Michael Strauss: Volition and Valuation

Volition and Valuation

A Phenomenology of Sensational,Emotional and Conceptual Values

Michael Strauss

University Press of America, Inc.

Translated from the Hebrew manuscript by

Ruth Hadass-Vashitz

Contents

Preface xi

Introduction 1

Part I - Elementary Value Theory

Chapter 1 Valuative and Motivative Values 13The distinction between them 13Translation into the Suggested Terminology 18Reducing Value to One of its Kinds 21The Distinction between Positive and Negative

Valuative Values 22The Distinction between a Full and an Empty Value 22Positive and Negative Motives 24

Chapter 2 The Will 27Volition and Motive 27Establishing Valuative Values 29Power of Judgment 30Self-Deception 32The Denial of the Will 34

Chapter 3 Value Properties and their Bearers 37Neutral Knowledge or Pure Cognitive Content 37Mixed Values and Pure Values 38What a Value-Property Is 39Value and the Value-Measuring Instrument 41The Value-Bearer 42

vi

Distinctive Marks 44The Value-Proposition 46Content and Form in a Proposition 47The Demand that Cognition Precede Valuation 48Value-Knowledge 49

Chapter 4 The Valuative Value: Modes of its Being 51a. Crystallization 52b. Values Implied by Valuations 52c. Values Implied by the Form of Valuation 53d. Values Implied by the Form of Cognition 54e. The Individual Value 54Feelings of Pleasure and Pain, Pleasantness and

Unpleasantness 56Passivity 56The Lack of Objectification 60Emotion 63

Chapter 5 The Dimensions of Value 71Victor Kraft on the Components of Value 71The Possibility of Reduction to a Pair of Values 72An Additional Dimension of Valuation 75

Chapter 6 Content and Form in Valuative Intention 79The Distinction between Content and Form of

Intention in General 79The Conscious and the Unconscious 82Transitive and Reflective Intention 84Observation of the Forms of Intention 86Emotion as an Intentional Content 90Preference 93Society and Its Mode of Reality 94Conjoint Intention towards the Same Meanings 97

Part II - The Division of Values and their Typology

Chapter 1 The Principle of Division 103

Chapter 2 The First Section: Valuation According to Results. The End 109

Efficiency 110The Proportion of a Sacrifice in the Present to a

Reward in the Future 112The Individual as a Means to His Own Ends 113

vii

The Individual as a Means to Another's Ends 116Goal-Oriented Speech 117Interest and End 118

Chapter 3 The First Section: Valuation According toResults. Caution 121

Chapter 4 The Second Section: Valuation According to theActivity Itself. The Need 123

Feeling Valuation 123Fullness 124The Motive 124A Given Value 125The Degree of a Need 126Distinctness of the Need 127Contracting the Meaning of the Word "Need" 128Can Anyone Know Better than I What Is Good

for Me? 130The Division of Needs According to the Object 131The Shape of a Value and Its Matter 132

Chapter 5 The Second Section: Valuations According to theActivity Itself. Inclinations and Constraints 135

Chapter 6 The Second Section: Valuation According to theActivity Itself. The Ideal 137

The Ideal Compared with the End 139The Ideal Compared with the Need 140Justice as an Ideal 142Truth and Beauty as Ideals 145The Game 145

Chapter 7 The Third Section: Valuation According to theActivity's Factors. Valuation of Motives 149

Two Kinds of Motive Valuation 149Values of Preference 151Morality 153Open and Closed Morality 155

Why Formal Morality Requires the Complement ofMaterial Morality 160

Summarizing the Issue of Motive Valuation 165

Chapter 8 The Third Section: Valuation According to the

viii

Activity's Factors. Valuative Values Directedat Abilities 167

Chapter 9 Valuation of Humans. Emergence of ReflectiveMotives 171

An Outline of the Division 176Sections and Types of Values 176

Chapter 10 The Typological Approach and Reductionism 177

Part III - The Relative Weight of Values and Conflictsbetween them

Chapter 1 Measuring Values 183The Platonic Theory of Measurement 183Measuring Valuative Values 185Measuring by Means of Decisions 186

Chapter 2 Money 189Money as a Cognitive Medium 190Money as a Valuative Medium 194

Chapter 3 The Rate of Value Realization and Valuative Grading 197

The Profile of a Valuative Value 197Comparison of Values According to Height and

Strength 202Dependence of a Value on another Value 203

Chapter 4 Reason and Conflicts 205The Distinction between Rivalry and Opposition 205Value-Stages 206The Constitution of Values 208Types of Opposition Between Values 213

Chapter 5 The Question of Radical Evil 215Extensions of the Need for Self-Defense 217Magic Redress of the Past 219Competition and Envy 221How the Conflict between Approval of Damage to

Others and Ethical Values is Resolved 222

Chapter 6 Tensions in the Moving-Calming Dimension 225

ix

Chapter 7 Goal-Orientation and Spontaneity 233The Synthesis of Goal-Orientation and

Competitiveness 238

Chapter 8 The Oppositions between Justice, Freedom and Other Values 241

Value's Place in a System and Its Essence 248Conflicts and the Relation between What Should

Be and What Is 252A Model for Opposition and Mutual Conditioning

in the Realization of Values 253

Chapter 9 Struggles Between the Will and MotivativeValues 257

Chapter 10 Repression 263

Chapter 11 Ideology 265Simple Ideology - Justifying Actual Prevailing

Value-Systems 266Compensating Ideology 270

Part IV - Objectivism and Subjectivism

Chapter 1 The Objectivist 275Naive Objectivism 276Reflective Objectivism 277Popular Objectivism in the Sphere of Values 277About Internalization and Externalization 279Society 281Evil as a Value-Property 282

Chapter 2 The Subjectivist 285

Chapter 3 The Validity of Values and the Question of their Foundation 289

Disagreement and Relativity 289The Theoretical Problem of Value Foundation 291

Chapter 4 Attempts to Solve the Problem ofValue-Foundation 293

Metaphysical Deduction of a Value from Cognition 293The Derivation of Values from the Nature of Reason 295

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The Reduction of All Values to Given Values 296Foundation in a Special Faculty of Knowledge 300Hypostasis of Values 301

Chapter 5 Waiving the Attempt to Achieve UltimateFoundation 305

Chapter 6 The Ontological Status of Values, Relationism 313

Chapter 7 Phenomenology of Values 321

Epilogue 327

Glossary 329

Notes 333

Biblography 361

Index of Names 367

Index of Subjects 369

Preface

This book was first written in Hebrew in the years 1985-1991 TheHebrew version was published by the Haifa University Press andZmora-Bitan Publishers in 1998.

The groundwork was influenced by my late teacher Nathan Roten-streich and my late friend Michael Landmann. The book has greatlybenefited from remarks of friends and colleagues and from discussionswith them. These friends are Asnat and Oded Balaban, Aaron BenZe'ev, Walter Brüstle, Torge Karlsruhen, Gideon Keren, and Ruth Lo-rand. I am grateful to all of them.

I am extremely grateful to Ruth Hadass-Vashitz who translated themanuscript into English. She took trouble to convey the precise mean-ing of the original. I made some changes in the text after she had fin-ished her work, and all responsibility for faults in the English text ismine.

I would like to call the attention of the reader to the glossary thatexplains the technical terms used in this book.

M. S., Jerusalem, 1999

Introduction

The phenomenology of values and valuation belongs to axiology, i.e.,the general theory of value, and differs from the other parts of thistheory in its methods, not in the investigated object. The general the-ory of value is concerned with a certain kind of relations prevailingbetween a subject and its environment.

The subjective side of these relations consists of attitudes adoptedby people towards their environment and their own lives which areembodied in their judgments, emotions, feelings and deeds. Thismeans that the theory of value is concerned with the stand people takefor or against something, and with the question how much and in whatways they are mentally involved in taking their stand.

The objective side of these relations can be characterized as a cer-tain kind of positions or statuses of the environment with regard to thesubject, namely, is it good or bad for the subject, rewarding or damag-ing, just or unjust, pretty or ugly, loved or hated, etc. However, thetheory is not only concerned with status, but also with value-proper-ties, some of which exhibit a much greater complexity than status.

Although the general theory of value addresses a broad range ofconcerns, it does not encompass the full scope of consciousness. Itsdomain is distinct from the following two:

(A) From cognitive thinking, that seeks to discover what exists orexisted without taking a stand towards it; to take a stand towards theexisting would mean going beyond it, as when it is measured by whatwe wish, or what ought to be.

(B) From the exposition of essences, which is a free exposition ofcontents with no concern for their existence (i.e., whether they are em-bodied in something that exists) or for their cognitive status, andwithout taking a stand towards them.

Volition and Valuation2

Besides the domain of value there is, then, a cognitive domain, towhich value-neutral sciences belong, and a domain of content exposi-tion, concerned neither with cognitive nor valuative status, to whichthe arts and mathematics belong.

Science can indeed be useful, and in this respect it is not value-neutral, but this value-bound quality refers only to its own existence,and not to its relationship towards its objects (or, to be more cautious,it does not refer to the way it wishes to relate to its objects). Art maybe beautiful and thus not value-neutral. In this respect, art has a value-character, but it is not its relation to its object (if it has one) whichpossesses a value-character, since the work of art may be beautifulwithout ascribing beauty to its object; for example: to paint a beautifulpicture does not imply its objects in a way that makes them beautiful.The work of art can be value-neutral, since its task is not to ascribevalue-quality to its object (if it has one).

Early in the history of the human spirit, the three domains men-tioned above were united, the unity being embodied in mythology. Thefirst to abandon this unity was the exposition of essences. It did so inorder to free itself from the constraints of both cognitive and value-status. Cognition and valuation remained unified until the Renaissance,and in everyday thinking they are unified to the present day. At thebeginning of the modern age, cognitive theoretical thinking wasreleased from these constraints and established itself as a science,seeking value-neutrality.

As to the assertion that until the Renaissance there was no separa-tion between cognitive and valuative thinking, consider whetherPlato's or Aristotle's theories are compatible with such a separation. InPlato's philosophy values have the status of ideas, and ideas in generalpossess a value-character. But ideas are also real, existing entities, andit is therefore not only impossible to separate knowledge from values,but also to separate them from art or mathematics.

In Aristotle's philosophy, teleology implies mutual assimilation ofcognition and valuation. It is obvious that every explanation accordingto a natural end already includes a valuation according to this veryend. Aristotle sometimes praises nature for being a fine artisan, creat-ing each thing for a specific and unique end (unlike human artisans,who made the Delphic knife)1 and sometimes reproaches nature formistakes (as, for example, when a three-legged chick or a two-headedcalf are born).2 Pre-Renaissance theories never addressed the questionwhether knowledge and valuation could be separated.

Let us now briefly examine how cognition and values relate to ac-tion. Cognition, i.e., knowledge separated from valuation, is not prac-tical, it cannot guide deeds, since cognition tells only what exists and

Introduction 3

not what action should be taken. Nor are values and valuations practi-cally separated from cognition, since without knowledge of facts weare not aware of a possible conflict between the realization of differentvalues; i.e., we do not know what we give up when we decide to ac-complish a certain value; we do not know what means should be em-ployed to achieve certain ends. Practical thinking, that is thinkingwhich guides our actions, is therefore a synthesis of cognition andvalues. But one has to distinguish between a synthesis whose compo-nents are distinct, and one in which they are not. The first kind ofsynthesis unifies previously separated elements, whereas the secondlacks awareness of the pure, unmixed elements, and lacks cognizanceof the difference between them.

Everyday thinking is practical in its core and is therefore a synthe-sis of cognition and values. Since it precedes science and theoreticalthinking in general, it does not incorporate awareness of the bounda-ries between its own components. The sections of everyday thoughtthat are not practical in themselves, are ramifications arising frompractical thinking; these include feelings, emotions and notions takenfrom the practical sphere. For this reason one and the same statementof everyday thought frequently expresses both knowledge andvaluation, and it is often the case that no neutral word can be found todenote something, and only words of praise or disapproval areavailable (“stingy” and “thrifty” may describe the same person fromdifferent valuative angles; the same can be said of “wasteful” and“generous”). Often, when you listen to a discussion, it is difficult toascertain whether people argue about facts or about their valuation offacts (and it may therefore happen that they are not valuing the samestate of affairs, and that the dispute has no object at all).

* **

Value-neutral knowledge first emerged at the beginning of themodern age, its object was nature, but later it extended its domain toinclude human beings. Since man cannot be known without his values,and his behavior cannot be understood without knowing these, anattempt at value-neutral knowledge of values themselves is indicated— that is, their description and explanation without either recom-mending or rejecting them. More precisely, there is a concern with theway given values, i.e., those that pertain to the nature of humans arerecognized, with the ways by which non-given values are created andestablished, and with the mode of applying and realizing values. Inshort, the matter in hand are the forms of value thought.


Here we should distinguish between two levels of thought: first,the level of values, where the intention is towards a specific value orthe value-character of a thing or an action, that is, to the content ofvalues; this level includes normative approaches; the second level isthat of meta-value, where the intention is towards the form of thethought taking place on the first level, the value level. The first level isof original, or transitive intention; the second is of reflection about theforms the original intention assumes, and it includes meta-ethics.3

Besides this difference regarding the object of thought, there is a dif-ference between the two levels with regard to the approach, or themanner of thinking. On the value-level, a stand towards something isactually taken, whereas on the plane of meta-value a conceptually neu-tral picture of the assumed position is drawn.

Using the word “value” on the first level, a person means only hisor her own value, while on the second level he may also mean a valuethat others, but not he adhere to. Thus I would assert, for example, thatvengeance is a value, attaching to the word “vengeance” a meaningthoroughly opposed to my own values, provided that I believe some-one else considers vengeance to be a valid norm of behavior.

Once the word “value” was mainly used in economic life; since the17th century the use of the word has been extended and it was intro-duced into other realms of thought. In many cases the word “value”and its derivatives replaced the word “good” and its derivatives, al-though obviously the latter was not ousted. Instead of the good-badand the good-evil contrast, we now deal with the distinction betweenpositive and negative values, or between value and “disvalue.” In theirmodern meaning, “value” and “valuation” are employed to describeand analyze the phenomena of praise, recommendation, command,blame, warning, prohibition, etc.

In meta-valuative usage, the term “value” is more appropriate thanthe term “good” in two respects:

1. We speak about positive and negative values, and about value ingeneral as encompassing both; it is obviously inappropriate to refer topositive and negative good, and to good in general as good-or-evil;John Laird in his Idea of Value already addressed this point.4 It is not asimple task to replace the word “value” in its meta-valuative usage bya synonym. Let us, for instance, take the proposition, “Over the yearsSmith changed most of his values in the domain of art,” and ask howwe can circumvent the use of the word “values” with the aid of theword “good” in this case. We may try to insert into this proposition thephrase “criteria for what he calls 'good'“ instead of “values,” andobtain: “Over the years Smith changed most of the criteria for what hecalls 'good' in the domain of art.” It turns out:

Introduction 5

A. That in this meta-valuative context it is more convenient to use“value” than a substitute.

B. That contrary to “value” the word “good” occurs in this contextin inverted commas, which is characteristic for a word normally usedon the valuative level, when it is mentioned on the meta-valuativelevel.

C. That the substitution of the word “value” by a phrase, formu-lated with the aid of the word “good,” involves some loss of meaning.

The mutual meaning relation of the words “good” and “value” maybe interpreted in the following way. The word “good” is a predicate ofthings (situations or actions) in which a positive value is realized (andthe word “bad” is a predicate of something in which a negative valueis embodied), but on the other hand the essence of value is not ex-hausted by its role as a method of calling things “good” or “bad.”

2. Contrary to “value,” “good” has no plural form.

* **

Neutral reflections on values were for sometime scattered in ethicsand aesthetics, in economics and psychology, in anthropology andhistory. Only at the end of the 19th century, Alexius Meinong andChristian von Ehrenfels (the discoverer of gestalt qualities) foundedthe general theory of value, termed “axiology” by Wilbur Urban, whointroduced it to the English-speaking world. The intention was togather the scattered reflections under one roof.5 Two obstacles, whichwe will briefly discuss, made the development of axiology slow andintermittent:

1. It is difficult to understand values that contradict (in some ap-plications) your own, namely, to understand the value-character ofcontents adhered to by another person. Unless you understand these,you cannot compare your own with other values, and you cannot ob-serve their form.

Value-neutrality does certainly not require from a person research-ing a certain topic to be himself neutral in any respect, but asks him todiscriminate between cognitive discourse on a subject matter and as-suming an attitude towards it. However, neutrality in the discourse onvalues also requires to treat of values not sustained by the person con-ducting the discourse — and these are blind spots in ordinary observa-tion; thus, the difficulty arises.

2. Axiology is a philosophical discipline, and philosophy has ingeneral not remained value-neutral with regard to the objects of itsanalysis. On the contrary, frequently philosophical discussion some-what resembles the session of a court of justice, which has to rule on a


charge of false pretenses against knowledge in general and science inparticular, or against any other object of philosophical discourse.

With regard to values, especially moral values, philosophy adoptedthe task of providing them with foundations. Various ways were pro-posed in order to accomplish this task, and there also were thinkers,like Max Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche, who objected to moralityand its foundations. Both the foundation of — or the argumentation infavor of — a value, and the objection to the same, are obviously notvalue-neutral. To sum up, it was a tradition of philosophy to value itssubject matter.

The development of axiology is thus the attempt of a philosophicaldiscipline to remove itself from a certain tradition prevailing inphilosophy. Besides the difficulty involved in such an attempt, therewas a much simpler difficulty from the angle of motivation: meta-valuative analysis was regarded as a corridor leading back to the arenaof values, and the analyst, being value-committed, was impatient dur-ing his lengthy walk along this corridor.

On the other hand, certain phenomena aroused axiological curios-ity. These were the value-conflicts: not only contrasts between differ-ent cultures, but even contradictions within one and the same systemof values, that is to say, even within an individual's own system ofvalues. George Simmel, Nicolai Hartmann and Michael Landmannanalyzed these conflicts and antinomies.6 When a philosopher stum-bles over antinomies taking place between his own values, the absenceof a solution pushes him from the valuative to the meta-valuative level.

* * *

Let me present some examples to clarify the difference betweenlevels of thought. The name “utilitarianism” may designate two differ-ent views. It may designate a certain system of values, which means:something on the level of values themselves. In this case, the utilitar-ian praises those who seek their benefit. He would say: perhaps thereare people who do not seek their own benefit, but they are fools andare exploited by clever people, or they are powerless and make a meritout of their weakness.

But the name “utilitarianism” may also refer to an axiologicalview, i.e., a view belonging to the meta-valuative level. In this case theutilitarian would say: there are no human beings that do not seek theirown benefit; utility is the only kind of existing value, or at least theonly kind of value which directs human action. In this case, theutilitarian would not necessarily praise those who seek only their own

Introduction 7

benefit (and in his opinion, all humankind belongs to this category).Hobbes, for instance, is utilitarian in this sense, but he neither praisesnor especially respects the human species. He indeed asserts that

The Value, or Worth of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is tosay, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore isnot absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement ofanother.

7

Hobbes' somewhat biting style was probably not chosen in order toastound the reader, but to express by means of style (instead of beingexplicit) his disapproval (on the value level) of people's utilitarianism.This disapproval does not diminish his meta-utilitarianism (i.e., hisadherence to the view that actually human beings seek only what helpsto achieve their ends).

As long as one deals with axiology one can neither agree nor dis-agree with the utilitarian in the first sense (who belongs to the objectof axiological discourse, but does not participate in it).

Further, when someone tells us, for example, that he is a hedonist,we should ask him: Are you trying to recommend pleasure seeking, ordo you rather claim that people seek only pleasures?

* **

This book is divided into four parts:The first part presents some elementary work: basic distinctions

are drawn and molds prepared for the notions appearing in thefollowing parts.

Part II is concerned with the division of values into major classesor into sections, and with the description of the characteristic typesaround which values converge in each section. The prevailing divi-sions were made out of concern about values, and not on the meta-valuative level. The division into ethical, esthetical and logical values,and the division into economic, social, political, religious, etc. values,are neither made according to the structure of values nor the way theyare applied, but according to the domain of the objects in which thesevalues are applied. In this part I propose a division that arises from thenature of values themselves.

The division of values is required in order to understand the con-cept of value, that is, to be able to analyze it exhaustively, and this isneeded in order to examine the attempts to reduce values to a singletype or kind.

Part III deals with relations between values and their integrationinto a system. First quantitative relations are analyzed, namely, themeasurement of values; whether they have a common denominator,


the exchange, the question of what money is, and what is expressed bythe price. Then there is an examination of the different ratings ofvalues as the ground for their order of preference. Finally the maintheme of this part: conflicts between values and attempts made byreason to settle them. The attained settlements are not final orsatisfying. In the course of these attempts, different figures of reasonarise.

The problem of the objectivity or subjectivity of values is dealtwith in the last part: do values exist beyond human consciousness orare they but caprices of human beings, independent of what existsaround them? I describe the different types of self-consciousness thatcrystallize around objectivist and subjectivist answers. The philoso-phical attempts made for the foundation of the values that seem toneed foundation is examined, since these attempts affected the devel-opment of axiology. Finally, several clues are presented how to de-velop the phenomenology of values.

* **

My own axiological view can be characterized as following:It is pluralistic and integrative, since it does not try to explain val-

ues by reducing them to one kind (like utility and ends, or pleasure andneeds), but by examining their integration into a system that rec-ognizes plurality in the configuration of values.

It is relational (or “relationist”), since it rejects both objectivismand subjectivism and maintains that value is a relationship betweenobject and subject (or between the object-in-itself and the subject-in-itself), a relationship which can be molded by the subject.

It is pragmatic, since it admits that there is no ultimate foundation(or no properly laid foundation) of value. That is to say, this viewrecognizes that value-thinking has to be content with the integration ofa value into a system, and with the demonstration of the sustainabilityof the system, namely, the evidence that the system fulfills the role ofoffering answers to the questions about how to approach the object andhow to treat it.

Finally, this view is phenomenological in the following senses:(a) It treats the difference between cognitive thinking and value-

thinking not as an ontological difference between the objects of theserealms of thought, but as a difference in the mode of intentionalitytowards the objects, a mode that leaves its mark on the latter (i.e., itperceives this difference as the difference between phenomena of con-sciousness).

(b) It suggests a way for axiology to bracket the validity of thevalues being described.

Introduction 9

(c) It acknowledges that the observation of phenomena of con-sciousness goes beyond empirical observation (which collects data fortheir comparison in general, and for induction in particular), and has acertain character of pure intuition (like Kant's approach), or intuitionof essences (like Husserl's approach), and that this observation is asource of meta-valuative knowledge. The “intuition of essences” isunderstood here as an observation of the typical.

Here I will add something regarding some metaphysical features ofthis treatise. Cautious of hypostases and wary of Ockham's razor, phi-losophers (especially in the second half of the 20th century) try toavoid describing the objects of their discourse as substances, or in away that implies the object possesses the status of a substance, or thestatus of a limb of a substance. Substance is mythological. Accord-ingly, they award the object the status of an event or of a state. In linewith this position one has to avoid speaking of the will, and insteadspeak of volitions; the volitions should be described as a kind of men-tal states, or as mental events; events should receive preference overactivity because activity assumes an acting agent who belongs to therealm of substance. In line with all this one should not mention “intel-lect,” “faculty of observation,” etc.

From the angle of epistemology and ontology, there is some meritin this abstinence. However, I do not believe that the ontological profitcompensates us for the inconvenience in the course of cognitive workand for the reduction of its fertility. Accordingly, I do not intend toaccept these limitations in my discussion of axiology. Not onlysubstance is a pattern of cognition and not a structure of reality, but forsimilar reasons the property, the event and the situation or the state arealso merely tools of the intellect when it sets out to cognize its objects.If one ascribes them an ontological status, they become mythologicalnot less than substance. The intellect cannot abstain from the use of itstools.

Substance is a kind of special intellectual glue, assigned to attach-ing products of conceptual abstraction to each other, namely, factorswhich only the intellect can separate. The intellect separates withoutjoining at the same time; it may separate A from B without joining itsimultaneously to C, and thus it creates the indefinite. With the aid ofsubstance it glues these indefinites once again together. The cat ingeneral has some color, but no definite color. When we attribute adefinite color to a specific cat we reconstruct it, i.e., we attach the catin general, which has some indefinite properties, to the affirmation ofdefinite properties and the negation of their alternatives (in the exam-ple, alternative colors). In this reconstruction the cat must be a sub-stance in the sense that it has to be made so that it can possess proper-


ties, or be the owner of properties, namely, that properties can attachthemselves to it.

We cannot describe a field of objects without the aid of substantialpatterns; without a description we have no basis from which to explainthe field of objects by laws, models or functions, namely, there is noway to expose the internal order of this field. We do not employ sub-stantial patterns because language imposes nouns on us, but on thecontrary, because thought needs these patterns, and in order to re-unitewhat it separates, it needs the nouns.

PART I

Elementary Value Theory

Chapter 1

Valuative and Motivative Values

The distinction between them

The question what a value is can be answered by showing the dif-ferent functions a value can fulfill. I will describe two such functionsand thus provide a heading, under which all other functions a valuecan fulfill may, perhaps, be subsumed. The two functions are valuationand motivation.

Valuation in its limited sense is the application of a value, crystal-lized as a concept. For instance, I have a concept of justice, which Iapply to actions and their agents, when I say that these are either justor unjust. When a value is applied to things, actions or agents, thesemay be called “objects of valuation” (or simply “objects”).

Valuation in the wider sense means taking a stand or assuming anattitude for or against something. This stand-taking need not be verbal;it may also be emotional or sensational. The most elementary form ofan assumed attitude is feeling pleasure or pain, for through thesefeelings we respond to objects; an object is pleasurable or painful,tasty or repugnant. Whenever a person takes a stand, he or she values.My use of the word “valuation” has, then, a wider range than commonusage. If someone finds a thing pleasurable, I say that he values it;likewise, if someone finds a thing distasteful, I will also say that hevalues it (in the sense that he has taken a stand on it).


Valuation that stems from judgment and is conveyed verbally mayexpress a position that exists only, or primarily, in a conceptual mode;such a position comprises a set of notions which is often accompaniedby emotion (for instance, when an action is judged as just or unjust).These types of valuation are tied to language. However, the verbalexpression of a valuation may also be the ex post facto expression ofan attitude which was originally pre-verbal or pre-predicative. I willlimit my discussion of elementary pre-verbal or pre-predicative valua-tion, so that only the attitudes of subjects with linguistic abilities, whoin principle could report these attitudes, will be considered valuations.Thus, because the data of axiology are the expressions of attitudes,most significantly symbolic expressions.

