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8/18/2019 Middle-Range Theory as Hermeneutics
1/8
Society for American Archaeology is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Antiquity.
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Society for merican rchaeology
Method in Archaeology: Middle-Range Theory as HermeneuticsAuthor(s): Peter KossoSource: American Antiquity, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Oct., 1991), pp. 621-627Published by: Society for American ArchaeologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/281540
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8/18/2019 Middle-Range Theory as Hermeneutics
2/8
METHOD
IN ARCHAEOLOGY:
MIDDLE-RANGE
THEORY
AS
HERMENEUTICS
Peter Kosso
Disagreements
bout
methodology
n
archaeology
re
often
ocated n terms
of
the
middle-range-theory
pproach
of
Lewis
Binford
and the
hermeneutic,
ontextual
archaeology
f
Ian Hodder.These
positions
are
usually
presented
in
opposition
o
each
other,
but here
they
are
shown to
present
very
much the same
methodological icture
of
archaeology.
This
specificanalysis
s more
generally nformative
f
the
methodological
elationbetween he
natural
and social
sciences.
Desacuerdos
cerca
de
metodologia
en
arqueologia
on
frecuentemente
lanteados
en
terminos
del
enfoque
de
teoriade
rango
medio
de
Lewis
Binford
la
perspectiva
ermeneutica
contextualde Ian Hodder.
Estas
posiciones
son
presentadas
normalmenteen
oposici6n,pero
en el
presente
articulose
demuestra
que
ambas
ofrecen
una
imagen metodol6gicasimilar de la arqueologia.Este analisis resulta mds informativoen terminosgenerales
acercade la
relaci6n
metodolo6gica
ntre las
ciencias
naturales
y
las ciencias
sociales.
On a
map
of the
sciences,
archaeology
would be a
border state
between the natural and
social
sciences. It is
like a
social
science
in
that
the
objects
of
interest are
people,
human
culture,
and
artifacts
created
under the
influence of ideas
and
social norms.
Evidence
in
archaeology
is
often
symbolic,
meaningful,
and
intentional,
and the
archaeologist
must
be sensitive
to
this
unnatural
content.
But
archaeology
is also
like
a
natural science
in
that its
focus
is
on
the material remains
of
people
in
the
past
and on their
relation with
he
natural
environment.
Not o
he
atural
environment.
Not
only
are the artifacts
often
the
products
of
coping
with
nature,
they
are
always
altered
by
natural
processes
of
aging,
material
degradation,
erosion,
and
the
like,
thus
making
aspects
of
natural
sciences
appropriate
resources for
getting
information
about the
past. Even under a mandate of paying attention to ideas
and
symbols,
the
text
from which
this
information is
read is
the
material
record. Linda Patrik
(1985:
34)
notes
thisthis
ual
nature of
archaeology
by
describing
two
ways
of
dealing
with the
archaeological
record:
Because
archaeological
evidence is
presumably
the
product
of
both
natural
processes
and
behavioral
processes,
rather
than the
product
of
either
one of
these
alone,
there
is
disagreement
amongst
archaeologists
over what
kind of
record
archaeological
evidence
forms.
Located at
this
interface,
archaeology
is
especially prone
to
disagreements
over
method. There is
a rich
variety
of
positions
among
archaeologists
regarding
the
appropriate
methods
for their
dis-
cipline,
and the
positions
are
often
presented
in
terms
of
just
how
like a
natural
science or a
social
science
archaeology ought
to
be.
In
wht
follows
here,
two
of
these
positions,
chosen
for
their
high
profile
in
the
profession
and
because
they
are
reference
points
for
the two
ends of
the
spectrum,
will
be
compared.
The
point
I
want to
make is
simple.
Though
these
two
methodological
ap-
proaches-the middle-range-theory concept of Lewis Binford and the model of contextual archae-
ology
advocated
by
Ian
Hodder-are
originally presented
in
strong opposition,
they
are
really
very
similar.
