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Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

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Page 1: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Military Coups and Military Rule

Political Economy of the Global SouthProf. Tyson Roberts

Page 2: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

What are the goals/motivations of national leaders?

Page 3: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Possible goals of national leaders

• Wealth• Power• National interests • Social group interests – Class, ethnic group, religious group, family/clan)

• Corporate interests (e.g., military)• Ideology

Page 4: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Intermediate vs. final goals

• Power => wealth• National prosperity => power• Ideology => class interests• Power => national prosperity

Page 5: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Intermediate vs. final goals

• Power => wealth• National prosperity => power• Ideology => class interests• Power => national prosperity– This is what most leaders say, but their actions

betray them

Page 6: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

How do the motives of national leaders in low income countries differ from those in wealthier countries, and why?

Page 7: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Some differences in motives/goals

• Lower income countries– Relatively more wealth-motive in politics– Power-motive rulers more difficult to remove– Politically relevant groups may differ• e.g., ethnic group rather than economic class

Page 8: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Self-selection => More money-motive rulers in low-income countries

Developed country Less developed country

$ $

Politics

Business

Politics

Business

Page 9: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

“Natural” selection =>More (explicitly) power-motive rulers in low-income countries

Developed country Less developed country

P I

N P

P I

N P

Page 10: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Indicators of (unrestrained) power motive

• Coronation ceremony• Opulent palace(s)• Unqualified relatives in

important military and government posts

• Execution of senior government & military officials w/o trial

• Cannibalism• Billion dollar Swiss bank

personal accounts

Page 11: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Methods to restrain ruler

• Rule of Law (institution)• Separation of powers– Law-making, purse, executive, judiciary

• Veto points• Accountability (ability to remove ruler)

Page 12: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

What are some ways to remove a leader who is not performing satisfactorily?

Page 13: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Methods to remove leader

“Regular” methods• Term limits• Direct vote• Party vote• Parliament vote“Irregular” methods (domestic)• Military coup• Rebellion• Popular protest• AssassinationDeposed by another state

Page 14: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

What are advantages and disadvantages of regular methods v. coup v. revolution v. foreign intervention?

Page 15: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Rulers are at risk of removal by multiple methods

• US: Term limits & direct vote• UK: Party vote & parliamentary vote• Zaire, Libya, Iraq (under Hussein): Rebellion,

military coup, and foreign state– State is autonomous from citizens=> popular

protest unlikely to be effective• Iraq (current): Party vote, parliamentary vote,

military coup, rebellion, foreign state

Page 16: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Rulers assess the greatest risks and take steps to remain in power

• Mobutu judged military to be greatest threat• “split his military into many different units so

that each can function as a check on the others” (Collier p. 149)

• Outcome: overthrown by invasion from Rwanda

Page 17: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

In general, military coup is the greatest risk among “irregular” exits

Source: Goemans et al 2009

Page 18: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Irregular exits generally lead to exile, imprisonment, or death

Source: Goemans et al 2009

Page 19: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

In some cases, the military coup has a constitutional basis

• Brazilian constitutions of 1891, 1934, 1946 (via Stepan 1988): – Military should obey the president “within the limits of the

law”– Military is a permanent national institution charged with

maintaining internal law & order and of guaranteeing normal functioning of constitutional powers

• Turkey (1920 constitution, etc.):– military guardian of secular tradition

• Thailand– Military’s first priority is loyalty to throne, not elected gov’t

Page 20: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Military prerogatives that can compromise/threaten civilian control (Stepan

1988)• Constitutionally sanctioned independent role of military

in political system• Active-duty participation in Cabinet & defense

department civil servant jobs• De facto control of armed services• De facto control of military budget & promotions• Control of intelligence & police• Control of key state enterprises• National-security laws and military-court system cover

large areas of political and civil society

Page 21: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Examples of civilian rule with high military prerogatives

• Egypt• Pakistan• Turkey (civilians now exerting more control)• Brazil (before most recent democracy)• Thailand

Page 22: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Rulers at greater risk of coup if...(Collier 2009)

• Government not severely repressive• Previous coups, in country or neighborhood• Ethnic polarization (in Africa ONLY)• Low income• Poor economic performance• Aid dependence• Ruler in power for a long time• Not recent years• No term limit

Page 23: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

• Huntington: “modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability”

• But economic growth deters military coups

Page 24: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Number of successful coups (1960-2008) and GDP/capita in 1960

Source: Center for Systemic Peace

Page 25: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Geographic distribution of coups

Source: Ppwell and Thyne 2011

Page 26: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Temporal pattern of coups

Source: Ppwell and Thyne 2011

Page 27: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

If the military has all the guns, why don’t they stay in power?

Page 28: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

• Military in politics leads to politics in military• Don’t want to be held responsible for

economic and social problems• Don’t have expertise in communicating with,

motivating, etc. the masses

Page 29: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Principal-Agent Model

• Principal: `A chief actor or doer; the chief person engaged in some transaction or function, esp. in relation to one employed or acting for him (deputy, agent, etc.); the person for whom and by whose authority another acts’ (see Brooker p. 41)

Page 30: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Military Regimes

• Military is principal • Chief executive (perhaps a junta chairman or a

civilian figurehead president) is agent

Page 31: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Military Regimes

Brazil 1964

Greece 1967Burma

Page 32: Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Although Egypt’s President Sisi was elected in 2014, many consider Egypt to be a military regime

• 2011: Youngest member of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) during Egyptian Revolution

• 2012: Appointed Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief by President Morsi

• 2013: Ousted Morsi in coup • 2014: Resigned from military

and elected president• 2015: Continued crack-down

on Muslim Brotherhood