Proxy Wars in the Middle East: Iran vs. Saudi Arabia

KAL’s Cartoon from the Economist March 28, 2015 edition. Accessed at <http://www.economist.com/news/world-week/21647354-kals-cartoon>

SMUNC 2015 Staff: Ben Krauz, Max Morales, Connor Stubbs

SMUNC 2015

2

Letter from the Chair Dear Delegates, Welcome to the Middle East 2015 JCC. My name is Ben Krausz and I will be one of the chairs for this committee. I have staffed SMUNC twice in the past—as Crisis Directors in both 2013 and 2014. I am currently a Junior computer science major at Stanford, but I also am extremely interested in foreign affairs, and have taken many classes in that field. I have enlisted the help of Max Morales, an International Relations major who I met during an intensive three week summer class on 21st century foreign policy, and Connor Stubbs, a sophomore who founded his high school MUN program and participated in Michigan Youth in Government throughout high school. I decided to chair SMUNC this year because of my interests in international relations and global politics. We chose the Middle East as the subject for our JCC because it is both an incredibly engaging and relevant topic. I’m sure everyone has seen ISIS atrocities crop up countless times in the news over the past year, and is well aware of the raging debate over the merits of the nuclear deal with Iran. Yet it seems that whenever American leaders attempt to influence Middle Eastern affairs, our good intentions (or in some cases, not-so-good intentions) seem to backfire. Well, it's a good thing you guys won’t be representing American leaders! In this JCC, you will be playing leading figures in the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two most powerful states in the Middle East. In order to assert your country’s dominance over Middle Eastern affairs, you will have to manage proxy states, consider the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and even contend with internal strife. My hope is that delegates participating in this committee will enjoy approaching complicated and multi-faceted issues from a perspective we rarely experience as living in the US. This JCC encapsulates a very broad subject, and there are many different issues to deal with. So please take care to spend a fair chunk of time researching the topics at hand. However, we understand that it is difficult to find information on many of the characters in this JCC, so just do your best. While writing your policy papers, don't worry if you can't find specific information as some of these characters are not very famous. Instead, focus on general policy and infer what your character would be worried about in their position. If you have any questions, feel free to contact me through email. I can’t wait to see you in committee! Ben Krausz bkrausz@stanford.edu

SMUNC 2015

3

A note on committee . . .

The setting for this JCC was chosen because both because the conflict in the Middle East is compelling and multi-faceted, and because it is a highly relevant topic that all modern global policy-makers must cope with. However, because the conflict is modern and rooted partly in religion, we understand that the proceedings of the committee has the potential to cause some delegates to feel uncomfortable. After all, the delegates taking part in this JCC will be role-playing as individuals who have expressed vile sentiments- from racism, to support for terrorists, to holocaust-denial. As a result, we request that delegates not use inappropriate or offensive language, even if the officials they are representing do so on a regular basis. As such, please adhere to the following guidelines when in committee:

• it is acceptable (and even encouraged) to make decisions based on one’s character’s prejudices. However:

• Under no circumstances is it OK to use terms derogatory towards any ethnicity, religious group, or country when in committee.

• Under no circumstances should such terms be included in directives or crisis notes either. We understand that we are asking delegates to toe a very thin line- between taking courses of action based on one’s character’s desire for Sunni/Shiite supremacy and openly expressing sentiments, which can be harmful to other delegates. If you have any questions, please ask the chair.

SMUNC 2015

4

The Histories Iran, or Persia, has been the seat of imperial power for thousands of years. It was one of the great civilizations of the ancient world, producing mighty kings and conquerors such as Xerxes and Darius the Great. It is a place of a proud and venerable culture; one that, even when it accepted Islam, maintained a distinct identity. Iran may have become Muslim, but it stayed Persian. Power politics is nothing new to Iran. The Sassanid Empire, the last of Persia’s great pre-Islamic states, fought a ninety-year war with East Rome (the Byzantine Empire) in the sixth and seventh centuries. The two empires were the superpowers of their time—colossal, multi-ethnic kingdoms that battled one another for influence across the Middle East. Both empires used religion as a tool to spread its power—East Rome sought to convert regional monarchs to its particular strand of Christianity in order to bring them under its influence. Persia, although it adhered to the Zoroastrian faith, sought to spread its influence through accepting the religious minorities that East Rome expelled from its borders namely Jews. While the two powers grappled in a brutal game of power politics, a new player rose far to the south on the edge of the Arabian peninsula. There, among a group of people the Persians and Romans viewed as little more than uncouth barbarians, a new religion was born. Inspired by the teachings of the prophet Muhammad, and led by a fiery zeal to spread their faith, the Arab people united for the first time in their long history. They expanded from their homeland and established a conquering empire, the Caliphate, which stretched from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean in just a few short decades. Along the way, they obliterated the Sassanid Empire and banished East Rome from the heart of the Middle East. Although it was conquered, Persia did not rest easily. Its people slowly adopted Islam, but Persia itself was always the hotbed of revolution and rebellion within the caliphate. In these early years at the dawn of Islam, the most important dispute among the faith focused on who had the right to follow in the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad and lead the umma. Two families, one of them descended from the Prophet’s daughter Fatima and her husband Ali, the other from the Prophet’s larger extended family, became the major players in these wars of succession. The latter family eventually won out and ruled the umma for centuries. The former family eventually came to known as the Party of Ali, the Shiite, and over the centuries developed a tradition centered on revolutionary struggle and charismatic leadership. Even from the very beginning, they were based in Eastern Iraq and Iran. It is easy to conflate Iran and the Shiite identity, especially looking backwards through history from today. But such a conflation oversimplifies Iran, reducing a startlingly complex and diverse place to a single strain of thought. Not only is Shiism itself a much more diverse faith than most people realize, but most of Iran was not Shiite for many centuries after the Prophet’s death. It is also a mistake to view Shiism simply as a way in which Persia attempted to create an independent identity within the Muslim world; Shiism developed independently from Persian culture and is not simply a latent expression of Persian nationalism.

SMUNC 2015

5

After a long interim period in which both what we now call Arabia and Iran were eclipsed by other world powers, the two countries eventually became the two great powers in the Middle East. After decades of war, much of the Arabian peninsula was united under the rule of the Saud family in 1932. Critical to the Saud family’s source of power among the people of the peninsula was the support of religious leaders, leading to an alliance that shapes the Kingdom to this day. With the discovery of some of the world’s largest oil reserves a few years later, the Saudi Kingdom became a key economic and political player on the world stage.