Values also reside in the foundations of sensual valuation (e.g.pleasure and pain) and emotional valuation (e.g. love and hatred), butthese are not crystallized as concepts, i.e., the valuing subject has nodefinitions for these values. Valuations of this type are quasi-applica-tions of the values residing in their foundations.

Accordingly, a value is a sensational, emotional or conceptual atti-tude we adopt, or a stand we take towards things, people or actions.

The second function of values is to motivate people to action. Onevalue may motivate a person maintaining it to act justly, another valuemay motivate him or her to eat something tasty. When fulfilling thisfunctions, a value appears as a desire, an aspiration, or a drive. Hereseveral questions arise. Does every entity, applied in valuation, actu-ally motivate? And on the other hand, does every motive serve as afoundation for valuation? In other words, does the same mental entityfulfill both functions? Since axiology has no a priori answer to thesequestions, it should employ a terminology that assumes no answer inadvance and ostensibly leaves them open. To do this one have to givedifferent names to bearers of different functions: The entity that servesthe valuation should have one name, while the motivating entityshould have another. I will call bearers of the first function “valuativevalues,” and bearers of the second function “motivative values.” Indoing so, I make no assumption with regard to the question whether asingle entity bears both names (and both functions) or a separate entitybears each name (and each function). Thus, I allow for the possibilitythat some values may be valuative without being motivative, (as, forinstance, when a person contemplates a singular past event, which iscertain not to repeat itself), or motivative without being valuative. Yet,I also allow for the possibility that the valuative and the motivativecharacters are only aspects of one and the same content.

Valuative and Motivative Values 15

What motivates to action could simply be called “motive” insteadof “motivative value,” but then the linkage between motivation andvaluation may not get the required attention.

To the two roles or functions already mentioned — valuation andmotivation — a third role may be added: guidance. In other words, avalue can be said to guide or direct a person's actions. But this role isactually filled by practical thought, which is a synthesis of valuativevalues and value-neutral knowledge of facts. If, for instance, the valua-tive value is a goal, then practical thought extracts from the neutral,theoretical knowledge of facts the means that should be pursued, i.e.,what is necessary to direct the action.

Let us further examine the nature and status of the four entities Idistinguish:

Valuative value Valuation (= valuing or adopting anattitude towards an object)

Motivative value Motivation (= motivating or activating)

Valuing and motivating are real occurrences or states within thesubject. They occur within a particular person at a particular time.Valuing and motivating (but neither valuative nor motivative values)are observable; in other words, a person apprehends that she or he isvaluing or is motivated; in the typical cases a person is conscious thathe or she is taking a certain stand, or that he or she is motivated bycertain aspirations in a particular way or, for example, that he or she isattracted or repelled by something. Each can examine his or her valua-tions and motivations and study them. I do not intend to say thatpeople are always completely aware of their motivations and valua-tions, for even what is in principle observable is not always immedi-ately and fully apparent. My point is simply that we know aboutvaluation and motivation not only from conceptual analysis but also,and primarily, from direct acquaintance.

The two kinds of values we have been discussing are themselvesneither processes, nor occurrences or states. They have no independentappearance, they are not directly observed, but exclusively through themediation of valuation and activation.

Motivative values are a sort of inner power the subject reveals inhis actions. They can also be described as personality traits that areresponsible for certain functions, or as dispositions towards certainactions. Motivative values may be expressed by the subject's wishes;but a wish is not only motivating, it may also mold a valuation. Fur-thermore, not every wish motivates to action.


Motivative values lack the immediate reality valuation and motiva-tion have. But they are still real, individual entities, residing in a par-ticular person at a particular time, and thus possess a certain strengthor intensity. They are changeable.

Valuative values, however, do not have this kind of reality. Theyreside in no particular place or time, and they are not changeable. De-scriptions of time and place do not apply to these values, i.e., they arenot suitable descriptors for them. A particular person at a particulartime may, of course, maintain a valuative value, recognize its validity,apply it and (if it is accompanied by a corresponding motivative value)even realize this valuative value in practice; and later the same personmay replace this value with another one. However, what changes whenthe valuative value is replaced is not the value itself, but rather themaintenance of values or the stock of values maintained by this par-ticular person. Maintaining a valuative value, or adhering to it, maypossess a particular intensity (one may adhere to it more or less deci-sively), but the valuative value itself is not subject to degrees of inten-sity and is not changeable. The state of maintaining a value is a reality,and in this sense its status is similar to that of motivative values. It hascausal relations with elements of its environment. Maintaining a value,or adhering to it, is added as a fifth element to the domain of values Ihave begun to describe:

Valuative value Maintaining it(= adherence to it)

Valuing accordingly

Motivative value Motivating

A person may therefore replace his values, even though aparticular value possesses some independence of being for him whilehe maintains it and uses it in his valuations. A value, for examplejustice, acquires the status of something unchangeable throughadherence and application by the individual, in complete contrast tothe valued object, which may, in principle, change. Until the particularvaluative value conflicts with some other valuative value in a field ofapplication, its validity is absolute.

We have to distinguish between the axiologist observing the ad-herence to values, and the person he observes. The axiologist is con-cerned with the form of the value, which is real and includes adherenceto the value, while the person being observed is entirely concernedwith the value's content. The intention of the observed person is di-rected at the value on the original level of intentionality, and what isintended on this level is the content of the value, whose validity is


universal and unlimited. Axiological reflection concerns the modes ofintentions, that is to say, the modes of the original, unreflective inten-tion. Besides adherence to the value, these modes include the ways inwhich it is applied and its place in the value system.

For naive first-level intention (not accompanied by reflection) thevaluative value is a Platonic idea. This is not a statement of the onto-logical status of valuative values, but rather of their role in valuationfrom the point of view of whoever maintains them. A valuative value'srole as an absolute is therefore constitutive for it, and not simply anillusion of naive consciousness.

On the other hand, it is proper for reflection in general and axiol-ogy in particular (both second-order endeavors) to speak of changes invalues and discuss their causes, so long as they do not overlook thefact that these are but a single aspect of their object, i.e., consciousnesson the first level. Stated differently, in the limited sense their object isonly the form of the value. Just as there is a difference between theconcept of a chair and a chair (one cannot sit on the former), there is adifference between the concept of axiological reflection about value-thought and the thought itself.

Often a valuative value is not only incorporated in valuation, butalso in a special concept that belongs to the first level of intention, forexample, justice in the concept of justice; in this case the person main-taining the value also has a definition (or a quasi-definition) for thatvalue. I will use the phrase “value concept” to refer to the first leveland not to the axiological concept (the concept of justice belongs to theobjects of axiological analysis, but is not a component of axiologyitself).

A value concept has also two aspects, content and form. In termsof content, the value concept is identical with the value itself. A personentertaining the concept of justice addresses justice itself quasomething of a particular nature, which is not a product of his ownwill. He believes that he cannot alter what he takes to be justice, orreplace it with a different definition of justice. In terms of form, avalue concept is part of reality and is interconnected and interdepend-ent with various aspects of reality. It is to the aspect of form that theaxiologist refers to when he says, for instance, that a particular personor society has a certain justice concept. The axiologist refers to thesame formal aspect when he notes that individuals may change theirjustice concept in order to accommodate it seamlessly within their setof values, and that a value of a society or a culture may change in thecourse of generations for various reasons.

In its original pre-reflective state, the mind turns outward, it at-tends to the outside world and it is inclined to objectify what it con-


ceives, i.e., to regard it as part of the outside world. Furthermore, themind even tends to absolutize what it conceives, i.e., to regard it asindependent of the conceiving mind. This inclination prevails in thecognitive as well as in the valuative realm. Objectification of sensualand conceptual ideas is the function of a mechanism of the mind,which establishes the content of ideas as an objective world, andthereby establishes the mind itself as a subject facing the world, i.e., assomething that knows and values the world.

In reflection the mind turns inward, it attends to itself and therebyalso to the objectifying mechanism. It is now inclined to judge se-verely what it has done in the first stage or on the first level. While fora person in an original, pre-reflective state, his idea of justice has abso-lute validity, on the reflective level he considers a network of relationsin which he himself was involved at the first stage, without havingthen been aware of it. This gives him reasons to look at his own idea ofjustice as changeable, and allows him to reflect on situations in whichthe application of one of his values contradicts the application ofanother of his own values. This, in its turn, gives him reasons to viewhis own idea of justice as lacking unlimited validity.

An apparent contradiction emerges between the results ofreflective analysis and the pre-reflective mind. But from theaxiological point of view, neither objectification nor absolutization areerrors of a naive mind, nor is critical reflection devoid of results whichare and remain relevant for axiology. A mind that lacks the ability ofobjectification would not only fail to establish itself as a subject, butwould also fail even to conceive of the idea of justice. Objectificationand absolutization are not to be considered mere opinions (of the naivemind), but rather the functions of a mental mechanism which detachesthe subject from the object. Such a mechanism is necessary toconstitute the subject itself, as well as values like justice, which wouldbe inconceivable without the first, unreflective way of thinking. Theapparent contradiction is resolved when we note that reflection refersto the form of the original level and not to its content. For example,reflection refers to the adherence to a value, to its applications, to itsmotivative power, but not to the content of the valuative value.

Translation into the Suggested Terminology

To clarify the distinction between motivative and valuative values,we will translate a number of statements about values into the sug-gested terminology.


Consider the statement that a person knows what is good or proper,but does the opposite: A drug addict, for instance, who values drugconsumption negatively, but keeps using drugs. This statement tells usthat while the valuative value rejects the deed, the motivative valueaccepts it. If we look at the state of this person, we discover twoadditional factors, not mentioned by the statement or its translation.For one, the valuation is not exclusively negative: The addict valuesdrug consumption as pleasant, or at least as less unpleasant than doingwithout; on the sensational level he values the deed positively. Thesecond factor is the negative motivation regarding drug consumption:If the addict not merely says that he values the deed negatively, but isconvinced of its evil, he may try to wean himself away; such an at-tempt is motivated by a negative valuation of the habit, even if it ul-timately fails. The above statement and its translation remain valid, butonly with regard to their sum total: The entire valuation totalsrejection, while the entire motivation totals acceptance. Our terminol-ogy enables us to describe the subtler lines of opposition within thesystems of valuation and motivation in the same terms we employed toexpress the difference between “know” and “do.”

We will now address the demand underlying morality, set forth inKant's Categorical Imperative. With certain deviations from the Kan-tian version,8 it may be formulated in this manner: Act but accordingto a rule that fulfills the following condition; it would not oppose yourwish, that (if it be the case) everybody will adhere to the same rule.

The wish is not discussed here as a motivative value, since you arenot asked whether you are prepared to influence others in order tochange their behavior. The wish will be revealed by the satisfaction ordissatisfaction you experience when everyone behaves in a certainmanner. It is necessary that no dissatisfaction be generated by the factof a certain trait appearing in the behavior of all people; dissatisfactionequals negative valuation. The condition inherent to the moral demandis therefore that you do not value negatively the possibility for the ruleunder consideration to become a universal standard of behavior.

The actual practice of behavior represents a certain motivativevalue, while the valuation of this practice represents adherence to acertain valuative value. If we consider the universality of this practicefrom the angle of its relation to each individual, be it whoever it is(and whatever his or her position towards the valuing person is), andnot from the angle of its dissemination, we arrive at a simple formula-tion: Act according to a motivation, whose prevalence with others,whoever they are, you value positively; or, in a more comprehensiveand precise formulation: Act only in accordance with a motivative


value, whose prevalence with others, whoever they are, you do notvalue negatively.

The demand we analyze means therefore to accommodate motiva-tive values to valuative values. This is a valuative value in itself, as-signed to value motivations according to their consonance with valua-tive values. It is feasible that this special valuative value may also beaccompanied by a matching motivation, namely, a motivation to causechange or to mold motivative values.

The following objection arises. When we base morality on adapt-ing the motivative to the valuative value, the issue of universality aswell as the issue of the other person fade-out: I am required to adaptmy own motivation to my own valuative value, independent of anyoneelse's behavior. The answer is that the question of the other person'sbehavior, or everyone's behavior, serves as a technique of thought thatisolates the valuative from the motivative value; its aim is to preventpartiality in applying valuative values; it prevents the user of thetechnique from applying one valuative value to his or her ownmotivation, while applying a different valuative value to the samemotivation when it appears in another person. The technique instructsus: Check how you value this motivation in another person, in order tolearn how to value it in yourself. Thus, we avoid a specious adaptationwhich would result from the choice of a valuative value post-factum,aiming to accommodate a given motivation. So far with regard to thetechnique; if we dismiss it from our thought, the residue is a negativevaluation of discordance between motivation and valuative value.

One could also argue that rule and motive are not identical, andtherefore it is not appropriate to consider the examination of a practicalrule as the valuation of a motivative value. The answer is that a motivehas an individual existence, and the same motive, implanted in twopersons, is not precisely the same anymore; hence, these are twomotives, but they embody one rule, namely, they follow the samepattern. Accordingly, the technique of thought experiment demandsthat the person wishing to value a motive and to represent it by a prac-tical rule, implant the same motive experimentally (i.e., in thought)within someone else.

Neither this analysis nor its translation venture to enrich the theoryof morality, nor do they intend to replace accepted formulations by anew one. Their aim is to assist axiology in discussing the moral modeof valuation.

To further clarify our terminology, we will employ somecharacteristic usage of the terms “hypocrisy” and “cynicism.” Both arenegative valuation terms, describing a certain relation betweenvaluative values and motives. The hypocrite hides his or her motives


and masquerades as a person whose motives match accepted values.He/she declares adherence to especially lofty valuative values andpasses severe judgments on others. When they cause obvious injury toother people, they do so out of concern for them, to save their victimsfrom an even harsher fate. The cynic condemns the hypocrite anddespairs of matching motivative to valuative values; he denies thevalidity of valuative values which do not fit motives. On the face of it,the hypocrite uses his valuative values as motives, the cynic employshis motives as valuative values.

Reducing Value to One of its Kinds

The question arises whether it is possible to reduce value to one ofits kinds, namely, the motivative or the valuative value. One aspect ofthe question is this: Is it possible to consider one kind of value as itssubstance and the other as a mere phenomenon of the same? From adifferent angle, the question asks whether it is possible to regard onekind as the cause and the other as its result. The difference in characterbetween the two kinds makes it possible for a reduction to valuativevalue to lean towards Platonic idealism, or at least towards objectiv-ism, while the reduction to motivative value would lean towards natu-ralism, or at least towards subjectivism. The debate over this matterarose among the founders of axiology at its very beginnings: Christianvon Ehrenfels supports reduction to the motivative value, the aspira-tion, while Alexius Meinong sees the fundamental manifestation of avalue in pleasure and distress, as opposed to aspiration. With timeMeinong became aware of the objectivist implications of his claim andsubsequently developed them explicitly.9

The intrinsic affinity between motivative and valuative values in-vites reduction attempts. On the other hand, we have found that thedifferences between valuative values and their mode of existence, andmotivative values and their mode of existence, are multiple and pro-found; they reflect the multiple facets of the human being. Reductionnot only disregards the differences and impoverishes the theory byshrinking and blurring its object; reduction also presents an utterlyone-sided picture of the human being. Numerous conflicts within thesphere of valuative values arise from the basic conflict between theseand motivative, and this conflict can not appear in the reductionistpicture.


The Distinction between Positive and NegativeValuative Values

When a person values something as bad, the valuation arises froma specific evil; we will address this evil as “negative value.” Murder,for instance, is a negative value; in contrast, not to murder (or to avoidmurder) is a positive value (or a positive valuative value). Injustice is anegative value as against justice, which is a positive value. Againstevery negative value there is at least one positive value, and againstevery positive at least one negative value. The positive and the nega-tive are a pair of values (murder and the avoidance of murder are a pairand so are tasty and not tasty); we say that each is a “correlate” of theother (or “a complementary value”).

One could argue against the above that condemnation of murder aswell as praise for avoiding it arise from the same content; crystallized,this content yields the same notion, i.e., one and the same value. Ac-cordingly, condemnation of a deed, or praise for its avoidance shouldnot be considered two values, nor should praise of a deed or condem-nation of its avoidance be so considered; these should be taken aspositive and negative sections of the same value, two halves of a singlevaluative scale.

One may use both kinds of terminology (the “idiom of pairs” and“the idiom of sections”), as long as we are able to translate one into theother.

It is quite possible that a certain valuative scale will not comprise azero point between good and bad, plus and minus; such a scale hasonly better (which is the lesser evil) and worse (which is the lessergood). Here good and bad are just pointers on the scale. There is noboundary between the positive and negative sections this scale repre-sents; one may say that it has only one section.

A value has more than two sections, for instance, when goodstands for a golden mean, flanked by negative sections; in this case wearrive at three sections.

The Distinction between a Full and an Empty Value

When a value refers to an act and its correlate to avoiding the act;when it refers to being the object of a certain act and its correlate tonot being the object of this act; when a value refers to an event and itscorrelate to the event's non-occurrence, or when it refers to a thing andits correlate to the non-existence of this thing; if a value is bound up


with feelings or emotions and its correlate with their absence — thefirst of each pair will be addressed as “full” and second as “empty.” Interms of “sections” the first section of these values is full and the sec-ond empty. When we address a pleasant or good action, the positivesection will be full and the negative empty. While addressing an un-pleasant or bad action, the negative section will be full, the positiveempty.

Not to murder is an empty, positive value; to murder is a full,negative value. In other words: The full section of the value “murder”is negative, the empty section is positive. To avoid aiding a hungryperson represents a negative, empty value.

A remark with regard to the names of values: The name of thevalue not to murder (or “avoiding murder”) is negative, and so are thenames of values like “injustice” or “not to aid a hungry person.” It ispossible that the names usually attach themselves to the full sectionwhose negation (“not” or the prefixes “un,” “in” etc.) designates itsempty counterpart.

To demonstrate the usage of our terminology we will translate aphilosophical thesis into these terms. Schopenhauer believes thatpleasure is but the absence or the cancellation of suffering, and joy theabsence of sorrow. We can therefore reproduce this claim by sayingthat pleasure and joy are empty values. It is possible that in Schopen-hauer's view all positive values are empty, at least with regard to emo-tion and feeling.

According to one theological thesis only good exists, while evil isbut the absence of good — it manifests itself through the non-exis-tence of something else. Formulating this theory in our terms, wewould say that only positive values are ontologically full, while nega-tive values are ontologically empty.

It is difficult to imagine a state in which a value is empty in all itssections and from all possible angles. On the other hand, one can eas-ily imagine a value to be full in all its sections from one particularangle — the feeling angle, for instance; to be felt for better and forworse, as is the case with the necessity to eat: The positive sectionmakes itself felt in pleasure while eating and the following satiety; thenegative section is manifest in hunger. The positive part is felt posi-tively and the negative part negatively — that is to say that with regardto feeling both sections are full.

The wish to live (in terms of pairs) is a full value when life pos-sesses a certain quality. In a case of mere survival, however, inparticular if all other values are subjected to it, the same value isempty.


One may smoke, without enjoying it but suffer without it. Thisgoes to show that notwithstanding the positive feeling valuation of theact and the negative valuation of its absence, the value referring to thisact is empty in its positive section and full in its negative section fromthe valuatively relevant angle (the angle of pleasure or suffering). Thisis a feeling-value concerning pleasure and suffering, the relevant angletherefore being the presence or absence of pleasure and the presence orabsence of suffering. Here the absence of a positive act reveals itself asfull and its presence as empty — a case that agrees withSchopenhauer's theory.

Positive and Negative Motives

Only a single motive corresponds to a valuative value which hasonly one full section. For instance, the person who smokes withoutenjoying it has a single motive: To avoid non-smoking. There is nodifference between sections in this motive. The motive to avoid non-smoking virtually (not altogether) fulfills the same function a motiveto smoke would; both lead to the same act (although there is probablya difference in the quality of the act).

A motive should be classified as “positive” or “negative”according to which section of a valuative value is full from the anglerelevant to this value. In the smoker's case only the negative section isfull — he or she suffers from not smoking; the desire to smoke isactually a desire to avoid non-smoking and may be considerednegative: This individual smokes because of a negative motive.

This individual does not enjoy smoking, but does not suffer from iteither. We could also imagine a person suffering from something he orshe does, who would suffer even more from avoiding the deed; thisperson, of course, also acts on account of a negative motive.

The paradigm of actions arising from negative motive is flight.Flight means actively avoiding to be in a certain place; being thereconstitutes a felt, real and full evil.

A positive motive is therefore the one that corresponds to the full,positive section of a valuative value, the negative that corresponding tothe full, negative section. The empty section of a valuative value hasno corresponding motive. A valuative value (which has two sections)whose sections are both full will be matched by two motives that makeup a pair. For instance, Reuben likes meat, enjoys eating it and sufferswhen not consuming meat. Reuben has two motives to consume meatand in general, it will be difficult to differentiate between them.However, should a feeling of hunger annoy Reuben while he is


preoccupied with his work and should he, in consequence, eatabsentmindedly and in a hurry, even though he consumes his favoritedish, we could say that he acts on the negative and not on the positivemotive (escape from irritating hunger). The positive valuation of eat-ing was empty at the time and thus not attended by a motive.

It turns out that when an act possesses a pair of motives, only spe-cial circumstances may isolate one of them temporarily, canceling theother.

Speaking of motives, I will not refer to the notion of sections, norwill I say that Reuben's eating-motive consists of a positive and anegative section. Doing so we would — in opposition to Ockham'swish — unnecessarily deal with multiple entities whenever a valuativevalue has only one full section. The following difference should benoted: In terms of sections — a “section” obviously assumes the exis-tence of another section; in terms of pairs — a “value” does not as-sume the existence of another value that pairs with it.

The distinction between positive and negative motives helps toexplain the notion of sacrifice. To offer a sacrifice for somethingmeans overcoming negative motives, namely, positive motives over-come the resistance of negative ones. I sacrifice something towards anend: My wish to achieve this end is the positive motive; however, torealize it I need means, so that the wish has to overcome my resistanceto employing these means — for instance, my resistance to getting upearly to work.

The positive motive manifests itself in the attraction to somethingor in clinging to an prevailing situation; the negative motive is felt asan urge to break out of the existing situation or to flee from something.

Sometimes adherence to a status quo ante may, however, appear asa negative motive, that is to say, the desire to avoid a bad situation, ora situation that is worse than the current one; for instance, avoidingdanger is a kind of breaking out, not from an already prevailing situa-tion, but from a situation into which one is about to slide.

Chapter 2

The Will

Volition and Motive

The task of the will is to regulate the relationship between the per-son, its owner, and his/her environment. It controls observation, theintellect and the motorial system in their relation to the environment; itissues commands and supervises their implementation; these com-mands are acts of the will or, which is the same, volitions.

With regard to values, the will mediates between valuative andmotivative values. We can emphasize its particularity by delineatingthe working of the will in a somewhat rough outline, i.e., formulate itin a way that requires some qualification; we may say that the willfrequently imposes — and has the tendency to impose — the valuativevalue upon the motive, namely, the valuative value as far as it consistsof a directive for action, upon the motive from the aspect of its power,or from the aspect of the direction it indicates. The will may modifythe motive: increase or decrease its power in relation to rival motives,or divert it into a channel that corresponds to the said directive, i.e., thevaluative value; to wit, it may change the motive's direction to acertain extent.

The will shapes the system of motives whenever a conflictbetween two values arises within the individual, and under givencircumstances the realization of one value foils realization of the other.


Here the will takes a decision, namely resolves the conflict by virtue ofpreference-values which constitute a certain kind of value, designed toguide the will. It may decide against the stronger motive. Will powerindeed reveals itself when its owner acts against the stronger motive,or in other words: against the motive that was stronger before the willintervened. The latter formulation is to be preferred: an action shouldnever be described as opposed to motive, but as matching the balanceof motives fashioned by the will.

Here a measure of doubt may come forth: whether volition is notbut one motive among others, the decision no shaping of a set of mo-tives by the will, but a certain victory of one motive over the other.The answer lies in the difference between volition and motivative val-ues. Volition is an intentional act, while the motivative value is a forcethat has magnitude and a direction towards some kind of deeds. Themotive reveals itself before the decision regarding the conflict betweenvalues takes place. The motive is felt as the aspiration for an action orits result, namely as an urge to break out of a certain situation, or as anattraction to a captivating action (or to an action necessary to achieveother captivating actions). The aspiration or attraction is felt in thecourse of thinking about what captivates the mind. This feelingaccompanies acts of thought, but it is not a specific act in itself; itaccompanies intentional acts but it is no intentional act in itself.Feeling the motive, like the motive itself, pertains only to the form ofintention, while volition also pertains to intentional content. Moreprecisely: Volition is a fully intentional act, possessing its own contentand a particular form. My volition with regard to a certain deedconstitutes the content of this act, what I intend, my intent (we shallthus name a crystal of content, which can be repeatedly intended). Yet,its being an act of volition constitutes a form of intention. The actitself, as distinct from the content, pertains to the form of intention.Volition is a certain kind of intentional acts.

However, the difference between volition and motive arises notonly from their mode of existence, but also from their nature: Motivesmay oppose each other, namely, the same person has different aspira-tions; under given circumstances the realization of one may preventrealization of others; opposition between motives is conscious anddoes not prevent their existence; volitions, on the other hand, may notoppose each other; to wit, if a person realizes that action according toone of her volitions will frustrate another action, arising from anothervolition, she will abandon one of them; if she is uncertain which tocancel, she will suspend both.

The distinction between reason and cause may serve to describethe will. Whenever the will adapts a motive to a valuative value, when

The Will 29

it chooses between incompatible guide-lines that arise from differentvaluative values, and strengthens the preferred motive, the will turns areason into a cause. I believe it is also correct to say that what servesas a medium for turning reason into cause is the will. To explain thisproposition further, we offer the following remark: “Reason” withinthis statement could, of course, be replaced by “argument” or “consid-eration.” Neither should the phrase “turn into” (in “turns reason intocause”) be taken literally: the reason does not cease to be a reason afterbeing “turned into” a cause. And as for the “cause”: the proposition isvalid with regard to a purposeful, attracting cause, when thepreferment of a positive motive is being considered as well as withregard to an active, impelling cause, when thought is given to theextrication from a prevailing predicament, i.e., to deliberationssupporting a negative motive.

Establishing Valuative Values

The roles of the will are not limited to the sphere of motivativevalues. The will participates in the constitution of valuative values.Reason may create the content of a valuative value; it cannot provideits status. The will complements reason's creation by establishing thevalue, thus according reason's product its actual status. The valuativevalue's actual status is embodied in its applications, namely in valua-tions; it is therefore embodied in attitudes a person assumes towardssituations, deeds, the objects of deeds and towards other persons. Theunfolding of a new value-content alone, comprehension of this contentalone, fails to award it the status of a valuative value. The award ofsuch a status represents a change of the subject.

