Militant Buddhism and Post-War Sri Lanka

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South Asian Review, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2014

Militant Buddhism and Post-War Sri

Lankan Cinematic Memory Work

Dinidu Priyanimal Karunanayake

Department of English, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio

[Abstract:Since 2009, several Sinhala films, such asMatha(2012) by

Boodee Keerthisena, andIni Avan(2012) by Asoka Handagama, haverevisited the memory of the last phase of the thirty-year Sri Lankan

civil war. Using as a touchstone Sarath Weerasekaras Gamani(2011),

a film that claims to be based on the true story about the LTTEsmassacre of a group of Sinhalese villagers, this paper explores the

uses and abuses of memory (Jelin) in statesponsored postwar

cinema. Through an examination of the film, this paper will show how

the Buddhist discourse contributes to a hegemonic memory culture,pushing subaltern testimonies and memories of war into the periphery.

It will examine the role of Buddhism, depicted in cinematic memory

work, in the project of post-war nation-building in Sri Lanka.]

These Buddhist clergy who are engaged in a nationally importanttask should not be feared or doubted by anyone.

Secretary of Defense Gotabhaya Rajapaksa at the opening of theBuddhist Leadership Academy of the Bodu BalaSena (Jeyaraj)

n June 15, 2014, the Bodu Bala Sena (the Buddhist Power Force

or BBS) organized a rally with the motto Avadiwawu (Wake

up!) in Aluthgama, a coastal town in the western province of Sri

Lanka.2 The rally was organized in response to an alleged attack on aBuddhist monk by a group of young Muslims in the neighboring

Dharga Town on June 11 (Athas and Hume). Speaking on the occasion,

BBS General Secretary Galadoba Aththe Gnanasara raved about a

timely-duty assigned to Sinhalese Buddhists in the country: to

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80 Dinidu Priyanimal Karunanayake

contain the Muslim community (Bodu Bala Sena Meeting

Aluthgama). The speech presaged a wave of anti-Muslim riots inAluthgama, Dharga Town, and Beruwala. After two days, the riots

culminated in four deathsthree Muslims and one Tamiland the

displacement of nearly ten thousand people (Karunarathne). As of July

4, 2014, Colombo Telegraph claims that not even the most basicinvestigations have been made into the incident by the state. Among

several other chauvinist organizations such as Ravana Balaya

(Ravanas Power) and Sihala Ravaya (Sinhalese Roar), the BBS

has, in this manner, emerged as a paramilitary organization with a self-

proclaimed nationally and religiously important mission in the post-warSri Lankan political situation.

Speaking of the Sri Lankan states three-decade long civil waragainst the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Ananda

Abeysekara observes, in Colors of the Robe(2002), that there exists anauthorization of a power dynamic between Buddhism, the state head,

and the nation.1 Buddhism, which is constitutionally granted a

foremost place (Chapter II: Buddhism), has percolated into the verycore of national politics in Sri Lanka. The official end of the war

between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the LTTE on May

19, 2009, has reaffirmed and heightened this religio-national power

grid, evident in the activities of the BBS. As revealed by the Secretaryof Defenses words, quoted in the epigraph, the state upholds the

nationally important task rendered by Buddhist monks, ignoring the

fact that such tasks have the capacity to ignite communal unrest andinter-religious animosity targeting non-Buddhist communities. The

words acquire an ominous tone when they come from the Secretary, a

brother of the President Mahinda Rajpaksa.The states passive stanceon the anti-Muslim riots and several preceding incidents in which theBBS was involved seems, for all practical purposes, a form of tacit

complicity.3This resembles the states indirect endorsement of ethnic

violence directed against Tamils in 1983.4 The religious fervor has

significantly become an indispensable ingredient in dominant memorywork in the post-war cultural milieu of Sri Lanka.

As is common in other historical contexts in Asia, Africa, and the

West, cultural and literary texts emerging in the post-war era are loadedwith a desire to revisit the history of war and narrativize supposedly

real stories. Through an analysis of Sarath Weerasekaras film Gamani

(2011), I examine how post-war cinematic memory-work positions the

Sinhalese Buddhist identity as historically, culturally, and racially

supreme over ethnic minoritiesTamil, Muslim, and Burgher

communities. The film upholds interests of the nation state and hasbecome an embodiment of the zeitgeist of post-war popular culture.