After WWII, Iran was divided into British, American and Soviet zones. These powers forced the monarch, the Reza Shah, to abdicate in favor of his son. A secular ruler who sought to modernize his country, the new Shah alienated the Iranian population with his increasingly dictatorial rule. In 1979, this discontent allowed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to take the reins of power in the Iranian Revolution and establish the Islamic Republic just three years later. Relations with the West deteriorated significantly thereafter, due to rhetoric on the part of the new Iranian government—who blamed the West for backing the Shah’s dictatorship— and culminated in the Iranian hostage crisis, when Iranian students kept United States embassy employees as hostages for over a year. The most immediate roots of the rivalry we see between Iran and Saudi Arabia are relatively recent, stretching back to the Iranian Revolution. Due to Western support of the Shah, among other factors, the Iranian Revolution from the beginning was hostile to the West, particularly the United States. This stance brought Iran into conflict with Saudi Arabia, which has for decades courted close ties with the West for military aid and the exploitation of its oil reserves. The two countries also have different visions of how the global oil market should be run, particularly with regards to the level of prices. Finally, the two countries are divided by religious differences. Khomeini has publicly called for the export of his Shiite Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is influenced significantly by Wahhabism- a radical sect of Sunni Islam. Wahhabi Muslims believe that non-Wahhabis are not only misguided- but that they are not true Muslims at all. As a result, anti-Shiite, and thus, anti-Iranian sentiment in Saudi Arabia is widely prevalent.1 However, it is a mistake to characterize the rivalry between the two countries as a purely religious dispute--it a complex and multifaceted relationship that has as much to do with history, economics, and ethnic differences as is had to do with faith. Iran and the Arabian heartland have a rivalry that predates either of the present governments in those territories by centuries. This rivalry has waxed and waned, changing with the power dynamics in the region. But the divide between Arabs and Persians was always present within Islam, eventually taking on a doctrinal as well as ethnic dimension. It is this tangle of economic, nationalistic, religious, and ethnic power politics, the latest chapter in a centuries-old game, that is now your responsibility to sort out. Good luck.2 1http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/04/26/How-Iran-desires-to-dominate-the-Middle-East.html 2 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG840.pdf

SMUNC 2015

6

The Governments

The Islamic Republic of Iran The Iranian government is a unique mix of presidential democracy and religious

theocracy. The most powerful political position in Iran is that of the Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader possesses constitutional authority over all three branches- executive, legislative, and judicial- of the Iranian government. No major decisions concerning Iran’s domestic, religious, or foreign policy can be made without the consent of the Supreme Leader. This office has been held since 1989 by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Khamenei (who will not be on committee but rather will be controlled by crisis) generally stays out of Iran’s day-to-day politics- but he reserves the right to do so. He is deeply involved in Iran’s foreign policy- and must approve all of Iran’s major foreign policy decisions. He is known to be a conservative, and has repeatedly taken deeply oppositional stances to the west.

Iran’s second most powerful political office is that of the presidency. The president is subordinate to the Supreme Leader, and does not even control the nation’s armed forces. Iran’s current president is Hassan Rouhani, who is considered to be a reformer. Hassan Rouhani succeeded Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who held the position from 2005-2013. Many were surprised that the regime allowed Rouhani to win the election, as the Iranian people, dissatisfied with Ahmadinejad’s alienation of the international community and obvious corruption, assumed that 2013 would be a repeat of the 2009 elections. The harsh crackdown by authorities during the 2009 elections triggered the “Green Revolution,” as Iranians took to the streets to protest Ahmadinejad’s re-election which they believed were rigged by the government. Many now see a struggle within the Iranian government between the Rouhani and the reformers (who want rapprochement with the West and to cut a nuclear deal with the US) and Khamenei and the hardliners. Those in Iran’s committee may find that there is significant internal conflict regarding Iran’s future path.3 The Iranian parliament consists of 290 elected members who serve 4 year terms, and serves as the country’s principal legislative body. However, parliamentary power is checked by the Supreme Leader and the Council of Guardians. The Council of Guardians is a body of 12 jurists, half of whom are appointed by the Supreme leader, the other half appointed by the Parliament and the head of judiciary. The Council of Guardians is the authority on all religious and, due to Iran’s adherence to Sharia law, legal matters. The Council of Guardians has the power to veto Parliamentary laws, and deem any parliamentary or presidential Candidate to be “unfit” to serve in office. A body called the Expediency Council was organized in 1988 to mediate disputes between the Council of Guardians and parliament. Its members are appointed directly by the Supreme Leader, to whom they also serve as advisers. 3 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2013-05-22/irans-democracy-small-differences?page=show

SMUNC 2015

7

The only check on the Supreme Leader’s power in Iran is the Assembly of Experts, a body of 86 experts in Islamic law that are elected directly by the people. They are charged with appointing the Supreme Leader, and have the authority to remove him, though they have never used this power. Candidates for this body are vetted by the Council of Guardians.

The delegates representing Iranian members of the JCC will be assigned a member of one of two bodies: the President’s Cabinet or the Iranian National Security Council. These two bodies advise the President and Supreme Leader on foreign and domestic policy, respectively, and their members are appointed by the leader that they advise. The two groups will be meeting jointly throughout the duration of the JCC.4 5

Image Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/assembly.stm

4 http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/supreme-leader 5 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html

SMUNC 2015

8

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia has been an absolute monarchy since 1932. Only sons of Ibn Saud, the

progenitor of the royal family, have ever ruled the Kingdom. The ascension of King Salman to the throne marked a generational shift in the monarchy; for the first time, one of Ibn Saud’s grandsons rose to power. Although King Salman named brother Muhammad bin Nayef as his Crown Prince, the generational shift has brought about uncertainty as to the stability of the Saud family.

The king of Saudi Arabia holds executive, judicial, and legislative power. He relies heavily on his advisers’ input and directly appoints two bodies to assist him: the Consultative Assembly and the Council of Ministers. The 150-member Consultative Assembly has the power to propose legislation, but all legislation must be approved by the King. The Assembly has no power to override the King’s veto. The Council of Ministers is the King’s cabinet and is charged with overseeing all domestic and foreign policies of the state.

This winter, Saudi Arabia got a new monarch: King Abdullah, a relatively pro-western reformer, passed away in January. During his reign, he sponsored the Arab Peace initiative in an attempt to normalize relations with Israel, and declared that not only would women be allowed to serve on the assembly, but recommended that at least 20% of the assembly should be female. His hand-picked successor King Salman has since ascended to the throne, and consolidated power by reshuffling his council of ministers. So far, King Salman has afforded his Council of Ministers significant authority, leaving it in charge of day-to-day matters- but he reserves the power to appoint, fire, and reshuffle members at his whim. Most of the delegates participating in the Saudi Arabian committee will be members of King Salman’s Council of Ministers. None of Saudi Arabia’s highest officials are elected, although citizens do elect several local officials.6

Another important body in Saudi Arabia is the ulema- Saudi Arabia’s authority on all religious matters. Because Saudi Arabia is a theocracy, the ulema has significant influence in Saudi Arabia. Like Saudi Arabia’s throne, the ulema has long been dominated by a single family- in this case, the Al ash-Sheikhs. The house of ash-Sheikh has a tacit agreement with the house of Saud- in return for the government’s official recognition of the ulema as a religious authority, the ulema legitimizes the government’s policies- especially those that might be deemed unpopular. This agreement is perhaps the fundamental component of Saudi government, and it is difficult to overstate its importance. 7

6 http://www.hziegler.com/articles/political-system-of-saudi-arabia.html 7 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/sa-ulama.htm

SMUNC 2015

9

Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions

Iran has been actively pursuing a nuclear program since the 1950s. During the days of the Shah’s rule, Iran’s nuclear program received assistance from the US. However, upon the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, Iran’s leadership halted its nuclear program, deeming it “un-Islamic”. In 1984, Iran reversed its stance on nuclear energy, and restarted its nuclear capabilities. Its nuclear program has coincided with a very muscular projection of Iranian power throughout the Middle East.8 This has taken the form support for proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas through arms and money, as well as an active engagement in Shiite militias and parties in Iraq, Qatar, UAE and elsewhere. Iran sees itself as a leading power in the region and has been aggressive in its projection of power through its proxies. This has put it into direct conflict with many of its neighbors. When Saddam Hussein, a Sunni Muslim, ruled Iraq, Iran fought an exhaustive and inconclusive war. It has been aggressive in its language and threats towards Israel and is seen as a threat by traditional regimes, usually Sunni, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey.9

Today, Iran possesses a robust nuclear program. Their capabilities rapidly progressed throughout the years after the turn of the millennium. The US has repeatedly accused Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons, but have been unable to prove such claims. It must be noted, however, that inspections of Iran’s nuclear program have been incredibly limited in recent years. In 2005, Iran’s supreme leader issued a religious decree forbidding the pursuit of nuclear weapons, but declared that they had the capabilities to power nuclear power plants with enriched uranium shortly afterwards. Iran currently possesses about 20,000 centrifuges, which could be used to enrich weapons-grade Uranium. Experts believe that Iran could potentially dash for a weapon in just a few months, should they opt to go down that path. Nations worldwide worry about an Iranian nuclear weapon- Israel views an Iranian atomic bomb as an existential threat, while other countries fear that Iran’s religious government might use such weapons irrationally, obsoleting the doctrine of mutually assured destruction which protected the world from nuclear conflict during the cold war.

