Miller v Board of Supervisors - Motion to Dismiss Denied

8/9/2019 Miller v Board of Supervisors - Motion to Dismiss Denied

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IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR LINN COUNTY

Joel Miller, Linn County Auditor, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. EQCV068249

vs. )

) RULING

Board of Supervisors of Linn County, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

_____________________________________

Joel Miller, Linn County Auditor, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. EQCV068235

vs. )

) RULING

Board of Supervisors of Linn County, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

Hearing was held on May 14, 2010, on Defendants Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss, filed

in EQCV068249. The claims stated in EQCV068235 also are relevant to the Motion to Dismiss.Appearances were made by Plaintiff, personally, along with his counsel, Attorney Peter Riley.

Assistant Linn County Attorney Susan Nehring appeared on behalf of Defendants. Having

considered the file, relevant case law, and written and oral arguments of counsel, the Courthereby enters the following ruling:

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Joel Miller, Linn County Auditor, filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in LinnCounty Case Number EQCV068249 on February 17, 2010. Plaintiff has named the following

Defendants: Linn County Board of Supervisors; Lu Barron; Linda Langston; Ben Rogers; BrentOleson; and James Houser. The individually named Defendants are members of the LinnCounty Board of Supervisors.

Plaintiff states that on December 14, 2009, he removed one of four authorized deputyauditors. Plaintiff claims to have acted under the auspices of Iowa Code 331.503(2). Plaintiffappointed Karen Heiderscheit to the open position on January 18, 2010. Plaintiff contends the

purpose of the removal and appointment was to fill one of the deputy positions with anindividual who is qualified to conduct audits of county expenditures because Plaintiff believes it

is appropriate in his duty to oversee the stewardship of public funds that a process of routine andrandom audits of county expenditures be conducted. Plaintiff alleges that, contrary to its duty,

the Board refused to approve the appointment of Ms. Heiderscheit as deputy. Plaintiff then

FILED05/18/201012:42PMCLERKDISTRICTCOURTLINNCOUNTYIOWA


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appointed Ms. Heiderscheit as a temporary deputy, and filed a bill for services with the Board onFebruary 3, 2010. The Board allegedly refused to pay for the services, and on January 25, 2010,

the Board voted to reduce the number of deputy auditors from four to three. Plaintiff asserts that

the reduction in the number of deputy auditors was not a proper exercise of the Boards power,

and was done for the purpose of preventing Plaintiff from appointing a deputy or compensating a

temporary deputy, and was an unlawful attempt to interfere with the statutory powers of Plaintiffto appoint deputies.

For the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Plaintiff argues the Board has acted illegally in (a)failing to approve the appointment of Karen Heiderscheit to the position of deputy auditor; (b)

refusing to approve the bill of services for Karen Heiderscheit as a temporary deputy; and (c)taking action to reduce the number of deputy auditors from four to three for the purpose of

interfering with Plaintiffs power to appoint deputies and compensate temporary deputies.

Plaintiff requests the Court issue a writ of certiorari, requiring the Board to certify to theCourt its records of proceedings in connection with the submission by Plaintiff of Ms.

Heiderscheit as deputy auditor; submission of the bill of services; and reduction of the number ofdeputy auditors from four to three. Plaintiff further requests a trial following submission of the

records of proceedings.

Defendants filed the pending Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ ofCertiorari on March 17, 2010. Defendants argue that there is no statutory authority for a writ of

certiorari review for the type of actions alleged in the Petition, and the Petition does notchallenge an action or inaction that could reasonably be considered to be a judicial function or

even a quasi-judicial function of the Board. Defendants further argue that the actions orinactions complained of by Plaintiff concern the Boards exercise of statutory powers, and could

not be construed to constitute a review of a judicial function of the Board. Defendants contendthe action should be dismissed for failure to present a claim for issuing a writ of certiorari.

Plaintiff resists, and also has filed a Motion to Consolidate. Plaintiff states that a separate

mandamus action has been filed (EQCV068235), and the mandamus action and this certiorariaction should be considered jointly. Plaintiff argues that the Board made its decisions regarding

the deputy auditor position based on Linn Countys determination that its home rule powers givethe Board the exclusive right to conduct internal auditing functions. Plaintiff contends that it is

unclear whether certiorari may be an appropriate remedy for some portion of the relief sought byPlaintiff, and it would be inappropriate to dismiss the certiorari action at this time. The Motion

to Consolidate also has been filed in EQCV068235, although it does not appear that an order hasbeen entered with respect to either Motion to Consolidate.

Defendants reply that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari does not state a claim upon which

relief could be granted because the only action taken by the Board was to reduce the number ofdeputy auditors from four to three, a power that is designated to the Board. Defendants argue

that because Plaintiff has alleged, in the mandamus action, that the Court should compel

mandamus because the deputy auditor issue is an area in which the Board has no discretion, it is

clear that Plaintiff cannot now claim that the board was acting in a judicial capacity in denyingthe claim. Defendants contend the Court can fully consider the merits of Plaintiffs claim in the


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mandamus action. Defendants state they do not object to consolidation of the cases if the Courtdenies the Motion to Dismiss.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Standards Applied to Motions to Dismiss

An order granting a motion to dismiss will be upheld only if the petition, on its face,

fails to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted under any circumstances.Raas v. State, 729 N.W.2d 444, 446 (Iowa 2007). On a motion to dismiss, the petition should

be construed in the light most favorable to theplaintiff, with all doubt resolved in the plaintiffsfavor. Id.

