MIDDLE EASTCONTEMPORARY SURVEY

Volume XXIII1999

BRUCE MADDY-WEITZMANEditor

The Moshe Dayan Centerfor Middle Eastern and African Studies

The Shiloah InstituteTel Aviv University

Jordan(Al-Mamlaka al-Urdunniyya al-Hashimiyya)

ASHER SUSSER

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The year 1999 marked the end of an era in Jordanian history. On 7 February, KingHusayn, who had been at the helm for almost forty-six years, since May 1953, finallysuccumbed to cancer at the age of sixty-three. In the early years of his reign, few believedhis regime would last. His death from illness rather than assassination, revolution orcivil war would have surprised most analysts and pundits of the 1950s. They wereconvinced that Husayn’s days were numbered and that he and his kingdom were destinedto be swept away by the forces of Arab radicalism led by Egypt’s President Jamal ‘Abdal-Nasir.1

Husayn was an extraordinary practitioner of the craft of politics and the art ofdiplomacy. His great talent was in the charting of Jordan’s course in a regional contextdetermined by more powerful players, who invariably set the agenda and the political,ideological and economic contours of the arena in which Jordan had to operate. Husaynmade the most of Jordan’s geopolitical centrality in the Middle East to forge alternatingalliances with regional actors, while consistently seeking to secure the support of a greatpower. He was also prepared, if need be, to use force against his domestic opponents.

When Husayn ascended the throne he had just turned eighteen, by the Muslim calendar,while according to the Gregorian count he was barely seventeen and a half. Amazingly,within the space of a few years, he had truly grasped the reins of power, not only intheory but in practice as well. He took the lead, undaunted even when there were thosearound him, in his earlier years on the throne, who were tempted to throw in the toweland to give in to the relentless and seemingly overpowering Nasirist onslaught. Husaynstood his ground, and won, defying the assessments that had predicted his imminentdemise time and time again, maturing in the process from a much-ridiculed boy kinginto one of the most respected senior Arab statesmen.

During his long reign Jordan was transformed into an institutionalized modern state.The country developed an efficient military and security establishment, a large (perhapstoo large) and functioning bureaucracy and a massive education system with a diversenetwork of universities and colleges. All these were “held together and given patrioticsubstance”2 by the monarch, both state-builder and stabilizer.

The stunning removal of Hasan as crown prince, in favor of Husayn’s eldest son,‘Abdallah, just days before the king’s death could have had an unsettling effect. The factthat it did not was due in part to Hasan’s own dignified and outwardly restrainedacceptance of his brother’s rather brutal decision. The succession success was, however,also a function of more profound structural and strategic factors, such as the continuedcohesion of the East Bank political élite, the loyalty of the security establishment andthe support of external powers for Jordanian stability, as an essential component of apeaceful regional order. The extraordinary turnout of world leaders for Husayn’s funeral

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was not only an act of respect for a much admired leader, but also a gesture of internationalsupport for a smooth transition in the geopolitically central kingdom.

After Husayn, Jordan was in transition in more ways than one, and not only becauseof the accession to power of a new untested monarch. Jordan had entered a period ofprolonged difficulty at least a decade earlier, with the onset of economic stagnation andrecession. The kingdom’s economic woes were taking a heavy social toll and were totop the new king’s list of priorities. Peace with Israel had not produced the expecteddividends and opposition to the treaty was on the rise. Continued economic hardshipand mounting domestic opposition did not allow for more than a closely controlledprocess of liberalization, that did not really open up the political system.

In foreign affairs, matters were not much easier, particularly since some of the issuesat stake had potentially destabilizing domestic ramifications. Balancing between theeconomic need for closer ties with Iraq and the kingdom’s strategic reliance on the USwas not an easy task. It was made all the more difficult by the fact that Saddam remainedvery popular in Jordan and any thought of Jordan cooperating with the US to unseat theIraqi ruler could have been expected to arouse fierce domestic opposition.

The linkage between foreign and domestic affairs was especially apparent in mattersrelated to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating track where Israeli-Palestinian tensions andviolence always harbored the danger of spilling over into Jordan. Moreover, the gradualprogression of the Palestinian Authority (PA) toward statehood exacerbated anxietiesand friction between Jordanians and Palestinians in Jordan itself, as Jordanians questionedthe future status of their Palestinian compatriots in the kingdom. Moving into the post-Husayn era, the new monarch faced a tall order of potentially troublesome issues thatrequired a great deal of courage, political and diplomatic skill and finesse, and goodfortune. Husayn had an unusually bountiful share of all four. Whether ‘Abdallah II hadthe same qualities and the capacity to face up to the old guard, if necessary, remained tobe seen.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

THE SUCCESSIONThe Ouster of Prince HasanThroughout the latter part of 1998 there were persistent rumors of an imminent changein the order of succession as Husayn underwent treatment for cancer in the US (seeMECS 1998, pp. 365-66). Despite repeated denials, the speculation continued unabateduntil Husayn’s return to the kingdom on 19 January 1999. Although the official versionclaimed that Husayn’s treatment had been successful and that he had “fully recovered,”3

he himself probably knew better — that he did not have much time to live. No soonerhad he set foot in the kingdom than he set about urgent preparations for the succession.The first order of business was the stunning removal of his brother Hasan as the crownprince and Husayn’s designated heir, a position he had held, without any serious question,for almost thirty-four years, since April 1965, shortly after the celebration of his eighteenthbirthday. The original plan had been for Hasan to succeed Husayn and for Hasan then toappoint Prince Hamza (b. 29 March 1980), Husayn’s eldest son from his marriage toQueen Nur, as crown prince, while ‘Abdallah would head the armed forces.4

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The Paris-based Arabic weekly, al-Watan al-‘Arabi of 8 January, published an articleon what is now known as the “problem of succession” (mushkilat al-khilafa), accordingto which it was more than just the question of who would become crown prince afterHasan became king. The question now was whether Hasan would, in fact, succeedHusayn. According to this report, officials in the US administration had met with Husaynin late December 1998 and informed him of their dissatisfaction with Hasan’s performancein Husayn’s absence and their doubts about him as a worthy successor. They said he wastoo intellectual and detached and did not capture the hearts and minds of the people atlarge, nor could he guarantee the loyalty of the all important Bedouin tribes. Moreover,the large Palestinian population was said to harbor grievances against him for positionshe had held in the past, presumably a reference to his reputedly adamant anti-Palestinianstance in the 1970 civil war. Prince Hamza was a better bet, they told Husayn, and hecould still benefit from the king’s coaching for a while to come. Husayn, according tothis report, told the Americans that he could not accept their interference in what was apurely Jordanian affair. Hasan was the “apple of [his] eye” (qurrat ‘ayni) and he had fullconfidence in him. Any change would only come about if Hasan chose so himself.5

Whether there had really been such an American approach or whether the report hadactually been inspired by one of Husayn’s confidants, to prepare the ground for whatwas to come, is a matter of conjecture. Husayn specifically denied this story as “baselessspeculation,” noting that it was inconceivable for him to discuss such matters withforeigners. The denial, however, did not include any endorsement of Hasan.6 As forwhat the Americans really knew in advance, according to a reliable American source,“the Amman CIA station was reporting right up to the change that Hasan would be thenext king.”7

On 8 January, Hasan met with Husayn in London where the king was convalescing onhis way back home from the US. In their first meeting for six months, the two brothershad an emotional reunion and a most cordial exchange, leaving Hasan quite reassured,with little if any inkling at all of what was really about to happen to him. In a speech tothe nation from London, broadcast on 16 January, Husayn praised Hasan for his role asregent but also noted that he was planning sweeping reforms upon his return.8 Seniorpolitical sources said the king was going to take crucial decisions concerning thesuccession,9 while Hasan, still amazingly in the dark, explained that the king had inmind major decisions regarding “land, water, energy and agriculture.”10

On arrival in Amman, Husayn did not refer to Hasan as his crown prince, but only asthe regent. As opposed to a similar occasion, when Husayn returned from his previoustreatment for cancer in 1992 (see MECS 1992, pp. 535-38) Hasan did not join the kingin his car, as he drove through the streets of Amman from the airport to the palace.11 Inthemselves these did not necessarily represent deliberate and final intent. But just a dayafter his arrival in Jordan, on 20 January, in an interview to CNN, Husayn was askedwhether there was going to be a change in the succession. The answer he offered was soconvoluted that the interviewer had to follow up with a question of whether he meant “ayes or a no?” He refused to commit himself.12 The fact that no customary denial wasmade and that no reassurance was given to Hasan was the first public indication fromthe king that he was considering Hasan’s replacement.

There were various explanations for Husayn’s drastic action. The most neutral andstraightforward was that his struggle with potentially fatal illness had “naturally rekindleda wish to seek posterity through passing the succession to one of his sons.”13 Husayn

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himself said that the problem of the succession arose initially over the question of whowas to succeed Hasan, and not over Hasan himself.14 Another was that Hasan was justnot cut out for the job. Throughout Jordan there was “recognition that the Oxford-educatedprince, a man short in charisma but long in verbosity, lack[ed] the agility of his brother.He [was] a respected thinker, committed to peace with Israel. But in times of crisis hefail[ed] to inspire his countrymen.”15 Husayn may have shared this appraisal for a longtime, but true to character, waited until the eleventh hour before actually making themomentous decision.

Husayn had told one of his visitors during his treatment in the US that he was unhappywith the way affairs of state were being conducted in his absence.16 Reliable sourcesreported that Hasan had been too involved in the daily running of affairs instead ofleaving them to the prime minister, as was the normal practice. Husayn was also said tohave been deeply aggravated by Hasan’s control of the media (his son-in-law, NasirJawda, was the minister of information), which was used to prepare for his imminentsuccession as if Husayn were not going to recover.17 On 25 January, in a rambling,humiliating and, at times, almost incomprehensible letter to Hasan, he tried to explainthe rationale behind his decision. Hasan’s appointment as crown prince in 1965, Husaynnoted, was due to the uncertain circumstances at the time, when Jordan was threatenedby subversion and the king’s eldest son was still an infant. These circumstances nolonger prevailed. He reprimanded Hasan for consistently rejecting his suggestion thatthe brothers agree in advance on the identity of Hasan’s successor, that is, one of Husayn’ssons, rather than Hasan’s own (cf. MECS 1998, pp. 365-66). Moreover, Husayncomplained, his wife Queen Nur was not spared backbiting and slander, as the tensionover the succession mounted.

Hasan was also scolded for his intention to sack the head of the joint chiefs of staff,Field Marshal ‘Abd al-Hafiz Mar‘i al-Ka‘abina, ostensibly on grounds of corruption(charges based on the unknown source of funds for an ostentatious villa Ka‘abina wasbuilding for himself). He was short-circuited at the time by Husayn, who then explainedangrily that it was none other than he himself who had given money to Ka‘abina as atoken of appreciation for loyal service. In other words, if that was corruption, then Hasanwas indirectly accusing Husayn of the same.18 Hasan had done his level best to fill hisbrother’s shoes in his absence and to prove that he was a capable successor to a kingwhose life expectancy was obviously not very long. Husayn apparently misconstruedhis brother’s independent decisions as presumptuous and even subversive haste to replacehim.

