The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 7 | Issue 12 | Number 1 | Article ID 3087 | Mar 16, 2009

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Militarism and Anti-militarism in South Korea: "MilitarizedMasculinity" and the Conscientious Objector Movement.

Vladimir Tikhonov

Militarism and Anti-militarism in South Korea:“Militarized Masculinity” and the ConscientiousObjector Movement.

Vladimir Tikhonov (Pak Noja)

Korea – "a national defense/conscription state"

It is a well-known fact that warfare andobligatory military service system long playeddecisive role in the formation of modern nation-states, first in Europe and later elsewhere inthe world. While externally the militaryprowess of a given state was (and still is)decisive for defining its place in a competitiveinternational system explicitly based upon anequilibrium of military force and hegemonicinterstate relations,

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internally conscription-based national armies formerly served as mainpillars of the state, linking conscript-age able-bodied males with the nationalist ethos1 andacculturating them to views and practices oftenreferred to as “militarized masculinity culture”.“Militarized masculinity”, both in theconscription states and in states possessinglarge-scale military but relying upon avolunteer force in peacetime, usually involvesboth a gendered view of the world in which theable-bodied man, the “defender of thefatherland”, was unconditionally privilegedover women, defined either as sexualizedobjects or as child-rearing “mother of thenation”, and a shared feeling of superioritytowards men unfit for or unwilling to engage incombat (handicapped, conscientious objectors,etc.).2 Examples of modern states which choseto define their whole able-bodied male citizenryas potential soldiers and use conscription asthe primary instrument of “creating nationals”,

include revolutionary and post-revolutionaryFrance (which began the history of modernconscription by declaring the levée en masseon August 23, 1793), and the Prussian state,which began introducing French-styleconscription practices after suffering a defeatat the hands of Napoleon’s conscript army in1806-1807.3 In more recent times, the state ofIsrael successfully used a comprehensiveconscription system applicable to both men andwomen. The conscription system inculcatedZionist ideals and the newly-forged Israelinational identity, as well as a siege mentalitybased upon the imperative of the “nationaldefense” against the demonized Arabic/Muslimworld, into the minds of a very heterogeneousbody of citizens,4 In South Korea too, as we willsee below, conscription provides an ideologicalfiction of equality, the exclusion of women fromthe conscription system and, consequently,much more manifestly the “hegemonicmasculine” character of the army being animportant difference.

While the classical militarized masculinity ofthe nineteenth century conscription statestended to grant able-bodied male “nationals”,as potential soldiers, a privileged place in the“national” discursive hierarchy, it marked allresisters and evaders, actual and potential,either as ideological delinquents lacking loyaltyto the “nation”, or as moral delinquents placingtheir personal well-being above “nationalinterests”. Both resisters and evaders becamean easy target for often extremely violent in-group exclusion, which was supposed to“strengthen the national spirit” and preventany further deviations from dominantideological and behavioral forms. In heavier

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militarized and illiberal states like pre-WorldWar I Germany, predominantly religiousmilitary objectors – the members of suchminority peace churches as the Mennonites andAdventists – were subject to routine abuse,imprisonment and scornful press coverage, as“non-patriots”.5 In France after defeat in thewar with Germany in 1870-71 and before WorldWar I, draft resistance was viewed as sacrilege,unacceptable rebell ion against basicRepublican values,6 While the “official”nationalisms in pre-World War I France andGermany used each other in order to create animage of an implacable external enemy, allthose deviating from the norms of militarizednationalist masculinity were conceptualized asan internal threat to the nation’s defense andits very existence. The negative otherization ofall who were unwilling to conform to thedominant militarist ethos became an organicpart of the general nationalist worldview ofcontinental 19th century European conscriptionstates. A similar worldview has been used bythe South Korean elite in order to consolidatesoc ie ty on the an t i - communis t anddevelopmentalist platform, create a climate ofuniformity and conformity and prevent theemergence of deviations from dominant modesof thinking and behavior.

As is the case with many other modern states,South Korea’s (hereafter referred to as Korea,except to differentiate South and North Korea)officially defined “nation” and mainstream,establishmentarian nationalism are inseparablyconnected to universal male conscription.While the institutional history of conscription inKorea is comparatively short – as explainedbelow, it was introduced by the Japanesecolonial authorities in 1943 – its discursivehistory is much longer. Conscription as thecornerstone of the military strength of thecontinental European powers was repeatedlymentioned in the publications of Korea’searliest modern newspapers, Hansǒng Sunbo(October 30, 1883 – August 21, 1884) andHansǒng Chubo (January 25, 1886 – July 14,

1888). One of the young reformist intellectualscharged with editing Hansǒng Sunbo, Yu Kiljun(1856-1914), included a detailed account of theconscription system in his encyclopedic SǒyuKyǒnmun (A Record of Personal Experiences inthe West). Explaining that, unlike thecontinental European countries, the US andBritain used voluntary recruitment inpeacetime, he also emphasized the “warlikespirit” of the Anglo-Saxon countries by addingthat Britons and Americans “receive militarytraining when they are not busy, in such amanner that all citizens become soldiers”. Hestressed also that conscription of the French orGerman type “equally makes both noble andbase, rich and poor join the colours” and thatthe essence of keeping a modern standingarmy, conscript or voluntary, is in training anddisciplining the soldiers, singling out theJapanese conscript soldiers, “known forsometimes getting into trouble with the police”as not yet well enough trained.7 Modernmilitary – and the continental conscript armieswere obviously seen as among the predominanttypes of modern military – was viewed by Yu asone of the main components of “civilization”.These views were essentially shared by theinfluential courtier and diplomat, MinYǒnghwan (1861-1905), who concluded thatuniversal conscription made BismarckianGermany the strongest state on the continent.On October 21, 1896, he urged king Kojong tofollow the example of the Russians, whostrengthened themselves by introducingconscription, by introducing it, together withmodern schooling for both sexes, into Korea –even though many other “Western customs”could not be introduced.8

Alarmed by the Russian advance intoManchuria in the wake of the Boxer Rebellionin 1900, Kojong soon decided to follow thisadvice and had the General Staff (Wǒnsubu)draw up a draft of a conscription edict – only tobe thwarted in August 1901 by objections fromcertain (unnamed) senior bureaucrats.9 On theurging of his closest advisers,10 Kojong

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managed, however, to override the objectionsof conservatives, for whom the principle ofuniversality of modern conscription lookeddangerously close to the “undesirable” idea ofcivic equality, and ultimately promulgated theconscription edict on March 15, 1903. Theedict represented a compromise of sorts, asmodern conscription was explained as“restoration” of a purported “ideal” Confucianmilitary system, in which “military affairs andagriculture were the same, and all four classesof the subjects learned military skills” and the“conscription rules of various countries” werereferred to only in passing.11 However, theedict was never realized in practice, due toadministrative shortcomings and chronicfinancial deficits.12 The Korean state wasunable to render effective military resistance toJapanese troops, who occupied the countrywithout a single shot being fired at the start ofthe Russo-Japanese War in February 1904,Korea’s relatively small professional army,formally numbering around 16,000 officers andmen, was gradually reduced in size underJapanese pressure, before being forciblydissolved on August 1, 1907.13 As Korea wasdeprived of its sovereignty and became aprotectorate of Japan on November 17, 1905,hopes that the government would establish ameaningful conscription system, disappeared.However, in many cases nationalistic educatorswere attempting to take the matter into theirown hands and provide the boys in the newlyestablished “modern” schools with someamount of basic military training befitting“patriotic nationals”. Pyongyang’s TaesǒngSchool, established on September 26, 1908, bythe noted Protestant nationalist educator andpolitician An Ch’angho (1878-1938), not onlyhad “military gymnastics” on its curriculum forall 3 years, but also treasured the custom ofperiodically arousing its boys on nights forharsh training sessions, which sometimesincluded marching barefoot in the snow.14

“Warlike spirit” was generally seen by theintellectuals in the early nationalist milieu as acrucial component of modern life, “Spartan

training” in the schools being considered thesecond best choice in a situation whereconscription was not possible.

After Japan’s full annexation of Korea in 1910,the military and/or physical training of Koreanyouth remained one of the main concerns of AnCh’angho, now an exiled, mostly US-basednationalist activist. He founded the YoungKorea Academy (Hǔngsadan) in San Franciscoon May 13, 1913, basing it on the Spencerianidea of the “harmonious development ofintellect, morals, and body” which was widelyp o p u l a r i n K o r e a i n t h e 1 9 0 0 s . I t s“Constitution” (yakpǒp) lists training in militarygymnastics or another sort of sports as acondition for membership.15 On April 29, 1920,An Ch’angho, then in Shanghai in connectionwith the organization of the Korean ProvisionalGovernment (where he was appointed insuccession as Minister of the Interior, ActingPrime- Minister, and Labour Office Director),organized the Far Eastern Committee(Wǒndong Wiwǒnbu) of the Young KoreaAcademy, which had its own Sport Section(Undongbu) and routinely included sportcompetitions (undonhoe) in its regularmeetings.16 While considering “preparations”and “cultivation of strength” for Korea’sindependence in the future as its first priority,An Ch’angho did not exclude a military option,and mentioned in his famed 1920 New YearSpeech (Sinnyǒnsa) that, in order to preparefor an eventual “war for independence” theémigré Koreans, men and women, had torealize the “principle of universal military duty(kaebyǒngjuǔi) and spend at least one hourdaily in military training. An concluded that“those who do not learn military skills are notKoreans. (…). Those who do not train inmilitary skills oppose the principle of universalmilitary duty. Those who oppose the principleof universal military duty oppose the war forindependence. And those who oppose the warfor independence are oppose independence”.17

Conscription, together with tax-paying, wasproclaimed the main duty of Korea’s (male)

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citizens in the “Charter” (Hǒnjang) publishedby the newly-established Shanghai ProvisionalGovernment on April 11, 1919, and wasmentioned in most projects for Korea’s futurestatehood worked out by the ProvisionalGovernment and the groups affiliated with it.18

However, all the military units organized by theProvisional Government from October 1938onwards in order to assist China’s Nationalistgovernment in its struggle against Japaneseinvasion, were voluntary:19 the ProvincialGovernment had no administrative apparatus atits disposal to conscript Korean residents ofChina.

While An Ch’angho’s position on universalmilitary training for Korean emigrants washardly more than a declaration of principle,another prominent nationalist in exile, PakYongman (1881-1928), undertook to realize thedream of the “people in arms” – at least, on thelevel of one small-sized community. Havingarrived in the US in February 1905, Pak, at thattime politically and personally allied withSyngman Rhee (Yi Sǔngman, 1875-1965),promptly established himself as one of theleaders of the Korean-American community,and founded in June 1909 a Boys’ MilitarySchool (Sonyǒnbyǒng Hakkyo) in Kearney,Nebraska. He hoped this would develop into“Korea’s West Point”.20 In April 1911, whilestudying at the University of Nebraska, Pakwrote and published in the Korean-Americannewspaper Sinhan Minbo (which he edited) histreatise on the necessity of conscription,entitled On Universal Military Duty (KungminKaebyǒng non, republished by America-basedTongnip between April 11 and August 22,1945). Pak described war as inevitable due tothe inescapability of the “struggle for survival”,and emphasized that conscription, whoseorigins he traced back to ancient Sparta, wasthe only way to respond to the challenges of the“commercial age”, when inter-nationcompetition intensified to the degree that “oneis necessarily attacked by others unless oneattacks them first”.21 After moving to the

biggest center of Korean-American life, theHawaii Islands, in early December 1912, PakYongman succeeded in establishing a larger(180-strong first enrolment) Korean militaryschool. But by 1915, he had run into a conflictwith his erstwhile friend Syngman Rhee overthe f inances of the Korean-Americancommunity. Rhee, a moderate who did notanticipate a “war for independence” in theforeseeable future, and viewed the attainmentof independence as first and foremost adiplomatic task, wanted to use the funds foreducational purposes. Pak Yongman’s ultimatedefeat in this confl ict shows that the“militarization” of the Korean-American societywas hardly a popular priority among America-based Koreans in the 1910s. However, thebelief that military training, together withregular schooling, was essential in creatingworthy “nationals” (kungmin) seemed to bewidespread.22

