed with caution and be prepared to stop at the next stop signal

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7 - do - Green and green Proceed

8 Colour light warner signal blow a stop signal two-aspect

Red and red Stop

9 - do - Green and red Proceed with caution and be prepared to stop at the next stop signal

10 - do - Green and green Proceed

11 Semaphore distant signal-two aspect

On Proceed and be prepared to stop at the next stop signal


13 14

Semaphore distant signal – multiple aspect - do -

On Attention

Proceed and be prepared to stop at the next stop signal Proceed and be prepared to pass next signal at such restricted speed as may be prescribed by special instructions


16 Colourlight distant signal – multiple aspect

Yellow Proceed and be prepared to stop at the next stop signal

17 - do - Double yellow Proceed and be prepared to pass next signal at such restricted speed as may be prescribed by special instructions

18 - do - Green Proceed

In the above chart, the „proceed‟ aspect mean proceeding at full sectional speed.

The type of signals to be displayed during engineering works within the station limits is given in para 15.09 of GR. As per sub para (2) in GR 15.09, in case the place of obstruction (engineering work spot) within the station limits, the provision of sub-rule (1) (Rules regarding provision of caution indicator and speed/stop indicator) may be dispensed with when the affected line has been isolated by setting and securing of the points or by securing at „on‟, the necessary manually controlled stop signal/s and approach signals shall not be taken „off‟ unless the train has been brought to a stop at the first stop signal in the case where driver has been issued with a caution order by a station in rear informing him of the obstruction and details thereof.

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Views of the Commission:

1. It may be stated here that the above provisions in sub rule (2) is generally not followed and engineering works continue with the provision of caution indicators, speed/stop signal indicators and termination indicators within the station limits.

2. Though the rules provide for lighting of these indicators at night, it is not generally followed now-a-days due to shortage of manpower and other reasons. Reliance is placed only on the caution order issued to the driver. In some cases, attempts are made to improve the visibility of the indicators by painting the same with reflective paint or attaching reflective strips to it. But this is done infrequently and even when it is done, it is not maintained properly.

3. Thus, the following of the speed restriction (generally 20 kmph) on the work spot within the station limits depends solely only on the following of caution order by the driver scrupulously after relating the same to the field details like TP etc at night as it becomes rather impossible to locate the engineering restriction board at night from a distance.

4. In view of above, the Railway Board vide their letter No. 87/Safety (A&R)/29/2 dated 22.04.1987 (copy enclosed) issued instructions that warner/distant signal should not be taken „off‟ when there are temporary speed restrictions within the station limits. It also quoted a subsidiary rule of South Central Railway in this connection (SR 3.43 (i)) which stipulates that the warner/ distant signals shall not be taken „off‟ to 90 deg./proceed aspect when (i) there is a temporary speed restriction within the station limit or (ii) there is a permanent speed restriction of less than 50 kmph within the station limits.

However, it is seen that recently, the Southern Railway has withdrawn the above SR in terms of Railway Board‟s letter No. 99/Safety(A&R)/19/32 dated 11.07.2000 without any clear reason.

5. Commissions recommends that in the interest of safer operation Railway Board may issue a unified S.R. on the lines of its letter No.87/Safety(A&R)/29/2 dated 22.04.1987, for being followed on all Zonal Railways.

28


Commission‟s considered view is that Railway Board should not have withdrawn the instructions contained in its letter No.87/Safety (A&R)/29/2 dated 22.04.1987 unilaterally, without obtaining the views of the Commission. This is another instance where the established norms have been given a go by.

Lucknow : (G. P. GARG ) Dated : Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety

* * * * *


This recommendation has been examined but not accepted as converting Warner or Distant Signals to indicate speed restriction in a yard is against the basic principle of providing these permissive signals. Moreover, prescribing for use of Warner/Distant for purposes other than what it is intended for in GR and that also merely for non observance of laid down norms for indicating speed restriction through other means in the station limit, which can otherwise be easily followed, is not desirable and hence, not accpeted.

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APPENDIX-I

(Refer Para 1.2.2)

Circle Offices and their jurisdiction & Incumbency of Officers in the Commission

1. Jurisdictions of Circle Offices (as on 31.03.2006)

Name of Circle Headquarters Route Kilometrage

(i) Central Circle . . . Mumbai 7483.410

(ii) Eastern Circle . . . Kolkata 5836.735

(iii) Northern Circle . . . New Delhi 6972.090

(iv) North Eastern Circle . . . Lucknow 6490.495

(v) Northeast Frontier Circle . . . Kolkata 3781.910

(vi) Southern Circle . . . Bangalore 8317.420

(vii) South Central Circle . . . Secunderabad 5743.420

(viii) South Eastern Circle . . . Kolkata 7468.310

(ix) Western Circle . . . Mumbai 11985.262

Note : Northeast Frontier Circle‟s jurisdiction includes 16.450 km.of Metro Railway/Kolkata. Central

Circle's jurisdiction includes 740.28 Kms. of Konkan Railway and Northern Circle's Jurisdiction

includes 62.15 Kms. of Delhi Metro.

2. Incumbency of Officers in the Commission (1.4.2005 to 31.3.2006)

2.1 Headquarters Office, Lucknow

(i) Chief Commissioner Full Period Shri .G. P. Garg

(ii) Deputy Commissioner (General) Full Period Shri Veer Narayan

Deputy Commissioners in Technical Wing/Lucknow

(i)Operating Full Period Shri. Sanjay Tripathi

(ii)Electric Traction Full Period Shri Ashutosh Pant

(iii)Signal & Telecom Full Period Shri P.R.Izardar

(iv)Mechanical Full Period Shri B.S. Dohare

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2.3 Commissioners in charge of Circle Offices

(i) Central Circle, Mumbai Full Period Shri Sudhir Kumar

(ii) Eastern Circle, Kolkata 01.04.05 to 31.08.05 Shri Mahesh Chand

01.09.05 to 31.03.06 Vacant

(iii) Northern Circle, New Delhi Full Period Sh. Bhupender Singh

(iv) North Eastern Circle, Lucknow 01.04.05 to 16.08.05 Vacant

17.08.05 to 31.03.06 Shri R.K. Kardam

(v) Northeast Frontier Circle, Kolkata 01.04.05 to31.03.06 Vacant

(vi) Southern Circle, Bangalore Full Period Shri Pranab Kumar Sen

(vii) SouthCentral Circle,Secunderabad Full Period Shri R.P. Agarwal

(viii) South Eastern Circle, Kolkata Full Period Shri Balbir Singh

(ix) Western Circle, Mumbai Full Period Shri Prashant Kumar

2.4 Dy. Commissioners (Signalling & Telecommunications) attached to Circle Offices

(i) Eastern Circle, Kolkata Full Period Shri P. K. Biswas

(ii) Western Circle, Mumbai Full Period Shri A.N. Toke

* * * * *

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APPENDIX - II (Refer Para 1.2.2)

COMMISSION OF RAILWAY SAFETY

HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS

1. Brief History

1.1 To exercise effective control over the construction and operation of the first

railways in India, which were entrusted to private companies, Consulting

Engineers were appointed under the Government of India. Later when the

Government undertook the construction of railways, the Consulting

Engineers were designated as Government Inspectors. In 1883, their

position was statutorily recognized. Later, the Railway Inspectorate was

placed under the Railway Board which was established in 1905.

1.2 Under the Indian Railway Board Act, 1905 and Notification No.801 dated

24th March, 1905 of the Department of Commerce and Industry, the Railway

Board was vested with powers and functions of the Central Government

under various sections of the Railway Act and was authorised to make

General Rules for the operation of Railways. The Railway Board is thus the

Safety Controlling Authority for the working and operation of Government

and Company managed railways.

1.3 Section 181(3) of the Government of India Act of 1935 provided that

functions for securing the safety, both of the traveling public and of persons

operating the railways, including the holding of inquiries into the causes of

accidents, should be performed by an authority independent of the Federal

Railway Authority. Due to the outbreak of the war, the constitution of the

Federal Railway Authority did not materialize and the Inspectorate continued

to function under the Railway Board.

1.4 To avoid direct subordination of the Railway Inspectorate to the Railway

Board, the Pacific* Locomotive Committee, headed by Lt. Col. A.H.L. Mount,

then Chief Inspecting Officer of the British Railways, suggested in para 210

of their report, submitted in 1939, as under:-

“We understand that, under the Govt. of India Act, 1935, it is contemplated

that the Inspectorate will be separated from the control of the Railway Board.