Binford's model
of
good
archaeological
method
(outlined
in
Binford
[1977, 1982a,
and
elsewhere])
has it
that
archaeology
should
be much
like
natural
science. It
deals
in
theories and
evidence
and
carries
out a
regimen
of
testing by
exploiting
the
causal
connections
between
things
in
the
past
and
their
remains
found
in
the
present.
Objectivity
is
the
methodological
goal. Hodder,
in
explicit
Peter
Kosso,
Department
of
Philosophy,
Northern
Arizona
University,
lagstaff,
AZ
86011
American
Antiquity, 56(4),
1991,
pp.
621-627.
Copyright
? 1991
by
the
Society
for
American
Archaeology
621
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8/18/2019 Middle-Range Theory as Hermeneutics
3/8
AMERICAN
ANTIQUITY
opposition
to
this,
claims
that natural
science
is
an
inappropriate
model for
archaeology
in that it
is
incorrigibly
insensitive to ideas. Artifacts can be understood
only
when viewed
in
the context
of
the ideas and norms
during
their manufacture and use. This
suggests
a
method
of
study
that is less
like
natural science and more like
reading
and
interpreting
a
text,
where the connection
between
evidence
and
object
of interest is one
of
signification
rather than of causation.
A
look at the substance behind the
slogans
of these two
positions
will
reveal that there
is little
methodological
difference.
In
showing
this,
the
focus
will
always
be
on
methodology
and not
on
issues of the
proper
aims of
archaeology
nor on the differences between the
objects
studied
by
social
and
natural
sciences. Even
if
the kinds of
objects
are
significantly
different,
this does
not entail
the
need for
significantly
different
methods.
And
granting
the two dissimilar
models
of the
archaeological
record
as
described
by
Patrik
(1985),
it
does
not follow that these demand
two dissimilar
methods
for
exploiting
the information
in
the
record and for
using
it
to
support knowledge
of
the
past.
The
plan
of
presentation
is
to first
briefly
describe Binford's
application
of
middle-range
theories
to
archaeology
and Hodder's
approach
of
reading
the
past.
Once out of their
packages,
these
models
of
archaeology
will be seen as
presenting essentially
the
same
methodological
picture.
The
hope
is
that this focused analysis of archaeological method will be more generally informative of the meth-
odological
relation between the
natural and social
sciences.
MIDDLE-RANGE
THEORIES
This
will
be
a
very
brief account
of
middle-range
theory,
an account
that
ignores
much
variety
of
detail
in
the
concept
but
that is
sufficient for
my
subsequent argument.
The
concept
of middle-
range theory,
as it
is
applied
to
archaeology by
Binford
(1977, 1982a)
and
by
Schiffer
(1988)
is
useful
in
any
science.
In
understanding just
what
the idea is
and how
it
works,
it
will be more
important
to
analyze
the notion
of middle
range
than that
of
theory.
Start
by
asking
what
is
middling
about
a
middle-range
theory.
There
are
differences between
Schiffer
and
Binford
on the details
of
middle-range
theories,
and
in
my
characterization
I
will
try
to honor
the task
set
by
Binford for
middle-range
theories,
with
a
sensitivity
to the
epistemic predicament
of
archaeology.
I will
point
out the crucial
characteristics
for a
middle-range theory
to
function
as
Binford
intends.
In Binford's
(1977:6)
use of
the
concept, middle-range
theories
are
descriptive
claims
that
fall
between
observational
descriptions
of what
the
archaeologists
find
in the
present,
that
is,
site
and
field
reports,
and the
descriptive
reconstructions
of the
past.
The material
remains
that are
found
in
the
present
function
as
evidence
for
the claims
made
about
the
past,
w ther those
claims
are
specific,
as about
the
shape
of a
particular
pot,
or
more
general,
as about
the
emergence
of
civilization.
Middle-range
theories
are
used
to make
the
informational
link between
present
and
past,
and
to
say
of what
the
material
remains
are
evidence.
