Mikoyan Talks

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COLD WARINTERNATIONAL ULLETIN

HISTORY PROJECT

Issue 5 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C. Spring 1995

CUB N MISSILE CRISIS"DISMAYED BY THE ACTIONS OF

THE SOVIET UNION":Mikoyan's talks with Fidel Castro andthe Cuban leadership, November 1962

by Vladislav M. Zubok

The talks between Anastas I Mikoyan,member of the CC CPSU Presidium, and therevolutionary leadership of Cuba in Havana

on 3-12 November 1962, were a lesserknown, but nonetheless dramatic episode inthe story of the Cuban missile crisis, and alsomarked a watershed in the history of relations between the Soviet superpower andone of its closest non-European allies.

Thanks to declassified documents fromU.S. archives, researchers have begun toappreciate the significance and nuances ofU.S.-West German, U.S.-Iranian, and otherkey patron-client relationships that were vital to American conduct during the ColdWar. But until very recently, the existenceand importance of parallel commitmentsand influences on Soviet foreign policy wereoften grossly underestimated. New Eastbloc archival evidence, however, has corroborated suspicions that, to take one keyexample, Walter Ulbricht, the East German

communist leader from 1953 to 1971, wasnot merely a Soviet puppet, but, since thelate 1950s, made his needs and agendasincreasingly present in the minds of theKremlin policy-makers. As Hope Harrisonhas convincingly shown, there are substantial reasons to analyze Soviet-GDR ties notonly as a relationship of submission andsubservience, but also as a relationship inwhich at times the tail wagged the dog far

more than the West realized. l Similarly,new Russian archival documents presentedby Kathryn Weathersby have disclosed innew detail how North Korean leader KimSung was also able to press his militantagenda on an even stronger Soviet leader,Joseph Stalin, with disastrous consequences,in the run-up to the Korean War. 2

The documents on the Mikoyan-Castrotalks from the Archive of Foreign Policy ofthe Russian Federation (AVPRF) in Moscow, published in this issue of the CWIHPBulletin reveal that for Nikita Khrushchevand his colleagues in the CC CPSU Presidium (Politburo), the Soviet -Cuban axisalso acquired a life of its own, beyond thebipolar dimensions of the Cold War. Thisalliance influenced Kremlin decision-making processes far more than the needs and

requirements of Soviet domestic constituents and forces (elites, bureaucratic services,propaganda and ideology, latent public opinion). In the events leading to the Cubanmissile crisis, the considerations stemmingfrom this axis had a part at least as importantas the interests and concerns flowing fromthe dynamic of U.S.-Soviet relations.3

The Historic-Documentary Departmentof the Foreign Ministry had declassified

documents on the Soviet-Cuban talks, likemany others related to the Cuban missilecrisis, in late 1991. But officials of theDepartment withheld them (in a manner thatunfortunately has become a recent pattern),allowing only a few to have a peek at them attheir discretion. One of them, SergeiKhrushchev, gives a dramatic, albeit shortdescription of Mikoyan's visit in his Russian-language book, Nikita Khrushchev:Crises and Missiles. 4 Some were also madeavailable to the makers of television documentaries, or published in Russian. Nowthey have become available to scholars, withcopies available for research at the NationalSecurity Archive in Washington, D.C., andtranslations of the minutes of the post-crisisSoviet-Cuban talks follow this article.

continued on page 89


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parity in the cheapest way. When the Sovietcomrades proposed to us to deploy the nuclearmissiles in Cuba I did not like the idea, but notbecause of the military risk; because from thepolitical point of view we would have been seenas a Soviet military base in Latin America. Wewere ready to accept the risk of an Americanmilitary invasion of Cuba in order to avoid thepolitical harm to the prestige of the Cuban revolution. But at the same time we understood thatthe Soviet Union needed that measure to ensuretheir own security. We knew that we had suffered a big political damage at the very timewhen we were dreaming about a revolution in allLatin America, but we were ready to make sacrifices for the Soviet Union.

I cannot take the credit for the resolution ofthe crisis. More likely, I believe, the major rolebelongs to Khrushchev who caused that crisis byhis stubbornness, and then resolved it. I did notknow what was the real correlation of forces atthat time, how many missiles did Khrushchevhave. Khrushchev told me that after the missileswould have been deployed in Cuba, Kennedywould have to swallow it, and that later theSoviet leader was going to introduce the Fleet inthe Baltic Sea (probably a mistake in the notesshould say introduce the Baltic Sea Fleet ). Ithought that Khrushchev's actions were too risky.I believe that it was possible to achieve the samegoals withoutdeploying the missiles in Cuba. Todefend Cuba it would have been sufficient tosend six regiments of Soviet troops there, be-cause the Americans would have never dared toopen military activities against the Soviet troops.

Now I understand that the actions undertaken by Khrushchev were risky, if not to sayirresponsible. Khrushchev should have carriedout a policy like the one Gorbachev is carryingout now. However, we understand that at thattime the Soviet Union did not reach the paritywhich it has now. I am not criticizing Khrushchevfor pursuing strategic goals, but the choice of thetiming and the means for achieving the goals wasnot good.

When I [Shakhnazarov said that Americans had to and did abide by the agreementreached during the Caribbean crisis throughoutthe whole periodafter the crisis, Castro responded:yes, indeed, it was so. That is why I don't thinkI have a right to criticize Khrushchev. He had his

own considerations. And it really doesn' t makemuch sense to replay the history guessing whatcould have happened if...

Fidel Castro supported the idea of publishing memoirs of the participants of those eventsand added that he would be willing to take part inthe discussions of the subject himself. I knowsomething about the Cuban crisis, he said witha smile.

I. The organizationand results ofthe 1987 Cambridgeconferenceare described in James G. BlightandDavidA. Welch. On the Brink: Americans nd Soviets Reex-

amine the Cuban Missile Crisis New York: Hill andWang. 1989:Noonday PressofFarrarStrausandGiroux,1990).2. On the 1989 Moscow conference. see Blight andWelch. On the Brink 1990 ed.).3. On the 1992 Havana conference, see James G.Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba onthe Brink: Castro. the Missile Crisis nd the SovietCollapse New York: Pantheon. 1993).

Georgy K Shakhnazarov was formerly a senior officialin the lntemationalDepartment o f the Cenlral Commil-lee o f the Communist Party of the Soviel Union nd nadviser to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

M OY AN'S TALKScontinued from page 59

The documents lend credence to thereminiscences of the historic participantsNikita Khrushchev, Fidel Castro, formerSoviet Ambassador in Cuba AleksandrAlekseev. 5 They reveal that the fraternitybetween Cuba and the USSR was badly

fractured. While the Kremlin leadership,faced with a severe danger, preferredgeostrategic pragmatism to ideological commitments, the Cuban revolutionaries sprungup in fierce defense of their national sovereignty and revolutionary legitimacy. Fromthe Soviet perspective, that of a superpower,the most important fact was that Castro had,in his letter to Khrushchev of October 26,advocated apreem ptive nuclear strike againstthe United States if it invaded Cuba. 6 Thisnotion, considered dangerous and irresponsible in Moscow, became an excuse completely to exclude Cuba from the U.S.-Soviet secret talks to resolve the crisis. Someof the Soviet leaders, gathered at the heightof the crisis on 27 October 1962 at NovoOgarevo governmental dacha nearMoscow,may even have feared that the Cubans, likeUlbricht, could push them all overthe brink'?John 1. McCloy, a representative of theKennedy Administration, told Mikoyan, inNew York on November I, that he wasreassured by the presence of Russian officers [in Cuba during the crisis]. The Cubans

could open fire without thinking ... But theRussians would think first. 8 Khrushchevhimself was forced to explain to Kennedythat the Cuban leaders were young, expansive people- in a word, Spaniards. 9

Mikoyan 's tr ip was tr iggered byAlekseev's cables from Havana. The Sovietambassador alerted the Soviet leadershipthat Moscow's actions had endangered Soviet-Cuban friendship. Khrushchev wasparticularly upset to learn that a rapprochment

was in progress between Cuba and thePeople's Republic of China. O The continuing pressure of the United States for moreSoviet concessions indeed corroborated thisimpression.

Mikoyan was Khrushchev's closest

friend and most loyal ally. As had hispredecessor-Stalin dispatched Mikoyan on

a delicate mission to Mao in January 1 9 4 9Khrushchev frequently used Mikoyan as atroubleshooter and personal diplomatic emissary: to Hungary (October 1956), to WestGermany (March 1958), tothe United States(January 1959), and to talk to the antiKhrushchev demonstrators during theNovocherkassk riots in south Russia (June1962). Important from the Cuban viewpoint,Mikoyan had been the last in the Sovietleadership who belonged to the old guardof the Bolshevik revolutionaries. He hadknown all great revolutionaries of the century, from Lenin to Mao Zedong. And hewas the first to embrace the Cuban revolution after his trip to Cuba in February 1960,at a time when the Kremlin still felt ambiguous aboutthe Cuban revolution and its young,non-Marx ist leaders. Castro, for all hisanger, let Mikoyan know on November 3that he remembered his role. Khrushchevsometimes said, Castro joked, that there isa Cuban in the CC CPSU. And that thisCuban is Mikoyan.