Through a close reading of Gamani, I identify the role of militant


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Militant Buddhism and Post-War Cinematic Memory Work 81

Buddhism in post-war hegemonic memory work. I insist that dominant

post-war cinematic narrative commits epistemological violenceviolence against knowledge that excludes other types of knowing

systemsby promulgating a single story of war that celebrates

sanguinary justice (Gebrewold 92). I will situate the seeds of retributive

justice evident in the film within a discourse of melancholiawhichSigmund Freud identifies as ones inability to mourn properlyvis--

vis the failure of Sinhalese Buddhists to mourn their historical losses.

Mnemonic exigencies of war and Gamani

In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Michel Foucault maintains that

memory is not a tangible element, but is developed by a society throughits relations with history. History is a way in which a society

recognizes and develops a mass of documentation with which it is

inextricably linked (7). Accordingly, the past is often reproduced andtreated in an epistemological sense in order to educate present

generations. In a similar vein, speaking of how Latin Americancountries changed from dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s to

democracies in the 1990s, Elizabeth Jelin identifies a power matrix

between the past, the present, history, memory, identity, andknowledge. For her, the past cannot be changed but its meaningis

subject to re-interpretations anchored in intentions and expectations

towards the future (26). She contends that the construction of

memory-based narratives becomes very problematic when they areconnected to social and political events, because hegemonic forces in

power decide the orientation of such work. Jelins articulation of

labors of memory and Foucaults take on history shed light on how

Weerasekaras film Gamani standardizes memory in post-war SriLanka.With the claim that it is based on the true story of the LTTEs

massacre of a group of civilians on August 25, 1999, in Gonagala, a

village located between a battleground and the civilian area in theEastern Province of Sri Lanka, Gamani revisits a melodramatic

moment in national memory. The film starts with the depiction of the

LTTEs massacre of a group of Sinhalese Buddhist villagers on theirway home from an alms-giving ceremonya Buddhist event that

invokes blessings on a dead personheld in memory of a fallen

soldier. It chronicles the ways in which the villagers and home guards

master military strategies under the leadership of the Buddhist monk of

the village temple, a Sinhalese teacher newly appointed to the villageschool, and a young military officer.5 They successfully thwart a

second attack by the LTTE cadres, kill them, and celebrate over enemybodies on a full moon day, a day with religious significance forBuddhists. Using this exemplary narrative, the film reiterates that all


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Sinhalese Buddhists have a patriotic and religious duty to enact the role

of Gamani, which was the designated post of village-protectors inancient Sinhalese kingdoms.6 Corresponding to this, the title of the film

echoes a prevalent obsession with King Dutugemunu who is frequently

idealized in post-war rhetoric, both by the state and by groups such as

the Bodu Bala Sena, as a savior of the Buddhist nation.7Gamani garnered state sponsorship, particularly in the post-

production stage. It received state-media publicity, was circulated

island-wide, and became a local blockbuster. The film also officially

represented Sri Lanka at the SAARC Film Festival 2013, held in

Colombo. At the launching ceremony of the films official website,President Mahinda Rajapaksawho, incidentally, starred in

GaminiFonsekas1994 film Nomiyena Minisun (Immortals) whichnarrates sacrificial roles played by ultra-patriotic soldiers in the Sri

Lanka Armyhailed it:[A] film that refreshes our memory of a history that is beingforgotten. The film best explains to the viewer the suffering of the

people in villages targeted by terrorists, the sacrifice made by thearmed forces to protect the people, and various difficulties andchallenges encountered by government servants working in thoseareas. (Gamani Refreshes Memory of a History Going into

Oblivion)