They
do
this
by
describing
the formation
of
the
archaeological
record as
it
is
today.
This
description
will include
general
theories
about
how
artifacts
are used and
subsequently
deposited by
burial,
neglect,
or
intentional
discard,
and
general
theories
about the alteration of deposited artifacts by both natural and cultural activities. It will also include
specific
claims
about
the
area,
its
propensity
for
erosion,
for
example,
and the
local
people.
All
of
these
claims
are
middle-range
theories
in
that
they
contribute
to
the
description
of
the causal
lineage
of
the
debris
that
is observed
today. Being
of
general
or universal
scope
is
not
a
necessary
feature
of
a
theory
as
it is used
in the
middle-range strategy
to cross
the
epistemic
gap
between
available
data
in
the
present
and
interesting
phenomena
he
resent
and
interesting phenomena
in he
past.
The distinction
of
middle-range
theories
is
in
giving
meaning
to our
contemporary
observations
made
on the
archaeological
record
(Binford
1982b:161),
and to
do
this
by describing
the
formation
process
of
the
archaeological
record
(Binford
1977:7).
The
debris
is
an
archaeological
record
of
something
of
interest
in the
past,
but
we
can
know what
it is
a
record of
only
with
a theoretical
reconstruction
of how
it was
formed,
and
this account
of
the
formation
of the
archaeological
record
is
the burden
of
middle-range
theory,
a
burden
that
will be carried
by
a combination
of
general
and
particular
claims.
Any
theory
could be used in the role of being middle range. Being middle range is not a feature
of the
content
of a
theory
but
of its
use
in
a
particular
instance.
The relevant
middle
in this
sense
is not
meant to
be
of
mid-generality
or
of
mid-empirical
content.
This
disregard
for
generality
or
622
[Vol.
56,
No.
4,
1991
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4/8
MIDDLE-RANGETHEORY
AS
HERMENEUTICS
empirical
content
differs
from
chiffere's account of
middle-range
theories,
according
to
which,
any
theory
can function
as
method,
depending
on context
(Schiffer
1988:436),
but
genuinely
middle-
range
theories
are
those
of
mid-comprehensiveness
and
mid-range empirical
content
(Schiffer
1988:
465).
Thus,
for
Schiffer,
middle-range
theories are
distinctive as to their
content.
This
is often
true
in other studies of science
(see,
for
example,
Schaffer
[1980]
about
biological
middle-range
theories
as
theories
of
mid-generality),
where the
terminology
of middle
range
is used
to indicate one
of
these
features
of
content,
but what is
key
to realize Binford's
intent is the role
a
theory
plays
in
processes
of
interpreting
evidence
and
testing
claims
about the
past.
There are no
special
theories
that are
of
use
only
for
testing
other
claims,
nor
should
any
be antecedent
ly
excluded from
use
in
testing.
A
theory
will
in one
context ble
theory,
but in
another
will
be
regarded
as itself
the
interesting,
finished
product,
answerable
to tests
against
the evidence.
In
other
words,
the
observations in
archaeology,
as
in
any
other
interesting
business
of
empirical
knowledge,
are
theory laden,
and
middle-range
theories
are
a
large part
of
the
load.
Insofar
as
observations in
the
present
are
to be relevant
as evidence
for theories about
the
past,
we
must
identify
information
of
the
past
in
the
present
remains.
The
tracking
of
the
flow
of
information
from interesting past to observable present is done by the middle-range theories.
Here
is an
example
of
middle-range
theories
in
action,
taken from
archaeological
studies of
ancient
Greece.
One
thing
ththat
archaeologists
and historians
want to
know about
ancient
Greece
is
the
structure and
genesis
of
socioeconomic
systems.
Part of
the
evidence
for claims
about
such
things
will
come
through
an
understanding
of
cultivated farmland in
ancient
times,
a
picture
of
the
sizes,
locations,
and
changes
of
fields under
cultivation.