What both sides felt and understood

during the talks was no less important thantheir formal written content. For the thirdtime, since the Stalin- Tito split (1948) andtheSino-Sovietquarrel (since October 1959),there was an open conflict of perspectivesand interests between the USSR and anothercommunist regime. And both sides werefully aware of this. Fidel Castro said (asquoted to Mikoyan by Ernesto CheGuevara): The United States wanted todestroy us physically, but the Soviet Unionhas destroyed us de jure [iuridicheskii; juridically, legally] with Khrushchev's let

ter II it is not clear whether this commentreferred to Khrushchev's letter of October27, with its offer to swap Soviet missiles inCuba for U.S. missiles in Turkey, or hisletter to Kennedy of October 28, agreeingwithout consulting Castro beforehand to

withdraw the Soviet missiles from Cubaunder UN inspection. But in any case, bothactions enraged and offended Castro, whoreminded Mikoyan, on November 4, thatafter the Spanish-American ware 1898), when


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the United States "liberated" Cuba fromcolonial rule, Washington also did not inviteCubans to a peace conference and Congresspassed the Platt Amendment (1901), whichdenied Cuba an independent foreign policy 12

On November 3, in a one-to-one meeting with Fidel (Alekseev interpreted),Mikoyan absorbed Castro's first angry as

sault and lived up to his thankless mission.When he left Moscow, Ashkhen Tumanian,his wife of forty years, was dying in theKremlin hospital. He learned about herdeath during the first, tensest conversationwith Castro. 3

Only on the second day of talks, November 4, did Mikoyan fully present theSoviet side's arguments. He defendedKhrushchev's claim that the outcome of theCuban Missile Crisis was not a surrender toWashington's demands, but a Soviet-Cuban"victory," because a military attack againstCuba was prevented without slipping into anuclear war. To win over the furious Castro,Moscow's messenger was ready to stay inCuba for an indefinite time. If my arguments would seem insufficiently convincing for you," he said, "tell me about it, I willthink how to get my point across to you, Iwill try to bring new arguments." Mikoyan ' slengthy arguments and explanations on November 4 and the afternoon of November 5finally elicited an expression of gratitudefrom Castro and an emotional, if grudging,

declaration of "unshakeable" respect for and"complete trust" in the Soviet Union.

But the Cuban leader and his comradeswere soon infuriated anew when, only minutes later, Mikoyan tried to convince them toaccept a United Nations inspection of thedismantling of the strategic missiles based inCuba-or at least their loading onto Sovietships in Cuban ports-arguing that such aprocess would strengthen the sympatheticposition of UN Secretary-General U Thantand remove any pretext to continue theAmerican blockade. Castro, acutely awarethat Khrushchev had accepted the principleof a UN inspection without informing him,bought none of it. "A unilateral inspection,"he told Mikoyan, "would affect monstrouslythe moral spirit of our people." Saying hespoke for the whole Cuban people, Castrofirmly rejected any international inspectionof Cuba-unless a comparable inspectiontook place in the United States-and toldMikoyan that if such a position endangeredpeace, Cuba could defend itse lf without the

Soviet Union 's help. "Come what may," heconcluded. "We have the right to defend ourdignity." Mikoyan could only plead plaintively that he didn't "understand such asharp reaction," and failed to convince Castroor his colleagues to soften their adamantrejection of inspection then or in a secondmeeting that evening which Castro skipped,

leaving others in the leadership, notablyChe, to denounce bitterly the Soviet stand.

Still another tense moment in the talkscame on November 12 after Khrushchev,yielding to Kennedy 's pressure, made a newconcession to the United States-agreeingto withdraw from Cuba Soviet-made IL-28medium-range bombers in exchange for thelifting of the U.S. naval blockade of Cuba.Unlike the missiles, the bombers had beentransferred into Cuban ownership, andKhrushchev took pains to "clear" this newdeal with Castro before expessing his "grea tsatisfaction" to Kennedy.14 For Mikoyan,this second mission was no less difficultthan the previous one. Castro interrupted theSoviet interlocutor with questions full ofscorn and skepticism or just stopped listening altogether. At one point, after hearingMikoyan's lengthy defense of the IL-28concession, he agitatedly cut off his visitor'sspeech with the words: "Why are these arguments being cited? You should say outrightwhat the Soviet government wants."15

The sequence of Mikoyan ' s arguments

allows us to look into mentality of the Kremlin leaders. Beneath the veneer of ideological phraseology lay the hard core pragmatism of superpower statesmen who had testedthe waters of globalism and reached its limits. Argument number one was that thesurvival of the Cuban regime in an areawhere the correlation of forces was so adverse constituted a great success of Marxist-Leninist theory."16 Mikoyan stoppedshort of telling the Cubans that understanding between Kennedy and Khrushchev wasthe sine qu non for the survival of theCuban revolution. But he admitted that theAmerican proximity to Cuba and the U.S.Navy 's huge preponderance otherwise wouldhave ensured Cuba 's subservient place withinWashington's sphere of influence. "Communications between us and Cuba are overextended. We cannot use our Air Force andNavy in case of [a U.S.] blockade of Cuba."[November 4] I f Cuba were located inplace of Greece, we would have shownthem." [November 5] "You were born like

heroes, before a revolutionary situation inLatin America became ripe, and the camp ofsocialism has not yet grown to full capabilities to come to your rescue." [November 5]

n spite of the U.S. geostrategic preponderance, Mikoyan said that Kennedy "took astep in our direction," because his pledge ofnon-intervention against Cuba "is a conces

sion on their part." 17 Until this episode, theKennedy Administration had argued thatCuba for the United States was analagous toHungary for the USSR-part of its securityzone. IS Mikoyan' s words make one thinkthat this comparison had also been importantin Kremlin thinking: while the USSR crushedthe Hungarian revolt in 1956, defending itszone, the United States had not y t managedto do the same to the Cuban revolution.

Mikoyan's next argument revealedMoscow's fervent desire to preserve its credentials as the center of the world revolutionary movement, particularly in the face ofthe challenge from Beijing. Mikoyan pressedthe analogy between Khrushchev's settlemento fthe Cuban Missile Crisis and Lenin'sdefense of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918),"an infamous peace" between revolutionaryRussia and Kaiser Germany aimed at savingthe Bolshevik regime at all costs. n fact, thedialogue between Mikoyan and the Cubanleaders revealed two starkly different perspectives: between the Kremlin's unwillingness to challenge frontally American he

gemony in the Western hemisphere, andHavana 's determination to blow this hegemony to pieces through a revolutionary offensive.

Castro and particularly Che Guevaralinked the future of the Cuban revolution tothe growth of the international revolutionarymovement in Latin America. In a passionateoutburst on November 5, with Fidel Castroabsent, Che told Mikoyan that Latin American communists and revolutionaries were"baffled by the actions ofthe Soviet Union."The developments especially frustrated Che,he explained, because. "We are deeply convinced in the possibility of seizing power ina number of Latin American countries, andpractice shows that it is possible not only toseize, but to maintain power in a number ofcountries, given specific [Cuban] experience and the assistance of socialist countries, first of all the Soviet Union." But, helamented, the Soviet "bargaining" with theUnited States and its "open retreat" beforeAmerican demands had led to de facto rec


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ogmtIOn of all Latin America as a U.S.sphere of influence, and discouraged nationalistic petit bourgeoisie from allyingwith radical forces against the omnipotentGringos from El Norte It seems to me,concluded Che, that one should expect adecline of the revolutionary movement inLatin America. He also stressed that in the

Soviet handling of the missile crisis hadalready produced a crack in the unity ofthe socialist camp. Both he and Mikoyanknew that this meant factional splits in manyradical groupings in Latin America and ashift of some of them to the PRe's wing.

n response, Mikoyan reminded theCubans of Nikolai Bukharin, a young Bolshevik ( although he was repressed, I thinkhe was a good person ) who in 1918 alsopreferred to promote world revolution evenat a risk of sacrificing Soviet power inRussia. We practically had no armed forces,but those comrades [like Bukharin] wantedto die heroically, reject Soviet power.Study Lenin, he lectured the Cubans. One

cannot live in shame, but one should notallow the enemy to destroy oneself. There isan outcome in the art of diplomacy. Kremlin apparatchiks would repeat this samelitany of prudence time and again, whenthey had to deal with radical regimes in theThird World later in the I960s and 1970s.

Mikoyan reminded the Cubans thatsince 1961, Soviet-Cuban economic rela

tions were trade in name only: the Cubanswere getting everything, including weapons, free of charge. We do not pursue anycommercial or national interests in Cuba,he told Castro. We are guided exclusivelyby the interests of internationalism. I9 Hepointed out to Castro that the Kremlin, awareof the American plan to strangle Cubaeconomically, had without any requestsfrom your side decided to supply to youarmaments, and in part military equipmentfor free. The Soviets had also covered theCuban balance of payment ($100 million)in order to foil the Kennedy plan, designed

to detonate Cuba from within. 20 f theAmerican blockade of Cuba continued,Mikoyan warned, then the Soviet Unionwould not have enough strength to renderassistance, and the Cuban government wouldfall. 2I

Mikoyan and Khrushchev evidently expected that these pragmatic arguments wouldcarry the day with the Cuban leadership, andthat the danger of a pro-Beijing reorienta

tion of Latin American revolutionary movement could be stemmed by generous Sovietassistance.