Despite all the rumor of an impending change in the succession, the Jordanian publicand, above all, Hasan himself were stunned by Husayn’s decision.19 Jordanians, asopposed to many of their Arab neighbors, could rest assured for many years in theircertainty as to who was next in line. This assurance was upset overnight. Certain unnamedforeign officials said that Hasan, despite his lack of charisma, was best equipped to runJordan, thanks to his passion for detail and management. Others shared this appraisal.Hasan’s ouster outraged some in the Jordanian élite, who thought that a man with greatexperience in both domestic and foreign affairs was being replaced with a far less suitable,unknown quantity. According to one such source, Jordan had lost Hasan, the onlyHashemite with experience, knowledge and maturity, who was replaced with “a zero asfar as most people are concerned. Prince ‘Abdallah might be a nice guy, but he [had] noexperience, no education, no seriousness.”20 The initial shock, however, wore off quickly.

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Husayn’s judgment was accepted by Hasan himself with majestic dignity, making it somuch easier for the general public to do likewise.

It was not immediately apparent who was to replace Hasan. While press reports spokeof Prince Hamza as Husayn’s favorite, the constitution determined the successor as oneof two, the king’s eldest son or one of the king’s brothers. Hamza was neither. Husayn’seldest son was Prince ‘Abdallah (b. 30 January 1962), from his marriage to his secondwife, Princess Muna. (He and his first wife, Queen Dina, had one daughter.) Husayn,therefore, had either to amend the constitution or appoint ‘Abdallah as crown prince.Prior to the king’s return to Jordan it was reported that Husayn intended to amend theconstitution.21 He was said to have examined this possibility with legal expertsimmediately after his arrival in Amman. But his condition left no time for such aprocedure, which would have required parliamentary approval as well. Moreover,meddling with the constitution in a sensitive time of transition could provide unnecessaryencouragement to the opposition to raise demands for other amendments less favorableto the monarchy.22 If this version is correct, ‘Abdallah would seem to have been appointedby default.

According to ‘Abdallah, Husayn had been talking about reverting the line of successionto his own descendants as far back as 1992, when the king suffered his first bout ofcancer. ‘Abdallah had not, however, anticipated being named himself and his appointment“took [him] slightly by surprise.” He only learnt of his father’s decision shortly beforethe public announcement.23 ‘Abdallah subsequently gave a slightly different account. InOctober 1998, Husayn had told him to prepare himself to play an important role. WhenHusayn returned to Amman from London in January, he informed ‘Abdallah of theseverity of his illness and asked him to “assume the mission.”24 According to yet anotherversion, it was in fact ‘Abdallah himself who had initiated the change, taking a secretflight to Husayn to urge him to leave his sickbed and return to remove Hasan, who wasreadying himself to take over from the dying king.25

It is also quite possible that Husayn, realizing that his time was very short, preferred‘Abdallah, the more mature thirty-seven year old career officer with the rank of major-general, to the barely nineteen year old Hamza. The young prince would not have beenable to benefit from an extended period of coaching by his father, as Husayn may haveinitially intended.

‘Abdallah had some other important assets, above all his popularity in the army, wherehe headed the élite Special Forces Command. He was also said to have his father’scommon touch and generally to be “a chip of the old block.”26 He was married to aPalestinian, Rania Yasin, who was born in Kuwait (31 August 1970) to a family from theWest Bank town of Tulkarm. This was a factor that could be helpful in achievingpopularity with the kingdom’s large Palestinian citizenry, but by the same token unhelpfulwith those East Bankers always over-sensitive about Palestinian influence in the country.‘Abdallah received almost all of his education in Britain and the US, an asset in manyrespects, but a liability in that his command of classical Arabic was not up to theexceptionally high standards normally set by the senior members of the family.

On 20 January, ‘Abdallah replaced Hasan in a meeting with the crown princes ofBahrain and Dubai in what was seen as a signal that it was he who was to be namedcrown prince in Hasan’s stead.27 In a royal decree dated 24 January and made public aday later, he was formally appointed crown prince.28

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The Death of HusaynThe dramatic change in the line of succession had hardly been completed when, on 26January, Husayn was flown back to the US for urgent treatment. Originally he had beenexpected to return for a check-up only in March, but a relapse of his lymphatic cancerand a sharp deterioration in his condition forced an alteration of schedule. (An alternativeexplanation was that Husayn knew all along that his chances for recovery were dismaland he returned to Jordan only to settle the succession issue). The hectic pace of eventswas unnerving. “Jordan [was] in shock”29 and the people were in desperate need ofreassurance as they braced themselves for what was clearly the rapidly approaching endof the Husayn era. Prime Minister Fayiz al-Tarawina reassured his people that Jordanwas not the artificial entity some “narrow-minded people” said it was, but rather a countrywith a mission of Arabism, construction and awakening.30 The media followed suit,exhorting the people to stand firm behind their “wise leadership.”31

Back in the US, Husayn underwent further chemotherapy and another marrowtransplant, but to no avail. On 4 February, suffering from organ failure, he was flownback to Jordan to “die in the homeland.” He was hospitalized in Amman, sustained onlyby life support systems. Husayn died at 11:43 a.m. on 7 February and was laid to rest onthe day after in a state funeral attended by “a dazzling roster”32 of presidents and primeministers, kings and princes from seventy-five countries, one of the largest gatheringsof foreign dignitaries ever seen anywhere. He was buried in the royal cemetery in thegrounds of Raghdan Palace, the final resting place of the Hashemite kings. The era ofHusayn that began in May 1953 had come to its close.

The Accession of ‘Abdallah IIBefore Husayn left for his final round of treatment on 26 January, ‘Abdallah was appointedregent by the king. On 6 February, as Husayn lay incapacitated on his deathbed, thecabinet transferred all the king’s authority to ‘Abdallah. On 7 February, just hours afterthe king’s death, ‘Abdallah took his oath of allegiance as king before a special session ofboth houses of parliament convened for that purpose. Hamza was designated crownprince, thus securing the line of succession as Husayn had initially intended.

Hasan congratulated ‘Abdallah on his accession to the throne, extending his best wishesas a “compassionate uncle and father.”33 That gesture, however, did not forestall Hasan’ssystematic political exclusion. Within days after ‘Abdallah’s rise to power, any hopesthat Hasan may have entertained to fulfill a meaningful political role alongside the newmonarch were dashed. On 21 February ‘Abdallah sent a letter to his uncle to thank himfor his “distinguished and fruitful efforts and services.” ‘Abdallah asked Hasan to continueto head the Higher Council of Science and Technology, the umbrella body for a varietyof research centers, foundations and educational institutions.34 Ostensibly a gesture ofgoodwill, it was actually a banishment from any center of political influence.

At the same time, dozens of senior officers were retired from the armed forces. Themove was primarily designed to promote a younger generation of officers, who were‘Abdallah’s peers and would henceforth owe their positions to him personally. It waspresumably also intended to remove officers who were reputed to be close to Hasan,such as Tahsin Shurdum, a former military adviser to the former crown prince, and oneof the four deputies to the chair of the joint chiefs of staff who were abruptly removed.35

More shake-ups in the military came in July. Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ka‘abina

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was replaced by Lt. Gen. Muhammad Yusuf Malkawi and eighteen other senior officerswere retired. “Now, he [had] generals who [were] on his wavelength.”36

On 21 March, ‘Abdallah bestowed the title of queen on his wife Rania. The formalcoronation ceremony of ‘Abdallah and Rania as king and queen was held on 9 June,thus combining the coronation with the longstanding national holiday, on 10 June, markingArmy Day and the launching of the Great Arab Revolt by the Hashemites against OttomanTurkish rule in 1916. King and country were one. ‘Abdallah’s mother, Princess Muna,out of the limelight for decades, was present at the ceremony, as was the deposed PrinceHasan. But, interestingly enough, Queen Nur and her son Crown Prince Hamza werenot, as both were abroad, Hamza at Sandhurst and Nur in the US. There was obviouslyno effort, on either side, to have them share the festivity of this special event.

‘Abdallah clearly tried to make his own mark. His first months at the helm werehyperactive, crisscrossing the globe with official visits throughout the Arab world, tothe US, Europe and the Far East to meet and familiarize himself with the world’s leaders.He sought to give the impression of being very much in control with a hands-on approach,which had a style of its own. In terms of image, ‘Abdallah had a problem that requiredattention. His youthful appearance and his faulty classical Arabic were handicaps, whichdid not make the filling of Husayn’s shoes any easier. As a result, the palace was said tobe eager to give his image a boost. ‘Abdallah grew a trim beard which made him lookolder and imparted “a certain gravitas.”37

He also experimented with a “dynamic way of ensuring political accountability.”38 Atthe end of July, after a spate of surprise inspection visits to government institutions andpublic services, ‘Abdallah made the first of his undercover inspections, which weresubsequently given much publicity. Dressed up as an elderly man accompanying a TVcrew, the king toured the Zarqa free trade zone, notorious for its bureaucratic ineptitude.39

A few days later, again under cover, he took a ride in a local taxi to check on the policein the streets and to listen to the public. ‘Abdallah’s “clandestine forays” were popularand were said to have served his image-building well.40

It transpired very quickly that ‘Abdallah was setting a political agenda of his own. Hewas determined to draw a distinctive dividing line between his reign and that of Husayn,and to indicate that he did not simply intend “to walk in his father’s shadow.”41 In shoringup his position at home, the new king focused on domestic affairs and the economy inparticular, coupled with a move away from the Israeli orbit toward the Arab hinterland.These were both facets that corresponded with popular sentiment and demonstrated ashift in emphasis away from Husayn’s constant preoccupation with regional, Arab-Israeliand international affairs at the expense of the tedious routine of domestic socioeconomicmatters.

In December, ‘Abdallah established a 20-member Economic Consultative Councilwhose main task was to monitor the implementation of vital socioeconomic, educationaland administrative reforms needed to take Jordan into the twenty-first century. Most ofthe members on the council were private sector representatives, who were young Western-educated professionals. ‘Abdallah was said to be determined to go all the way in preparingJordan for “revolutionary change.” Eight of the council members were of Palestinianorigin, a clear indication of ‘Abdallah’s intention to increase the representation ofPalestinians in positions of influence. This gradual shake-up of the status quo, notsurprisingly, aroused the concern of the East Bank old guard.42

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THE RAWABDA GOVERNMENTAfter ‘Abdallah’s accession to the throne, there were frequent reports of liberals andmembers of the younger generation who harbored expectations that the youthful Western-educated king would allow for a greater measure of political openness and liberalization.However, the appointment of a new government on 4 March suggested the continueddominance of the old guard. The government of Fayiz al-Tarawina was replaced by oneheaded by ‘Abd al-Ra’uf al-Rawabda, a sixty-year-old former deputy premier, ministerand former mayor of Amman, and a veteran member of parliament. A conservative, hewas hardly a representative of youthful change.43 A Beirut-educated pharmacist bytraining, Rawabda was an experienced politician and administrator. He had anencyclopedic knowledge of constitutional law and was a forceful and occasionally causticdebater, who intimidated potential opponents. He was not expected to curry favor withthe opposition, even though two Islamists from the professional associations wereincluded in the cabinet (Husni Abu Ghayda and Ishaq Maraka, both of whom were alsoPalestinians).