While Korean émigrés in the US or China werefree to elaborate publicly on the virtues ofconscripting and drilling Korean youth, andeven to organize some model drilling centers,the intellectuals of colonial Korea, writing inheavily censored newspapers and journals, hadto limit themselves to glorifications of Korea’s“warlike” past and appeals to Korean youth toimprove their physical condition. Yi Kwangsu(1892-1950), a famous novelist and one of AnCh’angho’s prominent disciples, wrote in hisMinjok Kaejoron (On the reconstruction ofKorean Nation: Monthly Kaebyǒk, May 1922issue) that “remaking” Koreans into modern“nationals” would require not only a library andschool, but also a stadium for every county –together with mass-production of hygiene- andsports-related books.23 Sports were seen as anopportunity to produce a strong and disciplinedcitizenry and were one of the main foci ofnationalist activities well into the late 1930s.However, discussions about conscriptionemerged in earnest when Japan, in dire need ofnew recruits after having launched full-scaleinvasion of China in 1937, in 1938 allowed

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Koreans to “voluntarily join the Imperial Army”.The Korean Education Law (Chosen Kyōiku rei)was also revised for the third time, introducinga much stronger military element into schoolcurricula. While the decision to switch towholesale conscription of Korean youth wasfinally taken by the Japanese government onlyon May 8, 1942,2 4 there was already anatmosphere of “all-out mobilization” in the late1930s. Many Korean nationalist intellectuals,partly under pressure, partly based on theirown racialized, Social Darwinian vision of theworld, came to see Japan’s expansion abroadand its officially proclaimed policy of naisenittai (“Interior [Japan] and Korea as one body”)as a certain form of fulfillment for Korea’s owndream of national greatness and a world-historical role. They voiced support for Koreanrecruitment into the Japanese army, oftenadvertising for the Japanese military.25 So,while hardly enjoying popularity amongordinary Koreans, conscription became anarticle of the intelligentsia’s nationalist faith –conscripting or providing voluntary militarytraining to émigré Koreans being an importantpart of the nationalist exiles’ plans forrestoration of the nation’s sovereignty.Conscripting and disciplining Korean masseswas the proclaimed wish of “pro- Japanese”colonial nationalists in the late 1930s-early1940s, who, for a variety of reasons, came toview Koreans as a part of the bigger “Japaneserace” and Japanese state. Although notimplemented in Korea until the mid-1940s, itbecame a central part of the Korean discourseon modernity.

Korean youths conscripted by the Japaneseauthorities in the last years of the Pacific

War

Conscription, first applied to Korean subjects ofthe Japanese Empire by Japanese colonialauthorities in 1943 (promulgated March 1,effective August 1), was reintroduced soonafter the establishment of the post-colonialKorean state on August 15, 1948. The firstMilitary Duty Law (pyŏngyŏkpŏp), promulgatedon August 6, 1949, drew largely on colonialprecedents and continental European (Germanand French) models, putting all male citizensunder the age of 40 under service obligations,requiring those whose obligations wereunfulfilled to return from sojourns abroadbefore reaching the age of 26 (and prohibitinganybody above this age from traveling abroaduntil fulfillment of the service obligations).Exceptions were only made for those declaredmedically unfit, criminals, or delinquents.26 Inanticipation of the coming all-out conflict withthe competing regime in the Northern part ofthe peninsula and wishing to “consolidate” themilitaristic nationalist platform and crushdiscontent among citizens at official corruptionand the dire socio-economic situation, theSyngman Rhee regime began from an earlypoint to militarize the schools as well: onDecember 26, 1948, regular military exerciseswere introduced in all schools above the middlelevel.27 In the beginning of the Korean War, on

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December 1, 1951, all male Korean students onthe high school level and above wereproclaimed soldiers of the “student army”(haksaenggun), to be drilled by active-dutyofficers on a regular basis; on April 1, 1953, itwas declared, in the “Rules for the Execution ofthe Order on the Conduct of the Student ArmyDrills” (haksaenggun hullyǒn silsiryǒng sihaengkyuch’ik), Defence Ministry Order No.16/Education Ministry Order No. 29), that theappropriate amount of drill time for high schoolstudents was 156 hours per year, with 5obligatory days in field camp.28

In exchange for participation in trainingrotines, the students – most of whom were atthat point coming from better-off families –received draft deferments from the start of theconscription system in 1949.29 In wartimeconditions, it was an enormous privilege, whichmeant that the scions of the propertied classesmight be legitimately spared the horrors of thefrontlines. It simultaneously underlined theinherently unfair nature of what was supposedto be “universal” conscription. The defermentsystem was scrapped in 1958, but studentscontinued to enjoy an important privilege ofserving only 18 months, that is half the usualterm for conscripted non-students.30 Theprivileges the country’s would-be educatedelite in discharging its military serviceobligations, were defended by the mainstreamright-wing newspapers, Tonga Ilbo and ChosǒnIlbo, on the grounds that higher educationrepresented a crucial element of “nationalstrength”, but was bitterly resented by manywhose offspring were unlikely to share inthem.31 In addition to legal privileges, illegalones for the rich and well-connected presentedanother good reason for popular resentment. Inthe chaos of the war, and under SyngmanRhee’s corrupt and inefficient administration,the actual workings of the conscription systemdiffered vastly from the orderly ideal of law-abiding citizens dutifully presenting themselvesto recruiting agencies upon receiving their firstofficial notice .32 Corruption was generally

rampant in the military forces, especially on theissues of military recruitment.33 Lack ofconnection or inability to bribe one’s way out ofthe system could expose a conscripted youth toall sorts of abuse, including, for example, beingforced to serve in the army twice.34 Many youngpeople, lacking any trust in government andafraid of bad conditions and harsh treatment inthe army, did everything possible to evade thedraft. Even according to official statistics for161,470 young males successfully drafted intothe army between September 1955 andSeptember 1956, there were 33,361 evaders,35

a situation that did not change significantlythroughout the 1950s. In 1959, around 16% ofthe conscription-age males were dodging thedraft – approximately the same share as in1955 (16,8%).36 The state was perceived asexternally imposed and predatory, thebureaucrats were considered self-interestedrent-seekers, and the wide use of nakedviolence by the state reduced its perceivedlegitimacy. In such a situation, the conscriptionstate sought by Syngman Rhee and hisassociates, could hardly succeed: conscriptionwas, justifiably, seen as a “poor man’s draft”,which burdened the poorer disproportionablyand was relatively easy to avoid for the sons ofthe rich and influential.

The situation began to change in themid-1960s, however, as Pak Chǒnghǔi’s (ParkChung-hee) government, involved in theVietnam War on the US side and aspiring tomilitarize the country to prevent the growingworking class from becoming “restive”,simultaneously tightened implementation of theconscription laws and started a large-scaleindoctrination campaign aimed at winningideological hegemony for the “national defensestate” the regime was building. Immediatelyafter the junta led by Pak Chǒnghǔi assumedpower on May 16, 1961, a national campaignagainst draft evasion was launched. The special“voluntary surrender periods” (chasu kigan),which allowed evaders to report to theauthorities and simply perform their service

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with minimum or no punishment, werepromulgated twice in 1961 and 1962.37 Alreadyin early June 1961, 9,291 civil servants,including teachers, even in the private schools(customarily counted as “semi-civil servants” inKorea), were fired from their positions forfailure to join the army at the appropriatetime.38 The military manpower administration,previously a joint field of responsibility betweenthe Interior Ministry (Naemubu) and theDefense Ministry, was from November 15,1962, concentrated in the hands of the specialMi l i tary Manpower Admin is t ra t ion(Pyǒngmuch’ǒng), with regional bureaus in allprovinces and bigger cities and 2010 speciallytrained employees nationally.39 The still-existing, although somewhat lenient, system ofstrict ly control l ing foreign travel byconscription-age males (under 35), whichrestricted permits for general traveling to 1y e a r , a n d f o r s t u d y t o 4 y e a r s f o rundergraduates and 3 years for postgraduatestudy courses, with cancellation of passportsafter the expiration of the permit periods, wasput in place on October 5, 1963 (DefenseMinistry order No. 84).40 Foreign travel andstudy abroad were still largely elite pursuits inthe 1960s, and the number of conscript-agemales who were granted individual permits bythe Defense Minister to travel abroad totaled5,916 for all of the 1960s. Of them, 299 did notreturn, and their guarantors and familiesbecoming objects of punishment.41 This aimedat strengthening the myth of “equality” infulfilling military service and thus consolidatedthe ideological foundations of the new militaryregime.

Medical check-up of conscripts, 1970s

The strengthening the administrative machine,fear-provoking campaigns against both draft-evaders and their corrupt “abettors” in officialpositions, obligatory national identificationcards from 1968 with fingerprints, stampedupon having completed military service,42 andother related measures drove down the rate ofevasion from military service to a negligible0.1% in 1974,43 thus giving people the view thatmilitary service as an inescapable part of a“normal” male lifecycle. They subjected tomilitary drills from an early age: militarytraining was re-introduced to the universitiesfrom 1968 and strengthened from December1970.44 Starting in 1969, mandatory, basicmilitary training (kyoryǒn) was also taught toboth to male and female students (the latterfocused upon emergency aid) in all highschools.45 It was praised as the way to make a“real man” (chincha sanai) on all levels ofeducation, in mass culture, and in the media.Draft-evaders were made national scapegoats,accused of being both unpatriotic and unmanly,as manliness was now firmly identified withwilling service in the army. This concentratedflow of militaristic propaganda, together withthe strengthened popular legitimacy of the PakChǒnghǔi regime brought about by tangibleeconomic success, seems to have won“ideological hegemony” of sorts for theconscription state. By the end of the 1970s,disgust at the “poor men’s draft” so widespreadin the 1950s-60s, was largely replaced by

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acceptance, if somewhat grudgingly andunwillingly, of military service as an organicpart of a “normal” male life and as natural as acitizen’s duty to pay taxes or complete primaryand secondary education. Viewing militaryservice as a matter of choice rather than an“innate” obligation of all Korean males towards“their” state and demanding a peacefulalternative to the draft was basicallytantamount to questioning the legitimacy of thestate and the fundamental coordinates of whatwas commonly viewed as “standard”, “normal”manhood. It comes as no surprise that, againstthe backdrop of such institutional anddiscursive settings, draft objectors becamesubjects of especially vigilant persecution.