For historians of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most interesting parts of the documents are where Mikoyan gave the Cubanshis version of the recent dramatic events.Though this version was obviously tailored

to Cuban sentiments and to Mikoyan's specific tasks, there is considerable overlap,sometimes almost verbatim, betweenMikoyan's story and the story later told byKhrushchev in his memoirs. So all themore intriguing and credible are details thatare missing in the Khrushchev's version.First, the documents hint at what possiblecountermeasures the Kremlin contemplatedagainst the U.S. attack against Cuba. Theconclusions must have been bleak, as heexplained to Castro on November 4. Wecouldnot retaliate by ablockade of an American base, for instance, in Turkey, since we donot have another outlet into the Mediterranean. We could not undertake similar stepsin Norway, nor in England, nor in Japan. Wedo not have sufficient capabilities for acounter-blockade.

Mikoyan and Khrushchev (in his lettersto Castro before and after the visit) sang thesame tune when they explained to the Cubans the reasons for Soviet secrecy and theirmisplaced hopes to camouflage the missiles.The most eyebrow-raising aspect of

Mikoyan's explanation deals with the question of what the Kremlin believed Kennedyknew and was about to do before the breakoutof the crisis. Of course, the standard versionof events in mostaccounts has it thatKennedyand his advisers did not obtain hard evidenceof the missile deployment until a U.S. U-2reconnaissance plane photographed sites inCuba under construction on 14 October1962-but Mikoyan told a different story.U.S. intelligence, said Mikoyan, workedbadly, but in mid-September r1962] theAmericans seemed to receive informationabout the transfer of Soviet troops and strategic missiles to Cuba. n Mikoyan' s version,presented on November 4, the initial sourceof this scoop was not the U-2flights but WestGerman intelligence [Bundesnachrichtendienst]. Only then, he said, theAmerican government sent planes to the airspace of Cuba to carry out the aerial-photoreconnaissance and establish the sites ofmissile deployment. Kennedy, saidMikoyan, spoke nothing about Soviet troops

which made people in the Kremlin thinkthat he spoke not all that he knew. Until

the end of rmid-term] Congressional elections, on November 6, asserted the Sovietmessenger, Kennedy did not want to speakabout the Soviet missiles in Cuba. Hedid notwant to aggravate ru.S.-Soviet relations].But two senators from the Republicanparty -clearly alluding to Kenneth Keatingof New York and Everett Dirksen of Illinois- Iearned about the fact of deploymentof strategic missiles in Cuba, thereforeKennedy hastened to take initiative in hishands We did not have information withrespect to how he was going to act.

A book on the hidden intelligence aspects of theCuban Missile Crisis is being coauthored now by American and Russianhistorians, and I hope they will comment onMikoyan's assertions. 3 t has becomeknown that CIA Director John McCone hadconcluded by the late summer of 1962 thatSoviets had decided to transport nuclearcapable missiles to Cuba, though most CIAanalysts discounted the likelihood of thispossibility.24 Yet, the Kremlin almost certainly erred in conflating the suspicions ofsome U.S. intelligence officials withKennedy's awareness of the missiles. n thiscase, it seems, Khrushchev's belief that theU.S. president knew about the Soviet installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba but fordomestic tactical reasons preferred to wait

until after the elections to deal with themstands out as one of the most remarkableexample of wishful thinking in the entirehistory of the Cold War.

n another interesting sidelight, the transcripts of the Mikoyan-Cuban talks indicatethat the issue of Berlin was not the maincause for the Soviet gamble in Cuba, but asideshow. Berlin was also the most seriousbargaining chip the Soviets had, but theyhesitated to use it during the brinkmanshipand bargaining in late October. Mikoyanmentioned only in passing to the Cubans onNovember 4 that countermeasures werepossible in Berlin, adding that the Sovietsused the Berlin asset in a disinformationcampaign in September-October, to distractAmerican attention from Cuba. n fact, onepassage from that conversation suggests thatthis disinformation backfired, making theKremlin believe that the Kennedy administration was interested to postpone not onlythe discussion on Berlin, but also secret talkson the Soviet strategic buildup in Cuba, until


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after the Congressional elections. AsMikoyan related to the Cubans, "Throughconfidential channels Kennedy addressed arequest to N.S. Khrushchev that he wouldnot aggravate the situation until after theCongressional elections and would not setout [immediately 1 then to solve the Berlinissue. We responded that we were ready to

wait until the end of the elections, but rightafterwards would proceed to the solution ofthe Berlin quesion. When the Americanslearned about the transportation of strategicweapons into Cuba, they themselves beganto get loud about Berlin. Both sides weretalking about the Berlin crisis, but simultaneously believed that the crux of theirpolicyin the present moment was in Cuba."

Did Mikoyan's mission prevent a Soviet-Cuban split? There is no categoricalanswer to this question. Castro had acceptedSoviet assistance, but not Soviet arguments.The Cuban leader and his comrades thoughtprimarily of the revolutionary "legitimacy"of their regime in Latin America. After theCuban missile crisis, the "honeymoon" inSoviet-Cuban relations ended and was transformed into a marriage of convenience. Thishad both immediate and long-term consequences. For instance, Mikoy an' s trip had adirect impact on Khrush chev's ongoing correspondence with Kennedy. In his letter ofNovember 22, the Chairman admonishedthe U.S. presidentto puthimselfintoCastro's

shoes, "to assess and understand correctlythe situation, and if you like psychologicalstate, of the leaders of Cuba... and this striving [for independence] must be respected. 25In all probability, Khrushchev addressedthese words not so much to Kennedy (whohad not the slightest desire to heed them), butto Castro, who on November 3 receivedcopies of all previous Khrushchev-Kennedycorrespondence on the settlement of the crisis. From then on the Soviet leadership, inorder to placate their "friends," had to forgive and overlook much in Castro's interna

tional behavior, and also had to carry theburden of this behavior. In immediate implication, because the Cubans rejected inspections in any form on their territory, Sovietmilitary and naval personnel had to complywith humiliating procedures of aerial inspection imposed on them by the Americans, something for which they could notforgive Khrushchev even decades later. Forthe next three decades, the Soviet economywas burdened with a multi-billion Cuban aid

program, including food, equipment, consumer goods, and weapons. Castro, whenhis dreams of Latin American revolutionswere shattered, sought to fulfill his "internationalist duty" in other lands, and foundpretexts to restore the revolutionary d ignityof Cuba. tarnished during the Cuban MissileCrisis, in Angola (1975) and Ethiopia (1977

78). Even then the Brezhnev leadership,who remembered Cast ro's outbursts in 1962,was reluctant to make full use of the Sovietleverage on the Cuban regime.

I See Hope M. Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete'Rose': New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics ofSoviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis.1958-1961," Cold War International History ProjectWorking Paper No.5 (Washington. D.C.: WoodrowWilson International Center for Scholars. May 1993).passim. quotation on 4.2. For illustrations, see Weathe rsby' s article in thecurrent CWIHP Bulletin as well as her CWIHP Working Paper and article in CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993),as well as her documentary essay. 'The Soviet Role inthe Early Phase in the Korean War: New DocumentaryEvidence." The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 2:4 (Winter 1993).425-58.3. This factor has begun to impress even those scholarswho had previously analyzed the origins of the CubanMissileCrisis through the prism of the bipolarconfrontation and the dynamics of the balance of strategicforces. and who firmly believed that "the factor of theCuban revolution was of no importance inKhrushchev's decision to deploy Soviet medium-rangemissiles in Cuba.4. Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev: Krizisi iraketi. Vzgliad iznutri, vol. 2 (Moscow: Novosti. 1994).388-90.5. "Memuar i Nikiti Sergeevi cha Khruscheva: KaribskiiKrizis." Voprosii Istorii 7 (1993).89-110; Castro andAlekseev comments quoted in James G Blight, Bruce].Allyn and David A. Welch. Cuba on the Brink: Castro.the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse (New York:Pantheon, (993). 88-99.6. See Castro to Khrushchev. 26 October 1962, inGranma (Havana). 23 November 1990. English translation reprinted in Blight. Allyn, and Welch. Cuba onthe Brink. 481-82.7. Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: Krizisi iraketi, vol. 2, 355-357.360- 362,364 ; Jerrold L. Schecterwith Vyacheslav V. Luchkov, trans. anded., KhrushchevRemembers: The GlasnostTapes(Boston: Little. Brown,and Co., (990). 170-183; Memuari NikitiSergeevicha...... 108; Brezhnev. according to his aide,

Andrei M. Alexandrov-Agentov, was "trembling" atthe thought of a nuclear exchange. A.M. AlexandrovAgentov, Ot Kollolllai do Gorbacheva [From Kollontaito Gorbachev] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodniie otnosheniia.1994),174.

8. Quoted by Mikoyan in his meeting with Cubanleaders. 5 November 1962.9. Khrushchev to Kennedy, 22 Novembe r 1962. published in Problems o f Communism 42 (Spring (992).108.10. See Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev, 378.II. Castro was quoted to this effect by Ernesto CheGuevara during Mikoyan's meeting with Cuban leaders on 5 November 1962.

12. The U.S. Congress passed the Platt Amendment inMarch 190 I. as an attachment to the Army Appropriations Bill. t authorized the U.S. President to occupyCuba until a Cuban constitution would provide guarantees that no "foreign power" would be ever permitted togain a foothold on Cuban soil. Castro referred to thisparticularclause of the Platt Amendment as aconstrainton Cuban sovereignty. He referred to it at the conference in Havana in January 1992: "We were told: eitheryou acceptthe Platt Amendment, orthere is no indepen

dence. No country in the world would ac cept that kindof amendment in its constitution, because it gives therightto another country to intervene toestablis h peace .....Cuba on the Brink. 331. 341.13. Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev. 378-79.14. The text of Khrushchev-Kennedy correspondenceregardin g this thorny issue on 6, II, 12, and 13 November 1962 is in Problems of Communism 42 (Spring1992),77-92.15. Transcript of conversation between A.1. Mikoyanand Fidel Castro, 12 November 1962, translation inGen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. Smith,Operation ANADYR: U S nd Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition q.1994). 191-99; see also ciphered tel egram, A. Mikoyanto CC CPSU. 12 November 1962, in ibid., 189-90.

