Military Review November 1966

7/27/2019 Military Review November 1966

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UNITEDSTATESARMYCOMMANDANDGENERALSTAFFCOLLEGE,FORTLEAVENWORTH,ANSAS

COMMANDANT. Major General Michael S. Davison

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT .Brigadier General Robert C. Taber

The Military Review is published by the United States Army Command and GeneralStaff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides aforum for the expression of mili tary thought on national and military strategy, nationalsecurity affairs, and on doctr ine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.

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Military ReviewProfessional Journal of the US Army

Elect ronic Warfare . . . . . . . . LTC Charles B. Ablett, USA 3China s Tota l St ra tegy . . . . . . . . Raymond L. Garthoff 12Br i t i sh Weapons and Tact i cs in Malaysia . . . . . . . Jac Wel ler 17Let ter t o a New M aj or . . . . . . . BG Lynn D. Smith, USA, Ret 25 h!ack hrder s Heart land . . . . . . . . . Wi l l iam D. Frankl in 32The Soc i al Sc i enc es . . . . . . . . COL Daniel F. Riva, USAF 40Pol i t ico-Mi l i t ary Expert ise . . . . . . . . Raymond J. Barret t 44Two Forgott en Americ an Strat egists . . . . . . . Niu Sien-t hong 53Peace in Viet nam . . . . . . . . COL Joseph F. H. Cut rona, USA 60Reconnaissance Vehicl es . . . . . . . . . . . Franz Kosar 69New w i nds i n Pyor rgyang? . . . . . . . . . . Thomas An 75

. Expansion f or Limi ted War . . . . . . MAI James S. Angeles, USA 82Brazil s Overseas M il it ary Operat ions . . . . . . Robert Reynolds 65,+faos Three Stages . . . . . . . . . Robert C. Suggs;rrd Brenda M . Wolak 92M i f i t ar y t f o t e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68M i l i t ery Boolm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

The VIEWS expressed in this ma azine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessari ly those of theUS Army or the Command and Genera Staff College.


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Editor in ChiefCOL Donald J. Delaney

Associate EditorCOL John B. McKinneyArmy War College.

Assistant EditorLTC A. Leroy Covey

Features EditorMAJ Charles A. Gatzka

Spanish-American EditorLTC Ren6 Ramos

Brszilian EditorsLTC Paulo A. F. VianaLTC Walter J. Faustin i

Production OfficerMAJ Norman C. Murray

staffArt istCharles A. Moore

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MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by ths U. S. Arm Command and Genersl Staff Collega, Fort Leawenworth, Kansas, in En Iish, Spanish, and Portuguese. Lse of funds for printing of this publication hasfeen approved by Hea qusrfers, De srfmant of the Army, 28 May 1965.Second+ss posfega ~jd at fort Lesvenwor fh, Kancos. .Nbacripfion rates $4.00 (US currency) syear m the Umted Statas, mted States military frost offices, and those countries which are members ofthe PawAnrericen Postal Union fincluding Spain); $5.00 a year in all other comrtr ie% single copy price50 cents. Address subscr iption mail to the Gook Department, U. S. Army Command and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansss 66027.


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EIECTROHICWARFAREr A Modem WeaponsystemLieutenant Colonel Cha rles B . MAett, U nited St ute.r Arrn uE LE CTRONI C devices ha ve become accepted, even rreceseary, 4part a of a milita ry force. Such de

, vices cont inu e t o evolve, t o t a ke onnew forms, to be put t o new a pplica tions, an d to become increasingly relied upon. Their direct effect is beneficia l, oth erw ise th ey w ould not beadopted. B ut a comma nder a nd hiss ta f f cannot ignore the fact that tbeincreased use of electronics has itsrisks and vulnerabllitiee. The Armyofficer interest ed in higher comma ndshould be thinkhrg about the conductof wa rfa re in a fourt h dimensionth e electr oma gnetic epectrum .

Any modem ma jor milita ry forcegenera t ee a ra dia ted elect ronic field.When tw o such opposing forces meet,t heir ra dia ted elect ronic fields int sr- act, either a ccidenta lly or intent iona lly. Act ions intent iona lly ta ken byone force to ma ke th e int era ctin g electr onic fielde contribut e to its ow n increa sed combat effectiveness a re collectively referred to a s electronic


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ELECTRONIC WARFASEThese a ctions a re either offensive

or defensive. Offensive E W opera tions, sometimes celled electronic countermea sures (E CMS), ha ve th e enemys electronic systems as the target.Defensive opera tions, on th e otherha nd, a re directed to ones own electr onic systems with t he intent to defeat or minimize effects of th e enemysoffensive operations. Defensive mezsures ar e esllcd electr onic count ercountermeeaurca (ECCMS).Offensive AatfonsOne type of offensive opera tS On involves pa seive mea sur es. A ma jormiiita ry force provides observable evidence of its existen ce in t he elect ronicdimension just se irrevocably a e itdoes in th ree-dimensiona l physicalspace. This evidence ind]cates notmerely th e exist ence of th e force, buta lso w here i t is, something a bout i tssize, mobility, a nd ty pes of firepower,how it is orga nized, a nd the type ofa ctivity in w hich i t is engaged. P sesive EC MS ma y be considered a s reconn a issa nce car ried out in th e electr onic dimen sion to detect a nd observeth e indica tors w ith the prime intentof producing int elligence a bout th eenemy.Su ch, int elligence ma y eupport a ctive milita ry operat ions either of th e

Lieutenant CoZonel Charlea i?. Ablett is with the 3d Radio Re8earchUnit He@uarter8 in Vistnam. Heholde an M.S. degree in Mathvmattc8from &uthera IUinoie Vnivere@ andan M.S. $n &?attatic8 from SbnfotdUniversity in California. He baaeerved m a member of the faculty ofthe V. S. ArmII Command and Gemeral Staff CoUege and as Chief, Operation Re8earch Division, US ArmIISecurity Agetw Board. HiiI article.Computer8 and &7viee Schoolej apprared ira the October 1965 insue vfthe MILITAIWREVIEW.

convent iona l ty pe or w ithin th e electr oma gnet ic spectr um. The intelligence value of paseive ECMe isgreat ly enriched wh en coordina tedw ith tra ditiona l surveil la nce of theenemy by patrole, photo and visuala ir reconna issance, a nd prieoner in.terrogation.

Active E CM S ma y be th ought ofas th e bomba rdment of the enemyselectr onic systems w ith ra diat ioneelect ronic %dleta -w ith t he int entof disrupt ing norma l operat ion ofth ese syetems. The ultima te purposeie to degra de in some w a y th e enemyscont rol of his forces, t her eby producing a rela tive increase in our owncomba t pow er. If the intent ie eimplyto override th e va lid sigoale w ith fa lsesigna le, th e a ctivity is ca lled ja mming.

A more subtle and at t imes moreeffective mea sure is to inject fra udulent eignals in euch a wa y tha t theywill be accepted es valid by the enemyequipmen t or personnel. Thie set ivityis celled imita t ive decept ion.Defensive Measures

Since th e enemy is ca pable of perform ing a ll th ese offensive operat iona gainst our ow n systems, defeneivemea sures must he developed t o count erthem.

A unit e ca pability to count er t heenemy s offens ive E CM S , actilve orpassive, is lar gely determ ined long before a ctua l operat ion begin by th eplane, pcdiciee, and doctrine preparedby the uni t and higher headquarters .U rdees epecific considera tion ha s beengiven to the effeeta of enemy EW ona future opera tion, a unit will be una ble to count er enemy effort s effectively af t er actua l engagement occurs.

Two forme of E CC MS tha t requirespecial planning and additional spe-

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cialized resources of personnel a ndequipment a re securit y monitoringa nd %na nipula t ive deception. Thefirst includes intercepting a nd a na lyzing signa ls from ones ow n elect ronicsyst ems for count erintelligence informa tion. This informa t ion providesthe comma nder w ith a basis for correctin g insecure ura ct icee a nd for im-

Efforts to ta ke a dvant a ge of electroma gnetic devices during w a rfa repreda te World Wa r I. It wa e duringWorld War II, however, that such effort s besa me a ma jor fa ct or in deciding the course of the entire warrather than ieolated battlee. Thie wasparticularly true of air operationswhich had come to rely on the exten-

Redio intereept opera tors copied J epsneee diploma tic mear w gesplementing cont ingency plans ba sedon probable compromise of prima ryplans.

Manipulative dcseption includesmeasures ta ken with rega rd to theopera t ion of ones ow n elect ronic sy ztem s designed t o mielczd t he enemyspaseive ECM efforte. One of the simplest exa mples is th e simulat ion ofa notiona l units elect ronic syst ems.To be effective, ma nipula t ive electr onic deseption must genera lly be apar t of a broader dcseption effort designed t o deceive a ll of th e enemysintelligence syst ems w ith a consistentetory.Novembor1968

eive use of elcst ronic equipment . E Wopera t ions dur ing World Wa r 11 showth e complexities of plann ing a nd execut ion a nd illustr a te th e successesand risks involved. They thue servea s a guide for present a nd futu re operations.

It is, of course, a well-known fa cttha t the United Sta tes ha d broken theJ a pan ese cryptosystems w ell beforethe a tt a ck on P czrl Ha rbor. The tra gictr a in of circumsta nces w hich resultedin the failure to a ct on the wa rningswhich EW had supplied is not partof this account. But the importancew hich the U nited St a tes placed on

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ELECTRONIC WARFAREth is source of intelligence is dra ma tica lly revealed in a letter from Arm yCh ief of St a tf George C. Ma rsha ll t oG overnor Thoma a E. Dewey duringth e president ial ca mpa ign of 1944:TOP SECRETFOR MR. DEWEYS EYES ONLY.You have my word that neither theSecretury of War nor the Presidenthaa ang intimuticn wfzatsoevev thatsuch a letter hna been addreneed toyou.The most vital evidence ~n the PearlHarbor matter consiets of our inter-

to inteatione toward Hawaii cmtil thela.%? weeeage before December 7,which did not reach OUThands uutilthe following c!qi, December 8.Now the point to the present dilemma ie that we have gone aheadwith thie buaineee of deciphering theircodee until we poese$s other codee,German ae well as Japaneee, but ourmain ba& of infomnatbu regardingHitlers intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron 08hima8 meseagesfrom. Berlin reporting hia interviews

with Hitler a nd other o@nla to the

G erma ns used a gents to ta lk bombers to ta rgetecepta of the Japune8e diplomatic communica tbnw . Over a period of yearsour Crpptograph people aualgzed thecharacter of the machine the Japanese are ueiug for eaooding their diplomatic message.r. Baeed en thti, accrreeponding machine wae built byus which ~dempheratheir me88age8.