Nuclear weaponry is appealing to the Iranian government for several reasons. First, Iran feels threatened by Israel, which is widely thought to control a secret nuclear weapons program. As long as Israel possesses nuclear superiority, Iran’s capacity to respond to potential Israeli aggression is limited. Second, nuclear weapons would allow Iran to pursue its interests in the region without fearing a direct foreign counterattack. The cold war provides an apt case-in-point: while the US and Soviet Union fought many proxy wars between the end of WWII and the fall of the latter, neither nation dared launch a strike- nuclear or conventional- on the other

8 http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/ 9 http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/06/world/meast/iran-timeline/

SMUNC 2015

10

country’s home soil. Western powers have carried out military operations in Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq just in the last decade- Nuclear weapons would help deter the West from adding Iran to that list.

However, pursuing nuclear weapons would pose serious risks to the Iranian government as well. Many Arab and Western countries fear and deeply oppose Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon both because it would limit the West’s ability to respond to Iranian provocations, and also because many people do not trust the Iranian government to behave rationally. Some experts predict that because of the role religion plays in Iran’s government, the principle of mutual annihilation would not act as a sufficient deterrent to the Iranians in the way that it did during the cold war. America and Saudi Arabia fear that Iran’s nuclear weapons might be sold to its proxies in Lebanon or Iraq, while Israel worries that nuclear weapons would allow Iran to make good on its repeated promises to “annihilate” the Jewish state. These foreign countries could take drastic economic and even military action in order to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

A second risk that the Iranian government must consider is that nuclear weapons could prompt Saudi Arabia to obtain nuclear weapons as well, to offset the Iranian threat. There are abundant examples of nuclear proliferation leading to more proliferation throughout the 70-year history of nuclear weapons: the USSR began their nuclear program in response to America revealing their nuclear capacities at the end of WWII, India started a nuclear program to counter China’s and Pakistan obtained nuclear weapons in response to India’s nuclear threat. Various Saudi Arabian government officials have openly, and repeatedly, stated their intention to obtain nuclear weapons should Iran proliferate first.

This begs the question: how would Saudi Arabia obtain nuclear weapons? Uranium is available in the market- though Saudi Arabia has no Uranium mines of its own, countries such as Khazakhstan, Canada, and Australia produce and export millions of pounds of Uranium per year. The next step would be to enrich uranium using a spinning cylinder known as a centrifuge- which is necessary to separate the U-235 isotope from the heavier U-238 isotope- U-235 is the only isotope capable of undergoing a fission chain reaction.10

Once the Uranium is sufficiently enriched, the bomb itself must be designed- which requires significant scientific expertise to ensure that the bomb detonates at the correct time. Finally, because most Uranium nuclear warheads are quite bulky and heavy, an effective deployment system must be created- even nuclear states North Korea and Pakistan have struggled to create effective, long-range deployment systems.

10 http://www.livescience.com/5752-hard-nuclear-weapons.html

SMUNC 2015

11

Experts are divided on whether Saudi Arabia could create a nuclear weapon from scratch. The skeptical Fareed Zakaria has argued that Saudi Arabia’s lack of skilled workers and poor scientific programs would preclude the nation from building a nuclear weapon, citing their inability up until now to construct a work automobile as evidence. 11 However, expert Jeffery Lewis responds that nuclear weapons are now a 70 year old technology, and similarly backwards states such as Pakistan and North Korea have succeeded in building nuclear weapons. 12

It is also possible that Saudi Arabia could obtain a nuclear weapon directly or in part from Pakistan. Pakistan could potentially donate nuclear reactors, centrifuges, or even completed weapons. Saudi Arabia helped fund Pakistan’s nuclear program in the past, and the two Sunni nations have professed to be allies. Some experts believe that Saudi Arabia may even have nuclear weapons on-order and ready to be delivered from Pakistan, should the Saudis deem it necessary. However, this is just speculation. It should be noted that Pakistan has let its nuclear technology leak in the past, and by actively helping Saudi Arabia obtain nukes, Pakistan would risk becoming a pariah state like North Korea.13

In order to prevent a nuclear arms race between Iran and Saudi Arabia, 6 world powers, known as the P5+1, (America, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) imposed a crippling sanctions regime that finally brought Iran to the negotiation table. Since 2013, talks between the 7 countries have been ongoing in Geneva. Negotiators have set a March deadline to conclude talks- when they hopefully agree upon a deal trading sanctions relief for stifling Iran’s nuclear program and the establishment of vigorous International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. Attitudes towards these negotiations are quite divergent- from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s staunch opposition to any accommodation of Iran, to the eager support of European businessmen. While Saudi Arabia eyes the negotiations from the outside with apprehensive caution, Iran’s policy makers are divided. Iranian hardliners oppose any effort to normalize relations with the west on religious grounds, while reformists hope that the end of the sanctions regime might bring prosperity to the Iranian people- or at least inject funds into Iran’s expansionist ambitions. However, some parties in Iran have been benefitted significantly from the sanctions regime. For example, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—answerable directly to the Supreme Leader—has made an enormous profit smuggling oil and controlling the black market. It is estimated that they control almost 60 percent of the Iranian economy, and therefore have a vested interest in ensuring that the sanctions are not lifted.14

11 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/saudi-arabias-nuclear-bluff/2015/06/11/9ce1f4f8-1074-11e5-9726-49d6fa26a8c6_story.html 12http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/12/sorry-fareed-saudi-arabia-can-build-a-bomb-any-damn-time-it-wants-to/ 13 http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/19/world/saudi-pakistan-nuclear-report/ 14 http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/16/iran-s-revolutionary-guards-loved-the-sanctions.html

SMUNC 2015

12

The Economies

Iran and Saudi Arabia are both oil rich states. Saudi Arabia accounts for roughly 16% of the world’s oil production, and is the world’s leading exporter of oil. The country is incredibly dependent on its oil production, which accounts for 80% of its budget revenues, 45% of its GDP, and 90% of its export earnings. Recently Saudi Arabia has attempted to diversify its economy- by expanding into telecommunications, natural gas, and power generation, among other markets. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s low oil production marginal cost has allowed it to exert significant control over the global oil market. Saudi Arabia is the most powerful member of OPEC, an international organization that regulates and controls oil prices. Critically, Saudi Arabia is able to profitably produce oil at prices that are unsustainably low for other oil-rich countries such as Iran and Russia. 15

Iran, meanwhile, controls an economy crippled by the international sanctions regime. Over the last few years, Iran has lost hundreds of billions of dollars in oil revenues due to the sanctions regime- and currently holds $100 billion locked up in foreign accounts that are inaccessible due to sanctions. While Iran’s economy relies on its oil market, it isn’t as one dimensional as Saudi Arabia’s. Oil exports account for approximately 15% of Iran’s GDP- with manufacturing and agriculture, among other forms of labor, accounting for the rest.16

15 http://www.indexmundi.com/saudi_arabia/economy_profile.html 16 http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2015/may/11/irans-economy-numbers

SMUNC 2015

13

Proxy Wars in the Middle East

For years, the Middle East has proved to be a place of constant and widespread conflict. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia will have the option of intervening in these chaotic conflicts in order to ensure that entities loyal to these nations are victorious.