16. Castro-Mikoyan talks, 4 November 1962.17. Mikoyan-C astro talks, November 4 and 5.18. See, e.g., the Rusk-Gromy ko meeting of 18 October1962 published elsewhere in this issue.19. Castro-Mikoyan conversation. 12 Novembe r 1962.20. Ca stro- Mikoyan conversation. 4 November 1962.21. Castro-Mikoyan conversation. 12 November 1962.22. For Khrushc hev's recollections of the crisis. inEnglish, see Strobe Talbott. trans. and ed., KhrushchevRemembers (Boston: Little, Brown. and Co (970).488-505; Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed KhrushchevRemembers: The LastTestament(Boston: Little. Brown,and Co., (974) ,509-514; Khrushchev Remembers: The

Glastnost Tapes, 170-83.23. T imothy Naftali from the University of Hawaii andAlexander Fursenko from the Russian Academy ofSciences are on a contract of Crown publishers to writethis story. Fursenko has a first-time access to the materials from the Archive of the President of RussianFederation and the archives of the KGB [not FederalCounterintelligence Service or FSK] that are beingdeclassified specifically for this project.24. McCone's predictions are docume nted in Mary S.McAuliffe, ed .. CIA Documents on the Cuban MissileCrisis (Washington. D.C.: CIA History Staff. 1992).esp. 51-52. 59-60, 67-68. 77-79. reproducing McConecables of 7.10,13, and 16 September 1962; see alsocomments of Ray Cline. Cuba on the Brink, 125-26.25. Problems of Communism 42 (Spring 1992). 108

Vladislav M Zubok is a researchfellow at the NationalSecurity Archive. Washington. D.C. His book Insidethe Kremlin's Cold War. co-authored with ConstantinePleshakov. will be published by Harvard UniversityPress.


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Mikoyan's Mission to Havana: Cuban-Soviet Negotiations, November 1962

[Ed. note: To preserve the flavor of the Russiandocuments, the original grammar and punctuation have been retained in some cases where theyconflict with normal English practice.]

Document I:And suddenly - concessions....

The First Castro-Mikoyan Conversation,3 November 1962

NOTES OF CONVERSATION BElWEENA.I. MIKOYAN and FIDEL CASTRO

This morning a two-hour conversation tookplace between comrade AI. Mikoyan and FidelCastro, where I [Soviet Ambassador to CubaAleksandr Alekseev] was also present.

3 November 1962

Unfortunately, AI. Mikoyan said, somedifferences of opinion have arisen between the leadership of the Republic of Cuba and our leadership. Ambassador Alekseev has informed usabout these differences, and about the speech byFidel Castro on I November 1962, in which thelatter explained to the Cuban people the positionof the revolutionary government.

The CC CPSU, Mikoyan emphasized, hadsent me to Cuba to discuss in the most frank wayall the unclear questions with the Cuban comrades. Judging by the welcome at the airport, theCuban leaders consider this a useful meeting. Icame here to speak to you sincerely and openly.And now it seems to me that it would be useful ifyou, comrade Fidel Castro, tell me frankly whatthe questions are that worry you. Only by speaking frankly is it possible to assure complete confidence and mutual understanding. As we agreedbefore, after this conversation a meeting will beorganized with the secretaries of the NationalCDR [Committees for the Defense of the Revolution leadership in order to discuss all the issuesin detail.

In response Fidel Castro said that the Cubanleadership was glad to see A.I. Mikoyan in Cubaonce again, and to speak with him about questions that are important for both sides. We areaware, joked Fidel Castro, that N.S. Khrushchevonce said: there is a Cuban in the CC CPSU andthis Cuban is AI. Mikoyan. We can speak toyou, Fidel Castro continued, very frankly. Weprofoundly trust the Soviet Union.

Regarding the questions that caused somedifferences, as we explained it to our people, I[Castro] would like to say the following.

These questions are motivated, first of all,by psychological factors. I would like to stress

that in those days when a serious danger arose,our whole people sensed agreat responsibility forthe fate of the motherland. Every nerve of thepeople was strained. There was a feeling that thepeople were united in their resolve to defendCuba. Every Cuban was ready to repel theaggressors with arms in hand, and ready to devotetheir lives to the defense of their country. Thewhole country was united by a deep hatred ofUSA imperialism. In those days we did not evenarrest anyone, because the unity of the people wasso staggering. That unity was the result of considerable ideological work carried out by us in orderto explain the importance of Soviet aid to Cuba,to explain the purity of the principles in the policyof the USSR.

We spoke with the people about the highpatriotic objectives we were pursuing in obtaining arms to defend the country from aggression.We said that the strategic weapons were a guarantee of firmness for our defense. We did notclassify the arms as defensive and offensive,insofar as everything depends on the objectivesfor which they are used [Ellipsis in originaL]

Speaking of psychological questions, wewould like to underline that the Cuban people didunderstand us They understood that we hadreceived Soviet weapons, that Cuban defensecapacities had increased immeasurably. Thus,when Kennedy attempted to frighten us, the Cuban people reacted very resolutely, very patriotically. It is hard to imagine the enthusiasm, thebelief in victory with which the Cubans voluntarily enlis ted themselves into the army. The peoplesensed enormous forces inside themselves. Awareof the real solidarity of the Soviet governmentand people, Cubans psychologically felt themselves to be strong. The Soviet Union 's solidarityfound its material embodiment, became the banner around which the forces and courage of ourpeople closely united.

In observing Soviet strategic arms on theirterritory, the people of Cuba sensed an enormousresponsibility to the countries of the socialistcamp. They were conscious that these mightyweapons hadto be preserved in the interests of thewhole socialist camp. Therefore, regardless ofthe fact that USA planes were continuously violating our air space, we decided to weaken theanti-aircraft defense of Havana, but at the sametime strengthen the defense of the missile locations. Our people proudly sensed their role as adefenderofthe socialist countries' interests. Antiaircraft gunners and the soldiers protecting themissile locations were full of enthusiasm, andready to defend these at the price of their ownlives.

The tension of the situation was growing,and the psychological tension was growing also.The whole of Cuba was ready for

defense...[ElIipsis in originaL]And suddenly--concessions...[ElIipsis in

original.]Concessions on the part of the Soviet Union

produced a sense of oppressiveness. Psychologically our people were not prepared for that. Afeeling of deep disappointment, bitterness andpain has appeared, as if we were deprived of notonly the missiles, but of the very symbol ofsolidarity. Reports of missile launchers beingdismantled and returned to the USSR at firstseemed to our people to be an insolent lie. Youknow, the Cuban people were not aware of theagreement, were not aware that the missiles stillbelonged to the Soviet side. The Cuban peopledid not conceive of the juridical status of theseweapons. They had become accustomed to thefact that the Soviet Union gave us weapons andthat they became our property.

And suddenly came the report of the American [news] agency UPI that the Soviet premierhas given orders to Soviet personnel to dismantlemissile launchers and return them to the USSR.Our people could not believe that report. Itcaused deep confusion. People didn't understandthe way that the issue was structured-the possibility of removing missile armaments from Cubaif the USA liquidated its bases in Turkey.

I was saying. Fidel Castro continued, that inthe post-revolutionary years we have carried outmuch ideological work to prepare people forunderstanding socialist ideas, marxist ideas. Theseideas today are deeply rooted. Our people admirethe policies of the Soviet government, learn fromthe Soviet people to whom they are deeply thankful for invaluable help and support. But at thatdifficult moment our people felt as if they had losttheir way. Reports on 28 October that N.S.Khrushchev had given orders to dismantle missile launchers, that such instructions had beengiven to Soviet officers and there was not a wordin the message about the consent of the Cubangovernment, that report shocked people.

Cubans were consumed by a sense of disappointment, confusion and bitterness. In walkingalong the street, driving to armed units, I observed that people did not understand that decision.

Why was that decision made unilaterally,why are the missiles being taken away from us?And will all the weapons be taken back? - thesewere the questions disturbing all the people.

In some 48 hours that feeling of bitternessand pain spread among all the people. Eventswere rapidly following one another. The offer towithdraw weapons from Cuba under the condition of liquidating bases in Turkey was advancedon 27 October. On 28 October there came theorder to dismantle the missiles and the consent toan inspection.


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We were very worried by the fact that themoral spirit of our people had declined sharply.That affected their fighting spirit too. At thesame time the insolent flights of American planesinto Cuban airspace became more frequent, andwe were asked not to open fire on them. All ofthis generated a strong demoralizing influence.The feeling of disappointment, pain and bitterness that enveloped people could have been used

by counter-revolutionaries to instigate anti-soviet elements. Enemies could have profittedbecause the legal rules about which we had beenspeaking with the people were being forgotten.The decision was made without consultation,without coordinating it with our government.

Nobody had the slightest wish to believe it,everyone thought it was a lie.

Since then our people began to address verysensitively the matter of sovereignty. Besides,after the current crisis the situation remainedjuridically constant, as the "status quo" did notchange:

I. The blockade organized by the USAadministration is still in place. The USA continues to violate the freedom of the sea.