Therefore, we po88e88ed a wealthof infovwwtion regarding their movesin the Pacific which in tmn wae fu?ntihed the Stnte Departmwttiatherthan, ae is popularly eupposed, theS@te Department providing ue withthe information-but which unfortunately made no reference whatever

Japane8e Government. The8c are atizlin the codes involved in the PearlHarbor events.To explain further the critioal uature of this 8etup which wmdd bewiped out almost in an iuatant if theleast euepicioa were arcuaed r e~ a r d

in g it,he Battle of the Coral Sea wasbaaed on deciphered me88agc8 andtherefore our few 8hip8 were in thenght place at the right time. Fuvther,we were able to concentr a te en ourlimited forces to meet their advanceson Midway when otherwise we almoatcertuinly would have been some S,000miles out of place.

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ELECTRONIC WARFAREWe had full information of theetrength of their foreee i% that advance aud also of the emaller forcedirected againet the Alew%zne whichfmallg lauded troope on Attu a nd

Kieka.Operaticne in the Paci@ are targelyguided by the information we obtainof J apaneee desdosrmente. We knowtheir etrength in van-owe garrisons,the rationa a nd other etoree continu

in g available to them, and what ieof vaat importance, we check theirjleet movement8 and the movement8Of the$r ccnv0u8.

The heavy loeeee reported from timeto time which they susta in by vea80nif our eubmarine action largely reeulte from the fact that we know theeailing datee and the routes of theirconvow and ca n notify our eubmrinee to lie in wait at the properpoint.The current raid8 by Admiral Hal-ees?e carrier force8 on Japaneee chipping in Manila Bay aud eleewherewere largely baeed on timing on theknown movements of Japaneee conVOS18,wo of which were canght, asanticipated, in hia destructive attacke.

You will understand from the foregoing the utter tragic corwequencesif the pre8ent political debate8 regarding Pearl Harbor di8cloee to the en-em~, German or Jap, any euqaicion ofthe vital mnrcee of information wenOW ~088e8e. . . .* * *The conduct of General Eiaenhow

ere campaign and of all operation inthe Pacific are cloeely related in ccncepticw aud t iming to the information we secretly obtain through theeeintercepted code8. They contributegreatlg to the victorti a nd tremendowdy to the savinge of American

livee, both in the eouduet of currentoperations and in looking toward theearly termination of the war.

Governor Deweys patriotic dutywa s clea r , and the Pear l Ha rbor contr oversy receded from t he politica lspotlight.Navigational Aids

The increasin g use of a ircraft w ithth eir a ssociat ed na viga tiona l a ids provided tw o of the ma jor ingredients towhat Wlneton Churchil l referred tua s th e Wiza rd Wa r. The par ticularstruggle rela ted to na viga tiona l a idsillustra te the dyna mic na ture of E Wth e consta nt interpla y of measur eand countermeasure.

After th e fal l of Fra nce, G erma nynndert ook to reduce th e B rit ish tosubmission by a eria l bomba rdment.The German bombers were guided toth eir t a rgets by ra dio beacons beam edat Englan d from sta t ions in northern Fra nce a nd B elgium. These a ndoth er na viga tiona l a ids permitt edall-weather, day-and-night bombingwhich severely taxed Brit ish defenses.

The Br itish t urn ed t o electroniccoun t erm ea sur e. The most obviouscount ermeasur e wa s to ja m the receiving equipment in th e bombere.This, however, would have been obvious to the Germans and, i f successful ,would have induced them to try something new. Thus, the Brit ish chose touse imita tive deception.

The initial German navigationalsyst em w a s ca lled th e Lcrenz. TheG erma n bomber w a e equipped w ith adirectiona l a ntenna so tha t i t couldride t he bea m th e required dkta nceto place the bomber over t he ta rget.The B ritish . locat ed directiona l beacons called Meaco?w (masked beacons)so tha t their bea ms intersected theLorouz bea ms a t a sl ight a ngle. Asth e bomber near ed the ta rget in E ng

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ELECTRONIC WARFARElan d, th e st ronger ilfea cerr signa l domina ted so th a t th e bomber follow edth e fa lse bea m, dr opping its bombeover uninha bited a reas.

To counter tlds beam-bendhrg~the G erma ns introduced a new navigat iona l a id w hich t he B ritieh ca lledHeadache. This consisted of two para llel bea ms-one eendlng dote, t heother dashes. The signals were sgrrchronized eo th a t a bomber flying direct ly betw een th em received a solidtone. Any deviation from course couldbe quickly correeted.

The B rit ish count ered w ith a counterpwsur e a ppropriately na med As-m%in.They rein forced only one beamby intercepting , a mplifying, a nd retra nsmitt ing it . As th e bomber nearedthe ta rget, aga in the imbalance signa ls a chieved wh a t w a s effectively a

Ra dio P a rie noticed tha t t he volumeva ried suspiciously. E very time th eyhad to turn the volume down, an airra id follow ed. Closer investiga tionehow ed th e volume ont dde th e ta rgeta rea faded. Fur th er a mdyeis revealedtha t Radio Pa rie wa s switching to adirectiona l a ntenna wit h the beampointed towa rd the ta rget area.

The Br itish found tha t a bea conbeam from another etation intersectedthe Radio P a ris bum at the ta rget ,electr onica lly ma rking th e bomb release point. To counter this, the British retra nemitted a n a mplified Ra dioParis signal which intersected thebeacon bea m over open count ry or th eEnglish Channel.

The Luft w a ffe a leo tr ied using eecret a gents in En gland a long the bombroute, equipped with frequency modu-.

. Thense of w indow or cha ff grea tlybending of th e beem. One report ha sit that the result of 400 bombe droppedin one German rzdd wee two chickenskilied in the open fields. The additionalva lue of deception over ja mm ing began to pay off as G erman a ircrewslost confidence in th eir na vigat iona lsysteme.

La ter in 1940 severa l B rit ish housewives Listening toentert a inrnent from8

reduced the effectiveness of radarlat ed. ra dios, to ta lk th e bombere toth eir ta rgets. This syst em. ca lled B enit o, w a ; coun t ered-by u;ing skilledIinguists a nd str onger signa ls to tra nsmit faI se bea rings a nd generally ca useconfus ion. Thecount errn ea sur e, calledD omino, ceused such confu sion a nddisorienta tion th a t some pilots la ndedin Engla nd by error. It ie a lso suepseted th a t th e bombings of Dublin

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in 1941 ma y ha ve ina dverten tly resulted from Domino.

The B a tt le of th e B eams: a sCh urchill ca lled i t , w ent m a inly to th eB ritish . This cont ribut ed significa nt lyto Adolf H itlere fa ilure to defea t, th eB ritish by a irpower a lone,Switsh in Air WarBy late 1940 the air war switchedfrom count ering G erma n offensivesystems to searching for a nd count ering G erma n defensive syst ems. Theseopera tions beca me essentia l to successful a ir a t ta cks a gainat G ermany.

The Germans had developed and insta l led several types of ra da r forearly w a rning, directing interceptora ircra ft , a nd a ir defense f ire direct ion. The Allieeneeded int elligence onequipment cha ra cteristics, opera tingprocedures a nd schedules, a nd geogra phic deploymen t in order to develop effective count ermea sures.

For the most par t , t hese dat a w ereobta ined by passive E CM reconna issa nce-signal interception and a na lysis. In ma ny ca ses, how ever, thesemea sures w ere supplement ed by low -Ievel, a ir photoreconn a issa nce missions a nd visua l observa tions. In a tlea st one ca se, wh ile a comma ndo ra idW?S carried out On a r a da r si t@> th era dar w as dismant led a nd the vita lpar ts eva cuat ed by boat to En gla ndfordeteiled analysis.

As early a s 1937, the B rit ish ba ddiscovered tha t a luminum strips simila r to Ch ristma s tree t insel , ca l ledw indow or cha ff, could be released byan a ircra f t a nd would ref lect ra darsignals w hich m a sked the signal r etur ned by th e a ircra ft . A ma jorcont roversy developed in E ngla ndw hether w indow should be ueed toprotect B rit ish bombers for fear th eG ermans would apply it aga inst B r i tish ra da r. The Germa ns a lso knew the

ELECTRONIC WARFAREeffeets of window a nd a ppa rently de.layed using i t beca use t hey werew restl ing with th e sam e dilemma.

The Allies fina lly used w indow t oma ak bombers during ra ids on Ha mburg in J uly 1943. The ra ids w erehighly effective with a sha rply d ecreased loss of bombers to either a irint erception or flak. Six w eeke lat er,the G ermans used window during araid on an Allied base with equallydevas ta ting effects. Window beca me asta nda rd offensive E W measur e forboth sides throughout the rema inderof the war .

P hysica l devices w ere suppleme&.ed or repla ced by a series of electr onicja mm ers mount ed in th e bombers orin One or more escort a ircraft . Alth ough th ese var ied in technical deta i l, al l genera ted signals w hich eitherma sked or spoofed th e ra da rs in intercept a ircra ft or th ose on th e ground.cont roll ing th e searchlight s a nd a irdefense a rt illery. As in th e case ofthe Ba t t le of the B eams, each E CMdevice was countered by new or improved ra dar wh ich, in turn, w as impaired by a new E CM device.Classic Naval Operation

Not a l l E CM opera tions perta hedto a ir operat ions. One of th e cla ssicE W opera tions occurr ed ea rly in 1942.Three G erma n w a ra bips-tbe Scha rw horst, Gnsisenau, a nd Prinz Euge+ha d been bot t led up in the B rest Ha rbor. B rit ish att empts todea troy themby air attack had been called off dueto hea vy losses incurred from a ir defense. The B rit ish relied on superiorna va l forces cont rolling th e seas tothe south and west should the shipshea d for th e Atla nt ic. Tbe rout e upthe Channel was covered by coastalra dars wh ich would a ler t the RoyalAir Force in th e unlikely event th a tthe G erma ns chose tha t esca pe route.