In order to arrive at practical decisions, the will has to transcendthe entire sphere of values and take into account a picture of the situa-tion, as it is transmitted by the cognitive work of the intellect; thus,because in deciding the will has to rely on a synthesis of known factsand values; each element of the synthesis does not in itself demand apractical conclusion, namely neither generates positive or negativeimperatives; or in any case, no categorical imperatives, but at the ut-most, hypothetical ones.


Power of Judgment

The will, then, goes beyond the sphere of values, assuming the roleof a cognitive power of judgment;10 it does so when it receivesproducts of the cognitive work carried out by the intellect. Receptionhere is not passive on part of the will; it occurs while a certain shapingis taking place. The results of the cognitive work possess a certaindegree of probability, lower than one (namely, lower than a hundredpercent). This statement is true at least regarding the products whichinterest the will. As a power of judgment the will has to determine athreshold-degree of probability, above which it is going to confirm theproducts of understanding as a situation-picture fit to guide activity;results whose degree of probability falls below the threshold may, forexample, lead to an instruction for the intellect to continue working onthe same task.

The need to serve practical decision-making (including thedecision whether already to decide a practical question) prompts thepower of judgment to divide the cognitive results of the intellect'swork into three groups: (1) the “yes” and “almost certain” group; (2)the “no” and “unreasonable” group, and in-between, (3) the “perhaps”group. If it would not have to serve decision-making, the power ofjudgment would divide the possible judgments on the situation-picturepainted by the intellect into more than three groups; for instance, itwould leave room for an additional group between the “yes” and“perhaps” groups (when required, a person indeed does so, but in aless skilled manner).

The height of the “yes” group threshold (granted confirmation bythe power of judgment) i.e., the border between this and the “perhaps”group, is determined by the degree of risk attached to the deliberateddeed, as well as by the amount of resources it demands: The greaterthe risk, the higher the degree of probability required from proposi-tions concerning facts.

Assembling the beliefs in three groups creates something like gapsin the continuity of degrees of belief. When the intellect's considera-tions in favor of a certain conceptual situation-picture accumulate andrise a little above the threshold, a person tends to feel over-confident inthe accuracy of this situation-picture. Increased confidence helps himto act decisively and energetically, notwithstanding the presence ofuncertainty.

One should notice that the very pondering the intellect alwaystends to pursue, entails the sacrifice of resources. As human resourcesare limited, it is open to question whether one should allocate addi-tional strength and time to gain information which might merely con-

The Will 31

firm once again what was already assumed, or whether the risk of ac-tion is not great, and one should act on the grounds of the informationalready achieved. The fear to miss a chance may at times also induce alowering of the confidence threshold.

On the other hand, the classification of some situation-picture inthe “perhaps” group, i.e., the group of doubtful cases, may involveunder-confidence: a lower degree of confidence (or subjectivecertainty) than justified by the reasons (or objective certainty). Thiswill occur when, for example, the reasons favoring the situation-picture justify a level of certainty but slightly beneath the requiredthreshold.11

Spinoza, in one of his letters interpreting Descartes, confronts theclaim, that as the source of error is the will's expansion over a muchlarger area than that of the intellect (or the understanding), this expan-sion constitutes a flaw or fault in human personality-structure. Hesays:

As to your second difficulty, I say with Descartes, that if we can-not extend our will beyond the bounds of our extremely limited un-derstanding, we shall be most wretched — it will not be in our powerto eat even a crust of bread, or to walk a step, or to go on living, for allthings are uncertain and full of peril.12

Should man inquire profoundly into the composition of a slice ofbread in front of him and into its qualities, and refrain from eating itbefore he achieves complete certainty, he would be miserable; to avoidthis, the will adds a supplement to the degree of established confidencein the proposition that this slice of bread is edible, or reduces it by adeduction of confidence. It creates a gap between the entirely doubtfuland the nearly certain.

The intellect's tendency in its cognitive work is not congruent withthe will's pragmatic tendency in its role as a cognitive power of judg-ment. Spinoza's correspondent considered this non-congruence a flawin personality-structure, because he adopted the intellect's viewpoint.The same is true for the phrase “bad calibration” (discalibration),which designates non-congruence between the degree of confidenceand probability. From the will's vantagepoint, the prevailingcalibration is good.

In the sphere of the intellect, the proceedings leading to the resultof its work are generally conscious as well as the results themselves,because the intellect is being supervised by the will. In other words:The intellect's broad unfolding in the field of awareness comes to fa-cilitate its supervision by the will. In the sphere of the will, however,its decisions are frequently conscious, while the ways by which it ar-rives at these do not unfold in consciousness. In such cases, a person


knows what he or she wants, but not why. Procedures of the will areconscious but to a limited extent, because the will is not subject tosupervision. Being itself a supervisor, the will is from the outset notdesigned to be supervised. This is especially valid when the will servesas a cognitive power of judgment. As the process by which the will,serving as a power of judgment, determines the degree of confidence isnot conscious, procedures that enhance confidence (or in other casesreduce it) take sometimes place, even though the matter in hand is notpractical, does not require decision-making, and therefore lacks thenecessity to divide into three (in order to decide “yes” or “no” or topostpone decision).

When the probability of a proposition, dealing with facts based onalready gained information, is close to 50%, and the time events allowa person in order to decide is short, the latter has no choice but to de-cide whether to act in a certain way or to avoid action by gambling.For instance, we need two objects out of three available ones in orderto execute a certain task. If for the time being we fail to see which arebetter suited and which less, there are two ways open to us: to devoteadditional time to learn their properties, or to choose two irrespectivelyof their suitability, according to some other criterion that may beutterly irrelevant (like throwing a coin or dice); what is required of thiscriterion is for its application not to consume a great deal of time andthat the results of this application be clear and unequivocal. This kindof will also appears in “larger letters,” to use Plato's allegory,13

(sometimes excessively large) in the social arena. Jonathan Swift de-scribes it in the method of appointing ministers in Lilliput: There arenumerous suitable candidates and they are asked to dance on a tight-rope; the few that succeed assume the coveted position. The applica-tion is not time consuming, it amuses the audience and what mattersmost, the result is unequivocal: whoever falls off is rejected.

Gambling is a craft in which the will reveals its arbitrariness,namely, its independence. However, people may shroud the arbitrari-ness of their choices post-factum in a sheath of rationality, and denythe irrelevancy of the criteria they employed.

Self-Deception

In the common case, then, the will relies on the intellect, thoughrounding off the degree of verification in this or that direction. In pre-sumably less common cases the will acts independently, namely,gambles. It is, however, also possible that there are cases in which thewill dictates the results of the intellect's work, i.e., these paradoxicalcases in which a person deceives him/herself. Obviously, the phrase

The Will 33

“self-deception” should not be taken literally. In other words, the as-sumption that the deceiver and the deceived are fully identical ismeaningless. It is therefore requisite to assume that one section of apersonality impinges upon another section of the same personality in amanner corresponding to deception.14

It seems that self-deception should be understood solely as a casein which the will “deceives” the intellect . It is not, however, to be seenas if the will knew the truth and hid it from the intellect — as is thecase with real deception (when a person deceives someone else). Thematter goes this way: The will determines a belief without permittingthe intellect to examine the issue. It charges the intellect with the taskto find arguments in favor of this belief, thus casting it in the role of anattorney bound to defend and not to judge his client — at the sametime trying to appear convinced of what he is out to convince others.Yet, in contradistinction to the metaphorical client, the will does notknow the truth either, nor is it interested in this case to correct itsignorance. If the truth corresponds to the will's verdict, well enough —if it does not, alas for the truth. The will adjudicates here with the aimto prevent conflicts within the personal value-system, paying but littleattention to knowledge. A married man may, for instance, ask hisintellect for evidence that his spouse does not betray him, and the wifemay request evidence that her spouse does not betray her.15 The fox'swill orders evidence from its intellect that the grapes are sour, andtherefore avoiding the vineyard will saved him unnecessary effort andrisk. The intellect in itself, namely according to its own inclination, isimpartial and does not presuppose something that needs to be proven.

If the Freudian claim about repression is right, then in our termssomething like the following could take place: a person's will decidesthat its owner harbors no forbidden wish; it shifts attention away fromtopics and contexts conducive to the explicit arousal of this wish; if thelatter nevertheless sneaks into the area of attention, the will orders theintellect to explain it away — to deny in a reasoned and rationalmanner that the forbidden wish exists. If the will succeeds in this en-deavor, it saves itself conflicts; if it fails, it may increase them and thesuffering they entail. In this case, the will “deceives” the intellect'sreflection about motivative values.

Yet, in a certain sense the will, while “deceiving” its owner, isaware of the truth — thus justifying the metaphor. The will knows(i.e., operates on the basis of this assumption) that if the truth is suchand such, and if we were aware of it, distress would follow. As afore-said, the will does not know that this is, in fact, the truth, and it pre-vents its owner from examining the matter impartially. If the decision-making process were conscious, the will would not be able to hide


anything and the metaphor, which implies hiding, would not presentitself. We may come closer to the truth by saying that something hideswithin the will, than by saying that the will hides something. In anentirely different sense and with less justification we could perhapssay, that sometimes the will itself “is deceived” by subordinate factors,when these evade the supervision it exercises over them. We shallreturn to this matter further on (in the second and the third part).

If matters, indeed, stand as proposed here, it is doubtful whetherthe saying that a person is owner of his or her will fits the relationshipbetween the will and other personality-components.

There are elements in the human personality whose action can becommanded by the will: the intellect, observation and the motor-sys-tem. There are other elements the will cannot command but may influ-ence. Emotion is among the latter. The will influences emotion in twoways.

First — the will can determine which emotion a person is going toexperience — by determining a belief concerning facts that arouse anemotional reaction. I decide, for instance, that so and so presumablydid a certain deed. The decision is taken in the light of a certain find-ing by the intellect, and this in its turn arouses my emotional reactionaccording to the nature of the deed in question. In this case, the willdid not influence the manner of my emotional reaction. The will drewthe stimulant for my emotional reaction either from a cognitive ten-dency (and the reaction emerged as a marginal result of the will's ac-tion), or from the tendency to arouse such a reaction.

Emotion is subject to the will's influence in an additional (second)manner — when the latter determines and establishes one of the valuescreated by reason; this value plays its part in the application and thecreation of guiding-lines, striking root in the human being and induc-ing change in the manner of emotional reaction — so that realizationof the new value will involve joy, and its non-realization sorrow.

The will influences the location of emotion within the individualvalue-system, in particular through its influence on the power of themotive that involves emotion commands. An aspiration involving anykind of emotion is placed in the order of priorities shaped by the will,and this placement influences the status of the emotion at issue.

The Denial of the Will

Most of the 20th century philosophical and psychological literaturetook pains to describe the human mind without the aid of the word“will” and its derivatives. Gilbert Ryle voiced the prevailing trend. In

The Will 35

general, the will was only discussed within a special section of dis-course, namely the traditional question concerning necessity and freewill. The mind with no will — as it appears in psychology and phi-losophy — is intellectual; it consists of the intellect and its offshoots(offshoots like observation, emotion or decision-making). The mind isa sophisticated computer with an addition of an emotional ornament.However, the question arises who operates the computer or who usesit, what kind of capacities it has are employed and to what ends. Andindeed, psychology senses that a work-place is created within themind-mechanisms it describes; this work-place seems for the timebeing to employ “little people,” homunculi, residing within the humanbeing: they press a button, activate a mechanism of sensory absorptionor of some intellectual activity, receive the requested message, stop theoperation and press a button in order to start another activity. And untilthe will is restored to its place, its substitutes will never be out of a job.The more psychology perfects its description of the mind as a systemof mechanisms, the less the burden imposed upon the homunculi —but it is far from being removed from their small shoulders.

When one psychologist (A) charges another psychologist (B) withhaving illegally employed a homunculus in his enterprise, the accusa-tion has to be examined from three angles: If psychologist A meansthat various mechanisms, like sensory perception, cognition or moti-vation, should be fully automatic and in no need of a guiding hand —then A is mistaken, because the models psychology designs need notbe more sophisticated than human mind as it actually is — and themind stands in need of the will. If, however, psychologist A wishes tosay that the homunculus works too hard for B, or that the latter em-ploys too many homunculi — i.e., the machinery in B's enterprise isnot up-to-date and a better alternative is available — then A has a case.The third viewpoint concerns substitution of the will: for as long as thewill is not in the picture, there is an empty space, recognizable by whatfills it up, which is but a temporary replacement.

There is room here for the question whether the sight of homunculispeeding along the corridors of the mind bears evidence to these twofactors alone — inadequacy of the mechanism (and therefore muchwork in operating it), and mainly, absence of the will — or whether itdemonstrates the discrepancy in self-knowledge between the mind as itis known by itself as an object and the real mind that knows itself — adiscrepancy the human mind cannot eradicate.

Popular thought and its idioms of everyday speech employ theword “will” and its derivatives in order to describe phenomena thatcannot be properly described in other terms. The phenomenologicalapproach in axiology has to acknowledge these phenomena, to


describe the full span of their specificity and avoid reducing andlimiting them to activities of the intellect.

To consider judgment in general, including cognitive judgment, asan activity of the will is a Cartesian view. In an argument against it,the word “to believe” and its derivatives (“belief” etc.) are morecongenial than the word “to judge” and its derivatives. Judgmentappears as active, believing as passive. Adjudication shapes thesubstance of discussion while believing appears as an act of acceptingthe intellect's products, the acquiescence in their being as they are andnot different. The category “judgment” is therefore congenial to aCartesian position, while the category “belief” is congenial to anintellectualist position. We will then employ the word “to believe” informulating a claim against the position proposed here. Can I decide tobelieve from now on something different from what I believed up tonow, and can I implement this decision.16 Can I decide to change mybelief in a matter of facts — for instance, decide that it is night, eventhough I see daylight, and can I implement this decision (i.e., beginbelieving something opposed to what I actually believe now); theserhetorical questions apparently demonstrate that belief is not subject tothe will. However, usually a person does not want to believe but whatthe intellect (which relies on observation) bears witness to. The will asan adjudicating power usually but processes the intellect's products,orders supplements from the intellect and sometimes even urges it on.The aim of processing is to serve decision-making. That is to say, thatthe will is not inclined to disown the intellect, but to harness it. The ex-periment suggested by the instruction to believe it is night while youactually see daylight, does not show but that the will is not free to turnitself into an object of experiments or games (irrespectively of whetherit is free or not in other aspects).

Chapter 3

Value Properties and their Bearers

Neutral Knowledge or Pure Cognitive Content

Should we describe the mathematical proportions between theparts of a cake and name the parts in reference to who receives them,we would arrive at a neutral description. Neutral will also be such adescription of a distribution of bread among hungry people. As neitherthe recipients of the helpings, nor the person who describes the matter,nor those who listen to the description or read it are (usually) indiffer-ent with regard to this proportion, they will value it for better or forworse. That is to say, they are not neutral in relation to this state ofaffairs, thus making it difficult to claim that the latter is itself neutral inrelation to them. If this state of affairs is not fictitious, it would also behard to claim that the fact in which it was realized, what we describedby way of mathematics, is neutral. If I oppose a certain state of affairs,is the latter neutral in relation to me? And if it is not neutral, then nocontent and no state of affairs, which are valued for better or forworse, seem to be neutral from the outset.

This problem has to be clarified in the following manner. Only thedescription and the explanation may be fully neutral; the object, or theobjective situation, or the state of affairs, are not neutral but in thesense that it is possible to report and explain them neutrally; they areneutral only as far as they can be covered by a neutral report.


Here another question could arise. Valuation itself and the adher-ence to values can be reported neutrally, namely at the meta-valuativelevel. It follows that any thought-content may be reported neutrally,and therefore the division between neutral and valuative is annulled. Iwill be challenged that I passed from altogether non-neutral sphere ofreality into the sphere of thinking, where any content could be neutral;a division between neutral and non-neutral does not prevail within oneof this spheres.

To defend ourselves against this challenge we have to qualify theaforesaid in the following manner: Content is neutral if, and as far as itis possible to transmit it by a neutral report on its own intentional level.The proportion between the parts of the cake and the proportionbetween the powers of their recipients, as well as the relation betweenthese, can be fully covered by a neutral report, and in this sense, wewill call them “neutral.” To this end, there is no need to reflect uponthe report. Our valuative response to these proportions cannot betransmitted neutrally on its own intentional level but only by reflectionupon it, or better, upon its form, and we will therefore call it “non-neutral.”

The distinction between levels of intention is not made ad-hoc, inorder to defend the distinction between what is valuative and what isvalue-neutral. Reflection upon a certain thought has an object which isdifferent from the object of this thought; the reflection dwells upon theways of this thought and its patterns and not upon its object. In otherwords: The reflection aims at the form of the original intention; it isnot a continuation of the original intention, because it aims at a differ-ent object. The reflective is not a continuation of the transitive.

A neutral content is not always cognitive (for instance, in art thecontent may be value-neutral without being cognitive). On the otherhand, knowledge is not always neutral. We call “cognitive” only theneutral part of knowledge.

Mixed Values and Pure Values

A value is mixed when besides the valuative element it also con-tains a cognitive element. The manner in which these elements areintegrated differs according to the nature of the valuative element. Forexample, a goal that a person establishes for him/herself, is a value thatusually contains a reasoned supposition that this goal is achievable.This supposition is a cognitive element; it is neutral in the sense thatanother person, who is indifferent to this goal, may judge, whether it isachievable according to his own knowledge, and his judgment may be

Value Properties and their Bearers 39

better than that of the person who established the goal. (Let us repeat:In some other sense this element of knowledge is not neutral — i.e.,the value-system does not consider it neutral, nor is the person whoestablishes the goal indifferent with regard to this element). Obviously,the goal also contains approval of its achievement, i.e., a purelyvaluative factor, thus making it a mixed value.

As an example of a pure value, one may offer the wish, whichcould embody the pleasure-principle in its opposition to the reality-principle (within the system of Freudian concepts).

What a Value-Property Is

A value-property is the embodiment of a valuation by the valuedobject, namely, an objectified valuation; one may, however, look atany valuation the other way round, namely, as recognition of a value-property, or as its subjective reconstruction, i.e., a subjectified value-reality. In both cases, we observe the itinerary between subject andobject, once in this direction and once in the other.

Let us take a few examples of value-properties. A deed involvingpleasure: the value-property of this deed is its being pleasurable (asmentioned above, deeds belong among objects). The property of atasty dish is to arouse a feeling of tastiness in certain humans. Thesympathy I feel for a certain person represents his or her value-property to be likeable in my eyes. A woman's beauty is her value-property. The justice realized in a personal deed is the value-propertyof this deed.

The content of a value-property is not fully identical with itsmatching valuation. If we take the elementary valuation, pleasure, andcompare it with the value-property of a commodity, we will find thatsome entirely equal units of this commodity, namely, equal also intheir value-properties, afford pleasure of varying quality and degree toa person aware of his feelings, who consumes them one by one. Let ussay that he is offered five units of a fruit he has never tasted before andsenses the full taste only while eating the second unit — yet the fifthunit will already be less tasty than the fourth, so that each unit willhave a different taste. This person ate the fruit units, which were ar-ranged in a row, from right to left. Had he eaten them in opposite or-der, the first unit on the left would have had the taste that the first uniton the right actually had. That is to say that the feeling valuation of thefruit differs regarding different units, while their value-properties areidentical; valuation changes in the course of consumption, while thevalue-property remains constant. In the course of objectification a


number of subjective factors, bound up with the state of the individualat a certain moment, are omitted. In other words: These factors areadded in the course of subjectification.

Intellectual, i.e., conceptual valuation bridges this gap, because itis conscious of the route it passes when it creates the idea of a value-property; it also reflects about its own procedure, no matter whetherthis reflection interprets the procedure objectively or subjectively.

The manner in which the value-property relates to motive resem-bles the manner in which it relates to valuation. The value-propertymay also be an appeal the object aims at us by its very presence, thusarousing the motivative value in us. That is to say, the value-property,which is an appeal, is somewhat close to a motive that is the arousal ofa motivative value. But from another angle there is a difference: thewish to receive an additional unit of fruit changes considerably andloses power within the same individual in the course of eating; accord-ingly the readiness to make some sacrifice for the sake of an additionalunit, decreases. This means that motive, like valuation, contains a hostof transient individual factors, which are not components of the value-property.

In a single, isolated try-out, a person going through it does not yetexperience the difference between a value-property and valuation, northe difference between the former and a motive. The value-property, orthe idea the subject has of it, crystallizes only in the course of severaltry-outs. The intellectual activity contributing to this crystallization isaccompanied by reflection; as mentioned above, this reflection distin-guishes between the subject, which includes valuation and motive, andthe object, which includes the value-property.

We accord a value-property the predicates of a value; namely, it ispositive or negative, full or empty, pure or mixed.

To sum up, a value-property is a relational property of an object,brought into being by the relation between this object and an individ-ual subject, and identical in its content with the core of valuation. Thedifference between a value-property and valuation resides in theirmanner of existence: the property belongs to the character of its owner,it is a component of the world, while valuation is an activity of thesubject.

Everyday speech does not make axiological distinctions and at-taches the word “value” to a variety of matters. When saying “thevalue of” something, the speakers either point to a value-property ofthe thing, or to its exchange-value (which we will discuss in part III).In this manner, one should interpret that “this thing has value” and thatthe thing “is valuable.” However, if one speaks about “the values of” acertain person, it denotes the values that guide this person's valuations.


The manner of speech we also employed about “adherence to val-ues” ties-in with the usage “the values of” somebody (if a person ad-heres to a value, the value belongs to him or her).

In contradistinction to a motivative value, a valuative value is trulyneither a possession nor a part, and thus does not belong in any precisemeaning to anyone or anything (a motivative value belongs to a personin a similar sense that his arm or his emotion belong to him).

Value and the Value-Measuring Instrument

It is sometimes said that a value is a measure, which seems perhapsto be the same as a measuring-instrument. Words like “standard” or“norm” are also used in explaining the concept of value withoutpaying due attention to the difference between a measure, for examplea yard or a meter, and a measuring instrument, e.g. a yardstick uponwhich centimeters, meters, inches and yards are marked by notches.The yardstick could be made of wood and could break and this doesnot apply to the yard as a measure. A measure is a general notion,whereas a measuring instrument is an individual object. What I want toemphasize is that the valuative value is a measure and not a measuringinstrument. Some single valued object may serve as a measuringinstrument to which other objects are compared with regard to “theirvalue” or more precisely, from the angle of the value-property in ques-tion. That is to say, the specific value-property of each among theother objects possessing the property in question, is compared to thespecific value-property of the sample-object we chose as a measuringinstrument. For instance, a judicial precedent is a measuring instru-ment similar cases are compared to. The saliently quantitative aspectof the role played by the measuring instrument may surface here in thedegree of punitive severity. The value represented by this measuringinstrument is the law.

The value-measuring instrument is a tool to test whether the valuedobject matches the valuative value. The difficulty in measuring this, orthe imprecision involved, arise from the fact that value-properties areoften not given immediately, but derived from valuation by omittingsome of their subjective features.

Regarding motivative values, we can envision two kinds of meas-urement. One is value-measurement, carried out by reflection thatseeks to value motives and does so by comparing them; at the root ofthis measurement lie special values, designed to value motives. Theother measurement is carried out by reflection that seeks neutralknowledge of the relative power the various motives have.


The Value-Bearer

We will now examine the notion of value-bearer. A value-bearer isa property or a structure of the object that accompanies the value-prop-erty; precision would oblige us to speak of a “value-property bearer.”It is, however, accepted usage to say that an object “has value” insteadsaying that it has a value-property; thus we may choose the shorter andmore convenient phrase in this case, and say “value-bearer” instead of“value-property bearer” — provided we remember the imprecision in-volved.

The value-bearer differs from the value-property in that it is value-neutral; it is neutral in the sense that it does not depend upon thesubject's stand for or against it and we know it through value-neutralknowledge.

The good taste of a dish is a value-property, borne by the chemicalcomposition of the dish, which is described by a chemical formula.The property of water to quench thirst is a full and positive value-property, given to perception and mixed (like other value-properties ofsensory/feeling substance); the bearer of this property are H2O mole-cules in liquid condition, mixed with some salts (because distilledwater barely quenches thirst).

Value-properties received by the senses (like tasty or refreshing)are mixed, namely, they are mixed with elements of information whichmay be treated as value-neutral, or they contain these elements. Theintellect as it were, extracts these elements, compares and processesthem, turning them into the point of departure for a procedure thatends with the physico-chemical description, i.e., it ends with the value-bearer. The value-bearer is achieved only at a late stage in theconceptual interpretation of the sensory given.

The question arises whether every value-property has a specificbearer and in consequence, if we could split the former into two value-properties, we could also split the value-bearer in a parallel manner.

Max Scheler says: “We know of a stage in the grasping of valueswherein the value of an object is already very clearly and evidentiallygiven apart from the givenness of the bearer of the value. Thus, forexample, a man can be distressing and repugnant, agreeable, or sympa-thetic to us without our being able to indicate how this comes about; inlike manner we can for the longest time consider a poem or anotherwork of art 'beautiful' or 'ugly', 'distinguished' or 'common', withoutknowing in the least which properties of the contents of the workprompt this. … In such cases the extent to which values (in our terms


'value-properties' - M.S.) are, in their being, independent of theirbearer clearly reveals itself.” 17

What is it in the appearance of a person that makes him/her like-able? I will not always be able to answer this question, but it concernsa value-bearer. Whoever holds the opinion that every value-propertyhas a bearer — we name this opinion “correlation-thesis” — will tellme: Even though you cannot isolate and pin down the factors of thelikeability-bearer now, this bearer exists. The way to find it begins bydiscounting the salient element of value within the value-property: wemust ignore the likeability of this likeable face and describe it in ex-haustive detail, so that finally we will be able to say that this and thatgeometrical arrangement of color patches results in a likeable face (fora certain person or for whoever belongs to a certain kind of humanbeings). The same holds for the question what makes an object curi-ous, mysterious, beautiful, trust-inspiring, etc.18

However, this thesis arouses doubt whether anything will be left inevery case, once the salient value element of the value-property hasbeen discounted. What argument supports this assumption, apart fromthe fact that in many cases one can find the value-bearer?

The correlation-thesis disciple replies thus: The value-property is arelation and needs the related entities, because there is no relationwhich is not borne by its bearers; one of the value-relation bearers isthe subject, so that the second bearer has to reside with the object, andtherefore this is the value-bearer.