Syria During the Arab spring in 2011, protesters in Syria took to the streets demanding

humanitarian reform in the country, which has been in a State of Emergency at the orders of the Assad government since 1963. In July of 2011, the Free Syrian Army was formed, and armed resistance with the intent of overthrowing the Assad regime began. The Shiite Assad regime is currently funded by Iran, and is supported by Iran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah. The mostly Sunni Free Syrian Army, meanwhile, receives varying levels of support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and the western powers. In mid-2014, ISIS, a radical Sunni power split from the more moderate FSA, and captured the city of Raqqah, where it set up its headquarters. At present, Syria is still embroiled in its chaotic 4 year civil war: the Assad regime still controls the capital of Damascus and much of western Syria, the FSA controls several disjoint regions in the south and North-West of Syria, ISIS controls much of eastern Syria, and various Kurdish militias, mostly aligned with the FSA, control northern Syria.

Iraq

In June of 2014, ISIS declared declared itself a worldwide Caliphate, proclaiming itself the political and religious leader of Muslim worldwide. ISIS swept into Iraq and, though vastly outnumbered, swiftly conquered Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. The Iraqi army, possessing very low moral, and with no appetite to fight for their Shiite-dominated government, fled the city- leaving behind tanks and advanced weaponry to be used by ISIS. ISIS conquered much of western Iraq, and even made inroads into Iraqi Kurdistan to the north, before US-led airstrikes stifled their advance. While the Iraqi military remains relatively incompetent, the Kurdish Peshmerga and Iran-backed Shiite militias, aided by US airstrikes, have seen moderate levels of success in retaking ISIS-held territory. Nonetheless, ISIS continues to remain a dangerous presence in Iraq- and their appeal to Sunni Muslims worldwide deeply worries states such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

There has been speculation that influential members of the Gulf states have offered ISIS financial support since its inception. While these links are murky and controversial, it is true that the governments of Saudi Arabia and other Sunni powers provided substantial financial aid to opposition groups in Syria, many of which had ties to Islamic militant groups. Many members of

SMUNC 2015

14

these groups are now members of ISIS. While it seems clear that the Saudi government is not backing ISIS directly, it is probable that much of their aid has unintentionally benefited ISIS. It is also probable that members of the Saudi elite have backed ISIS directly through financial means, although their contributions are largely superfluous; ISIS has the means to sustain itself financially.17

A map of the political situation on the ground. Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Syrian,_Iraqi,_and_Lebanese_insurgencies.png Dark orange = Lebanese government, Light Orange = Assad regime, Blue = Hezbollah, Green=Syrian Rebels, Yellow=Syrian Kurds, Darker Yellow = Iraqi Kurds, Black=ISIS, Magenta = Iraqi government.

17 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29004253

SMUNC 2015

15

Other players in (or meddling in) the Middle East

The United States of America The US has maintained a fairly positive relationship with Saudi Arabia since the 1930s,

when the US businesses took an interest in Saudi Arabian oil, and have frequently cooperated due to security concerns and common interests in the Middle East. In 1991, Saudi Arabia cooperated with the American military during the gulf war, when an American-led coalition ousted Iraqi forces from Kuwait. However, relationships between the US and Saudi Arabia have recently hit troubled waters. While both countries share a common interest in containing Iran, Saudi Arabia resents America’s alliance with Israel, as well as its support for the Arab-Spring movement that toppled Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in 2011- an event that Saudi Arabia’s leaders fear might repeat itself in Saudi Arabia itself. In addition, Saudi Arabia’s open cooperation with America has frequently made it the target of terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda.

The United States continues to possess an extremely hostile relationship with Iran. The US takes issue with Iran’s repeated threats to destroy Israel, its alleged attempts to develop nuclear weapons, and its sponsorship of parties that commit acts of terror such as Hezbollah, its poor human-rights record (conveniently ignoring that the state of human rights in Saudi Arabia is no better), and of course its frequent chants of “Death to America”. To this day, the US and Iran have no formal diplomatic relations. While many American officials advocate bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities to ensure that the latter does not develop nuclear weapons, some liberals in America hope that nuclear deal currently under negotiations will lead Iran onto a path of moderation, and ultimately to a detente with America.

Yemen On the south-eastern border of Saudi Arabia, Yemen is a country strategically important

to Saudi Arabia’s oil market- as the Gulf of Aden to the south constitutes a major oil shipping route. Yemen is embroiled in civil war. Yemen has long been a cite of great instability, but the conflict has heated up tremendously in the last few months. When the Sunni politician Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi became president of Yemen in a rigged, single-candidate election in 2012, the Shiite rebel group known as the Houthis were outraged. In September 2014, after 2 years of unrest, the Houthis captured Sana’a, and forced President Hadi to sign an agreement that gave the Houthis unprecedented power in exchange for peace, while western governments supportive of Hadi’s regime as an ally against Al-Qaeda evacuated their embassies. But peace did not last. Seeking even more authority over Yemen’s political affairs, on January 20, 2015, the Houthis

SMUNC 2015

16

laid siege to Hadi’s presidential compound, forcing the president under house arrest. Seemingly defeated, Hadi resigned from office.18 19

Israel Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia recognize the State of Israel, and Israel has had hostile

relationships with both states since its founding in 1948. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia accuse Israel of committing human rights offenses against Palestinians living within and outside its borders, although Israel argues that Iran and Saudi Arabia’s hostility towards the Jewish state to stem from pure, unfettered, anti-semitism. Currently, Israel allows the small strip of territory between Jerusalem and Jordan known as the “West Bank” to be controlled by a Palestinian government known as the Palestinian Authority. However, this strip of territory has been shrinking in size as Israel builds new settlements in the region. While Israeli settlers are able to participate in Israeli politics, non-Israeli Palestinians do not have that right.

In 2005, Israel pulled out of the Gaza strip, a small strip of territory on the Egyptian border, but felt threatened when Hamas, a party bent on eventually expelling Israel from the region, rose to power in Gaza. Israel has fought multiple wars with Hamas since then, most recently in summer 2014. Hamas generally has good relations with Iran, who provides it with funding and possibly weapons. However, ties between the entities were rocked in 2011 when Hamas refused to support the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war. Hamas’s relations with Saudi Arabia tends to correlate inversely with its ties to Iran- during periods of conflict between Hamas and the Shiite state, Saudi Arabia has treated Hamas warmly, while viewing the latter with distrust during periods of close Hamas-Iran ties. Israel is especially wary of Iran, has criticized the current nuclear negotiations, and may go to great lengths to ensure that Iran never develops nuclear weapons.20 21

Pakistan The predominantly Sunni Pakistan is one of Saudi Arabia’s closest allies. In 2014, the two countries signed a defense cooperation pact. Pakistan developed a nuclear weapons in the 1990’s, in order to offset the threat of a nuclear India. Saudi Arabia helped fund this program, leading to allegations that Saudi Arabia has nuclear weapons “on order” from Pakistan should Iran obtain them first, which Pakistan has flatly denied. Experts are divided on the likelihood of such an occurrence- while Pakistan and Saudi Arabia do have very strong relations, the former would risk its international credibility if it enabled the spread of proliferation.22 23

18 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423 19https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/yemen-rebels-attack-presidential-compound-in-escalating-attacks-seen-as-coup-bid/2015/01/20/693aed94-a0b7-11e4-9f89-561284a573f8_story.html 20 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/09/hamas-iran-rebuild-ties-falling-out-syria 21 http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/23/us-saudi-palestinians-idUSKCN0PX1H520150723 22 http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/india-and-saudi-arabia-sign-defense-cooperation-pact/ 23 http://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-and-pakistans-nuclear-weapons-pact-2015-2

SMUNC 2015

17

Syria As outlined above, Syria is embroiled in a bitter civil war between ISIS, the Syrian government, the Free Syrian Army, and the Kurdish YPG. While Assad is a close ally of Iran, Saudi Arabia advocates support for the rebels. Though the Assad regime is Shiite, the total population of Syria is actually just 15-20% Shiite.