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ELECTRONIC WARFAREOnt he night of 11 Februa ry 1942,

during foul weat her , G erman ja mmers along the French coast weretur ned on, gra dua lly increasing th eirsignal strengths. The ja mming wa s soakll l fully executed that Brit ish radarpersonnel thought their equipmentha d developed ma lfunctions. Whilethe B rit ieh were disassembling ra dmalooking for nonexistent bugsfl th eth ree wa ra hips w ere moving th roughthe Engl ish Cha nnel.

Only one experimenta l ra da r opera ting on a frequency not previouslydetected by th e G erma ns-hence notja mm ed-observed th e flight of th eships. B ut since i t wa s not t ied int oth e comm unicat ion net, it could nota lert t he B rit ish to count eraction.

In th is one E W opera tion, th e G erma ns ha d earned grea t dividends, an dth e B rit ish ha d lea rned a n expensivelesson. Thedecision a eto wh ether th ebenefit to be derived by using a pa rticula r mea sure is w orth the loss ofsurpr ise a nd th e inevita ble development of a count ermeasur e by th e enemy a lwa ys cha llenges th eseniorcomma nder an d his sta f f.Communicat ions

Concurrent wi th t he struggles in ra da r an d navigat ional a ids, the interpla y of mea sure a nd count ermeasur ewa s ta khg pla ce in commun ica tions.Sin ce the use of w indow increasing lyreduced th e effectiveness of ra da r oninterceptor a ircra ft , the G erman a usedground cont rollers to direct int erceptors by voice radio. The Britieh soonequipped bombers w ith a n electronicja mmer to search out the signal a ndja m it . The G erma ns count ered by us-

o ing high -pow ered broadca st ing sta tions.

Ra t her tha n t ry to mat ch the increased power with heavier jammingequipment, the B rit ish pla ced G errna n

spea king opera tors w ith a ta lent formimicry in th e bombers. They simu lat ed th e ground cont rollers, providing th e int erceptor pilots w ith erroneous informa tion w hich, a t th e lea st ,ca used confusion as to wh o wa s the1 rea l cont roller. The G erma ns sw itchedto a woman broadcaster ; the B r i t ishfollowed suit w ith a Germa n-spea kingEngl ishwoman,

In one incident, th e G erman contr oller , af t er much ha ra ssment, ga veout w ith a violent out burst of profa nity . The ghost voice a dvised th eint erceptors, The E nglishma n is nowswea ring. The G erman shouted, Itis not the Engl ishma n who is swearing, but me !

Sir Art hu r T. H a rris d escribed afavorite ta ctic of th e B rit ish w hichwa s to intersperse recordings of Hit ;lers speeches in t he broa dca st s. TheFuhrers screams did little to relieveth e irrita tion of th e fight er pilots.Operations Today

The opport un ities t o influen ce mili ta ry opera tions with EW today arevast ly gr eat er tha n in World Wa r I I .The preparedn ess of th e scientist s a ndtechnical pereonn el to eupport suchoperat iona ia, of course, a critica l fa ctor. B ut equally importa nt, every senior comm a nder a nd st a ff officer needato review t he a ge-old pririciples ofwa r, broa dening hie interpreta tion toinclude a ll milita ry opera tion, eventh ose condu cted in th e fourt h dimensionthe electroma gnet ic spect rum .

Ma reha l Va a ili D. Sokolovsky offerea good s umm a ry of E W toda y. Tha tit represent s a Soviete view m a kes itdoubly a ignitica nt. H e sta tes:

The wide8r?read use of radio-electronic equilnnsnt in all lield8 fro8ee adij)icult problem concerning the battlein space. The problem LQhow be8t toMilitary hViEW10


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ELECTRONIC WARFAREprohibit or decreaee the effectivenes.sof the enemge rudio-electronic 8g8tems ad at the same time, how toemsure the eucceeeful use of ones ownequipment. One O( the main aims isto disrnpt the enemys comtrol overhis troops amt weapons by active radio interference a nd the destructionof hie mo8t importaut radio eyeteme.Thi8 iucludes demolishing or interfering with the enemye electronicequipment tnetalled in aimraf t ormieailee; preventing the enemy% Weeof electronic equipment for aenal detection, navigation, bombing, and mis

8ile guida nce; a nd di8TUpting the operation of the enemye ground-baaedelectronic apparatus ueed for commanding trOOp8.

Thie li8t alone 8howe the great eztent to which electronic countermeasure, a nd protection from electroniccountermeasures of the enemy, can beueed; it showe how eeriorw their consequences can be. The development ofelectronics ie, at the pre8ent time, aesignificant as the development of nuclear mieeilee, which, incidentally,cannot be ueed without electronicequipment.

The increasing use of aircra ft ma kes such equipment a s terr a in a voidan cera da r, better na vigat iona l a ids, better surveilla nce sensors, a nd devices w hichw ill give our a ircra ft a better a ll-w eat her capability very import a nt . Higbspeed communications over great distances with fightweigbt equipment isun der development . We a re a leu w orking on ways to jam the enemys com. municat ione a nd to ma ke our ra dios a e immune to ja mming a s possible.

General Dwight $. Beach

November 1966


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Chinas Total StrategyA Soviet CritiqueFrom The Reporter

Raymond L. Garthoff

T H E excha nge of polemica l lett ers a nd a rt icles betw een th eCommunist P a rtY of the Soviet U nion a nd the CommunistP a rty of China has been highly revealing. It has, how ever, been apublic polemic-fa shioned w ith a n eye t o domestic consu mpt ion a ndon th e Communist a nd neutra l na tions follow ing th e disputeabroad.

P erhapa even more revealing a re dwumenta of a n internal Soviet discussion on Chinese Communiet politico-milita ry str a tegy

; not int ended to be ma de public. One such is a n a rt icle called The. P eking Version of Tota l St ra tegy: w hich a ppea red in t he Soviet

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G ener81 St a ff th eoretical journ a l MiLitar~ !Moctght for October 1963, andit is st ill both perth ent a nd instr uctive. This journ a l is ma rked For G enera le, Admira ls, a nd Officers of th eSoviet Arm y a nd Na vy Onlyit w a snot intended to be read by Chinese(or Amer ican ) eyes.Journal Is Revealing

I t a na lyzee C hinese Communistview s on milita ry th eory a nd policy,a nd wh ile it no doubt distorts theCh inese Commun ist position to somedegree, it revea ls a great deal bothahout the Chinese and Soviet conceptions. The current Chinese Communiet view of milita ry science isdescribed a s facing th e past , th eCh inese past , not recognizing a ny experience oth er th a n the experience ofChina . . . . Thie a tt itude, a ccordingto th e Soviet critic I. Yerma shev,lea ds to a nother a nd even more cribiwd fault of contempora ry Chinesemilitary science:

It is .cimplg obsolete. Aad it becameobeolete not meretg bv iteelf but asa ceueequenee of radical chnngee inmany objective conditions, includingthe material base of war and aboveall of weaponry.Primarily, Yermashev commente,

This article wae rewnted frmnthe original, publiehed in TH EREPORTER,19 May 1966, underthe title, A Soviet Critique ofChinae Total Strategy. CoprJrighted @ 1966 by The ReporterMagazine Company.

Dr. Garthoff ie Special Aseistant for Soviet Bloc Politico-Military Affairs with the Departmentof State. Hie article, MarehalMalinovskye Manchuria Campaign: appeared in the October1966 ieeue of the MIL ITARY R E VIEW.

November 1966

CHINAS TOTAL STRATEGYthe Chineqe exaggerate t he significance of the polit ical and ideologicalcharacter of poeeible future war atthe expense of evalua ting rea listica llyth e bala nce of rea l ma teria l forcesth a t is, recognit ion of Americanmilita ry pow er. The Ch inese Communists a re eaid to bank on a protr a ctedwa r, and on winning such a protra ctedw a r :

. . . even if at a given timetkutis, epeaking plainly, at the preeenttimethe enemy ie etronger, becaueein the cocwee of the etwuggle the re-Zation of forces will change to theadvantmge of the weaker.Soviet Rebuttal

This t he Soviet w rit er finds unconvincing. He says:

It ie absurd to euppoee that a warof attntion will favor the weak andharm the etreug. In euch a w a r , theweak will be exhaueted before thestrong.Chinese Marxism (MilitaryThought put it in quotes) is eaid to

ma ke populat ion a decisive fa ctor,a long w ith politica l-morale fa ctors,determin ing victory or defea t. The,Soviet rebutt a l not only cites th eB rit ish conquest of India a s an exa mple w here size of populat ion w a s noindex of str ength , but a leo pointedlyrecalle the defeat of China in 1895by lit t le J apa n. Similar ly, the Ch ineee exa mple of th e defea t of J a panin Ch ina in 1945 a s a n illustr a tion ofvictory in a protr a cted w a rth ecorn erst one caee for Ma o Tee-t ung et heoriesis reject ed a s un conv incing.

The C hin ese neglect to n ote tha tJ apan wa s t ied down on many frontein th e P a cific Ocean : Yerma shevsays, and tha t the a nti-fascist coa lition took the war to the J apimese

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CHINAS TOTAL STRATE6Yhomela ndboth ra re, if indirect, S oviet credits to our r ole in defeat ingJ a pan. The a uthor does not forget tonote tha t t he S oviet Army dealt complete defeat to th e J a panese Army inNorthea stern an d Northern China:without wh ich the might of J apaneseimperia lism w ould not ha ve been broken. B oth t he hist orical role of th eChinese Communists a nd th e th eoretica l und erpinning of th eir present milita ry doctr ine a nd politico-milita rystra tegy a re thus demolished.Stress Relianca

In th e ear ly 1960s, th e Ch inese,seeking to ma ke a virt ue of the necessity imposed by th e cessa tion of Soviet economic, technical, a nd milita rya ssistan ce, bega n to str ess relian ceon ones ow h etreng th . Yerrna sheva tt a cks this principle (w hich he termsa nt i-L-eninist, a nt i-Ma rxist, a nd Na tiona list) on the ground tha t it isadvanced by the Chinese for:

. . . the political and tactical aim ofseparating the peoplee of the oppreesedcountrfee from the camp of eoc?izhrn[for inetance, the Soviet bloc], sowingamong them the eeede of nationalismand chauvinism.Referrin g to P ekings development

of its ow n nuclear w eapons, he cays:After all, not a single eocialiststate except Chimz coneidere it neceesarg to have its own nuclear weapone,considering entirely correctly that thepower of the Soviet nuclear forces reliably covere the entire sociuli.et campfrom attack. The leader8 of the CCP[Chinese Communiet Partv] do notbelieve in fraterrud friendship withthe other socia!ist conntriee and donot value this friendship, mentingthemselves only on their ownstrength.