While positioning the film as a text that serves a crucial role in

rectifying national amnesia, the President applauds its representation of

the sacrifice and humanitarian services rendered by the armed forces. In

a similar vein, responses of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist forces to thefilm within Sri Lanka were very positive, and the film continues to be

revered as a cult memory work.8

It must be noted that none of these nationalist critics questioned the

obvious contradictions that exist between the films representations andhistorical accounts. For instance, as far as historical records reveal,

hands-on combat training was not provided to the home guards or the

villagers of Gonagala, nor did they thwart a second attack by the LTTE.In fact, the LTTE did not wage a second attack at all. Furthermore, the

actual event, widely known as the Gonagala Massacre, happened on

September 18, 1999, and not on August 25, 1999, as claimed by the

movie.9 As for the death toll, while the film declares it to be 57, The

Sunday Times mentions it as 54. The Official Website of the Data and

Information Unit of the Presidential Secretariat, Sri Lanka, quotes the

film as the true source and also identifies the death toll to be 57. Other

sources mention varying figures.

10

These factual and historicaldiscrepancies were never contested by those who applauded the film,rather preferring to echo President Rajapaksas words. Instead,

Sinhalese viewers seemed to be dazzled by its emotional appeal. For


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instance, a reviewer writing in the mainstream Sri Lankan newspaper

The Island says: My critical eye was dimmed very often with tears atthe sheer pathos, deplorable difficulties faced and tragedies submerging

the poor villagers of Gonagala in Ampara (Pethiyagoda). It is clear

that the audiences perceptions of memory are more attuned to

nationalist sentiments rather than to a critical interrogation of history(and even the historicity of history). In other words, a humanitarian

depiction of the victims of warwho are Sinhalese Buddhists as the

film and its reviews suggestcan willfully override any dissimilarity

to the events that happened in reality. As this paper seeks to explore,

the state seems to endorse this logic in composing the chemistry ofpost-war memory culture, which is a post-war strategy to officialize

and legitimize a master narrative of its warthe self-proclaimedHumanitarian Mission or the Worlds largest hostage rescue

mission against the LTTE (The Ministry of Defense website).

Officializing Memory and Master Narratives

Meaningful links between history and memory are intimate. As

Jelin asserts, memories generate meanings of the past, framed by the

power relations in which their actions are embedded in the present (xv).Thus, memories occupy a central space in present-day power politics,

and can best serve a national imaginary. Jelin also elucidates the ways

in which the past is use[d] and abuse[d] by actors with bureaucratic

powers to officialize and institutionalize their own masternarratives of the nation (23-27; 44).These discourses of nationalism

and national identity compel master narratives to be selective and to

privilege saviors of the nation. Along these lines, Gamanis attempts to

officialize a dominant version of memory are noteworthy. Sulochana,the ultra-patriotic Sinhala teacher in the film, levels the culpability forthe massacre at the armed forces that are officially responsible for the

protection of civilians. This is evident in her sardonic question to the

young military officer, Major Vikum: What did the army do until thiskind of predicament befell the village? (Gamani) This question would

certainly occupy a legitimate space in the nationalist mindset of the

Sinhalese viewer. Furthermore, the film repeatedly flashes back tointense moments of the massacre in a bid to remind the audience of the

LTTEs violence. Unarmed mothers and fathers are hacked to death

while infants are smashed on the ground. The notion of culpability is

used, in this fashion, as a point of departure to legitimize the course of

militant actions taken by the Sinhalese Buddhist victims who areseemingly driven by a search for justice.

Along these lines, the film valorizes retributive justice in the finalencounter between the villagers and the LTTE in which SinhaleseBuddhist war heroics get the better of the LTTE cadres, reversing the


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aftermath of the former massacre. Women, who were once terrified by

the LTTEs hostility, are armed with guns to confront the LTTEsswords and knives. Fathers, who could not hold their ground, excel in

martial arts and the use of weaponry. Children, who were once

traumatized by the LTTEs terrorism, now revel in witnessing the

Sinhalese heroism. A child who lost her voice at the trauma ofwitnessing the deaths of her sibling and parents, regains her voice when

the perpetrator is strangled to death by a Sinhalese home guard.

Clearly, the film presents an alternate narrative to illustrate the

Sinhalese Buddhist national imaginarys stance on how things should

have happened. This seems to be an attempt to address SinhaleseBuddhists melancholiatheir inability to grieve over what they once

lost in war. As Freud states, melancholia borrows some of its attributesfrom mourning, which is the reaction to the loss of a loved person,

object, or ideal (243). Unlike normal mourning, melancholia is markedby pathological mourning (Freud 250). In other words, it stems from

a situation in which the subject cannot properly manage the act of

mourning. On the other hand, Judith Butler writes that melancholia isthe repudiation of mourning (29). The rejection of mourning can

render results that are similar to those of unsuccessful mourning.