South Korea may be classified as a “hardcoreconscription state” –obligatory military servicelasts 24 to 28 months at the time of this writing( l a s t r educed i n Oc tober 2003 ) , i scomparatively long by international standards.While Thailand, Columbia, or Kazakhstan alsorequire their male c i t izens to serveapproximately 2 years in the military, those EUcountries that continuously practiceconscription, rarely impose more than one yearof compulsory service, and Taiwaneseconscripts currently serve only 16 months.Practically all able-bodied Korean males aged20-35, are legally required to serve. Korea’sstanding army, staffed largely by conscripts atlower levels, has approximately 690.000servicemen and servicewomen, while anadditional 140,000 draftees serve for a longerperiod (28-32 months) doing civil tasks (publicadministrat ion, work at “designatedenterprises”, etc.), but only after havingcompleted 4 weeks of basic military training.Thus, rather than being a genuine alternativeservice for those unwilling to take arms due tocons idera t ions o f consc ience , th i s“supplementary” service (poch’ungyǒk)presents a way of utilizing the “humanmaterial” judged, for reasons of health or anyother reason (special qualifications, etc.) to beunfit for actual military duty. South Korea’s

Military Duty Law does not envision thepossibility of legally refusing to performmilitary service, and stipulates that those whoobject to active military service face prisonsentences of up to three years (Article 88).Those who object to reserve force training, faceprison sentences of up to six months or pay afine of up to two millions wǒn (Article 90). Inreality, however, the price those who eitherobjected on principle to military service (COs –conscientious objectors) or simply tried toavoid it for a variety of personal reasons, had topay, was much higher. First, there was (andthere still is) the prospect of legal punishment,and in the 1970s, in the heyday of the Yusin(“revitalization”) dictatorship, it was notnecessarily limited to 3 years. There were caseswhen COs, mostly Jehovah witnesses, wereforcibly sent to the barracks even aftercompleting their sentences, and then weregiven second ones, as they refused to serveonce again; the process was often accompaniedby cruel, sometimes lethal, beatings. The totalnumber of imprisoned COs for the wholehistory of Korea after 1949 (when conscriptionwas introduced) is more than ten thousand(more than 99% of whom are Jehovahwitnesses), and over the last two decades therehas been a constant increase: from 220 in 1992to 683 in 2000, and 755 in 2004. The number isestimated by some Korean researchers tocomprise around 90% of all COs imprisonedannually worldwide, in such conscription stateslacking provisions for alternative service asTurkey, Korea, Azerbaijan or Angola. However,the customary sentence meted out to COs wasshortened to 18 months by the early 2000s. It isthe minimum time one has to spend in prison toavoid being drafted again. Second, there areinstitutional sanctions waiting for COs aftertheir release from prisons – the criminal recordprevents them from entering the service of thestate or any major corporation, and effectivelymarginalizes them politically, socially andeconomically. Third, COs are still largelystigmatized by public opinion, often to thedegree of making them “non-citizens”

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(pigungmin) in the eyes of the public. In suchan atmosphere, which did not significantlychange even after the “democratization” of1987, closely knit religious communities likeJehovah witnesses were perhaps the only socialgroups able to withstand the enormouspressures and develop a CO movement.Although students belonging to undongkwǒn(anti-establishmentarian social movementcircles) were often targeted in the army forindoctrination, forcibly recruited as informersor simply brutalized and killed in the 1980s, theundongkwǒn did not develop any recognizableCO movement in the 1980-90s. The onlypossible exception was the 1988 campaignagainst placement on the frontline (DMZ) by“NL” (“National Liberation” – left-nationalists)activists. The situation has only started tochange in the 2000.46

Factors behind the emergence of the COmovement in the 2000s

The growth of the new CO movement in Koreain the 2000s was influenced by several factors.First , throughout the 1990s Korea’sundongkwǒn was undergoing a deeptransformation. The beginning of this periodwas marked by the demise of the EasternEuropean Stalinist states, and 1995-1998witnessed a major humanitarian catastrophe inNorth Korea. The transformation of EuropeanStalinism into “normal” capitalism – togetherwith capitalist restructuring by Mao’ssuccessors in China – largely discredited thosemainstream currents among the “PD”(“People’s Democracy” – orthodox socialists,often subscribing to various interpretations ofMarxism-Leninism) followers which tookBolshevism in its Stalinist guise as theirdoctrine. The obvious inability of the NorthKorean state to secure its subjects the basicright to physical survival greatly reduced theappeal of pro-Pyongyang left-nationalists.However, the “anti- hegemonic” thrust of theirpropaganda retained a certain currency in theeyes of their followers, due to the continuous

tension in the US-DPRK relationship andconstant visibility of the US military presencein the southern part of the peninsula. Inside theundongkwǒn there emerged a tangible demandfor rebuilding the ideological basis of activism,transcending both the “socialism in onecountry” dogma and rigid attachment to “anti-hegemonic nationalism” and its “liberatedzone” in the North. The violent showdownbetween the police and nationalist-ledHanch’ongnyŏn students in August 1996,followed by a wave of arrests targeting almostexclusively left-nationalists, failed to deal adecisive blow to the “NL” stream of the studentmovement, but left it seriously weakened.47 The“PD” stream – including its moderateoutgrowth called “21st Century StudentCouncil” (21 segi haksaenghoe) – continued tocontrol a sizable chunk of the universities – 27in 1997 and 18 in 1998. They also applied newpressures to the hardcore nationalistleadership of Hanch’ongnyǒn,48 Lack of internaldemocracy and the need for reforming theentire movement were among the main issueson the agenda on March 3, 2001 meeting ofHanch’ongnyǒn’s Central Committee – the firstsuch meeting in four years, since governmentalrepression relentlessly continued.49 On April 13,2003, the reform-minded milder nationalistswere at last elected into Hanch’ongnyǒn’sleadership, winning leading positions on aplatform advocating internal democraticreforms and eventual legalization of theorganization – which did not materialize in theend due to the unchanging governmentalcourse.50

In this atmosphere of lively debates stronglytinged with a sense of crisis – as nationalisticrhetoric of “self-reliance” and “struggle forunification” appealed less and less to thestudent public, and Hanch’ongnyǒn’s visiblelack of institutional democracy was becoming amajor issue -interest in less orthodox means of“progressive struggle” was gradually growing.In the end, some of the former student radicalsturned to the anti-military movement,

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perceiving it as a venue for fulfilling theaspirations which grew out of the old “NL” and“PD” platforms but not realizable inside theframework of the older 1990s studentmovement. For example, Yu Hogǔn (born1976), who proclaimed his refusal to serve inthe army on July 9, 2002 – thus being amongthe pioneering non-Jehovah witness COs inKorea – belonged to a left-nationalist stream inthe Korean Democratic Labour Party (KDLP).51

He proclaimed himself a CO saying that hewould never point his gun at another Korean,regardless of the state affiliation forced uponthem by the era of national division; but at thesame time advocated a “pluralistic society”,which would acknowledge the differencesbetween those who agree to serve in the armyand those who do not.52 His example vividlyshows the changes in worldview of some milderleft-nationalists brought about by the crisis anduncertainty of the 1990s undongkwǒn milieu. Agood example of a “PD” activist-turned-CO isNa Tonghyǒk (born 1977).53 He declaredhimself a CO on September 12, 2002, and,explaining his decision, mentioned, amongother things, Korea’s “defensive, exclusionistnationalism, typical for a country which hasbeen through a war, but also useful forcontrolling and freezing a society in the nameof national security, locking up people’simagination and making it comfortable andnatural for people to be controlled in theireveryday lives”.54 In this case, the “PD”aversion to nationalism, which deepened in thecourse of the competition with hardcoremainstream “NL” forces for influence oncampuses, further developed into a logic ofstruggle against the logic of the “nationalsecurity state” underpinned by nationalism.55

The fact that the representatives of twocompeting anti-establishmentarian ideologies,“PD” and “NL”, eventually became comrades inthe anti-militarist struggle may seem somewhatparadoxical, but it shows that the introductionof the anti-militaristic topic was necessitated bythe general logic of the development of Korea’ssocial movement in the 1990s. This logic

expanded confrontation with the state todeeper layers of Korea’s “life world”, andchallenged the “national security complex”underlying the whole construction of Korea’sdominant ideology.

The second factor which definitely influencedthe growth of the CO movement in the 2000s,was a general strengthening of the left-wing inKorean politics in the wake of several landmarkevents – the first-ever pan-national generalstrike after 1946 and a concomitant wave ofdemonstrations and mass meetings by radicallabour unions in December 1996-February1997, the Asian financial crisis and the IMFbailout in late 1997-early 1998, and KimTaejung’s (Kim Dae- jung) government rise topower in February 1998. While the generalstrike, with the participation of around 380,000unionized workers,56 demonstrated them o b i l i z a t i o n p o t e n t i a l o f a n t i -establishmentarian radicalism, the fact thatKim Taejung’s government, initially supported –albeit “critically” – by many activists, especiallyamong left-nationalists, rushed to implementthe IMF restructuring programme whichundermined the livelihoods of a large part ofthe working class, distinctively showing theneed for political organization by the workersand for the workers, and alienating activistsfrom mainstream “bourgeois” politics. KDLP,formed on January 30, 2000, by moderate “PD”activists on an anti-neoliberal, “welfarist”, andpro-peace platform,57 instantly became apopular alternative for unionized workers,lower-ranked intellectuals and a large segmentof the lower middle and middle classes. In anopinion poll conducted around the time of itsformation, it was ranked 3rd by its approvalrating, which was 20.9%.58 The unexpectedlyhigh approval rating did not immediatelytranslate into electoral success, but in theDecember 2002 presidential elections theKDLP candidate, Kwǒn Yǒnggil, scored 3.98%,having almost one million Koreans vote for him,and during the April 2004 parliamentaryelections, the party elected 10 MPs and

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managed to get 13.1% of the vote.59 Given thescale of anti-communist indoctrination inKorean society up to the mid-1990s, theachievements of the KDLP were indeedunusual, reflecting the deep sense offrustration in non-privileged sectors of thesociety over all mainstream politics. The veryfact that a legal workers’ party existed thathighlighted “peace” in its programme andadvocated reduction of both North and SouthKorean armies to the 100,000 level, andabolishment of conscription in South Korea andintroduction of a professional military,60 was anenormous psychological boost for the fledglingCO movement. A sizable portion of COs in the2000s are KDLP members – O T’aeyang (thefirst to declare his refusal to serve, onDecember 17, 2001), Yu Hogǔn, Kim Yǒngjin(Dongguk University philosophy student,declared himself a CO on January 1, 2005,currently imprisoned), and several others.However, so far organizational support of theKDLP for the CO movement has been verylimited.

O T'aeyang

The third factor is a massive gap between thestate of Korea’s civilian society and life in thebarracks. That compulsory military service inKorea often entails direct danger for one’s lifeis indicated by the large number of cases underinvestigation by the governmental InvestigationCommittee on Suspicious Deaths in the Army(Kun ǔimunsa chinsang kyumyǒng wiwǒnhoe,formed in January 2006). By the beginning ofJanuary 2007, the number of cases accepted bythe Committee had reached 595.61 Even duringthe supposedly “democratic” 1995-2005decade, the average annual number of deathsin the army was 202, and 41% of this numberwere officially declared “suicides”. It is quiteobvious, however, that in many cases the“suicides” were, in fact, violent deaths causedby “disciplinary” beatings by superiors; in other

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cases, there are ample grounds to suggest thatthe conscripts in question were driven tosuicide by the institutionalized brutality ofbarrack life.62 In fact, already by the end of2006, the Investigation Committee managed toconfirm that in two of the cases it had accepted– one of them as recent as 1996 – the deaths,initially classified as “simple death” (tansunsamang) or “suicide”, were, in fact, caused bybeatings.63 While “disciplinary” killings looksomewhat extreme and unusual even by thestandards of the Korean army, “simple”beatings, together with other forms of abuse(verbal, sexual, etc.) remained a “normal” partof military life until very recently.64 It looks as ifcertain efforts to eradicate at least the worstforms of abuse in the barracks and makemilitary life more acceptable for conscriptsoccurred in the last fewyears.65

Nevertheless, prospective conscripts still haveample reasons to view military l ife asintolerable, inhumane oppression aimed atdehumanizing young males and instilling thehabits of blind obedience. A survey of writingsand statements by Korean COs shows thatextreme aversion towards routine brutalizationof conscripts played an important role informing their general attitudes towards militaryservice. The role of the CO movement in theimprovement of the “feudal authoritarianism”of army life, its potential to strengthen thepressure upon the military authorities toeradicate the practice of physical punishmentin the barracks, were highlighted, for example,by an anonymous activist in the CO movementin a letter sent to the Korean Socialist Party(Han’guk sahoedang) on May 16, 2003.66 Inaddition to physical violence, another unsavorypart of military life for urban conscripts wholean towards independent, progressive thinkingis “moral education” (chǒngsin kyoyuk) – aweekly four hour long (two hours for technicalunits) weekly indoctrination sessions.67 Thethaw in inter-Korean ties in the early 2000s ledto a significant weakening of anti-North Koreanarmy rhetoric (for example, by the end of 2004,

South Korea’s White Book on Defence stoppeddefining North Korea as the “main enemy”).68

While it is possible to surmise that such achange at the top influenced indoctrinationbelow, it still basically clings to the Cold Warworldview, emphasizing the “reality of thehostility” between North and South over peaceideals or possible unification.69 Since themilitary is quite slow to reform its ways of“educating”, disciplining and punishingconscripts, army brutality is expected tostimulate the anti-military movement for a longtime to come.