According to Military Thought, t heChinese Communists argue forand

a tt empt to force on oth ersa stra tegybased on the conclusion tha t t he a nti-imperialist etruggle requires wa r. OneCh ineee a rt icle in par ticular is cited,Lu Ch ih-chaoe E xam ina tion of th eQuestion of War Must Not RunCount er to th e Ma rxist-Leniniet Viewpoint of th e Cla es St ruggle: w hichappeared in Red Nag on 15 August

1963. It a rgued th a t th e Soviete judgethe nature of war by the scope of itsdeetr uctivenees in the nuclear a ge,ra ther tha n by a dhering str ict ly toth e Ma rxist-Leninist view point of th eclass nature of any war.

The Soviet a filcle deals w ith t hischa rge only obliquely, but claim s tha tth e rea l cla ss a pproa ch ie to consider t he consequ ences of such a w a r,w hich lea ds to th e conclusion th a tnuclea r wa r m uet not be permitt ed.

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Concerning Mao Tse-tungs remarkthat only half of the population ofthe w orld w ould die in a nuclear w a r,Militarst Thought comments:

AU the subsequent development ofthis idea [in Chinese Communistwritings] beam witnees to the factthat it was no chance remark but aconsidered conception. Just WarsMilitary Thought defends nationallibera tion w a rs a e just w a rsY butit qua lifiee t hie eupport by reitera ting the need for pea ceful coexistencebetw een sta tee, and by cha llenging thea lleged Ch ineee a dvoca cy of revolutiona ry wa r everywhere ra ther tha nselectively. It finds in th is positilon th echa ra cterist ics of t he ideology ofpett ~ bourgeois revolutionism, a ndgoes on to make this condescendingbut slash ing critiq ue of Commun istChina:

One must not forget that contemporary Chiua is etill jcwt an enormoue peasant countrg with a relativelyemall proportion of proletarian elements, with a young and not get tempered working class, actually omgiruzting only in the Zast quarter centurg;. a ,comztt-~ in which there are etitlstrong and living rem?wnte, not completely eliminated, of the otd ideologgof small and veng emalt prapertg a wn-er e of the recent past and eves elements of feudzzl ideologv in customs,the family, a nd interperaoual relatio?w,

One cannot completely exclude theinfluence of all these pettv-bourgeoissocial strata on the leaders, especiallyif these very leadere themselves akosuffer from etrokee of extreme revolutienariee in a time of internal dificultiee as a result of the adventunetcourse of the epeedup [Great LeapNovembef1966

CHINAS TOTAL STRATEGYForward] to soctalism by crude a dministrative meaeures.

The Soviet diecuesion arguee thatca pita lism ie, indeed, doomed but tha tt he role of t he S Ocia liet count ries iato speed ite fall not th rough wa r,w hich w ould br ing ruin to th em, too,but t hr ough economic competit ion, forw hich peace ie necesea ry . Thk is afa miliar th eme in th e polemics of th epast several years. On th e basia ofth is Ch inese th eoretical rea diness fornuclear wa r, wh ich the Soviets dialectically int erpret a s desire for nuclear war , the Military Thought articlegoes s o fa r a s specifica lly t o a ccuseth e Ch inese Commu nist leaders of supporting genocide.Pure AdventurismTo the Soviets these deficiencies inthe Chinese Communist a pproach t omilita ry science, policy, a nd str a tegylea d to severa l conclusions. First ,China s m ilita ry ecience is pure a dventur ism; her view of th e West asa pa per tiger is illogica l a nd erroneoue; a nd the reeult of a protr a ctedmilita ry conflict w ould be defea t, notvictory: The adventurist, totalstrategy of the P ekkg etyle ia fra ughtw ith indeecriha ble cala mities for a llpeoples, in cludin g t he Ch inese people.

The Chinese Communiet, leaders,derisively referred to a s th e P ekingsupermen, a re not genuine Ma rxist-Leninist, a nd they know it :

When one acquainte oneeelf cloeelywith the themee of the Peking leaders and their practical activity in theinternational arena , itbecomes clearthat they pat in Jirat place not the intereete of the peofdee struggling forpeace, soctal$em, and national liberation, but their own great power aims.

They coneider that world thermonuclear war is inevitable and, atten@t


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CHINAS TOTAL STNATE6Yi ng to hurrg it along, they evidcntltieuppoee that the Chinese people wiUhave the best chance since they arethe meet POPU1OUCeople on the earth.In case of the destruction of the ma.jority of the peoples of the world,their statee, and their ccdtures (andthte, in the &nguuge of the Pehingpolitical hysterics, is t$alled the fallof imperialism), there would remain,in their opnion, the epoch of worlddomimatien by people of the Uellowrace. The Pehing leadere have alreadyconce to teraw wth the idea of d{vialing people by race, by the CO1OTftheir dcine, rather than bg class andsocial characteriatice. Thus, they haveentered the path leading into theewamp of racism, with aU the

conaequencee that fZow therefrom.The Soviet critique concludes:The propaganda war conducted withunheard-of licentiou-snees in Chinoaga inst the Soviet Union, the CPSV[Cmmmnniat Party of the SovietUnion], and other Marzist-Leninictpart iee ie a n integral part of thiestrategy. By their hoetile tene, malicious impertinence, and dirty inebmatione, articlc8 in the Chineee zneeecould grace anti anti-Soviet snperreactimmtyi, even fa8cist preee. . . .And all thie ie not the reecdt of polemical ranting, bnt on the contra~ti a Coti blooded realization of thedefinite plan of the leadev8 of the CCPin descending the path of extreme racist chawinism.

COMMENTSNVITEDThe Military Review welcomes your comments on any mate-

rial published. An opposite viewpoint or a new line of thoughtwill assist us and may lead to publication of your ideas. If youare an authority on a certain subject, why not write an articlefor our consideration ? If you have, only an idea, query us; per-haps we can assist you in developing an acceptable article.

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T H E confronta tion betw een In donesia a nd Malay sia ca me toa n end on 11 Augu st 1966. The sign ing of a peace accord in J aka rtabrought a forma l ha lt to thr ee yearsof spora dic fighting between B rit isha nd Commonw ealth forces on one ha nda nd guerrillas an d Indonesian troopson the other.

Mala yeia , a member of the B rit ishCommonw ealth of Nat ions a nd protected by a mutua l defense a greementwith G reat B rita in, forma lly a chievedind ependence on 16 S eptember 1963.Although Malaysian independence initia lly reeeived t he blessings a nd goodwishes of a bnoet a ll na tions, a thr eatto th is independence bega n a s ear lya s April 1963.

Malaysia has a tota l la nd mass of127,461 sq ua re m iles, a nd consiet s oftwo eegmenta separated by 400 to1,000 miles of water. The Malaya segment consists of th e low er th ird ofthe Malay P eninsula a t the southeastern extremity of th e continent of Asia.I t has only one land boundarythatin the north a butt ing Tha ila nd. I t isbounded on the east by th e South

China Sea , and on the south and westby the na rrow Stra i t of Malacea .

Roughly ova l in sha pe, Ma lay amea sur es a pproxima tely 480 milee inits north -south dimension a nd 200miles east -w est, encompa ssing a tota larea of 50,400 square miles. Its shoreline mea sur es over 1,200 miles, a ndits land bounda ry with Tha ilan d is314 miles long.

The Ma lay sian section of B orneo(Sa raw ak and Sa bah) is a long, narrow strip of land extending a cross the

BRITISHWEAPONSANDTACTIC$INMALAYSIAJ a c Weller

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BRITISH IN MALAYSIAnorthern qua rter of the isla nd. I t extends in a northeasterly-southwesterly direction for a bout 670 miles w itha ma ximum w idth of 160 miles. Coast a lbounda ries include th e South Ch inaSea to the northw est , the Sulu Seato the north and east , and the CelebesSes for a short distan ce on the easta nd south. In addit ion, it ha s a 900mile land border with Krdima nta n,form erly known a s B orneo, w h]ch occupies the rest of the island. Its landma ss. tot& a pproxima tely 77,000square miles.Strategic DefenseAt first sight, th e str a tegic problem of defending Mala ysia from outside a ggression a ppears insur mounta ble. The border a rea s comprise hu ndreds of miles of dense rain forestwhich melt into swamps and lagoonsth a t extend up to 20 miles inlan d. Allof the Malay P eninsula ca n be reachedfrom S umat ra by ca noe.

The init ial a t ta cks a gainst Mala ysia durin g 1963 a nd the first ha lf of1964 w ere prima rily a imed at settin gUP pockets of guerrilla resista nce deepinside t he border in North B orneo.The idea wa s to penetr a te th e count ryoverland with skeleton cadres andha ve th em disa ppear to recruit loca lguerrilla forces.

D urin g th e second ha lf of 1964, In donesia ns endeavored to use th e sa me

Jac Weller, a firearms cenenltfmtwith ofies in Pnnceton, New Jereeg,attended Georgia M&?arII Academyand was graduated from PmncetonUniversity. He i-r a frequent contributor to numerous US and foreign jouruafa and is the author of the book,Wellington in th e P enineula . His meetrecent article for the MILI TARY R E VIEW, Scandi?mvian Infantrg Weapona: appeared in the Febrmwy 1966ieeue.18

ta ctics a gainst the Federa tion of Malaya by penetra ting from the sea an da ir. The guerrilla concea led th emselves for a time, but w ere forced intoth e open in sea rch of food. In eo doing, tbe loca l popula tion report edth em, cont ributin g immeneely t o tbefa ilure of th e cadr es to eeta blieh guerrilla forcee.