But we do
not see the
cultivation.
What the
archaeologist
finds
are remains
of terrace
walls,
sparse
scatterings
of
potsherds,
and
other
indirect
traces of
past
agricultural
activity.
The
light
scatter
of sherds can
be taken
as
evidence of
cultivation
in
light
of
middle-range
theories
that
describe a
pattern
of
rural Greeks
discarding
old
pots
near
their
houses where
the broken
bits
get
inadvertently
mixed
into
the manure of
farm
animals
kept
at the
place
of residence.
The manure
is
spread
as fertilizer
on cultivated
fields and
the mix
of
sherds
is
scattered,
leaving
a
lasting
trace of
the activities
of
cultivation.
Areas once
under
cultivation
may
now be scattered with sherds, while areas not cultivated will not be, and insofar as the sherds can
be
dated,
the cultivation
activity
can be
dated. In
this
way
the sherd
scatter
is a
kind of
image
of
the
agricultural
activities.
It
is
certainly
not an
obvious
likeness of
cultivation,
and
the
image
has
been
distorted
through repeated
use of the
land,
erosion,
and
other
natural
and
cultural
forces,
but
such
distortions
can be taken
into account in
the
descriptive
reconstruction
of
the
past.
This
is
by
no means
a certain
or
universally
accepted
inference
from
contemporary
data
(sherd
scatter)
to
past
activities
(manuring
and
cultivation),
but it
does
have
significant
support
(e.g.,
Bintliff
and
Snodgrass
1988:507-508)
and
credible
evidence in its
own
right (Wilkinson
1982).
There
is
reason
to doubt
that
manuring
was a
universal
practice,
characteristic
to all
agricultural
settings
in
the
ancient
Mediterranean
(Cherry
et
al. 1991
:Chapter
3),
but
this
indicates
not
that it
is
inappropriate
as
a
middle-range theory
but
that
extra work
is
called
for to know
the
circumstances,
such
as
availability
of
water,
in
which
the
theory
of
manuring is likely to apply. Where manuring has been
done,
the
link
between
off-site
sherds
and
cultivation
can be
exploited
as
a
middle-range
theory.
Middle-range
theories
of
this
kind are
commonplace
in
the
natural
sciences.
They
are the
imaging
theories
that
describe
the
informational
connection
between
what is
seen
and
its
causal
antecedent
of which
it
is
evidence.
Again,
these are
not a
special
kind of
theory.
It is
simply
a
special
kind
of
use for
ordinary
theories.
Consider,
for
example,
the theoretical
account of
how
an
optical
microscope
works.
General
theories
from
optics,
describing
the
diffraction
and
interference of
light,
the
behavior
of
lenses and
so
on,
are
invoked
to
describe
how
the
image
is
formed
and
to
keep
track
of
any
instrumental
distortions.
This is
the
source of
confidence
that
features
of
the
image
are
reliably
informative
of
features
of
the
specimen,
and
these
are
middle-range
theories,
used
as
they
are
to
describe
the
formation
of the
image
and
thereby
make
it
evidence
of
something
interesting.
Another
example
comes
out in
Shapere's
(1982)
account
of
observing
the
interior
of
the
sun.
Neutrinos
observed on the earth, or more strictly, the detector-clicks caused by beta emissions from radioactive
argon
produced
by
neutrino
interactions,
are
evidence
for
theories
about
solar
processes.
But
the
neutrinos
(or
the
clicks)
are
informative
of the
solar
interior
only
by
way
of
a
theoretical
account
Kosso]
623
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AMERICAN
ANTIQUITY
of
the
causal chain from the sun
to the
clicks,
that
is,
by way
of theoretical neutrino
physics,
radiochemistry,
and
more,
middle-range
theories all.
Thus,
Binford's
application
of
middle-range
theories to
archaeology puts
it
in
close
company
with standard
practice
in natural
science.