This is very desirable in so far as it will eradicate the present anomaly of the

Board being the Inspecting as well as the executive Authority. We were

informed that the Board

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* Engines with 4-6-2 configuration of wheels are called “Pacific Locos”.

fully appreciate the position, and would welcome the change, although it

appears that, in practice, Government Inspectors have generally retained

their freedom of judgement.......”

1.5 The principle of separation of the Railway Inspectorate from the Railway

Board was endorsed in 1940 by the Central Legislature who recommended

that “Senior Government Inspectors of Railways should be placed under the

Administrative control of some authority of the Govt. of India other than the

Railway Board.” Accordingly, the Railway Inspectorate was placed under the

administrative control of the Department of “Posts and Air” in May 1941 and

continuously thereafter under whichever Ministry that held the portfolio of

Civil Aviation.

1.6 The erstwhile Railway Inspectorate was re-designated as the Commission of

Railway Safety on 1.11.1961.

1.7 The responsibility for safety in the working and operation of Railway rests

solely with the Railway Board and the Zonal Railway authorities. The main

task of the Commission of Railway Safety is to direct, advise and caution the

Railway executives with a view to ensure that all reasonable precautions are

taken in regard to soundness of rail construction and safety of train

operation. The Railway Board refers to the Commission matters relating to

modification or enhancement of standards in respect of operation of trains,

track, locomotive, rolling stock and revision of rules embodied in the General

Rules, Rules for the opening of New Lines, Manuals, IRCA Regulations,

Schedules of Dimensions and other publications. Suggestions made by the

Commission of Railway Safety are duly considered by the Railway Board

before necessary revisions are notified.

2. Duties:-

2.1 The duties of a Commissioner of Railway Safety as spelt out in Chapter III

of the Railways Act 1989 are as under:-

to inspect new railways with a view to determine whether they are

fit to be opened for the public carriage of passengers, and to report

thereon to the Central Government as required by or under this Act;

to make such periodical or other inspections of any railway or of any

rolling stock used thereon as the Central Government may direct;

33

to make inquiry under this Act into the cause of any accident on a

Railway;

to perform such other duties as are imposed on him by this Act or

any other enactment for the time being in force relating to Railways.

2.2 The term “such other duties” mentioned in Para 2.2 has been detailed in

Sections 22 to 24 of the Act and covers the following:-

sanctioning the opening of new railway lines after inspection on behalf

of the Central Government;

sanctioning the execution of all works, including new works,

affecting the safety of running lines;

when, after inspecting a line already in use or a rolling stock already

authorised, the Commissioner is of the opinion that their continued

use will be attended with danger to the travelling public, he may

report his opinion to the Central government, who may then order the

closure of the line or the discontinuance of the use of rolling stock;

and

to inspect such a closed line and sanction its re- opening for

carriage of passengers and also report to the Central Govt.on the

fitness for use of discontinued rolling stock.

2.3 Functional duties, including field inspections, of an Inspector of Railway,

since designated Commissioner of Railway Safety, are amplified, among

other technical publications, in the;

General Rules for all open lines of railways in India administered by

the Government;

Rules for the opening of a Railway or Section of a Railway for the

public carriage of passengers;

Indian Railways Code of practice for the Engineering department;

Indian Railway Way, Works and Signal Engineering Manuals;

Schedules of Dimensions;

Conference Rules of the Indian Railway Conference Association;

Statutory Investigation into Railway Accidents Rules, 1998

34

Railway (Notices of and Inquiries into accidents) Rules, 1998

2.4 After its separation from the Railway Board in May, 1941, a post of Chief

Government Inspector of Railways, later designated as Chief

Commissioner of Railway Safety, was created to enable the Central

Government to exercise “effective technical control”.

2.4.1 The Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety directs the activities of

the Organisation and is responsible for advising the Central

Government in all matters relating to Railway Safety, recruitment of

officers, postings and promotions, budget and expenditure etc.

The Chief Commissioner deals principally with: -

Matters appurtenant to Field Inspections and statutory inquiries

into accidents;

Inspection Reports of Commissioners of Railway Safety;

Reports of statutory inquiries held into accidents by the

Commissioners. After careful study he forwards his considered

opinion to the Controlling Ministry and the Railway Board with

such recommendations as he considers necessary;

Railway Board‟s suggestions pertaining to corrections or

amendments to General Rules, Rules for Opening of a Railway,

Schedule of Dimensions, the P. Way, Works and Signal

Engineering Manuals, Procedures for inquiries into accidents,

Codes of Practice for Engineering Works and other

publications; and

Preparation of the Annual Report on the working of the

Commission of Railway Safety and its placement in each House

of Parliament.

All the Technical publications indicated in para 2.4 above

including others issued by Railway Board from time to time.

2.4.2 Field duties of the Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety consist of

inspections of sections of Railways, visits to the Railway

Headquarters and Divisional Offices, Railway installations and

Circle Offices. If considered necessary by him, he may himself

hold inquiries into important accidents.

* * * * *

35

APPENDIX- III

(Refer Para 4.1)

STATUTORY INQUIRIES INTO RAILWAY ACCIDENTS-RULES, SCOPE AND PROCEDURE

1. RULES

1.1 Rules for Inquiry into Railway accidents :-

Rules for the guidance of the Officers of the Commission of Railway Safety

for holding inquiries into Railway accidents are contained in the “Statutory

Investigation into Railway Accidents Rules, 1998” notified by the Ministry of

Civil Aviation in the Gazette vide G.S.R.No. 257 dated 26.12.98 and G.S.R.

No. 63, dated-02.01.99.

1.2 When should a Statutory Inquiry be held ?

A statutory inquiry by the Commissioner is obligatory in every accident to a

passenger-carrying train which is attended with loss of human life, or with

grievous hurt as defined in the Indian Penal Code, to a passenger or

passengers in the train or with serious damage to railway property of the

value exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs. The Commissioners may also inquire into any

other accident which in the opinion of the Chief Commissioner or the

Commissioner of Railway Safety requires the holding of an inquiry. Where

the Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety considers the holding of an

Inquiry into an accident necessary, he may either hold the inquiry himself or

direct the Commissioner of Railway Safety to do so.

The Inquiry shall be obligatory only in those cases where the passengers

killed or grievously hurt were travelling in the train. If a person travelling on

the foot-board or roof of a passenger train is killed or grievously hurt or if a

person is run over at a level crossing or elsewhere on the railway track, an

inquiry is not obligatory. Workmen‟s trains or ballast trains carrying workmen

shall also be treated as passenger trains and in the event of a workman

getting killed or grievously hurt as a result of an accident to the train, an

inquiry shall be obligatory.

1.3 Procedure when Commissioner is unable to hold an inquiry:-

When a Commissioner is unable to hold an inquiry, he is to inform the

Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety of the reasons as to why an inquiry

can not be held by him. The Chief Commissioner may himself hold the

Inquiry or may direct another Commissioner to inquire into the accident or

else the inquiry can be entrusted to the Railway itself, who will then

36

appoint a Committee of Railway Officers to inquire into the accident. The

Committee‟s inquiry report is submitted to the Commissioner of Railway

Safety who scrutinises it and in case he agrees with the findings, forwards it

to the Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety along with his views on the

findings and recommendations made. If, on the other hand, the Commis-

sioner of Railway Safety considers that an inquiry should be held by himself,

he proceeds to do so.

1.4 When shall the Commissioner stop or discontinue his inquiry?

Whenever the Central Government appoints a Commission of inquiry under

the Commission of Inquiries Act, the Commissioner shall discontinue his

inquiry.

2. SCOPE : -

The Commissioner holds inquiries into accidents with a view to ascertaining the

causes and fix the responsibility thereof on the individuals concerned.

Investigations are also carried out into the question whether prompt and ade-

quate steps were taken by the railway administration for relief measures such as

provision of first aid, medical treatment and refreshments to passengers,

evacuation of injured passengers and other facilities like arrangements for

transhipment, completion of their journey to destination, running of duplicate

trains etc. As a result of his inquiry, the Commissioner may also make

recommendations which are designed to prevent the recurrence of similar

accidents, and which may suggest laying down new rules or modifying existing

rules of working, and improved standards of signalling, installation and

maintenance of track, bridges, etc. He also comments on matters observed by

him during the course of his inquiry which may not have any direct bearing on

the cause of the accident under investigation but which may in some cases

affect the safe working of the railway and lead to accidents.

3. Procedure for conducting a Statutory Inquiry

As soon as the Commissioner of Railway Safety receives intimation about the

occurrence of a serious accident, he proceeds to the site, conduct inspection of

the accident site and records all particulars relevent to the accident; He then

fixes a date for the inquiry, which is given publicity in the media. Officers of the

local Magistracy and police are separately advised of the dates of the inquiry.