A Motion to Dismiss pleading for failure to state a cause of action is sustainable onlywhen it appears to a certainty the pleader has failed to state a claim upon which any relief may be

granted under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim asserted. Murphyv. First National Bank of Chicago, 228 N.W.2d 372 (Iowa 1975).

A Motion to Dismiss admits well pleaded facts in a petition and waives any ambiguity or

uncertainty. Tate v. Derifield, 510 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1994).

The petition, however, must contain factual allegations that give defendant fair noticeof the claim asserted so that defendant can adequately respond to the petition. Rees v. City of

Shenandoah, 682 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Iowa 2004). A petition complies with the fair noticerequirement if it informs the defendant of the incident giving rise to the claim and of the claims

general nature. Id. We view the plaintiffs allegation in the light most favorable to theplaintiff with doubts resolved in that partys favor. Id. In Cutler v. Klass, Whicher, &

Mishne, 473 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1991), we expressed the pitfalls in filing a motion to dismiss and

stated:

We recognize the temptation is strong for a defendant to strike a vulnerablepetition at the earliest opportunity. Experience has however taught us that vast

judicial resources could be saved with the exercise of more professional patience.Under the foregoing rules dismissals of many of the weakest cases must be

reversed on appeal. Two appeals often result where one would have sufficed hadthe defense moved by way of summary judgment, or even by way of defense at

trial. From a defendants standpoint, moreover, it is far from unknown for theflimsiest of cases to gain strength when its dismissal is reversed on appeal.

Id. (citing Cutler, 473 N.W.2d at 181).

Writ of Certiorari Standards

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1401 provides:

A writ of certiorari shall only be granted when specifically authorized by statute;

or where an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, isalleged to have exceeded proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.


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I.R.Civ.P. 1.1401 (2010).

Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy. Wallace v. Des Moines Independent Comm.

Sch. Dist., 754 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Iowa 2008) (citingHohl v. Bd. of Educ., 94 N.W.2d 787, 791

(1959)). It is the method for bringing the record of an inferior tribunal before the court for thepurpose of ascertaining whether the inferior tribunal or body had jurisdiction and whether its

proceedings were authorized. Id. (citingHohl, 94 N.W.2d at 791).

Illegality exists when the court's factual findings lack substantial evidentiary support, or

when the court has not properly applied the law. Christensen v. Iowa District Court for PolkCounty, 578 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1998).

Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind could accept it as adequate to reach thesame findings. City of Cedar Rapids v. Municipal Fire and Police Retirement System of Iowa,

526 N.W.2d 284, 287 (Iowa 1995) (citingNorland v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 412 N.W.2d 904,913 (Iowa 1987)). Evidence is still substantial even though it would have supported contrary

inferences. Id.

With respect to judicial functions, the Iowa Supreme Court has held:

We do not construe judicial functions in a strict or technical sense.Hoefer v. Sioux CityCmty. Sch. Dist., 375 N.W.2d 222, 224 (Iowa 1985). Therefore, the action of the Board

need only be quasi-judicial to support a certiorari proceeding.Id. We consider threefactors to determine whether an action is judicial or quasi-judicial in nature: (1) whether

the questioned act involves a proceeding in which notice and an opportunity to be heardare required ; (2) whether a determination of rights of parties is made which requires

the exercise of discretion in finding facts and applying the law thereto ; or (3) whether

the challenged act goes to the determination of some right the protection of which is thepeculiar office of the courts. Id. at 224-25 (quotingBuechele v. Ray, 219 N.W.2d 679,681 (Iowa 1974)). [Q]uasi ordinarily means superficially resembling but intrinsically

different. Therefore, when an activity appears to be judicial in nature, but in reality is not,it is termed quasi-judicial. Id. at 225 (quotingBuechele, 219 N.W.2d at 681). However,

the mere exercise of judgment or discretion is not alone sufficient to characterize anact as quasi-judicial. Id. (quotingBuechele, 219 N.W.2d at 681).

Wallace v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. Bd. of Directors, 754 N.W.2d 854,858 (Iowa 2008).

The Court finds the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is sufficient to meet notice pleadingstandards, and when the allegations of the Petition are viewed in the light most favorable toPlaintiff, the Court cannot say with certainty that there is no set of facts under which Plaintiff

might be entitled to certiorari relief with respect to the claim stated against Defendants. Nodiscovery has taken place, and Defendants have not produced the documents that may comprise

the certiorari record. The Court finds that exploration of Defendants actions and developmentof the record of proceedings below will be necessary to determine whether Defendants exercised

judicial functions, and whether a certiorari action is appropriate. Therefore, the Court finds the


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Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss should be denied. This action should be consolidated with themandamus action while the record is developed in order to give Plaintiff an opportunity to

determine whether it will be necessary for him to proceed with the certiorari action, or whetherthe relief he seeks can be sought solely through the mandamus action.

RULING

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that EQCV068249 and EQCV068235 are consolidated

for the purposes of discovery. Consolidation for other court proceedings may be addressed at alater date, upon the application of either party.

Clerk to notify.

Dated this 17th day of May, 2010.

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__________________________________________

SEAN W. MCPARTLAND, JUDGE

Sixth Judicial District of Iowa

Documents

Miller v Board of Supervisors - Motion to Dismiss Denied