Rawabda’s brief, as set out in his letter of designation, was to focus primarily ondomestic affairs with special reference to the kingdom’s ailing economy,44 not much ofa novel approach. Eight ministers in the new cabinet had served in the outgoing team(see table, p. 364) and some other ministers were old hands who had served in previousgovernments. At the same time the king appointed former premier ‘Abd al-Karim Kabaritias chief of the royal court instead of Jawad al-‘Anani. Kabariti had considerableexperience in foreign affairs and a more liberal predisposition than Rawabda.43

Kabariti was, therefore, a logical complement to the new premier but also a naturalrival. No sooner had they settled into their new offices than reports of competition andtension between these two powerful personalities began to appear. The fact that suchpower struggles took place at all was a reflection of the prevalent sense in the élite thatthe new young king had yet to fill the space of his father at the top of the power pyramid.Men of influence were, therefore, jockeying for power in his vicinity. There was a lot atstake. Kabariti was said to favor more rapid change in liberalizing the economy, fightingcorruption and allowing a greater measure of Palestinian representation in positions ofinfluence. Rawabda, on the other hand, represented the old guard of the East Bankerélite, who feared that such reform would encroach upon their longstanding politicalprivilege. By the end of the year Kabariti was on his way out, frustrated and stymied byRawabda.46

The conservative image of the new regime was further reinforced by the other “king’smen” who were said to be most influential in ‘Abdallah’s court, reportedly in accordancewith Husayn’s advice imparted to his son before his death. The group most commonlyreferred to was composed of six: “al-‘Abdayn wal-Zaydayn wal-fariqayn” (the two‘Abds, the two Zayds and the two generals). The two ‘Abds were Kabariti and Rawabda(occasionally a third ‘Abd was included, ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Majali, the speaker of theChamber of Deputies, a scion of the all-powerful southern clan from Karak). The twoZayds were Prince Zayd bin Shakir, a senior member of the Hashemite family and aformer chief of staff and prime minister, and Zayd al-Rifa‘i, the eminence grise ofJordanian politics, a close friend of Husayn’s since childhood and former prime ministerwho was the speaker of the Senate. The two generals were Samih al-Batikhi, director ofGeneral Intelligence and ‘Abd al-Hafiz al-Ka‘abina, chair of the joint chiefs of staff.47

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Of the six, the two most influential were Batikhi and Kabariti, both of whom had axes togrind with Prince Hasan, thus ensuring his political isolation. Batikhi was very close toHusayn throughout his terminal illness, reported to him constantly, and reputedlyinfluenced his decision to depose Hasan. Kabariti had a major falling out with Hasanwhen he was prime minister in 1997 and lost his job as a result (see MECS 1997, p. 457).In November, ‘Abdallah appointed Batikhi as his personal adviser in addition to his postas director of General Intelligence, a move which elevated the general into being the keyman behind the throne, all the more so since Kabariti by then was at the end of his tether.

The only ray of reformative light in the new administration was the appointment on10 March of ‘Adnan Abu ‘Awda as political adviser to the king. Abu ‘Awda was alongstanding loyal Palestinian stalwart of the regime, and an intellectual with originalideas on the restructuring of Jordanian-Palestinian relations in the kingdom.48

On 3 April, Rawabda presented his policy statement to the Chamber of Deputies.Making what was described as a “rare public acknowledgment that the country [had]indeed fallen into an economic recession,” the prime minister undertook to acceleratethe implementation of free market reforms agreed upon with the IMF and to set theeconomy on a path of growth. On other domestic issues, he paid the usual lip service tothe fight against corruption, the strengthening of democracy and the safeguarding ofpublic freedoms. But he did commit his government to the continuation of dialoguewith the opposition parties and the professional associations (for the beginnings of thisdialogue see MECS 1998, pp. 376-77).49 As one observer noted, there was little in thestatement that had not been declared by previous governments for decades, with onlyfew of these “noble goals” actually ever achieved.50

The debate in parliament on the statement was the usually long-winded, but in thiscase, rather low-key two-day affair, which eventually produced an overwhelming voteof confidence in the new government on 8 April, by 66 to 12 with 2 abstentions. Thiswas the strongest vote of confidence ever for a Jordanian government.51 In an era ofsensitive transition, the establishment seemed to be doubly cautious so as not to rock theboat.

The first change in the cabinet came with the resignation on 3 July of the minister ofyouth and sports, Muhammad Khayr Mamsar. In preparation for the Pan-Arab Gamesthat were to be held in Amman in August, Mamsar had apparently angered the primeminister by getting involved in an attempt to mediate between Kuwait and Iraq to ensureKuwaiti participation in the games.52 Mamsar, a Circassian, was replaced by anothermember of his community, Sa‘id Shuqum, at the end of August. Another Palestinian,Muhammad Wahsh, was added to the cabinet as minister of social development. Hereplaced Faysal Rufu‘ who was now to head the Ministry of Culture. Ayman al-Majali,the deputy prime minister, assumed a second portfolio as minister of information,replacing Nasir al-Lawzi who became minister of transport. Lawzi himself resigned inDecember.

By year’s end, Rawabda’s government was facing increasing criticism from the Islamistand left-wing opposition for its deportation of the Hamas leadership. Critics came fromwithin the establishment as well, from the likes of the National Constitutional Party(NCP), headed by the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Majali. TheNCP issued a communiqué in December, criticizing the government’s confusion andbad management. The king, however, reaffirmed his confidence in Rawabda.53

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PARLIAMENT, PARTIES AND THE PRESSParliamentary ActivityThe ordinary session of parliament ended on 15 April, shortly after the vote of confidencein Rawabda’s government. Parliament reconvened for a brief extraordinary session inJune, after a petition had been duly served to the government by a majority of the deputies.The real drive for the extraordinary session was to discuss the controversial electionlaw. That objective, however, was defeated from the outset by the king who set theagenda for extraordinary sessions. Though the king did include the similarly controversialPress and Publications Law (see MECS 1998, pp. 369-70), it was not discussed and thesession devoted its energies primarily to the politically innocuous business of economiclegislation.54 On 20 June, scores of deputies boycotted the session of the Chamber ofDeputies that was to approve an unpopular sales tax hike from 10% to 13%. On the nextday, however, the chamber dutifully approved the increase, as did the Senate a few dayslater.

King ‘Abdallah convened yet another extraordinary session in mid-August. Like itspredecessor the session was called primarily to speed up the process of economiclegislation required for the country’s economic reform, but once again the Press andPublications Law was on the agenda. A second extraordinary session was unusual andwas therefore seen as a sign of the new king’s more liberal predisposition and hisindication to the government and parliament of the need to combine economic reformwith more political change than they themselves were willing to consider.55 During thissession, parliament did finally approve the amendments to the repressive Press andPublications Law (see below).

The next ordinary session opened on 1 November with the customary speech from thethrone, delivered for the first time by King ‘Abdallah II. ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Majali wasreelected speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, after defeating one of his kin, Amjad al-Majali, by 50 votes to 26. Generally speaking, the public image of parliament was hardlypositive. The media repeatedly castigated the Chamber for failing to do its homework inmonitoring the government. When it came to legislation, deputies invariably tended toendorse whatever came from the government and their rhetoric was rarely translatedinto action.56

As for the political parties, none except the Islamic Action Front (IAF) was reallyworthy of the name. Toward the end of the year, two new centrist parties, Al-Ajyal(Generations) and Al-Fajr al-Jadid al-‘Arabi al-Urdunni (The New Arab Jordanian Dawn),were established, adding to the plethora of inconsequential organizations. As one localobserver put it, of the more than twenty political parties with which Jordan entered theyear 2000, “most [were] clinically dead.”57

Civil LibertiesElectoral Reform‘Abdallah made regular declarations about his desire to liberalize the political systemand to give the people a greater sense of participation in the sharing of responsibility.58

The national dialogue set in motion by Husayn in 1998 and continued by Crown PrinceHasan and the Tarawina government (see MECS 1998, pp. 376-77) was resumed after‘Abdallah’s accession to the throne. The key issues on the agenda were the demands ofthe opposition, led by the Islamists, to amend the controversial election and press laws;

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to cease harassment of the opposition by the security authorities; and to reduce IMFcontrol of Jordan’s economic recovery. Moreover, they suggested, Jordan ought to pursuea foreign policy more congruent with the country’s national and cultural identity.59 Inother words, to shift the kingdom’s orientation away from Israel and the US toward theArab hinterland, especially Iraq.

‘Abdallah had hardly settled into his new position when approaches were made by theopposition, clearly emboldened by the transition, pressing for political and constitutionalreforms that would reduce the role of the monarchy in the system.60 On 18 March, theking met with the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. During the meeting, ‘Abdallahordered the release of sixteen Brotherhood members who were being held on securitycharges. A few days later, in a more sweeping, albeit largely symbolic gesture of goodwillto the opposition, the king approved a general amnesty, enabling a number of Islamists,from the Islamic Liberation Party (ILP) and other illegal organizations, imprisoned forpolitical or security offences, to be released.61 However, when it came to substance,there was little correlation between the lofty pronouncements on democratization by theking and his prime minister, and the actions of the Rawabda government.

In late March, the prime minister held further meetings with the opposition parties,the professional associations and the trade unions; in April ‘Abdallah also met with thepresidents of the professional associations. Despite the repeated reassurances of theMuslim Brotherhood and the IAF of their loyalty to king and country and their role asthe “cornerstone to stability in Jordan,”62 their deliberations with the regime producedno change in the election law. The Islamist-led opposition continued to reject the “oneperson, one vote” system (see MECS 1993, pp. 462-65) and Rawabda agreed “inprinciple” that the law ought to be amended. The opposition made various proposals tochange the system, one of which was to establish eighty electoral districts with onerepresentative each, while another forty party representatives would be elected nationwideaccording to a proportional system.63 The IAF threatened to boycott the next generalelections scheduled for 2001, just as it had done in 1997, unless the law was changed.64

Democratization and the Freedom of ExpressionAs for the Press and Publications Law, it was finally amended by parliament in Septemberafter lengthy deliberations between the government and the Jordan Press Association(JPA), the journalists’ syndicate. The notoriously restrictive Article 37 of the law, whichlisted fourteen subjects that the press was not allowed to cover, was abolished, journalistscould no longer be required by the courts to reveal their sources, and the capitalrequirements for new dailies and weeklies were considerably reduced. The amendment,however, still left a lot to be desired. The government continued to own large shares ofthe major daily newspapers (62% in al-Ra’y and 31% in al-Dustur) and journalists werestill required to belong to the JPA. The JPA ensured tight government control over themedia, as journalists from state-controlled or state-owned media dominated theassociation. Moreover, the penal code still included some of the same restrictions thathad been excised from the Press Law with even harsher penalties.65

Generally speaking, the Rawabda government’s record in the field of civil libertieswas not very impressive. Setting forth a liberal vision, King ‘Abdallah assured journaliststhat “the sky [was] the limit for press freedoms in the kingdom.” As always, however,this outward liberalism was tempered by expectations that journalists should “place thenational interest above all other considerations.” ‘Abdallah resorted to the language of

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his father and the old guard when he repeatedly urged journalists to exercise “responsiblefreedom.”66 Rawabda strongly criticized the over-controlled nature of the state-run radioand television, and the government allowed the Doha-based al-Jazira satellite station toresume operations in Amman in March. It had been shut down by the Tarawinagovernment in November 1998 for airing an anti-Jordanian program.67 In practice,however, little, if anything of substance actually changed for the better.