The public is invited to give evidence in the inquiry in person or to write to the

Commissioner.

* * * * *

37

APPENDIX–IV

(Refer Para 3.2.3)

BRIEF DETAILS OF SERIOUS RAILWAY ACCIDENTS INQUIRED

INTO BY THE COMMISSION OF RAILWAY SAFETY

1.01 FIRE IN MOTOR COACH NO.72011 OF N-16 UP SUBURBAN LOCAL TRAIN

BETWEEN KHADAVLI-TITWALA STATIONS IN THE KASARA- KALYAN

SUBURBAN SECTION OF MUMBAI DIVISION OF CENTRAL RAILWAY ON

29.04.2004.

a) CAUSE - DUE TO SHORT CIRCUITING (BY EXTERNAL OBJECT) ON THE

ROOF OF THE MOTOR COACH.

b) CASUALTIES - KILLED- NIL, GRIEVOUS -1(passenger), SIMPLE -1(Rly. crew).

c) COST - Rs.5000/-

d) CATEGORY - "FAILURE OF EQUIPMENT - ELECTRICAL ROLLING STOCK".

RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. Timely maintenance schedules and proper maintenance of panto insulators should

be monitored so that tracking or puncturing of insulation near the panto assembly

does not cause fire. The proforma for maintenance record should also include

sample inspection/test check by officers in the shed.

2. An insulating material which does not burn under heat caused by fire and does

not emit dense smoke should be found out and considered for usage.

3. The issue of provision of proper insulation for the EMU roofs should be

examined and adequate insulation of entire roof of the EMU against short

circuiting should be ensured. The action may be taken immediately and

Commission advised of the same.

4. An alternate non-combustible material should be identified in the market and

used on the catwalks, which will neither add nor get consumed by the fire leading

to further panic by the commuters.

5. The items for fire prevention not implemented in the EMU coaches as per Code

of Practice for Prevention of Fires on EMU stock, October, 1991 and the revised

manual of 2003 issued by RDSO should be identified and implemented on war

footing by Central Railway.

6. The performance of micro processor based relays may be reviewed quickly and if

satisfactory, should be provided at all the DC sub-stations on a time bound

programme.

38

1.02 REAR-END-COLLISION OF TK SPECIAL GOODS TRAIN WITH SMET

GOODS TRAIN ON UP LINE BETWEEN SHOLAKA AND HODAL RAILWAY

STATIONS OF AGRA DIVISION OF NORTH CENTRAL RAILWAY ON

10.05.2004.

a) CAUSE – When the SMET Special Goods train was moving at a speed of 12 Kmph

in the Automatic block section of Sholaka-Hodal and in the Signalling

section beyond the gate Signal of level crossing gate no.555 TK special

goods train came speeding from behind & collided in the rear,

disregarding the Red Aspect of gate signal of manned Engineering Level

crossing gate no.555.

b) CASUALTIES – KILLED – 1 (Rly. Crew), GRIEVOUS-1(Rly. Crew),

SIMPLE – NIL.

c) COST - Rs.1,46,19,195/-

d) CATEGORY - Failure of Railway Staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. Intensive checks and monitoring of all the drivers and assistant drivers of the

goods trains in the Automatic sections on Palwal-Mathura section should be

undertaken for their alertness.

2. In the sections working on Automatic block system the data loggers should

generate reports of the drivers which overshoot the red aspect of the signals and

also whether the drivers controlled the speeds when the trains moved past the

signal showing single yellow aspect.

3. Vigilance control devices should be provided in all the locomotives moving in

section worked on Automatic Block System.

4. Voice recorders should be installed in all locomotives which can be analysed to

know what happened just before the accident.

5. Anti collision devices should be installed expeditiously to prevent collision,

particularly in sections working on Automatic block system. On a high speed

route even a slow moving train collided in the rear of another train moving ahead.

6. Flasher light should get switched ON automatically in a locomotive when it

derails/capsizes.

7. Whenever the drivers report for duty in the lobby they should first sign ON and

thereafter their breathalyzer test should be undertaken and the results recorded in

the signing ON register.

8. Agra Division should immediately be provided with a 140 T crane to form part of

ART at Agra Cantt.

39

9. In sections working on Automatic block working smaller electrified sections may

be provided by the Railway in order to pull out the trains quickly in the event of

any accident so as to expedite the restoration work.

10. Audible warning and road warning lights should be provided at all the manned

level crossing gates falling in automatic section as per para 20.1.3.1 SEM part-II.

1.03 INCIDENCE OF FIRE IN THE REAR LUGGAGE COMPARTMENT OF REAR

SLR OF TRAIN NO.2625 UP TRIVANDRUM CENTRAL – NEW DELHI

KERALA EXPRESS AT GUDIYATTAM STATION OF CHENNAI DIVISION

OF SOUTHERN RAILWAY AT ABOUT 02.36 HRS. ON 11.06.2004.

a) CAUSE – Due to an inadvertent and negligent act of an unknown person who left

behind an unextinguished beedi/cigarette butt on the parcels of the rear

luggage compartment of the rear SLR at the time of loading at Jolarpettai,

when the doors were open.

b) CASUALTIES – KILLED – NIL, GRIEVOUS- 1 (passenger), SIMPLE –NIL.

c) COST - Rs.66,940/-

d) CATEGORY - FAILURE OF OTHER THAN RAILWAY STAFF.

RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. Proper care and due diligence should be exercised by the Commercial Clerks and

Parcel clerks while loading the parcels inside the luggage compartments to ensure

that no untoward incident happens.

2. The parcel compartments (both rear and front) should be kept padlocked and

sealed.

3. Fire alarm system may be installed in Parcel compartments, which will ring in the

driver‟s compartment for front SLR and guard‟s compartment for rear SLR.

4. Fuses only of proper gauge should be used in the electrical circuits of coaches.

5. The lights in the parcel compartment should be turned off while on the run.

1.04 DERAILMENT OF 2620 UP MANGALORE–LTT MATSYAGANDHA EXPRESS

BETWEEN KARANJADI AND VEER STATIONS OF RATNAGIRI REGION OF

KONKAN RAILWAY ON 16.06.2004.

a) CAUSE – Due to failure of East side slop of Ambivali cutting resulting in boulder

and soil fall, resulting in obstruction on track.

b) CASUALTIES – KILLED – 15 (Passenger), GRIEVOUS-39 (Passengers),

SIMPLE – 65 (Passengers).

c) COST - Rs.6,54,85,000/-

d) CATEGORY - “An Act of God”.

40

RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. Observing 75 kmph speed restrictions on cuttings deeper than 20 metres, in

addition to other local instructions imposed by KRC.

2. Introducing monsoon patrolling in potentially vulnerable sections as per Chapter

X of IRPWM, 1986 wherein the unit of patrolling is stipulated as a block section.

1.05 DASHING OF A ROAD TRUCK WITH 9304 UP BHOPAL-INDORE

INTERCITY EXPRESS ON UNMANNED LEVEL CROSSING BETWEEN

PINGLESHWAR AND UJJAIN STATIONS OF RATLAM DIVISION OF

WESTERN RAILWAY ON 27.06.2004.

a) CAUSE – Due to negligent driving by road truck driver.

b) CASUALTIES – KILLED – 01 (Rly. crew), GRIEVOUS-01 (outsider),

SIMPLE – 03 (02 Passengers), (01 outsider).

c) COST - Rs.1,08,000/-

d) CATEGORY - Failure of person other than Railway Staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. The Level Crossing No.33-C should be manned.

2. Western Railway with the help of road, police and civil authorities should

organize campaigns in Ratlam Division‟s jurisdiction for educating the public in

precaution to be taken before entering unmanned level crossings.

3. Western Railway should arrange through civil authorities ambush checks in

Ratlam Division on road vehicles passing through unmanned level crossings and

penalising vehicle drivers violating the prescribed procedure.

4. Railway should arrange prominent display of caution boards for unmanned LC

and relevant instructions (Section 131 of Motor Vehicle Act) in Road Traffic

Authorities campuses.

5. Railway should emphasise on State Civil and Police authorities that all

applications for driving licenses are invariably examined in identification of

cautionary and stop boards of unmanned level crossings and duty of road vehicle

driver before passing through such level crossings.

6. Railway should arrange retroreflective painting of cautionary and stop boards on

all unmanned level crossings.

7. Railway should arrange that duty bunks and staff quarters on such unmanned

level crossings, which are not to be manned, be prominently painted

“Abandoned” in local, Hindi and English languages and scripts and it should be

such as to be visible from both road approaches from at least 10 m in rear of

speed breakers.