Everyday brutality – a conscript beingpunished by a senior soldier in the Korean

Army

Last but not least, intensification of worldwidewarfare by the US and its allies in the early2000s, together with mounting tensions on theKorean Peninsula after the inauguration of theG.W. Bush administration in January 2001,seemed to greatly boost the pacifist strain inKorea’s social movement camp, inspiring COsfor a struggle not only against their owncountry’s militarism, but also against thephenomenon of militarism as such. IndividualCOs and their organization, “World withoutwar” (withoutwar.org: Chǒnjaeng ǒmnǔnsesang), formed on May 15, 2003, were activeparticipants in the campaign against Koreanparticipation in the US-led invasion of Iraq. Oneof Korea’s best-known COs was actually an

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active-duty soldier, Private 2nd class KangCh’ǒlmin, who proclaimed himself a CO whileon leave in November 2003, protesting Koreangovernment plans to send Korean troops toIraq. He was given the 18 month-long sentencecustomarily meted out to COs, and released onparole from custody in February 2005.70

Another cause célèbre for Korea’s pacifists wasthe struggle against the forcible removal ofvillagers in Taech’uri and Toduri nearP’yǒngt’aek, when the government decided toconfiscate 2,851 acres of their land to expandCamp Humphreys of the United States ForceKorea (USFK). The campaign, which lastedmore than a year, culminated on May 5, 2006in a violent eviction of resisting farmers andactivists by around 13,000 Korean armytroops.7 1 Several COs were among theTaech’uri defenders on May 5, 2006, and“World Without War” issued a strongly wordedprotest against military and police violence inthe P’yǒngt’aek area, pointing out that themodern Korean state monopolized the legalmeans of violence, but still continued to behavein a manner more befitting an organizedcriminal group.72 The Korean government keptits 2,300-strong military contingent in northernIraq for several years, and did not completetheir withdrawal until December 2008.73 It alsocontributed 360 soldiers to the “peacekeepingmission” in Lebanon, which promises to beanything but peaceful.74 It is quite clear thatKorean participation in US wars or in missionsrelated to conflicts initiated by US allies willcontinue to fuel anti-militarist protest insideKorea’s social movement.

Composition of the 2000s CO movement

The jumpstart for the CO movement in the2000s was provided by O T’aeyang’s publicrefusal to serve in the military (December 17,2001). O, born in 1975 in Kwangju, was earlytraumatized by the soldiers’ violence heexperienced during the 1980 Kwangjumassacre, and by the ubiquity of violence inKorea’s family and social life. A graduate of

Seoul Pedagogical University, he became adeeply devout Buddhist and simultaneously ledthe life of a social activist, working full-time fora Buddhist humanitarian organization “GoodF r i e n d s ” ( C h o ǔ n p ǒ t d ǔ l(http://www.goodfriends.or.kr)).75 His decisionto refuse serving in the military partly had itsbackground in O T’aeyang’s involvement insocial activism, but was mostly based on hisBuddhist beliefs – which included thedisciplinary precept against taking life, and onthe belief that violence could never lead topeace.76 However, despite the tangible depth ofO T’aeyang’s Buddhist beliefs, his COdeclaration received only very limited andguarded support from his co-religionists.Institutional Buddhism, represented in Koreaby the Chogye Order and many lesser Buddhistdenominations, provided no public support atall: the Chogye Order never made any officialstatement on the issue, while its representativeinside the military, Kim Marhwan, the Buddhistdirector of the Army’s Religion Office(Kunjongsil), told reporters in June, 2004, thatKorea’s Buddhism is “state- protecting incharacter” and “takes military service as a formof realizing the Bodhisattva’s way, bysacrificing yourself for the sake of the others”.77

A spiritual head of another main Buddhistdenomination, the T’aego Order, the ChongjǒngHyech’o,, interpreted in a private capacity,Buddhism’s attitude towards military service inan even more original way, saying that servingin the army in peacetime does not involve anykilling and thus does not contradict Buddhistprecepts; moreover, only after having fulfilledone’s obligations to the state can one rightlyserve Buddha.78 However, by February, 2002, OT’aeyang received messages of encouragementand support from a number of lay Buddhistorganizations,79 and also very active assistancefrom some influential monks involved in socialcauses.80 The fact that O T’aeyang’s views werealso widely aired, mostly in a very positivelight, by a variety of progressive media outlets,including Hangyǒre and www.ohmynews.com ,and made into a national issue by human rights

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campaigners, undoubtedly contributed toproducing a small miracle in the world ofKorean jurisprudence – in February 2002, OT’aeyang was released for the duration of histrial on charges of violating the conscriptionlaw, to be sentenced and imprisoned only inAugust 2004, and then released in November2005.81 His two years of unexpected freedom in2002-2004 turned out to be an enormous boostfor the CO cause, as his activities (interviews,lectures, and articles) hugely contributed toexposing the whole conscription system andpopularizing anti-militarist beliefs.

Buddhist chaplains (kunsǔng) in theKorean Army, wearing military uniforms,

symbolize the collusive ties betweeninstitutional Buddhism and the military

O T’aeyang’s pioneering declaration and themomentous controversy it created, werefollowed by successive “coming-outs” of otherCOs. The non-Jehovah witnesses who declaredtheir refusal to undergo military training in the2000s – numbering around 30 in 2001-2007 –may be categorized in the following way:

a) Socialist/ left-nationalistactivists. Together with NaT o n g h y ǒ k a n d Y u H o g ǔ n ,mentioned above, several other

people belong to this category,notably Yǒm Ch’anggǔn (born in1976, declared himself a CO onNovember 13, 2003), who servedas a managing director (samukukchang) for Iraq Peace Network,the umbrella organization for avariety of groups involved in thes t r u g g l e a g a i n s t K o r e a nparticipation in the US invasion ofIraq. Yǒm aspired to go to Iraq as a“living shield” in early 2003, buthis intentions were thwarted byregulations that severely limitedthe right of conscription-agedmales to leave the country.82 Sofar, the number of Korean socialistCOs is very small in proportion tothe size of the socialist milieu. Thisis due both to family pressures andthe several limitations a criminalconviction for refusal to serve mayimpose on one’s professional lifeand political career. However, thebelief in the basic right to refusemilitary service to a (capitalist)state seems to have become anaccepted article of faith amongKorea’s pol i t ica l radicals ,excluding perhaps only hardcorepro-Pyongyang left-nationalists.

b) Religious COs – for the timebeing, two Buddhists (O T’aeyangand Kim Tohyǒng; the latter, bornin 1979, proclaimed himself a COon April 30, 2004, and received an18-month sentence), one Catholic(Ko Tongju, born 1980, proclaimedhimself a CO on October 19, 2005),and one Protestant (Kyǒngsu, bornin 1980, proclaimed his refusal toserve in June 2006). A commonfeature of nearly all of them isactivist participation in religiousyouth groups: Kim Tohyǒng hadworked full-time for the Korean

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Students’ Buddhist Federation(Han’guk taehaksaeng pulgyoyǒnhaphoe), while Ko Tongju, bornto a deeply Catholic Cheju family,rose to vice-chairmanship of theSeoul Diocese Federation ofCatholic Students (K’at’olliktaehaksaeng yǒnhaphoe). Youngac t i v i s t s ho ld ing broad lyprogressive orientations, especiallyi n C a t h o l i c a n d B u d d h i s tcommunities, tend to be eithers y m p a t h e t i c o r , a t l e a s tunderstanding of “their” COs –fellow religious activists, whosedevotion to their respective faithsi s w e l l - k n o w n i n t h e i rdenominations. The attitude of thedenominations to which thereligious COs belong is, however,much more guarded. It has alreadybeen mentioned above that themain Buddhist denominations inKorea have never made any clearpublic statements on the issue ofmilitary objection, obviously eitherbeing unable to give a full, logicaland non-contradictory doctrinaljustification to the fact of theirlong-established collaboration withthe Korean military, or beingunwilling to expose their pro-m i l i t a r y a t t i t u d e s t o t h eprogressive- minded youngerBuddhist publ ic. In privateinterv iews, however , theyemphasized the primacy of theobligations of a Korean Buddhist(kungmin ǔrosǒǔi pulcha) towardsthe state and the link betweensacrifices in the name of the stateand the realization of Buddhistideals. Catholics used to showm u c h m o r e a w a r e n e s s o fworldwide trends in religiouspacifism and Biblical doctrinaljustifications for the refusal to

undergo military training: CardinalKim Suhwan told EducationalBroadcasting (Kyoyuk pangsong) inone interview in March 2002, thatalternative service for the COs isacceptable in principle, as long asit does not threaten the state’sdefense potential.83 Clearly thisstatement was influenced byCardinal Kim’s knowledge of thea u t h o r i t a t i v e “ P a s t o r a lConstitution on the Church in theModern World Gaudium et Spes”adopted by the Second VaticanCouncil in 1965 and including thef o l l o w i n g c l a u s e a b o u tconscientious objection: “It seemsright that laws make humaneprovisions for the case of thosewho for reasons of consciencerefuse to bear arms, providedhowever, that they agree to servethe human community in someother way”.84 However, despite theult imate acceptance of theconscientious refusal to bear armsby the Vatican in 1965, the KoreanCatholic hierarchy still avoidedgiving any official and publicencouragement to Korea’s ownpotential Catholic COs, obviouslyunwi l l ing to chal lenge theprevailing militaristic norms of thesociety and disturb i ts owncooperative relationship with themilitary.8 5 Thus, the KoreanCatholic hierarchy practicallyreaffirms its conservative vision ofa confrontation with North Koreaas a “just war”.86 In this context, itshould be remembered that, unlikemany Catholic leaders worldwide,in November 2003, Cardinal KimSuhwan supported the dispatch ofKorean troops to Iraq “for the sakeof peace and reconstruction” –while at the same time reiterating

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the Vatican’s basic position criticalof the Iraq war itself.87 WhileBuddhists and Catholics largelyavoid public debates on the issueof the conscious object ion,Protestants seem to be sharplydivided. While the progressiveKorean National Counci l ofChurches (KNCC: Han’gukkidokkyo kyohoe hyǒbǔihoe)officially urged the government inMay 2004 to speedily introduce analternative service for pacifists andto stop imprisoning them, theconservative Christian Council ofKorea (CCK: Han’guk kidokkyoch’ong yǒnhaphoe) stated that theintroduction of alternative servicemight only “disrupt publ icharmony and endanger ournat ional secur i ty” . 8 8 Evenprogressive Protestant clergymen,however, kept relatively lowpro f i l es in the debates onconscientious objection andalternative service, avoiding doinganything that may compromisetheir credentials as assiduouscontributors to the “nationaldefense” cause in the eyes of moreconservative audiences.

c) Environmentalists and followersof alternative lifestyles – a growingcategory of objectors, whichi n c l u d e s , f o r e x a m p l e ,environmental activist Ch’oeChunho and environmentallyminded primary school teacherCh’oe Chin89, or gay activist ImT’aehun.90 The common motive forthis group of military objectors,together with their reluctance tobe trained as killers of livingbeings, is the rejection of theauthoritarian nature of military life– that is, extreme unwillingness to

accept the uniformity and absoluteobedience that barrack l i feimposes. Possibly, the clearestexpressions of such sentiments arethe interviews and writings by oneof the most unconventionalrepresentatives of “alternativeKorea”, anarchist Cho Yakkol.91

Radical anarchists are a tinyminority inside the Korean socialmovement, and have a muchsmaller following than otherradical non-conformist groups –Trotskyi tes ( Internat ionalSocialists), militant “PD” groups,or hardcore left-nationalists.However, the environmentalmovement is known to be on therise, and coming-out becomeseasier and easier for sexual andlifestyle minorities. It may beexpected that activists from thesemilieux will continue to fill theranks of COs, motivated both bytheir belief in non-violence and bytheir alienation from the Koreans ta te , w i th i t s pe r s i s t en tdevelopmental agenda, consistentdisregard for environmentalconcerns, and continuous use of“disciplinary” techniques in theeducational sphere and barracklife.