2 The Americans seek to determine whatweapons we can possess. Verification is beingorganized. The situation is developing in thesame direction as it is or was in Morocco, Guinea,Ghana, Ceylon and Yemen.

3 The USA continues to violate Cubanairspace and we must bear it. And moreover, theconsent for inspections has been given withoutasking us

All of this seemed to our people to be a stepbackward, a retreat. It turns out that we must

accept inspections. accept the right of the USA todetermine what kinds of weapons we can use.

Our revolution rests firmly on the people. Adrop in moral spirit can be dangerous for thecause of revolution.

The Soviet Union consolidated itself as astate a long time ago and it can carry out a flexiblepolicy, it can afford maneuvering. The Sovietpeople readily understand theirgovernment, trustit wholeheartedly.

Cuba is a young developing country. Ourpeople are very impulsive. The moral factor hasa special significance in our country.

We were afraid that these decisions could

provoke a breach in the people's unity, undermine the prestige of the revolution in the eyes ofLatin American peoples, in the eyes ofthe wholeworld.

It was very difficult for us to explain thesituation to the people. If the decisions had beentaken in another way, it would have been easier.

a truce were suggested first and then the issueswere coordinated. we would have been in a betterposition.

Comrade A.I. Mikoyan made an observa

tion that the threat of aggression was so critical,that there was no time for consultations.

Then for half an hour A.I. Mikoyan discussed the issues about which Fidel Castro hadtalked. but these explanations were interrupted byan incoming report about the death of Mikoyan' swife. The transcript of this part of the conversation will be transmitted with the notes of the next

conversation.

3.XI.62 ALEKSEEV

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives ob-tained and translated by N K television copyprovided by Philip Brenner; translation byVladimir Zaemsky.]

*****

Document II:I t was necessary to use the art of diplomacy"

- TheSecond Castro-Mikoyan Conversation,

4 November 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

A.I. MIKOYAN with Fidel CASTRO. [CubanPresident] Oswaldo DORTICOS TORRADO,[Defense Minister] Raul CASTRO, ErnestoGUEVARA, Emilio ARAGONES and CarlosRafael RODRIGUEZ

4 November 1962

A.I. MIKOYAN transmitted to the Cuban

leaders cordial fraternal regards on behalf of thePresidium ofthe CC CPSU and N.S. Khrushchev.He said that the Central Committee of the CPSUfeels admiration and respect toward Cuban leaders, who from the very beginning of their struggledemonstrated courage and fearlessness, confidence in revolutionary victory in Cuba, r eadinessto devote all their forces to the struggle. We areproud of the victory achieved by the Cuban revolution against interventionists on Playa Giron[Giron Beach. Bay of Pigs]. Cuban revolutionaries demonstrated such a potent spirit of resistancethat it inspires admiration and proves that theCubans are always ready to fight until victory is

achieved. Cuban leaders have shown great courage, intrepidity, and firmness in dangerous days.The CC CPSU admires the readiness ofthe Cubanpeople to stand up. We trust Cuban leaders as wedo ourselves.

In the course of the Cuban events our partyand government were acting having in mind to dowhatever was necessary to make [the situation]better for Cuba. When Ambassador Alekseevinformed [us] about the opinion of comrade FidelCastro, that there are some differences betweenour parties, we were very pained. Immediately all

the leadership held a meeting. For the question of

Cuba worries us a lot. We felt it necessary to reestablish mutual trust because trust is the basis ofeverything, the basis of really fraternal relations.We understood that no correspondence can suffice to explain completely the misunderstandingof those days. Therefore the CC CPSU decidedto send me to Cuba in order to explain to ourfriends the Soviet posit ion and to inform them on

other subjects that may be of interest to them. Weknow, - Mikoyan continued, - that if we explaineverything frankly then you, our brothers, willunderstand us. Comrade Mikoyan made theobservation that he, naturally, had no intention toput pressure [on Cuba], that his task was toexplain our position. Being acquainted with theCuban comrades, - A.I. Mikoyan said, - I mconfident that they will agree with it. It is certainly possible that even after our explanationsthere will remain some issues about which weshall still have different points of view. O ur taskis to preserve mutual trust which is needed forreally friendly relations with Cuba, for the futureof Cuba and the USSR and the whole worldrevolutionary movement.

Yesterday comrade Fidel Castro explainedvery frankly and in detail that the Cuban peoplehad not understood everything regarding the mostrecent actions of the Soviet government. Comrade Fidel Castro also spoke on the issues whichworry the Cuban leadership. He underlined therole of the psychological factor which has specialsignificance in Cuba. Several particularities ofthe psychological mold of Cubans have formedas a result of the historical development of thecountry. And, as comrade Fidel Castro wassaying, it is very important to take this intoaccount.

In New York, said Mikoyan. I learned thesubstance of the speech by comrade Fidel Castroon I November. Certainly I could not perceivecompletely the speech insofar as the Americanpress frequently distorts the substance of thestatements made by Cuban leaders. But even onthe basis of the American press interpretation Iunderstood that it was a friendly speech pronounced by comrade Fidel Castro underlining thegreat significance of friendship between the Soviet Union and Cuba, mentioning the broad aidrendered by the Soviet Union to RevolutionaryCuba. He also said that there were some differ

ences in views between us, but those differenceshad to be discussed on the level of parties andgovernments, not massive rallies. Those wordsof Fidel Castro, testifying sentiments of friendship and trust toward our country, were reaffirmed by the welcome reception on my arrival toHavana. The very tone of the conversation withcomrade Fidel Castro was imbued with a sense offellowship and trust.

I m confident, continued Mikoyan, that theexisting mutual trust between us will always bethere notwithstanding some differences of opin


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ion. The American press spreads a lot of conjectures regarding the aim of my trip to Cuba. Theyare writing that I went to Havana allegedly inorder to apply pressure on Cuban leaders, in orderto pacify them, as [U.S. negotiator John]McCloy had stated to the American newspapers.About my conversation with McCloy I can tellyou in detail afterward, but first of all I would liketo answer the main questions.

As I have already s tated before my departurefrom New York, the Soviet government wassupporting the five points put forward by comrade Fidel Castro. The demand on liquidation ofthe US Guantanamo base is a just and correctdemand. I had no plans to speak publicly in NewYork, but when I read in the American press thespeculation about the objectives of my trip, Idecided to voice that statement in order to makemy position completely clear. Using radio, American propaganda is trying to embroil Cuba [inconflict] with the Soviet Union, is trying to stingCubans to the quick. It' s natural. Because theenemy can t behave differently. He always acts

like this. But the enemy must be repulsed.By decision of the CC CPSU, my task in

cludes explaining our position to Cuban leaderswithin my abilities and capacities, so that nodoubts are left. We also want to discuss newproblems that arise in front of our two countries.It is not a part of my task at all to put pressure onCuban leaders. That is an impudent conjecture ofAmerican propaganda. Our interests are united.We are marxist-leninists and we are trying toachieve common objectives. We discussed thecurrent situation at the CC CPSU and came to adecision that there was no complete relaxation oftensions yet.

On the military side we can observe a considerable decrease in danger. I can add for myselfthat in essence currently the danger has abated.But the diplomatic tension still exists. Plans formilitary assault have been frustrated.

A victory was gained regarding preventionof a military assault. But stilI we are facing evenlarger tasks on the diplomatic field. We mustachieve a victory over the diplomatic tension,too.

What does that victory mean? How do weunderstand it? I'l l explain later.

I would like to do whatever is necessary toensure that you understand us correctly. I m not

in a hurry and if you don t object, I'll stay in Cubaas long as necessary to explain all the aspects ofour position. I think, first of all, we mustconsiderthose issues where some differences have appeared. I ll domy best to help you understand us.We must consider all these questions and decidewhat can be done jointly to ensure the success ofthe further development and future of the Cubanrevolution.

At the moment of critical military danger wehad no opportunity for mutual consultations, butnow we have good possibilities for thorough

consultations on diplomatic forms of struggle inorder to determine how to act in common.

Comrades, I would like to begin by askingyou to say, what steps of the Soviet governmenthave caused misunderstanding and differences,in order to give you the necessary explanations.True, yesterday comrade Fidel Castro alreadynarrated much about this. But I would like to askboth comrade Fidel Castro and all of you to raise

all those questions that you are interested in.

F.CASTRO. My colleagues are aware of thesubstance of our conversation yesterday, but inorder to summarize the questions which are important for us let me repeat them briefly. Ascomrade Mikoyan has already said, recent eventshave considerably influenced the moral spirit ofour people. They were regarded as a retreat at thevery moment when every nerve of our countryhad been strained. Our people is brought up in thespirit oftrust in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless ,many people do not understand the linkage between the Cuban events and the issue of the

liquidation of American bases in Turkey. Theunexpected withdrawal of Soviet missiles without consultations with the Cuban government hasproduced a negative impression upon our people.The Soviet Union gave its consent for inspectionsalso without sending a notification to the Cubanleadership. is necessary to take into account thespecial delicacy of our people which has beencreated as a result of several historic developments. The Platt amendment, imposed by theAmericans upon Cuba, played a particular role inthis regard. Using the Platt amendment the UnitedStates of America prohibited the Cuban government from deciding by itselfquestions of foreign

policy. The decisions were made by the Americans behind the back of the Cuban people. During the current crisis there was also an impressionthat important issues, concerning all of us. werediscussed and resolved in the absence of Cubanrepresentatives, without consultations with theCuban government. The USA imperialists undertook a series of aggressive measures againstthe Republic of Cuba. They set up a navalblockade of our country, they try to determinewhat kind of armament we can have and use.Systematically they violate Cuban air space andelevate these violations o f the sovereignty of theCuban Republic into a prerogative of the USA

administration.There is the question of inspections. True,

inspections are a sore subject for us. We cannottake that step. f we agree to an inspection, thenit is as if we permit the United States of Americato determine what we can or cannot do in foreignpolicy. That hurts our sovereignty.