The most instructive case of governmental constraints on the freedom of the presswas the protracted skirmish between the Rawabda government and the privately owneddaily, al-‘Arab al-Yawm, because of what the paper believed to be its independent andcritical stance. When the paper, under financial duress, dismissed some of its staff(including four journalists) in April, the JPA, encouraged by the government, organizedprotests against the measure.68 In June-July the government launched what appeared tobe an orchestrated campaign against the paper. One of its senior journalists was brieflydetained by General Intelligence; another of its writers was beaten up by unidentifiedassailants; government-controlled dailies published articles implicitly condemning thejournalistic practices of al-‘Arab al-Yawm; and the Jordan News Agency, Petra, deniedthe paper its services until it “raised [its] ethical standards.” The evening paper, al-Masa’iyya, owned by the same group as al-‘Arab al-Yawm, faced similar treatment. Thehead of its editorial department was arrested in late July. He was released on the king’sorders in mid-August and shortly thereafter Petra resumed its services to al-‘Arab al-Yawm, also on the king’s personal instructions.69

That, however, was not the end of the saga. In mid-September the chairperson of thepaper’s board, Riyad Hurub, was detained for a few days on charges of corruption,based on a complaint by one of the shareholders. Whether this was related to the paper’sindebtedness and real financial straits or to its political clash with the government wasnot entirely clear. But just a fortnight later, at the end of September, the paper’s editor-in-chief, ‘Azzam Yunis, was arrested following the publication of a number of articlesby Shaykh ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Abu Zant, an outspoken Islamist preacher, condemning thegovernment’s actions against the Palestinian Hamas (see below). Abu Zant was alsodetained for his critical writing and for having violated the law on preaching bydenouncing the government in sermons, defying a ban in force since 1994 when heattacked the regime for signing the peace treaty with Israel. At the end of November, thetwo men were brought to trial on charges of having slandered the prime minister. Inearly December, the paper’s publishing house had its assets frozen by a court orderbecause of a debt to the Social Security Corporation. This was an extraordinary measure,considering the fact that other institutions that owed more were not penalized in thisfashion.70

Another conspicuous instance of government curtailment of civil liberties was theresignation of Mustafa Hamarna, director of the Center for Strategic Studies at theUniversity of Jordan. Hamarna was forced to resign from his position in July, presumablybecause of the government’s displeasure with research and polling conducted by thecenter that related to such sensitive issues as Jordanian-Palestinian relations, the level ofdemocratization, or the government’s popularity.71

The enfant terrible of Jordanian politics, the maverick Islamist Layth Shubaylat, didnot hold the new regime in high regard. In a series of interviews to the foreign Arabicpress in March, Shubaylat continued his longstanding crusade for the establishment of atruly constitutional monarchy. He argued that the country was in need of “radical

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constitutional reform” and he blamed Husayn for having left a vacuum by failing tofoster in his lifetime a regime of constitutionally functioning institutions for his successors.Husayn’s appointment of the unprepared and untrained ‘Abdallah, who did not evenhave a respectable command of the Arabic language, only made matters worse, accordingto Shubaylat. Shortly after the appointment of the Rawabda government, securitysurveillance of Shubaylat’s movements was lifted, but he was subsequently barred bystate-controlled Jordanian Television from appearing in its studios even for programsproduced for foreign channels.72

Fairer observers than Shubaylat concurred that the process of democratization thatthe country had undergone since 1989 was seriously flawed. Political practitioners andacademics alike expressed deep dissatisfaction with the results. Former prime ministerTahir al-Masri, who was of Palestinian origin, faulted the East Bank “oligarchy” whichhad pursued “its [own] self interest” under the guise of “‘national interest’” for the pastfifty years. The restrictive election and press laws served these conservative forces bycontaining both the Islamists and the Palestinians. The “one person, one vote” systemand the manner in which constituencies were designed served tribal affiliations ratherthan party politics and preferred East Bankers to Palestinians (see MECS 1989, p. 474,Table 2).

Peace with Israel, according to Masri, had also negatively affected the democratizationprocess. It entrenched the tendency “to ignore public opinion, and took the nationaldialogue down to zero.” Only national unity between East Bankers and Jordanians ofPalestinian origin could restore the “concept of state” which, according to Masri, hadbeen deformed by geographical and tribal affiliations, the religious and patriarchalstructure of society, and corruption.73

‘Abdallah, it was often said, was constrained, and at times even ignored, by the powerfuland corrupt East Bank old guard, in seeking to move toward a more sustained liberalizationof the political system. This “tribal corporate élite” feared that such a process wouldinvariably be at their expense, both in terms of their political influence and their economicprivilege. The cash-strapped state, after years of recession and high population growth,was no longer capable of supporting the needs of the entire population and was in urgentneed of economic reform and liberalization, which required at least a measure of politicalliberalization as well.74

Women’s RightsA key issue on women’s rights, Article 340 of the penal code, became the subject of anintense public debate in the latter part of the year. The article dealt with so-called “crimesof honor,” which involved males who murdered their female relatives to protect thehonor of their families in the wake of real or suspected sexual misconduct by the womenin question. Such murders were punishable by lenient sentences, which critics now arguedwas an example of legalized gender discrimination incongruent with women’s rightsand the moral codes of modern societies. In September, the cabinet approved anamendment to the law toughening punishment for honor crimes, which was referred tothe Chamber of Deputies.

The amendment, however, met with fierce opposition in the chamber. The head of theLegal Affairs Committee, Mahmud Kharabsha, condemned it as a decadentencouragement of adultery, introduced not by popular demand but by foreign influenceand moral corruption promoted by normalization with Israel. A group of twenty-seven

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deputies even objected to the discussion of this “invitation to obscenity.” The secretary-general of the IAF, ‘Abd al-Latif ‘Arabiyyat, and other Islamist leaders denounced theproposal “to liberate women [as] the work of the Zionists to devalue [Jordanian] society,”and an opinion poll published by a local daily showed that 62% of the population opposedthe amendment. On 21 November, the chamber rejected the amendment by a sweepingmajority. On 13 December, however, the Senate voted in favor of the amendment, thusleaving the issue open for further parliamentary deliberation.75

CONTENDING WITH THE ISLAMISTSIslamist Success in the Municipal ElectionsMunicipal elections were held throughout the kingdom (excluding ‘Aqaba, wheremunicipal responsibilities were transferred to the ‘Aqaba Regional Authority in the nameof administrative efficiency) on 14 July. The last municipal elections, which were heldin July 1995, generated considerable controversy because of blatant governmentalinterference to prevent the election of Islamist candidates in various towns, especially inZarqa (see MECS 1995, pp. 401-2). Just over one million voters registered as 5,241candidates vied for 2,530 council seats and mayoral positions in the kingdom’s 304municipal councils.76 (In Amman, the people elected only 20 of the 40 members of thecouncil. The government appointed the other 20 and the mayor.)

For the opposition parties the elections were a litmus test for government credibility.The participation of the IAF and other opposition parties in the municipal elections, incontrast to their boycott of the general elections in 1997 (see MECS 1997, pp. 464-67),was an effort to establish a new modus vivendi with the regime of King ‘Abdallah.77 Theregime, for its part, allowed generally free elections. Consequently, the new king receivedcredit from the opposition for advancing Jordan’s march toward democracy. The turnoutwas poor, but the Islamists this time around had no complaints. The IAF made a strongshowing and even they conceded that the elections were generally free of governmentintervention. The IAF swept to victory in Irbid, Zarqa, Rusayfa, Madaba, Karak andTafila, and got five of their number elected to the Amman City Council. Nearly 80% oftheir candidates were elected to municipal councils.78

Women, on the other hand, did not fare well. The only female mayor, who was electedin 1995, was defeated and only eight women councilors were elected in the whole country,as opposed to ten in 1995. The failure of women was attributed to a combination of“conservatism, tribalism, customs and traditions.” Voter turnout was generally higher inrural areas than in the towns. This, too, was attributed to tribal loyalties. The failure ofpolitical parties to take root in Jordanian society, primarily due to their incapacity to riseabove petty personal interests and to formulate relevant political platforms, was alsonoted as an explanation for the continued hold of tribal traditions.79

Dissension in the Muslim BrotherhoodWhile the IAF did well in the municipal elections and seemed to be readying itself for apolitical comeback in the forthcoming general elections in 2001, the Muslim Brotherhoodwas racked by internal dissension between hawks and doves. The infighting was overmatters relating to organizational and financial control, as the hawks appeared to bemaking inroads amongst the rank and file at the doves’ expense. The feud was fueledfurther by differences in attitude toward Hamas. The doves were concerned that intimate

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relations with Hamas might jeopardize the chances of achieving a political understandingwith the regime that would include a deal on a new election law (see above), while the(predominantly Palestinian) hawks regarded support for Hamas as an article of politicalfaith.

The Hamas representatives in Jordan exacerbated the tension because of what wasseen as an exploitation of their links with the hawks to assert greater influence over theBrotherhood. Some in the Brotherhood leadership even suggested that the time hadcome for the Hamas leaders to leave Jordan for the PA where they belonged. Reportswere subsequently circulated in the press, in Jordan and elsewhere, of rampant corruptionin the Hamas leadership in Jordan. In early July, there were numerous reports on theintention of the leadership to suspend some of the hawks in an effort to reduce theirclout. Moreover, the leadership of the Brotherhood was seriously considering severingits links with Hamas to further weaken the hawks and to improve relations with theregime.80 By the end of July, an internal compromise of sorts was reached and a moreserious split was avoided. Relations with Hamas were patched up as well, but a residueof suspicion and ill will remained.81

The Expulsion of the Hamas LeadershipThe Jordanian authorities were quick to take advantage of the apparent disarray anddissension inside the Muslim Brotherhood and between the Brotherhood and Hamas.The regime itself had an obvious interest of its own to widen the divide between theBrotherhood and Hamas and to forestall Hamas influence in the Brotherhood ranks.82 Inearly July, the authorities initiated a series of concerted actions against the Hamas presencein the kingdom. The organization was ordered to cease the publication of statementsagainst the peace process from its Amman bureau. Hamas operatives were occasionallyharassed and detained for interrogation. At the end of July, there were reports fromAmman that the Hamas leadership in Jordan would have to leave the country soon.83

The blow finally came at the end of August, catching the Hamas leadership off guard,outside the country.

On 30 August, the police closed down the Hamas offices in Amman, arrested thirteenoperatives (a few more were arrested later on) and issued warrants for the arrest of fiveleaders of the organization. The men in question were politburo chief Khalid Mash‘al,spokesperson Ibrahim Ghawsha, former politburo chief Musa Abu Marzuq, politburomember and editor of the Hamas monthly Filastin al-Muslima, ‘Izzat al-Rishq, and themovement’s representative in Jordan, Muhammad Nazzal.84 The first three were in Iranat the time. Rishq and Nazzal went into hiding in Jordan. Rishq was eventuallyapprehended in mid-November.

The Jordanians had calculated, and also actually demanded that the leaders who wereabroad would not return to be arrested, which would thus save the government theembarrassment of actually having to imprison them. The Muslim Brotherhood alsosuggested that they remain abroad until agreement on their case was reached with thegovernment. The Hamas leaders, however, chose to challenge the regime following thefailure of efforts by the Brotherhood to strike a deal with the government, and returnedto the kingdom on 22 September. They were arrested upon arrival. Abu Marzuq, whowas not a Jordanian but a Palestinian holder of a Yemeni passport, was immediatelydeported and resurfaced a few days later in Damascus. Mash‘al and Ghawsha weredetained and charged with membership in an illegal organization, an offense punishable

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by up to two years in prison. They were subsequently charged with far more seriousoffenses that were punishable by death, such as the illegal possession of an automaticweapon and explosives.85

The timing of the government’s action against Hamas coincided with the formation ofa new Labor government in Israel (see chapter on Israel) and the widely acceptedassessment that promising final status negotiations between Israel and the PA would belaunched shortly. Considering Jordan’s own interests in these negotiations (see below),it could hardly afford friction with the US, Israel or the PA because of the Hamas presencein Jordan, which they all strongly opposed. The US and Israel suspected that the Hamaspresence in Jordan provided logistical support to terrorism, while the PA believed thatJordan’s relationship with Hamas had ulterior political motives and was a potential cardfor the Hashemites to play if and when they chose to meddle in internal Palestinianaffairs. The Jordanian desire to reduce possible tension with the PA was also noticeablein other matters, especially the question of Jerusalem. ‘Abdallah assumed a far moreexplicitly detached and non-competitive approach (see below) than that which KingHusayn had pursued for years.