Let us examine this argument. Obviously, the very metaphor of avalue-bearer invites such reasoning. This metaphor also fits scientificcommonsense, or the surface that reveals itself to critical reflection,once the mixture of knowledge and values (most of it) has been re-moved. At this stage, we arrive at a picture whose value-neutral ele-ment is fundamental and independent of the subject, while only thevalue-element is relational. The value appears as a bridge and thevalue-neutral element as a river-bank, i.e., as the one linked to thesubject's opposite bank by the value-bridge. As long as we find value-bearers, this picture is conveniently workable. One has, however, toexamine its verity.

The correlation-thesis and the philosophy surrounding it would becorrect, if the object of science were the thing in itself, namely, if it didnot carry the contributions of sensory observation and the intellect,which cannot be removed without annulling the object. As these con-tributions exist, the object of a value-neutral description is a relational(and not fundamental) entity as well, possessing no ontologicaladvantage over the value-property. One should also say that both arephenomena, and the same thing may possess a value-phenomenon and


a neutral phenomenon, as well as it may appear only in one of thesetwo modes.

In support of the correlation-thesis one could argue, that viewingthe difference between a value-property and the value-bearer asentirely subjective, amounts to an excessively subjectivist treatment ofthe latter, as the value-bearer is not a pure cognitive idea, but what isaimed at by means of that idea or what is intended by it. I admit thatthe value-bearer is not really an idea (a notion or a picture), but what isbeing imagined. However, this consideration also holds with regard tothe value-property, which is not identical with valuation, but is in-tended by it. If you demand that by “what is aimed at,” or “intended”we specify a fundamental entity, then we intend the same thing, thesame entity, in valuation as well as in cognition. If, however, you statethat “what is intended” should specify something concrete (asdistinguished from the fundamental, which cannot be characterized),then the value-bearer contains subjective contributions.

In consequence, the value-bearer has no ontological advantageover the value-property, and there is no guarantee that every value-property has a bearer.

A value-bearer will have the same value-property as long as thesubject does not change; the value-bearer will have varying value-properties for different people, according to their difference incharacter.

The fact that apparently value-properties, attributed by differentpeople to a certain object, differ more from each other than neutralproperties attributed to the same by the different people, is not incom-patible with the proposition that both are of relational character. It ispossible that (a) one relation is more sensitive to differences betweensingle individuals than the other. It is also possible (b), as ClarenceIrving Lewis says,19 that value differences matter more to people thanpure cognitive differences, and are therefore more emphasized. If so,then it is also possible that (c) there is a connection between the twopossibilities (a and b), i.e., that owing to the importance of these dif-ferences, we do not only emphasize them, but are more sensitive tothem and grasp them more firmly from the outset.

Distinctive Marks

It is not always easy to determine the borderline between value-properties and value-bearers. The taste of a dish will nearly always


carry a value-charge, and has therefore to be considered a value-prop-erty. The same goes for smell. With regard to touch as well as hearingand sight on the other hand, we may be able to point at qualities we areindifferent to, even though they do not appear in an isolated state.What is perceived by the senses has therefore usually some valuativecharacter; the cognitive interest takes it as a point of departure, fromwhich it develops the notions concerning the value-bearer; having de-veloped these notions, the cognitive interest views either what is ab-sorbed by the senses or the value-property as a distinctive mark of thevalue-bearer's presence. For instance, someone has an aching tooth;this value-property may distinctively mark the damage suffered by thetooth.

However, the value-bearer may also serve as a distinctivecharacteristic of the value-property, primarily in the public domain.Two people whose values differ will require neutral distinctive marksin order to proceed to mutual understanding in the sphere of values.When one of them, for instance, talks about a just society, the otherwill ask for distinctive marks; he is obviously neither interested inpraise of the just regime nor in its description in terms of values, but ina description in neutral terms. It is also possible that one of them tellsabout a tasty dish and the other, belonging to a different culture, willask for distinctive marks in terms of the taste-bearers. The distinctivemark serves as a means for identification.

A satisfactory list of a value-property's distinctive marks may func-tion as its definition. As it is in general possible to exchange the de-finiendum with the definiens (without altering the meaning of what issaid), it seems possible to exchange valuations of objects with theirscientific description wherever constant value-bearers exist, and tocarry out a quasi reduction of the desirable to the existent.

Let us take an example. I wish to learn the distinctive marks ofgood writing-paper; I find that it is thick and silky; I even state itsthickness and silkiness quantitatively. I have, therefore, a definition,and from here onwards the question whether a certain paper is goodwriting-paper addresses neutral facts; the sentence “this is good writ-ing-paper” will from now on be true or false in the same sense that ascientific text is true or false. On the face of it, a reduction from thesphere of values to the sphere of science has taken place.

Nevertheless, this consideration ignores a substantial item: Thedefinition of “good writing-paper” does not convey the full meaning ofthis phrase, because it does not re-state the preference, or the value-character represented by the word “good.” The translation into termsof value-bearers is therefore not an exhaustive translation.


The issue can also be examined from the following point of view:The definition provided for good writing-paper is not a nominal defi-nition, because it is not arbitrary; I do not decide to call a certain writ-ing-paper “good writing-paper”; I find that I prefer a certain writing-paper and I describe this paper in neutral terms, but not my preferencefor it. Yet, preference is a mode of valuation.

The Value-Proposition

There are two kinds of value-proposition: a) The value-constituting proposition, which creates and establishes the value (or,from an objectivist point of view, creates a value-notion andacknowledges the value). b) The valuative proposition, namely theproposition that applies the value.

Not every value is constituted, as there are values which are givento us by means of emotional and feeling valuation. However, we con-stitute the values that are not given to us by means of propositionsexpressed in sentences. Constitution includes the conceptual creationand the establishment through judgment, and it is not necessary thatthe former be accomplished before the latter; on the contrary, it is ap-parently more frequent for creation and establishment to be inter-woven. The value being created functions in the process of its creationas a syntactical subject explained by predicates. The created value ismade up by the predicates that are ascribed to it and (before it is estab-lished and acquires its emotional charge) it is but the sum of these. Wemay begin to create the notion of justice by thinking the propositionthat justice is the proper method to distribute an object possessing avalue-property among people (distribution of roles or goods,obligations or rights), and go on to make terms by which we arrive at acertain recommended shape of the distribution method. The better wesucceed in defending the notion of justice we have shaped against agreater number of doubts, the more strength it will gather, i.e., it willbe established in its place. The predicates attributed to the value-notionand accumulated within it, are at least partially themselves value-notions.

The faculty of reason of the individual is the value-creating agency— be it original in its endeavor or reconstructing in its own way thecreative work of other individuals.

The valuative proposition is either an application of a constitutedvalue, or the posterior expression of a feeling or emotional valuation.Such an expression is a conceptual elaboration of a given valuation.


Both kinds of value-proposition frequently contain a pure cogni-tive component. In a value-constituting proposition this componentmay be embedded in the value itself, thus making it a mixed value,like a goal or a duty. In a valuative proposition, the purely cognitiveelement may be the value-bearer, functioning as a distinctive mark ofvalue-quality.

When my friend asks “do you also believe this is good writing pa-per,” he may aim at the purely cognitive aspect, namely, “do you alsobelieve that this is thick and silky paper”; he may, however, aim at thevalue-component, namely, “do you also prefer thick and silky paper toany other?” In an actual situation, I will usually know what he means.

I hear two people arguing whether Reuben Ben-Simon is economi-cal or stingy, and what I hear does not permit me to determine therelation between the cognitive and the valuative elements in their ar-gument. It is possible that they only differ with regard to facts or onlywith regard to values — the latter if the value-bearer of stinginess ac-cording to one opinion is also the value-bearer of economy accordingto his correspondent's values. (Theoretically they may not differ at all— if the value-bearer is not the same, i.e., what the one condemns isnot exactly what the other praises; however, this fact will presumablysurface by itself if their argument is to the point). The difficulty inseparating the components of such valuations is that we have no third,neutral word to designate the characteristic of a person who tends tospend only a small part of his or her income, to wit,, we have no namefor the value-bearer.

Content and Form in a proposition

Not every sentence that comprises value-words (like “good” or“bad,” “tasty” or “not tasty”) expresses a value-proposition. A value-proposition is a proposition in which the intention aims at the valuativeand not at the cognitive element (which is not always present in avalue-proposition), while a cognitive proposition is that in which theintention is directed at the cognitive and not at the valuative element(which will not always be present in a cognitive proposition). When aproposition incorporates an element at which the intention of the per-son who maintains this proposition does not aim, this element func-tions as an accompanying factor, namely, as background orframework, as an auxiliary means, as a mediating factor between thesubject and the intention's object — namely, it functions as the form ofthe intention. In a value-proposition, the valuative element is the


intentional content, while the cognitive element belongs to the form ofthe intention; the opposite holds for a cognitive-proposition.

Let us take an example. A child watching a movie asks whetherone of the protagonists belongs to the good guys or the bad guys. Fromwhat the child says throughout the movie and at the end there is nodoubt that it seeks information, knowledge of facts, in order tounderstand the sequence of events — for instance, whom this protago-nist wishes to assist by his deeds. The circumstance that facts andevents of the movie belong to an imagined reality does not alter thenature of the child's interest, which is cognitive; the question whetherthat person belongs to the good guys or the bad guys w as not a requestfor assistance in determining a position with regard to the protagonists,but a request for assistance in the reconstruction of images and plot.The answer to the question will therefore not be taken as a valuativebut as a cognitive proposition in which values belong exclusively toform. Here value-qualities function as distinctive marks that show whobelongs to this or that warring party.

When we have no convenient and value-neutral terminology at ourdisposal (as we have no third term in relation to “miser” and “frugalperson” or no other names for the good and the bad in a movie), wewill have to draw on valuative words, even if the discussion is notaimed at valuation.

The Demand that Cognition Precede Valuation

It has been demanded that an object be known before it is valued;that a perceptual and conceptual idea be created before one assumes aposition with regard to an object. Descartes, for instance, presents thisdemand when he infers from his analysis that one should permit theintellect to accomplish its task before the will passes judgment, as longas the inquiry seeks the truth (and not a supposition needed for a deed).And indeed, the intrinsic logic of this demand is clear. Nevertheless, Ido not believe that we, namely human beings, are made in a way thatenables us to meet this demand — in any case, to meet it as it ispresented. The sensory given is not value-neutral; what we absorbpleases or causes pain, befriends or confounds us. If the sensory givenwere neutral we could, indeed, meet the demand that cognition precedevaluation. And not only is the actually given not neutral, but further-more: The points of departure for cognitive thought and value-thoughtare inextricably entwined; on the level of sense-perception it is impos-sible to separate the value-element completely from the neutral infor-mative element; the separation is only achieved through abstraction by


means of conceptions (moreover: having made the abstract distinctionwe will not always be able to determine the correlation between onequality and another, between a value-quality and its bearer).

One could also rearrange this demand by division into three in-stead of two: First one should imagine and understand possible entitiesand only afterwards judge the matter of their existence or non-exis-tence and whether they are good or bad. According to such a demand,pure thought-content comes first while the two later offshoots, cogni-tion and valuation, are not interdependent, and their order of appear-ance is therefore of no account. This demand is also violated by thenature of the given.

Nevertheless, it is possible — though not in the comprehensivecourse of thought — to meet some of these demands in certain sectionsof the thinking process.

Value-Knowledge

The question arises whether there are erroneous valuation sen-tences, which ascribe to a certain object value-properties it lacks. Forinstance, the statement that a certain fruit I hold in my hand is tasty,may be proved wrong. The supposition that certain value-propertiesare interdependent in a specific case or in general, may also be provedwrong. Against existing erroneous valuation sentences, there are cor-rect valuation sentences, namely, value-knowledge.

In pre-Renaissance thought as well as in everyday thought up tothe present there is no boundary and no division between value-knowl-edge and pure (i.e., neutral) cognition; science, as far as it detachesitself from everyday thought, also detaches itself from value-knowl-edge.

Chapter 4

The Valuative Value: Modes of itsBeing

In this chapter, I discuss the subjective reality of the valuative valueand the feelings and emotions in which it is embedded.

From the aspect of its content, the valuative value does not belongto reality, but faces it as a kind of mirror in which as it were reality canobserve itself. From the aspect of its form — the back of the mirror —the valuative value includes real ties with the rest of reality andtherefore belongs to it: people adhere to a value, apply it and realize it;however, a value appertains to reality not only at the final stage —realization by its disciples — but already in the ways in which realsubjects adhere to it.

The presence of a value involves its location in valuation, and fromthis angle we can distinguish five states, or five modes of being: thefirst is crystallization, the other four are ways of diffusion by whichthe value is implanted in valuations and in what is being valued.


a. Crystallization

The crystallized value does not only exist in its applications, thevaluations made according to this value, but also separately, as a con-cept. Justice is crystallized in the concept of justice, namely in itsdefinition (or something like a definition), in the distinctive marks ofthe objects which come under this heading (these marks may be value-properties or their bearers), or in their expositions. True, different peo-ple have different notions of justice or injustice, but these are but dif-ferent answers to the same question human beings face, and all enjoythe same status — each with regard to whoever adheres to it.

A value-concept may crystallize from a value in diffusion. It ispossible, for instance, that the word “just” or the word “unjust” wereused as syntactical predicates in valuation sentences before the word“justice” began to function as a subject in value-constituting sentences.The comparison of valuations serves as a point of departure and sup-plies the matter from which the concept of justice is shaped.

Once the separate value has been constituted, its essential priorityreveals itself in the temporal precedence it takes over its applications:the mind addresses the value before it addresses valuation.

b. Values Implied by Valuations

This is the state of a value that exists only in the valuations carriedout according to it, but these valuations exist as special, intentionalacts or procedures. Even though the value is scattered, or in a state ofdiffusion, it is embedded in the intentional content, namely, it belongsto what is meant. The valuations made in its light are eitherpredicative, or emotional, or feeling-valuation.

Predicative valuations discussed here are, for example, the use of“just” or “unjust” before the concept of justice has been shaped in thecourse of its function as a syntactical subject. We have already men-tioned this usage, describing it as what functions subsequently as thematter from which the concept of justice is fashioned. Here the mean-ing of value-words is determined by paradigms, namely, examples thatconstitute what is being exemplified. When a deed is said to be just(before justice has been defined), another, already known deed, analo-gous to the former, demonstrates what justice is. The analogy withcases that have already acquired the status of just deeds replaces theapplication of a concept (as long as the required concept does not ex-ist).

The Valuative Value: Modes of its Being 53

It is likely that emotional valuations also serve as a source of con-tent for the creation of value-concepts, but the manner of contenttransmission from emotion to concept is rather obscure. It is probablymediated by the predicative, diffuse value, i.e., by the influence emo-tions exert upon the use of value-words.

As for feeling-valuations, even though they may be expressed onthe predicative level, they cannot feed the crystallization of concepts.Someone, let us call him Reuben, says “this ice-cream is tasty,” thusvoicing a predicative feeling-valuation on a predicative level. It is ob-vious that neither this valuation nor its expression represent the appli-cation of a value-concept. And indeed, should we find the value-bearerof what is tasty for Reuben in the form of a certain chemical formula,this will be a cognitive concept of what is tasty for Reuben, but not avalue-concept. Even if Reuben himself adopts this concept, it willneither replace the implied value nor function as a crystallized value.Try to imagine what would happen if the chemical formula stood forthe crystallization of a value; let us assume that the chemical composi-tion of some foodstuff appears in print on the package; Reuben wouldperuse this and find the food tasty or not tasty in accordance with theprinted message. I admit that this message may influence what is feltas taste, but basically it is not decisive (imagine that the label Reubenrelies upon was by mistake attached to a different product, and conductthe inferred experiment in your imagination). The concept of a value-bearer of what is tasty for Reuben belongs to the meta-valuative andnot the valuative level.

c. Values Implied by the Form of Valuation

Here we also treat of a value enclosed in valuations, but belongingto their form and not to their content, while their content is an applica-tion or a quasi-application of other values. For instance, a positiveemotional valuation I harbor with regard to someone may influence theapplication of a conceptual value to the same person. As long as theemotion exists only as a bias in my conceptual value-judgment, itappertains to the form of valuation. That is to say that the applicationof a value-concept may have an emotional form, or better, may have aform that incorporates emotional factors.


d. Values Implied by the Form of Cognition

To show that the valuative element in a sentence may serve as theform of the cognitive element, we drew on the example of the childasking who belongs to the good or the bad in a movie. In this examplethe valuative element served only as a kind of framework, but in othercases the valuative form could shape the cognitive content, inaccordance with the latter's own tendency or opposing it. There is al-ways a mixture or a compound of cognition and valuation in practicalthought, with one element functioning as content and the other asform, and they are usually not opposed to each other; in practicalthought as a whole, cognition serves the valuative element, for in-stance, knowledge about the nature of a certain substance serves theaim of shaping a hunk of this substance in a certain way; this knowl-edge is gained in order to serve this aim and its patterns are shapedaccordingly. The full subordination of the cognitive to the valuativeelement prevents opposition between them in the practical sphere.Here the shaping of cognition by valuation does not representdistortion. Theoretical cognition, on the other hand, asks forsovereignty; any influence of the valuative form upon the finalcontent-product will therefore equal distortion.

e. The Individual Value

The particular value-property of a single object is the embodimentof an individual value. Usually it is the value-quality of one person foranother person, and we may also call it “personal value.” The value ofa father for his son may (at least in many cases) serve as an example ofan individual (or personal) value. It is possible that not only a humanbeing will serve as the object of an individual value.

The individual value is not separate from the valuation made ac-cording to it, and the latter is embodied in a value-property of the ob-ject it addresses. The value-property has no bearer; namely, the objecthas no neutral property which can be considered as a bearer. If it had abearer, the bearer would also have to be peculiar to this object. Youmight say: the peculiar combination of the object's neutral properties isthe bearer of the individual value. However, the whole point of thevalue-bearer rests with the comparison from which it arises, i.e., thecorrelation between value-property and neutral-property, whereas theindividual value leaves no room for the required comparison. So per-haps you will argue: person A possesses individual value for person B,


and nobody else possesses this value for B, but person C has the samevalue for person D and therefore comparisons can be made and abearer for this value can be found. For instance, everyone has only aone father, but there is room for a comparison between A's attitude tohis father and C's attitude to his father. The answer is this: the properindividual value bears the stamp of the valuing as well as the valuedperson; as two people never have the same fingerprints, so two peoplenever make an individual valuation in the same manner, and there areno two people who are valued in the same manner by individual valua-tions.

Perhaps one could claim that the entire object is the bearer of theindividual value. But the object in the relevant cases is constituted byits specific value-property; it is made-up by this property and thereforecannot bear it.

The individual value exists simultaneously on the level of feeling,emotion and conceptual thought, but on the conceptual level it is notcrystallized. It is enclosed in the sum total of relations between thevaluing person and the person being valued. These relations may bereciprocal, so that each of two people will represent (or possess) anindividual value for the other — but these will not be one and the samevalue.

An individual value par-excellence is not conditioned by the activi-ties and the states of the value-owner. In this respect, individual valuesdiffer in degree, but there are some that come at least close to, or evenachieve absolute independence of circumstances, i.e., of the object'sactivity and state, let alone its other circumstances. That is to say thatwhen the individual value is positive, valuatively negative activitieswill not cancel it.

An individual value has no name. At times, when the need arises, itis addressed by the name of another, not individual value, to which itis somewhat close. For instance, one will say that somebody “loves”his father, yet to refer to the relation in this manner is but an analogy(if, indeed, this father embodies an individual value). For the personmaking the valuation the name of the object functions virtually as thename of its value.

Having reviewed the ways in which a value exists, we will nowbriefly examine the nature of pre-predicative levels, where the valueexists in diffusion.


Feelings of Pleasure and Pain, Pleasantness andUnpleasantness

Pleasure and pain are the most elementary attitudes a person as-sumes with regard to his or her environment, to his or her own activi-ties and states, but these do not circumscribe all feeling attitudes; thefeeling of bad taste is not pain, anxiety is not pain, repulsion or disgustregarding a certain sight or smell, or the grating of a certain voice orsound are not pain either; nor would a person say that he enjoyshimself just because he feels comfortable; someone who feels compla-cent (the opposite of anxious) would not say either that he enjoys thefeeling. In order to embrace the whole range of feeling-positions it istherefore preferable to speak of pleasantness and unpleasantness, withpleasure and pain appearing as kinds of pleasantness and unpleasant-ness. Pain differs from other kinds of unpleasantness in degree and inthat it is located in a part of the body. A feeling of slight unpleasant-ness in a certain limb or organ will not be addressed as “pain,” andneither will a feeling of unpleasantness not located in the body. Pleas-ure should possibly be interpreted in a parallel manner.20

Elementary attitudes could be addressed as “pre-valuation,”because in the use of language prevailing outside axiology, one wouldnot, for instance, address pleasure or pain as “valuations.” However,the requirements of axiological discourse make it preferable to callsuch a state “valuation,” because even the abstract thought process,whose intention is the assumed stance, is accompanied by feelings andemotions and also bears their imprint. The realm of values is one andthe same. Its unity is noticeable not only in the complementarity of itsparts — “pre-valuation” and valuation — but also in their opposition:A value of reason would not actually be opposed to a feeling-value, ifthey did not reside in the same arena.

Feeling-valuation differs from other valuations in two characteris-tics: passivity and the absence of objectification.

Passivity

Feeling is passive in this respect that we seem to become aware ofit only post-factum. Apparently, it is not generated within the mind:the mind has only the finished product at its disposal — thus says thetestimony of immediate self-awareness, leaning on self-perception.The words “apparently” and “seem” have to convey that on thephilosophical level I cannot adopt this position without reservations.


It seems as if it were not us who make these valuations but ourbody, the organism, does it for us, decides what is good or bad, whattastes good or bad, and passes its verdicts to consciousness in the formof feelings. If you doubt whether this is, indeed, the testimony ofimmediate (or, better, pre-philosophical) self-awareness, ask a personin pain whether the pain is bodily or mental.

If the human body, or the human organism is a physical entity (i.e.,can be reduced to its physical elements, can be exhaustively describedin physical terms), then there is no room for pleasantness orunpleasantness, pleasure and pain included, as physics does not knowsuch things: textbooks in physics do not tell of pleasures and aches,nor do the words “pleasure” or “pain,” let alone “pleasantness” or “un-pleasantness,” translate into physical terminology. If someone fails torecognize the basic difficulty and says that perhaps tomorrow atranslation into the language of physics will emerge — we should askhim about a simple thing like a table for example: Is the table aphysical entity? True, each single table is a physical entity, but can wetranslate the word “table” into the language of physics, namely, canthe concept “table” be reduced to concepts in physics? In order to doso, we will have to find a physical property common to all tables andonly to tables — while we deal with tables made from differentmaterials, of different size, form, color etc. Actually, what is commonto tables and singles them out are valuative characteristics, namely,that humans make them with the aim to satisfy certain human needs —to serve them while writing, reading or eating. Aims, however, havebeen absent from books about physics for many years. So, what isvalid for the table is certainly valid for pain and pleasure and evenmore so for pleasantness and unpleasantness in general.

Even if every ache has a physical correlate, it does not follow thatpain in general has a physical correlate, namely, that there is a physicalattribute common to all correlates of pains and only to them, and thesame holds for pleasures. I think it reasonable to assume that everysingle mental “phenomenon,”21 or every mental entity has a singlephysical correlate, something like a physical infrastructure. However,the supposition that for every kind of mental entity there is a matchingkind of physical entity is rather doubtful.

The human body, as far as it is considered to engage in valuativeactivities, is not a physical entity. In the sense in which pleasure andpain are corporal, corporality is not physical. The body of which im-mediate self-awareness bears witness, is the body as it is experienced,one's own body as it is perceived, and not the body that is no one'sown, as it is considered and calculated by physics. It is the location of


pleasantness and unpleasantness that constitutes the body as a self-experienced body.

Feelings of pleasure or pain have in two main respects the samestatus as, for instance, the sight of color. 1. In both cases consciousnessaccompanying the intentional activity reports that what is perceived —for example pain or green color — are not a product of the mind butapprehended by it, i.e., come from outside; it is not the mind thatdecides what will cause pain, or what is green; it learns what these areas an accomplished fact. 2. From the viewpoint of the psycho-physicaldichotomy, the pain and the green spot both are not physical entities. Acertain length of light waves is a physical characterization, and acertain frequency of electrical impulses in a certain nerve-fiber is alsoa physical characterization, but neither the pain nor the green color.Both qualities, pain and green, belong to bodies in the body-minddivision of experience and belong to the psyche in the psycho-physicaldichotomy. The difference between feeling and sensation is that in theframework of information seeking observation, sensation belongs tothe realm of value-neutral mental activities, like scientific thinking,and in this sense there is an affinity between them; there is no suchaffinity between feeling in the sense of assuming an attitude andscience.

My aim here is to describe consciousness and not to clarify thepsycho-physical problem. I mentioned the issue merely to prevent anerroneous ontological interpretation, which does not distinguish be-tween one's own body as it is experienced and a physical entity, frombeing applied to the phenomenological reference to the human body.

To sum up: self-awareness bears witness to the mind's passivityregarding pleasantness and unpleasantness; it is not the mind that di-vides what it faces into pleasant and unpleasant and into kinds ofpleasant or unpleasant. The mind finds a fait-accompli — the divisionhas been made and is presented to it. The divider and presenter is, onthe face of it, the body, but not the body as a physical entity. Fromhere we have to go on weaving the thread.

The divider and presenter is not exactly the body as it is experi-enced either, because what is experienced is perceived, and the processof division, sorting and display-arrangement is not perceived, we arenot aware of it.

If so, it is not the physical stratum within the human being thatcarries out elementary valuations — neither the body, as experienced,nor the mind as far as it is aware of itself — but a pre-consciousmechanism which presents to consciousness what the senses absorb, 22

seeing to it that the latter already incorporate its being delightful or


distressing to the ear or the palate. This mechanism may be viewed asbelonging to the mind, or as belonging to the organism.

Sensation and feeling differ as acts of reception in that sensationapprehends value-neutral properties, while feeling apprehends value-properties. However, sensation as an intentional act, is not separatefrom feeling. By the same act of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling ortouching a person usually apprehends value-properties and value-neu-tral properties of objects, namely, a person senses and feels simultane-ously.

Not only sense perception but also self-perception (i.e., the percep-tion of mental states) is pleasant or unpleasant. The pleasantness orunpleasantness of perception is also the pleasantness or unpleasantnessof the perceived by that perception. Mental events and processes, asfar as they are perceived, i.e. as far as they are conscious, are pleasantor unpleasant in various degrees and manners (it is, of course, possiblefor something to reside at the zero point of a scale from pleasant tounpleasant). Certain thoughts are pleasant, others are unpleasant to thesame person. The object of a pleasant thought is not necessarily some-thing perceived through the senses.