8. Railway should ensure that parcel compartment of driving coaches of push rakes

are kept locked and passengers do not enter in this portion.

41

9. Railway should introduce the practice of checking of calibration of speed

recording by sheds at the time of replacement of strips and to take corrective

action in case of discrepancies.

10. Loco Inspectors should monitor the enginemanship of drivers working with push

pull rakes and counsel them for smooth driving and controlling the speed of the

train within maximum permissible speed.

11. Railway should ensure that walkie-talkie in working order, is available with

Guards of all trains.

12. Railway should advise its divisions to ensure that any work, requiring

amendment to Station Working Rules, should be carried out only when amended

Station Working Rules and Station Working Diagram have been made available

to concerned station.

13. Railway should ensure that headlight of push pull rakes are maintained to same

standards as that of locomotives.

14. Railway should make technical arrangements for application of brakes in the

locomotive alongwith brake application on coaches of push pull rakes.

15. Railway should take action for strengthening of driving cabs of push pull rakes to

reduce the risk to driving crew.

1.06 ACCIDENT OF TRAIN NO. E 183 CHENNAI CENTRAL-TIRUTTANI EMU

FAST SUBURBAN LOCAL RUNNING ON DOWN FAST LINE AGAINST

PROTRUDING TIE BAR FENCING AT PATTABIRAM STATION OF

CHENNAI DIVISION OF SOUTHERN RAILWAY AT ABOUT 19.44 HRS. ON

16.07.2004.

a) CAUSE – Failure of the fencing due to poor structural condition of the fencing

combined with outside interference.

b) CASUALTIES – KILLED – NIL, GRIEVOUS-02 (1 Passenger), (1 Railway staff),

SIMPLE – 01 (Railway staff).

c) COST - Rs. NIL.

d) CATEGORY - Failure of Equipment –Steel Tie Bar Fencing.

RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. All the tie bar fencings along the suburban lines, including the fencing between

PAB up slow line and down fast line, should be immediately inspected and if the

condition of the fencing is not found satisfactory, immediate repair works by

welding of new members may be carried out. Alternatively, the case of removal

of such fencings may be investigated by Railway on a case of case basis and

action taken duly considering the safety of passengers.

2. The fencing at PAB station and other such corroded steel fencings in other

stations over Southern, South Western and other Zonal Railways should be

replaced by brick walls of suitable height topped with iron nails to prevent

trespassing.

42

3. Presently, the duties of Section Engineer/Works regarding maintenance of all

structures (including those carrying advertisement hoardings) have been codified

in the Indian Railway Works Manual, para 224(f). This scope obviously includes

steel fencing also. The steel fencings should be suitably numbered and results of

biannual inspection entered in structural steel register.

1.07 DASHING OF A ROAD LORRY NO.HR 68 1512 WITH CD DN GOODS TRAIN

AT TRAFFIC MANNED INTERLOCKED LEVEL CROSSING GATE 25/T KM.

160/11-9, LINGAMPALLI STATION YARD OF SECUNDERABAD DIVISION

AT 03.04 HRS. ON 01.08.2004.

(a) CAUSE – Due to negligence of lorry driver, the boom of the lifting barriers of LC

gate being in closed condition.

(b) CASUALTIES – KILLED – 01(Outsider), GRIEVOUS-01(Outsider),

SIMPLE – NIL.

(c) COST - Rs. 1,25,000/-.

(d) CATEGORY - Failure of other than Railway Staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. The above traffic level crossing gate No.25/T should be upgraded to a „Special

Class‟ level crossing and the maintenance of level crossings should be based on

provisions in Indian Railway Permanent Way Manual. The area around the above

level crossing should be illuminated with proper lighting arrangements. The type

and intensity of illumination for various types of level crossings should be

specified to various field units in the form of a circular to have uniformity on the

Railways.

2. Train activated warning system should be provided on all „Special Class‟ level

crossings in mid section as well as in the yard to warn road users as W/L boards

have been dispensed with at manned level crossings.

3. Railway Administration should have proper tie up with local nursing

homes/doctors to attend in case of emergencies, if they are being called.

4. Vacancies in category of drivers, assistant drivers and guards being running staff

should be filled up on priority.

1.08 DERAILMENT OF 3201 UP PATNA-LOKMANYA TILAK TERMINUS

EXPRESS BETWEEN CHANDANI AND ASIRGARH ROAD STATIONS OF

BHUSAVAL DIVISION OF CENTRAL RAILWAY ON 03.08.2004.

a) CAUSE – Due to failure of first thermit weld on the right side rail at km.513/15-13.

b) CASUALTIES – KILLED – NIL, GRIEVOUS-NIL, SIMPLE – 04 (Passengers).

c) COST - Rs.30.00 Lakhs.

d) CATEGORY - Failure of Railway Material and the Failure of the Railway Staff.

43

RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. Mere issuing of the instructions to the field units does not extinguish the

responsibility of HQ. HQ Track Cell should monitor/ensure that the instructions

issued by them are being followed in the field.

2. Officers, especially THODs, during their field visits should ensure that welding

of rails, USFD testing of welds, record keeping of welds, reporting of progress of

USFD testing by field units is being done properly as per extant RDSO/HQ

instructions.

3. Construction Organisation may issue policy guidelines to ensure involvement of

construction officers in welding and USFD testing of rails in their jurisdiction.

Some percentage of test checking and accountability may be stipulated at ADEN,

XEN, Dy.CE(C) level.

1.09 DASHING OF UNIDENTIFIED ROAD VEHICLE WITH TRAIN NO. 6507 UP

JODHPUR-BANGALORE EXPRESS AT UNMANNED LEVEL

CROSSING-209C BETWEEN BASNI-SALAWAS STATIONS OF JODHPUR

DIVISION OF NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY ON 26.08.2004.

a) CAUSE – Due to Infringement by unidentified road vehicle.

b) CASUALTIES – KILLED – NIL, GRIEVOUS-02 (Passengers),

SIMPLE – 01 (Passenger).

c) COST - Rs. NIL.


RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. The Railway should ensure preservation of clues in case of accidents.

2. The Railway should get all unmanned level crossings inspected and ensure that

only such cautionary boards as prescribed for unmanned level crossing are

provided on these level crossing.

3. Railway Board may consider the issue of creation of Gatekeepers posts for new

manned LCs and direct the Railway for timely creation of getekeeper‟s posts.

4. Railway Board may obtain status of implementation of their instruction on

provision of brake van equipment on passenger carrying trains from Zonal

Railways and may again direct Zonal Railways to ensure full implementation of

these instructions.

1.10 DERAILMENT OF 6338 UP ERNAKULAM – OKHA EXPRESS BETWEEN

DIWANKHAVATI – KARANJADI STATIONS OF RATNAGIRI DIVISION OF

KONKAN RAILWAY ON 25.09.2004.

a) CAUSE – Due to failure of East side slope of cutting, resulting in the obstruction on

track.

44

b) CASUALTIES – KILLED – NIL, GRIEVOUS- 02 (01 Passenger), (01 Rly. Crew),


c) COST - Rs.4,03,59,090/-

d) CATEGORY - Sudden Convulsion of Nature.

RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. Present tempo of safety works should be continued for atleast next three years to

restore the confidence of the passengers.

2. Inspite of noticing heavy rains SM/KFD did not impose SR in the block section.

He may be counselled.

3. The Railway Administration may consider eye testing, in case of Drivers aged

above 55 years, affected with Diabetes, every six months instead of every year.

4. The Guard did not move underailed coaches from the site of accident to DWV for

quite sometime. Even when the coaches were moved the brakes were not released

properly. He should be counselled.

5. The lapse in the Control office of not communicating the weather warning may

be examined by Dy.COM(S) and staff counselled.

6. Quicker restoration and to train the field staff to deal with such emergencies.

7. Field staff may be issued guidelines as considered necessary to avoid the undue

inconvenience to stranded passengers in future.

8. Railway Board to consider sanctioning additional funds as required vide MD‟s

letter No.KR/CO/MD/07/03, dated 01.07.2003.

9. For next monsoon a speed restriction of 60 kmph may be observed on all the

cuttings deeper than 20 metres. In addition monsoon patrolling may be ensured in

terms of Chapter X of IRPWM 1986.

1.11 BUMPING OF LOCOMOTIVE NO.22374 WAP-4 INTO COACH NO.EC 98272 A

IN MADHUPUR YARD OF ASANSOL DIVISION OF EASTERN RAILWAY ON

14.10.2004.

a) CAUSE – Negligence of a number of Railway Staff.

b) CASUALTIES – KILLED – NIL, GRIEVOUS- NIL,

SIMPLE – 03 ( 02 Passengers), (01 Rly. Crew)

c) COST - Rs.6,600/-


RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. The shunting of passenger trains should be supervised by responsible staff.