During the three-decade-long war, Sinhalese Buddhist civilians and

their state underwent woeful experiences of material and human loss.As a result, their self-esteem was disparaged by the enemy-other in

many instances of military defeat. The end of the film rectifies the

mistake the Sinhalese Buddhist villagers make by letting the enemymassacre their kith and kin at the beginning. This moment points to

Qadri Ismails discussion of the notion of loss that has been historically

and culturally troubling the Sinhalese Buddhist majority for severalcenturies:

Crushed culturally and politically for some four and a half longcenturies by three Christian Western powers (Portugal, Holland,

Britain), attacked incessantly by Tamils (Hindus from southern India)in the even longer centuries before colonialism; in short, subjugated,dispossessed, victimized, and wounded by history itself, the

Sinhalese Buddhist majority in Sri Lanka . . . is simply trying,according to its autobiography, to redress the balance, heal thoseinjuries, correct those wrongs, attempting to finally live in peace and

security in the post-colonial period. (34)

Ismails criticism sheds light on a national state of melancholia that

dates back to the second century B.C. when Elara, a Chola invader,

seized power.11 One way of redress[ing] the balance seems to begetting even with the enemyor more correctly, getting the better of

the enemy. The centuries-long anxiety displays a state of inability to

mourn properly, which is, in other words, a state of national


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melancholia. A viable solution recommended by hegemonic memory

work is to promulgate a culturally superior narrative for SinhaleseBuddhists and ensure that it remains the only narrative, as evidenced by

the national mission assigned to Gamani.

This single narrative presented in the film embodies the ideology

behind the Governments final offensivethe HumanitarianOperationagainst the LTTE. As the state reiterates, its war against

the LTTE is a mission for justice on behalf of innocent civilian victims.

This official truth reverberates in Gamani in which the villagers

overpower their enemy through civilized warfare. On the contrary, the

LTTE cadres savagery and lack of humanity are displayed in theiruse of basic weapons like swords and knives with which they

sadistically hack unarmed innocents to death. Their actions are placedon par with images of tribal genocide in movies like Hotel Rwanda,

Tears of the Sun, andBlood Diamond. The tyrannical nature of Africanvictimizers as captured by Hollywood is well replicated in the violent

gestures and grotesque physiognomy of the LTTE soldiers. In this

manner, the film pronounces a strong adoration for the human-nessof the state forces in tandem with its denunciation of the sub-human

nature of the LTTE. Most importantly, it recasts the death of the LTTE

leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, who was reportedly killed in an attempt

to use innocent unarmed civilians as a shield.12 In the movie, before hisdemise, the LTTE leader keeps Sinhalese villagers as hostages and tries

to shield himself with a Sinhalese mother and her child when he is

surrounded by the government forces. The Government viewed thekilling of the LTTE leader as an ultimate moment of rendering justice

to the nation as was pronounced in a news report by the Defense

Ministry: The end of the megalomaniac killer and the megalomaniacoutfit he created finally did the justice to the 19 million Sri Lankancitizens who suffered immensely due to the madness he unleashed (n.

pag.). In a similar vein, the elimination of the LTTE leader in Gamani

restores order and justice to the victimized as it marks the climax of the

Sinhalese Buddhist villagers victory. They jubilantly celebrate theiraccomplishment in a way that suggests that the Sinhalese Buddhist

nation is invincible.

The single story of victory presented in Gamanitakes place againstthe backdrop of Sinhalese cultural heritage. This phenomenon is

evident in the use of the lessons on Sinhala Literature and history that

are incorporated into the home guards training sessions to give them a

good morale. This also illustrates another aspect of the officialization

of the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist master narrative. Such narratives

are drafted by professional historians whose link to power is crucial totheir task (Jelin 28). In the film, the official narrative-tellersthe

monk, Sulochana, and Major Vikumhave socially hierarchical


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positions as they are more informed than the villagers. At a symbolic

level, these three characters serve three aspects indispensable toSinhalese Buddhist chauvinism: the monk represents ideological

leadership; Sulochana the need to educate citizens on history; and the

Major, the mechanism that officially implements military decisions.