In early 1965 the Indonesianscha nged their ta ctice by concent ra ting on a cte of eabotege a nd a tt a ckson police a nd milita ry unite. F orcesof from three to 100 pereone camea croea t he land border in Sa bah a ndby eea into both Malaya and S abah.In donesia n confront a tion forcesalong the Sabah border increased tosevera l full briga des. Fight ing continued on the ground a nd at sea thr oughout 1965. The Mala yeia n securit yforcee under B rit ish comma nd did anextr emely efficient , professiona l job.P ersonnel losses w ere in fa vor of tbeB ritish -Ma lay sian forcee five to one.They w ere su cceeeful in more t ha n200 sepa ra te enemy opera tions. In fdtra tors w ere ca ught individually an din small groups, a nd guerrilla unitsa t times w ere a ccounted for 100 percent.Experienc e an Advantage

P erhaps the great est eingle a dvanta ge the B ri t ish had in thie wa r wa sexperience. More th a n tw o centu rieeof politica l a nd milita ry a ccomplishments in the Fa r Ea st provided areedy source of experien ced personnela nd proved jungle w a rfar e ta ctics.

In a ddition ti officer an d enlistedmen fresh from w estern Eur ope, th eBrit ish Gurkha soldier, recruited fromNepa l, w a s a n enormous help in th esuccessful defea t of th e a ggreseorforces. The Gnrkha soldiers have arecord of more tha n a century a nda ha lf of loya l service in the B rit ish

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Army . They a re mpall men, but incredibly t ough, bra ve, a nd skillful a tall forms of wa r, pa rt icula rly in thejungle. When ambushed, their reaetions were so quick and vicious theyfrequently won the ensuing fight.They suffered ca sua lties, but still pursued th e enemy force unt il every sin-

BRITISH IN MALAYSIAment in Mala ysia weighed slightlymore t ha n 50 pounds a nd included arifle and 180 rounds of ammunitionin magazines.

A black nylon overa ll a nd a pairof snea kers-entirely sa tisfa ctory fornight comba tbedding a ccording toha bits of individual soldiers, medical

gle ma n in it wa s eith er killed orcaptured.

E ven though t he individua l an dsma ll unit effectiveness of th e B ritisha nd their a llies in th e jungle w a s excellent, these men were not asked toendure unnecessary ha rdships. Ca rsful study indicates that Brit ish,G urkha, and the new Malaysian soldiers functioned w ell in th e jungleenvironment w hen provided w ith a kltth a t a llow ed comfort. In dividual equiptlovembcr 1966

supplies, drinkhg wa ter, and var ioustools for use in th e jungle w ere a llcar ried in a comfort a ble harness. Mosquit oes, leeches, w et feet un comfort a ble sleeping a rra ngements, poor food,a nd exposure can cont ribute to poorhealth a nd mora le a nd increase theproblems of w a rfa re. The soldier w a sequipped to combat these problems,and yet was not burdened with somuch equipment tha t he beca me immobile. I

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BRITISH IN MALAYSIAAlthough the B ritish steadily em

pha sized th e individual, his persona lequipment , a nd his opera tion in th ejungle on foot w ith a rifle, th ey werenot a verse to ta king a dvant a ge ofmore complicat ed equipment . Theyw ere unusua lly successful in a da ptingelect ronic comm unica t ions t o junglecondit kms. Ra dio commu nicat ions ina ra in forest a re notoriously poor, butB ritish a nd G urkha experience rest ored full ra nge a nd cla rity of reception.Airl i f t System

The poor roa ds in Mala ya a nd almost complete lack of them in Sabahgrea tly limited th e use of motor vehicle tr a vel. However, lightly a rmoredvehicles w ere extr emely useful in certa in area s. To compensa te for lack ofmotora hle roa ds, the B ritieh ma na gedto integra te helicopters, a nd sma llfixed-w ings a nd some la rger a ircra ftinto a n a irlift syst em ca pable of providing logistic support to a comba tforce of a pproxima t ely 20,000 in S a bah . In a ddition to logistic support ,th ese a ircra ft provided a n effectivemea ns for str a tegic deployment ofpersonnel to a reas w here t he milita rysituation dicfated.B rita in realized from t he beginningof the Indonesian a nd Mala ysian confronta tion the extr eme importa nceof int elligence in coun t erguer rilla opera tions. Su ccess in th ese opera tionshinged on friendship w ith t he localpeople. The enviable record of theBritish for fair dealing, decent government , a nd honest economic a ndsocia l progrese dur ing t he colonia l period contr ibuted a dva nta geously toga ining t he support of t he local people.

B rita in, extended economic a id a ndexpa nded civic a ction, pafilcula rly ina reae w here the government wa sw ea kest. Free medica l trea tment a nd

modern miracle drugs were dkpeneedin 1arge quantities. WeI1s w ere dug,buildings erect ed, an d, more importa nt , the B ri t ish a nd G urkbaa showeda real and friendly interest in the people. In this hear ts a nd minds progra m, th e soldiers und er B ritileh command proved the best advertisementfor democra tic government a nd theway of life of the Free World.

B ritieh, Austra lia ns, a nd New Zealanders helped Mala ysians a rm a ndtr a in t hemselves, ma king it possiblefor th em to ga in confidence fromth eir ow n modest comba t a chievementses w ell as from th ose of t heir Commonwealth allies. This positive approach to problems w hich a re commonly fa ced by newly emerging na tions w ill serve a s a useful forma tfor developing Mala ysian milita ry a ndeconomic resources.Small Arms

B eca use of the B ritfsh empha sis onth e individual sotdier a nd his persona lweapon, small arme were of great import a nce. The B rit ish Army ha d a finenew fa mily of predomina nt ly 7.62millimeter infa nt ry w eapons, a s efficient a nd effective a s a ny in the w orldfor conventiona l wa rfa re. For var iousreasons, these arms were not particula rly w ell ada pted t o th e jungle. Tosome extent, they were superseded byothers, or did not replace weapone previously used by th e B ritish Arm y inthe area.

The sta nda rd infant ry rif le in theB ritish Army a nd the a rmies of thew ealt hier members of th e Commonw ealth w a s th e self-loa dlng rifle designed by the Fabmque NationaledArmes de Guerre (FN). This is afine w eapon w hich tires the %.62m illimet er NATO round , 20 t o ea ch deta cha ble box maga zine. In the B ritishArmy, this weapon does not fire fti)ly

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automatically, but can deliver rapidsingle shots with astonishing accu-racy. Itwa a entirely ea tiefa ctory during the Mala ya n emergency, but eventua lly ra n into severe competition fromth e AR15 (U S M16) th a t tires a caiiber .223 (5.56 millim eter ) ca rt rid ge.The high -velocity bullet from t hie

A Gurkha soldier with the tmdttiomdknkrilight round wae found to be aatiefectory in rega rd to killing pow er in th ejungle.

The AR15 with 180 rounda of ammunit ion in ma ga zinee w eigha 13.8pound e compa red t o a w eight of 23.5pound e for th e self-leeding rifle a ndthe same number of rounde. The AR15is 3S.6 inch es long a s opposed t o 41inches for the standard rif le andweighs, when fully loaded, 7.4 pounds

as opposed to 10.7 pounds. The lighterwea pon wa a a a id to be coneiderahlyquicker to use in a n emergency a ndha d a fully a utomat ic ca pabili ty. Forua e in th e jungle, th e B ritish Armyfelt th a t the AR15 wa s euperior toth eir self-loa ding rifle, a nd th eyequipped unit s of ba tt a lion eize completely with these new rifles.New Machinegun

The B ritish Army a dopted a newgenera l purpose ma chlnegun, a lso ofFN design, that tires 7.62 millimeterNATO a mmun ition from t he came disintegrating l ink beltz that are usedby t he U S M60 ma cbinegun. The general purpose ma chinegun, in its lightrole, haa a biped mount a nd hutt stock similar to moat modern lightmachineguns. It can also be equippedw ith a heavy ba rrel a nd mounted oha tr ipod for medium ma chinegun opera t ion. Thk w eapon ia one of t hebest a nd most relia ble in th e w orldtoday when used in conventiona l w a r.far e situat ions a e either a squa d lightma chinegun or a s a compa ny eupportw a a pon. It ha d tr ouble, how ever, inbot h of t hese funct ions in t he jnngle.

The new medium m a cbinegun onits specia l recoil-a hsorbh g t ripodwith tw o sighting eystema wa s efficient, a ccura te, relia ble, a nd muchlighter th a n t he old caliber .903, w a ter-cooled Vickers. Weight was of littleimportance because medium machinegune w ere generally insta lled ifi bunkers and remained there until the ent ire fort ified a rea wa e moved. The oldVickcrs w eapons fired slow er andmore a ccura tely a nd w ere a ble to sta yin a ction indefinitely w ith no ba rrelchanging.

B eca uee of its relat ively high cyclicra te, the ba rrel of the genera l purpose mechlnegun must be repla ced if

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BRITISH IN MALAYSIAit is to rema in long in a ction. A skillful crew ca n cha nge a bar rel in eeconds and be back in opera tion. B uteven seconds may be too long in ajung le bunker if a n enemy only a fewya rds aw a y chooses t he bar rel-cha nging t ime to run forw a rd a nd bow] aha nd grenade through the embra sure.

The Ferret unloading here fmrctionswell in reasonably open ereesIn some ba se ca mps, t he genera l purpose ma chineguns w ere in cosmolinein boxee while the old water-cooledVickers held the forts.

Tbe B rit ish ha d a superb n ew 84millimeter recoilless rifle th a t w ouldkneck out any tank and wae lighterand shorter than most o ther s imilara rms in use th roughout th e world, including th e new U S 90-millimeter recoillees rifle. But these weapons werenot req uir ed in t he jun gle. To someNovember 1966

extent a t least , the B rit ish cont inuedto use the 3.6-inch rocket launcherw hich w a s simpler, l ighter, a nd equallyeffective on Mala yeia n ta rgets.

Since the terrorists a nd the Ind onesia ns ra rely used more tha n 160 mentogeth er, B rit ieh forces in Mala yeiaoften did not need to opera te a bovecompany strength, Although Brit iehand Commonw ealth bat ta l ions andeven briga des sometimes ma neuveredtogeth er, pla toone were far more important in contact with the enemy.Jungle Tact ic sA platoon armed with rifles, andsmall a nd light ma chineguns carr iedsufficient a mmunition to engage in afa irly exteneive action w itbout r esupply. The import a nt rea sons for thiswere that these units were the hunters, not the hunted, and knew howto ta ke full a dvant a ge of the junglew hile denying its use to th eir enemies.Their w eapons a nd fire discipline w eregood. They changed their bivouac areaevery night , a nd perimeter securityin da rknese w ee a seured beca use oftheir experience a nd consta nt pra ctice.