CONTEXTUAL
ARCHAEOLOGY
Hodder
(1986:12, 29)
argues
that this
methodological
association with natural science
puts
ar-
chaeology
in
with the
wrong company. Middle-range
theories
and
their natural-science methods are
inappropriate
to the
study
of human culture
because,
he
claims,
as theories
they
make cross-cultural
generalizations. They
are
insensitive,
that
is,
to
peoples'
ideas, intentions,
and
meanings,
and
thereby
they
miss an
important
aspect
of the
past,
an
aspect
which is
essential for
understanding any
part
of
past
human
culture. Since ideas and
norms are
often culture
specific
and
even
individual
specific,
they
will
be
missed
by
a
method that bases its evidence on
cross-cultural
middle-range
theories.
If
there are
any
general
theories
they
must be the result of information from the
evidence,
that
is,
they
must be
proven,
but
they
cannot be assumed and invoked to
support
the
informational content
in
the
evidence.
Methodological
sensitivity
to ideas and intentions is
crucial,
Hodder
(1985:12,
1986:3-4) argues,
because all material culture
is
mediated
by
the beliefs of
the makers
and
users
(as
well
as the
finders)
and the
meanings
intended.
All
artifacts reflect either
conscious or unconscious
ideas and
norms.
Everything,
not
just
artistic,
linguistic,
and ceremonial
behavior,
is
symbolic.
The
patterns
of
use
and the
spatial
arrangement
of
everyday
stuff reflect
the
attitudes
and tacit norms
of
thought
of
the
individuals and
their culture. These basic
material
objects
and their
organization
are
indicative
of
ideas
on,
for
example,
the
importance
of
particular
things,
the ro
herthey
play,
relations
between
people
and to the environment.
The
influence
of
ideology
is
in
everything
an
archaeologist
studies.
In
other
words,
the
system,
that
is,
the material
things
and
their
physical organization,
is a
mani-
festation
of
the
structure,
the
nonphysical
factors
such as social norms
and
individuals'
ideas
and
intentions.
Thus,
an
understanding
of structure
is achieved
through
an
understanding
of
system.
But a system cannot be properly understood without knowing something about the structure. Insofar
as the material
objects
are
symbolic they
are
signifiers
of
ideas,
but there
is
no
link
between
signifier
and
signified
without
an
understanding
of
the
ideological
context
and
the intentions
behind
the
meaningful
activities.
We need
some
appreciation
of
the actors'
ideas,
for
example,
to
group
com-
ponents
of
the
system
into kinds
in
a
way
that
is
relevant
to their
worldview.
Given
this
relation
between
system
and
structure,
the
individuals
and
cultures of
the
past
can
only
be
understood,
as
Hodder
says
in
agreement
with
Collingwood's
approach
to
history,
from
inside
(Hodder
1986:30).
The
archaeologist
cannot
get
anywhere
without some
preliminary
knowl-
edge
of
structure,
what
is
going
on inside
the
peoples'
minds
and
inside
society.
There
is
then
a
circularity
in the
process
of
knowing
the
past
in
that
system
is the
source
for
understanding
structure,
and structure
is
the
background
for
understanding
the
system.
It is
a hermeneutic
circle,
hence
the
method
of
reading
the
past.
As Hodder
sees
it,
the method
is unlike
the sort
of linear
inference
back
along
a causal chain as is the approach when middle-range theories are invoked. All aspects
of
archaeological
knowledge
will
require
some
initial
knowledge
of
intentions
and
the
meanings
of
things
as
a
way
to break
into the
hermeneutic
circle.
In
fact,
It
is
only
when
we make
assumptions
about
the
subjective
meanings
in
the
minds
of
people long
dead
that
we can
begin
to do
archaeology
(Hodder
1986:79).
It
is
important
to realize
that these
are
not
wild, irresponsible,
or
irreversible
speculations. They
are
accountable
to a kind of
testing
in that the
assumptions
of
meaning
must
lead to
sensible,
consistent
system
and
structure.