The Brotherhood and the IAF naturally denounced the government’s anti-Hamasactions as unprovoked and unjustified.86 But their protest was generally quite meek andnowhere near what it could have been had the Brotherhood really sought a head-onconfrontation. The exception to this rule was Shaykh ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Abu Zant, one ofthe Brotherhood’s leading hawks, who had a lengthy record of previous altercationswith the authorities (see MECS 1994, p. 434;1995, p. 400). He was detained for deliveringsermons accusing the regime of collaborating with the US and the Israeli Mossad.87 TheBrotherhood and other opposition parties staged a few peaceful rallies in Amman insupport of Hamas, but the preferred modus operandi was to seek a solution to the problemthrough negotiation with the authorities.88

The Brotherhood proposed a compromise to allow for the leaders to return, accordingto which the arrest warrants would be withdrawn in exchange for a commitment to limitHamas activities in the country.89 The government was in no mood for compromise andnegotiations between the leadership of the Brotherhood and Prime Minister Rawabdaproved fruitless.

Government spokespersons initially accused the Hamas operatives of having engagedin illegal activities, of interfering in Jordan’s domestic affairs and of having taken actionthat could have harmed Jordan’s relations with the PA.90 These accusations weresubsequently upgraded to charges of stocking arms caches and conducting militaryexercises in various parts of the country, all denied by Hamas. Eventually, the governmentcame up with the greatly exaggerated contention that Hamas posed a danger to statesecurity reminiscent of the dark days of Black September of 1970.91 Even Jordanianobservers who were sympathetic toward the regime thought that the “Black September”imagery would require a “mammoth job” to convince the country “of the soundness [of]and basis for those charges.”92

Attempts by the Brotherhood to cut some form of deal with the government to solvethe crisis continued until mid-November, but proved fruitless. The government wasdetermined to put an end to Hamas activities in the kingdom and demanded the deportationof the leaders if they were to be released, unless they were willing to abandon their postsin Hamas.93 Mash‘al and Ghawsha tried to pressure the government with a hunger strikebut that did not make any difference either. Instead of the prolonged spectacle of a

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public trial, the government had made up its mind to expel the Hamas leadership fromthe country, regardless of the legality of such a measure.

On 21 November, Mash‘al, Ghawsha, Rishq and another member of the Hamaspolitburo, Sami Khatir, surprised by the government’s determination, wereunceremoniously placed on a flight to Qatar and banished from the kingdom. Thegovernment made the incredulous explanation that the measure was in response to theHamas leaders’ own request to be “allowed to leave the country” and not a deportation.This was flatly denied by Mash‘al who referred to their departure as “compulsorydeportation.”94 The remainder of the Hamas detainees, some twenty people, were released.

The Muslim Brotherhood, despite its failure to prevent either the arrest or the expulsionof the Hamas leaders, still preferred to avoid confrontation. Both the hawks and the rankand file in the Brotherhood consequently attacked the leadership for not having defendedHamas with greater fervor. The leadership continued to urge the government to allowthe Hamas leaders to return and the Qatari authorities entered into a mediation effort tothe same end. By year’s end, nothing had changed. The government remained adamantin its refusal to allow Jordanians to have loyalties to, and to operate in Jordan on behalfof non-Jordanian organizations instead of demonstrating their undivided loyalty to theJordanian state.95

The Detention of Muslim ExtremistsThe authorities invested considerable effort in the prevention of terrorism. On occasion,members of the Muslim Brotherhood suspected of ties with Hamas or other more radicalorganizations were apprehended by the authorities. Members of the ILP were harassedand detained as a matter of course. At the end of April, nine men accused of involvementin a number of sabotage operations in Amman in April 1998 (see MECS 1998, p. 375)were sentenced to between fifteen years and life imprisonment with hard labor. In May,three men, accused of planning attacks on Israeli tourists in February 1998, were sentencedbetween five and seven and a half years in prison.

In December, the security authorities arrested thirteen people suspected of planningterrorist attacks on popular tourist sites and US government targets in the kingdom. Thegroup, composed of eleven Jordanians, an Algerian and an Iraqi, had been trained inAfghanistan and was linked to Usama bin Ladin. Another Jordanian involved with thegroup, Khalil al-Dik, said to be one of the founders of Muhammad’s Army (see MECS1991, p. 498), was extradited from Pakistan. Another suspect, ‘Umar Abu ‘Umar, hadobtained political asylum in Britain some years before. He had already been sentencedto death in absentia in 1998 for involvement in bombing attacks in Amman (see MECS1998, p. 375).96

‘ABDALLAH’S ECONOMIC INHERITENCEPoor Economic Performance, Poverty and UnemploymentJordan’s troubled economy was top priority on King ‘Abdallah’s agenda, which in hisview meant raising the standard of living, combating unemployment, speeding upprivatization, improving the bureaucracy and eradicating corruption.97 After a decade ofIMF-inspired reform, the kingdom was still finding it difficult to achieve economicgrowth rates that would keep abreast of population increase. Experts projected that theeconomy had to grow by an annual rate of 6% to accommodate the annual population

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increase of 3.5%. However, growth rates had averaged around 1.5 % (and possibly evenless) in the last three years (1996-98). Real GDP per capita declined from $1,560 to anestimated $1,430, as the population increased from 4.29m. to 4.76m. during this period.98

Poverty was widespread, with 38% of Jordanian families living below the povertyline. Some 9% lived in extreme poverty. Unemployment remained very high (officially16% but in practice much higher, anywhere between 22% and 27%) and repeated effortsto curtail cheap illegal foreign labor met with little success. A report in July thatunemployment had dropped to 10.2 % was received with justifiable skepticism.99 Manyof the Jordanian unemployed were university and college graduates, unlikely to replaceany significant number of the some 300-400 thousand (according to some sources thefigure was closer to a million) foreign laborers employed in manual jobs on the lowestrung of the economy.

As ‘Abdallah traveled to Western capitals in search of debt relief, his travels to Arabcapitals in the early months of his reign also had a predominantly economic agenda:direct aid from the oil states and the opening of the job markets there to Jordanians. InAugust, it was reported that some three hundred thousand Jordanians were living andworking in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.100 This was less in absoluteterms than the number of Jordanian workers in the Gulf in the early 1980s, thoughJordan’s population had doubled since then. But rising oil prices towards the end of theyear raised hopes for more jobs for Jordanians in the Gulf and higher remittances aswell.

Jordan’s main export market, Iraq, suffered from sanctions and the low oil prices andthe level of its imports from Jordan thus continued to decline. Jordan’s exports to thePA, on the other hand, were limited by Israeli and Palestinian restrictions and could notcompensate for Jordan’s losses in Iraq.

Debt and IMF Reform Jordan’s foreign debt stood at a staggering $7.5bn., slightly over 100% of the kingdom’sGDP.101 To qualify for credit and debt rescheduling, the country was required by theIMF to engage in economic reform, which included privatization, the overall liberalizationof the economy and the lowering of the budget deficit. In May, a new agreement wassigned with the IMF. The agreement was to provide Jordan with $150m. p.a. over thenext three years (and additional loans to compensate for export shortfalls) and pave theway for further debt rescheduling by the Paris Club of creditor governments. In themeantime, servicing the debt was costing Jordan some $800m. p.a., over 25% of thenational budget (JD 2.16bn. or $3.04bn. in 1999), diverting scarce resources from capitalexpenditure and job creation. In July, the World Bank approved $210m. in loans forvarious development projects in the kingdom in the fields of water, health and economicreform.

In February, after the death of King Husayn, Jordan’s allies in the Arab world and theWest were quick to promise further emergency aid to prevent economic destabilizationand to secure a smooth transition. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) deposited $150m.in Jordan’s Central Bank and the US undertook to accelerate the transfer of $300m.supplementary military and economic aid that it had pledged to Jordan in conjunctionwith the Wye River agreement of October 1998 (see MECS 1998, pp. 68-77). But littleelse actually materialized.

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In May, shortly after his installment, King ‘Abdallah embarked on a whirlwind tourof Western countries primarily designed to obtain debt relief for the kingdom. ‘Abdallahwas aiming for a write off of half (if not all) of Jordan’s debt, but Jordan did not qualifyfor debt relief under the industrial world’s existing initiatives for the poorest states.Moreover, the international community was not prepared to offer aid without a crediblecommitment by the Jordanians to carry out economic reforms. The Paris Club agreed inMay to reschedule (not to write off) $800m. of Jordan’s foreign debt. Another $350m.was to be rescheduled by states and regional funds outside the Paris Club.102 TheJordanians placed high hopes for debt relief in the meeting of the G-8 states that tookplace in Cologne in June. Here, too, they were disappointed, and had to settle for astatement that generally endorsed assistance to Jordan in coping with its debt.103

As a Jordanian analyst pointed out, no amount of outside aid would pull Jordan out ofits economic trough if the Jordanians did not help themselves. Aid given in the past hadnot always been put to good use, a fact previously ignored by donors for overridingstrategic reasons. The Jordanians had become very skillful in exploiting their geopoliticalcentrality as a lever for aid which, he noted, was often wasted.104

One of the reforms demanded by Jordan’s external supporters was rapid privatization.Government efforts in this regard were not popular and had moved ahead rather slowlyamidst public apprehension that such measures would lead to job losses and increasedforeign influence. Under ‘Abdallah, privatization acquired a renewed urgency andimpressive progress was registered. In August, a deal with a US company was finallysealed for the privatization of the ‘Aqaba Railway Corporation, and by year’s end asimilar deal secured a 40% stake for France Télécom in the Jordan TelecommunicationsCompany. Progress was also made toward the privatization of the national air carrier,Royal Jordanian. The Jordan Cement Factories Company, which had been privatized in1998, was already showing healthy signs of increased profitability.105 According to onelocal observer, the privatization was a harbinger of real political change. The “traditionalJordanian paternalistic style of government” where employment policies served “as apatronage tool for promoting social and political stability” was finally being challenged.106

In November, after years of negotiations, Jordan was finally cleared for entry to theWorld Trade Organization (WTO) after having taken the necessary liberalizing measures,including the passage of legislation on taxation, customs, investment and intellectualproperty rights.

Perhaps the most encouraging economically relevant data of the year were the initialindications of decline in the rate of population growth. A 1997 survey conducted by theDepartment of Statistics showed a downward trend in reproduction rates followingincreased use of birth control by women of childbearing age. Between 1976 and 1997the average reproduction rate dropped from 7.4 children per married woman to 4.4. Inthe same period, the percentage of children under fifteen in the total population declinedfrom 52 to 41.107 Since the imbalance between resources and population was at the rootof all evil in the Jordanian economy, these new figures were a most encouraging ray oflight at the end of the tunnel.