45

2. Eastern Railway to appoint a committee to conduct a work study to determine the

time required for shunting to train No.3231 Up and 3232 Dn at Madhupur and

then take remedial measures if required.

3. East Central Railway to appoint a committee to analyse the duty hours of loco

crew working 3231 Up/3232 Dn and 3111Up/3112 Dn express trains between

Danapur and Asansol and take remedial measures if necessary.

4. Railway to take immediate steps to fill up the vacancies among the Safety

category staff.

1.12 DASHING OF RAOD VEHICLE BY RATLAM-GANDHIDHAM DN GOODS

TRAIN AT MANNED LEVEL CROSSING BETWEEN CHANDLODIYA AND

AMBLI STATIONS OF AHMEDABAD DIVISION OF WESTERN RAILWAY

ON 04.11.2004.

a) CAUSE– Due to LC No.7 being kept unauthorisedly in open position.



c) COST - Rs.3,500/-


RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. Western Railway Administration should complete the action for changing normal

position of gates as Open to road traffic wherever prescribed conditions are satisfied

and TVUs are more than 25,000.

2. Western Railway should review progress of works of interlocking of LCs and ensure

completion of such works preferably within 2 years of sanction and definitely within

3 years of sanction.

3. Railway should identify, through joint inspections by P.Way and traffic officials,

those manned non-interlocked level crossings, where normal position of the gate is

“closed to road traffic” but due to high density of road traffic, gates are likely to be

opened without obtaining private number from Station Master.

Railway should arrange to counsel Station Masters of controlling stations of such

identified level crossings to arrange opening of these gates frequently for road traffic.

Section Controllers should also be made aware of the requirement of opening of such

level crossings.

4. Railway should take action to post three gatekeepers on special class LC No.6 at

Chandlodiya and other LCs where TVUs are more than 50,000.

5. Railway Board may consider including scooters and motorcycles in road traffic units

for level crossings situated in city areas and may decide weightage for such vehicles.

6. Railway should ensure that signaling plans should be altered only to the extent of the

work to be commissioned at that stage and no future work should be included in

signaling plan.

46

7. Railway should issue instructions that inter cabin slot once granted after exchange of

one set of private numbers should be got cancelled if not accepted and when it is

required to be obtained again, it should be taken afresh through another

communication and exchange of private numbers.

1.13 COLLISION BETWEEN UP DIESEL BPC SPECIAL GOODS TRAIN AND 106

DN LALGOLA-SEALDAH PASSENGER TRAIN IN BIRNAGAR YARD OF

SEALDAH DIVISION OF EASTERN RAILWAY ON 06.11.2004.

a) CAUSE – Due to passing of Up home signal at danger by the loco crew of Up Diesel

BPC Special Goods train.

b) CASUALTIES – KILLED – NIL, GRIEVOUS-NIL,


c) COST - Nil.


RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. On single line sections, sand humps be provided in replacement of derailing

switches/traps at both ends of the platform loops of all stations within a time

bound programme.

2. Till sand humps are provided the provision viz “during crossing of trains, both

the trains shall be brought to a halt at the home signals, and then admitted one by

one into the station, at two line stations not provided with sanded/snag dead end

isolation‟ should be strictly enforced in station working on single line sections.”

3. Doubling work of Ranaghat-Kalinaryanpur-Krishnanagar section to be expedited

and given priority for completion at the earliest.

4. TPWS should be implemented on a programmed basis.

5. Railway to develop a mechanism to ensure that stretchers are provided to the

brake van of all passenger trains.

6. goods Warning Boards had not been provided on Ranaghat-Krishnanagar section.

Railway should conduct a separate inquiry and fix responsibility for this lapse.

7. Proforma used by signal sighting committee to be amended by the Railway.

8. Eastern Railway should take separate action against the supervisors not

undergoing periodical vision test although they had been conducting foot-plate

inspection.

9. Station records were not seized properly. Railway to fix responsibility for the

lapse.

10. Pressure gauge had not been supplied to the Guard of goods train. Railway to

conduct separate inquiry into the lapse and fix responsibility.

47

11. Eastern Railway to issue joint Procedure Order for points to be checked and time

allowed during change of train crew.

12. All loco crews should be retrained in testing the brake power of their train

immediately after taking over the train and application of various types of brakes

in the loco.

1.14 ACCIDENT DUE TO HITTING OF TRAIN NO.6346 UP TRIVANDRUM

LOKAMANYA TILAK NETRAVATI EXPRESS AGAINST RE LADDER

TROLLEYS BETWEEN QUILON AND PERINAD STATIONS OF

TRIVANDRUM DIVISION OF SOUTHERN RAILWAY AT ABOUT 11.23 HRS

ON 08.11.2004.

a) CAUSE – Due to violation of rules with regard to obtaining and cancellation of line

block as well as for protection of the ladder trolleys by flagmen while

carrying out Railway Electrification works.


SIMPLE – NIL.

c) COST - Rs.4,000/-


RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. The rules for the obtaining and cancellation of line block for working of lorries in

case of ladder trolley work as stipulated in the G & SR should be scrupulously

followed with the use of proper printed forms. This aspect should be supervised

by the officers at random to see that the rules are being followed in letter and

spirit.

2. Similarly, the rules for protection of the work site by flagmen as per GR 15.27

should be strictly adhered to by the supervisors incharge of the work during a line

block. The flagmen should be supplied with the mandatory tools/signals to carry

out their work.

3. The competency certificates to the flagmen should be issued only on their being

judged fully competent and not merely as matter of routine.

4. No short cut methods like the use of Walkie-Talkie etc. should be used for

obtaining and clearing line block. Similarly, the cancellation of the line block can

be done only on the positive proof that the ladder trolley or lorry are removed

from the track.

5. Proper GDR written message giving the full details of the train accident

(including the approximate cost of damage, if possible) should be issued

immediately after the accident. This should also be insisted on by the controllers

who should not communicate the details about the accident without getting this

most important message.

48

1.15 DERAILMENT OF 1515 DOWN KATNI-CHOPAN PASSENGER BETWEEN

NIWAS ROAD AND SARAIGRAM STATIONS OF JABALPUR DIVISION OF

WEST CENTRAL RAILWAY ON 09.11.2004.

a) CAUSE – Due to rail breakage in the free rail track.


c) COST - Rs.52,16,000/-

d) CATEGORY - Failure of Railway Material.

RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. On track lengths having 90 R free rails on Katni-Singrauli section, a speed

restriction of 30 Kmph may be imposed for all trains.

2. Institutions of Safety Counsellor, Track Quality Cell and THODs should be

objectively monitored through their inspection reports, periodic discussion and

guidance by PCE.

3. As per Accident Manual, DRM is the field incharge for efficient restoration of

traffic. On reaching site, he should prepare the action plan and monitor on hourly

basis so as to expedite the restoration.

4. Issue of policy instructions for procedures in case of CTR works for particular

sites.

5. A Technical Supervisor should be employed at P. Way track work sites by the

contractor.

6. Instructions regarding sleeper spacing at shoulders of the rail joints may be

reiterated.

7. In weak track section with old rails, routine maintenance works should be

specially monitored and additional precautions be taken to avoid accidents.

8. P. Way contractors should be prequalified or approved list may be prepared in the

Division.

9. WC Administration should ensure posting of ADENs with P. Way background in

sections having weak track structure.

10. SAG officers who have been away from track works and have not undergone any

Advance Course at IRICEN may be deputed for Advance P. Way Course at

IRICEN so that they can contribute in the field objectively.

11. Necessary instructions may be issued to avoid over loading of wagons in KTE-

SGRL section.

12. Checking of completion of field records.

13. Safety Counsellor (Engg) should be counselled for visiting the track work sites.

49

14. XEN(R)/JBP, former ADEN/BEHR and THOD/JBP may be counselled.

1.16 HEAD ON COLLISION OF 9112 JAMMU TAWI-AHMEDABAD EXPRESS

WITH 1 JMP (DMU) PASSENGER TRAIN BETWEEN MIRTHAL AND

BHANGALA STATIONS OF FIROZPUR DIVISION IN NORTHERN RAILWAY

ON 14.12.2004 AT ABOUT 1153 HRS.

a) CAUSE – The two Station Masters did not follow proper procedure of exchange of

messages on VHF sets, when other modes of cummunication between

Mirthal and Bhangala stations were out of order and dispatched the two

trains in the same block section towards each other on paper line clear

tickets.

b) CASUALTIES – KILLED – 35 (Passengers), 03 (Railway crew)

GRIEVOUS-21 (20 Passengers), (01 Railway crew),


c) COST - Rs.2,18,25,000/-


RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. The use of 25 W VHF sets installed at stations, tuned to the same frequency as

that of 5W Walkie-Talkie sets given to the drivers/guards, should be stopped

forthwith for line clear working during PLC.