Perusing the map of the mind, one might wonder: Are the moreabstract intellectual activities also accompanied by those elementaryfeelings, which are originally reactions to sensation? In response wemay say: Mental activities, also the complex ones, have a formal as-pect that incorporates “vestiges” of lower strata, and among these“vestiges” are the elementary sensual reactions.

Motives may join the pleasantness or unpleasantness of mental ac-tivities, namely a striving to achieve the pleasant or to avoid the un-pleasant. Such motives may be conscious or unconscious. They areconscious, for example, when a person chooses to read something or towatch a movie, because he takes pleasure from these activities. Theyare unconscious, for example, when a person represses an unpleasantthought. When a forbidden wish is repressed, it is at once pleasant andunpleasant. Yet there is a less extreme instance than repression, thoughnot less interesting to us, which one could call the “expulsion” ofthoughts. The difference is like that between driving an irritating insectaway and killing it. If we ask a person to consider an idea (or a wish)and tell us whether he had thought about it and then repressed it, thereis no doubt that this person will not only find it difficult to answer, buteven to recognize the suggested idea, if he/she has truly repressed it.Yet this would not occur with regard to an idea that was temporarilydriven away. The person asked would recognize the idea and not denyit. A psychologist told me of a person who engages in diversion-maneuvers in order to divert his attention from a certain thought


whenever it surfaces; whenever the slightest sign of this thoughtappears in the area of self-perception, he at once feels a pain in hischest or a difficulty in swallowing or giddiness, and his attention shiftsto the question of possible damage caused to his body. This personpays in physical suffering for his success in temporarily removingfrom his range of awareness a matter which is unpleasant, because itinvolves a great deal of bother. Less drastic means are ineffective indriving this insect away.23

Wherever feeling is to be found, it bears this feature of passivity.That is to say, it remains passive even when what it accompanies be-longs to the realm of activity. When we look at the psycho-physicalsubject as a whole, there is no doubt that feeling is an activity, thatwhat we name “apprehension” is an activity, that pain or the greencolor do not exist without a subject. Yet, this is activity at a “low”level, namely, activity of which considerable components are not con-scious, or not distinctly perceived. So far as feeling is an activity, it isnot yet comprehensively an distinctly “covered” by self-perception, atleast not to the degree that activities of the intellect are.

The apparently passive or receptive character paves the way forobjectification, but at this stage it does not yet occur.

The Lack of Objectification

As pleasantness and unpleasantness accompany highly different in-tentional acts, they also accompany acts of valuation, so that valuingan object for better or for worse on a conceptual level will itself begood or bad from the feeling angle; being good or bad from this anglebelongs to the form of the conceptual act, while the attitude towards itsobject makes up the content of this valuation.

It may therefore occur that valuing something as good may in itselfbe bad, and valuing something as bad be good. Here we have avaluation of valuing. What emerge are layers of valuations in which anemotional valuation, for instance, settles on top of an intellectual one.The bottom layer of valuations is the “original,” while the one above is“being stratified”; it is also possible that both be intellectual, in whichcase the stratified valuation belongs to reflection. The originalvaluation addresses an object, while the stratified valuation addressesthe act of valuation, but it may at the same time address the state of thesubject engaged in this activity.

A stratified valuation may either belong to the same intentional actupon which it settles, or it will belong to its form, or it may be the


content of a separate intentional act, i.e., it will belong to reflectionabout the original valuation.

Here a question arises: When pleasantness or unpleasantness areoriginal valuations — for example, of what the senses receive — canan additional pleasant or unpleasant valuation settle on top of them? Itis, of course, possible to value the original feeling by a reflective act ofthe intellect, and for this act of reflection to be accompanied by anemotion. When reflection mediates in the application of value-con-cepts, pleasantness may be accompanied (in a round-about way) byunpleasantness and vice-versa. However, without such mediation,there is no stratification of feelings upon feelings.

The matter is fairly clear with regard to the most elementary feel-ings, pleasure and pain. Pleasure is not merely a valuation that whatgives pleasure is good, but is good in itself and thus the state of thevaluing subject is also good. Pain is not merely a valuation that whatcauses pain is bad, but is bad in itself and so is the state of the subject.This is no feeling stratification of good upon good and bad upon bad,but the issue is this: Valuation of an object at the elementary levelalready comprises the state of the subject. The feeling of one's ownstate is not something distinct that accompanies the feeling of pleasureor pain. Pleasure and pain have therefore a double character from theoutset: Here a positive valuation is in itself a valuatively positive state,and a negative valuation, a valuatively negative state. Any negativevaluation of pleasure or positive valuation of pain will belong toreflection, namely, it will represent an activity of the intellect or bemediated by the latter, i.e., it will be external to the original,elementary valuation and will occur later. One could also say thatfeeling has a triple character: valuation of the object, valuation of thisvaluing and valuation of the valuing subject.

An organic attitude compounds what exists separately in more de-veloped positions as three distinct activities, in a unity whose func-tional components are not perceived separately. Only a comparisonwith valuations from more developed levels enables us to speak of thedouble or triple character of pleasure or pain. Where the rule of theprimitive layer prevails that to value something as good is itself good,there is but a single good, blending a pleasurable object and a pleas-ure-receiving subject within itself. The same is true — the other wayround — for pain. That is to say, the differentiation between subjectand object has not yet occurred. Only the intellect that interpretspleasures and pains creates this polarity by its interpretation. The sub-ject-object gap emerges in two steps, by objectification and by thereflection, which discovers the subject against the background of ob-jectification and accomplishes its constitution. At the level of pleasure


and pain feelings that accompany sensations the first step — objectifi-cation — is still absent (there are things and movements at this level,but not objects). What is being valued is therefore the state of the spe-cific meeting between subject and object and thus the function, whichstratification was to fulfill in its own way as it does in the rest ofvaluations, is fulfilled by feeling. A certain gap between subject andobject is a condition for stratification.

The claim that at the level of sensory reception subject-object po-larization has not yet occurred, should not be construed as if what isbeing received lacked structure and meaning, or internal relationshipsand significance. One may definitely acknowledge that what is re-ceived has already been shaped into things and movements which pre-serve their own identity, and which are tied into a network of connec-tions, so that one may acknowledge that reception includes immediateunderstanding, without claiming polarization, not to mention a gap,between subject and object. In this layer, the subject's feeling of itselfis still assimilated into the feeling of the external object.

What is said about pleasure and pain applies to pleasantness andunpleasantness in general. Let us take hunger as an example of un-pleasantness. Hunger has two aspects: one is directed at the object, theabsence of food (absence meaning current unavailability). The secondaspect is directed at the subject's state. The negation inherent to thefull, immediately given, negative value-property we address as “hun-ger” prevails in both aspects at once and cannot be separated. One ofthe first papers published in the sphere of value-theory conducts a po-lemic on these grounds. In his paper “The Need” (1894), OskarKraus24 engages in a controversy with an author named Hermann.Hermann wrote that “a feeling of want together with the desire to can-cel this want, is called 'need'.” Kraus argues that the desire included inneed is not to cancel want, but to cancel the feeling of want, so thataccording to Kraus we should amend the statement and say: A need “isa feeling of want together with the desire to cancel this feeling” (fur-ther on he continues and amends this definition as well). I believe thatin hunger both desires are united — the one Hermann point outs (di-rected at the object) and the one Kraus presents in opposition to theformer (directed at the state of the subject), and that this unity is ele-mentary and characterizes need. I have brought the example of hungerin order to point to the double character of feeling, which belongs tothe realm of valuative values. However, the example involves an addi-tional factor, desire, which is a motivative value. The motive that joinsfeeling bears the same double character we found in the feeling itself.

What is true with regard to the original pleasantness and unpleas-antness is also true with regard to stratified layers: no additional pleas-


antness or unpleasantness settles upon the pleasantness or unpleasant-ness of predicative thought, for the same reason that rules the originalfeeling: pleasantness does not merely represent the value of what ispleasant, but also the state of the subject that makes this valuation —thus preventing the possibility of an additional (not reflective) tier ontop of this pleasantness; the double or triple character so to say, buildsa sloping roof which leaves no room for additional, upward building.And the same rule holds for unpleasantness.

When the role of valuing the valuation of X (and thus also valuingthe state of the subject, while it values X) is already fulfilled by thevaluation itself and embedded in it, the valuation of the valuation willalways carry the sign of the latter (i.e., the valuation of X): If that oneis positive, so will the other be, if that one is negative, the other willalso be negative. However, when stratification fulfills this role, thereare two possibilities: the valuations may carry the same sign and theymay carry inverted signs.

Without the double or triple character of feeling, it would be alto-gether impossible to understand cases of thought repression or ban-ishment. If the negative valuation of a thought were not correlativewith a bad state of the subject, the subject would not avoid it and thusavoid the thought valued by this feeling.

Both characteristics of the feeling-valuation, passivity and the ab-sence of objectification, contribute to the strength of its ties with ap-propriate motives. Both prevent vacillation and delay. When an issuearises, it has already been determined whether it is good or bad at thislevel; when it is good, the subjective totality in which it is embedded isalso good; when it is bad, the totality is bad. That is to say that themechanism of assuming organic positions is efficacious in certain cir-cumstances: its “yes” and its “no” are immediate, comprehensive anddirectly bound up with appropriate motives. The manner of its reactionchanges but a little in the course of an individual's life, once earlychildhood has passed, and it is doubtful whether it has changed muchthroughout the history of the human species.

Emotion

While valuation of the object and of the state of the self are indi-visibly bound up on the feeling-level, these functions are separate onthe emotional level.25 Here we find two sets of poles:

Love and HateJoy and Sorrow.


The first polarity refers to and the focuses on objects, the secondexpresses the state of the subject. The lack of congruence betweenthem is obvious: Love is not always bound up with joy, nor hate withsorrow. The rule that the state of the subject is positive while valuingpositively, and negative while valuing negatively, does not prevailhere. Thus emerges the polarization between subject and object.

A cluster assembles around each of these four emotions. Next tolove we find fondness, sympathy, liking, adoration; next to hate —resentment and contempt; next to joy — gayety and high spirits; nextto sorrow — distress and depression.

One might, however, ask: Do not joy and sorrow also refer to ob-jects, namely, to what causes joy or sorrow; do not love and hate, onthe other hand, also make up states of the subject, for instance, thestate of being in love. Indeed, this is true, but the emphasis of eachpolarity is different — in the first it is objective, in the second subjec-tive.

Some emotions reside somewhere between these sets of poles,nearer to one of them. For instance, the emotion of belonging to afamily, a peer group, a clan or a people is primarily directed at theobject, but it also constitutes the subject; it is one of the emotions thatcluster around love. Another example: Fear is also mainly directed atthe object, namely, viewing something as frightening. Nevertheless italso is a conscious state of the subject; the emphasis may be shiftedhere and there: primarily focusing on one object or scattered overoccasional objects, when it mainly becomes a state of the subject.

I do not claim that the specific nature of an emotion is exclusivelydetermined by the positive-negative and subject-object parameters. Onno account do I wish to say that the map of emotions (or of full valuesin general), arranged on the axis separating the positive from the nega-tive half, is symmetrical (if one takes empty values into account, theresult will always be symmetrical, because against love its absencewill appear, the absence of hate against hate, etc.).

Emotion, like feeling, exists in the sphere of observation (i.e.,sensory perception) as well as in the sphere of the intellect (i.e., con-ceptual thought). Let us first turn to observation.

The object being friendly, welcoming, nice, charming or beloved isa value-property it possesses, expressed in what is perceived by ex-ternal perception, namely the senses, but the property itself does notreside in the field of this perception. The intentional act of understand-ing what is sensed discovers the emotional value-property the formerexpresses. This property composes the emotional content. What issensed and immediately expresses the property, belongs to the form of


this intention. That is to say that emotion belongs to the intentionalcontent of observation.

Pleasure and pain refer to what is sensed, while love and hate referto the meaning of what is sensed; at the level of acts of sensory recep-tion this meaning is immediately involved with what is sensed, as itsgestalt, and it is immediately understood within the act of reception.Seeing something graceful incorporates the understanding of what isseen; gracefulness is the meaning or significance of the sight and bothare apprehended together. Admiration of this gracefulness is the emo-tion residing in the act of seeing as well as in the sight. Even more so,seeing a beloved person incorporates the understanding of what isseen.

Feeling and emotion involved in observation differ in the mannerof their reference to what is sensed: while feeling is involved with thesensed elements, emotion refers mainly to the structure, namely, to theorder of elements and its meaning. Accordingly, feeling and emotionalso refer in different ways to the body of the self. Feeling is the pres-ence of this body, facing the soul from the angle of the body's value-properties and valuative situations; feeling is valuative self-perception,and prima facie, what is perceived precedes its perception in order ofessence and even in time. Not so with emotion. Emotion precedes itsbodily expression in order of essence and occasionally even in time. Aperson cries because he/she is sad, and is not sad because he/she cries.William James tends to reduce emotion to feeling.26 When the emotionbelongs to intentional content (i.e., what is meant), it requiressensation and feeling to bear or to embody it.

While emotion functions in the sphere of observation mainly as in-tentional content, in conceptual thought it serves primarily as form,namely, here it is a manner of reference to the object; a person thinksabout the object as beloved or as hated, while he usually thinks onlylater about his love or his hatred, by reflection about his originalthought. However, in lyrical poetry, for instance (although its form isverbal and from this angle close to conceptual thought), the intention isinitially trained on emotions. As reflection presumably tends to attachemotion to observation and not to thinking, we will now name someintellectual emotions (i.e., which accompany the intellect): theemotions of confidence and hesitation, of satisfaction or dissatisfactionwith the intellect's work, the emotion of curiosity, enthusiasm for anintellectual task, concern for the fate of a person the subject thinksabout (there is no need for this thought to be accompanied by percep-tual images), the emotion of sympathy or hostility regarding an ab-stract idea.


Emotion does not always need a special value-word in order tofunction as the emotional form of a conceptual, cognitive content. Theemotion accompanying a thought determines its course, or participatesin determining its courses; it participates in the choice of patterns andthematically, in the choice of focal points. When knowledge wishes toremain value-neutral, it tries to prevent emotion from influencing theshape of content, allowing it a merely companionate role. It tries toprevent emotion from leaving its imprint on the product of knowl-edge's work.

If cognitive thought has an emotional form, so much the more soreason, which constitutes and applies values. As affinity prevails be-tween a diffuse value residing in the form of reason and the crystal-lized value that composes its content, reason cannot dissociate itselffrom emotions, nor can it attend to its concerns without their partici-pation in tracking its courses. The form of reason includes feelings aswell as emotions.

Frequently one and the same emotion an individual has with regardto a certain object, exists in sense perception, in cognitive thought andin the constitution of this person's values (like the establishment ofgoals) and in their application.

The difference between love-hate and joy-sadness is also apparentin that joy-sadness are valuative values only and not motives, or inother words: they have no matching motives. In certain ideas of loveand hate, the motives bound up with them are so salient, that manytheoretical descriptions viewed them as the gist of the emotion. Lovewas described and even defined as an aspiration, i.e., a motivativevalue. Plato, in the “Symposium”27 defines it as the aspiration to pro-create within the beautiful. Aquinas defined love as the aspiration togood because it is good (and hate as the aspiration to shun evil or theaspiration to oppose evil).28 Ortega y Gasset argues against this ap-proach in his paper on love, and I believe his position is right.29 Alto-gether love cannot be defined but as a valuative emotional value, whilethe motives bound up with various cases of love are very different andit is doubtful whether they suit a single definition (namely, it isdoubtful whether there is a quality common to all these motives and tothem only, apart from their matching this particular kind of valuativevalues).

In general joy and sorrow do not make up the content of inten-tional acts (in observation or thinking), but accompany them or makeup the background to their content; they may be considered as belong-ing to their form. But observation of what is joyful as being joyful, orof what is distressing as being distressing may incorporate these emo-tions within the intentional content, whenever different shades of joy


or sorrow are expressed by the objects of observation (in variousfields: sight, hearing, touch etc.).

People listening to music that expresses emotions provide an in-teresting theme for axiology. An initial examination of the listenersalready reveals the difference between feeling and emotion. For in-stance, a person enjoys a sad tune, namely, the feeling is positive whilethe emotion is negative, or more precisely: the listener's com-prehension of the negative emotion is accompanied by a positive feel-ing. There is no conflict between the emotion's negativity and the feel-ing's positivity (it is not in spite of its sadness that the listener enjoysthe tune), because their levels are different.

The example of listening to music (or reading a story or watching amovie) not only clarifies the emotion-feeling difference, but alsoemphasizes the fact that an emotion, even if it is strong, is not alwaysaccompanied by a motive.

Someone who listens to music may understand it as conveying acertain sorrow, such as suffering, or a certain joy, or yearning, and hemay even share these emotions, without their appealing at all to his setof motives. Needless to say that there are other cases, in which musicjoins the appeal to motives and reinforces them.

The very motive to listen to music is immanent to the perceptualsystem and one of its characteristics. One must thoroughly distinguishbetween the motive to observe and be receptive to emotions conveyedby observation, and the motive aroused by these emotions: The lattermay not appear at all. What reveals itself here is the separation be-tween the realm of valuative values and the realm of motivative val-ues.

There are additional examples for the separation of emotion fromfeeling and motive. Reading a sad story or watching a sad movie onemay drop a tear, but at the same time enjoy the experience. Here I donot deal with the question why a person enjoys this experience (thereason is that his or her inclination to be moved or aroused has beensatisfied; the issue of arousal, of being moved, will be discussed be-low).

The plot of the story or the movie may refer to the past or to animaginary world, so that the emotions the reader or the spectator expe-rience with regard to the protagonists and the fate visiting them, willnot involve any motives whatsoever. His comprehension of the pro-tagonists' motives and the sympathy felt for the latter (or for some ofthem) are another matter — but these are not his own motives and donot activate him.

We will now discuss two attempts made to reduce all emotions andalso some additional values to two polar emotions.


Spinoza discusses elementary values (or valuations) under theheading “affections.” According to him, there are three basicaffections: Joy, sadness and desire. Joy and sadness comprise a polarsystem, while desire stands by itself and is congruent with what wename “motive” or “motivative value.” The different motives all derivefrom a single, original motive, which is the aspiration to perpetuate thegiven being. However, what we denote as “emotions,” is to be derivedfrom a single pair, namely joy and sorrow (furthermore: all kinds ofpleasantness and unpleasantness derive from this pair). Spinozawishes, therefore, to base the polarity of references to the object on thepolarity of the subject's situations.30

While discussing love, Spinoza first rejects its definition as thewish to unite with the beloved (in which Ortega y Gasset follows him),and also rejects the inclusion of desire in the definition of love (“onecan assume love without this or that desire too”).31 What remains ofthese definitions is the peculiarity of the lover that accompanies love,i.e., the presence of the beloved object pleases him,32 but thispeculiarity is not part of love's definition. That is to say, love is not amotivative value but, according to Spinoza, a kind of joy, differingfrom its other kinds in that love refers to an external object, whichprovides the reason for this joy, and this reference is knowledge of theobject. Ortega y Gasset says in this context33 that love is in this caseexchanged for one of its possible results, namely, that love may bringjoy to the lover, but is not in itself joy; there is no doubt that love mayalso cause deep sorrow.

I believe Ortega y Gasset is right in rejecting the reduction of loveto joy, and for similar reasons any variation on Spinoza's attemptshould equally be rejected. Love is a certain kind of attitude to an ob-ject, whose core is neither the joy nor the hope for joy of the subject,but the object's, namely the beloved's, aspired joy. A mother who lovesher son wishes him well, wishes him joy, while her own joy ismarginal to the matter. One should give thought to the fact, that fo-cusing on an object does not characterize the cognitive branch of con-sciousness only, but also the branch that assumes a position. On thesegrounds, hate should not be considered as a kind of sorrow either (noris it necessary for the person who hates, to be sad).

While Spinoza tips the scales towards the subject and its states,Franz Brentano tips them the other way, proposing the reduction of joyand sorrow to love and hate,34 which in his opinion are the foundationof the sphere of values. The theory of intention originally tried theradical way of basing all that is subjective on the reference to objects. Ibelieve, however, that observation of universally known phenomenashows us that joy is not exhaustively covered by viewing the object as


joyful, or as beloved, nor is it tied to objects; it is therefore to beexplained as that offshoot of the form of intention, which becomeslargely independent of specific contents and constitutes the state of theintending subject. The same holds for sorrow in the opposite direction.

To sum this chapter up: It is characteristic for the feeling-emotionlayer to serve as a kind of infrastructure for those above it. That is tosay that elementary “phenomena” (or the entities belonging to the ele-mentary layer) accompany every intellectual act of intention. A sensa-tion-feeling element also belongs to every act or proceeding of reason(the sensational character of the verbal aspect of thinking and the feel-ing, which is pleasant or unpleasant) and also an emotional element(the emotion we experience towards the object we think about).

Chapter 5

The Dimensions of Value

Victor Kraft on the Components of Value

Victor Kraft, in his “Foundations for Scientific Analysis ofValue”35 says, that the concept of value incorporates affirmation onone hand, and what is affirmed on the other, or negation on one hand,and what is negated on the other. Accordingly, value-concepts are con-structed by two elements: A) The positive or negative character; B)The descriptive (or material) content, which comprises what is af-firmed or negated. Thus value-concepts, apart from very generalvalues like good and evil, which have no descriptive content, areconstructed only by these two elements.

One should note that according to Kraft the descriptive content isentirely neutral.36 The difference between one positive value and an-other positive value resides therefore only in the neutral materials theyinclude, and not in their valuative nature, namely, their character asvalues. By the same token negative values differ only in their neutralingredients and not with regard to their being values.37 Here Kraft con-fronts his position with its alternative; in his opinion, the differencebetween values does consist of a specific quality which, (in each sepa-rate value) is a whole that does not lend itself to analysis. Kraft deniesthat a value is a particular quality, also denying the existence of value-properties.


While unfolding his thesis,38 Kraft comes to discuss emotionalsituations in which something is alien or familiar; in this case he ad-mits that we face a particular phenomenon of consciousness whichcannot be taken apart. He subsequently39 admits that the phenomenol-ogical theory of value is not entirely mistaken. His reservations regard-ing the validity of his thesis refer to a certain outlook and to certaincases.40 We will now leave Victor Kraft and continue to discuss theprinciple he presents, concerning the breakdown of a value into itscomponents.

The Possibility of Reduction to a Pair of Values

The following consideration supports the analysis of a value intotwo factors.

An affirmation must affirm something; if what is affirmed is an af-firmation in itself, it must also affirm something, and if it is a negation,it must negate something; if we do not arrive at some stage atsomething which does not include affirmation and negation, it showsthe affirmation to be empty. Obviously, the same holds for negation; atthe bottom line it negates something that does not include affirmationand negation. That is to say, that what is affirmed or negated isneutral.

The same consideration holds for assuming a position in general. Aposition is for or against something, and this something has to bedifferent from the position towards it. However, if in a certain case thissomething is itself a position, the chain of positions assumed withregard to other positions must finally — in its course towards the realthing — arrive at something which is not in the domain of positionsassumed, something which does not include being for or against,namely, something neutral.

If a value can be broken down into neutral content on one hand andits valuative element on the other, and if the valuative element rests ona single polar relation, which is the positive-negative relation, i.e., therelation for and against, it follows that there is only one pure value, avalue consisting of a valuative element only, and that it possesses asingle, half-positive, half-negative scale. Or, in other terms, there is apair of values which is good and evil.

As impure values are but the application of a pure value to neutralmaterial, it is doubtful whether they are values at all — whether theyare addressed as “values” by right.

This solicits a question: why stop midway between the most gen-eral value “good” and the valuation of a specific object as good? Why

The Dimensions of Value 73

stop at a kind of things or activities, or at a group of these, and addressthe statement that this kind or this group is good by the name “value”?Either every good object is a value, or only the word “good”designates a value, and the same holds for evil. If every good or badobject is a positive or negative value, the word “valuation” is redun-dant. And if this is not so, what remains is only the pair of values,good and evil, which from the angle of their content are but “beingfor” or “being against.”

According to this line of thought all values — except two emptyones — turn out to be but valuations. Just is but what is good in theeyes of society, beautiful — what looks good, etc. The meaning of thedifferent value-words is the application of good and bad to hypotheti-cal (neutral) contents, and their use but a comparison of that hypo-thetical content to a real situation, or a measuring of the real situationby the yardstick of the hypothetical content, whose good or bad naturehas already been determined.

Up to this point, the set of a priori considerations yields a clear andsimple pattern. The difficulty arises when we turn to the phenomena.So and so is for ice-cream, for receiving a salary-rise, for justice, forhis beloved, for himself to stop smoking, and for some football team.Do all these “fors” have the same meaning? And is all that remains —apart from the abstract “being for” — neutral content? Would theaddition of a plus sign (+) to the descriptive content create a value?Could we create so and so's values, whose expressions we have justmentioned, in this manner?! Is it not more reasonable to assume that“being for” is just an abstraction, based on a certain proximity be-tween the cases of being for? In my opinion, the valuative affirmationis not one and the same affirmation in these different cases; that itdiffers not only in degree but also in manner and meaning, namely, byquality-differences in accordance with the quality of what is affirmed.And the same rule applies to negation.

Positive valuations differ qualitatively according to the level onwhich they are made, i.e., feeling, emotion or predicative thought, butalso within the boundaries of each of these — according to their spe-cific substance. Do pleasures differ from each other only in degree?Does a person take pleasure in different things in the same sense? Andif the phenomena suggest a negative reply here, all the more so in thesphere of emotions, which has more ramifications. On the other hand,predicative value-thought in general, and conceptual value-thought inparticular — the one that applies values as well as that which consti-tutes them — does not hover in a void, creating something out ofnothing, or spinning a spider's web out of its possessions by the aid oflogical equipment. It mediates with regard to the rest of the world


through pre-predicative valuations; while it does not limit itself to theirexpression in its own way, it is altogether held by them, in its form aswell as in its content. Value-thought begins its work by dealing withthe qualitative multiplicity of the position-assuming it faces, andadopts that multiplicity, at least in part.

Here we have briefly to return to Victor Kraft who claims in thiscontext, that there are acts of valuative judgment without feelings ofpleasantness or unpleasantness, devoid of emotional coloring and evenwithout any aspiration.41 But the question is by no means whether hefeels something or experiences an emotion while passing a valuativejudgment, but whether the value-concept he applies was not createdwith consideration for a whole fabric of feelings and emotions, andwhether the value concept does not reflect some qualitative multiplic-ity of emotions and feelings.