As demonstrated above, the CO movement ofthis century includes widely diversecomponents: radical socialists (Yi Wǒnp’yo)have, for example, a political and social outlookessentially different from that of minorityactivists (Im T’aehun). But what is interestingis the degree of “cross-involvement” inside theCO movement: some religious COs, especiallyKim Tohyǒng, are active in the environmentalcauses, others –for example, O T’aeyang –became KDLP members and tried hard toachieve their (moderate) socialist ideals and

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religious beliefs. Practically all the COs, unitedunder the umbrella of their main organization,“World Without War”, were very prominent inthe campaigns against the deployment ofKorean troops to Iraq and against the forcibleremoval of the Taech’uri and Toduri peasants.In a way, CO/anti-military movement seems tobecome a “cooperation zone” within the socialactivism domain in Korea’s public life – a zone,where cross-fertilization between diverse andoften conflicting branches of Korea’s socialmovement is possible. The struggle against theconscription state emerges today as a commondenominator for Korea’s assorted andheterogeneous social movement community,together with a number of other foreign policyand domestic issues (disengagement from Iraq,boycott of Chosǒn Ilbo, etc.). But while in thematter of military service, the right to choiceseems to have been firmly adapted as a part ofthe unwritten commonsensical credo of Korea’sprogressive circles, it still has not become apart of wider popular consciousness.

Anti-military activist, Kang Ǔisǒk (SeoulNational Univeristy, Faculty of Law

student), fully naked, protests a militaryparade in Seoul in 2008.

CO movement – a long road to official andpopular recognition?

While the concrete, short-term aim of the COmovement is defined as the introduction of analternative civil service for draftees withpacifist beliefs, the long-term, broader aim is toscrutinize the “militarized citizenship” complexand the whole framework of the “nationalsecurity state” ideology, as well as legitimizenon-violence as the new, alternative norm forsocietal and personal behavior.92 However,

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despite greatly strengthened awareness ofpacifism inside the social activists community,both aims of the CO movement have thus faronly been achieved to a very limited degree.The road to recognition of pacifist beliefs bothon the legal level and in popular consciousnessstill seems to be a long way off.

On January 29, 2002, a judge from theSouthern Seoul District Court, Pak Sihwan,who had to sentence a Jehovah witness refusingto take a rms , sen t an appea l t o theConstitutional Court (Hǒnpǒp chaep’anso)alleging that Korea’s Military Duty Law(Pyǒngyǒkpǒp), which does not provide anyvenue for realization of pacifist beliefs, is anti-constitutional.93 As the matter was underinvest igat ion at the Supreme Court(Taebǒbwǒn) and Constitutional Court, anumber of pioneering non-Jehovah witness COswere paroled. This gave wide publicity to theissue and gave the COs an opportunity topromote their cause in the media while waitingcourt decisions. However, this pause in thelegal persecution of COs – possibly influenced,among other factors, by a “détente” mood onthe Peninsula after the June 2000 summitmeeting between North and South Koreanleaders – did not last long. Although in May2004 another Southern Seoul District Courtjudge, Yi Chǒngnyǒl, gave, for the first time inmodern Korean history(!), an acquittal to threeJehovah witnesses refusing the join the army,94

this historical verdict was soon overturned bytwo successive decisions of the Supreme Courtand Constitutional Court. It ruled, in July andAugust 2004 respectively, that the COs were tobe found guilty of violation of the Military DutyLaw, and that the Military Duty Law in itsexisting form is fully constitutional. The rulingof the Constitutional Court (voted 7:2), statedsignificantly that the future introduction of analternative service would require a “nationalconsensus” (kungminjǒk konggamdae). Thiswas obviously judged to be lacking for the timebeing – and the state had to investigate ways toaccommodate the demands of the COs - but at

the same time was not constitutionallyprevented from punishing them at present.95

The ruling – which came as Korea waspreparing for its September 22, 2004,deployment of 2,800 troops to Iraq,96 despitethe staunch opposition of a majority ofinfluential NGOs and amidst a growingalienation between progressive NGOs and Pres.No Muhyǒn’s regime - signaled that repressionagainst COs was back to “normal”. Pre-trialdetentions of COs once again became common,although the practice of giving COs “custom-tailored” 18-months sentences – a minimalsentence for making an individual exempt fromconscription in the future – established in2000-2001, did not change, and most COsactually continued to be paroled after havingserved about a year. The conservative court’sonslaught on CO rights was to a certain degreereversed when the National Human RightsCommittee (Kukka in’kwǒn wiwǒnhoe)recommended on December 26, 2005 that theright of conscientious objection to militaryservice be officially acknowledged, andalternative service introduced.97 Influenced bythis decision, the defense minister promised onFebruary 9, 2006, that a decision on theintroduction of alternative service would bemade after approximately one year of thoroughdeliberation98

It should be remembered, however, thatneither the “recommendations” of the NationalHuman Rights Committee nor any “promises”by the defense minister were binding. Indeed,while the Defence Ministry promised inSeptember 2007, in the last days of Pres. NoMuhyǒn’s administration, to draft and submitto the Parl iament a new law al lowingalternative service for the religious COs,99

subsequent political changes cast doubt on itswillingness to do so. After the new conservativeadministration of Pres. Yi Myǒngbak assumedpower in early 2008, the Defence Ministryannounced that it would “further look intopublic opinion” and “thoroughly reconsider” itspreviously stated commitment to establish the

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alternative service option, hinting that it mightrenege on its promises. Eventually, onDecember 24, 2008, it declared that “lack ofnational consensus” did not presently allow thegovernment to implement alternative service,while leaving open this possibility in thefuture.100 The external pressure – the fact thatthe right to conscientious objection isrecognized by the UN Commission for HumanRights as one of the basic civil and politicalrights,101 the UN Commission for Human Rightsin early December 2006 recommended that theSouth Korean government compensatepreviously imprisoned COs and stopimprisoning COs,102 and that the issue ofKorea’s CO rights started to attract theattention of many human rights groups allaround the world – does not seem to havedecisively affected the course of the SouthKorean authorities. Far more decisive is theability of the defence establishment and itsallies in the media and educational system tocontinuously inculcate the notion of the“sacredness” and “indispensability” of theconscription system into the minds of thepublic, and to present COs as “deviants” –“religious fanatics” (in the case of the Jehovahwitnesses) , “ immoral ind iv idua ls” ,“ideologically impure persons”, etc. So far, itappears that the ideological hegemony of the“national security state” remains solid, despiteall the challenges put forward by the COmovement and the NGOs supportive of it in thelast years.

While the last six to seven years saw publishingof several masterfully written books by legalexperts, gender researchers and civil activistson the issue of militarism, conscription and COrights, 1 0 3 and several popular mediapublications, prominently the Daily Hangyǒreand the Weekly Hangyǒre21, took a consistentand principled stand in favour of theintroduction of an alternative service system,the majority of the conservative media refusedto prioritize human rights over the “sacred”issue of “national security”. Some strongly-

worded editorials warned of the “grave dangerof the growing mood of refusal of militaryservice”,104 while others expressed doubts as towhether the Nat ional Human RightsCommittee, which “came to the extreme oftaking the side of military objectors” shouldexist at all.105 Most important, TV broadcasting,with its high penetration rate and ability tomanufacture “popular consent”, continued tocover CO-related issues only sparsely andmostly focusing on the potential “negativeinfluence” of military objection on “nationaldefense”.106 The schools, for their part, continueto teach in civics classes that military service isthe “sacred duty” o f Korean males ,indispensable for proving one’s masculinity andKoreanness.Teachers who refuse to toe theline, are still being punished.107 Little wonderthat, in the situation when the KDLP’sprogressive political agenda still remainslargely marginalized in public political debates,the carefully crafted media and educationalindoctrination strategy of the defenseestablishment and its allies brings theseresults: according to 2005 opinion polls(commissioned by the Defense Ministry), only23.3% of the pol led were in favour ofintroducing alternative service, although,significantly enough, the idea was favoured by36.6% of the conscription age youth.108

Even if Korea’s Defense Ministry were tointroduce an alternative system in the (distant)future, it would likely be limited to religiousCOs, thus leaving the tiny minority of socialists,environmentalists and non-religious pacifists tobe punished and excluded from mainstreamsociety – as a criminal record bars employmentby the state, and scares many larger privateemployers. Judging from the way popularopinion is being formed today by newspaperand TV coverage, it is highly likely thatalternative service would be punitive incharacter, for example, longer than the“normal” military service. Given the presentstate of regional tension in North-East Asia, aswell as the ideological hegemony of the

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“national security” establishment, it is alsohighly likely that such a course will not meetmass popular resistance. However, that doesnot mean that the CO movement of the 2000shas achieved nothing. If the ideologicalhegemony of the hardcore conscription state isby and large intact, its ideological monopoly isgone forever: the subject of the anti-militaristmovement, once taboo, is now firmly within thedomain of public debate, and it continues tochallenge orthodox views on both citizenshipand “normative” masculinity. Appearing in theprogressive media, the COs, who voluntarilychoose imprisonment and potential exclusionfrom mainstream careers even after theirrelease, present an image of self-sacrificingconviction, in sync with the traditionalConfucian view of fidelity to one’s beliefs andperseverance in adversity. At the same timethey staunchly refuse to allow the state todiscipline their minds and bodies in thebarracks, thus showing by their example thatjoining the army is not the only way to becomea “real man”. The very fact that conscientiousobjection and the introducing an alternativeservice are being mentioned as “matters fordeliberation” by the governmental, itself mayhelp to destroy the myth of the “sacredness” ofmilitary duty: if it were truly sacral, the firstpeople of the state hardy could have beenallowed to commit “blasphemy” by mentioningalternatives. The challenge the CO movementpresents to the state-approved image of the“model” male citizen voluntarily submitting toarmy discipline, passes the limits of debates onconscription and conscientious objection. Ifmilitary service to the state is a matter ofchoice with individual conscience being thecentral criterion, then the same may beinferred about the whole spectrum ofrelationships between the individual and thepowerful institutional actors of social life. Oncestate-sponsored militarism can be rejected byan act of individual conscience, the same mayapply to the developmentalist logic that makessacred the likes of Samsung Electronics intothe “cornerstones of national economy” and

precluding any consistent, thorough criticism oftheir managerial, environmental or labourpractices, especially abroad, where they “earnforeign currency for the motherland”. It alsochallenges repressive labour immigrationpolicies presented under the banner of“national interest”, which practically rules outlegal immigration of mostly Asian and Africanmanual workers to Korea for prolonged periodsof time, with no hope of lawful permanentsettlement. In brief, the challenge to the“sanctity” of conscription is, by implication, amajor challenge to the whole set of officially-sponsored beliefs and values, which may bedefined as Korea’s “establishmentarianideology”. If this challenge is continuouslypursued with today’s intensity, we may expectthat it will further undermine the beliefsimposed by ruling groups, and could eventuallycontribute to a major re-definition of thedominant ideology.

Born in Leningrad (St-Petersburg) in theformer USSR (1973) and educated at St-Petersburg State University (MA:1994) andMoscow State University (Ph.D. in ancientKorean history, 1996). Vladimir Tikhonov(Korean name – Pak Noja) is a professor at OsloUniversity. A specialist in the history of ideas inearly modern Korea, he is the author of Usǔngy ǒ l p ’ a e ǔ i s i n h w a(http://www.aladdin.co.kr/shop/wproduct.aspx?isbn=8984311529) (The Myth of the Survival ofthe Fittest, 2005. He is the translator (withO.Miller) of Selected Writings of Han Yongun:From Social Darwinism to Socialism With aB u d d h i s t F a c e(http://www.amazon.com/Selected-Writings-Han - Y o n g u n -Darwinism/dp/1905246471/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1237140788&sr=8-1) (GlobalOriental/University of Hawaii Press, 2008). Thisis a revised and updated version of hiscontribution to the collection entitledContemporary South Korean Capitalism: Its

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Working and Challenges, (forthcoming, fall2009, Oslo Academic Press).