The Dead Sea Economic ForumAt the end of November, 120 senior officials and businesspeople gathered at a Dead Searetreat under the auspices of King ‘Abdallah for the “First National Economic Forum.”The forum produced what were described as “landmark recommendations” for the

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development of the national economy to guide Jordan into the twenty-first century andto meet the challenges of globalization. These essentially focused on the furtherliberalization of the economy and its adaptation to the global economy; the attraction offoreign investment; the reform of the state bureaucracy on the basis of merit andefficiency; and educational reform, including the study of English and computer literacyfrom an early age.108 However, according to an experienced Jordanian observer, the“absolute sharing in economic and political power” that had to be achieved to implementthe recommendations was “not likely to be accepted easily by the old guard powerélite.”109 In mid-December, ‘Abdallah appointed an Economic Consultative Council,composed of twenty members, to monitor the implementation of the economic reforms.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JORDAN, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITYUneasy Relations with IsraelSuspicion and mistrust governed Jordan’s relations with the Netanyahu government.This was true in Husayn’s time and remained so thereafter. According to ‘Abdallah, thebotched Mossad attempt on the life of Khalid Mash‘al in 1997 (see MECS 1997, pp.478-80) had eroded the trust between the two countries to a degree that had yet to befully overcome.110 Netanyahu visited Amman for talks with ‘Abdallah at the end ofFebruary. The meeting was marred, however, by statements made by Netanyahu shortlybefore his arrival in Jordan. Netanyahu criticized Jordan’s relations with Iraq during theGulf War, suggesting that peace with Jordan did not necessarily guarantee Israel’s securityon its eastern front.

In mid-March, feathers were ruffled again when Israel informed the Jordanians that itintended to cut back on its supply of water to Jordan because of the drought. Due in themain to population growth and the overall regional shortage, Jordan’s water problemwas steadily becoming more acute, exacerbated by drought, wastage and misuse. At theoutset, the Jordanians had justified their treaty with Israel, inter alia, in terms of theretrieval of their water rights. The issue was, therefore, of considerable sensitivity andwhen the matter became public the Jordanian protest was particularly angry.

Israel asked the Jordanians to agree to a cut of 40% of the water they received fromIsrael and to accept 33m. cu.m. instead of 55m. cu.m. In the Jordanian view this wastantamount to a violation of the treaty and they insisted that Israel supply the full amount,as originally agreed, irrespective of the drought. In April, the Israelis changed theirminds and agreed to supply the full amount. As suddenly as the crisis began, so it cameto an end.111

Against the background of prolonged difficulty with the Netanyahu government, itwas no surprise that Jordan welcomed the election of Ehud Barak as Israel’s primeminister (see chapter on Israel). In mid-July, just days after Barak formed his new cabinet,‘Abdallah met with the new prime minister in ‘Aqaba. The Jordanians expressed theirkeen interest in rapid progress on the Palestinian track, which the Jordanians believedwas essential for their own stability. Furthermore, they reasserted their own interests inthe final status negotiations and their expectation that Israel would bear the kingdom’sneeds in mind when broaching these matters with the Palestinians, especially thePalestinian refugee question, but also on borders, security and water. The Jordanians

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were not asking for a seat at the table. But they did not want to be left out of the pictureeither, to be surprised by results in which they had had no say.112

Relations with Israel under Barak were no great success story either. Breakthroughswith the Palestinians did not occur. It did not take long for Jordanian complaints toemerge on Barak’s inconsistency and his tendency to “emulate his predecessor’s tacticsby saying one thing and doing another.”113 The warmth and personal chemistry of theRabin-Husayn era were gone. Barak’s appointment of former Mossad chief Danny Yatom,the person directly responsible for the Mash‘al affair, as point man for Israeli-Jordanianrelations, was received in Jordan with outrage. Then, in mid-October, a Jordanianparliamentary delegation, visiting the West Bank, was heckled and accosted by Jewishsettlers in Hebron.114 The Jordanian government postponed an upcoming visit of anIsraeli minister and lodged an official complaint, but the Israeli government was slow toreact and eventually only expressed its regret rather than offering a formal apology,which only added insult to injury.115

The low level of bilateral trade remained another bone of contention and cause fordisappointment with the peace dividend. But the Jordanians complained especially ofIsraeli restrictions on trade with the West Bank and Gaza, which in 1998 amounted toonly $23m., equal to about 1% of Israel’s trade with the PA areas. The Jordanians claimedthat if Israeli security restrictions and stringent standards and specifications were removed,they would be able to develop an annual $300m. market for their exports to the PA, acritical substitute for the lost Iraqi market.116 At the end of the year, Israel agreed toremove one of its security measures that was impeding trade and to allow Jordaniantrucks, as of January 2000, to enter the West Bank directly without having to off-load toWest Bank vehicles at the border.

After five years of peace, relations with Israel were no more than lukewarm andgenerally unpopular with the Jordanian public. The peace with Israel had failed to bringthe expected prosperity and the Palestinians remained “a subjugated and humiliatedpeople.” Only a small minority of Jordanians actively pursued mutually beneficial contactswith Israelis (though some 27,000 Jordanians were said to be working illegally in Israel).The large majority refused to engage with Israelis. Jordan as a state had reaped realeconomic benefits from peace such as debt relief and rescheduling and the creation ofsome 3,500 jobs in the Qualified Industrial Zones in cooperation with Israeli companies.But these had no tangible impact on the lives of most Jordanians. As a Jordanian observerpointed out, the main reason for the opposition to normalization was rooted in theperception that peace with Israel symbolized Israeli victory and Arab defeat. It was notpeace that Jordanians hated, but defeat.117 The opposition also blamed the treaty withIsrael for the regression in Jordan’s democratization process, as successive governmentssought to stifle the opposition.118

In the prevailing atmosphere, and with the untested ‘Abdallah at the helm, the anti-normalization movement, led by the country’s thirteen professional associations, assumedan increasingly combative demeanor. In April, ‘Ali Abu Sukkar, the head of the EngineersAssociation and chairperson of the Professional Associations’ Committee to ResistNormalization (lajnat muqawamat al-tatbi‘) announced the committee’s intention topublish a “blacklist” of individuals (some of whom were prominent political figures)and companies that were engaged in normalization.119 By the end of the year, the list hadnot been published, presumably to avoid a possible confrontation with the regime overthe issue.

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In mid-March, the Jordan Press Association (JPA) reaffirmed an earlier decisionbanning its members from normalizing relations with Israel and in October, after threeof its members had visited Israel, a decision was taken to expel them from theassociation.120 International human rights groups condemned the JPA for the expulsiondecision, which they regarded as a violation of the journalists’ fundamental right tofreely pursue their profession. A compromise was subsequently reached in mid-November. The expulsion was withdrawn in exchange for a public apology in which thethree journalists endorsed the fight against normalization.121

Even the Fawanis (Lanterns) Theater Group came under fire from the Jordanian ArtistsAssociation in April for hosting a Palestinian theatrical group that included Israeli Arabsin its cast. Members of professional associations, who attended the Israeli embassyindependence day reception in April, were similarly denounced. The second anti-normalization conference (for the first, see MECS 1995, pp. 394-96) was held in Ammanin September. The conference, attended by more than five hundred representatives ofprofessional and business associations, civic organizations and political parties, reiteratedits rejection of the peace treaty and called for the re-enforcement of the Arab boycott ofIsrael.

Some, but not many, Jordanians were outspoken in their condemnation of the “politicalgangsterism” of the professional associations, threatening their members’ livelihoodbecause of political opinions (professionals in Jordan are generally required to belong toan association as a precondition for practicing their profession). Moreover, the governmentno longer went out of its way to promote contacts with Israelis. It had also dropped itsthreats to cut the professional associations down to size (see MECS 1997, p. 461).122

Bent on shoring up his domestic power base, ‘Abdallah put considerably greater stockin improving Jordan’s far more popular relations with its Arab hinterland than in therelationship with Israel. From the regime’s point of view, as opposed to that of the generalpublic, the relationship with the Arabs or Israel was not a mutually exclusive zero sumgame. According to Foreign Minister ‘Abd al-Ilah al-Khatib, Jordan saw “no contradictionbetween strengthening ties with its natural environment in the Arab world and itsdetermination to maintain good relations with Israel.”123

Jordan did not have any interest in eroding its treaty with Israel. But under ‘Abdallah,the public profile of the tie to Israel was certainly lower than it had been in Husayn’stime. The new Rawabda cabinet did not include ministers with Israeli experience, whileon the other hand it included some outspoken opponents of normalization with Israel,such as the minister of public works and housing, Husni Abu Ghayda. During his firstfew months on the throne, ‘Abdallah visited dozens of countries, literally criss-crossingthe globe from East to West. Israel was not on the list.

Jordan and the PAJordan’s relations with the PA were never entirely free of at least a measure of distrust.Husayn was almost always suspected of harboring some hidden agenda in regard to theWest Bank.124 ‘Abdallah, however, from the very outset appeared to be making an effortto convince the Palestinian leadership that he was different. And he was. The new kingwas only five years old in the Six Day War of June 1967. Jordan’s historical attachmentto Jerusalem and the West Bank were not part of ‘Abdallah’s sense of Hashemite missionand ambition to the extent they had been for his father.

As Israel and the Palestinians approached final status negotiations, in which Jordan

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had interests of its own, Jordan took demonstrative action to allay Palestinian fears ofHashemite intentions, in order to ensure a measure of coordination. King ‘Abdallahmade his first visit to the PA at the end of May for talks with ‘Arafat in Gaza. ‘Abdallahreportedly told ‘Arafat that Jordan had no regional ambitions, including no special claimsin regard to Jerusalem and its holy places.125

In late August, unprecedented action was taken to curb Hamas activities in the kingdom,in part at least, to reassure ‘Arafat and the PA (see above). At the same time Jordanissued a series of statements on the Jerusalem question, affirming more unequivocallythan ever before that the fate of the city was for the Palestinians (and not Jordan) todetermine with Israel. This was a departure from the stand that had demanded a specialrole for Jordan in respect to the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem. Jordan’s status hadbeen recognized by Israel in the peace treaty between the two states and considerableambivalence had characterized Husayn’s position on the future of the city ever since(see MECS 1994, pp. 412, 414; 1996, p. 442;1997, p. 484; and 1998, p. 381).

‘Abdallah made no bones about it in public. After a number of statements on thematter by Prime Minister Rawabda and other senior Jordanian officials, King ‘Abdallahhimself explained that the Palestinians were closer to the facts on the ground and thusbetter placed to determine the fate of the holy places.126

As for the future relationship between Jordan and a Palestinian state, ‘Abdallah’spolicies reflected a greater measure of continuity. Just days after Husayn’s death inFebruary, ‘Arafat revived the idea of confederation between Jordan and Palestine.Presumably intended to test the waters under the new monarch, ‘Arafat was given a coldshoulder by the entire Jordanian leadership. As before, they rejected the idea as prematureand one not to be discussed until the Palestinian state was established and the Jordanianshad a better idea of what they were actually dealing with.127 The Jordanians did, however,note that “some form of unity” or confederation could emerge once the Palestinians hadestablished their sovereign independent state on their own soil and a referendum washeld on the matter by both peoples.128

Jordanians, Palestinians and Refugees — The Domestic DimensionEver since the Oslo accords and the impression that the Palestinians were rapidlyapproaching statehood, tensions in Jordan between East Bank Jordanians and Jordaniansof Palestinian origin were exacerbated. Jordan supported the establishment of a Palestinianstate. This was in the hope that such a state would not only affirm that Palestine wasPalestine and Jordan was Jordan and not Palestine, but that it would also pave the wayfor the reduction of Jordan’s Palestinian population through the return of at least somePalestinian refugees to Palestine.