The reduction of all value-thought to two values, positive andnegative, also misses the difference between valuative and motivativevalues. Even when a valuative and a motivative value perfectly matcheach other, i.e., the motive serves the valuative value and the latterconfirms the former, their content is not identical in most cases, and itis doubtful whether it can at all be fully identical; it should, therefore,not be viewed as neutral, descriptive content: it is altogether steeped inthe character of a valuative value here and a motivative value there.Take, for example, a man's love for a woman or for his son, and com-pare it with the motives bound up with it. Even if we add the factorvaluation-motivation to the factors affirmation-negation and neutralsubstance, we will not be able to build love and the motivations boundup with it out of these.

To sum up: if we strip, so to say, all positive values of their posi-tive character as far as it is equal in all of them, what remains at ourdisposal will not be neutral substance, but specific contents, possessinga specific value-character. With the appropriate change in terms, thesame consideration holds for negation. I believe that the observation ofrecurrent values sufficiently justifies rejection of the analysis-thesis.

Looking at complex cases, we will find that not only analysis, buteven the attribution of a value to a positive or negative group cannotbe made unequivocally. We will present three such cases here.

The enigmatic and mysterious nature of something, for instance asomewhat dark forest on whose edge we stand, may be consideredvaluatively positive, because by this very characteristic the forestbeckons to us, namely, arouses a motive to walk its paths. It may,however, be considered alien and unwelcoming. If the forest ties af-firmation and negation together, then applying the thesis of value-analysis would mean the following: humans attribute a positive char-


acter to part of the neutral matter and a negative character to anotherpart; one should, therefore, divide the matter and thus induce positivityand negativity to separate on their own. But is it not precisely thisphysiognomy of estrangement and unease which attracts the personwhose senses are receptive to them? That is to say: perhaps here it isprecisely the negative which is positive.

From the receptive aspect to the motorial, with a content-relatedexample: adventure-seeking. The risk along the way does not reducethe adventure's value for whoever seeks it; on the contrary, cancelingthe risk would reduce its value. If we have pure affirmation and purenegation, they will probably cancel each other out; accordingly, if wereduce the negative element in a certain action, the rate of its net posi-tive value should increase, but what occurs is the opposite.

A sad song, sung with a sad tune may be considered as positivebecause listeners demand it and it is willingly performed — and it maybe considered negative, because it induces sadness, i.e., negates joy.

In all these cases there is no act of mixing a positive value-bearerwith a negative value-bearer and thus also mixing the value-properties.The proof is in the fact that increase of negation may increase the netaffirmation of the whole. It is reasonable to assume that value-character possesses an additional dimension besides the dimensions ofaffirmation-negation and subject-object — a kind of valuative depthdimension. The dimension constituted by the subject-object relation isnot specifically valuative as it serves also non-valuative intentions,whether in itself or as background. An additional, specifically valua-tive dimension is required, upon which we can draw for the descriptionof what cannot but be described paradoxically in terms of positive andnegative.

An Additional Dimension of Valuation

It is surprising how much the mental states involved in the realiza-tion of various positive values differ from or contrast each other. Whena value, full in its positive section, is attained to a considerable extent,the subject, i.e., whoever adheres to this value, frequently reacts bycalming down, by passing into a state of ease and steady equilibrium(according to the rule: If the situation is favorable, I am relaxed). Onthe other hand, there are full-positive values whose expression andrealization — for instance, in the sublime or in the beautiful — in-volves emotional movement; when the unrest passes, the subject re-mains in a state of unstable equilibrium. Here: as the rate of affirma-tion increases, so does calm. There: on the contrary, with the affirma-


tion emotional movement increases. As affirmation increases, move-ment, the opposite of calm, also increases.

The presence of a positive value-property may therefore act in op-posing directions: Calm, and perhaps even steady, in one direction,moving, touching or even agitating in the opposite direction.

We should note that we do not address motives here, i.e., the ap-peal of the valued object to motivations. In its appeal to motives theobject — be it a thing or an activity — arouses and incites, or lulls andparalyses. A highly emotionally moving property, however, may notappeal to motives at all, and may not cause any (considerable) changein a person's aspirations and desires. And the soul is moved by anobject not because motives have been aroused, or because somenegative value has been realized; for example, music may calm andmay emotionally move; it is easy to see that music may emotionallymove without any appeal to motives.42

It is now quite obvious that the difference between what is movingand what calms cannot be described by any of the parameters we havediscussed so far: It is not the difference between positivity and nega-tivity; not the difference between a value accompanied by a motiveand one not accompanied by any, or by a certain motive; nor is it thedifference between full and empty or between subjective andobjective. We are faced with an additional dimension of the value-ambit.

One should not view every state of the mind that opposes calm, asmovement. Calm is violated by valuatively negative factors — forinstance, distress; it is also violated by tensions between opposed mo-tives; it may, perhaps, be violated by a state of emptiness of positivevalues (the state Schopenhauer considers as usual, and perhaps as ex-clusively so in our world), and even more so by sudden awareness ofsuch a state.

The emotionally moved subject is sensitive to changes in the mov-ing object, in contradistinction, for instance, to someone wishing toquell his hunger, who is relatively indifferent to differences betweenkinds of food. A change or a difference in the object, which would bedescribed as tiny or almost unnoticeable from every neutral angle, mayincrease emotional movement, or even cancel it altogether. As a neu-tral description, we may consider one accepted by an observeradhering to different values, i.e., one who is not being moved. What isa small change from a neutral point of view may be a considerablechange also in the positive-negative dimension.

The subject's sensitivity is the sensitivity of its values. Therefore,the moving value is the value that is sensitive (in its full section) to thevalued object, mainly within a certain area of modifications. In other


words: It is sensitive to the slightest differences in what is valued,around a certain peak. This sensitivity should be understood in thisway: If you change the value-bearers even to the smallest degree, thevalue-property will change considerably. However, the said changesare basically neither slight nor tiny; only their neutral surfaceprojection is slight or tiny.

The additional dimension is the valuative depth dimension of ob-jects. From the angle of value-bearers and the angle of the positivity-negativity relation, we see on the surface projections of images resid-ing in the depth dimension. In the value-bearer dimension the image iscontracted, at times a line contracted to a dot. The surface image is adistorted picture of the depth image, namely, of the emotionally mov-ing value-properties. A person adhering to a moving value does notdecipher the images that appear according to the other dimensions andparameters, but stands at a vantage-point from which the depth dimen-sion of objects is seen.

The demand for objective validity of individual aesthetic judg-ments may seem pretentious. Nevertheless, when the judgment suc-ceeds in reconstructing observation with concepts, or in other words— when it conveys what observation has revealed, its validity does notlag behind that of the value-bearer's description. And the depthdimension of emotionally moving images also reveals itself to obser-vation.

What moves us emotionally may look on the surface like a mixtureor a compound of positive and negative value-properties, like goodand bad (or evil), held in each other's grasp.

In a certain sense, valuative depth is identical with value quality.The differences of degree between positivity and negativity do notmake up value-quality, but presuppose it. The location of an object onthe positive-negative scale of a certain value does not exhaust the ex-pression of its quality.

What moves emotionally may appear not merely as a positive-negative compound, but also as something neither positive nor nega-tive, but nevertheless valuative. A mysterious sight, for instance, issometimes beyond positivity or negativity, but it belongs to the do-main of value-properties and does not leave us indifferent. Whensomething captures our attention and arouses our curiosity, it possessesa value-property because we are not emotionally indifferent towards it,even though our attitude is not clearly positive or negative. However,one could perhaps claim in this case that this is no proper example fora value-character; yet, when the fascinating and curious thing, which isneither positive nor negative, is also emotionally moving, there is noroom for doubt that it has a value-character. This case provides


additional evidence that the positive-negative dimension is not thesole, specifically valuative dimension. (The relation subject-object alsomakes up an intentional, but not specifically valuative dimension).

I took examples from the sphere of aesthetics in order to acquaintourselves with the additional dimension, because in this sphere thefactor requiring demonstration was isolated from other factors, or be-cause here it is easier for reflection to isolate factors — for instance, todistinguish between an emotion and its accompanying motives: by itsvery nature the emotion aroused by sublimity need not be accompa-nied by any motive. But there is also some emotional movement in-cluded in enthusiasm, and here it may sometimes be bound up withstrong motives.

Coping with danger, in particular when there is only a hair'sbreadth between success and failure, involves sensitivity to slight dif-ferences in the value-bearer, and this may, indeed, emotionally move.For similar reasons gambling may move, as well as gladiators' battlesin ancient and bullfighting in our times. We will return to this subjectin Part III.

Chapter 6

Content and Form in ValuativeIntention

The Distinction between Content and Form ofIntention in General

We have already used the distinction between content and formabove. I now wish to examine it further before we return to use itagain.

The distinction between content and form of intention is more orless congruent with the distinction between the intentional act and thecourse of intention on one hand, and the intent i.e., towards what theact is intended, on the other. What is meant, what is understood, whatis wished — is the intent. The act belongs to the form while the con-tent altogether resides in intent.

An intentional act (an act of meaning, an act of understanding) islocated in time and in the subject, but it does not spread over a periodof time; it is a cross section of time within an intentional process, andwithin this section the fabric of relations particular to intention revealsitself. That is to say, that intention needs no extension in time in orderto prevail. Intention already takes place at a point in time. A process of


intention does, of course, extend in time, but each of its cross-sectionsalready contains intention.

The form, however, reveals itself not only in a section, but also inthe modes of the intentional course, as well as in its background withinthe intending subject, because the act's structure and the modes of theprocess are tied to this background. The background of one intentionalcourse consists of other intentional processes.

The question arises: How does intent acquire its independence,how does it separate from the act directed at it? It exists in separationfrom the act in the sense that other intentional acts (in the same proc-ess, as well as in other process) are also directed at it. The possibilityto refer to it again without duplicating the same act by means of whichwe initially referred to it, without referring to this act, without anyreference to the background against which we first recognized this in-tent — this possibility bears evidence to the intent's independence.

An intent may gradually acquire such independence in the courseof many intentions — for instance, when the intention is a notion andthis acquisition represents crystallization of the notion.

Intention is immanent to consciousness and transcends it. It isimmanent to the extent that it is made up, for instance, by an image ora concept. It is transcendent to the extent that consciousness estab-lishes the image or the concept outside itself. The real table outsideconsciousness and its comprehensive idea (perceptual and conceptual)function in intent as one.

Intent may be extraneous to time (like the relation expressed byPythagoras' theorem), or it may exist in time (like Napoleon's deporta-tion to St. Helena). If it is located in time, its location is not congruentwith the act's location in time (except incidentally).

In contradistinction, intentional form is always immanent to mind,and never extraneous to time. Even when a formal relation does notoccur between elements which are sequential in time, like cause andeffect, and therefore does not need time as the ground to spread on, itis nevertheless located in time and exists as a procedure within reality(i.e., the human being's reality).

A concept of the unchanging may, of course, change. In otherwords: The thought about what is unchangeable is, of course, change-able itself. Unchangeability here belongs to content, while changerefers to form. Intentional content may not only refer to the unchange-able; it may refer to what is changeable, but even then it remains un-changeable content, because a change of thought and a change inintention altogether belong to form. If I harbor the wish for a certainchange to occur today between noon and 1p.m., then the wish refers tothe change, but this change does not govern the wish itself (neither in

Content and Form in Valuative Intention 81

its being content, nor in its being form). And if an hour later I have adifferent wish (which is incompatible with the former), this change is aform of intention.

The possibility of change is only one character trait that distin-guishes between the content aspect of an intention and its factual exis-tence.

If the correlate of intent is the act, namely, if the category intent isapprehended as what resides in the field of intention once the act has,so to say, been removed from it, then intent also includes charactertraits imprinted by the intentional act, by the proceedings and patternsof the intentional process. Should we try to understand intent as pureintentional content, we would not be able to extract concrete examplesof intent, because every example would also have formal charactertraits; we will, therefore, employ the word “intent” in a manner thatenables us to choose examples. When a person considers a table thatwould meet his or her requirements, we can say that the table is theintent. We cannot say without reservations that the table is the inten-tional content. The term “intentional content” designates the pure cor-relate of the form of intention; we have already found that in reality itcannot be isolated and that it is impossible to demarcate a borderlinebetween content and form in a specific case; one can only extract cer-tain forms from the intention and present them to reflective observa-tion, so that other forms remain embedded in the concrete intentionfrom which these forms have been removed. If we stripped an inten-tion of its entire form, we would not hold pure content, because thecontent, so to say, would evaporate. In order to be present, namely, inorder to be something that can be intended once again, content has toshoulder the burden of forms.

Intentional content is made of special metaphysical matter, whileintent is this matter, already imprinted by the initial minimal stamp ofform. Within the system the intent acquires its shape, it receives addi-tional imprints and becomes a substance or a property, a process or alaw, an event or a change; in these completed shapes the intent mayacquire some transcendental status, namely, be established by an indi-vidual consciousness even outside the totality of any consciousness,i.e., it may win recognition of its independence from consciousness.

“Before” it becomes transcendent (for instance, as a real table), theintent is an entity of meaning. The shaping into entities, the borderdemarcation between one entity and its neighbor, is determined by thecontent as well as by the form that does the shaping. The word “be-fore” at the head of this paragraph should not necessarily be under-stood as temporal precedence; the understanding of a content and itsestablishment may occur simultaneously. In a certain sense the pedes-


tal on which the content is going to be established may be ready priorto the establishment, and predesigned for an entity of meaning thatmeets certain requirements.

Not every content is subject to objectification in general and tran-scendence in particular. Part of what a momentary intent contains failsto become the property of an object. We have already seen that not thewhole volume of a valuation becomes the volume of a value-property(which, in its turn, participates in constituting the object).

In short, it belongs to the form of an intention that the latter is car-ried out by somebody, at a certain hour, under certain circumstancesand in a certain manner. The form represents a fact and is part of theworld. The content, however, is not part of the world and may be takenup (by means of form) as an approach to the world. An intention has,so to say, a face and a back (or a rear); the face may be turned towardsthe world (or rather, towards part of it), but not belong to it as a part;the back or rear is part of the world. One could shift this metaphor andhave it include a mirror, to wit: the mirror's face is the content, its back— the form. Intents are what is to be seen in the mirror's face.

I mentioned in the introduction that science may be useful and isfrom this angle not value-neutral — but its value-character concernsonly its own existence and not the manner of its reference to objects.We can now say: Its value-character belongs to its form, while it isvalue-neutral (or tries to be so) according to its content. We said therethat art may be beautiful and is not value neutral from this aspect. Nowwe can add that the absence of neutrality belongs to the form of art.

The Conscious and the Unconscious

The division of an intention into form and content crosses the di-vision into conscious and unconscious (in various degrees and man-ners). We will now examine a few cases of this intersection.

A The content is fully conscious as far as it is unfolded and whileit is unfolded in internal perception. It unfolds in the field of internalperception through an act of understanding or of meaning. When aperson immediately understands the order of sensory elements that arepresent, without the help of interpretation, the internally apprehendedmeaning is identical with the externally apprehended order, and thismeaning is the fully manifest and unfolded intentional content. Seeingthat includes understanding, visual understanding, may provide anexample: the sight expresses its meaning (what is externally appre-hended expresses and the internally apprehended is being expressed).When a person watches a ball rolling on a surface, bump into another


ball and send it flying, he/she understands the sight even before con-ceptual thought turns to it. The observed meaning is entirely clear andneeds no interpretation.

B The content is conscious even while it is folded and only someof it is present, and we feel able to unfold it again. This is the casewhen a content exists as a concept and is represented by a word: ifnecessary, we will interpret this word in a number of sentences.

C A content which was actually present in the past and by a greateror lesser effort (in the course of lengthy or shorter searches andrestoration) we can lift it anew into the field of internal perception.

D Let us take the case of something of which a part is present (inone of the fields of perception), while the part which is absent was notpresent in the past either; it is connected to the present part, but notexpressed or revealed by it. Yet, in some cases we are in a certainsense acquainted with the non-present part, while in another sense weare not acquainted with it. I am not acquainted with it because it wasnot yet present. I am acquainted with it, since in these cases I willidentify it when I come across it as that whose absence was felt , as thatwhich meets a certain want. Until I came across it, it was not con-scious, but it existed for me so far as it was missed and so far as Ipossessed the ability to identify it. Here we have an expression whichnot only unfolds a certain content but also the absence of somethingwhich is needed to complete the content. Until now I did not meet thisthing and I cannot produce it by means of the factors that are present,but I will be able to identify it when I meet it; this expression is acertain kind of unsolved hint (more precisely: an unsolved hint ar-ranged in an order that does not allow for prediction). Imagine a hand-some painting from which a part is missing (it is hidden by a stain),and an art-loving observer notices this, but cannot complete the paint-ing on his own. On the other hand, he will be able to say with certaintywhich completion of four, suggested to him, is the right one. He was tosome extent acquainted with the appropriate completion before he sawit. He had an intention towards the completion implied by means of thehint and in this sense it belonged to the intent, but it was not conscious.

E A frequent case is that of an immediately conscious form of in-tention, namely, one that is unfolded (to a certain extent) in the field ofself-perception. For instance, a person is aware of being glad or sad,i.e., the joy or the gladness are apprehended, they are present in thefield of self-perception. He/she is thus also aware of being angry whilethe anger lasts.

F There are forms which are not apprehended, e.g. a certain orderof intentional acts. They may, however, become conscious in somesense in a roundabout way. We will mention a couple of these:


1. By conceptual analysis of phenomena, reflection arrives at aconcept addressing a certain non-apprehensible order, for example, inpsychoanalysis. The concept will be a reconstruction of the form underdiscussion on the conceptual level (reconstruction with the metaphysi-cal matter of concepts); the concept itself is apprehended (in the fieldof internal perception), and by means of the concept this unconsciousorder is apprehended (in a certain sense and as far as the concept isadequate). For instance, emotions functioning as a form of conceptualthought may not be immediately conscious; they may, however, be-come subsequently conscious (in general only partially and to somedegree of appropriateness) in a sense mediated by concepts about themwhich reflection achieves by analysis (not necessarily psychoanalysis),as well as by interpolation and extrapolation.

Emotion may, therefore, be immediately conscious, a) as content(perceptually expressed), b) as form (in the perception-field of statesof the self, in which emotions are also apprehended); c) in other casesemotion may become conscious only posteriorly, through the media-tion of a concept about it.

2. When reflection, aided by the will, causes the repeat of a certainproceeding, turning its form into a content. If this turn-about is suc-cessful, the unconscious form will become conscious, not as form butas content, namely, it will appear in the field of internal perception.That is to say, the mind repeats a previous proceeding, but now takesnotice of how it conducted this proceeding. In this manner, a meaning-bearer can be turned into meaning; we notice, for example throughrepetition, the verbal form which we used in the original act withoutnoticing. Subject-object relations, which were not noticed in an origi-nal act of intention when our attention was occupied by the object, canalso be revealed in a repetition designed to this end.

The form which became content by reflective reconstruction doesnot retain all the qualities it had before; it primarily loses its self-dy-namic, its automatic proceeding, and becomes dependent on continualsteering by the will.

Transitive and Reflective Intention

In Alexander Pfänder's terms, the original intention is transitive; itpasses from the intending consciousness to what is outside (in variousdegrees of transcendence). The original intention, in its turn, makes upthe intent of reflective intention (in other words: of reflection).43 Moreprecisely, not the whole transitive intention is the intent of reflectiveintention, but only its form. The original intentional content is not


designed to be included in the content of reflection, or to be the objectof this content. Duplication of a content is not reflection about it.

We have here something like a building with multiple floors: thereflective first floor rises above the transitive ground floor, and thecontent of the first floor treats of the form of the ground floor. If asecond floor of reflection on reflection exists, its content will alsoaddress the form, but that of reflection (from the floor beneath). Theact on one floor points to the form on the floor beneath it. However,the form of an intention is not (fully) identical with the content ofreflection about it, in the same manner that the idea of a table is not atable. Nevertheless, for an actual intention this identity prevails withinit: the intention towards a certain content is at once an intention to-wards the object of this content. Looking at it from some distance wewould say: by means of the content, a person intends towards the ob-ject (which the content addresses). Yet, for the intending person (dur-ing the act of intention) identity prevails. The specific, real table andthe idea of it represent one and the same intent and are actually identi-cal for the intending person, whose intention is straightforward andinnocent of reflection. In the same manner the existing form of inten-tion and its reflective idea compose one and the same intent, and areidentical for the person actually engaged in reflection (without reflec-tion about this initial reflection).

The form of an intention may function as the object of reflectionby virtue of its being immediately conscious in part, namely, appre-hended in the field of self-perception.

It is fairly obvious that an intention is not exhaustively representedby the part which lends itself to description, because only its form isdescribable. Neither is it exhaustively represented by the part whichlends itself to valuation, because only the form can be valued.

Reflection does not only treat of this or that single intention, butalso generalizes and searches for types of order, prevailing in intentionin general; it also treats of the subject itself, which is represented as asum-total of forms of intention (for instance, a certain single subject,in a superficial way, as the sum-total of his modes of response); reflec-tion also knows that in truth this sum-total does not exhaustively rep-resent the subject. Sometimes reflection wishes to refer to the intend-ing person, but actually refers post-factum to the modes and circum-stances of intention, because we have no idea of the intending subject(of the true “I”), apart from the background and modes on one hand,and from the intent on the other.


Observation of the Forms of Intention

Our knowledge about mankind is altogether but the knowledge offorms of intention. In other words: The sciences addressing man andsociety as well as knowledge about man and society in everydaythought belong to the realm of reflection. The sciences seek value-neu-tral knowledge of the form of intention (the form of valuation in-cluded), while everyday thought lacks this tendency.

The knowledge of form encounters two obstacles. Besides the dif-ficulty that not the whole form is immediately conscious while it ispresent or takes place, there is the difficulty that the same form, whichtruly is immediately conscious (i.e., is perceived) does not, accordingto its very function, attract the attention of the subject in the course ofintention (namely, while this form exists). It is perceived but not dis-tinctly. Attention focuses on the intentional content and only on part ofit, its center (namely, on a certain intersection of content-lines, whichthus becomes the center of the internal perception-field). A personpays attention to what he/she intends, and not to how it is intended.

Only recurrence makes the attention to the initially conscious, buthardly noticed form, possible. Only recurrence makes it possible forthe form to become an object and reveal itself distinctly. It is to thecredit of Franz Brentano to have shown that something may be per-ceived in self-perception without being an object of observation (andattention); we will further discuss Brentano's theory below.

Knowledge of the form of intention (including meta-valuativeknowledge) consists of observation and of conceptual interpretation ofwhat this observation reveals. This is not merely empirical knowledge,in the narrow and conventional sense of the word “empirical.” Theform that appears is not some data which acquires meaning only bycomparison with other data, by generalization or by its conceptualinterpretation; it is initially meaningful, while it is still perceivedwithout attention being paid. It is immediately understood, prior to anycomparison. Observation means attending to the structure andfunctioning of form, i.e., its significance. Conceptual interpretation ofthe data revealed by observing the form of intention leans on theiroriginal meaning, but also criticizes it. Immediate understanding ofsingle cases makes it possible to compare them, because the meaningof one case revealed to observation usually exceeds its own limits; themeaning of the individual case goes beyond individual reality, or be-yond the presence of this individual at this point in time. The exposi-tion of an emotion, for instance, grants the observer acquaintance withthis emotion, with its essence, which is not merely an acquaintance


with an experience of this emotion, and certainly not merely the indi-vidual experience, under these specific circumstances. This acquain-tance includes the ability to recognize the same emotion on a differentbackground, within a different plurality. The emotion expressed byanother person, one's own emotion as intentional content and one'sown emotion as form (for instance, of conceptual thought) may beattributed, by virtue of their original meaning, to one kind of emotion,like love or hate, or to other emotions directed at an object. And thisoriginal meaning, or, so to say, the original quality of these emotions,enables us to identify them even in a case in which the form is dis-closed only through interpretative consideration.

The acquaintance of the mind with itself has in its basis a charac-teristic of pure intuition in the Kantian sense (similar to the pure intui-tion of space as the basis of geometry), rather than the characteristic ofempirical, data-collecting observation. Empirical observation of intel-lectual phenomena comes relatively late and is based on immediatelyunderstood observation. Here one may, however, draw not only onKant, but on any philosopher who treats of the immediate perceptionof the universal within the individual, or of the individual's display ofits essence or its meaning. Intuition as described by Spinoza or byBergson, observation of essence according to Husserl or intuition ac-cording to Hartmann, as well as the function of expression as dis-cussed by Cassirer and myself — all these are pertinent to the discus-sion of our acquaintance with emotions.

One of the characteristics of Kantian pure intuition, which we alsofind in the observation of intention forms in general, is constructive-ness. For instance, the recall of events incorporates a building activity.This activity may lead to the uncovering of emotions, which are in-volved in those events. Art in general and in particular the art of narra-tive, of the play and the movie, incorporates the construction of imagesand of emotions. A work of art enables the person absorbing it toexperience emotions he or she did not feel previously, and also to un-derstand emotions (e.g. of a protagonist in a novel) he or she does notexperience even while reading, watching or listening to this work ofart. This comprehension is based on the building activity.

The activities of recollection, imagination and absorption of worksof art are a source of knowledge about forms of intention. They paral-lel actual building in space, as well as that of geometry.

We will now turn to Franz Brentano's teaching — the philosopherwho renewed the category of intention, thus turning the corner leadingto the 20th century.

Brentano distinguishes between external and internal perception.In external perception colors, sounds, tastes, smells and sensations of


touch are present. Internal perception grasps intentional activity andintentional contents (the meanings or purports). According To Bren-tano, all intentions and all intents are perceived. This means that eve-rything which is mental is conscious, since Brentano characterizesmental as intentional.

On the other hand Brentano believes that introspection is impossi-ble, because this observation imposes a change on its object; thus theenquirer does not observe what he sought, but an artificial by-productof his own activity.44 An infuriated individual, wishing to observe thisfury, is bound to fail.

However, according to Brentano, this is no deficiency. Internalperception presents whatever is necessary in order to determine theprinciples of knowledge in general and the knowledge of emotions inparticular (the latter underpinning the ethic which tells us what rateslove and what rates hate). And as all that belongs to the mind is pre-sented to the intellect, it is presented clearly and distinctly. Thus theperceiver and the perceived are identical and there is no mediation,liable to distort or garble the perceptional message; accordingly, thecapacity of internal perception belongs to the realm of accomplishedtruth. For example, causality is grasped when the endorsement the willaccords an activity (of body or intellect) is grasped. Thus, somethingthat is required for the principle of causality is grasped. For instance,love is perceived when a person grasps his love for his offspring; thus,something is perceived which is necessary for the principle that tells uswhat deserves love.