2. Only those VHF sets which have two frequencies and can be tuned to the

frequency other than the normal frequency of 5W Walkie-Talkie sets may be

used for line clear working on PLC ensuring that the VHF sets have been tuned to

such other frequency and the system of repeating the train numbers with their

description and private numbers of previous three trains passed over the block

section is followed. Alternatively a system of exchange of Identification

Number/Code supported by Private no. similar to what has been provided in SR

06.02.03 of South Eastern Railway may be adopted with such VHF sets. Suitable

amendment to relevant paragraphs of Northern Railway Block Working Manual

should also be carried out accordingly.

3. While introducing PLC working in a block section, a speed restriction of 30

kmph should be introduced till normal working is restored. Also PLC working

may be included in the list of circumstances leading to issue of caution order,

given in Appendix „A‟ Para II of Northern Railway‟s General and Subsidiary

Rules-2000.

4. Northern Railway should retain Parts „E‟ & „F‟ pertaining to cancellation of line

clear message in the new forms of Line Clear Enquiry message (Outward) and

(Inward) books. The old forms of Line Clear Enquiry and Reply books as well as

Paper Line Clear Ticket given in Appendix „A‟ to Northern Railway Block

Working Manual, 1983 should be replaced with new ones and the Manual

amended accordingly.

50

5. Suitable machinery should be evolved to cut down the delays in filling up the

vacant posts of ASMs/SMs, running staff and other safety categories and

anticipated vacancies of future 03 years may be taken into account while placing

indents on Railway Recruitment Boards.

6. Railway Board may like to check with the Zonal Railways whether digital voice

recorders, as per RDSO‟s specifications have been provided in all control offices

and whether test rooms have also been connected with the same.

7. Railway Board may please ensure that the provisions of its Joint Procedure Order

no.1/Sig./2004 dated 16.12.2004 are implemented in letter and spirit in the field

and the cable route plans are prepared for all underground cables. Cable route

markers should also be provided on the ground along the alignment of the cable

at every 200m and at every change of alignment/direction.

1.17 DASHING OF ROAD TRACTOR WITH 002 UP WAGHAI-BILLIMORA MIXED

PASSENGER TRAIN AT UNMANNED LEVEL CROSSING BETWEEN

RANKUWA & CHIKHLI STATIONS OF MUMBAI DIVISION OF WESTERN

RAILWAY ON 20.01.2005.

a) CAUSE – Due to negligent driving by tractor driver.

b) CASUALTIES – KILLED – 01 (Outsider), GRIEVOUS-01 (Passenger),

SIMPLE –01(Passenger).

c) COST - Rs.700/-


RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. Stop boards on unmanned LCs should be relocated to 5 M from Centre of nearest

track and on the side of the road.

2. Cautionary boards prescribed by Motor Vehicle Act, should be got installed by

pursuing this matter with road authorities on all unmanned level crossings.

3. Stop and proceed instructions for trains should be implemented for LC No.22 and

LC No.23 in Bilimora-Waghai section.

4. Railway should provide satellite phone to the Guard of trains worked in

Bilimora-Waghai section.

5. Railway should take action as per para 1005 (a) of Indian Railways Works

Manual, 2000 to ensure protection of train running in the section against any

possibility of accident due to blasting of stone by quarries.

6. Railway should issue instructions to the effect that message of „No injury to

persons/passengers‟ should be conveyed only after ascertaining the same with

reliability.

7. Western Railway Administration should report all Section 113 accidents to the

Commission of Railway Safety.

51

1.18 DERAILMENT OF 5621 UP GUWAHATI-NEW DELHI NORTH-EAST

EXPRESS TRAIN BETWEEN TILRATH AND BARAUNI STATIONS OF

SONPUR DIVISION OF EAST CENTRAL RAILWAY ON 24.01.2005.

a) CAUSE – Due to defects in coach and track.


c) COST - Rs.1.29 Crores.


RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. Loco No.17958 WDM 3A hauling train No.5621 Up was running overdue

schedule M4 since 05.09.2004. East Central Railway to fix responsibility for this

lapse and ensure that such lapses do not occur in future.

2. Sonpur Division has 33 stations where 3 aspects have been provided in the starter

signal from loop line or in other words starter signal shows green when a train

leaves from loop line. This fundamental defect in signaling system should be

corrected over East Central system by 31.12.2005.

3. Action against Shri Ram Naresh Mahto, Section Engineer/Signal and Shri Nand

Kishore Singh, Junior Engineer/Permanent way be taken for not getting their

eyesight tested periodically.

1.19 UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE OF A ROAD TRUCK INFRINGING AND

GRAZING WITH THE SIDES OF THE COACHES OF 1553 DOWN

PASSENGER TRAIN BETWEEN HADAPSAR AND LONI STATIONS OF PUNE

DIVISION OF CENTRAL RAILWAY ON 01.03.2005.

a) CAUSE – Due to infringement of track by road truck.

b) CASUALTIES – KILLED – NIL., GRIEVOUS – 03 (Passengers),

SIMPLE – 10 (Passengers, 05 of them Trivial injuries).

c) COST - Rs.NIL.

d) CATEGORY - Failure of Persons other than Railway Staff–„Failure of Truck

Driver‟.

RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. Pune Division should conduct more drills for disaster management to improve the

responsiveness of various railway officials.

2. In the present case ARME reached LNE station 50 min later than reasonably

possible. Corrective action to be taken.

3. The P & T phone was not working at LNE station for last 10 days. Due to this

local doctors could not be informed by P&T phone. A proper system to be

established to keep the P&T phones at stations working properly.

52

4. The accident message to Commercial Branch officers was very late. Thereafter

the responsiveness of Commercial officers was unsatisfactory. Suitable

guidelines to be issued and included in the Disaster Management Plan.

5. Division should prepare a detailed Disaster Management Plan as done by

Mumbai Divisions of Central and Western Railway.

* * * * *

APPENDIX-V

LIST OF NEW RAILWAY LINES AUTHORISED FOR PASSENGER TRAFFIC 2004-05

NEW LINES

S.No. Date of

Authorisation Sanction Operated Railway Km.