A map of the Middle East displaying the Shiite-Sunni divide. (Percentages represent percentage of Muslims who are Shiite). Source: Pew Research Center, US Department of State

Iraq Iran is similarly involved in a civil war. Since it borders both Iran and Saudi Arabia, both countries have reason to worry about the implications of the country falling to ISIS.

SMUNC 2015

18

Lebanon Lebanon features a relatively even Sunni-Shiite divide. Parts of the country are currently

controlled by the armed political faction, Hezbollah. Hezbollah, an Iranian backed group, cropped up in the 1980’s, partially in response to the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon at the time. Though it started as a revolutionary group, it morphed into a political one in the 1990s.

Hezbollah currently works within the Lebanese political system in its struggle for Shiite supremacy. Its armed wing has been described as one of the most effective terrorist organizations in the world, and employs both conventional and guerrilla military tactics. Hezbollah frequently clashes with Israel, most recently in 2006, and openly seeks the Jewish state’s destruction. Currently, Hezbollah is embroiled in the Syrian civil war, fighting on the side of the Assad regime. It is heavily funded by Iran, making it Iran’s most powerful proxy in the Middle East.24

Jordan Jordan, while small and seemingly insignificant, is actually a very important player in the

politics of the Middle East. Jordan has mediated several important disputes between nations and parties across the middle east thanks to its elaborate court system that draws inspiration from its ancient tribal tradition of “wasata”, which involved a tribal leader bringing parties together to resolve a dispute. Because Jordan has maintained positive relations with Saudi Arabia, the West, Israel, and all Sunni nations in the Middle East, it frequently facilitates discussion between oppositional countries and parties, such as between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Though relations with Iran have been rocky since the Iranian revolution, Jordan and Iran have worked to mend relations in recent years. Jordan supports Iran’s right to a peaceful, civilian nuclear program and has advocated for the use of diplomacy to prevent proliferation in the region. Jordan’s pacifism has its limits, however. When ISIS released a video of a Jordanian pilot being burned alive in early 2015, the country ignited with anger. Though its military is small, Jordan has since stepped up its role in combating the Islamic State- despite the fact that a minority (~10%) of Jordanians actually support ISIS.25 26 27

Turkey The mostly Sunni Turkey is the only Middle Eastern nation that is a member of NATO.

However, under their current leader, Tayyip Erdogan, the country’s relations with the West have cooled significantly, and its policies have become increasingly Islamist. Turkey has been reluctant to enter the fight against ISIS out of fears that doing so would empower the ethnic 24 http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/hizbollah.html 25 http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/jordan-iran-foreign-relations 26 http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-6/november-3/mediation-in-jordan.html 27 http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/02/23/388456448/jordans-army-preps-for-a-bigger-role-against-isis

SMUNC 2015

19

Kurds living in Iraq and Syria. Turkey worries that allowing a Kurdish bid for independence to materialize would cause unrest in the Kurdish population within its own borders.

SMUNC 2015

20

The Crisis

February 20th, 2015

Could the Middle East become any more chaotic? ISIS rampages across Iraq, president Bashir-al-Assad continues to cling to power in Syria, and the world powers scramble to contain Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear bomb.

The answer is yes. Today, a bombshell exploded in Aden, Yemen, where ex-Yemeni president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi made a surprise appearance after a daring escape from the compound where he was held prisoner by the Shiite Houthis. Hadi promptly rescinded his resignation, and has declared the Houthi government illegitimate.

But as Houthi revolutionaries and Sunni tribesmen prepare for battle, governments across the Middle East realize that the conflict is larger than Yemen itself. Supreme Leader Al Khamenei of Iran sees an opportunity to make yet another Middle Eastern government his proxy, while King Salman of Saudi Arabia both fears Iran’s expanding sphere of influence and recognizes Yemen as an important asset for Saudi Arabia’s dominance over the oil market.

Yemen, however, may only be the starting point for a conflict between the Middle East’s two most powerful states . . .

OTHER NOTES AND THINGS TO KEEP IN MIND

• Keep in mind that the start date of this committee is February 20th, 2015. This is before the conclusion of the Iranian nuclear negotiations and announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of action. The conflict in Yemen has just begun- and neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran has directly intervened yet. All events that have happened since February 20th are not guaranteed to occur, and crises that never happened in real life may develop.

• Remember that both of these countries are ruled by leaders that must sign off on all

legislation/ foreign policy actions. Thus, your directions and crisis notes should be written in the form of recommendations- most of the characters on committee are advisors after all. Example: do not pass a directive stating “Move 5,000 Iranian troops into Iraq to combat ISIS immediately.” unless you want an angry Supreme Leader. Instead, state, “This body urgently advises the Supreme Leader to send 5,000 troops into Iraq to combat ISIS immediately.” A happy Supreme Leader / King means a happy committee! Or at least, a committee with no political executions.

SMUNC 2015

21

• As this JCC takes place in modern times, many important facts regarding Iran and Saudi Arabia are not public, or are based on speculation. Questions such as: “How close is Iran actually to developing an atomic bomb?” and “Could Saudi Arabia really obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan?” will be answered via crisis notes to the relevant delegates at the beginning of the first committee session.

• Remember that while Saudi Arabia and Iran are top dogs in the Middle East, they are not

quite as strong in the global community as a whole. As such, the crisis team will not afford Iran or Saudi Arabia much leeway should they initiate open warfare with a superpower such as the US, even if the country is under the control of crisis and not another room of delegates. Tread carefully when making your power-plays: there are always bigger fish in the pond. Likewise, remember that both countries possess militaries that are primarily defensive in nature- so neither country should expect to rampage across the middle east without confronting severe logistical issues.

• Many Americans view the leaders of both Iran and Saudi Arabia as irrational, insane, or

even evil. And it is certainly true that many of the individuals you will be portraying have committed serious atrocities. But it is vital that when “in character”, delegates do not view themselves exclusively in this light. Always consider your character’s motivations- do they want to expand their country’s power? Inflate their own power? Ensure that religious law is adhered to? If these motivations lead your character to commit atrocities, then so be it. But try not to take such actions based on the starting premise that your character inherently evil or chaotic.

• Remember to have fun!