Individual
assumptions
are
evaluated
by
inter-
preting
general
understanding
or
foreknowledge
in
relation
to our
understanding
of
particular
con-
texts
(Hodder
1991:8),
and
are
inadmissible
unless
they
show
coherence
with other
ideas
attributed
to
the
people long
dead,
and
unless
they
provide
correspondence
to
the
evidence
(Hodder
1986:
95),
that
is,
allow an
easy,
rational
link
between
intentions
and
material
behavior.
Hodder's account of archaeological
method
seems
to
have shifted
the
burden
of
proof.
Cross-
cultural
generalizations,
as
would be
found
among
middle-range
theories,
have
to
be
proven,
not
assumed
(Hodder
1986:80), though
he admits
that there
are some
simple
rules
underlying
all
624
[Vol.
56,
No.
4,
1991
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MIDDLE-RANGE
THEORY AS HERMENEUTICS
languages (Hodder 1986:123)
that can be
used to understand
the
past.
Cross-cultural
generalities
cannot
be assumed but
subjective
meanings
can.
This
apparently
differential treatment is a
feature of the
advertising
of
the
methodological position
that does
not
accurately
reflect the
product.
The distinction between
assumption
and
proof
works
only
to
confuse both
Binford's and Hodder's
models of
archaeological knowledge
since
in
both
models,
what
may
be
initially
assumed is
accountable to
subsequent
proof.
Whether it is of a
cross-
cultural
generalization
or of a
subjective meaning,
an
assumption
is
tentative and
revisable. It is
a
hypothesis
in
need of
justification.
In
the
methodological
scheme of
things, middle-range
theories
function
as do claims
about
ideas,
hypothetical
in
activities of
discovery,
and
in
need of
proof
in
activities of
justification.
A
look
at how these
things
are
justified
will
reveal
greater similarity
between
middle-range
theories
and claims
ndclaims about
structure,
and between the two
archaeological
methods in
which
they
function.
The
suggestion
at this
point
is that
instead of
opposing
Binford's and
Hodder's
methodological
models
by saying
that
contextual
structuring
ring
ciples
intervene
(Hodder
1986:116), meaning
that the
structuring
principles replace
middle-range
theories,
it is more
accurate to
regard
the
structural principles as part of the theories. Recall that the operative notion of a middle-range theory
places
no
restrictions
on the
content or
degree
of
generality
of
the
claim,
only
on
its use for
making
sense
of
(finding
information
in)
the
evidence.
MIDDLE-RANGE
THEORY AS
CONTEXTUAL
METHOD
The
distinctive
feature
of
Hodder's
contextual
method is
its
affinity
to
hermeneutics
in
the
relation
of
mutual
support
between
evidential
claims about
system
and
claims about
structure.
A
description
of
the
confirmation of
middle-range
theories
will
show
that
Binford's
methodological
account shares
this
affinity.
Middle-range theories, recall,
are
just
ordinary
theories.
They
are
tested and
justified
like
any
other
theory,
including
the
ones
whose
observational
evidence
they
laden.
Middle-range
theories
are tested and justified by comparison to evidence, that is, to observations. There is then a kind of
circularity.
Theories
in
general
(including
theories
used as
middle-range theories)
are
confirmed and
understood
through
an
appeal
to
observations,
and
observations
in
general
are understood and
verified with
the
support
of
theories.
This
second
half of the
cycle,
the
theory
ladenness of
obser-
vation,
represents
a
blurring
of
the
distinction
between
fact and
theory, exactly
as Hodder
advocates.
Observations
are
theoretically
influenced
claims about
local
and
specific situations,
closely
linked
to
perception.
They
are
similar
to
claims
about
the
meanings
of
specific
passages
in
an
unfamiliar
text,
claims
motivated from
specific
marks on
the
page.
Theories are
observationally
influenced
claims
about
more
global
processes
that
are not
directly
linked to
particular perceptions.