1. 08.04.2004 New Katni Jn.-Katni Murwara Jn. West Central 1.600

2. 19.04.2004 Talvadiya-Khirkiya West Central 57.198

3. 21.04.2004& 22.04.2004

Gazole-Balurghat Northeast Frontier

73.263

4. 23.04.2004 Jammu Tawi-Bajalta-Udhampur Northern 54.850

5. 08.06.2004 Una-Himachal-Churaru-Takarala Northern 16.288

6. 11.06.2004 Bhestan-Udhana Western 3.267

7. 09.09.2004 Pattabiram-Tiruvallur Southern 13.745

8. 19.10.2004 Thane-Vashi Central 18.501

9. 11.11.2004 Kakinada Town-Kotipalli South Central 45.200

10. 18.11.2004 Mahendra Lal Nagar-Amta South Eastern 11.747

11. 14.12.2004 Vishwa Vidyalaya-Kashmere Gate DMRC 4.06

12. 22.12.2004 Kanthi-Digha South Eastern 32.414

13. 28.03.2005 Panvel-Karjat Central 28.150

Total 360.283

53

DOUBLING

S.No. Date of


1. 06.04.2004 Kesinga-Rupra East Coast 16.17

2. 22/23.04.2004 Ferok-Calicut Southern 8.843

3. 27.05.2004 Vasai Road-Virar Western 10.200

4. 09.06.2004 Jarwal Road-Ghaghraghat North Eastern 4.190

5. 24.06.2004 Ahmedpur-Kopai Eastern 8.770

6. 03.09.2004 Raghunathpur-Paradeep East Coast 51.385

7. 08.09.2004 Majerhat-New Alipore Eastern 1.83

8. 17.09.2004 Chandari-Kanpur Central North Central 3.640

9. 24.09.2004 Garva Road-Kusumunda South East Central

2.258

10. 25/26.09.2004 Cannanore-Valapattanam Southern 5.494

11. 30.09.2004 Rupra Road-Norla Road East Coast 7.313

12. 02.11.2004 Domingarh-Gorakhpur North Eastern 4.100

13. 04.11.2004 Kuppam-Bisanattam Southern 12.33

14. 23/24.11.2004 Tanur-Kadalundi Southern 17.833

15. 01.12.2004 Renigunta-Tirupati South Central 9.79

16. 01.12.2004 Birupa Block Cabin-Kendrapara East Coast 2.654

17. 04/05.12.2004 Bellary Jn. – Kulatini South Western 16.395

18. 14.12.2004 Vishwa Vidyalya-Kashmere Gate DMRC 4.06

19. 28.12.2004 Sheoraphuli-Diara Eastern 5.44

20. 25.01.2005 Jaugram-Gurap Eastern 7.03

21. 11.02.2005 Dadhapara – Dagori South East Central

15.099

22. 14.02.2005 Chowkaghat-Burhwal North Eastern 6.382

23. 15.02.2005 Moradabad-Amroha Northern 31.10

24. 15.03.2005 Panskura East-Raghunathnari South Eastern 5.645

25. 22.03.2005 Sainthia-Ahmadpur Eastern 13.13

Total 271.081

54

GAUGE CONVERSION

S.No. Date of


1. 02.04.2004 Jasai-Munabhaw North Western 100.280

2. 21.05.2004 Bandikui-Bharatpur North Central 97.00

3. 17.06.2004 Samuktala Road-Jorai Northeast Frontier 18.00

4. 20.07.2004 Junagarh-Veraval Western 81.720

5. 13/14/15.07.04 Raja Palayam-Tenkasi Southern 69.304

6. 28.07.2004 Kudatini-Toranagallu South Western 11.297

7. 24.09.2004 Rajula Jn. – Mahuwa Western 30.650

8. 02.10.2004 Kinwat – Adilabad South Central 45.18

9. 02.12.2004 Viramgam – Mahesana Western 64.800

10. 27/28/29.10.04 Madras Egmore-Tambaram Southern 51.100

11. 03.02.2005 Jorai-Gosaigaonhat Northeast Frontier 18.00

12. 06.02.2005 Nizamabad-Manoharabad South Central 119.50

13. 31.03.2005 Dhasa – Rajula Western 103.439

Total 810.270

DIVERSION

S.No. Date of


1. 27.04.2004 Nerul – Belapur Central 1.702

2. 21.05.2004 Vasai Road – Virar Western 4.750

3. 30.072004 Palla Road – Saktigarh Eastern 1.701

4. 27.08.2004 Krishna – Vijayawada South Central 3.625

5. 01.10.2004 Palsit – Saktigarh Eastern 3.758

Total 15.536

55

ELECTRIFICATION

S.No. Date of


1. 21.05.2004 Vasai Road -Virar. Western 10.200

2. 11.06.2004 Bhestan-Udhana Western 3.267

3. 02.07.2004 Kanchipuram-Takkolan Southern 21.895

4. 30.07.2004 Palla Road-Shaktigarh Eastern 1.701

5. 08.09.2004 Majerhat-New Alipore Eastern 1.830

6. 17.09.2004 Chandari-Kanpur Central North Central 3.640

7. 24.09.2004 Garva Road-Kusumunda South East Central

2.258

8. 01.10.2004 Palsit-Saktigarh Eastern 3.758

9. 19.10.2004 Thane-Vashi Central 18.501

10. 22.09.2004 Renigunta-Nandalur South Central 132.740

11. 27 to29.10.04 Madras Egmore-Tambaram Southern 51.100

12. 02.11.2004 Balasore-Bhadrak East Coast 61.29

13. 04.11.2004 Kuppan – Bisanattam South Western 12.33

14. 18.11.2004 Mahendralal Nagar – Amta South Eastern 11.747

15. 14.12.2004 Vishwa Vidyalaya– Kashmere Gate DMRC 9.72

16. 22.12.2004 Kanthi – Digha South Eastern 32.414

17. 28.12.2004 Sheoraphuli – Diara Eastern 5.44

18. 31.12.2004 Khurda Road – Puri East Coast 50.16

19. 25.01.2005 Jaugram – Gurap Eastern 7.03

20. 11.02.2005 Dadhapara-Dagori South East Central

15.099

21. 15.03.2005 Panskura East-Raghunathbari South Eastern 5.645

22. 28.03.2005 Panvel – Karjat Central 28.15

Total 489.915

***********

56

APPENDIX-VI

ACTIVITIES IN REGARD TO DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION 1.0 Delhi Metro Rail (Operation & Maintenance) Act 2002 was enacted by the

Parliament and was published in the Gazette of India vide Notificaion No.72 dated 18.12.2002.

1.1 Delhi Metro Rail (Operation & Maintenance) Act 2002 vide its Section 7, provides that the Central Government may appoint one or more Commissioners of Metro Railway Safety. The duties and functions of the Commissioner of Metro Railway Safety are given in various section of this Act, which mainly pertain to the opening of the new Metro Railway, use of new type of rolling stock, sanction of new minor works on already opened Metro railway, investigation of accidents etc. These are very similar to the provisions in Railways Act, 1989 for Commissioner of Railway Safety.

1.2 Section 12 of the Delhi Metro(Operation & Maintenance) Act also provide for

preparation of Annual Report by the Commissioner for each financial year giving a full account of his activities during the previous financial year and forwarding the same to Central government who shall cause the Annual Report of the Commissioner to be laid, after its receipt, before each House of Parliament under Section 13 of the Act.

1.3 Ministry of Civil Aviation's letter no. A.11013/1/02-RS dated 13.12.2002 that

Shri G. P. Garg, the then Commissioner of Railway Safety(CRS), Northern Circle will also act as Commissioner of Metro railway Safety(CMRS) for Delhi Metro. In view of the above, the report of CRS while functioning as CMRS is included, as part of the Annual Report of Commission of Railway Safety.

INTRODUCTION – 2.0 A Technical Economic Study was carried out by M/s RITES in the year 1990,

at the instance of Delhi Govt. and in pursuance of the Cabinet decision a Detailed Project Report (DPR) was completed by them during the year 1995. In their feasibility report of 1990, M/s RITES had recommended Integrated Multi Model Mass Rapid Transport System( IMMRTS) for Delhi comprising of three components viz. Rail Corridors (Surface/Elevated), Metro Corridors (Underground) and dedicated bus way, for a total network of 184.5 kms. The network was later proposed to be extended to connect Vasant Kunj, an additional length of 14 kms, increasing the length of total network to 198.5 kms. The study recommended implementation of network in 16 sections, in a sequence based on traffic density. The recommended first phase project of 67.5 km comprised of 02 Metro Corridors, 02 Rail Corridors and a Bus Way.

2.1 At the DPR stage in 1995, M/s RITES made certain changes in the first phase

network including the change of Bus Way to Metro Corridor. The first phase network was further modified on the advice of Ministry of Urban Affairs &

57

Employment and Govt. of National capital Territory of Delhi, and it was reduced to a length of 55.3 kms due to various constraints.

2.2 The Govt. of India gave its approval for taking up the Phase-I of Delhi MRTS project in Sept. 1996 as under:

(i) Metro Corridor

Vishwavidyalaya - Central Secretariat 11.0 kms (ii) Surface Corridor (Partly elevated/partly on the ground)

(a) Shahdara to Nangloi 25.0 kms (b) Subzi Mandi to Holambi Kalan 19.3 kms Total 55.3 kms

2.3 The sections in Phase-I of the project underwent further reviews and the latest

Phase-I, approved by the Union Cabinet, comprises of the following three lines: -

Line No. Section Length (Kms)

No. of Stations

Line No. 1 Shahdara – Inderlok – Rithala 22.00 18

Line No. 2 Vishwavidyalaya – Central Sectt. 11.00 10

Line No. 3 Indra Prastha - Barakhamba Road – Connaught Place – Dwarka

25.60 25

Extension of Line-3 into Dwarka Sub-city* 6.50 06

Total 65.10 59

* This section is being funded by DDA as Deposit work. 2.4 The main objective of long overdue Delhi MRTS project is to provide a non-

polluting, efficient, safe and affordable rail based Mass Rapid Transit System for Delhi, duly integrated with other modes of transport. The expected ridership in the year 2005, when Phase-I is targeted to be completed, is 2.2 million commuter trips per day, thus taking away equal number of trips from the roads of Delhi. As per DMRC's official Souvenir Book released on 24 th

December 2002, the first phase when completed will translate into: -

(i) siphoning off 2,600 buses from Delhi roads. (ii) Increase in average speed of buses from present 10.50 kmph to 14

kmph.

58

(iii) Reduction in road accidents, thus protecting human life and financial saving of rupees 800 millions.