Brentano believes that the sciences and ethics have no need of pre-suppositions or a priori synthetic sentences. According to Brentano,Kant's theory about the synthetic a priori propositions legitimizesprejudices (which are synthetic because they are not based on logic,and are a priori, because they are not based on experience).

These are a few guide-lines from Brentano's teachings which be-came to some extent characteristics of phenomenological thought.Without engaging in a detailed discussion, I wish to express somereservations with regard to essential issues.

1. We should distinguish between self-perception, which graspsthe “I,” or rather the forms of its intentions, and internal perception,which grasps intentional contents, or meanings. The ties of internalperception with self-perception are not closer than the former's tieswith external perception.

2. As not everything which is mental is truly conscious or per-ceived, the self-perceived is segmented and bears the ensuing distor-tions. Our understanding of what is self-perceived is not better-grounded than our understanding of what is externally perceived. The


immediate comprehension accompanying both fields of perception isfar from being complete and is in a number of cases even illusory.

To sum up these two points: In self-perception the perceiver andwhat is perceived are not fully identical.

3. Conceptual interpretation (formulated in words and sentences)of what is self-perceived is not complete at any stage, and conceptualinterpretation of pure external intuition (observation in space) is notfinite either.

Let us now briefly turn to Kant's school of thought. The concept ofpure intuition of space as the basis for geometry is correct in the sensethat the observation geometry is based upon is not empirical, and doesnot collect statistical data. This conception is incorrect from the anglethat Euclidean geometry was not complete without being incorporatedin a more comprehensive system, i.e., without mentioning that it treatsof a specific, relatively simple case, in which the degree of space-curvature equals zero, and that there are other geometries for the otherdegrees of space-curvature. As geometry is an a priori concept, it doesnot treat of the given physical space, whose curvature-degree is not tobe determined a priori, but treats hypothetically of all the differentcurvature degrees.

The same rule holds for pure observation in the sphere of self-per-ception. There is no guarantee, at any stage, that further qualificationof propositions will not be needed; that further clarification of alterna-tives is not necessary; that no need will arise for the integration of thepropositions we have asserted, as special cases within a wider frame-work.

Since it is not certain that the formulation of a proposition iscompleted and that it does not require qualifications, one should notsay either that it is evident.

With regard to terminology: pure intuition, or the observationwhich does not gather data for induction but enables us to learn some-thing from a single case, and the propositions supported by pure intui-tion, rate the name “a priori,” if a posteriori equals inductive. Yet,actually one should also understand pure intuition as a certain kind ofexperience and the propositions leaning on them as being empirical, ina somewhat broad sense of the word.

4. As mentioned above, Brentano believed that internal (or self)perception provides a basis for evident truth, but he also believed thatthere is no self-observation (or introspection). Yet, even though theobstacle Brentano mentions exists, it does not prevent self-observation,yet somewhat distorts what appears to it. The study that discovers thedistortion consists of meticulous interpretations of observations, whichaim at its isolation.


The reconstruction of intention-proceedings enables us to observethem. It occurs in such reconstruction that the form turns into content,which from the cognitive angle presents an advantage and a disadvan-tage; the advantage is that what was folded is spread out, so that itscomponents are distinct; the disadvantage is that this turn-aboutchanges what we seek to observe.

For Brentano, this obstacle equalled prevention, because he soughtcompleted truth and full certitude with regard to this truth.

5. Conceptual interpretation of empirical observation as well as ofpure intuition requires prior suppositions, namely, suppositions whichare not proven by observation or intuition.

Emotion as an Intentional Content

While dealing with matters discussed in previous chapters, I morethan once came up against a claim which could have been aimed atmultiple issues in this part of the book. The claim was: an emotion is afact that confronts the mind like a feeling and like an unwanted state ofthe own body; therefore it has the character of an “is” and not an“ought”; consequently it is neither a value nor a valuation. The answershould be: A typical emotion is not exhaustively represented by itspassive and factual aspect; furthermore: this is not its main aspect. Weshould distinguish between the emotion itself and the fact of experi-encing it, as we should distinguish between a value and the fact thatReuben or Simon adhere to it, namely, believe in it, apply it and mayeven be guided in their behavior by this value.

The difference between a typical emotion and its beingexperienced by someone under certain circumstances is not thedifference between the general and the individual, namely, betweenthe emotion in general and individual case, or between a certain kindof typical emotion (like love or hate) and an actual, individual casebelonging to this kind, but the difference between intentional contentand intentional form. Experiencing an emotion is an intentional act (itbelongs to the form), while the emotion proper is what one intends bythis act, or: it is one element of what is intended, it belongs to intent(i.e. to the content). For example — in love the beloved will belong tothe realm of intent; his being beloved by someone is not only one ofhis properties but constitutes the idea this person has of him, namely,constitutes intent.

The value — valuative or motivative, emotional or conceptual —is primarily a certain kind of intentional content. This means that tosay, a value is the sum total of content and form, would be misleading:


a value is a value only by virtue of its being content. When I observevalues adhered to by others, which are not my own values, my view isreflective and absorbs the form of the value, the facts, the meta-valuative fact that some values are present, namely, that they are beingadhered to. Yet, for whoever holds to the values I observe, while theyadhere to them, the same values belong to the realm of content, andthey will usually pay no attention to their form. When we speak of achange in values, the word “value” refers only to the formal aspect —the aspect revealed to the view from outside. With regard to itscontent, a value is unchangeable, even though it may refer to a valua-tion of change. Accordingly, we are inclined to make intent, or some-thing in it, absolute. For cognitive reflection about concepts of justicein various societies, justice is changeable, or in any case, one conceptof justice may be exchanged for another. However, for the person in-tending justice on the transitive level, it is unchangeable; he or shecannot possibly believe that such and such rules equal justice now, buton the morrow something else will represent justice. Being indignantat an injustice, one does not say: this is unjust according to the stan-dards I hold now.

It is true that at times emotion is no content whatsoever, even forthe person who experiences it; it functions in such cases, for instance,as the form of some non-emotional content which may not be valua-tive either. Yet the origin of this emotion, so far as it is a typical emo-tion, is in its status as content. Before love and hate serve as a form forthoughts, they are contents of sensual perception; usually they dealwith an object being viewed as beloved or as hated, namely, withcomprehension of a sight as expressing the state of being-beloved or asexpressing the state of arousing love, being worthy of love. We alsocomprehend the sight as expressing the object's being graceful, attrac-tive, or as expressing its being hated, threatening and malicious.Comprehension of the sight belongs to the intentional act of seeing, itis part of this act, and the meaning of the sight is the intentional con-tent of seeing. The same holds for the tactile, the audible and othersensory aspects of contemplation. In one of its origins, emotion be-longs to the meaning of sensory impressions we receive from the ob-ject.

Intentional content is the non-factual aspect of intention. Here itmakes no difference whether the sensory aspect has the character of apicture or of a symbol, whether the content is an emotion or a concept,whether the intention is valuative, cognitive, or the contemplation ofpossibilities. Factuality is only one aspect in any case — the aspectthat serves once again as an object for intention on a higher plane —


the object of descriptive and explanatory as well as of valuing reflec-tion.

Whoever fails to notice the content of emotion because of its fac-tual aspect (and therefore claims that it is not a value), will not committhe same error in the intellectual sphere. When dealing with anintellectual, cognitive act whose content is a concept, it is easy to seethat there is more to it than form, because its content crystallizes at theopposing pole to its form. As content it is universal, as form it isindividual, an activity taking place in real life. The objectivity of in-tention qua content resides in the direction towards the objective, andfrom this angle it is precisely the form which is subjective — is acertain component of the subject; the subjectivity of intention quacontent resides in its existence in the sphere opposite the facts, butfrom this angle the form is objective, is part of the world, part of thefield of facts and not a reference to the latter. Intellectual cognitiveintention is well-polarized and the philosopher cannot ignore this po-larity; he is compelled to admit that here the factuality of intention isbut one pole of an entirety. In emotion, however, the non-factual ele-ment is a certain facet, but it does not crystallize at a particular pole;one may, therefore, be apprehensive of a one-sided view, namely, ofunderstanding form, as if it were not the form of a content, a meta-valuative fact, but an ordinary fact. Even though what is perceived byreflection is always only form, and a comprehensive view understandsit as the form of a content, the one-sided view does not see the signalsof its function, its bearing evidence of an intentional content whichexists beyond the form. The one-sided view we should beware of heremay be called “naturalistic” — viewing emotion as a mere reaction tosensory impressions. The fear of such a naturalism somewhat recedesin the discussion of conceptual thought, because it is fairly obviousthat this is not a reaction, or only a reaction, primarily on account of itsinherent demand for validity. This naturalism with regard to emotion iscompatible with an entirely non-naturalistic approach to conceptualthinking.

This naturalism not only denies the intentional character of emo-tion, but views it as always following sensation, which as a picture or asymbol of an object conveys information. In this view, the emotion hasan external relation to the object and to the sensation, namely, therelation of effect to cause. It is not the meaning of the specific sensa-tion immediately involved in this sensation.

Whoever distinguishes between content and its form in the intel-lectual sphere, understands that here factuality belongs to form andthat the adherence to a conceptual value is but one aspect of value-


thought, needs only this additional step: to make this distinction andthis understanding pertinent for the entire sphere of intention.

This discussion raises the question which emotions may be con-sidered emotions proper, or typical emotions, i.e., originate in theirfunction as intentional content. Are joy and sadness also typical emo-tions (in the meaning mentioned here)? What is the relation betweenunderstanding an emotion of another person, and experiencing an emo-tion? We will not attempt to answer these questions here. For thisdiscussion it is sufficient that there are emotions directed at objects,emotions expressed in images of these objects, which may be embod-ied in value-properties of the objects, i.e., there are emotions to whichtheir function as content is essential and enables them to come intobeing, even if they do not function exclusively in this manner.

The claim we presented at the beginning of the current paragraph,was the following: an emotion represents a fact and not the content ofan “ought to” and is accordingly not a value. We must now treat of thecategory “ought to” that appears in this claim. This category does notrefer to the whole sphere of values — it characterizes only values ofreason, namely, conceptually crystallized values (and even amongthese, usually only norms and obligations).

As the category “ought to” serves only part of the sphere of values,one should not say about something: this issue does not constitute an“ought,” therefore it is not a value.

Preference

Preference can be characterized as choice or quasi-choice. It is anadjudication between good and good or between bad and bad. When aperson is faced by a choice, adjudication will hold on to the greaterand abandon the lesser good, or hold on to the lesser and avoid thegreater evil. When a person is not actually faced by a choice, his pref-erence is somewhat like a game that simulates choosing.

Preference is therefore a certain kind of valuation. While valuing isbasically drawing a line between good and bad, preference demarcatesthe difference between good and good or bad and bad; namely, it dif-ferentiates between relative good and relative bad. A bad possibilitycompared to another bad possibility can be relatively good.

The act of preferring takes place on ground prepared by anothervaluation which is not preference, since the comparison of good withgood assumes that the distinction between good and bad has alreadybeen accomplished.

Preference, in its turn, divides into two kinds:


A) Quantitative preference — choosing one out of multiple objectspossessing the same value-property, based on measurements accordingto the scale of a single value.

B) Qualitative preference — choosing one out of multiple values(one from among different value-properties).45 Qualitative preferencecombines a volition and an act of reflection.

Only qualitative preference (when carried out in the presence of anactual choice) is an adjudication in its proper meaning, namely, an actof the will.

Prima facie, qualitative preference is a valuation of values. Weshould, however, keep in mind that a value is not wont to be valuedbut from the angle of its form. A motive can be valued, adherence to avalue can be valued, persistence in such adherence, and other factorsbelonging to the form can be valued — an implementation of a valueand its embodiment by a value-property; we can, of course, value avolition or a deed from the aspect of the volition it embodies. But, thecontent of a valuative value is not, in its turn, subject to additionalvaluation. There is no need to justify the basis of justification onceagain. One does not ask whether justice is just or beauty is beautiful.

Qualitative preference represents valuing reflection, whose task isto value consciousness and its motives; the object are the forms of thisconsciousness, because reflection covers but the form of intention.

Society and Its Mode of Reality

Relations “between” human beings which make up society do notreside between but within them, within their consciousness. Even theirinstitutional crystallization, state and law included, has no independentexistence whatsoever; it exists but in consciousness, namely, only inthe consciousness of individuals. The same rule holds for money andfor property in general.

These relations, however, and primarily their crystallizations —state, law, property, money — usually appear to the members of soci-ety as very real, as an objective reality independent of their conscious-ness. And truly, these relations exist objectively, but this is the objec-tive or factual existence of consciousness itself. Nothing in this exis-tence, in this mode of being, is independent of consciousness. Societyis a certain segment of intentional form (or the form of a certain seg-ment of intention).

For several reasons, the form of intention may indeed be mistak-enly considered as something outside and independent of conscious-ness.


A) The form is not always conscious it is not in all instancesgrasped immediately by self-perception. For example, the thinker neednot be aware of his manner of thought. The form is independent ofawareness in general and awareness of itself in particular. This inde-pendence of awareness can in some circumstances appear as independ-ence from the mind.

B) From a number of angles, the form of intention is not subject tothe will, even when it is conscious. This is true of emotional as well asof intellectual forms.

C) Forms of intention which have crystallized as inter-personal re-lations, acquire independence with regard to the individual.

The intention whose forms make up society, is intention towardsvalues; thought about society and its institutions is but reflectiveknowledge and valuation of forms of value-thought. Facts in thesphere of relations between one individual and another, for instance,reciprocal contractual obligations they undertake, are meta-valuativefacts.

When someone tells a friend that X, with whom both are ac-quainted, embezzled his employer's money, was caught and sacked, hemay but wish to inform his friend, to report facts, without valuing Xand his deeds; the friend may view the story in the same manner andask for factual details — what the employer knew at various stagesabout the use of his money, whether he trusted X and so on, questionsabout X's and his employer's intentions and emotions. The conversa-tion is therefore conducted on a meta-valuative neutral level, but thelanguage is valuative now and then, because, as opposed to axiology,common reflection about value-thought needs no special technical jar-gon (different from the language employed by value-thought). Thesame word designates a value on the level of its application as well ason the level of reflection about it and its application. Because of thisthe meta-valuative conversation may sometimes, so to say, slide un-wittingly back to its original level. For instance, the parties to thisconversation, on the face of it, draw a valuative conclusion from thefacts — that X should be made to repay what he stole, or that in anycase he should not be given money to handle. Actually, they havepassed from the meta-valuative, neutral meaning of the words describ-ing a certain social reality, to the valuative meaning of these words,and have drawn a practical conclusion through the mediation of thismeaning.

It is quite possible for a person to describe a bank robbery withsome sympathy (let us say, if nobody was hurt), employing wordswhich are negative on the original level of their meaning (also forwhoever tells the story) like “robbery,” “fraud,” “misrepresentation”


— even though in the meta-valuative context of the story they bear nonegative coloring; here they are somehow amusing and are usuallyviewed in this vein by the listeners as well. When the gap betweenlevels is so great there is no danger of unwittingly sliding from one tothe other, but it seems that such a gap is not frequent.

Dealing with ordinary facts, for instance those concerning inani-mate nature, a contemporary of ours would not confuse a value and itsapplication with things and facts. However, when the facts are meta-valuative it is harder to pinpoint the passage from fact to value andvice-versa, because here the fact is but the form of a value, namely, thelatter's residing in our consciousness. The value form is caught be-tween two levels of content — the level whose reality is made up bythe form, and that which discusses it as an object; it turns into a pro-gressively thinning factual barrier between levels of content, at timesbecoming transparent and disappearing from the sight of the philoso-pher. If Reuben believes wholeheartedly that he owes Simon 1000 $,and he persists in his belief, he will, on the face of it, truly owe himthis sum — in particular if he expresses this belief in writing and signsit. The question whether a debt by Reuben to Simon exists turns on ameta-valuative fact. If a person believes that he is sinning by notadhering to the articles of faith his religion prescribes, could he bewrong? His belief concerns a meta-valuative fact, valued as a sin; yet,the meta-valuative fact here is, as it were, a layer of thin ice, walkedby individual reflection.

However, whoever cautiously walks this layer of thin ice, will findthat it covers the entire field of value-thought and also the whole fieldof intention, and the border between the moving waters and the iceexists. The valuative content of intention and its factual existencecomplement each other in unity, but are by no means identical.

Truly there is no passage from the form of any intention to its con-tent, because these are two facets of the same procedure, and one facetdoes not turn into the other one.46 Reflection deals always exclusivelywith form. However, reflection itself proceeds from the description ofthe form of value-thought to its valuation, namely, from the descrip-tion in valuative language of meta-valuative facts to their valuationand to practical conclusions.

The passage that occurs in reflection does not affect its object. It isreflection itself which passes from one kind of reference to intentionalform to another kind of reference to the same. The form which servesas an object for reflection does not turn into the content it serves asform, nor does this content turn into its own form. A fact and valuativecontent do not metamorphose into each other. This rule is valid for the


fact which is the object of valuative content, as well as for the fact thatX thinks this content (and how he thinks it).

A meta-valuative fact is not less substantial than another fact; itlends itself to neutral description, i.e., which may be accepted as cor-rect by adherents to opposing values. And as a meta-valuative fact issubject to the same rule as all facts, one cannot derive a valuation or apractical conclusion from such a fact without the mediation of a valua-tive assumption.

An imperative (non hypothetical) and statements of worthiness andof what ought to be, are not derived (directly) from the neutral descrip-tion of social facts, or from any description so far as it is neutral.

Conjoint Intention towards the Same Meanings

The bond between content and content also belongs to the realm ofcontent. That is to say: the content of intention is not cast into separateunits, each one indifferent to all the rest, and connected to each otherby links of form; as if contents were shut into metal boxes, joined bymetal links. And from intention in general to thoughts: the connectionbetween the intentional content of one thought to the content ofanother one is not only formal; on the contrary, on the whole it isprimarily the bond of content.

The first content bond between several intentions is their being di-rected towards the same intent. Identity of intent is the content bondbetween different acts. But this bond is also accompanied by a formalelement, and it is the latter which enables reflection to discuss thebond; even though reflection fails to reproduce the identicalness con-ceptually, it can refer to it so far as it was immediately understood onthe pre-reflective level; this shortcoming of intellectual reflectionarises because identicalness is a bond of content and not a pattern ofform.

Understanding an intent as identical with the intent of a previousact (along the continuity of the same proceeding or within anotherproceeding) involves understanding the distinction between the identi-cal and the different. The identification is not made by means of dis-tinctive marks, because in this case one would have to ask how thesemarks are to be identified — whether once again by distinctive marks;the identification occurs immediately (a person getting up in the morn-ing does not ponder who he is and needs no distinctive marks to de-termine his own identity).

Identification by the intellect is preceded by that of sense percep-tion. A person grasps that two sense-percepts are identical already at


the lowest level of complexity in sensory reception. The casting ofintentional content into units, namely into intents, occurs by virtue ofidentification.

The identity bond between intentions provides the basis for a bondof continuity, thus enabling us to weave a thread of comprehensionwhich passes through many intentions. From here we will turn to theconnection between intentional proceedings of different people.

The primary connection between human beings is their conjoint in-tention towards the same intent. This connection is the foundation forall other human ties. The identity bond between intentional proceed-ings of different people, enables them to intertwine their intentionalcontents. The contents join a totality by virtue of their consisting of thesame metaphysical matter, and by their thematic proximity. Thecommon thought embodied in conversation belongs to the primaryconnection, but conjoint or common intention also occurs in the sphereof perception.

The quasi-natural factual relation between members of a society ismerely a covering for the primary connection, even when it is institu-tionalized and has acquired quasi-independence of the individuals in-volved (they replace each other, the relation remains valid); it is but aform of intention, or more precisely: a form of the content bonds be-tween the minds of individuals.

Here as well as in individual consciousness the essentially firstbond is identicalness and the distinction between the identical and thedifferent. Different individuals intend the same intent. To the questionwhether this is truly one and the same intent, one should reply that it isso in the same manner in which an individual intends the same intenton different occasions — notwithstanding some difference between theintent on one occasion and that on the other one.

Individuals can understand each other by virtue of intent identity,and they can also continue each other's thoughts. In this partnership,one person is not the object of another's activity or thought, but bothintend a third thing. One person becomes the object of his or her coun-terpart only on a higher level, which rests on this layer of intentionalcooperation.

It has become clear what makes the joint and the mutual under-standing possible. As communication it is carried out at its basis bymeans of immediately understood expressions, i.e., by means of sen-sations which embody their meaning and need no interpretation —emotional meanings as well as value neutral meanings (such as causa-tion).47

The immediate character of the expression does not exclude errorsand misunderstandings, because the point of immediacy is that it needs


no mediation, no explanation in order to understand a certainsensation. In other words: this sensation (the expression) is not mean-ingless and waiting for me to supply the meaning (by interpretation);however, it has not yet been said thereby, what the cognitive value ofthis meaning is.

Mutual expressive understanding in the sphere of perception en-ables humans to develop a system of common symbols and signs, todraw on symbolic expressions and to converse with each other.

I can think about another's thought only when I have understood it,namely, when I have thought it myself (following the other person'sutterance). Accordingly, I can think about the other person as havingthis thought only after understanding him to some degree on the levelof participation in its content. In the course of a conversation thelistener is subject to the rivalry between an understanding and areflective approach; adopting one approach prevents adopting the otherat the same time, or at least impedes it. This rivalry indicates that theapproach to another person as an object is not liable to mix with theapproach to the other one as a partner on the basic level of reference tothe same intent.

What was said here about consciousness is mutatis mutandis validin practice. In practice, inter-personal partnership is also a necessarycondition for one individual to become the object of another individ-ual's activity.

As mentioned above, the casting of intentional content into intentsoccurs by virtue of identification, i.e., actually by virtue of the contentcasting itself.

The casting of consciousness in general into individual subjectsoccurs by virtue of the will's individuality, namely, it occurs becausetwo people do not possess one and the same will. Only the boundariesof the will determine the borderline between my consciousness andother humans, between my soul and all other human souls. The do-main of voluntary action is wide enough to establish the individualityof the mind.

As the difference between will-faculties of individuals explain whya number of humans do not make up one intending subject, so theexistence of the will explains why a person has no more than one soulor intellect, namely, why he or she is a single personality. A humanbeing is an individual, i.e., indivisible, because his will is indivisible(and as far as his will is indivisible). Even when a person seeks toannul his own in favor of somebody else's will, and the same personwishes to be absorbed by the personality of the other, he cannot do so.The will can annul itself in this or that case, with regard to certainissues, but it cannot abolish itself altogether (without injuring the very


life of its owner). The very existence of the will therefore impedesmystic aspirations which seek to abolish the boundaries of the indi-vidual (and thus the individual itself) by its absorption into a perfectbeing; in fact, mystic authors point to this impediment.48

David Hume asked what our impression of the “I,” the self was.And indeed, it seems that there is no unmixed impression of the self.Yet, in self-perception we receive impressions from volitions, andthese include a feeling of the self, of the “I” that wills. Accordinglycommonsense rejects doubts concerning the existence of the “I.”

PART II

The Division of Values andtheir Typology

Chapter 1

The Principle of Division

In this part I will try to divide values into sections according to themanner of their application, and describe some types of values in eachsection — values around which, all other values in this section cluster.

The question we have to answer is according to what values shouldbe divided. We have to take account of a distinction made by variousscholars,49 even though it appears in a number of variants and inslightly differing terminology. This is the distinction between what, inits own right, possesses a value-property in the full sense of the word,and that which does not have full ownership of a value-property,because the latter adheres to it by virtue of something else and not inits own right and immediately. This distinction was linked to the claimthat an experience (which includes any action or activity) or a state ofconsciousness may have intrinsic value, namely, it may possess avalue-property which is not mediated by anything else. Experiences ofpleasure, joy or their opposites, as well as experiences of wonder andbeing emotionally moved, are links in the chain of a person's life,whose essence is their specific value-character. An external object onthe other hand, namely, a thing or a set of events in a person'senvironment, has value because experiencing it carries value, i.e., themeeting between this person and this object possesses value. Theobject's value is extrinsic, it is indirectly related to the object.


According to the inner logic of this claim, nothing can be said tobe good, unless it is good for someone. That is to say that goodness isbeing good for somebody, and reality of goodness in a good thingresides in someone's experience of this thing. The thing is good in amediated sense, while experiencing it is good in its own right. It is notthe apple which is good in the full meaning of good, but eating it, notthe painting, but looking at it, not possessions but their consumption.

This logic is rooted in the relational character of values and value-properties. Their character makes the existence of an external object'svalue-property conditional on the latter being bestowed on the objectby the meeting with a subject. The actual existence of a value-propertyresides exclusively in the experience and in life.

The point of departure for this logic is the critical axiological view,which examines the mode of existence attached to value-phenomena(in order to assemble a kind of axiological ontology) and tips thescales in favor of the subject — not in favor of the subject beyond itsrelation to an object, but in favor of the live subject, in favor of theexperience. The importance of this logic lies in that it underminespopular value-philosophy, which has a penchant for extreme objectiv-ism, a cult-like approach to the material embodiments of values. How-ever, the popular value objectivism, which mistakes value-propertiesfor fundamental properties of an external object, is not just an errone-ous philosophy, to be replaced by the study of critical axiology; it is anexpression, albeit a naive one, of the outward-directed character ofvaluative intention. Objectivism expresses the general tendency of theintentional system to objectify. However, the unbalanced picture ofvalue-character critical axiology draws, shortchanges the report on thistendency by presenting the experience, or the state of mind, as valua-tive per se, in opposition to the external object, whose value is merelysecondary or extrinsic. Does a person undergoing a valuative experi-ence — that on which axiological attention now focuses — truly feelthat the experience itself is the core, and the external object this personexperiences is merely secondary? Is experiencing the hub and not whatis being experienced? Is it possible for the form of intention to be themajor issue while its content is subordinate, namely, will this be theoriginal transitive experience itself, in which the external object is theintent? I suspect that precisely those who claim that the experience isthe core draw a picture which is not faithful to it, namely, to theoriginal experience that turns outward from the individual to the world— the experience which reveals its nature when it is lived through inconcentration, while “one forgets oneself,” without reflection whichmight spoil its spontaneity. I do not suggest that the scales turn to-

The Principle of Division 105

wards the object beyond the meeting, but towards the object within themeeting.50

There is an additional argument against the division into experi-ence, or a state of consciousness or of mind on the one hand, and theexternal object on the other hand: From the viewpoint of consistentcritical reflection — is the object truly external? Is the object not thatwhich is being experienced, which exists within the experience, thatwhose properties are all relational to the subject? It is precisely theviewpoint adopted by the distinction we discuss here, which requiresthe object to be considered external only to one of the experiencedcontents, or to one of the intents, but not to consciousness as a whole,or the mind as a whole. For instance, the object will be external to thebody of the valuing individual, but not to its mind, since this exter-nality — as it is intended — is altogether made of materials belongingto the mind, of sensations and notions (the mind here has a widerscope than the body).