Posted at The Asia-Pacific Journal on March 16,2009.

Recommended citation: Vladimir Tikhonov,“Militarism and Anti-militarism in South Korea:‘Militarized Masculinity’ and the ConscientiousObjector Movement,” The Asia-Pacific Journal,Vol. 12-1-09, March 16, 2009.

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Notes

1 Samuel Finer, “State and Nation-Building inEurope: The Role of the Military”, - CharlesTilly (ed.), The Formation of National States inWestern Europe, Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1975, pp. 84-163.

2 On the relationship between militarism andmasculinity in modern American culture, see,for example: Cynthia Enloe, The morning after:Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War,Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

3 Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism, NewYork: Meridian Books, 1959, pp. 104-152.

4 Uri Ben-Eliezer, “A Nation-In-Arms: State,

Nation, and Militarism in Israel’s First Years”, -Comparative Studies in Society and History,Vol. 37, No. 2, April 1995, pp. 264-285.

5 The pressure was enormously high even inpeacetime, and in wartime, as it happeneddur ing Wor ld War I , i t was c lose tounbearable. In the climate of all-pervasivemilitarized nationalism, the majority of GermanAdventists, for example, were forced tocompromise their beliefs and agree to beararms, in order to protect their denominationfrom destruction. See Mock, Melanie SpringerWriting Peace: The Unheard Voices of GreatWar Mennonite Objectors, Cascadia PublishingHouse, 2003; Ronald Lawson, “Church andState at Home and Abroad: The Evolution ofSeventh-day Adventist Relations withGovernments”, - Journal of the AmericanAcademy of Religion, LXIV/2, 1996, pp.279-311.

6 Draft objection was eschewed even by the“mainstream” pacifist organizations, such asL’association de la paix par le droit, whichalways emphasized their patriotism andwillingness to “serve the nation” in wartime,while urging “peace by diplomatic means” –basically, the introduction of bindinginternational arbitration. See: Sandi E. Cooper,“Pacifism in France, 1889-1914: InternationalPeace as a Human Right”, - French HistoricalStudies, Vol. 17, No. 2, Autumn, 1991, pp.359-386.

7 Yu Kiljun (translated into modern Korean byHǒ Kyǒngjin), Sǒyu Kyǒnmun (A Record ofPersonal Experiences in the West), Seoul:Sō’hae munjip, 2004, pp. 262-267.

8 Kojong Sunjong Sillok (Veritable Records [ofthe reigns of kings] Kojong and Sunjong),translated into modern Korean, Seoul:T’amgudang, 1986, Vol. 2, p. 605 (33rd year ofKojong, 10th month, 21st day).

9The objecting bureaucrats, as the dailyHwangsǒng Sinmun reported on August 26,

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1901, did not like the idea of “forcing all andeverybody from 18 years old, regardless ofwealth and status, to be registered with themilitary authorities and to receive 3 years oftraining”. See: Hwangsǒng Sinmun (reprint),Seoul: Kyō’ngin munhwasa, 1984, Vol. 5, p.358.

10 One of the chief royal advisers who insistedon introducing conscription, was Vice-Minister(hyǒpp’an) of Justice, Yi Kidong, a man ofcommoner origins and some mil i taryexperience. He considered strengthening themilitary state’s first priority. See: Sǒ Yǒnghǔi,Taehan Cheguk chǒngch’isa yǒn’gu (PoliticalHistory of the Great Han Empire), Seoul: SǒukTaehakkyo, 2003, p. 87; Hyǒn Kwangho,Taehan Cheguk ǔi taeoe chǒngch’aek (ForeignPolicy of the Great Han Empire), Seoul:Sinsǒwǒn, 2002, pp. 268-269.

11 See the edict’s text in: Kojong Sunjong Sillok(Veritable Records [of the reigns of kings]Kojong and Sunjong), translated into modernKorean, Seoul: T’amgudang, 1986, Vol. 3, p.281 (40th year of Kojong, 3rd month, 15th day).

12 Hyǒn Kwangho, Taehan Cheguk ǔi taeoechǒngch’aek (Foreign Policy of the Great HanEmpire), pp. 270-275.

13 Sǒ Inhan, Taehan Cheguk ǔi kunsa chedo(Military System of the Great Han Empire),Seoul: Hyean, 2000, pp. 223-281.

14 Chu Yohan (ed.), An Tosan chǒnsǒ (CompleteWorks by An [Ch’angho, courtesy name]Tosan), Seoul: Samjungdang, 1963, pp. 82-83.

1 5 Hǔngsadan 50nyǒnsa (Young KoreaAcademy’s 50 year of History), Seoul: TaesǒngMunhwasa, 1964, p. 14.

16 Ibid, pp. 43-45.

17 Chu Yohan (ed.), An Tosan chǒnsǒ (CompleteWorks by An [Ch’angho, courtesy name]Tosan), p. 558.

18 Mu Tao, Sun Zhike, P’i ǒrin 27nǒn: TaehanMin’guk imsi chǒngbu (The bloodied 27 years:Republic of Korea’s Provisional Government),Seoul: Kǒn’guk taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1994,pp. 36-37.

19 Ibid, pp. 174-199.

20The school, financed by the local Koreancommunity, had only around 30 students bysummer 1910, and had to shut down around1913-1914 due to chronic problems withstudent recruitment and financing. Originally,Pak Yongman had envisioned it as thebeginning of universal military education forAmerica-based Korean youth, in anticipation ofa military clash with Japan. However, his hopeswere short-lived. See: Pang Sǒnju, ChaemiHanin ǔi Tongnip undong (IndependenceMovement of the Korean-Americans),Ch’unch’ǒn: Hallim Taehakkyo Asea munhwayǒn’guso, 1989, pp. 22-53.

21The way to remaking Koreans into “a nation ofpatriotic warriors” envisioned by Pak Yongmanwas to accustom pre-school children to militarytoys and games from a very early age,strengthen gymnastics, shooting drills, wargames and teaching military history and tacticsin communal Korean schools, infusingschoolchildren with “the military spirit ofsubmission to orders”, and generally“militarizing” (kunsa chojikhwa) Korean émigrésociety, actively using “newspapers, theater,novels, arts, songs and music” for glorifyingancient Korea’s military greatness andpatriotic, soldierly virtues. See:.Kim Tohun,“1910 nyǒndae Pak Yongman ǔi kuninyangsǒngnon” (Pak Yongman’s Ideas on Raisingthe Soldiers in the 1910s), - Kunsa, Vol. 42,April 2001, pp. 125-155.

22 Pang Sǒnju, Chaemi Hanin ǔi Tongnipundong (Independence Movement of theKorean-Americans), pp. 53-105.

23 Yi Kwangsu chǒnjip (Complete Works by YiKwangsu), Seoul: Samjungdang, 1962, Vol. 17,

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pp. 197, 213.

24 Sin Chubaek, “Ch’eyuk kyoyuk ǔi kunsahwawa kangjetoen kǒn’gang” (Militarization of thePhysical Education and Forced Healthiness), -Kong Cheuk & Chō’ng Kō”nsik (ed.), Singminjiǔi Ilsang: Chibae wa kyunyǒl (The EverydayLife of the Colony: Domination and Fissures),Seoul: Munhwa kwahaksa, 2006, pp. 230-256.

25 For one example, a well-known leader ofCh’ǒndogyo (“Heavenly Way”) religious group,Ch’oe Rin (1878-1958), praised war as “thebest way of disciplining and uniting thedisorganized masses” and proposed universalconscription for Koreans as a way of forcingthem to “become real subjects of Japan bypresenting the state with the ultimate sacrificeof their own life” and accelerating the abolitionof discriminatory practices against Koreans, bythe close of 1936. See: “’Chosǒnin chingbyǒng’tǔng ǔl ǒha nǔn sijunghoe suryǒng Ch’oe Rinssi” (Mr. Ch’oe Rin, the Leader of Sijunghoe,Speaking of Conscripting Koreans and OtherSubjects”, - Monthly Samch’ǒlli, December1936, pp. 48-51.

2 6 Pyǒngmuch’ǒng (Military ManpowerAdministration) ed., Pyǒngmu Haengjǒngsa(The His tory o f Mi l i tary ManpowerAdministration), Seoul, 1985, pp. 36-45.

27 Soon after, in early 1949, the first school drillofficers (156 males and 40 females) were sentto the schools to conduct the exercises. Ibid, p.256.

28 This system was replaced by a 10-weekmilitary training course for universitygraduates on Ju ly 2 , 1954, and thendiscontinued in practice, to be revived in aneven more thorough form in the heyday of the“barrack state policies”, in 1968-1969 (seebelow). Ibid, pp. 178- 181.

29 “Taet’ongnyǒngnyǒng che 283ho chaehakchachingjip yǒn’gi chamjǒngnyǒng” (ThePresidential Decree No. 283, Provisional Draft

Deferment for the Students), - Kwanbo (OfficialGazette), February 28, 1949.

3 0 “Taet ’ongnyǒngnyǒng che 1183hochaehakcha chingjip yǒn’gi chamjǒngnyǒngp’yeji ǔi kǒn” (The Presidential Decree No.1183, Abolition of the Provisional DraftDeferment for the Students), - Kwanbo (OfficialGazette), November 7, 1956.

31 O Cheyǒn, “1950nyǒndae taehaksaengchiptan ǔi chǒngch’ijǒk sǒngjang” (PoliticalGrowth of the Students as a Social Group in the1950s), - Yǒksa Munje Yǒn’gu (Research on theHistorical Problems), Vol. 19, 2008, p.p.180-181

32 The corruption surrounding the process ofdrafting young people into the army was even asubject of heated debates in Parliament. See:“Chingjip chingbyǒng pujǒng tǔrǒ ǒje kukhoeesǒ taejǒngbu chilmunjǒn chǒn’gae” (The “warof questions” to the government yesterday inthe parliament about the corruption aroundconscription into the army), - Tonga Ilbo,October 26, 1952.

3 3 See , for example , the memoirs o ft’aekwǒndo’s inventor, General Ch’oe Honghǔi:T’aekwǒndo wa Na (Me and t’aekwō’ndo),Seoul:Taum, 1997, Vol. 1, p. 233.

34 Prof. Kim Yongjun (b. 1927), South Korea’srenowned chemistry expert and Christianessayist, recollects, for example, being draftedagain, after having already completed wartimeservice as translator, into the army for almostone year in the late 1950s, his position as ahigh school teacher being of no help. See: KimYongjun, Nae ga pon Ham Sǒkhǒn (HamSǒkhǒn as I saw him), Seoul: Ak’anet, 2006, pp.39-41.

3 5 Pyǒngmuch’ǒng (Military ManpowerAdministration) ed., Pyǒngmu Haengjǒngsa(The His tory o f Mi l i tary ManpowerAdministration), p. 409.

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36 Ibid, p. 507.

37 It was reported that a total of 452,565persons voluntarily surrendered, while 3,031were arrested and indicted for draft-dodging.Ibid, pp. 520-522.

38 Ibid, pp. 522-524.

39 Ibid, pp. 204-206.

40 Ibid, pp. 143-144.

41 Ibid, pp. 740-742, 761.

42 Chǒng Kyǒngt’aek, “Chumin tǔngnokpǒpsihaengnyǒng kaejǒng naeyong kwa kǔ ǒmmuch’ǒri” (The Revised ImplementationRegulations for the Residents Registration Lawand Processing the Related AdministrativeDuties), - Haengjǒng, Vol. 18, No. 189, 1969,pp. 141-144.

4 3 Pyǒngmuch’ǒng (Military ManpowerAdministration) ed., Pyǒngmu Haengjǒngsa(The His tory o f Mi l i tary ManpowerAdministration), p. 750.

44 Male university students were expected toundergo 711 hours of compulsory militarytraining before graduation, including firing liveammunition. See: Ch’ae Sō’ngju, “Yusin ch’ejeha ǔi kodǔng kyoyuk kaehyǒk e kwanhanyǒn’gu” (Research on the Higher Educationreform under the Yusin System), - Kyoyukhaengjǒnghak yǒn’gu, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2003, pp.317-336.