Jordanians, from the king down, flatly rejected the notion that more Palestinian refugeesfrom Syria and Lebanon might be resettled in Jordan.129 Some East Bankers even justifiedopposition to premature talk of confederation in terms of their anxiety that it mightencourage others to consider settling Palestinian refugees from Lebanon in Jordan.130 Inthe meantime, essential infrastructure development in refugee camps was greeted withsuspicion by Palestinians and East Bankers alike as the thin wedge of refugee resettlement,to which both objected, albeit for different reasons. Jordanian nationalists wantedPalestinian refugees to leave out of fear of their demographic weight, while Palestiniansdid not want to appear to have conceded their right of return to Palestine. The governmentgenerally held the middle ground. Thus, it supported the right of refugee return in principle

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(especially of the camp dwellers — some 270,000 individuals, mainly 1967 refugees,out of a total of 1.51m., according to UNRWA figures131). But it also recognized thepragmatic need to prevent the camps from deteriorating into abjectly poor livingconditions.

The Jordanians urged ‘Arafat to postpone the unilateral declaration of independenceinitially scheduled for 4 May 1999 (see chapter on the PA). Their stand did not stemfrom opposition to the idea of Palestinian statehood, but rather from concern for theramifications on Jordan of an Israeli-Palestinian confrontation (generating possiblePalestinian flight) that might have resulted from such a declaration. With the onset offinal status negotiations between Israel and the PA later in the year, which included theissue of the Palestinian refugees, domestic tensions in Jordan mounted again. “Alarmbells” were “ringing louder about the real status of Jordanians of Palestinian origin” andtheir loyalty to the Jordanian state.132 Jordanians were reportedly worried about a“resettlement conspiracy” (mu’amarat al-tawtin), according to which the US waspressuring Jordan to accept the final settlement of the Palestinian refugees in Jordanrather than the exercise of their right of return, coupled with greater integration ofPalestinians into Jordanian political life.133

The Jordanian government had resigned itself to refugee resettlement and did notexpect many refugees to return to Palestine, but it was counting on financial relief forthe refugees and for the state (over $5bn. in “infrastructure compensation”). Debt reliefand compensation, the Jordanians hoped, would not only help to absorb the refugeesand upgrade the infrastructure of the camps, but would also serve to counter East Bankeropposition if it could be seen that the economy stood to benefit substantially.134

The Jordanian-Palestinian cleavage also influenced other issues on the domestic agenda,such as political and economic reform. ‘Abdallah’s ideas on the liberalization of thepolitical system or the economy, which could mean greater integration of Palestiniansinto the upper echelons of the decision-making apparatus or benefits for the Palestinianbusiness élite from privatization, for example, encountered the suspicion and resistanceof certain segments of the East Bank élite. The rivalry between Chief of the Royal CourtKabariti, on the one hand, and Premier Rawabda and Chamber Speaker Majali, on theother (see above), was also tied in with issues of domestic reform.

Rawabda and Majali represented East Bank conservatives, who were apprehensiveabout such matters as electoral reform that would allow Palestinians a more equitableparliamentary profile. (In the existing distribution of constituencies, the Chamber ofDeputies severely underrepresented urban centers that were densely populated byPalestinians — see MECS 1989, p. 474, Table 2). It was also members of the East Bankélite who were deliberately arousing fears of refugee resettlement in Jordan, and ofother schemes to solve the Palestinian question at Jordan’s expense. This was all part oftheir design to prevent the new monarch from leaning too far toward liberalization, ingeneral, and greater Palestinian integration, in particular, at least until such time as therefugee question had been resolved.135

All the same, while on a tour of the Baq‘a refugee camp in early October, ‘Abdallahreiterated his support for national unity and for “equality and justice among all citizens”regardless of their origins. He was supported by more liberal-minded members of theélite, who expressed the opinion that the refugee question should not be allowed toretard the building of Jordan’s civil society.136 The king’s political advisor, ‘Adnan Abu‘Awda, argued that “a balanced demographic equation based on full rights and full

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citizenship as well as institutionalized democracy, were the basic foundations of a brighterfuture.” Abu ‘Awda also contended that economic development would dilute inter-communal tensions. With more wealth to share, the exclusive Trans-Jordanian nationalistswould have less of a grievance toward their Palestinian compatriots, he believed.137

In the meantime, however, inter-communal tension occasionally resurfaced with avengeance. In early December soccer fans of a Jordanian East Bank team (Faysali)attacked players of a Jordanian-Palestinian side (Wahdat), sending a few of them tohospital with serious injuries.

JORDAN AND THE ARAB WORLDThere was a calculated priority shift in Jordan’s foreign policy under ‘Abdallah. Jordandistanced itself from Israel and reinforced the kingdom’s ties with the Arab hinterland inits entirety, as far afield as Libya, which ‘Abdallah chose as one of his first venues, fora state visit, in mid-April. He even graced Libyan leader Mu‘ammar al-Qadhdhafi withhis presence once again in September. Husayn’s passing allowed for the burying ofsome old hatchets and set the stage for a wider range of relationships with the Arabworld, infinitely more popular at home than relations with either Israel or the US.According to a Jordanian commentator, the central theme in ‘Abdallah’s deliberationswith his Arab counterparts was that Jordan’s continued commitment to peace with Israelwould not be at the expense of its relations with Arab countries and would have “nobearing whatsoever on the kingdom’s Arab identity,”138 (see also chapter on inter-Arabrelations).

Particularly striking was the rapid rapprochement with Syria. The way was paved bySyrian President Hafiz al-Asad’s unexpected appearance at Husayn’s funeral in February,portrayed by the Syrians as the turning of “a new page” in the relationship between thetwo states.139 President Asad was followed in Amman a few weeks later by his son anddesignated successor, Bashshar, of whom ‘Abdallah tended to speak highly, suggestingan apparent rapport between the two younger men. After years of estrangement (seeMECS 1998, pp. 386-87), Asad’s gesture was well received by the Jordanians, thoughhis apparent objective of driving a wedge between Jordan and Israel required cautiousmaneuvering on Jordan’s part. As always, however, the Jordanians made the point thatthey sought nothing but a relationship of equals, meaning that as much as they reallyhoped for better relations with their powerful neighbor to the north, they would notconcede on their own key interests. According to one senior Jordanian official, Jordanwas quite willing to recognize Syrian sensitivities about Lebanon if only the Syrianswould similarly recognize Jordanian sensitivities about Palestine.140

‘Abdallah made a two-day visit to Damascus in April, crowned by final Syrianacceptance of Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel and agreement to revive the Jordanian-Syrian higher joint committee, which had been inactive for years. They also agreed tospeed up the construction of the Wahda Dam on the Yarmuk River shared by the twocountries (see MECS 1987, pp. 507, 647-48), and to amicably resolve any other bilateraldifferences.141 Jordan instructed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood members, who hadtaken refuge in the kingdom since the early 1980s, to cease all forms of anti-Syrianpolitical or media activity.142

Against the background of disagreement with Israel over water supply (see above),the Syrians were quick to earn some good publicity by offering the Jordanians in earlyMay a symbolic 8m. cu.m. of their own to help Jordan overcome its summer shortage.143

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In mid-July, some of the Jordanian prisoners held in Syria, an issue that had marredrelations in the recent past (see MECS 1998, p. 387), were released as part of the generalamnesty announced by President Asad. And at the end of July ‘Abdallah was back inDamascus for another round of consultations with Asad, focusing on the Syrian track ofthe Israeli-Arab peace process.

Better relations with Syria also meant a marked improvement in Jordanian-Lebaneserelations. At the end of May, Lebanese President Emil Lahhud visited Jordan followedby a two-day visit by King ‘Abdallah in mid-September to Beirut, the first by the king ofJordan since the 1960s. The Lebanese were reported to be seeking a solution to theirPalestinian refugee problem in a future Jordanian-Palestinian confederation,144 hardlyan idea likely to be seriously considered by their Jordanian counterparts (see above).

Shortly before ‘Abdallah’s visit to Beirut, the Jordanians floated the rather half-bakedidea of a trilateral Jordanian-Syrian-Lebanese economic association.145 ConsideringEgyptian discontent with this Fertile Crescent initiative, as well as the fact that Iraq wasthe more natural and traditional trading partner for the Jordanians, the trilateral clubidea did not seem to be going anywhere by the end of the year. Furthermore, in Jordanitself the idea was not universally welcomed, especially by those who remained suspiciousabout a tie to Syria that might be too close for comfort.146

As for relations with Iraq, ‘Abdallah made it clear from the outset that Jordan wouldnot serve as a springboard for any hostile actions against its eastern neighbor. Moreover,the Jordanians were increasingly anxious to see an end to sanctions on Iraq to pave theway for enhanced trade, which was critical for Jordan’s own economic recovery. DespiteJordanian openness towards Iraq, ties with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which had alreadybeen on the mend for some time (see MECS 1998, pp. 387-88), continued to improve.

The Saudis made a point of demonstrating their support for ‘Abdallah immediatelyafter his ascension to the throne, and the Kuwaitis were not far behind. The Jordanianembassy in Kuwait was reopened in March. Regardless of a minor squabble over Iraqiparticipation in the pan-Arab games hosted by Jordan in August, ‘Abdallah and hisKuwaiti-born wife, Queen Rania, visited Kuwait in early September, the first such visitsince prior to the 1990-91 Gulf War.

Customarily careful not to ruffle Egypt’s feathers by repeatedly deferring to its seniorstatus, Jordan’s relations with its “big sister” (al-shaqiqa al-kubra) remained on an evenkeel.147 In March, Egypt was the first on the list of ‘Abdallah’s busy schedule of visitsabroad. The relationship was, however, not always free of tension. For example, theEgyptians were rather wary of Jordan’s new honeymoon with Damascus. The Jordaniansmade every effort to placate Cairo lest the Egyptians chose to retaliate by ignoring Jordan’sneeds on the Palestinian track.148

JORDAN IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENAAs a Jordanian analyst put it, Jordan’s most valuable assured resources seemed to be thegoodwill of the West and Japan, translated into stop-gap economic assistance.149 Indeed,‘Abdallah spent an inordinate amount of time in his first year on the throne traversingthe capitals of the industrial nations in search of economic support and debt relief.Although unable to obtain a write off of Jordanian debt, he secured sufficient reschedulingand other forms of aid to keep the kingdom’s struggling economy afloat.

Most critical were relations with the US. In Husayn’s final days and immediatelyafter his death, the US was most reassuring, from the president on down, in its unwavering

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public commitment to Jordan’s security, stability and economic wellbeing. The USpledged to accelerate supplementary aid to Jordan, above and beyond the annual packageof $225m. (see above) and continued to urge other industrial countries to forgive Jordan’sdebts, as the US had already done (see MECS 1995, p. 421).