Notably, the film is directed by a Former Rear Admiral in the SriLankan Navy. As Jelin holds, official memory workers claim

authority in the practice of assigning meaning to historicized memories

(44). Even though the film features a displaced Tamil family that has

undoubtedly undergone similar experiences, their narratives are

positioned on the periphery, and only in service of the hegemonicnarrative. Along these lines, the film overwhelmingly depicts

Sinhalese-ness, which points to another paradigm of post-war SriLankan memory workthe polarization between Sinhalese as the

insiders and other communities as outsiders or interlopers.

Brandishing Sinhalese Buddhism and Sanguinary Justice

Michel Foucault writes that history is a way in which society

recognizes and develops a mass of documentation with which it is

inextricably linked (7). History and memory are mutually constitutive,and documenting history becomes a concomitant process of archiving

memories. As Jelin puts it, [m]emory . . . incorporates knowledge,

beliefs, behavior patterns, feelings, and emotions conveyed and

received in social interaction, in processes of socialization, and in thecultural practices of a group (9). This involves advancing one version

of history that, together with patriotic symbols, monuments, and

pantheons to national heroes, could serve as a central node for

identification and for anchoring national identity (Jelin 27). Thismnemonic process grants ownership of memorization to a dominantcultural group, as in the case of Sinhalese Buddhists in Gamani.

Notably, Tamils are not given an opportunity to engage with collective

memory. Instead, their experiences are narrated for them by SinhaleseBuddhists. The family of displaced Tamils is introduced and their

victimization is narrated in order to reiterate Sinhalese Buddhist

humanism that is collectively celebrated. The film, thus, shows thatcollective memory functions in an insular way in the context of religio-

nationalism.

Further, in line with Gamanis depiction of Sinhalese Buddhist

nationalism, the Buddhist monks preaching is used as a background

soundtrack in the opening scene. The Buddhist chant in the openingscene that invokessamyak dushtika godsgods who have been graced

with the enlightenment of Buddhismto come and listen to thepreaching is an invitation to a Sinhalese Buddhist audience tocongregate to witness a narrative crafted for their entertainment.


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Clearly, the film is not meant for a multi-cultural Sri Lankan audience

but only for a selective Sinhalese Buddhist audience. It mistakenlyconflates the Sinhalese Buddhist identity and Sri Lankan-ness while

excluding Tamils and non-Buddhists as others. In one scene, while

the village monk preaches about the woeful experience in departing

from the beloved with an emphasis on the Buduwadana (the word ofthe Buddha), a home guard enters the kitchen to flirt with his fiance

who is preparing alms. He asks for food in a playful way, and she

replies in a similar manner that he has to wait until bana (Buddhist

preaching) is over. At this juncture, he retorts, [b]ana? If we are

listening to bana, whod be protecting the village? (Gamani). Whilethe significance of the indispensable role of the home guard in civil and

national security is pronounced in this manner, this scene also shedslight on the need to take up arms to protect the national religion,

Buddhism. The woman changes her mind and offers food to the homeguard by subverting the religious convention, as if to acknowledge his

superior position as a jaatiye muradewathathe guardian god of

the nationa name attributed to armed forces in the nationalistimaginary.13This scene conflates the Sinhalese Buddhist identity and

Sri Lankanness as something indispensable to the safe upkeep of the

Sinhalese nation.

On par with the home guard, another seminal Gamani figureemergesthe Buddhist monk who is positioned as the inspirational

live wire of the Sinhalese Buddhist military mobilization against the

enemy. In Buddhism Betrayed, S.J. Tambiah documents theemergence of militant monks whose active involvement in Sri

Lankan politics dates back to 1935 (Jayawardena qtd. in Tambiah 18).