As in other jungle combat a rea s,pat rolling a nd a mbuehee were of extreme value in Mala ysia, part icularlya t night . In order t o ma ke th eir offeneive maneuvers more effective, theB rit ish a dopted a system of compan ybases. These ear th , timber, a nd sometimes concret e fort kica tions w ere sur rounded by ba rbed w ire a nd punjis.They norma lly conta hed one 105-millimeter pack howitz er a nd tw o 81-millimeter morta rs, a nd relied hea vily onmedium ma chinegune in bunkers, usually the water-cooled Vickere.

The baeic idea of a defense of t histy pe, how ever, w a e to support offeneive pat rolling. A B rit ish rifle compan y conta ins four plat oons. One of\

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BRITISH IN MAIAYSlhthese, plus headquartersand assignedtroops, could hold a base ca mp whilea s ma ny a s th ree pat rolled outilde it .

The B rit ieh preferred a large number of small pat rols, in some inst a ncesno lar ger tha n a single squa d, to asma ll num ber of la rge pa tr ols. Theides w as to confuse the enemy. I t alsobad the seconda ry a dvant a ges of covering a larger am ount of ground an dimpressing more civilian s. If sma llpat rols w ere coordina ted, but irregular in t ime a nd pa th, th ey support edeach other.

The Brit ish a nd th eir allies ma def~ iends w ith t he jungle and with t heloca l inha bita nts. The G urkbas, w hoa re superb jung le fight ers, deservemuch credh in th is conn ection. Theya re intensely a mbitious milita rily, a ndth eir a bility to move in jungle terr a inby day or night was remarkable.The B rit ish used dogs w ith considerable success. For offensive operations, t hey developed a tr a cker teemthat usually coneisted of two dogs,each with a ha ndler , and two humantra ckers from t he inland Sa bah tribesknown as 2bans or Dayake.

Each dog handter and each Ibanha d a rifleman for protedion, a ndth ere wa s a comma nding officer a nda noncmumissioned officer with a ra dio for a tota l s tr engt h of 10. Thea nimals used in these units w ereusually La brador retrievers. One ofthese teems could move fast , far, andaccurately.

The B rit ish a 2ao used dogs for security a round th eir ba ses a nd fora lert ing patrols to da nger a t night .These animals were chosen for theirover-all alertness, viciousness, andsense of hear ing. G erma n sh epherdswere usually best for this mission.

B ri t ish a nd Malaysian forces w ereable to ma inta in a reel superiority

in intelligence, Mala ysian polic~ an dsecurity force bases were hit oceqsionally by emall units armed with morta re, rocket laun chers, a nd mediumma chineguns. B ut report s of theseunite usually reached the Brit ishwh ile the Indonesia ns w ere st il l ontheir own side of tbe border. Most ofthe penetra ting forces w ere a mbushedbefore they reached their objectives.

Ae long se Brit ish and Malaysianint elligence w a s superior to th a t ofthe enemy, th eir better ra dio andtra nsporta t ion equipment, includinghelicopters , a llow ed them to disperseto protect a large port ion of theborder a nd concentr a te for effectiveaction when neceseary.

Wha t l ies ah ead ? Can Malaysia ,wit hout B ritkh a nd other allied milita ry a nd economic a ssista nce, ma inta in int erna l pea ce an d successfullyrepel externa l overtures with a n a rmedforce of less than 20,000 men? Need1sss to say, a ny immediate withdra wa lor cessa tion of milita ry a nd economica ssistan ce w ould surely t a x the ingenuity of Mala ysian lea ders. The Ma laysian armed forces would certainlyprovide a n experienced nu cleue forcont inua tion of th e milita ry civic a ct ion program s an d jungle w ar fare ta ctics th a t h a ve eo fa r proved eucceeeful.

Ca pita lizing on Iessone lea rnedduring the past three years , enhan cing na tiona l ra pport , a nd establishing a eound economic ba ee te eueta inpresent a nd futur e progressive government programe are foremosta mong the problems facing Mala ysia.Continua tion of friend2y rela t ionswith neighboring countries a nd determ ina tion on th e par t of th e peoplewill contribute immeasura bly to resolving th ese problems a nd w ill lea dMalaysia forw a rd towar d a eolventindependent country.

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Brigadier General Lynn D. Smith,Uaited State8 Armg, Retired

Li%tzw6/a Ji%i%i!.+w

Dear Major:

Congratulations on your recent promotion. Inclosed is a set of leavesthat were given to another new major long ago. I am eorry not to be.present to pin them on you, but I will take this opportunity to discussyour new status ae a field grade officer. The field grade is a broad field,and thus these comments range from cabbages to kings. By the timeyou are wearing eagles, you may have different views on the matter. Theonly trouble is that by then you will be buckhg for a star, and in thatstate of frustration it is sometimes difficult to view your profession withobjectivity.

Today, you are still young enough to laugh at ulcers. Oh, I knowyoti already have seen action and been decorated, and the lieutenants inyour outfit refer to you as the old manfl but you are still younger thanthose who rank you. This will not alwaya be the case. Before you retire,some men now junior to you will be wearing more stars than you. Moreimportant, you will be taking orders from men in civilian clothes who areschoolboys today.That is one of the reasons for this letter. When the men making thebig decisions are older than you, their domain seems far removed, andyou do not lie awake nights quarreling with their judgment. Later, however, the destiny of the Nation will be in the hands of men who are yourcontemporaries or juniora rather than your elders. It is then that youmay think you can do a better job than they, particularly as it concernsnational strategy.


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I want to otFerfor your corwideration, therefore, some thoughts concerning strategy for the layman. Yes, even though you wear the uniform,you are as much a layman in the sphere of national strategy as the manin the gray flannel suit. When you have learned to live with this fact,YOU will have taken a long step toward professional objectivity.

As a starting point, consider the nuclear weapon. Before you retire, there may be devices which can effectively ward off the awesomedestructiveness of this weapon. As of the moment, however, the existenceof the nuclear-tipped ballistic missile drastically limits the ability ofarmed forces to perform their traditional role of interceding betweenthe enemy and the homeland. This has created a situation which demandsan understanding of the difference between a calculated risk and a gamble.. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel defined that difference in laymansterms:

It ia my experience that bold de&iona give the beet promise ofswcceiw. But O?W m~t di#erenti@e between strategti or tcwtical bokfneee and a military gamble. A bold operatwn is one in which eaccess &?not a certaint~, but which in caae of failure leaves one with. @kie?ztforcee in hand to cope with whatever eibaatwn may ariae. A gamble, onthe other hand, ia an operation which can lead either to victo~ or to thecomplete deetrwction of once force.

In the last 20 years there have been many, both in and out of uniform, who have londly urged bold courses of action in our nationalstrategy. For the occupants of the WMte House, however, the existenceof the nuclear weapon has caused such recommendations to be viewed asgambles in which the 10SScould be total, rather than as calculated risksin which a loss would leave the Nation with the ability still to cope withwhatever situation may arise.

Well, then, what is strategy? The Dictwmwyi of US MilitaW Tern-wfor Joint Usage contains a wide spectrum of definitions of the term. Thebroadest pertsins to national strategy:The art and science of developing amt using the political, economic,and p~chologiazl powers of a natwn, together with ite armed forces,dumngpeace and during war, to secure the national objective.Edward Mead Earle wrote:The highest tgpe of etrategy-eometimee called gvand etrategy-ia

thut which so integrate the pol%ee and ammwnents of the natwn thutthe reeort to war is either reno%ed unneceeeaw or ia cmdertaken withthe mummzm chunce of victov. . . . Strategy, tiwrefore, ia not merelya concept of wartime, but is an inhereni element of statecraft at all times.

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NEW MAJOR

That is not a new concept or a result of the nuclear age. AbrahamLincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt were well versed in this meaning ofstrategy. They were also aware of the pros and cons of bold operationsand military gambles. When President Lincoln finally found his generals,for example, he could take calculated risks. He could afford to let GeneralWilliam T. Sherman cut loose from his base and disappear into the heartof the Confederacy because if the operation failed, it would not have resulted in the complete destruction of the Union. When the entire Pacificappeared to be at the mercy of the Imperial Japanese war machine in1942, President Roosevelt could cooly calculate the risk and then givefirst priority to the elimination of Adolf Hitler.

Such freedom of action has not been available to a President of theUnited States since 1950 when the othef side acquired the bomb. In the1950s and 1960s, the men in the Oval Room have had to give far greaterweight to the possibility of rendering war unnecessary than to the alternative of maximum chance of victory.As a professional soldier, you must understand the difference between national strategy and military strategy. Military strategy is defined in the Dictionqt for Jo$nt Usage as:The art and .cCieme of employing the armed forces of a nution to

secure the objectives of national policy by the appltiatiun of fovce, orthe threat of force.If you master this art and science, you will earn all the stars anddecorations your country can bestow. You will be so occupied that youwill not have time to concern yourself with debates on the fine points ofthe political, economic, and psychological aspects of national strategy.

You learned the basic national objectives of our country when you werestill in grade school. These objectives were stated in their simplest andmost enduring terms in our Declaration of Independence as life, liberty,and the pursuit of happiness.The attainment of those objectives is in the sphere of the professional politician. The term politician is used in its proper and honorableconnotation. Websters dictionary defines a politician as one versed orexperienced in the science of government. Today, the science of government encompasses the population explosion, the effect on people of scien-Brigadier General Lzmn D. Smith, US Arnw, Retired, is a graduate andformer faeultg member of the US Armu War College. Hie aeaignments includeduty with the 18th Airborne CorP8; 8th Infantrg Divieicn; Director of the Reeerve Affaire Divieian, O&e of the Aeektant Secretarzi of Defense (Manpower);and Director, Enlieted Pereonnel Directorate, O&e of Pereonnel Operatio~,Department of the A?vrvy. I

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NEW MAJOR

tific and technological breakthroughs, the great and compelling effort toeliminate racial discrimination, the incalculable wealth of a few nations ina world where millions are still starving to death, and the demand for aplace in the sun by dozens of nations so new their names are not yet in theatlas. Under such conditions, the attainment of such apparently simpleobjectives as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness requires the leadership of the most professional of politicians.