In conclusion I said that we are a youngcountry, where a revolution has recently triumphed, so we can t carry out such a flexiblepolicy as does the Soviet Union because they area consolidated state and on that ground they have

possibilities for maneuvering, for flexibility inforeign policy. The Soviet people easily understands similar decisions of its government.

The mentioned facts represent a danger forthe revolutionary process, for the Cuban revolution itself.

Here is the summary of the questions elucidated by me in the conversation yesterday withcomrade Mikoyan. We didn' t touch on the issue

of the assessment of the international situation. Imade the observation that at the most criticalmoment it had appeared that we had no understanding of preceding steps. For example, theobjective of placing strategic armaments in Cubawas not clear enough for us. We could notunderstand where is the exit from that complicated situation. By no means were we thinkingthat the result could be a withdrawal of strategicarmaments from Cuban territory.

Yesterday comrade Mikoyan partly explained some issues but the conversation wasinterrupted by the tragic news of the spouse ofA.I. Mikoyan.

A.I. MIKOYAN asks: Perhaps the Cubancomrades want some other questions to be answered?

DORTICOS makes the observation that inthe summary offered by Fidel Castro there havebeengeneralizedall thequestions thatha ve causeddifferences, but he asks [Mikoyan] to explain,why N.S. Khrushchev has accepted Kennedy'sofferto make a statemento fnonaggression againstCuba under the condition of removing Sovietmissiles from Cuba, though the Cuban government had not yet given its view in this regard.

A 1 MIKOYAN asks ifthereare more questions.

C.R. RODRIGUEZ says that his question isrelated to that formulated by Dorticos. It is notclear what does the Soviet Union regard as avictory. whether its substance consists in themilitary success or the diplomatic one. We wereconsidering that forthe time being it is impossibleto speak about victory insofar as the guaranteeson the part of the USA are ephemeral.

A 1 MIKOYAN says that he will give the

most detailed answer to all the questions raised bycomrade Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders inorder to make the Cuban comrades understand uscompletely. Therefore I will have to speak for along time. Later, when you bring forward youropinions and perhaps ask some other questions, Iwould like to say some more words. f myarguments seem to you not convincing, pleasenotify me, I will think over what to do in order tomake you understand me, I will try to put forwardnew arguments.

The main issue, the issue of prime impor


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tance, is why have we decided to withdraw thestrategic missiles from the Cuban territory. Apparently you agree that this is the main question.If there is no understanding over this issue, it isdifficult to comprehend other questions.

Being in Moscow I did not realize that thisquestion would be asked. Previously it had notarisen.

Thefate of the Cuban revolution has always

been important for us, especially beginning fromthe moment when Fidel Castro declared theobjective of constructing socialism in Cuba. Socialist revolution in Latin America should develop and strengthen. When we received thenews that had defeated the counter-revolutionary landing on Playa Giron it naturally made ushappy, but to some extent it worried us, too.Certainly, it was foolish on the part ofthe Americans to organize such an invasion. But that factindicated that they would try again to organize anaggression against Cuba, that they would nottolerate the further development and strengthening of socialist Cuba. t is difficult for them to

reconcile with the existence of Cuba which isconstructing socialism in the immediate proximity of their borders.

This event worries us, as we were realizingthat the Americans would not give up their attempts to suffocate the Cuban revolution. Andindeed, the American imperialists began elaborating two parallel plans. The first one consistedof an attempt at the economic suffocation of theRepublic of Cuba in order to provoke discontentinside the country, to provoke famine and toachieve the collapse of the new regime due topressure from within, without military intervention. The second plan foresaw preparation of an

intervention with the participation ofLatinamerican mercenaries and with the supportof the United States of America. This planenvisaged invasion as the means to deal the finalblow and to kill the revolutionary regime, if theeconomic hardships weaken it from inside. Afterthe defeat on Playa Giron the American imperialists proceeded to the execution of those plans.

The victory of the revolution in Cuba is agreat success of marxist-leninist theory, and adefeat of theCuban revolution would mean a twoor three times larger defeat of the whole socialistcamp. Such a defeat would throw back therevolutionary movement in many countries. Such

a defeat would bear witness to the supremacy ofimperialis t forces in the entire world. That wouldbe an incredible blow which would change thecorrelation of forces between the two systems,would hamper the development of the international revolutionary movement. We were andare considering to be our duty, a duty of communists, to do everything necessary to defend theCuban revolution, to frustrate the imperialistplans.

Some time ago our comrades informed usthat the economic situation in the country [Cuba]

had worsened. This deterioration was caused bypressure on the part of the Americans and largeexpenses for defensive needs. We were afraid thatthe worsening of the situation could be the resultof the implementation of the [American] plan forthe economic suffocation of Cuba. The CC CPSUdiscussed the situation in Cubaand decided, without yourrequest-you are very modest and try notto disturb us by requests-to undertake some

measures in order to strengthen ou r help to Cuba.If before you were receiving part of the weaponson credit and only a portion of armaments free ofcharge, now we decided to supply you gratis withweapons and partly with military uniforms-I 00thousand sets in two years-and equipment. Wesaw that the Cuban trade representatives, whowere participating in the negotiations, were feeling themselves somewhat uneasy. They wereshort of more than 100 million dollars to somehow balance the budget. Therefore we acceptedall their proposals in order to frustrate the plan ofKennedy designed for [causing] an internal explosion in Cuba.

The same thing can be said regarding foodand manufactured goods. n order to alleviate theeconomic situation in Cuba we sent there articlesand food worth 98 million rubles. Speaking veryfrankly, we have been giving to you everythingwithout counting.

According to my point of view, we haveentered a new stage of relations which nowadayshas a different character. Indeed, during the firststage there was some semblance of mutuallybeneficial trade. Currently those supplies are partof clearly fraternal aid.

I recall, that after his trip to trip to Bulgaria[14-20 May 1962---ed.], that, N.S. Khrushchev

told us that while staying in that country he wasthinking all the time of Cuba, he was worried thatthe Americans would organize an intervention inCuba with the aid of reactionary governments ofLatin America or would carry out a direct aggression. They do not want to permit the strengthening of Cuba, and the defeat of Cuba, N.S.Khrushchev said to us, would deliver a verypowerful blow upon the whole world revolutionary movement. We must frustrate the plans of theAmerican imperialists.

It was at that time when there appeared a planthat carried great risk. This plan placed hugeresponsibility on the Soviet government insofar

as it contained within it the risk of a war which theimperialists could unleash against the SovietUnion. But we decided that it was necessary tosave Cuba. At one time N.S. Khrushchev relatedthat plan to us and asked us to think it through veryseriously in order to make a decision in three days.We had to think over both the consequences of itsimplementat ion, what to do during different stagesof its execution, and how to achieve Cuba s salvation without unleashing a nuclear war. t wasdecided to entrust our military with elaboratingtheir considerations and to discuss it with the

Cuban leadership.The main condition for the success of this

plan was to carry it out secretly. In this case theAmericans would find themselves in a very difficult position. Our military people said that fourmonths were necessary to implement that plan.We foresaw that the delivery of armaments andSoviet troops to Cuban territory would take a halfof the preparatory period. Measures were also

thought out in order to prevent the unleashing ofglobal nuclear war. We decided to work throughthe UN, to mobilize international public opinion,to do everything in order to avoid a world collision. We understood that the Americans coulduse a blockade. It appeared to be the mostdangerous thing if the USA imperialists blockaded the supplies of fuel to Cuba. They couldabstain from limiting food deliveries to Cuba,while demagogically declaring that they do notwant to doom the Cuban people to famine, and atthe same time prevent supplies of weapons andfuel to Cuba. And Cuba, who doesn t have herown energy resources, can t survive without fuel.

Our communications with Cuba are very stretched.We are separated by enormous distances. Therefore transportation to Cuba is very difficult. Wecan t use our Air Force or Navy forces in case ofa blockade of Cuba. Therefore we had to use suchmeans as political maneuvering, diplomacy, wehad to utilize the UN. For example, we could notblockade American bases in Turkey in responsebecause we have no other exit to the Mediterranean. We could not undertake such steps neitherin Norway, nor in England, nor in Japan. We donot have enough possibilities for counter-blockade. Counter -measures could be undertaken inBerlin.