Influenced by Indian nationalism and left-wing politics, and armed withan anti-British attitude, they formed various movements with politicalaffiliations. Tambiah illustrates how monks were drawn into political

violenceas perpetrators as well as victimsin the 1971 JVP

insurrection and in the Sri Lankan Governments war against the

LTTE. He examines how the sons of the Buddha dedicated to non-violence have transformed themselves into a militant, violent, radical,

and political identity as sons of the soil which entails militant and

violent politics and thus defies the non-violent teachings of Buddhism(Tambiah 95-96). With some notable exceptions, he says, the

majority of monks explicitly or privately supported and condoned the

Sinhalese armys killing of Tamil guerillas and had not felt the moral

imperative to object to the tribulations imposed on Tamil civilians

(Tambiah 95). Even though this seems to be a sweeping generalization

which is later refuted by Daniel Kents studymany monksinterviewed by Kent are of the view that Buddhist monks should never

encourage soldiers to kill enemiesthe dominant Buddhist rhetoric


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which is under the purview of the prominent monks is often linked to

the states interests.14These attributes are embodied by the monk of thevillage temple, who is enraged by the incapacity of villagers to hold

their ground following the massacre:

We cannot tolerate these crimes . . . .We are a nation of good blood.You better know! Our ancestors fought the Portuguese, the Dutch,

and the English with poised swords and daggers. We are such anation. We must remain in these villages even if it means killing(enemies) with suicide. If anyone wants to go, go! If home guardscannot safeguard this village, I will disrobe and take a gun into my

hand. (Gamani)

These words remind us of Ismails aforementioned quote pertaining to

the Sinhalese nations desire to heal its historical injuries. The monk

uses address terms such as yako (hey!), thopi (you), and directives

such as denaganiyaw (know), pala (go) which are loaded withmilitant rhetoric (Gamani). The monks vocabulary is notably

reminiscent of that of Anagarika Dharmapala, a Buddhist revivalist in

colonial Sri Lanka. He initiated an island-wide campaign of national

regeneration with the motto Awake, You Sinhalese! (Jayawardene)The revivalist rhetoric he used in mobilizing Sinhalese Buddhists to

protect Buddhism from Christian missionaries was directive and

militant. Dharmapala is considered a prototype of a nationalist hero,who, in President Rajapaksas words, performed his duty to uplift

Sinhala Buddhist[s] during a dark era in Sri Lankan history when there

was no opportunity for the people even to think about freedom

(Anagarika Dharmapala Raised His Voice During the Darkest Era inSri Lankan HistoryPresident Rajapaksa). The monk in Gamani is

positioned as a reincarnation of Dharmapala. Notably, the monk is alsodriven by a consuming desire to avenge the massacre of Sinhalese

Buddhists by the LTTE.Thus the monk widens an existing gap between the two factions at

war. He further exclaims in an alarming tone:

[B]e informed. Even if we are killed in hundreds, we dont leave ourvillages. Did we leave them when we were attacked by Chola, andPandya? Our kings organized armies for years, attacked them andchased them away.[15] Those noble people will curse us from their

graves if we leave our villages in fear of these. (Gamani)

He mistakenly conflates the identity of South Indian Chola and Pandya

invaders with that of Sri Lankan Tamil-ness, which, in his eyes, is

embodied by the LTTE. This idea echoes the articulation of religious

nationalism by Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka who are of the view thatBuddhism has always been the national religion of the people of SriLanka (Tambiah 102). The monk sees the seventh-century Sinhalese


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and the twentieth-century Sinhalese in the same light. This view

reinforces a notion of the Sinhalese identity as one that has remainedconstant and can be traced back 1,400 years.

Furthering Sulochanas justification of retributive justice, the monk

in the film interprets violence as a Buddhist solution to war: Killing

a man isparajika. . . .But killing someone for ones own safety is notparajika.16 Even Lord Buddha has sanctioned it (Gamani). Along

these lines, he advocates a just-war theory and interprets Buddhism

in militant terms. He even questions the non-violent position

traditionally assigned to a monk: So whats the role of the present-day

monk? Does it mean going into woods and meditating while hisdevotees are being killed, or helping save those innocent people?