They
are
the
developing
account of the
plot
of
the
story.
Just
as
individual
passages
of
text are
interpreted
by
their
context
in
the
larger message
of
a book
while the
larger
message
is itself
put
together
from
an
understanding
of
the
parts,
so
too are
individual
observations
interpreted
by
appeal
to
theories
that are themselves put together and supported by observations. That is, the content and justification
of
theories
are
strongly
influenced
by observations,
and
in
turn
the
informational
content
and
justification
of
observations are
influenced
by
theories.
This is
exactly
the
structure of the
herme-
neutic
circle.
And
middle-range
theories
participate
on both
sides of this
dialogue
between
theory
and
observation.
Middle-range
theories
are
hermeneutic
tools.
This is
not
to
say
that
the
objects
of
study
that
Binford
advocates as
important
for
archaeology
are
the
same as
those
stressed
by
Hodder
and
contextualist
archaeologists.
To
point
out
that the
methodological
structure
of
middle-range theorizing
is
similar
to the
hermeneutics of
contextual
archaeology
is not
to
force
the
former
into a
study
of
the
mental
component
of
the
archaeological
record.
The
point
is
rather
that
the
two
different
concerns
and different
objects
of
study
are in a
similar
epistemic
predicament
that
calls for
a
shared
method.
The
point
is
relevant
beyond archaeology. Natural science in general, role model for middle-range
theorizing,
includes a
hermeneutic
component
in
the
dialectic
between
theory
and
evidence. The
hermeneutic
structure
shown
above
for
Binford's
middle-range theories,
the
reciprocating
influence
Kosso]
625
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AMERICAN ANTIQUITY
between theories about the whole
and observations of the
parts,
would
apply
as
well to
the astro-
physics example
discussed above. This indicates that
differences
between for-science and
against-
science
approaches
to
archaeology
have been
based
in
part
on an
incomplete
and inaccurate
image
of
science
in
general.
Science must read nature
just
as Hodder
points
out
archaeology
must read
the
past.
The
unity
of the two
approaches
then comes in
realizing
that
doing archaeology
in a
scientific,
middle-range-theory way
is
doing
it
in
a
contextual,
hermeneutic
way.
Some
assumptions
need to be made to break into
the circular
association between
theory
and
observation. There
will
be neither
meaningful
evidence nor theoretical
understanding
without initial
hypotheses
and
preliminary
middle-range
theories.
All
of these
assumptions
are revisable. That
is
exactly
the sort of
epistemic
responsibility
we demand of science.
They
are revisable
against
the
standards of
coherence
with other
theories,
that
is,
an internal
plausibility
in the
context
of other
theories,
and
correspondence
with
the
data,
that
is,
with
the
evidential
claims
aden with
other
theories. The
revisions
are answerable
to,
as Alison
Wylie (1982:42)
puts
it,
two sets
of con-
straints ...
plausibility
considerations
... and
empirical
constraints.
The
requirement
that evidential claims
should be
influenced
by
heories
hould be influenceotherdhaby
the
one for
which they are evidence is important and it is the foundation of Binford's idea of objectivity. He
advocates
a
view
of'objectivity'
developed
within the
sciences. That
was the view that
it was
not
the status
of
the observer
that
yielded objectivity
but the
status
of logical
or intellectual
independence
between the ideas
being
evaluated,
on the one
hand,
and the intellectual
tools
employed
in the evaluated
investigations,
on the other
(Binford
1982a:128, emphasis
in
original).
Furthermore,
this
require-
ment of
independence
between
object theory
and
middle-range theory
can
be used to
answer
ob-
jections
of
circularity
in
the
testing
of
theory against
theory-laden
evidence,
as
put
by
contextualists
such as Shanks
and
Tilley,
who
say,
If
all observation
is
to
a
certain
extent
theoretical,
..
.
it
is
illogical
to maintain
that
theories can be
independently
tested
against
observation
(Shanks
and
Tilley
1987:40-41).