45 It was not downgraded to a selective subjectuntil 1997. “’Kyoryǒn’ yǒksa sok ǔro. 38 nyǒnman e kaemyǒng” (“Basic Military Training”Becomes History – renamed after 38 Years), -Yǒnhap nyusǔ, January 28, 2007.

46 Yi Suhyǒk, Uri yǒp’ ǔi yakcha (The weakerpeople near us), Pusan: Sanjini, 2006, pp.104-116; Moon Seungsook, MilitarizedModernity and Gendered Citizenship in South

Korea, Duke University Press, 2005.

47 During elections to the student councils inDecember 1996 - January 1997, hardcorenationalists belonging to the “Self-reliantStudent Council” (Chajujǒk haksaenghoe)fraction, managed to elect representatives in62 of 128 universities, but were seriouslythreatened by competition from mildernationalists, who formed a nation-widefederation called “Human Love StudentCouncil” (Saram sarang haksaenghoe). Theywon power on the councils of 14 universities,including the Seoul Pedagogical University, ona platform that sharply criticized the radicals’handling of the August 1996 standoff. See: KimT o n g h u n(http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine/new_donga/9701/nd_446.html), “Hanch’ongnyǒnkaehyǒk e han moksori” (All demand the reformof the Hanch’ongnyǒn), Monthly Sindonga,January 1997.

48 They, for exsample, nominated a “PD”candidate to the Hanch’ongnyǒn chairmanshipin March 1997 (the election was eventually putoff), sharply criticized the pro-Pyongyangcourse of nationalist radicals and urged thestudent movement to popularize itself byshrugging off the grand narratives of“unification-obsessed nationalism” and workingwith concrete issues on the grassroots level.S e e : K i m C h ’ a n g s ǒ k(http://www.hani.co.kr/hankr21/K_974A0152/974A0152_053.html), “Hanch’ongnyǒn, tasipyǒnhyǒk ǔi kippal ǔl ollinda” (Hanch’ongnyǒnagain raises the banner of reforms”, WeeklyHangyore21, Issue 152, April 10, 1997.

4 9 K a n g S i n u k(http://www.voiceofpeople.org/new/news_view.html?serial=439), “97 nyǒn ihu 4nyǒn man esǒngsatoen Hanch’ongnyǒn chungangwiwǒnhoe” (Hanch’ongnyǒn’s CentralCommittee meeting – for the first time in 4years, since 1997), Minjung ǔi sori, March 6,2001.

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5 0 A n H o n g u k(http://www.kinds.or.kr/main/search/searchcontent.php?docid=01100101.20030414KHD2106&highlight=%ED%95%9C%EC%B4%9D%EB%A0% A 8 : % E B%8C%80%EC%9D%98%EC%9B%90:%EC%84%A0%EA%B1%B0:%EA%B2%BD%EC%84%A0), “’Kangnyǒng minjujǒk chǒnhwan’ hubo ǔijangtangsǒn. Hanch’ongnyǒn happǒphwa t’allyǒkpadǔl dǔt” (The candidate who pledged todemocratize the Hanch’ongnyǒn platform wins.The legalization of Hanch’ongnyǒn may getmomentum), - Kyǒnghyang sinmun, April 14,2003.

51 He once was a full-time KDLP activist (atTongjak Ward’s local chapter in Seoul), andthen worked for a small NGO, “Sharing,Solidarity, Peace, Community – A Village ofHope” (Nanǔm, Yǒndae, P’yǒnghwa: HǔimangTongne), which was, among other activities,distributing rice to the poorest families. See:S i n - Y u k T o n g u k(http://h21.hani.co.kr/section-021003000/2004/07/021003000200407210519033.html) ,“Tayanghan yangsim, kamokhaeng sijaktoeda”(Diverse consciences begin their way toprison), Weekly Hangyoreh21, Issue 519, July21, 2004.

5 2 H o n g S e h w a(http://www.kinds.or.kr/main/search/searchcontent.php?docid=01101001.20040622HRD1801&h i g h l i g h t =%EC%9C%A0%ED%98%B8%EA%B7%BC:%EB%B3%91%EC%97%AD%EA%B1%B0%EB%B6%80:%EB%8F%99%EC%A1%B1:%EA%B0%80%EC%8A%B4:), “Yangsimjǒk pyǒngyǒk kǒbu wataech’e pongmu” (The COs and alternativeservice), Daily Hangyoreh, June 22, 2004.

53 He was a mathematics student from theprestigious Seoul National University, and onceran for the chairmanship of his university’sstudent council in 1999 as a representative of aradical “PD” group, “Communard” (he came5 t h ) . S e e : C h ǒ n g H o s ǒ n , “ S ǒ u l d a e

ch’onghaksaeng hoejang sǒn’gǒ piundongkwǒnsasang ch’ǒǔm ch’oeda tǔkp’o” (For the firsttime in history, a non-undongkwǒn candidatesreceives the majority of votes at the elections ofSeoul national University student councilchairman), - Daily Maeil Kyǒngje, November2 4 , 1 9 9 9 :http://www.kinds.or.kr/main/search/searchcontent.php?docid=02100101.19991124MED0124&highlight=나동혁:PD

54 Hong Sehwa, Op. sit.

55 Na himself defined his refusal to serve as acontinuation of his earlier struggle againstcapitalism and the capitalist state, making clearthe connection between war-making and profit-making in the modern capitalist world-system.See: Aussaidǒ ǔi mal (Words by the Outsiders),Seoul: Aussaidō’, 2004.

56 Kim Yō’nggon, Han’guk nodongsa wa mirae(Korean Labour History and Future), Seoul:Sǒnin, 2005, Vol. 3, p. 91.

57 Initially, the party platform did not evenmention the word “nation”, minjok. Left-nationalists entered the KDLP en masse in2002-2003, and managed to capture a numberof leading positions in the party on the partyelections in June 2004.

58 Im Hyǒnjin, “Han’guk ǔi sahoe undong kwachinbo chǒngdang kǒnsǒl e kwanhan yǒn’gu” (AStudy on Social Movements and ProgressiveParties in Korea), - Han’guk sahoe kwahak, Vol.23, No. 1, 2001, pp. 1-49.

5 9

http://intro.kdlp.org/index.php?main_act=content&content=www_history

6 0

http://intro.kdlp.org/index.php?main_act=content&content=www_gang

61 44% of the supposed victims were first andsecond-class privates – that is, people at the

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bottom of the barrack hierarchy. See: ǑmK i y ǒ n g(http://www.kukinews.com/news/article/view.asp?page=1&gCode=kmi&arcid=0920413903&cp=nv), “Kun ǔimunsa chinjǒng 600 kǒn nǒmǒ”(The number of petitions on suspicious deathsin the army surpasses 600), Daily KungminIlbo, January 4, 2007.

62 The figures are taken from the officiali n t r o d u c t o r y b r o c h u r e(http://www.truthfinder.go.kr/Data/?ctl=view&cat=Pds&Id=899&page=1) of the InvestigationCommittee on the Suspicious Deaths in theArmy.

6 3

http://news.naver.com/tv/read.php?mode=LSS2D&section_id=115&section_id2=293&office_id=057&article_id=0000047067&menu_id=115

64 For example, according to one surveyconducted by the National Human RightsCommittee (Kukka inkwǒn Wiwǒnhoe) inNovember 2005, 41.1% of surveyed drafteesserving in the police acknowledged that theywere being abused in a variety of ways: around10% named sexual abuses, and 12.4% -beatings. Quite shockingly, 21.9% of thosebeing beaten by their superiors, claim that theyare beaten on a daily basis. See: Im Myǒngsǒp(http://www.breaknews.com/new/sub_read.html?uid=29132), “Chǒn, ǔigyǒng 41% kahokhaengwi kyǒnghǒm, irǒlsu ga” (41% of thedraftees in the militarized police and theconscript-staffed police units experiencebrutalities – is it possible?), Bǔreik’ǔ nyusǔ,November 14, 2005.

65 “Tragedy and reform in the military”, - KoreaHerald, December 29, 2005.

6 6 S i n C h u n g s ǒ p(http://news.naver.com/news/read.php?mode=LSD&office_id=021&article_id=0000089319&section_id=110&menu_id=110), “’Chujǒkkaenyǒm’, pyǒn’gyǒnghaeya hana?” (Do wehave to change the ‘main enemy” concept?), -

Munhwa Ilbo, November 23, 2004.

69 There are claims that rote memorization-based ways of “educating” conscripts intosharing the worldview of their commanders hasnot undergone any considerable changes. See:P ’ y o M y ǒ n g n y ǒ l(http://www.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?at_code=391735&portal=portal), “Nuga kamhi? Nohǔi ga sagwan hakkyo rǔl ara?”(Who dared? Do you know the MilitaryA c a d e m y ? ) , w w w . o h m y n e w s . c o m(http://www.ohmynews.com/), February 14,2007.

70 A person somewhat influenced by left-nationalist “anti-hegemonic” discourse, Kangreaffirmed his opposition to Koreans being sentas “canon fodder” to fight “America’sunjustifiable wars”, and pledged to continuethe struggle for “equal relations between Koreaa n d t h e U S ” . S e e : K i m H a y ǒ n g(http: / /news.naver.com/news/read.php?mode=LSD&office_id=002&article_id=0000016791&sect ion_ id=100&menu_ id=100) ,“’P’abyǒng pandae yangsim sǒnǒn’ KangCh’ǒlmin ibyǒng kasǒkpangtwae” (Private 2nd

class Kang Ch’ō’lmin, who issued a declarationof conscience protesting against the dispatch of[Korean] troops [to Iraq] released on parolefrom prison), - P’ǔresian, February 28, 2005.

71 This was the first time in since the Kwangjumassacre of 1980 that the army was usedagainst unarmed civilians. The suppression wasundeniably less violent – “only” 200 peoplewere injured and approximately 500 detained.S e e : N a t a s h a P e r s a u d(http://socialismandliberation.org/mag/index.php?aid=663), “U.S. base expansion in Koreasparks protests”.

7 2 C h ǒ n g I n m i(http://www.voiceofpeople.org/new/news_view.html?serial=57637&category=type11), “Zaitunpudae p’abyǒng yǒnjang tongǔian kukpangwit’ongkwa” (The motion to prolong the dispatch

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period for Zaitun unit [in Iraq] passed by[National Assembly’s] Defence Committee), -Minjung ǔi sori, December 12, 2006.

7 4 “Assembly panel OKs Lebanon troopdispatch”, - Korea Herald, December 16, 2006.

75 He was doing voluntary work with olderpeople left without family support (muǔit’aknoin), and also teaching “problematic”children from poorer families at an NGO-runevening school instead of following a “normal”teaching career. See: “Kukka podan kaein ǔii n k w ǒ n I t ǒ s o j u n g(http://www.hani.co.kr/section-005100025/2002/06/005100025200206281859002.html)”(Individual human rights are more importantthan the state), - Daily Hangyǒre, June 28,2002.

7 6 O T ’ a e y a n g ’ shttp://www.haeinsa.or.kr/maroo/board/?hlq=view_po&num=95&pg=2&tbid=newsbud

7 8 P o n g s ǒ k(http: / /news.naver.com/news/read.php?mode=LSD&office_id=001&article_id=0001208702&sect ion_ id=100&menu_ id=100) ,“Chonggyogye ‘yangsimjǒk pyǒngyǒk kǒbu’ǒttǒk’e pona” (How do the religious circlesview Cos?), - Yǒnhap nyusǔ, February 1, 2006.

79 His backers included the Korean BuddhistYouth Organizat ion (Taehan PulgyoCh’ǒngnyǒnhoe) and the Buddhist Citizens’Alliance for the Realization of EconomicalJustice (Kyǒngje Chǒngǔi Silch’ǒn Pulgyo SiminY ǒ n h a p ) . S e e t h i s l i n k(http://www.haeinsa.or.kr/maroo/board/?hlq=view_po&num=95&pg=2&tbid=newsbud).