(Gamani). This points to Tessa J. Bartholomeusz discussion of theprima faciejust war theory, a mechanism used by Sinhalese Buddhists

since classical times, to rationalize their involvement in war despite thenon-violent teachings espoused by the Buddha. Accordingly, the

obligation to refrain from killing can be overruled by the obligation to

protect Buddhism. Bartholomeusz shows how Sri Lankan state leadersin the recent history, while making references to the Mahavamsa

portrayals of ancient Buddhist rulers such as Dutugemunu, have

asserted [their] right to wage war against the LTTE for the greater

good of the citizens of [their] country (37). These ethical obligationsregarding war claimed by a ruler are central to Sinhalese Buddhist

nationalism (46). Similar views are expressed in Gamani, which links

the just war theory to the Sinhalese Buddhists right to restore orderand claim justice. This fits into the nationalistic agenda and justifies

the Governments use of violence and military power in resolving the

ethnic problem. The film voices the need to arm Sinhalese Buddhistsagainst the LTTE/Tamil invaders who have no rightful claim to theSri Lankan motherland which is the sole property of Sinhalese

Buddhists. Similar to the monks in Bartholomeusz study who talk

about a rulers ethical obligations regarding war (46), the monk in the

film invokes blessings on the Governments military ventures againstthe LTTE. He is invested with powers that supersede even those of the

military hierarchy. He walks into the training sessions at his will and

preaches about the grandeur of the Sinhalese Buddhist ancestors.Clearly, he is positioned as a proxy for the ruler. It must also be noted

that when he addresses the villagers, he is positioned standing against

the background of a huge Buddha statue. This example of mise-en-

scne contributes much to the overarching presence of Buddhism in the

monks political activism.

As Stanley JeyarajaTambiah argues, seeing the utopian past asa beacon for the future is a prominent feature in militant Sinhalese

Buddhist rhetoric (106). Based on the success stories of ancient


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Sinhalese Buddhist kings military ventures against terrorism, the

monk defies western political solutions to the countrys problem,which he considers to be flawed: Giving political solutions to

terrorism is extremely dangerous. When they realize they can win their

demands by killing innocent civilians, they ask for more (Gamani).

The fact that these words are addressed to a gathering of representativesof a non-governmental organization (NGO) is also significant. During

the time of war, the GOSL frequently accused NGOs, of being under

the auspices of western donors, and of aiming to destabilize the

countrys sovereignty and territorial integrity.17Along these lines,

Gamani writes back to the western solutions to war, while upholdingthe Buddhist states decision to resort to militarism.

While Buddhism is thus used to rationalize the states militaryventures, the enemys use of religion in war is denounced. For

instance, the LTTE leader tries to console the mother of a fallen cadresaying, [t]he son martyred himself for the Eelam. He went to heaven.

Now youre a Mahaveer family (Gamani).18But the mother objects:

My son did not die for Eelam. He died for us, whom you kept incustody in fear that he would shirk the assigned task in Colombo

(Gamani). She accuses the LTTE of telling lies from the outset that

the Sinhalese kill Tamils and rape Tamil women. She retorts: If

someone kills innocent people for his/her own advantage, that persondoes not get to heaven, but hell, according to our religion (Gamani).

This dubious take on religious justification of war furthers the films

endorsement of Buddhisms legitimate warfare.

Conclusion

A close analysis of Sarath Weerasekaras Gamani shows theemergence of several political and cultural paradigms in post-war SriLanka. While post-war cinematic memory-work functions within the

political agenda of the ruling state, such work also complies with

religious and nationalist interests of the majoritarian SinhaleseBuddhist community that is eager to establish their cultural superiority

over ethnic and religious minorities. On one hand, the desire for

superiority can be comprehended as an attempt by the SinhaleseBuddhist nation to grapple with a state of post-war melancholia. On the

other hand, this situation shows how state-sanctioned memory work

creates a deleterious single narrative about the war. Dominant

cinematic memory that interprets justice via militant Buddhism not

only echoes but also provides an ideological nourishment to post-warBuddhism-based violent mobilizations, such as the BBS, which target

ethnic and religious minorities. The film, in this manner, presages anew phase in militant Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism that is endorsed

by the state as something nationally important and, hence, not to be


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doubted, as evident in the Secretary of Defenses words quoted above.