SMUNC 2015

22

Iranian delegate list (party affiliation in parentheses): Ali Tayebnia: Mr. Tayebnia is the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance. He is associated with the Reformist Party, and supported President Rouhani in the last election only after his more reform-oriented favorite, Mohammad Reza Aref, dropped out of the running. Mr. Tayebnia believes that Iran must diversify its economy if it is going to be economically viable in the future. (Reformist)28 Morteza Sarmadi: As the Minister of Foreign Affairs is abroad negotiating a nuclear agreement with world powers, Mr. Sarmadi, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, is representing the Ministry in Cabinet. He maintains contact with his superior, but has significant leeway to make his own decisions due to his experience as a former ambassador (he has served as Iran’s ambassador to the United Kingdom) and statesman. He will serve as the Cabinet’s link to negotiations in Geneva.(Reformist)29 Bijan Namdar Zangandeh: Mr. Zangandeh is the Minister of Petroleum. As such, he is in charge of the world’s fourth largest oil reserves, the vast majority of which are state-owned. He is head of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). He is in the midst of privatising much of the oil industry in a bid to attract potential foreign investors. While he remains in charge of the oil, however, he is a very influential and powerful man--oil revenue supports more than half of the government’s budget. (Reformist)30 Mohammad Farhadi: Mr. Farhadi is the Minister of Science, Research, and Technology. A physician, he has also served as Minister of Health under a previous administration and is the head of the Red Crescent Society. His ministry oversees the development of scientific research and technology within Iran.(Reformist)31 32 Masoud Nili: Mr. Nilli is the Senior Economic Advisor to the President. His position has less formal power than the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, and, as his title suggests, he has primarily an advisory role. He commands influence with the president, however--he has been a part of Rouhani’s campaign almost the beginning. He is a strong supporter of liberalizing the Iranian economy and eliminating the country’s dependence on oil.33

28 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jahandad-memarian/new-iranian-cabinet-nomin_b_3726826.html 29 http://www.payvand.com/news/03/aug/1141.html 30 http://www.payvand.com/news/13/sep/1007.html 31 http://www.payvand.com/news/14/nov/1175.html 32 http://news.yahoo.com/iran-parliament-approve-science-minister-nominee-080140155.html 33 http://www.payvand.com/news/11/sep/1179.html

SMUNC 2015

23

Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh: Mr. Nematzadeh is the Minister of Industry, Mines, and Trade. He is primarily concerned with reestablishing commercial ties with Europe and other areas of the world if international sanctions are to be lifted. Similar to other cabinet members, he wants to liberalize the Iranian economy and is in the midst of privatizing various state owned industries. As mines also fall under his purview, he has influence over the country’s uranium reserves. (Moderate)34 Hossein Dehghan: Mr. Dehghan is the Minister of Defense. He controls Iran’s regular armed forces and helps the Supreme Leader oversee the Revolutionary Guard. He also oversees the purchase and sale of weapons, and, through the Revolutionary Guard, has links with Hezbollah. The Revolutionary Guard is over one hundred thousand strong and is extremely powerful both economically and politically within Iran. It must be remembered that Mr. Dehghan has limited control over the Revolutionary Guards, as the Guards purpose is to be independent of the conventional military and their officers report directly to the Supreme Leader. (Moderate)35 36 Ali Jannati: Mr. Jannati is the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance.37 He is charged with maintaining the censorship of the Iranian media, assuring that television, music, movies, and the press only include material that is deemed Islamic. The Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance does not set the criteria for what is deemed Islamic; it only enforces and punish entities for being un-Islamic. Mr. Jannati has been criticized in recent years because he has pushed for the legalization of Facebook and a general loosening of government censorship of the media.38 His Ministry is also charged with upholding political freedom of the press, but usually allows government officials to censor unflattering material, even though doing so is illegal under Iranian law.39 (Moderate) Ali Akbar Salehi: Mr. Salehi is the Senior Advisor on Atomic Energy.40 He is Iran’s nuclear chief, and is charged with advising the president on all affairs related to Iran’s nuclear program. He has a PHD in physics from MIT and is one of Iran’s leading scholars and academics, as well as a long serving and prominent public servant. In addition to advising the president, he is also a primary spokesman on Iran’s nuclear program.41 (Moderate) Akbar Torkan: Mr. Torkan is the Senior International Advisor. In addition to being the president’s chief advisor, he is also one of the most trusted. He is an exceptionally experienced public servant, with extensive ties in the military and other sectors of the government. Although

34 http://www.payvand.com/news/15/jul/1162.html 35 http://www.payvand.com/news/14/apr/1105.html 36 http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-revolutionary-guards/p14324 37 http://www.payvand.com/news/14/mar/1010.html 38 http://www.payvand.com/news/14/aug/1152.html 39 http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2013/08/ministry-culture/ 40 http://www.payvand.com/news/14/feb/1051.html 41 https://www.thebusinessyear.com/iran-2013/the-road-to-peace/inside-perspective

SMUNC 2015

24

he enjoys little formal power, he is enormously influential and respected by the Iranian political establishment.42 (Moderate) Mohammad Bagher Nobakht: Mr. Nobakht is the Vice President on Supervision and Strategic Affairs.43 He is the principal spokesman for the government, and is the chief liaison between the cabinet and both the Iranian and the international press.44 (Moderate) Mahmoud Alavi: Mr. Alavi is the Minister of Intelligence. As such, he is in charge of the various intelligence agencies--both domestic and foreign--that the Islamic Republic employs.45 He has tried to minimize the role of the intelligence community in Iran’s daily life, but has so far met with little success. The agencies still serve as a tool of repressing religious minorities and other “foreign agents.” He was also formerly a member of the Assembly of Experts.46 (Conservative) Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli: Mr. Fazil is the Minister of Interior. He is in charge of supervising elections and other matters that affect the whole of Iran on a domestic scale.47 He has focused on pursuing corruption charges against his fellow government officials, especially cases that take place during the electoral process.48 (Conservative) Mostafa Pourmohammadi: Mr. Pourmohammadi is the Minister of Justice. This Ministry is often considered to be the least powerful among the president’s cabinet; however, Mr. Pourmohammadi enjoys the influence of being a conservative politician within a reformist government. In addition to his formal role as the president’s conduit to the judiciary, he also serves as a conduit to the conservative establishment and consequently enjoys more power than one might expect. He has also expressed his concerns about the role of big money in Iranian politics. He is an expert is Shiite jurisprudence and is the subject of controversy due to his alleged role in the execution of many prisoners under a previous administration.49 (Conservative) Elham Aminzadeh: Ms. Aminzadeh is the Vice President on Legal Affairs. She is the only women in the cabinet.50 As the president promised to include more women in his government, and has frequently been criticized for not doing so, Ms. Aminzadeh is a symbol for both Rouhani and his more reform-oriented and feminist supporters. She holds a PHD in international law.51 (Conservative) 42 http://www.payvand.com/news/15/jul/1065.html 43 http://payvand.com/news/15/feb/1029.html 44 http://news.yahoo.com/iran-presidents-inner-circle-western-accent-174522954.html 45 http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/rouhanis-new-spymaster-after-100-days/ 46 http://www.payvand.com/news/13/aug/1023.html 47 http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/en/page/1920212/Abdolreza+Rahmani+Fazli.html 48 http://www.payvand.com/news/15/apr/1102.html 49 http://www.payvand.com/news/13/aug/1053.html 50 http://www.payvand.com/news/13/aug/1083.html 51 http://www.payvand.com/news/13/aug/1085.html