Our plans did not include creation of ourbase here, on the American continent. In general,the policy of constructing bases on foreign territories is not a correct one. Such a policy wascarried out in the time of Stalin. There was ourbase in Germany which was created on the groundof our right as conqueror. Currently our troops inGermany are quartered there according to theWarsaw Pact. Under treaty there was our navalbase in Finland. We also had a base in Port Arthurin order to defend our eastern borders from Japan.All these bases were liquidated. Right now wedon t have any bases on foreign territories. Nevertheless there are our troops in Poland in order to

ensure communications with our forces in Germany, and Soviet troops are quartered in Hungary in order to protect us from the side ofAustria. We do not need bases in Cuba for thedestruction of the United States of America. Wehave long-range missiles which can be used directly from our territory. We do not have plans toconquer the territory of the USA. The workingclass of that country is stupefied by capitalistpropaganda. Besides, such a plan would contradict our theory. We can use the long-rangemissiles only to deliver a retaliatory blow, with


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out landing troops on USA territory.The objective of bringing Soviet troops and

strategic weapons to Cuba consisted only instrengthening your defense potential. It was adeterrence plan, a plan designed to stop the imperialist play with fire regarding Cuba. f thestrategic armaments were deployed under conditions of secrecy and if the Americans were notaware of their presence in Cuba, then it would

have been a powerful means of deterrence. Weproceeded from that assumption. Our militaryspecialists informed us that strategic missiles canbe reliably camouflaged in the palm forests ofCuba.

We were following very intently the transportation of troops and strategic weapons to Cuba.Those sea shipments were successful in July andAugust. And only in September the Americanslearned about the transport of those forces andmeans. The USA intelligence worked badly. Wewere surprised that Kennedy in his speeches wasspeaking only about Soviet military specialists,but not Soviet troops. At the very beginning he

really was thinking so. Then we understood thathe was not saying everything he knew, and that hewas holding back in order not to complicate the[Congressional---ed.] election campaign for himself. We let the Americans know that we wantedto solve the question of Berlin in the nearestfuture. This was done in order to distract theirattention away from Cuba. So, we used a diversionary maneuver. In reality we had no intentionof resolving the Berlin question at that time. Ifcomrades, the question of Berlin is of interest toyou, I can give you the necessary information.

Kennedy addressed N.S. Khrushchevthrough confidential channels and made a request

not to aggravate the situation until the end of theelections to Congress [on 6 November 1 9 6 2 -ed.], and not to proceed to the Berlin issue. Weresponded that we could wait until the end of theelections [campaign], but immediately after themwe should proceed to the Berlin issue. When theAmericans learned about the transport of strategic weapons to Cuba they themselves begancrying a lot about Berlin. Both sides were talkingabout the Berlin crisis, but simultaneously believed that at that given moment the essence oftheir policy was located in Cuba.

By mid-September the Americans apparently received data regarding the transport to

Cuba of Soviet troops and strategic missiles. Ihave already spoken about this fact with comradeFidel Castro. The American intelligence was notthe first in obtaining that information, it was WestGerman intelligence who gave that informationto the Americans. The American administrationsent planes to the air space of Cuba for aerialphotography and the ascertainment of the deployment areas of the strategic missiles. N.S.Khrushchev gave the order to place the missilesinto vertical position only at night, but to maintain them in a lying-down position in the daytime.

Nevertheless, the Americans managed to take aphoto of the missiles in the firing position.Kennedy didn' t want to speak about Soviet missiles in Cuba until the end of the Congressionalelections. He did not want to strain relations. Buttwo Republican senators [a clear reference toSens. Kenneth Keating of New York and EverettDirksen of Illinois---ed.] learned about the fact ofthe strategic missiles placed in Cuba and there

fore Kennedy hastened to take the initiative intohis hands, or else he would be hardpressed. Wehad no information on how he intended to act.

The United States of America organizedmaneuvers in the area of Vieques Island [in theCaribbean]. naming them Ortsac, i.e., Castro,if you read it backwards. But those maneuverscould appear to be not an exercise, but a sea coverfor a strong blow against Cuba. At that moment,when Kennedy made a statement and announced[on October 22---ed.] the decision of declaring ablockade against Cuba, we didn't know if theAmericans were really carrying out maneuvers orwere preparing for a direct attack upon Cuba.

On 28 October in the morning [presumablythis refers to Moscow time, which would meanthe evening of 27 October in Washington---ed.]we received reliable reports of preparations for anattack againstCuba. Indeed we were aware of thefact that the Americans had interrupted theirmaneuvers because of a hurricane. The maneuvers did not resume when the hurricane wentaway but the American combatant ships remainedin the same area in direct proximity to Cuba. N.S.Khrushchev rebuked Kennedy for declaring ablockade around Cuba. We strongly opposed theAmerican attempts to assume the right to determine what weapons Cuba can use and what

armaments it may not possess. And then theAmericans decided to carry out a direct aggression. Their plan consisted of two parts. Wishingto free themselves from the threat of a blow fromthe strategic missiles, they decided to liquidatethe launchers in Cuba with the help of conventional warhead missiles and immediately afterthat land troops on Cuban territory in order toliquidate centers of resistance as soon as possible.

It would have been impossible for us in thesecircumstances not to repulse theaggression of theUSA. This assault would mean an assault uponyou and us as far as in Cuba there were situatedSoviet troops and strategic missiles. Inevitably,

nuclear war would be unleashed as a result ofsuch a collision. Certainly we would destroyAmerica, our country would be strongly damaged too, but we have a larger territory. Cubawould have been destroyed first. Imperial istswould do their best to liquidate Cuba.

The objective of all the measures undertaken by the Soviet Union was the defense ofCuba. t was necessary to determine our line ofconduct. The loss of Cuba would mean a seriousblow to the whole socialist camp. And exactly atthe moment when we were pondering the ques

tion of what to do in the created situation wereceived thecommunication from comrade Castro,it was on Sunday, that an aggression against Cubawould be unleashed in the next 24 hours. Fromother sources we were in possession of information that the USA aggression would begin in 1012 hours. Despite the fact that these were separate sources, the information corresponded. Until the moment of the start of the USA aggression

against Cuba remained 10-12 hours. t wasnecessary to use the art of diplomacy. Had we notbeen successful in this regard there would havebeen unleashed a war. We had to use diplomat icmeans.

Kennedy was making statements that he hadnothing against the stationing in Cuba of Sovietweapons, even troops, but that placing strategicweapons in Cuba was evidence of preparationsfor an assault against the USA. Therefore theUSA would defend itself. Considering that themissiles had been discovered and were no longera means of deterrence we decided that for thesakeof saving Cuba it was necessary to give an order

to dismantle and return the strategic missiles tothe Soviet Union and to inform Kennedy of this.You agreed with the withdrawal of strategic missiles from Cuba while leaving there all the otherkinds of armaments. We managed to preserve allthe forces and means which are necessary for thedefense of the Cuban revolution even withoutstrategic missiles which had been a means ofdeterrence, but they were discovered and therefore lost their significance. We have enoughpowerful missiles that can be used from ourterritory. Since Kennedy agreed with the retaining of Soviet troops in Cuba, the Cubans keptpowerful armaments and anti-aircraft missiles,

so we consider that he [Kennedy] also made aconcession.

The statement of Kennedy about non-aggression against Cuba on the part of the USA andlatinamerican countries also represents a concession. If we take into account these reciprocalconcessions and all other factors, we will see thata big victory has been gained. Never before havethe Americans made such a statement. That iswhy we decided that the main objective salva-tion of Cuba had been achieved. There wouldnot be an assault against Cuba. There would notbe a war. We are gaining more favorable positions.

Indeed, it was necessary to send the draft ofour decision to Cuba in order to have consultations with you, to receive your consent and onlythen announce it. It would have been done in thisway if there were normal conditions. In his letterFidel Castro informed us that an inevitable aggression was expected in 24 hours. By the momentwhen we received itand were discussing thesituation, only 10-12 hours were left before aggression. Ifwe had tried to send you our draft wewould have had to encode the document, transmitit by radio, decipher it, translate it into Spanish.


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All of this could take more than 10 hours and suchaconsultation would not have made sense by thattime. t would be too late. It could happen in sucha way, that the answer would be received, butCuba itself would have ceased to exist, a warwould have been unleashed. It was a critica lmoment. We thought our Cuban friends wouldunderstand us. Moreover we knew from the cablefrom Fidel Castro that the Cuban leadership was

aware of the direct threat of assault. At thatmoment the main objective consisted of preventing an attack. We thought, the Cuban comradeswould understand us. Therefore, we made thedecision to act immediately, but without payingdue attention to the psychological factor, aboutwhich comrade Fidel Castro spoke here.

Regarding the possibility of a truce at thatmoment, mentioned by the Cuban comrades, theAmericans would not take such a step in thoseconditions. There are a lot of revanchists in thePentagon, and Kennedy is a deterrent elementwith respect to them. The Americans would haveburst into Cuba. We had no time. Certainly, it

was a decision that created some difficulties foryou, the Cuban people.

Let us compare the situation at the presenttime and the situation before the crisis. Before thecrisis the Americans were preparing an intervention against Cuba. Now they have committedthemselves not to attack Cuba. It is a greatsuccess. Certainly , the events also had negativeconsequences, especially as American propaganda was trying suit their own ends by usingsome facts and distorting them. But that isinevitable. These are the costs of events that havecrucial importance. Our task is to eliminate thenegative consequences of the recent events.

Comrade Dorticos is correct when he askswhy did we give our consent to Kennedy s message on non-aggression against Cuba without theconcordance of the Cuban government. But itwas exactly our consent (and nothing else) thatensured some truce for a certain time.

One cannot perceive nihilistically all agreements and commitments, although sometimesthese agreements and commitments are important only during a certain time, until conditionschange. So they keep their importance until thesituation changes.

We were asked about our demand on theliquidation of American bases in Turkey.