As a personal checkpoint-to be noted periodically in the effort tomaintain your objectivity-I urge you, therefore, to remember that, although you wear the uniform, you are a layman in the field of nationalstrategy.Now, let us look a$ this business of being a field grade officer. Youhave just relinquished command of a company, probably the most satis.@ing command you will ever have-cert.ahlly, the most instructive. Neveragain will you live so C1OSCo the men who make up the Army. In yourtours of small unit troop duty, you have learned more about your fellowAmericans than Ph. D.s can learn in a lifetime of controlled experiments. When the time comes that your advice is sought as to the capabilities and limitations of the Armed Forces, the most important part& your recommendations will concern men. When you sit in a leatherchair acrose a table from a civilian member of the Government, yourauthoritative knowledge of the capabilities of men may well be yourgreatest contribution to national strategy.~ou have learned that the great majority of young men are trulyfine, regardless of their background. You have discovered that 100 percent of the mischief is caused by ahout three percent of the men, and

that the other 97 percent habitually abide by the rules because they understand that the rules are for their protection rather than for theirharassment. Remember this when prophets of doom preach the short&comings of the younger generation.You have Iived intimately in an environment where desegregationwas a fact long before the term civil rights became a byword, and youlearned to judge a man by his ability rather than the color of his skin.You have seen men demonstrate the real meaning of patriotism when the

chips were down. Some of those men probably did not cornwehend thesignificance of the pamphleta on Why We Fight, but they unhesitatinglyput their lives on the line for the fellowmen in their outfit. Interestingly enough, Websters first definition of the word patriot is fellowcountryman.In the years ahead, as your efforts are directed toward more nebulousmatters, you must not discount the importance of your knowledge ofmen. You have now advanced into that phase of your life where time

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NEW M AJOR

moves faster. When the gold leaves were pinned on your shoulders, itmay have seemed there was a long gap between major and major general,but before you really want it to happen you will be in the zone of consideration for general officer. In the meantime, the Army will devotemuch time and money educating you to use what you already have learned.

In this postgraduate part of your schooling, you will have the intellectual freedom to explore many concepts. You will be tempted to takeyour eye off the ball and become a dilettante with words and theories,ratherthan a practitioner of facts as you were when you commanded acompany. If tattooing were still in vogue, I would suggest that on theback of your right hand there be indelibly inscribed the words, I am anArmy officer, not a politician.~ and on the back of your left hand, wordshave no meaning in themselves.As a company officer you used words, usually in a direct exchangeof ideas with Sergeant Jones or Private First Class Doe. As you becameproficient in your job, you did not worry too much about the words themselves. Rather, you formed your judgment by the expression in PrivateFirst Class Does big blue eyes, or the slightly cynical droop of Sergeant

Jones? mouth. They,in turn, did not worry as much about your choice ofEnglish as they did about the set of your jaw when you asked, Do Imake myself clear ?Communication between you and the men of your command was loudand clear, even though it might have been unintelligible to a psychologiststudying motivation.Now, your end of that channel of communication is disconnected.In the future, you will deal with those men through others. Usually,what the others tell you will be in written form, or in a stylized oral presentation. Before it is too late, I hope you learn that words have no,meaning in themselves.The quotation is from Stuart Chase. Read his book, titled TheTgranny of Words, and you may avoid some of the frustration that causesmost of the ulcers in the Pentagon. That building has a large accumulation of the most articulate men in uniform, but too many of them spend

too much of their time manipulating words, Hundreds of young fieldgrade officers there put in 60 to 70 hours every week writing essayson everything from grand strategy to how many etripee a private firstclass should wear. These studies are then read by other field grade officerswho, in turn, write equally long and scholarly studies commenting on,and often nonconcurring with, the papers of their brethren.Sometimes these papers are shown to a general or a civilian official.Before this can be done, the hundred pages of the beautifully writtep

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essay are reduced to a single page contilning the meat of the matter,together with a recommendation as to why the idea should not be approved. The original author is convinced that his concept was not accepted because the recipients of his paper failed to grasp its true meaning,despite his lengthy and painful research to find exact and exotic wordsto express his ideas. Mr. Chase might have had these dedicated men inmind when he wrote, We assume we know exactly what we mean,and that readers who do not understand us should polish their wits.In this environment, reality can become obliterated in a plethoraof verbiage. Staff positions can become idols to be defended at allcast by words rather than ideas. Even pragmatic officers who shouldknow better can sometimes forget that a position paperfl which cleverlyand devaetatingly cuts the ground from under the opposition across the. hall, does not usually do much for an infantry platoon engaged in a searchand destroy mission in some far off jungle.Before long, Major, you will find yourself in that arena. As youdeal with problems far above the company level, your recommendationswill be baeed on judgment and logic more than on specific experience.Your ideas will be ueeful only if they can be communicated to others. In

thie matter of communication, Mr. Chases viewe, on the meaninglessness of worde in themselves, are worthy of wnsideration. An examplequoted from his book makes the point:Here are three paile of water, with temperatures ae indicated inthe dtigram:

A B

Put your left hand into pail A, and IIOW right hand in pail C. Nowwithdraw the left baud from A aud putit into B: Nice warm water.Withdraw the right huud from C aud put it into B: Brrr! beaetly coldwater. There is thus no absotute thing cold w warn?: The uee of lamguzzge to produce euch subetantivee ie false to the facte. Theee wordscanuot truly exprese thinge, but on.lg relatiom.

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You can chew on that for quite a while, Major, so I will bring thisto a close. In this pinning ceremony: I have imposed on your time tosuggest some guidelines that may bring tranquility rather than frustration in the remainder of your career. When you develop the grand planfor nations, right wheel ! remember you are a layman in the field ofnational etrategy. Remember, too, that the nuclear weapon and its fantastic delivery systems will require most bold concepts to be judged asrisky gambles by the men in civilian clothes who must make the finaldecisions. As you become older and tend to look on your fellow beingewith a more jaundiced eye, cheer yourself by recalling the fine thingsyou learned about men when you were a company officer. Finally, do notdespair when others fail to agree with your papere. It could be that thewords you used have a different relationship to the problem in the mindsof your readers than they do to you.There, Major, I know exactly what I mean, and if you do not understand it, you should polish your wits.

Affectionately,

Lynn D. SmithBG, USA, Ret

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.

WNiam D. FranklinSR Ha lford J . Ma ckinder in Democratic Ideata and R@tw observed tha t democra cy refuses to thinkstr a tegica lly unt il compelled t o do sofor purposes of defense. The influenceof Ma cklnders th ought ha s been w idea nd profound, a nd most ana lysis ofna tional str a tegy since 1942 ha s beenbased, in whole or in part, upon histh eories. H e believed th a t the SovietU nion occupied t he strotigest na tura lsea t of pnw er in the world, a nd his influence upon Soviet etrategic thoughtcannot be minimised. He was one ofthe first strategic thinkers to predictthe eventual clash between the tw ogreat est land and sespowers the w orldhas ever known.

BY the end of World Wa r II , theUnited Sta tes was undisputed maeterof th e w orlds oeea mi, w hile th e U SS Rhad ama ssed a landpower of garga ntua n dimensions. For the conta hnn entof this Communist landpow er, the US

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command of the sea is vital to thema intena nce of forces in Eu rope a ndAsia. Most of th e ear lier criticism ofMacklnders hear tla nd concept wa sconnected with the effects of new tech.nology upon stra tegy. I t wa a th oughttha t the introduction of th e long-ra nge bomber a nd intercontinent a lba llia tic missile (IC B M) w ith nuclearwa rheads w ould eupersede hia w orkin fa vor of a more esoteric mega deat hstra tegy.Pivot AreaThe hear tla nd wa a considered byMa &inder a s th e pivot a rea of w orldpow er. Viewing the w orld as a Mercat or projection, he a tt ributed overw helming import a nce to th e cont inental heart land.

Who rutee easterw Europe commaruta the Heartland; who rvde8 theHeartkwtd commande the wor3d island;who rules the world ieland commandethe world.

Ma ckinder visualized ea stern Eu rope as the heart land. H e classifiedthe ba lance of E urope a nd Aeia a e theinner or ma rginal crescent, a nd therest of th e w orld aa th e outer or insula r crescent . H e considered th e inner crescent rimla nds a a being exceptiona lly valua ble a e land bridges w hosepoeaeesion w ould enh a nce a na tionspow er posit ion. The la nd brid ges ofFra nce, I ta ly , Egypt , India , a nd Ko-

WiUiam D. Fra nklin is a n Aseizta ntResearch Economist in the Department of Economics, Texa8 Transportation I?wtit~te, Tezae Agmcultuvaland Mining University, CoUege Station, Texas. He holds a B.S. degree inHiatoW and Economic8, aud an M.S.in Economics. Hz is the author ofProbability, VtilitV, and NationalStrategy; which appeared in the August 1966 iseue of the MIL ITARY R E -VrEw.Wovemher986

MACKINDERS HEARTLANDrea would give the hear tla nd a doorwa y t o the sea, and, in a ddit ion, w ouldprovide a buffer betw een tbe hear tlan d a nd th e out er crescent . The Ru8sia n-Siberian a rea wa s tbe heart lan dof the World Isla nd, a nd occupied apoeition destined event ua lly t o dominate the outer crescent.

Concerning tbe doctr ine of sea-pow er, Ma cklnder believed tha t th eunity of the oceana meant nothing unless th e dominan t na vy a lso poseeseedna val bases at stra tegic pla ces onland.Naushofers Geopolitics

A G erma n soldier-echolar na medKa rl H a uehofer drew all of Ma ckinders concepte together int o th e science w hich he called geopolitics. H edeveloped bts theory in a n effort tojustify the G erma n expansion t ha treeulted in World Wa r II . Germa nyfailed to a cquire t he hear tla nd, but .her defea t left a resurgent SovietU nion in und isputed cont rol of th ea rea .

If G erma n geopolitica l doctr ineswere valid, nothing could prevent Soviet-Ch inese dominat ion of th e w orld.But they may not be valid. A briefexa mina tion of the genera l a nd limited conflict etrategiea will reveal thatthe essent ia l para meters of wa rfarehave, indeed, undergone drasticchanges since World War H. Nevertheless, it ca n be a rgued tha t in somerespects the stra tegic th eory of Mac-kinder is as viable in an IC B M an dthermonuclea r framework as i t wa ein the era of short-ra nge a ircra ft a ndgunpowder.