SMUNC 2015

25

Mohammad Ali Jafari: Mr. Jafari is the chief of the Iran’s 300,000-strong Revolutionary Guard, and a member of the national security council. Hand-picked for the role by the Supreme Leader, he commands tremendous power. Because the Revolutionary Guard has benefitted under the international sanctions regime, he has been critical of the geneva nuclear negotiations, and is highly critical of any accomodation of the western powers. Mr. Jafari is a specialist on “asymmetrical warfare” and advocates for the use of Guerrilla type tactics should Iran be attacked. (Conserative) Hossein Salami: Hossein Salami is the deputy commander of Iran’s revolutionary Guard. Like Mr. Jafari, he is skeptical of the nuclear negotiations with the P5+1, and opposes IAEA inspections of Iran’s military cites. He will assist Mr. Jafari in the management of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. (Conservative) Masoumeh Ebtekar: Ms. Ebtekar has been called “the most powerful woman in Iran.” She first achieved international fame for her prominent role in the Hostage Crisis in the early days of the Iranian Revolution. She is a Vice President and the head of Iran’s Environmental Protection Organization.52 Mehdi Sanaei: Mr. Sanaei is the Ambassador to Russia. He will handle all formal communications between the Islamic Republic and the Russian Federation.53 Hossein Sadeqi: Mr. Sadeqi is the Iranian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. He will handle all formal communications between the two countries, and as such commands enormous power.54 Hassan Danie: Mr. Danie is the Iranian ambassador to Iraq, and will handle all formal communications with the Iraqi government, which has formed an important relationship with Iran since the fall of Saddam Hussein.55 Alireza Haghighian: Mr. Haghighian is the Iranian ambassador to Pakistan, a critical country in the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. He will handle all formal communications between the Iranian and the Pakistani governments.56 Mojtaba Ferdosipour: Mr. Ferdosipour is the Ambassador to Jordan. His role is mainly one of mediation. As neither Israel nor the United States have formal diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic, the ambassador to Jordan at times arranges meetings between the foreign powers in a neutral country. Communication with these powers outside of the Geneva talks will 52 http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/power-players-abc-news/meet-iran-s-first-woman-vice-president-125615087.html 53 http://www.payvand.com/news/10/oct/1134.html 54 http://theiranproject.com/blog/2014/11/27/expansion-of-ties-with-neighbors-irans-top-priority-ambassador/ 55 http://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/zebari-meets-with-iranian-ambassador-to-iraq/ 56 http://www.comsats.org/index2.php?LinkID=304

SMUNC 2015

26

be the primary role of this delegate.57 The delegate will also handle all formal communication between the Iranian and Jordanian governments. Mohammad Ali: Mr. Ali is the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, and thus its link to Hezbollah, a key Iranian ally in the Middle East. He will handle all formal communications between the Iranian and Lebanese governments.58 Mohammad Reza Shaibani: Mr. Shaibani is the Iranian ambassador to Syria, perhaps Iran’s most important ally. He will handle all formal communications between the Iranian and Syrian governments.59 Majead Ansari: Mr. Ansari is Iran’s Vice President for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. Thus, he will serve as the committee’s link to the Iranian parliament. Though all laws must be approved by the Supreme Leader, Iran’s parliament still plays an important role in the legislative process. (Reformist) Mahmoud Hassanzadeh: Mr. Hassanzadeh is the Iranian ambassador to Yemen. Relations between the two countries have soured over allegations that Iran is secretly supporting the Houthi rebels. Mr. Hassanzadeh was recently the target of an al Qaida assassination attempt and will handle all formal communications between the Yemen government in exile and the Iranian government.60 Ali Reza Bikdeli: Mr. Bikdeli is Iranian ambassador to Turkey, a nation with which Iran has a complex relationship. He will handle all formal communications between the two governments.61 Mohammad-Ali Shahidi: Mr. Shahidi is the Minister of Martyrs and Veterans. He is a cleric who maintains close ties with President Rouhani--they both served in Parliament at the same time. In his current position, he is in charge of handling all veteran’s affairs of the Islamic Republic.62

57 http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.572413 58https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fa&u=http://jahannews.com/vdcam6ney49niy1.k5k4.html&prev=search 59 http://theiranproject.com/blog/2013/09/21/foreign-intervention-no-solution-to-syria-iran-envoy/ 60 http://iran-un.org/en/2013/01/08/iran-refutes-allegations-of-meddling-in-yemen-as-west-plot/ 61 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-23/iran-s-bikdeli-says-10b-projects-await-turkish-companies 62 https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fa&u=http://basijnews.ir/fa/news

SMUNC 2015

27

Saudi Arabian Committee Ali Al Naimi: Mr. Naimi is the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. He is, in the words of Forbes, the “most powerful oilman in the world.” He was formerly the head of Saudi Arabia’s largest state owned oil company, until the king placed the monopoly under the control of the new Minister of Defense. However, he is still in charge of developing the maintaining the vast Saudi oil fields, along with Minister of State Motleb bin Abdullah Al-Nafisah. He is a graduate of Stanford University.63 Prince Saud al-Faisal: Prince al-Faisal is the Foreign Minister.64 In reality, he died of natural causes halfway through the dates that the committee is going to cover and was replaced by a different man. However, for simplicity’s sake, in our simulation this will not occur. His staunch support for the US gradually gave way to suspicion in the post-9/11 world as the relations between Saudi Arabia and the US became more complex. At the time the committee begins, Saudi foreign policy was moving away from what al-Faisal had practiced for decades; it was becoming more aggressive and less subtle. It will be up to the delegate how Prince al-Faisal reacts to this change and others in Saudi foreign policy.65 Saleh bin Abdul-Aziz Al ash-Sheikh: Mr. ash-Sheikh is the Minister of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Call, and Guidance. He is in charge of maintaining all religious life in the Kingdom, such as servicing mosques and the printing of Korans. Perhaps more importantly, he is charged with making sure that all religious organizations adhere to the King´s interpretation of religious law. He, like most of the government, adheres to the Wahabi stream of Sunni Islam.66 Prince Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud: This young prince is the Minister of Defense and appears to be the king’s favorite son.67 He has risen in the ranks quickly for one so young, and his rise has generated a fair amount of controversy. The king also recently put him in charge of the state oil monopoly, greatly reducing the power of the Minister of Petroleum.68 Prince Muhammad bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al Saud: Prince Muhammad is the Deputy Crown Prince and is second in line for throne. He is noted for his pro-American stance and his aggressive counterterrorist policies. These policies have made him the target of several

63 http://www.forbes.com/profile/ali-al-naimi/ 64 https://www.saudiembassy.net/embassy/adelbio.aspx 65 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/10/prince-saud-al-faisal 66 http://www.moia.gov.sa/eng/Menu/Pages/About.aspx 67 http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/Biographies-of-Ministers.aspx 68 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/world/middleeast/surprising-saudi-rises-as-a-prince-among-princes.html?_r=0

SMUNC 2015

28

assassination attempts. He also serves as Minister of the Interior, which means he is in charge of Saudi Arabia’s domestic counterterrorism efforts, as well as matters of immigration.69 Abdullah ibn Muhammad Al ash-Sheikh: Mr. ash-Sheikh is a renowned scholar of Islamic law and jurisprudence. He has both a master’s and a doctorate, and has served on various committees and organizations dealing with Islamic Law. He is the chairman of the Consultative Assembly (see above) and a former Justice Minister.70 Tawfiq Al Rabiah: Mr. Al Rabiah is the Minister of Commerce and Industry. He is charged with making sure that domestic industry within Saudi Arabia develops in a healthy manner. He is also responsible for developing commercial relationships with other countries.71 Waleed bin Mohammad Al Samaani: Mr. Al Samaani is the Minister of Justice and is charged with enforcing Islamic Law in the Kingdom.72 The Kingdom’s interpretation of Sharia has been controversial in the West, with punishments such as public beheadings, floggings, and amputations that many claim violate fundamental human rights. Such punishments often make it difficult for Western leaders to associate themselves with Saudi Arabia.73 Ibrahim Abdulaziz Al-Assaf: Mr. Al-Assaf is the Minister of Finance. He is charged with proposing the Kingdom’s annual budget as well as its enactment.74 An expert in economics, he also sits on the board of directors of the Saudi state-owned oil company.75 Mutaib bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud: Prince Mutaib is the Minister of the National Guard.76 The national guard is not a reserve force--it is an active second military equal in size to the Saudi army and navy.77 It is primarily used as an insurance against military coups and as a way to keep order within the Kingdom. Prince Mutaib has risen quickly within the military ranks and maintains close ties within the American military.78 Adel Al Toraifi: Mr. Al Toraifi is the Minister of Culture and Information. He is also the head of Al Arabiya News, the Saudi state-owned news corporation.79 As minister, he is charged with