Speaking frankly, we were not thinking aboutbases in Turkey at all. But during discussion ofthe dangerous situation we received informationfrom the United States of America, including anarticle by [columnist Walter] Lippmann [in theWashington ost on October 25], where it wassaid that the Russians could raise the question ofliquidating the USA bases in Turkey. They werespeaking about the possibility of such a demandinside American circles. This question was discussed in the USA. Turkish bases do not havegreat importance for us. They will be eliminated

in case of war. True, they have certain politicalsignificance but we don t pay them special importance, though we will seek their liquidation.

From your statements I see now that theCubans were regarding this demand as if it wassome sort of exchange. There are USA bases notonly in Turkey, but also in England and otherEuropean countries. But nowadays these basesdo not have decisive importance insofar as the

long-range strategic missiles, aimed at Europe,can quickly destroy them.

F. CASTRO. There is a question, on whichwe are insufficiently informed.

On 26 October the Soviet government sentKennedy a letter without a word about Turkey.On 27 October we learned about Turkey from thebroadcasts of Soviet radio. The American mediaexpressed some surprise because this problemhad not been raised in the message of the 26th.What is it a false communication or were theretwo letters of 26 and 27 October? We havereceived one letter that coincided with the docu

ment transmitted by Moscow radio.

A.I. MIKOYAN. There were two letters.The letter of the 26th was not published. Theletter of 27 October was published. But thecontent of the letter of 27 October covers thequestions raised in the letter of the 26th. Thequestion of Turkey was not raised at the beginning. Later this issue was included. You have allthe correspondence on this issue. If there is sucha necessity, we can check it.

F CASTRO. Here is the letter of 26 October, whose text, as it seemed to me, is identical to

the other letter at my disposal, which was received from the transmission of radio Moscowand TASS. t seemed to me that one le tter has notbeen published.

A.I. MIKOYAN. f you want, we can check.

F CASTRO. Forall that, when did Kennedyaccept the proposal ofN.S. Khrushchev and promise guarantees not to attack Cuba? Wasn t it inresponse to the letter of 26 October? What did hesay then?

C.R. RODRIGUEZ. There were secret let

ters.

A.I. MIKOYAN. Comrades, all the documents have been given to you.

F. CASTRO. On 27 October Kennedy gaveguarantees not to attack Cuba, if the Soviet government removed its offensive weapons. Theimpression is growing that it was in response to[Khrushchev s] letter of 26 October. That is animportant question. t was decided urgently,without consultations. Apparently, before my

letter to Khrushchev, N.S. Khrushchev wrote toKennedy and simultaneously with my letter ananswer from Kennedy to Khrushchev arrived.After all, why is Kennedy already speaking aboutthe Soviet proposal about dismantling, etc., in hisresponse of27 Octoberto Khrushchev s messageof 26 October, if it was not directly said in theconfidential message from Khrushchev of 26October? Negotiations began at night, after the

message from Kennedy. Consequently, it wasnot possible to consider inevitable an attack againstus. When I was writing to N.S. Khrushchev Ididn t know that Khrushchev was writing toKennedy and Kennedy-to Khrushchev. It seemsto me that on 27 October, at that time, there wasno unavoidable threat of attack. The principle ofagreement had already been found. It seems tome that there was available time for consultations.

A.I. MIKOYAN. In his answer of27 October Kennedy was formally responding as if onlyto the confidential message of the 26th, but prac

tically he was answering both this one and chieflythe message from Khrushchev ofthe 27th, openlytransmitted by radio, though there was no directreference in Kennedy s message. All the messages between Khrushchev and Kennedy andeverything received from him confidentially weregiven to comrade Fidel. I m a participant of allthe meetings, I m aware of everything, but if youwant me to do it, I ll check all the documents thatI have with me and tomorrow I ll complement myinformation.

F. CASTRO. I agree with comradeMikoyan s suggestion.

A.I. MIKOYAN. So, let s pass to the nextquestion.

To many Cubans it seems that instead of ourdemand for the liquidation of American bases inTurkey it would be better to put the question ofthe liquidation of the base in Guantanamo. Sucha demand seems tempting from the Cuban political and practical points of view. But from thepoint of view of military and practical interests ofCuba we could not put the question in this way. fthe question were raised about withdrawal fromCuba of all kinds of armaments, then the[Guantanamo] question would be raised. There

are no nuclear weapons at Guantanamo. But wedid not have intentions of taking away all thearmaments from Cuba. The Guantanamo basedoes not have a huge real significance insofar asthe Americans can transfer their forces to Cubawithout difficulties due to the geographical situation of the USA and Cuba. Indeed, it was notpossible to lose all our armaments in Cuba. f wewere to raise the question of Guantanamo baseliquidation in exchange for withdrawal of Sovietweapons from Cuban territory in general, thatwould undermine Cuba s defense capability. We


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COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT ULLETIN

can t do that. You know that in the message fromN.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy there was said thatwe want to create confidence among Cubans,

confirming that we are with them and we do notrelieve responsibility for rendering help to theCuban people.

F. CASTRO. But we are speaking onlyabout strategic missiles. Such an act would havepolitical rather than military significance. Wewere looking for an exit from that situation. tseems to us that it was possible to create a moredifficult atmosphere for the Americans by raising such a question as the liquidation of theGuantanamo base.

A.I. MIKOYAN. If the Americans hadaccepted such an offer, and they could do so, wewould have had to leave Cuba. We could notafford it.

Now I ll pass to the issue of inspections. fwe had made a statement declining inspections,the Americans would have taken it for our desireto swindle them and their intervention wouldhave become a reality. We declared that weagree to inspections. What we are speakingabout is not a broad inspection, but a verificationof the sites, known to the Americans due to aerialphotography and which have been locations ofthe strategic missile launchers. The objectivewould have been to verify if the missiles hadreally been dismantled and their embarkationreally accomplished; verification of the areaswhere the missiles had been assembled could becarried out in one day and verification of loading- in several days. t was not a question of anypermanent or general inspection. t was said thatrepresentatives of neutral countries would carryout a verification only once. We were not deciding this question instead of you. Cuban issues aresolved by the Cuba n leadership only. But, beingowners of that kind of weapon, we stated ourconsent for verification of dismantling and loading. We believed that after coordinating withyou, you would accept this suggestion. But wecould not decide it instead of you.

We were assuming that it was possible togive consent to verification by representatives ofneutral countries of the dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles - doing all of this withouthurting Cuba s sovereignty. Certainly, no state

would bear violation of its sovereignty. But inparticular cases sovereign governments also permit some limitation of their actions, owing tovoluntary agreements. Now we are not speakingabout those cases when foreign powers imposetheir will over other countries.

I can give examples how our state and othercountries voluntarily limit their actions whilepreserving their sovereign rights. For example,sovereignty of a host-country does not apply tothe territory of foreign embassies. In this case wesee a limitation of actions without limitation of

sovereignty.Another example. n agreement to create an

international verification commission wasachieved in Geneva [in 1954] during the discussion of the Indochina issue. The proposal wasmade by representatives of the Soviet Union,China, and othercountries. The proposal wasalsosupported by the leader ofthe Democratic Republic of Vietnam comrade Ho Chi Minh, who wasdirectly concerned. Currently both Ho Chi Minhand the king of Cambodia ask to preserve thatinternational verification commission. In thiscase there is no question of limiting the sovereignrights neither of Vietnam nor Cambodia.

Further. Between India and Pakistan in thearea of Kashmir is working an international verification commission without infringing on theirsovereign rights.

Several years ago we proposed [in MayI955---ed.] to the Americans and English to create jointly international verification posts on railway junctions, in large ports, and along highways.In due time [in the 1957 Rapacki Plan---ed.] wealso suggested to organize international verification in the zone covering 800 kilometers on bothsides along the demarcation line in Germany. Inthe event of the acceptance of this suggestion, apart of our territory, Poland, and Hungary wouldhave been controlled. And such an act, under thecondition of voluntary acceptance of the commitments, would not have undermined the sovereignrights of the states.

A similar example is the creation of an international commission in Laos in order to verifycompliance of the 1962 agreement, in particular,to verify the withdrawal of foreign troops fromLaos and a ban on the introduction of weapons.[Laotian Prince] Souvanna Phouma did not objectto such a verification. Communists of Laos andVietnam allowed international control, communists of India didn t object to international verification. Poland agreed to verify the withdrawal ofAmerican troops and the troops of Ho Chi Minh.And it was done with the consent of comrade HoChi Minh and the Laotian communists.

I m giving you all these examples becausewhen we, on the basis of the above mentionedexperience, were thinking about you, we didn'tpay due attention to that psychological factor,about which we learned here from comrade FidelCastro. In principle everything is correct, but not

all that looks good in principle can be applied to aconcrete situation.

Everything I m talking about I m saying notto gain a change of the international stand ofCuba, but in order to explain to you the motiveswhich guided us. It is unthinkable that I might tryto exercise any pressure.

During the conversation with McCloy inNew York I touched on the question of verification of the dismantling of our missiles. McCloysaid that insofar as Cuba was objecting to verification organized with the help of neutral coun

tries, the USA did not insist on this form ofcontrol and it was necessary to seek other measures so that the Americans could be convincedthat it had been done. He said that they wereaware of dismantling work, but they were afraidthat the missiles could be hidden in Cuban forests. They need to be sure that those weapons areremoved from Cuban territory. I asked him aboutother forms of verification that he had in mind.McCloy answered that, in their opinion, an aerialinspection could be used for this aim, but that itwas necessary for Cuba to agree to verificationfrom airspace. I resolutely said in response thatsuch a method is out of the question because itwas damaging Cuban sovereign rights. I addedth