While
the antecedent
of this
is
true
(all
observation
is
theoretical),
the
consequent
is not
(theories
can be tested
against
independently
secured
evidence),
and it
is the insistence
on
independence
that breaks
any
problematic, self-serving circularity
of
theory
and
evidence.
Obser-
vations can serve as objective evidence for theories even though observations are indelibly theo-
retical.
In
general
then,
the
acceptability
of
middle-range
theories
and
the evidential
and
theoretical
claims
they
support
is
governed
by
a
requirement
of
consistency
and coherence
and a constraint
of
independence
in
the
accounting
for evidential
claims.
No
claims,
whether
preliminary
assumptions
of
meaning
or
middle-range
theories,
are
acceptable
if
they
lead to
contradiction.
We assume
that
the book
makes
sense,
hence
an
interpretation
that
introduces
contradiction
must
be
mistaken.
Interestingly,
independence
is
also
the answer
to
objections
of
circularity
and
unverifiability
directed
against
the
contextual,
hermeneutic
approach
(Binford 1989).
The
assumptions
about
subjective
meanings (Hodder
1986:79)
that
influence
our observations
of the
material record
are
themselves
accountable
to other
evidence
that
is
influenced
by
other
independent
hypotheses
of
subjective meaning. This contextual method need not be problematically circular
or left to
unsub-
stantiated
speculation
as
long
as
one insists
on a coherence
among
independently
arrived at
claims
about the
past.
It is no coincidence
that the
key
to
objectivity
is the
same
in the
middle-range
theory
and
hermeneutic
approaches.
It is
the result
of their
common
structure
and
the fact
that
they
are
fundamentally
the same
method.
CONCLUSION
The
original
presentation
of
Binford's
and
Hodder's
models
of
archaeological
method cast
them
as
being
in
opposition.
Archaeology by
Hodder's
contextual
account
is
as
reading
a
book
written
in an unfamiliar
language.
It
involves
a
hermeneutic
circle
of
analysis
that
requires
some
initial
assumptions
to
break
in
and
get
started.
Binford's
middle-range- theory
account
portrays
archaeology
as
being methodologically
like
the
natural
sciences.
Responsible
archaeology
demands
observational
evidence
as tests
for
theories
about
the
past,
and
informative
observation
requires
theories
that
describe
the formation
of
the
evidence.
626
[Vol.
56,
No.
4,
1991
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MIDDLE-RANGEHEORY
S HERMENEUTICS
They
are both
right.
It is not that
archaeology
is a
rigid
and
segregated
system
of theories
and
observations in
which brute facts are used
to test theories. It is rather
that the methods of
natural
science,
and those advocated
by
Binford for
archaeology,
are more like the
contextual,
hermeneutic,
back-and-forth
model
than Hodder's
original
opposition
seemed to
recognize.
The
argument
for
this
similarity
is
in
the
display
of the nature of claims about the
past
and claims
of
evidence,
and
the
structure of confirmation
as advocated
by
each
approach.
It is not the content
of claims that
is
shared
but
the
method
of
justification
and the standard of
objectivity.
It is
important
to
display
this
point
of
similarity
between
the
processualist
and contextualist
views
of
archaeology
to show that the
opposition
between the
two cannot be located
on basic issues
of
method.
Methodological
complaints
such as
circularity
and
speculativeness,
made from one
position
about
the
other,
are seen as
pointing
out
potential
weakness
that
both have and both must
cover
with the insistence
on coherence
under
the constraint of
independence
among
claims.
Hermeneutics,
as
a method of
acquiring knowledge
beyond
the most
manifest is
seen to be
appropriate
for
more
than
just uncovering
meanings, ideas,
and intentions. It
is
the
method as well of natural
science.
Acknowledgements.I am gratefulto CynthiaKosso for help with the facts and to the National Science
Foundation
for
support
(DIR
89-17989)
during part
of
my
work
on this
project.
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