69 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/profiles/2015/01/27/Profile-Prince-Mohammed-bin-Naif-bin-Abdulaziz-Al-Saud.html 70 http://www.shura.gov.sa/wps/wcm/connect/ShuraEn/internet/CV/Abdullah+Bin+Mohammed+Bin+Ibrahim+Al-Sheikh 71 https://mci.gov.sa/en/AboutMinistry/MinistryFunctions/Pages/default.aspx 72 http://www.arabnews.com/news/711896 73 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/25/ministry-justice-contract-saudi-arabia-prison 74 https://www.mof.gov.sa/English/MinistryProfile/Pages/ministercv.aspx 75http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=39760978&privcapId=1241120&previousCapId=24963659&previousTitle=Housing%20&%20Development%20Board 76 http://houseofsaud.com/saudi-royal-family-profiles/mutaib-bin-abdullah-bin-abdulaziz-al-saud/ 77 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/sang.htm 78 http://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-national-guard-yemen-campaign-2015-4 79 https://english.alarabiya.net/authors/Adel-al-Toraifi.html

SMUNC 2015

29

controlling media contacts with the outside world and controls all broadcasting within the Kingdom. Along with the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Culture maintains censorship on all published materials.80 Grand Mufti Abdul Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Abdul Rahman ibn Abdullah Al ash-Sheikh: The Grand Mufti is officially the highest-ranking scholar within Saudi Arabia. However, it must be remembered that there is no formal priesthood in Sunni Islam and one is not doctrinally obligated to follow the commands of any single Mufti. The Saudi Grand Mufti has the backing of the Saudi regime and is appointed by the king. He is often used to give the regime religious legitimacy.81 Khalid bin Ali bin Abdullah Al-Humaidan: Mr. Al-Humaidan is the Chief of General Intelligence. As such, he oversees the primary intelligence agency, the General Intelligence Directorate. He is a veteran of Saudi intelligence, and rose to his role by replacing a member of the royal family--an unusual occasion for a non-royal.82 Majid bin Abdullah Al Qasabi: Mr. Al Qasabi is the Minister of Social Affairs. As such, he is charged with social welfare and development, particularly with regards to the poor.83 He is also responsible for preventing social unrest. Bandar bin Mohammad Al Hajjar: Mr. Al Hajjar is the Minister of Hajj. He is in charge of overseeing the pilgrimage and thus wields control over an important component of the government’s revenue and relations with the wider Islamic world. 84 Dr. Mohammed Ibn Ibrahim Al-Suwaiyel: Mr. Al-Suwaiyel is the President of King Abdullaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST), the government institution charged with the development of science and technology. Compared to Iran, Saudi Arabia is rather technologically backwards- especially with regards to nuclear technology. It is Mr. Al-Suwaiyel’s job to rectify this problem.85 Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir: Mr. Al-Jubeir is the Saudi ambassador to the United States. He has studied and worked in the US, and is one of Saudi Arabia’s most influential diplomats. In reality, he is currently the Saudi Foreign Minister, but as he was appointed to this post after the date on which our committee begins, he shall start the committee as ambassador to the United States86. He will handle all formal communications with the US.

80 http://www.saudinf.com/main/c6e.htm 81 http://www.britannica.com/topic/muftiç 82 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/princely-personalities-sidelined-in-saudi-arabia 83 http://www.saudinf.com/main/c6v.htm 84http://www.haj.gov.sa/en-US/Information/AboutMinistry/Sectors%20OfMinistry/Pages/AboutMinistry.aspx 85 http://www.kaust.edu.sa/admin-bios/al-suwalyel.html 86 http://saudiembassy.net/about/AdelAljubeir.aspx

SMUNC 2015

30

Abdul Rahman bin Ibrahim Al Rassi: Mr. Al Rassi is the Saudi ambassador to the Russian Federation.87 The committee starts with Russian-Saudi relations at their normal lack of warmth. The ambassador will handle all formal communications with the Russian government.88

Sami bin Abdullah Saleh: Dr. Saleh is the Saudi Ambassador to Jordan, a country with which Saudi Arabia enjoys cordial relations. He will handle all formal communications between the two governments.89

Thamir Sabhan: Mr. Sabhan is the Saudi ambassador to Iraq, a country which has increasingly come under Iranian influence. An accomplished military officer, he will handle all formal communications between the Saudi and Iraqi governments.90 Motleb bin Abdullah Al-Nafisah: Mr. Nafisah is the minister of state and secretary general of the Supreme Council for Petroleum and Mineral affairs. He, along with Al Naimi, will manage the country’s petroleum affairs. Mohammad bin Abdulmalik Al Shaikh: A member of Saudi Arabia’ preeminent religious family, he is a Saudi Arabian Minister of State and a member of the Economic Development Council, and has a major hand in regulating Saudi Arabia’s stock market. Abdullah Al-Zahrani: Mr. Al-Zahrani is the Saudi ambassador to Pakistan, another key military ally of the Kingdom. He will handle all formal communications between the two governments.91 Musaad bin Mohammed Al Aiban: Mr. Al Aiban is a Saudi Minister of State who sits on both Saudi Arabia’s Council of Political and Security Affairs and its Council of Economic and Development Affairs. A Harvard Graduate, Mr. Al Aiban possesses a broad range of influence on the Iranian committee. He has served as a Saudi representative at several foreign events- such as the inauguration of President Rouhani of Iran in 2014. Mohammed Saeed Al-Jaber: Mr. Al-Jaber is the Saudi ambassador to Yemen, a country that the Kingdom views as vital to its national security. He will handle all formal communication with the government in exile.92

87http://www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/ServicesAndInformation/news/MinistryNews/Pages/ArticleID2015810141327909.aspx 88 http://www.businessinsider.com/here-comes-the-saudi-russian-alliance-2015-6 89http://www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/ServicesAndInformation/news/MinistryNews/Pages/ArticleID2014116113414864.aspx 90 http://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/saudi-arabia-appoints-thamer-sabhan-ambassador-iraq/ 91 https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Abdullah+Al-Zahrani 92 http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/725756

SMUNC 2015

31

Ahmed Kattan: Mr. Kattan is the Saudi ambassador to Egypt, one of the Kingdom’s most important military allies. He will handle all formal relations between the two countries’ governments.93 Dr. Adel bin Siraj Mirdad: Mr. Mirdad is the Saudi Ambassador to Turkey, a country with which the Kingdom is beginning to experience improved relations. He will handle all formal communications between the two governments.94 Ali Asiri: Mr. Asiri is the Saudi ambassador to Lebanon, a country with which the Kingdom has close relations. He will handle all formal communications between the two governments.95 Khalid bin Abdullah Al Arj: Mr. Al Arj is the Minister of the Civil Service. As such, he is a man of important influence, for he is in charge of every government bureaucrat.96

93 http://www.timesofisrael.com/saudi-ambassador-returns-to-egypt/ 94 http://www.ankarascene.com/mobil/haber.php?id=5066 95 http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/saudi-today/2015/05/03/ 96 http://www.saudinf.com/main/c6b.htm