The frozen w a stes of th e Arctic, a ethey a ppear in a polar ra da r projection, offer scant protection in th e eventof war. An ICBM launched from underground or underw a ter could be delivered in 30 min ut es or lese to a

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MACKINDERS HEASTIAHDta rget a nyw here in the w orld-evento th e interior of the heart land.New w eapon systems ha ve virtua llycha nged the fundamental para metersof w a rfa re. One therm onuclear wea ponha s more firepow er tha n ha s been expended in all the wara in Klstery.

We ha ve a n implied sliding scaleof relevan ce embodied w ithkr th e a n-

U.9NewIn the event of war, hmdmassee andIr o&es of w st er w ould not prevent n uclear missiles from reaching the heart

land interiornourwed policies of our Governmenttha t indica tes tha t n ot a ll ca ses ofa ggression w ill he count ered w ith corn .plete reaction on th e genera l w a r level. ~Dr . H enry A. Kksinger felt tha t :

. . . all-out war corwtitutee a epecialcaae. It comes about through the ab

dication of politicrd leaa%ehip orwhea there exiete eo deep a echiembetwean the ce?rtctutere that the totrdde8t?wction of the encmg appeare tiwonlI/ goat worth contending for.It is one of t he most obvious a ndda ngerous ma nifesta t ions of the principle of lea st effort . It is simply menta lly easier to a t t empt the resolutionof seemingly una nsw era ble conflictsby th e a pplica tion of geomilita rymeans.

There ha s been pra ctica lly no occasion in recorded history w herein th evictor in a confikt put the entir e populat ion of the van quished to the sw ord,w hich, in a nuclear eense, ie th e implied result of general nuclear war.This would depict the death of populat ions in term s of millions, a th oughtw hich tends to assume a fuzzy a bstra ctness in the mind of most indlviduals.Major AltarnativeaNevertheless, decision makers, onnationaland internationallevels,muetcometo grips with the reality of totalthermonuclear conflict. In a worldabundantly supplied with multimega-tmr weapons and, therefore, destinedhenceforwardto be living always onthe edge of total disaster, new alter-natives, new solutions, and new con-cepts must receive thoughtful consid-eration. One of the major al ternat ivesto consider is locat ed a t a n int ermediate point on the conflict scale and has,a s a n a lternat ive to th ermonuclearw a r, been actively pureued a s policyby the U nited St a tes. This a lterna tiveis th e concept known a s limited w a r.

Approxima tely six month s a fter th ea rmistice w tilch ended th e Korea nWa r, Secreta ry of St a te J ohn FosterDun es coined th e term ma ssive reta liat ion in a speech before th e Council of Foreign Rela tione in New York

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MACKINDEQS HEARTLANDon 12 January 1964. Massive retal iation a s a response to a direct a tt ackupon us ha s genera lly been a cceptedas a ppropria te. P resident J ohn F.Kennedy invoked this type of threatened responee w ith th e Soviet U nionin relat ion to th e Cuba n crieie. Du ring eeaentially the same period, hea lso utillized th e eliding scale to ra spond in a dif ferent ma nner in south east Asia.Deterrent Force

In the interaction betw een na tions,the threat of wa r haa a lwa ya been aninst rument of diploma cy by w hich onesta te or na tion deterred a nother fromdoing someth ing of a milita ry or polit ical na ture w hich the former wishedto dela y or prevent. In a th ermonuclear sense, this impliee that the particular na tion ha s th e forcee in beingto implement a policy or str a tegy ofdeterrence.G enera l Cutile E. IAfa y ha s sta ted:

A deterrent fores is orw that &large enough that no matter whut theenemg does, either offeneivelp or defeneivelg, he etill will receive a quawtity of bombs or explosive force thati8 mare than he ia v@Wng to accept.

The nuclear sta lema te tha t existsbetw een the ma jor pow ere today ma yp$e~ ent general wa r for the present.On th e oth er h a nd, it will n ot preventlimited conS icte. It ma y, in fact, a sKieeinger ha s pointed out, even encoura ge them. Without the thin threa dof nuclea r dest ruction ha nging overevery periphera l decision, grea terboldness can be expected in confronta tions dealing with the Wimlands tothe Communist w orld.

Sin ce 19S9 a bout 18 different coun tr ies ha ve been incorpora ted into th eCommun ist w orld a nd encloeed behindthe Iron or B amboo Curta ina . I t wa sreadily a ppa rent tha t the Soviet U nion

intended to pursue the expansionisticpolicies advoca ted by H a ushofer dur ing th e Adolf H itler period,

From a geopolitica l sta ndpoint, th eU SS R recognized th e signitkxmce ofth e inn er crescent a s both a buffera gainet the outer crescent a nd aa astra tegic outlet to the oceans t ha tcould s ecure a jumping off place toth e event ua l conq uest of the empiresof the sea made up of the islands ofth e outer or insula r crescent. E ssentia lly follow ing th e pat tern la id downby Ha ushofer, a nd uti l izing the historica l interpretat ion of Ka rl Ma rx aato th e event ua l expan sion of communism, the Soviets began the expanaionof the heart land both during a nd following World War II.First Limited War

P resident Ha rry S Truman, w hoha d been observing th is expan sion a spar t of the big picture of world gee- .politica l movement e, decided th a t th isinner creecent must be denied theComnmniets. He felt tha t denial ofthe rimlands would conta in furth erexpan eion of th e Commun iet hea rt lan d, a nd a nnounced his policy a s euchin 1947, w ith t he Trum a n ~doctr ine,promising a id to G reece an d a ll othercountr ies th reat ened by Communistexpa nsion. As P resident of th e mostpow erful nuclea r na tion on ear th , herestra ined tha t power a nd entered hiacount ry into the f ira t limited w a r ofthe nuclear age.

The fundam enta l cha ra cteristic tha tdistinguishes limited w a r from genera l w a r is th e import a nt concept ofrestra int . I t is a wa r fought to a chievelimit ed object ives. The pur pose of limited w a r, ae Kissinger pointed out, isto infl:ct loseee or to pose risks forth e enemy out of propofilon to t he objectives under dispute. It requires adesire by both eides not to exceed cer-

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MACKINDERS HEARTLANDta in restra ints-a sort of ta cit bar gain th a t might conceiva bly includestr a tegic bombing on selected ta rgetasuch as a irstrips or a mmunitiondumps w hile being a s careful a s possible not to hit cities.

Korea wa s a periphera l a nd l imitedwa r, an d represented the only meansfor prevent ing, a t a n a ccepta ble cost,th e eapan eion of th e Communist ha a rt-

U S AmwGeneral Curt is E. LsMay

land. During a nd since this period, theU nited St a tes ha s declined to employeven limited nuclear wa r. I t has beenfelt tha t t his relucta nce is a clear indica tion or signal tha t the U nitedSt a tes w a nt ed t e keep conflicts limited to conven t iona l w ea pons. All evidence points to the fact that this signa l ha s been received a nd a greed uponby the Communists.

The U nited St a tes is in a conflictin sonth east Asia in wh ich m en a ndma chines a re used not merely t o dest roy or conq uer, but for psychologica l gain a s tokens of int ent in a grimga me of bluff a nd coun t erbluff. Thea6

key to the game is credibility~w hich means the ca pacity to conveyones int ent in unmist a ka ble form bydiploma t ic-milita ry signa ling. This iathe overwhelming a dvant a ge to thelimited nonnuclea r w a r stra tegy. B othsides a re permitt ed to signal t heir desires in a more adequate ma nner t hanw ould be poseible in a genera l w a r.Industrial Potential

An import a nt a spect of limited conventional wa r is the fact tha t i t permits the mobilizat ion of th e indust ria lwa r potentia l of both t he U nitedSt a tes a nd the pat i lcular count ry defended, Thue, if conflicts a re limitedto th e Korean or south east Wlan -ty pe,tbie mobilizat ion of th e indust ria lbase can be employed to the greateststra tegic advantage.

The Communist world cannot matchth e Western World in th is respect,a nd thie gives a n overwhelming a dva nt a ge to th e West in a ny limited orcont rolled conflict. In recent ycar e, th eimport a nce of th is tr emendous industria l potentia l w as overshadowed instra tegic thinking beca use w a r wa sbeing th ought of in a tota l ly nuclearsense that would not permit any timefor mobiliza t ion. Any poten t ia l formilita ry production possessed by a nycount ry wa s discount ed beca use i t wa ebelieved it w ould be crippled or w ipedout in th e first few boors of deva station.

It is clea r t ha t und er limited wa rcondit ions th is it not tr ue. With th einitia l commitm ent by the U nitedSta tes in any l imited wa r , a smal l undercurrent of stra tegic industria l mobilizat ion ia set into motion. If thewa r then progresses th rough va rioussta ges of esca lat ion, a t each sta gemore of th ie pota nt ial is brought intouse. Then, a s th e conS ict esca lat es intoever grea ter ferocity , a n increasing

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MACKlt40ERS HEASTLANDa mount of industr y. is convert ed toproducing military hardware. Therefore, even if the limited conflict doesevent ua lly degenera te into genera lw a r, the initial l imita tion ha s permitt ed t he moblliza ticin of th e st ra tegic indust ria l base over time. Thetime fa ctor in th is type of conversionfrom nonstr a tegic to str a tegic production can mean, perhaps, the criticaldifference between ultimate success orfailure.Assessment of Probabilities

It is evident th a t t he proba bilitiesconnected w ith each str a tegic move inlimited war can be assessed with considerably more empirical knowledgethan could thoee connected with general war. The decieion maker, eitherpolitica l or milita ry, ha s a baee ofknowledge, informa t ion, experience,and belief that can be utilized to as.eign a subjective proba bility w eightto a par ticular str a tegic decieion, H ema y ha ve a limited ty pe of frequ encydistribution a ccumulat ed a e a resultof previous deeisione th a t can be considered in a rriving at a current decieion.

As a limited w a r progresses up th eeca le of ever grea t er violence, ea ch esca la tion can be subject ively ,w eighedin relat ion to th e proba bilities a ssigned a s a result of previous moveseith er up or down t he violence scale.G iven the individua l mix of cireumstancee that determine each subjective weight a t a given time, the individual decision maker may view theviolence eca le a nd t he probability scalea s moving in tbe sa me direction, inversely, or a s ha ving no relat ionshipat al l .

I f he fe

Documents

Military Review November 1966