(iv) Substantial reduction in vehicle generated atmospheric pollution, (v) Saving of fuel worth Rs. 3.80 billions each year.

(vi) More comfortable and safe travel for commuters and improvement in

overall quality of life.

(vii) 50 to 75 % reduction in journey time and thus saving of approximate Rs 6.0 billions per year and 2.0 millions man hours per day in term of passenger traveling time.

(viii) A net socio-economic benefit of Rs. 43.7 millions per day for the city.

2.5 Construction work of Delhi Metro Railway project commenced on 1st October, 1998

and Commissioner of Metro Railway Safety gave his authorization from the first segment of line no.1 of Phase 1 from Shahdara to Tis Hazari for opening the section for passenger traffic on 18.12.2002.

2.6 The total route kilometers of Delhi Metro Rail as on 31.03.2005 is 26.116

km as detailed below: -

Line No. Section Route Kms No. of Stations

Line No. 1 Shahdara-Rithala 22.056 18

Line No. 2 Vishwavidyalaya-Kashmere Gate (Metro Corridor)

4.060 04

Total 26.116 22

3.0 ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMISSION - Activities of the Commission in regard to Delhi Metro Railway during the year

2004-05 have been as under: - 3.1 Statutory inspection and authorization for carriage of passenger service.

Phase-I New Double Line

Line Date of authorization

Section opened Route Km. No. of Stations

Line No.2 14.12.2004 Vishwavidyalaya to Kashmere Gate (Metro Corridor)

4.06 04

The above route was also electrified and the total length electrified was 9.72 kms.

3.2 Periodical inspections-

Following periodical inspections were carried and necessary directions issued to the Managing Director, Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, New Delhi.

59

Rithala to Shahadra 22 Kms. Inspection from the cab of a train.

3.3 Sanction to Rolling Stocks –

Sanction given to Rolling Stock already running on the Metro Railway - Nil Sanction given to New Rolling Stock of a design or type different From that already running on any section of Metro Railway - 02 nos.

3.4 Accidents –

There have been no accidents involving train carrying passengers on the Delhi Metro Railway. The total number of million train kilometers were 2.18.

(BHUPENDER SINGH) Commissioner of Railway Safety Delhi Metro & Commissioner of Railway Safety, Northern Circle,

New Delhi

*******

60

APPENDIX-V

LIST OF NEW RAILWAY LINES AUTHORISED FOR PASSENGER TRAFFIC 2005-06

A-NEW LINES

S.No.

Date of Authorisation

Sanction Operated Railways Km

1. 04.04.2005 Chandigarh-Morinda Jn. Northern 43.892

2. 17.06.2005 Patna Sahib-Patna Ghat Eeast Central

1.000

3. 08.06.2005 Kashmere gate-Central Secretariate (under Ground)

DMRC 6.621

4. 15 9.12.2005 Kadwip-Namkhana Eastern 13.153

5. 23.12.2005 Barakhamba Road-Dwarka DMRC 22.936

6. 26.12.2005 Omalur-Metur Dan Southern 28.930

7. 15.01.2006 Barahat-Banka Eastern 15.528

8. 18.01.2006 Princepaght-Majerhat Eastern 5.750

9. 20.01.2006 Shravanabelagla-Hassan South Western

41.170

10. 24.03.2006 Dwarka-Sec-9 DMRC 6.474

TOTAL 185.454

B _ DOUBLING

S.No Date of Authorisation

Sanction Operated Railway Km.

1. 22.04.2005 Barauni-Tilrath East Central 8.140

2. 08.06.2005 Kashmere Gate-Central Secretariat (Underground)

DMRC 13.242

3. 15.06.2005 Sonarpur-Champahati Eastern 7.900

4. 02.07.2005 Mansi-Mahesh Khunt East Central 10.500

61

5. 05.07.2005 Harischandrepur-Bhaluka Road Northeast Frontier

10.060

6. 12.07.2005 Masagram-Jangram Eastern 7.092

7. 19.07.2005 Tanur-Tirunnavaya Southern 16.487

8. 26.08.2005 Palla Roar-Masagram Eastern 5.973

9 28.09.2005 Tirunnavaya-Kuttipuram Southern 6.748

10. 06.10.2005 Cuttack-Raghunathpur East Coast 31.553

11. 10.10.2005 Jalandhar-Pathankot Northern 17.627

12. 25.11.2005 Naini-Link Jn. North Central 0.815

13. 07.12.2005 Bharoli-Madhopur Punjab Northern 12.264

14. 23.12.2005 Darakhamba road-Dwarka DMRC 45.872

15. 02.01.2006 Raghunathbari-Rajgoda South Eastern 7.983

16. 09.01.2006 Bhaluka Road-Kumarganj Northeast Frontier

19.577

17. 15.01.2006 Chitpur-Dum Dum Eastern 2.784

18. 24.03.2006 Kuttipuram-Pallipuram Southern 7.175

19. 24.03.2006 Dwarka-Dwarka Sec. 9 DMRC 12.948

20. 28.03.2006 Balapalle-Pullampet South Central 41.047

21. 31.03.2006 Mansi-Khagaria East Central 8.740

TOTAL 294.527

C – GAUGE CONVERSION

S.No Date of Authorisation


1. 11.04.2005 Madurai Jn.-Manamadurai Southern 47.973

2. 24.04.2005 Gosaigaonhat-Fakiragram Northeast Frontier

23.000

3. 30.04.2005 Ranchi-Lohardaga South Eastern 57.233

4. 04.05.2005 Agra-Bhartpur

Idgah-Agra Fort Agra-Bandihui

North Central 51.590 1.390

5. 09.05.2005 Sihor Jn-Palitana Western 27.520

6. 26.05.2005 Subramanya Road-

Kabakapputtur South

Western 42.290

62

7. 10.06.2005 Mansi-Saharsa East Centra; 42.45

8. 27.06.2005 Berach Jn Cabin-Udaipur City North Western 112.012

9. 05.09.2005 Rupra-Baripada South Eastern 51.617

10. 12.09.2005 Bankura-Sonamukhi South Eastern 40.985

11. 20.09.2005 Salakati-Fakiragram Northeast Frontier

19.000

12. 23.09.2005 Guntakal Jn-Hagari South Central 34.932

13. 18.11.2005 Salakati-New Bongaigaon Northeast Frontier

19.000

14. 16.12.2005 Kasara-Igatpuri Central 19.550

15. 20.12.2005 Munabao-Indo Pak Border North Western 1.600

16. 16.01.2006 Siwan-Thawe North eastern 28.171

17. 20.01.2006 Barsoi Jn-Radhikapore Sec. Northeast Frontier

54.420

18. 25.01.2006 Harari-Bellary South Central 14.550

19. 07.03.2006 Bolarum-Secunderabad South Central 13.780

20. 31.03.2006 Mansi-Khagaria East Central 8.740

TOTAL 721.803

D - DIVERSION

S.No.



1. 05.10/08.10. 2005

Thalangai-WalajahRoad Southern 4.300

2. 05.10/08.10 2005

Thalangai-Walajah Road Southern 5.300

TOTAL 9.600

63

E- ELECTRIFICATION

S.No.



1. 04.05.2005 Ernakulam-Kayankulam Southern 124.000

2. 05.05.2005 Ernakulam-Kottayam Southern 69.542

3. 08.06.2005 Kashmere Gate-Central

Secretariate (underground) DMRC 13.242

4. 15.06.2005 Sonarpur-Champahati Eastern 7.900

5. 12.07.2005 Masagram-Jaugram Eastern 7.092

6. 26.08.2005 Palla Road-Masagram Eastern 5.973

7. 05.10/08.10 2005


8. 05.10/08.10 2005


9. 29.11.2005 Bhadrak-Barang East Coast 156.000

10. 09.12.2005 Kakdwip-Namkhana Eastern 13.153

11. 23.12.2005 Barakhamba Road-Dwarka DMRC 45.872

12. 02.01.2006 Raghunathbari-Rajgoda South Eastern 7.983

13. 15.01.2006 Chitpur-Dum Dum Eastern 2.784

14. 18.01.2006 Princepghat-Majerhat Eastern 5.750

15. 22.03.2006 Saharanpur-Laksar Northern 63.068

16 24.03.2006 Dwarka-Dwarka Sec-9 DMRC 12.948

17. 30.03.2006 Kottyam-Kayankulam Southern 53.788

TOTAL 598.695

Documents

MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATION - Commission of Railway · PDF filethe Ministry of Civil Aviation of the Government of India, deals with matters pertaining ... 114 of the Railways Act 1989