It is not an understatement to say that Gamani sets the stage for thebirth of neo-tribalism, which Hywel Williams defines as modern

governments desire to justify their existence in historical terms and to

propose tribewhich is savage in instinct and ritualistic in religion as

the basis of a grunting solidarity (67), in post-war Sri Lanka. In theseterms, hegemonic memory work renders a notable service to the task of

converting the country into a military regime, which is established on

cultural supremacy and militarized Buddhism.

Notes

1. The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka can be identified as a civil war in linewith the definition articulated by Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis.They identify a civil war as an armed conflict between an internationally

recognized state and one or more armed oppositional groups that wageresistance against the state. For the definition, see page 31 of Making War andBuilding Peace: United Nations Peace Operations.

2. Founded in 2012, The Buddhist Power Force is a hard-line Sinhalese-Buddhist organization that promises to safeguard Buddhism against threats and

to lead the nation to build up a Buddhist society in Sri Lanka (Bodu BalaSena).

3. On April 9, 2014, the BBS sabotaged a press conference convened byRev. Watareka Vijitha, a staunch critic of the BBS. A few days later, on April

23, 2014, the BBS stormed the premises of the Ministry of Industry andCommerce, which is under the purview of minister Rishad Bathiudeen, aMuslim. In both incidents, the police did not take action against the BBS.

4. After thirteen soldiers were killed in an LTTE ambush in Jaffna on July

23, 1983, the government brought the bodies to Colombo for final rites. Inreprisal, anti-Tamil riots broke out in several parts of the capital (Ethnic

Conflict of Sri Lanka).The events of the ethnically-oriented violence areknown as Black July.

5. Home guard is the lowest-ranking post in the Sri Lankan armed forces.Often denigrated as gam batta, a home guard occupies a peripheral space in

the military hierarchy.6. See Perera for an analysis of the etymology ofgamani.7. King Dutugemunu (101-77 BC) is well known for unifying Sri Lanka

after defeating King Elara, a Chola invader, who seized power and ruled thecountry for forty four years. See Senaveratna for a detailed account of the war

between Dutugemunu and Elara.8. The film was positively reviewed in mainstream Sinhala newspapers

such as The Lankadeepa, The Dinamina, and The Silumina. These reviews havenot been digitally archived.

9. See Kamalendra.10. For instance, SLNewsOnline reports 61 dead.

11. See Senaveratna.12. Velupillai Prabhakaran (November 26, 1954 May 18, 2009) founded

the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1976 with the intention of


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creating an independent, separate state for Tamils in Sri Lanka. The war he

started against the Sri Lankan state is one of the longest civil conflicts in SouthAsia. Based on the widely publicized beliefs, Jyoti Thottam reports, By thefinal weeks of conflict, he [Prabhakaran] was believed to be using thousands of

Tamil civilians as human shields against the advance of the Sri Lankanmilitary (n. pag.).

13. As the convention goes, the alms are not supposed to be consumeduntil offered to the Buddha.

14. Daniel Kents 2010 study Onward Buddhist Soldiers: Preaching tothe Sri Lankan Army recounts interviews with monks who reject the idea thatBuddhism justifies any form of violence. However, it must be noted that thosemonks do not occupy any position in the dominant nationalist rhetoric, unlike

the informants in the studies by Tambiah and Bartholomeusz.15. Cholas were South Indian Tamil rulers whose occupation of Sri Lanka

dates back to the Kingdom of Anuradhapura (377 BC1017). Pandyas were

Tamil rulers from the extreme south of India, and they invaded Sri Lanka

during the Kingdom of Polonnaruwa (10561212).16.Parajika refers to a set of actions that result in a monks expulsion

from monkhood. There are ten such actions in the case of a novice monk, andfour with respect to a fully-ordained monk.

17. Speaking in December 2008, the Chairman of the Parliamentary SelectCommittee said that some of the leading INGOs and NGOs were supporting the

LTTE directly and indirectly (Sriyananda). Four years after the war ended, thisis still a popular accusation repeatedly made by the state (President Warns ofForeign Plot to Destabilise Sri Lanka).

18. Mahaveer is a title given as a tribute to the fallen LTTE cadres in

memory of their sacrifice for the organization.

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Documents

Militant Buddhism and Post-War Sri Lanka