81 He went to India as a member of the “Goodfriends” educational service group afterwards.P a k S ǒ n g j i n , K i m Y u j i n(http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=200612311857431&code=940100),“Yangsim pyǒngyǒk kǒbuja: sugam chung igǒnach’urok hu sahoe pongsa” (COs – either

imprisoned or engaged in voluntary activismafter release), - Daily Kyǒnghyang sinmun,December 31, 2006.

82 An example of a more radical socialistrefusing to serve in the army was Yi Wǒnp’yo,head of the planning department of the Taejǒnlocal chapter of the Korean Socialist Party, whoproclaimed himself a CO in August 2004 sayingthat he preferred serving his time in prison tobecoming a soldier for a state which commitswar crimes by participating in the aggressiona g a i n s t I r a q . K a n g S ǒ h ǔ i(http://www.prometheus.co.kr/articles/102/20060131/20060131172300.html), &“Pyǒngyǒkkǒbuja Yǒm Ch’anggǔn, Yi Wǒnp’yo ch’ulso”(COs Yǒm Ch’anggǔn and Yi Wǒnp’yo came outfrom prison), January 31, 2006.

8 3 S i n - Y u k T o n g u k(http://www.hani.co.kr/section-021014000/2005/11/021014000200511010583028.html),“Han’guk k’at’ollik ch’oech’o ǔi pyǒngyǒkkǒbu!” (The first CO among Korean Catholics!),- Weekly Hangyō’re 21, Issue 583, November 1,2005.

84 “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in theM o d e r n W o r l d G a u d i u m e t S p e s(https://apjjf.org/“Pastoral Constitution on theChurch in the Modern World Gaudium etSpes”)”

85 Typically, the representative Committee forJustice and Peace (Chǒngǔi P’yǒnghwaWiwǒnhoe) of the Korean Catholic Bishops’Council (Han’guk Ch’ǒnjugyo chugyo hoeǔi)stated in December 2005 that “under theconditions of North-South confrontation, itseems to be too early for the introduction of analternative service”, adding quickly, however,that “the alternative service should beintroduced in the long run”. Yi Pongsǒk,“Chonggyogye ‘yangsimjǒk pyǒngyǒk kǒbu’ǒttǒk’e pona”

86 The “just war” theory is still a part of officialChurch teachings despite the proliferation

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since 1965 of anti-war statements from thehighest levels of the Catholic hierarchy. See:R e v . R i c h a r d B e n s o n(http://www.the-tidings.com/2006/0825/benson.htm), “The ‘Just War’ Theory: a TraditionalCatholic Moral View”, - The Tidings, January10, 2007.

8 7 Y u I n h w a(http://news.naver.com/news/read.php?mode=LSD&office_id=032&article_id=0000041838&section_id=102&menu_id=102), “Kim Suhwanch’ugigǒng ‘Irak’ǔ p’yǒnghwa wihan p’abyǒngǔl” (Cardinal Kim Suhwan: ‘Dispatch the troopsfor the sake of peace in Iraq’), - DailyKyǒnghyang sinmun, November 23, 2003.

88 Yi Pongsǒk, “Chonggyogye ‘yangsimjǒkpyǒngyǒk kǒbu’ ǒttǒk’e pona”

89 Ch’oe Chunho (born in 1981, declaredhimself a CO in March 2003) refused toundergo any training which may cause damageto any sort of life. Ch’oe Chin (born in 1977,declared himself a CO in May 2004) washaunted by the images of the massacresperpetrated by the South Korean army duringthe 1950-53 Korean War near his place ofemployment in Mun’gyǒng County, NorthKyō’ngsang Province and declared himselfunwilling to cause any damage to living beings.S e e : S i n - Y u k T o n g u k(http: / /news.naver.com/news/read.php?mode=LSD&office_id=036&article_id=0000005191&section_id=103&menu_id=103), “Ch’oeChin: ‘Ai dǔl kwa p’yǒnghwa rǔl yaksokhangǒryo” (Ch’oe Chin: ‘But I promised to [servethe cause of] peace to my pupils’), - WeeklyHangyǒre21, May 19, 2004.

90 Im (born in 1975, declared himself a CO onJuly 22, 2003) is a former head of the sexualminorities group in the Korean chapter of Amnesty International. He was angered andfrustrated by institutionalized anti-gaydiscrimination in the army and the sexualabuse of known gays by their superiors in the

course of barrack life. See: Yi Ch’ungjae(http: / /news.naver.com/news/read.php?mode=LSD&office_id=119&article_id=0000006534&sect ion_ id=100&menu_ id=100) ,“Kundae poda anjǒnhan kamok ǔl t’aekhaetta”(I chose prison, which is safer than Army), -Teillian, March 9, 2006.

91 Cho (also known as “Dope head Cho”;renowned singer-songwriter, also involved in afeminist NGO) was an active supporter of theCO movement from the beginning and creatorof several anti-military web-sites. He statedthat tolerating the “total uniformity”(hoegilchuǔi) of military life is tantamount tocollaboration with militarism, which, with itsdisciplinary techniques, serves as the main stayof the entire Korean state system. See:“MModǔn p ’ongnyǒk kwa moryǒk ep a n d a e h a n d a !(http://www.hani.co.kr/section-021014000/2001/021014000200103270352005.html)” (I objectto violence and military force in all forms!), -Weekly Hangyǒre21, Issue 352, March 27,2001.

92 http://www.withoutwar.org/intro1.htm

9 3 K i m C h a e j u n g(http://news.naver.com/news/read.php?mode=LSD&office_id=005&article_id=0000090495&section_id=102&menu_id=102), “Yangsimjǒkpyǒngyǒk kǒby ch’ǒbǒl pǒbwǒnesǒ wihǒnsimp’an chech’ǒng” (A court appeals toinvestigate the [possible] anti- constitutionalityof punishing COs), - Daily Kungmin Ilbo,January 30, 2002.

9 4 C h o P ’ u n g y ǒ n e t a l(http://news.naver.com/news/read.php?mode=LSD&office_id=022&article_id=0000033007&section_id=102&menu_id=102), “Chonggyo iyupyǒngyǒk kǒbu ch’ǒt muchoe” (The first-everacquittal to the religious Cos), - Daily SegyeIlbo, May 21, 2004.

95 “Hǒnjae, ‘kukpobǒp, pyǒngyǒkpǒp haphǒnkyǒlchǒng (http://news.naver.com/tv/read.php?

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mode=LSS2D&section_id=&section_id2=&office_id=056&article_id=0000038925)” (TheConstitutional Court rules that the NationalSecurity Law and Military Duty Law areconstitutional), - KBS TV, August 26, 2004.

96 Korea Focus, Vol. 12, No.5, 2004, p. 150.

97 “Yangsimjǒk pyǒngyǒk kǒbu wa taech’ep o n g m u(http://www.hani.co.kr/kisa/section-013002000/2006/01/013002000200601081533978.html)”(Conscientious objection to the military serviceand alternative service), - Daily Hangyō’re,January 8, 2006.

98 “Yun kukpang ‘Taech’e pongmu 1nyǒn kǒmt’oh u k y ǒ l c h ǒ n g(http: / /news.naver.com/news/read.php?mode=LSD&office_id=019&article_id=0000130026&section_id=100&menu_id=100)” (Defence minister Yun: ‘Will decide onalternative service after a year- longdeliberation period’), - MBN, February 9, 2006.

9 9 C h ’ o e C h ǒ n g m i n(http://www.pressian.com/scripts/section/article.asp?article_num=60071112193235), “SahoePongmuje, kukhoe e nō’mgyō’jin kong”(Alternative service: the ball sent to theParliament), - Pressian, November 21, 2007.

1 0 0 Y u S a n g h o(http://www.donga.com/fbin/output?n=200807050141), “Pyō’ngyō’k kō’buja taech’e pongmuchaegō’mt’o” (Alternative service for the COsreconsidered), - Daily Tonga Ilbo, July 5, 2008;“Taech’e pongmu paekchihwatoena?(http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/12/24/2008122400721.html)”Are alternative serviceplans

being cancelled?, - Daily Chosō’n Ilbo, December 24,2008.

1 0 1

http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2002/vol1/objectionchr.htm

1 0 2 Y u S i n m o

(http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=200612081825301&code=910100),“Yuen in’kwǒn wi ‘yangsimjǒk pyǒngyǒk kǒbusugamja e posang” (UN Human RightsCommission demands to compensate theimprisoned COs), - Daily Kyǒnghyang sinmun,December 8, 2006.

103 For example, Prof. Kim Tusik’s (law studies)pioneering account of the world history ofconsc ient ious ob ject ion , Swords toPloughshares(K’al ǔl ch’yǒsǒ posǔb ǔl, Seoul:Nyusǔ aen choi, 2002), Yi Namsǒk’s (politicalstudies) account on the principles of theconscientious objection and the intrinsicfallacies of the “just war” theory, ConscientiousObjection and Civil Disobedience (Yangsim ettarǔn pyǒngyǒk kǒbu wa simin pulpokchong,Seoul: Kǔrinbi, 2004), or Prof. Kwǒn Insuk(gender studies) popularly written analysis ofthe ideological structures of Korean militarism,Republic of Korea is an army (Taehan Min’gukǔn kundae da, Seoul: Ch’ǒngnyǒnsa, 2005).

104 ‘Sasǒl: Pyǒngyǒk ǔimu nǔn pundanguk ǔiy a n g b o h a l s u ǒ m n ǔ n k a c h ’ i d a(http://www.segye.com/Service5/ShellView.asp?TreeID=1052&PCode=0007&DataID=200612101629000147)” (Editorial: Military duty is avalue a divided nation cannot yield on), - DailySegye Ilbo, December 10, 2006.

105 “Sasǒl: Chajungchiran in’kwǒnwi, issǒyah a n a(http://www.heraldbiz.com/SITE/data/html_dir/2006/09/27/200609270134.asp)” (Editorial:Internal strife-ridden Human Rights Committee– should it exist?) , - Daily Heraldō” Kyǒngje,September 27, 2006.

106 For example, in a televised news commenton the recommendation by the National HumanRights Committee to acknowledge CO rights,the main public broadcaster, KBS (Han’gukpangsong kongsa) presented a frighteningpicture of “everybody busy converting to thatparticular religion, which requires its followers

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to object to the draft (the Jehovah witnesses, -V.T.)” It also appealed to widespread populardiscontent about the de facto “poor man’sdraft” in Korea, emphasizing the concern that alternative service might become “a newp r i v i l e g e ” . S e e : I m C h ’ a n g g ǒ n(http://news.kbs.co.kr/news.php?kind=c&id=817450), “Nyusǔ haesǒl: “yangsimjǒk pyǒngyǒkkǒbu wa anbo ǔi chǒpchǒm” (Comments on thenews: the point of contact between the“conscientious objection” and “nationaldefence”) , - KBS, December 29, 2005.

1 0 7 For one example, in August 2006, YiYongsǒk, a unionized teacher working at aschool in Puch’ǒn, close to Seoul, wassuspended for 3 months for “teaching his pupilsa value system, which oversteps the limits ofour society’s common sense”, telling students

that obligatory salute to the national flag maybe regarded as a totalitarian ritual and thatsince the army is the institution whichmonopolizes violence, one has to be carefulabout internalizing the logic of state-approvedviolence while being drafted. See: “Haksaengk w a h a k p u m o p o h o h a r y ǒ h a e t t a( h t t p : / / w w w . h a n i . c o . k r / s e c t i o n -021037000/2006/08/021037000200608170623010.html)” (We were going to protect the pupilsand their parents), - Weekly Hangyǒre21,August 17, 2006.

1 0 8 N a K i c h ’ ǒ n(http://news.naver.com/news/read.php?mode=LSD&office_id=022&article_id=0000127419&section_id=100&menu_id=100), “Kungmin 72%‘Taech’e pongmu antoenda, kundae kaya’”, -Daily Segye Ilbo, October 29, 2005.