US President Bill Clinton and three former US presidents, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carterand George Bush, all attended Husayn’s funeral in what was described as “an extremelystrong statement” of US support for the kingdom.150 Jordan was constantly referred to asa “key ally”151 and when ‘Abdallah made extended visits to Washington twice, in Mayand again in October, Clinton reaffirmed the American determination to support Jordanwith economic and military assistance.152

Between May and July, ‘Abdallah also toured a number of other key Western capitals,including London, Berlin, Paris, Rome and Ottawa, where he secured political andeconomic support. These were concluded in mid-November by a four-day state visit toFrance. In addition to bilateral debt relief and economic assistance, Jordan also obtainedsignificant sums of economic aid from the European Union (EU). In November itapproved a package of 128.9m. euro, the EU’s largest annual commitment ever made toJordan.153

At the beginning of December, ‘Abdallah’s travels took him to the Far East for statevisits to Japan, South Korea, China. Japan was one of Jordan’s key financial benefactors.While it did not offer debt forgiveness, Jordan was one of the largest recipients of Japanesedevelopment aid per capita, and ‘Abdallah’s visit was crowned by the announcement ofa new Japanese aid package of $400m. for Jordan over the coming three years.154

TABLE: THE RAWABDA CABINET, FORMED ON 4 MARCH 1999

Post Incumbent

Prime Minister and Minister of Defense ‘Abd al-Ra’uf al-RawabdaDeputy Prime Minister Marwan ‘Abd al-Halim al-HumudDeputy Prime Minister Ayman al-MajaliDeputy Prime Minister and Minister of

Planning Rima Khalaf (P)Minister of the Interior Nayif al-Qadi*Minister of Information and Culture Nasir al-Lawzi*Minister of Foreign Affairs ‘Abd al-Ilah al-Khatib*Minister of Finance Michel Martu* (P)Minister of Transport, Post and

Telecommunication Jamal al-SarayiraMinister of Awqaf, Islamic Affairs

and Holy Places ‘Abd al-Salam al-‘Abbadi*Minister of Municipal, Rural and

Environmental Affairs and Ministerof State for Parliamentary Affairs Tawfiq Kurayshan*

Minister of Youth and Sports Muhammad Khayr Mamsar*+

Minister of Tourism and Antiquities ‘Aql Biltaji* (P)Minister of Labor ‘Id al-Fayiz

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Post Incumbent

Minister of Education ‘Izzat JaradatMinister of Agriculture Hashim al-ShubulMinister of Energy and Mineral Resources Sulayman Abu ‘UlaymMinister of Water and Irrigation Kamil MahadinMinister of Justice Hamza HaddadMinister of Social and

Administrative Development Faysal al-Rufu‘Minister of Health Ishaq Maraqa (P)Minister of Public Works and Housing Husni Abu Ghayda (P)Minister of Industry and Trade Muhammad ‘Asfur

* Served in outgoing cabinet(P) Of Palestinian origin+ Resigned in July

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication,news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see“List of Sources.” Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is theplace of publication noted here.

1. Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism; Jordan, 1955-1967(Oxford University Press, 1989).

2. The Times, 20 January 1999.3. JT, 3 January; al-Wasat, 4 January 1999.4. ME, March 1999.5. Al-Watan al-‘Arabi, 8 January 1999.6. R. Amman, 18 January 1999 (DR).7. WP, 25 February 1999.8. JTV, 16 January (DR); JT, 17 January 1999.9. AFP, 16 January 1999 (DR).

10. JT, 16 January 1999.11. Al-Hayat, 21 January 1999.12. Excerpts of the CNN interview were published in JT, 21 January 1999.13. NYT, 20 January 1999.14. CNN interview broadcast on JTV, 25 January 1999 (DR).15. The Times, 20 January; similarly al-Majalla, 31 January 1999.16. Al-Hayat, 21 January 1999.17. Al-Hayat, 23 January 1999.18. JTV, 25 January 1999 (DR).19. NYT, 24 January 1999.20. LAT, 23 January; JP, 25 January; NYT, 28 January 1999.21. AFP, 18 January 1999 (DR).22. Al-Hayat, 23 January 1999.23. WP, 6 February; JT, 7 February; NYT, 8 February 1999.24. CNN interview shown on JTV, 3 May (DR); al-Hayat, 12 May; al-Wasat, 15 November

1999.

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25. The Sunday Times, 31 January quoted in JP, 1 February 1999.26. IHT, 26 January; JT, 7 February 1999.27. AFP, 20 January 1999 (DR).28. Petra-JNA, 25 January 1999 (DR).29. Musa Kaylani in JT, 30 January 1999.30. JTV, 26 January 1999 (DR).31. Al-Ra’y (Amman), 28 January 1999.32. WP, 9 February 1999.33. JT, 10 February 1999.34. JT, 22 February 1999.35. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 22, 24 February; al-Wasat, 1 March; al-Watan al-‘Arabi, 5 March, 9

April 1999.36. JT, 26 September 1999.37. WP, 9 August 1999.38. Rami Khuri in JT, 3 August 1999.39. JP, 30 July; JT, 31 July 1999.40. WP, 9 August 1999.41. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 28 March; WP, 12 May 1999.42. JT, 16, 22 December 1999.43. Al-Wasat, 8 March 1999.44. R. Amman, 4 March (DR); MM, 5 March 1999.45. Al-Dustur, 7 March 1999.46. JP, 1 October; JT, 2 December 1999.47. Al-Ahram al-‘Arabi, 13 March 1999.48. Abu ‘Awda (Abu-Odeh) was the author of Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite

Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process (US Institute of Peace Press, 1999).49. JT, 4 April 1999.50. JT, 6 April 1999.51. JT, 10 April 1999.52. JT, 4 July 1999.53. JT, 5 December; al-Hayat, 14 December 1999.54. JT, 30 May, 6 June 1999.55. Al-Hayat, 12 August 1999.56. JT, 29 December 1999.57. JT, 23, 24, 27 December 1999.58. JT, 23 March; al-Hayat, 12 May 1999.59. Al-Hayat, 29 January; al-Dustur, 30 January; al-Sabil, 16 March 1999.60. JT, 28 February 1999.61. JT, 20, 30 March 1999.62. Al-Dustur, 30 January; al-Hayat, 10 February; al-Sabil, 16 March 1999.63. JT, 16, 22 June, 1, 22 September; al-Sabil, 6 July 1999.64. Al-Hayat, 18 July; al-Sharq al-Awsat, 18 August 1999.65. JT, 13 June, 15 August, 7, 8 September; The Star, 9 September; al-Wasat, 20 September

1999.66. JT, 18 March, 10 August, 6 October 1999.67. JT, 18 March, 20 April 1999.68. JT, 8 May 1999.69. JT, 1, 20, 29 July, 2, 11, 14 August 1999.70. JT, 19, 30 September, 2 October, 30 November, 4 December 1999.71. JT, 15 July 1999.72. Al-Ahram al-‘Arabi, 13 March; al-Safir, 18 March; al-Shira‘, 29 March; al-Quds al-

‘Arabi, 30 March; JT, 23 May 1999.73. Al-Majalla, 5 September; JT, 7 September 1999.74. Rami Khuri in JT, 28 September 1999.

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75. JT, 29 September; 9, 17, 18, 22 November, 14 December; al-Wasat, 13 December 1999.76. JT, 1, 8 July 1999.77. Al-Wasat, 12 July 1999.78. Al-Hayat, 16, 17 July; JT, 17 July; al-Wasat, 26, July 1999.79. JT, 17, 18 July 1999.80. Al-Majd, 29 March; al-Watan al-‘Arabi, 11 June; JT, 19 June, 15 July; al-Quds al-‘Arabi,

16 July; al-Wasat, 26 July 1999.81. JT, 25 September 1999.82. Al-Nashra, July; al-Watan al-‘Arabi, 9, 30 July; MM, al-Sharq al-Awsat, 12 July 1999.83. Al-Nashra, July; Yedi‘ot Aharanot, 25 July; JT, 28 July; JP, 30 July 1999.84. Al-Hayat, 31 August, 1 September; JT, 31 August 1999.85. Al-Hayat, 23 September; JT, 9 October; al-Watan al-‘Arabi, 15, 29 October 1999.86. Al-Dustur, 1 September 1999.87. Al-Hayat, 29 September; JT, 29, 30 September, 2 October; JP, 30 September 1999.88. Al-Majalla, 6 September 1999.89. Al-Hayat, 13 September; al-Dustur, 16 September 1999.90. JT, 8 September 1999.91. JT, 18, 25 September; AFP, 23 September (DR) 1999.92. Musa Kaylani in JT, 25 September 1999.93. Al-Dustur, 13, 30 October; al-Sharq al-Awsat, 3, 21 November; JT, 11 November; al-

Hayat, 15 November 1999.94. Al-Hayat, JT, 22 November; al-Sharq al-Awsat, 23 November 1999.95. Al-Hayat, 26 November; JT, 12 December; al-Wasat, 13 December; al-Sharq al-Awsat,

31 December 1999.96. Al-Sabil, 9 March; al-Hayat, NYT, 16 December; JT, 16, 18 December 1999.97. Al-Hayat, 12 May 1999.98. JT, 16 February 1999.99. JT, 5 July, 12 August 1999.

100. JT, 23 August 1999.101. JT, 20 June 1999.102. FT, 10 May; JT, 22 May 1999.103. JT, 22 June, 1 July 1999.104. Riad Khuri in JT, 18 February 1999.105. JT, 26 July 1999.106. Rami Khuri in JT, 24 August 1999.107. JT, 14 March, 30 November 1999.108. JT, 28 November 1999.109. Rami Khuri in JT, 30 November 1999.110. JT, 8 May 1999.111. Ha’aretz, JT, 15 March; JP, al-Dustur, 16 March; al-Sharq al-Awsat, 17 March; JT, 21

April, 8 May; al-Hayat, 22 April 1999.112. JP, 13 July 1999.113. JT, 18 August 1999.114. Al-Hayat, JT, JP, 10 October 1999.115. AFP, 12 October; JT, 16 October 1999 (DR).116. JT, 17 March; JNA, 20 April (DR) 1999.117. Fahd Fanik in JT, 24 October 1999.118. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 29 July; JT, 11 August, 23 October; al-Wasat, 1 November 1999.119. JT, 6 April 1999.120. Al-Hayat, JT, 20 October 1999.121. JT, 30 October, 18 November; JP, 18 November 1999.122. Rami Khuri in JT, 23, 26 October 1999.123. JT, 21 October 1999.124. Musa Kaylani in JT, 23 January 1999.

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125. Al-Quds al-‘Arabi, 27 May in MM, 27 May 1999.126. Al-Hayat, 31 August; al-Watan al-‘Arabi, 10 September; JP, 19 October; al-Wasat, 15

November 1999.127. JT, 13 February; Monday Morning, 20 September 1999.128. See, for example, Prime Minister Rawabda quoted in JT, 4 April and al-Hayat, 13 April

1999.129. Al-Hayat, 7 October 1999.130. Fayiz al-Tarawina in JT, 17 June 1999.131. Al-Hayat, 15 November 1999.132. JT, 20 September 1999.133. Al-Watan al-‘Arabi, 12 November 1999.134. JT, 6 October; al-Quds al-‘Arabi quoted in MM, 10 November; al-Hayat, 15 November

1999.135. MM, 5, 6 August 1999.136. JT, 6, 23 October 1999.137. JT, 16 November, 6 December 1999.138. Musa Kaylani in JT, 24 April 1999.139. Al-Hayat, 11 February 1999.140. JT, 15 February, 25 April 1999.141. Al-Hayat, al-Sharq al-Awsat, 22 April; al-Ra’y (Amman), al-Hayat, 23 April 1999.142. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 25 April 1999.143. Al-Hayat, 4 May; FT, 14 May 1999.144. Al-Watan al-‘Arabi, 4 June 1999.145. Al-Hayat, 24, 25 August 1999.146. JT, 29 August 1999.147. ‘Abdallah to al-Wasat, 15 November 1999.148. Al-Quds al-‘Arabi, 27 July 1999.149. Riad Khuri in JT, 15 September 1999.150. NYT, 9 February 1999.151. JT, 17 May 1999.152. WF, 18 May; JT, 13 October 1999.153. JT, 17 November 1999.154. JT, 2 December 1999.