The object of the experience is the content which has undergoneobjectification. The critical axiological reflection short-changes thisobject because of a perspectival distortion.

According to its nature, reflection only treats of the form of an in-tention, while it discards the content as belonging to the object of theparticular intention. If reflection addresses a transitive intention, itdiscards the content of this intention as belonging to an external object,namely, external in the sense of axiological ontology. This is not thesame externality that a person ascribes to an object he or she expe-riences on the transitive level — an object which is external in thesense that it is not a limb or a part of the human body. In the context ofaxiological ontology externality means independence from the mind orfrom consciousness. It transforms the object described as external intosomething alien to the mind and irrelevant to the values that mindmaintains.

Axiological ontology asks: Can anything that has no relation to ahuman being (or a subject) possess a value-property? Can a value-property not be of value for someone? The answer is negative. Inten-tional content and the real object of experience become blind spots forthis ontology, their contents being transferred either to the intentionalact and to the form in general, or to the utterly external object. Thisdivision of intentional content and of the object that is immanent toexperience, transfers value-properties to the act. Not beauty, but thepleasure derived from it “possesses value of its own,” or “intrinsicvalue,” not justice, but the good of society as a whole, not freedom,but what one does with freedom.


All this yields a perspectival distortion which biases truth to vari-ous degrees. Verily, between the intentional act, including its modesand background, and “the object in itself,” there is something else —the intentional content, or the intent, with its two facets: the objectifiedfacet, which has become a value-property, and what remains as asubjective remnant that has not undergone objectification, namely,which remains only the (subjective) content of an intention (devoid ofobjective status).

We learn that although every value-property relates to a subject,things, activities and people may possess a positive or negative value-property in a full or intrinsic sense, and not only for the sake of pleas-ure or sorrow, content or discontent. That is to say — even though thebeautiful thing is beautiful in someone's eyes, it is so in this person'seyes by virtue of its essence and without reservations. Beauty is notidentical with the satisfaction derived from viewing it in a beautifulthing. Nor does the question whether what is beautiful in the eyes ofone person, is also beautiful in the eyes of others, increase or decreasethe validity of this claim. We have, however, to clarify the nature ofthe “what” mentioned here. When two people see the same thing and itis beautiful in the eyes of one and not beautiful in the eyes of the other,they do not see the same sight. Although this proposition is valid onlywith regard to a certain, basic kind of beauty, it is sufficient for ourpurpose. Beauty may belong to the factors constituting the sight, andnot only to those which make up the response to a sight.

A value may be relational in two aspects; we may ask about a goodthing for whom and in whose eyes it is good. And these are twodifferent questions. We may also ask in whose eyes these or thosecontents (say, a certain kind of equality) represent justice — but it ispresumably impossible to ask “justice for whom” in the same way weasked “good for whom?” Although we say that justice was done to acertain individual (when people remedy an injustice done to him), thisbelongs to the realization of justice, mediated by the application of thevalue “justice” to facts, and not to the content which makes up thisvalue.

Good is relational in its form (in whose eyes, who adheres to it) aswell as in its content (for whom), while justice is relational only in itsform.

It would be wrong to understand justice as what is good for thepublic. The absence of identity between justice and what is good forthe public may surface properly in a situation in which justice impedesthe public in its treatment of a certain individual (or some individuals)belonging to it, and this impediment obstructs the public good.

The Principle of Division 107

The realization of justice therefore possesses a full value-characterof its own, which does not reside in the satisfaction we derive from it.

The identification of something which possesses self or inner valuewith the experience or with trying it out, is therefore bound up with aperspective of reflection that denies the existence of intentional con-tent.

A typology of values cannot be built upon the shifting sands be-tween object and subject, driven by the winds of reflection. Valueshave to be divided into sections, so that each section holds experiencesas well as objects being experienced, be these external or internal. An-other requirement is that the difference between sections should notarise from the division of the valued objects into genera and species,but from a difference which is essential to the form of valuation.

The requirements arising from our discussion can be met by aprinciple of division based on the structure of activity.

Every valuative value is bound up with human activity. Aestheticvalues also possess this bond, because intuition belongs to the realm ofactivity. And this bond may serve as a differentiating property in thegeneral division of values into sections, i.e., we will attribute a certainvalue to one of the sections according to the nature of its bond withactivity.

The complex in which activity is embedded can be divided intothree members: The result of an action, the action proper and thefactors of an action. The third member circumscribes here the motivesand their background, all the factors that participate in bringing theaction about, and in some respect the individual subject as a whole.

I divide valuative values into three sections according to their di-rect bond with this or that member of the activity-complex. A value isdirectly bound up with one member, bearing upon the other membersthrough its mediation. The same can also be put in this way: We valuethe totality and the remaining members according to one member, forinstance: We value the action-proper and the person carrying it outaccording to the action's result.

The term “according to” can be used in two ways: a) A person val-ues an object according to a certain value (namely, based on this value,or in the course of its application). b) He or she values a certain objectaccording to another object (or one member according to anothermember, always of course, based on some value), for instance, theaction proper according to its result.

To the extent that valuative values are accompanied by motives,the division of the former may also serve as a division of the latter;that is to say, the motivative value will belong to the same section andto the same type within the section to which its congruent valuative


value belongs; it follows that this division may also serve as a divisionof actions, so far as each of these actions is determined by anexclusive, or a principal motive that belongs to a certain section andtype. When a type of deed or action matches a type of valuative valueby means of the motive, we will delineate the typical characteristicsaccording to the deed in which this particular motive, namely, thataccording to which the deed was classified, is exclusive.

The sections are therefore:First section: Values designated to value according to the action's

result.Second section: Values designated to value according to the

action-proper.Third section: Values designated to value according to the factors

of activity.Forthwith I will also name them section A, section B and section C.

At the conclusion of the discourse about the division of values intosections and types (at the end of Chapter 9 in this part) I will try topresent the result of this division in a table.

Chapter 2

The First Section: Valuation Accordingto Results. The End

The term “end,” in an extension of its usage, also serves at times in thesense of “raison d'être.” We will use it here in its narrow meaning, as asynonym for the word “goal.” That is to say, the end is an idea(perceptual or conceptual) of an action's desired result; this actionitself is a means, namely, it is directed at the end. Although end is anidea, the achieved end is not an idea, but the real, desired result (in ourterminology).

The end accommodates the valuation of the actually achieved re-sult, the valuation and guidance of the action aimed at the result, aswell as the valuation of the person executing this action.

A typical achieved end is the outcome of an objective process, in-tertwined with a goal-oriented action, or the final link in a chain ofcause and result, the action being one of the links. Sowing wheat is atypical goal-oriented action — because one “sows in tears” as well asbecause it emphasizes the integration of an action as a link in a naturalcausal chain.

The person seeking the end has to be knowledgeable with regard tothe process his object undergoes, in order to enter the process and in-cline it towards his end; furthermore: he needs previous knowledge of


the results (i.e., a well-founded supposition of the results; a supposi-tion whose probability is proportional to the required amount of re-sources).

The idea of the desired result appeals to the heart and to the intel-lect. It appeals to the heart as a pleasant idea. The sower in tears isencouraged by the idea of reaping. To the intellect, the idea of the re-sult appeals as a planning instruction. Planning characterizes goal-ori-ented activities. Good planning turns the following stage into execu-tion, namely, into a non-spontaneous activity, which in principle canbe carried out by machines.

The end that appeals to the heart is the motive. A deed properlybelongs to those which are goal-oriented when the end is its sole mo-tive, namely, when it has no positive value-property except the result itis expected to achieve; its membership in this category becomesespecially obvious, when it possesses negative value-properties inother aspects, for instance, if the deed is exhausting and unpleasant oropposes the ideals of its executor.

Efficiency

Valuation of the objects of a goal-oriented deed is mediated by theconcept of usefulness, while the concept of efficiency mediates valua-tion of the deed itself. Efficiency represents the combination of effec-tiveness and economy (factors which may exist separately), namely,the proportion between a given amount of accomplished end, i.e.,product, and the amount of resources invested in it. The smaller theamount of resources, the greater efficiency is. Here we view theactivity as an act of exchange: We provide resources, we receive arealized end. Being efficient means to give but little.

An important component, present in any system of goal-orientedresources, is time. The less time we devote to a goal-oriented activity(while the quantity and quality of the result remains constant), thegreater its efficiency. The activity is valued negatively as a loss or asacrifice of resources and should therefore be contracted and reducedas far as possible. The executor of a goal-oriented activity iscompensated for its negative value by the positive value of its result.

From here follows the most salient difference between an efficientand a pleasant deed. The first is carried out as fast as possible, whilethe second suffers from speed (in any case, beyond a certain limit).What is efficient possesses in itself a negative value, while a pleasantactivity possesses a positive value. Accordingly, the typical pleasant

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deed is not goal-oriented and does not belong to section A but to sec-tion B, in which the motive aims at the deed itself.

When a person eats tasty food, he or she does not try to do it effi-ciently, so that their eating is not to be considered as goal-oriented.However, a sick person who has no appetite and eats in order to getwell, may eat in an efficient manner.

A deed of mixed character, which according to its motives belongsto both sections A and B, incorporates an opposition between theseheterogeneous elements; under certain circumstances the oppositionwill become topical and require a decision and preference.

Whoever paints his home, fixes something within it, decorates it orworks in his garden (and perhaps also the person polishing his car),usually does not do it efficiently, because he does not try to save time.Why does he not grudge spending his time? Perhaps a), because on theface of it, he already consumes the product of his work while he workson it, and consumption, of course, is not meant to be efficient; in thiscase, two activities take place simultaneously or alternately, like aperson who now and then tastes a dish he or she is cooking; or perhapsb), because he likes this work and is free to do it in his own homeanyway he wishes.

The medieval artisan, whose guild protected him from competi-tion, could afford to elaborate his work at the expense of efficiency —for instance, to decorate his carpentry with artistic carvings.

Viewing the action as devoid of intrinsic positive value in therealm of goal-orientation is not only a matter of methodology. Fromthe methodological aspect, we consider an action in section A as de-void of positive value, because we look for typical cases. The typicalcase of section A is that which has value exclusively by virtue of itsend, and not in its own right.

However, apart from the methodological aspect, a relevant consid-eration arises not from the nature of the meta-valuative discussion, butfrom the nature of the issue. Goal-orientation itself demands effi-ciency, and efficiency demands curtailing the action's time-span,namely, viewing the action as a sacrifice offered up to the end, as asurrender of resources for which compensation is due, i.e., the view ofactivity as negative and therefore as requiring contraction or curtailing,belongs to the structure of goal-orientation.

The predisposition of a person for a goal-oriented action is differ-ent from that for an action pleasant in its course, or in general for onedesirable for its own sake. The predisposition for a goal-oriented ac-tion is tyranny of the will.


The Proportion of a Sacrifice in the Present to aReward in the Future

As said before, the goal-oriented deed is a matter of exchange. Thedecision to execute it is a decision to sacrifice power, time and materi-als now, in order to gain a reward in the future.

How great a sacrifice is a certain reward worth? Here we face acomplex question. Axiology should not recommend a norm, but try tofind out in general what norms can determine this matter. It has toclarify whether different kinds of sacrifice and different kinds ofreward have some common denominator. If there is no commondenominator, no common measurability, the existence of a quantitativerelation, which fulfills the role of a threshold of profitability ispossible.

Let us take a case possessing common measurability. Is it worth-while to expend 100 units now, in order to receive 100 units in future(in a year)? To clarify the question: We do not speak of 100 physicalunits (because then the question would address the relation betweenthese and my present need, whether they represent more than I need),but of 100 units of a certain pleasure (we will assume for a momentthat such a thing exists). It seems we will receive more negative thanpositive replies to our question. For this discussion, it is sufficient thatwe will also receive negative replies. We go on to ask whether 100 inexchange for 101 would be alright. We can also ask in financial terms:What is the correct or accepted rate of interest for these pleasures?

Let us now assume that there are negative units of pleasure,namely, units of pain which set off the units of pleasure, in any casewhen they appear simultaneously. Will we agree to suffer 100 negativeunits in order to gain 100 positive ones a year later? If not, will weagree in exchange for 101 a year later? The question concerns the rateof interest (or the discount) of pleasure and suffering. This questionincorporates another one — how much wear and tear a person is pre-pared to undergo today, in order to achieve a given amount of pleas-ure, in the future.

It appears that the rate of interest for pleasure and distress differswith different people, and even differs for the same people in differentperiods of their life or perhaps even on different days. The diligentperson has a low rate of interest, the lazy one has a high rate of inter-est. It seems that a zero rate of interest will mark the upper limit ofindustry and an infinite rate of interest the limit of laziness. It is pos-sible, however, that people who are not lazy, who tend to be active in aspontaneous and non goal-oriented manner, people inclined to engagein activities whose attraction resides in themselves and not in their

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results, will join the lazy ones in choosing a higher rate of interest thandiligent people. The rate of interest for pleasure and distress istherefore not a function of personal readiness for activity and effort ingeneral, but represents the degree of goal-orientation an individual ad-heres to on a certain day (or permanently).

The will determines the rate of interest for pleasure and sufferingand by means of this decision expresses its structure in general, as wellas its position with regard to goal-orientation in particular.

A lower rate of interest prevails in modern industrial society(within the active nucleus that propels it) than in traditional societies,and behavior according to this lower rate is considered more rational.By the way — in a certain sense a negative rate of interest is possible;a person may seek to postpone pleasures (to leave the best dish for theend of the meal) and to hasten pain, because anticipating pleasure ispleasurable in itself (an addition to the expected pleasure),51 while an-ticipating pain is distressing in itself (an addition to expected distress).There is some room for casuistry here: whether the rate of interest istruly negative in such cases. But we will not discuss this possibility.

The Individual as a Means to His Own Ends

In every goal-oriented activity, its executor is also aimed at an end,i.e., he himself is one of the means to the end. As the activity's execu-tor is also the “owner” of the end (it is his end), the subject here has adouble status: he constitutes the end and he is subjected to it. He con-stitutes the end by his will, and he is subject to it through his intellect,his sensory observation and his body. As a will, he subjects himself asintellect, as sensory faculty and as moving body.

The will is not only required to constitute, namely, to choose andestablish the end, but also to supervise the body, the sensory observa-tion and the intellect — lest they indulge their own inclination to actspontaneously or to rest — in order to have them carry out, at the fast-est possible pace, the plan paving the way to the goal. The will has toovercome opposition all along the way; this opposition increases themore the end, addressing the intellect which processes it into a set ofinstructions, is alien to the end addressing the heart, namely, to theattractive idea of the achieved end, meant to arouse the motives thatpropel the implementation of the intellect's instructions. When theinstructions point to a deed which is not at all similar to the achievedgoal as it is imagined, the end addressing the heart confronts an obsta-cle on its way to mobilize the requested forces. The will stops the gap.


This gap exists already between the instruction to sow and the wishto reap, but it is greater when the instruction demands a repeatedmovement of the hand on an assembly-line, or the filling in of blanksin forms. The will bridges the expanding abyss by diverting forces,aroused by the pleasurable idea of the achieved result, into the channelleading there, and by underpinning these forces.

Once the intellect, the faculty of observation and the body becomeaccustomed to the implementation-routine, the will needs less vigi-lance to supervise them. Recreation, on the other hand, diverts theintellect, the observation faculty and the body from the tasks of im-plementation, even beginning to arouse their inclination to act in theirown way; thus the will has to be more vigorous and to use force, inorder to put them back on the track they are destined to follow.

Here it is meet to address briefly some front-lines on which goal-orientation clashes with opposing inclinations.

Goal-orientation trains the faculty of perception and observation tosearch certain objects, to look for certain characteristics in the object,to choose the useful, and, of course, to do so quickly.

Observation, however, tends by its nature not to hurry. If some-thing within the object arouses it in particular, it is the pleasant and notthe useful element. It may be pleasant to behold or pleasant in someother respect. Observation does not hunt for anything, but it may askfor something, for the continuing display of something, for thecontinuation of a displayed sequence, or even for its completion. Fromthe view point of the faculty of observation, the thing itself, as it were,asks in this case for completion, while observation just follows in itswake.

When observation is not harnessed to an end, it incorporates im-mediate understanding of expressions in general and emotional expres-sions in particular. The free observer lets his or her eye linger on adetail until its image surfaces, or until it joins other details and ex-presses something. According to the nature of activities, a rivalry ex-ists between a predisposition for observation aimed at understandingexpressions and that for observation which supplies the intellect withdata in the search for what is useful. If such a pattern becomes fixatedwithin an individual, it may damage his or her ability to change to thealternative tack. Observation, concentrating on the search for what isuseful, is weaned away from its own inclinations and may, in thecourse of time, lose part of its ability to see understandingly.

Goal-orientation trains the intellect to apply principles and to cre-ate on the conceptual level, by means of these principles and based onthe data supplied by observation, a practical substitute for the objectsof goal-oriented activity. This substitute enables the intellect to arrange

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the deed in thought prior to arranging it in reality, and as it were, evento absorb possible failures in a thinking-game and not in practice(Bergson believed that the intellect is incapable of reaching far beyondits goal-oriented role). In other words: The conceptual picture theintellect is required to create, must enable it hypothetically to predictresults of our intervention while it is going on. That whose reaction toour intervention cannot be predicted, is not an object of goal-orientedactivity. The intellect, trained to obey the goal-oriented will isrequired, like observation, to save time, to avoid dealing with endlessdetails and to keep to the straight and narrow. When the will in itscapacity as power of judgment, decides to stop the intellect's work on acertain task, it assembles the results of the latter's labor into a coherentpicture and answers the questions that are still open. The will allocatesprobabilities: When the data accumulated by the intellect yield apartial picture, justifying the allocation of 70% probability to apositive, and 30% probability to the negative answer, the will some-times stops the intellect's work, allocating, for example, 90% to thepositive and 10% to the negative answer (according to the individualwill's inclination), and begins to issue commands according to thepositive answer. If such a procedure, which the goal-oriented willtends to employ, extracts a high price through practical failures, thewill has to revert to greater patience within this specific range of cases,and to permit the intellect to use more time for its tasks, raising thethreshold from 70 to 75.

It would be correct in general to say that the will determines theend while the intellect chooses the means, because the choice of meansto a given end is but cognitive work. However, even in pure goal-ori-entation, when the executor of the deed considers it merely as a meansand therefore planning the deed is a matter of cognition, the will quajudging power also intervenes with regard to probability calculations,i.e., the shaping of verifications.

If the intellect, owing to its inclination to inquire into whatevercrosses its sight, begins to research the will itself, it flaws the latter'sspontaneity in the same manner in which it is liable to flaw the spon-taneous course of other activities the individual engages in, by observ-ing them. For example, a person becomes angry, his fury rises and hedecides to observe his rising fury; it will not be the same fury if hesucceeds at all in observing his own emotional states, because self-observation alters what is observed; he may, however, fail in the im-plementation of the decision to observe his rising fury because thelatter carries him away, namely, it refuses, so to say, to become anobject for observation. The same pattern holds for the opposition pre-


vailing between the mechanism of goal-oriented activity and its core,the will, and self-knowledge.

The Individual as a Means to Another's Ends

When the intellect, the observation faculty and the motor system ofan individual adjust to the execution of tasks in general and to a certainroutine of execution in particular, the individual's will can in certainmatters be replaced by another will, authorized by the former, whichrelinquishes its place and transfers its authority to the alien will. Aperson can become a means for someone else only after he or she haveadjusted to their status as a means. In contradistinction, no one couldderive profit from a hippie in the sixties or the seventies of our centuryor from a cynic in ancient times (although a person could derivepleasure from their company).

When a goal-oriented individual's will deposits part of its authoritywith an alien will, it does not do so in order to establish an additionalend, but as a means to its own, already established ends, namely, inexchange for a reward or the cancellation of a threat, be it a threatfrom the same alien will, or from some third party.

The alien will tends less to accept self-oriented inclinations in thesystems which from its point of view should merely carry out instruc-tions. Replacement of the master will usually make subjection to theend more severe.

The goal-oriented individual is his own master, that is to say, he ishis own slave. As a slave, he can be turned into a means or a tool forsomeone else. On the other hand, as a master who treats himself as ameans, he considers others even more strongly as means. If he con-siders himself also or to a great extent as a means, he will tend to con-sider others exclusively as means.

A person captured into slavery as a result of war or a slave huntdoes not function as a slave against his will, but against his wishes;that is to say, the will decides to prefer slavery to death, but the personwishes not to be faced with this alternative. Regarding such a person, itis not only his master who views him as a means (a living andspeaking tool) but also the other way round: he treats his master in agoal-oriented manner (for instance, the goal of annulling the threat). Inslavery, the interpersonal relationship is mutually goal-oriented, on thepart of the master as well as on the part of the living and speaking tool.Therefore, as Aristotle states, friendship between the master and theslave, qua slave, is not possible.52

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Goal-Oriented Speech

When a person turns from a subject, which has intrinsic value, intoa means for himself and for someone else, the interpersonal bond alsoturns into a means. Speech, initially being voiced thought, namely,letting the other one participate in the speaker's thought, or thinkingjointly about some object, now becomes itself an external object, thatis to be used as a tool. It is not anymore spontaneous cooperation withthe other one, but a tool used to manipulate him. It is not thinkingaloud, but the product of silent thought.

The factual aspect of intention also exists without goal-orientation,be it in talk of the individual's soul with itself, or in talk with anothersoul. But in goal-oriented speaking the factual aspect of the intentionbecomes external to it; it is not anymore the intention's own form.

Goal-oriented speech has two facets: a facet of speaking about anda facet of speaking to. From the angle of its content the speech is aboutan object, and in this respect it may be truthful or not truthful; from theangle of its form speech is to a person and shaped in order to attaincertain results in this person; accordingly it is measured as more or lessefficient.

In its simple manifestation, goal-oriented speech is a request or anorder, a threat or a promise, whether this form is revealed by the struc-ture of a sentence or by its intonation. In its complex manifestation itsounds as if the goal-oriented person talks innocently, provides infor-mation or deliberates aloud; the speaker himself may, of course, be-lieve in the truth of his information and the validity of his deliberationsand speak in order to make the other one draw the practical conclusionthat serves the speaker's end, or in order to win the listener's trust.

For the observing philosopher, goal-oriented speech in general andits complex brand in particular, demonstrate the paradoxical phenome-non of intention towards form. That is to say, this speech is thoughtconducted on two floors at once: as “speech about” it belongs to onefloor, say, the transitive floor, but as “speech to” it is guided by thereflective, i.e., a higher floor. Reflection's active intervention, aided bythe will on the transitive floor causes this transformation of form intocontent — of what is usually and ordinarily a form of intention, intothe speaker's intent; at the same time, what is usually content becomeshere — again, for the speaker — something that accompanies thought,aids it, i.e., a form of thought. The manipulative element of goal-ori-ented speech creates the polarization of publicity-secrecy, whichcharacterizes the entire field of social occurrence.


Interest and End

Originally, the word “interest” and its derivations addressed in-volvement, namely, a valuative attitude. For recent generations, theyhave increasingly become synonymous with what possesses from agoal-oriented point of view, a positive value-property. This property issometimes meant to be an end, or a means to achieve it, and some-times also to be something like a potential end. The word “potential”points to a special kind of objectification, characterized by the possi-bility for someone to have an interest unknown to himself or herself (orstill unknown to him or her). Having such an interest is compatiblewith acting against it. It is difficult to claim that a person has a goalunknown to himself, but the transformation of the goal into an interestmakes this possible. That is to say, we who observe Reuben Ben-Simon, believe he “should” establish a certain goal for himself (whichin reality he does not establish), and name it “the interest of ReubenBen-Simon”; we also believe that whatever aids achieving this goal(which in reality does not exist) is in his interest. Reuben's interest isseen as his potential goal, and we expect him to adopt it.

What ends (or, what is the same: goals) a person has, depends onhis or her will; circumstances influence the substance of ends only in aroundabout way, through the will. In contradistinction, circumstancesand not the will determine what a person's interests are. Interest isgiven. It seems to be an end dictated to a person by the surroundingobjects. Actually, neither objects nor our cognition about them maydictate an end, but only the means required to achieve it.

The conceptual pattern bound up with the usage of the word “inter-est” is a category in the valuative reflection of one goal-oriented indi-vidual, discussing another goal-oriented individual. However, thisreflection does usually not consider itself as valuative, but as knowingthe facts of life in a neutral manner.

This category makes it possible also to ascribe a sort of end tosomething besides a real, individual, human being. If we say that someinstitution, be it a political party, a library, a state or a university, “has”this or that end, this statement will presumably be interpreted thus: thisinstitution is a means to this or that end; the institution does notestablish the end. But we can speak of an institution's interests so thatit appears as a subject, possessing interests, and not as a means to theirrealization. According to this manner of speech, we may refer to aninstitution as if it had a will and adheres to values, without spelling thisout. If I say “party A has interest B” I will not be understood that partyA is useful for someone in achieving B, but that party A is interestedin achieving B (or that we expect it to be interested in doing so).

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Objectification of the end while it is transformed into an interestties therefore in with the set of ideas in which institutions exist assubjects. These ideas may be acknowledged as convenient metaphors.There are, however, multiple degrees in the transfer of characteristicsfrom the metaphor or the allegory to the exemplar. The user of themetaphor is not always aware of the borderline between what is andwhat is not transferred to the exemplar. If we ask him for an account,he will draw the borderline in a manner that transfers the necessaryminimum to the exemplar. Nevertheless, while he uses the metaphorand focuses on it, he may act according to a different borderline.

A group of people stands midway between the individual and a so-cial institution. The group resembles a real subject in that it may ad-here to common values (i.e., in a certain area members of the groupadhere to the same values), and it may in a certain sense establish anend for itself (i.e., the members of the group establish the same end forthemselves), and act towards it (i.e., the members of the group willcoordinate their activities towards this end); but a group of people doesnot have a will and is therefore not a subject. The subject-resemblinggroup is usually small, while one can only metaphorically speak aboutlarge groups in the language one uses in speaking about an individual.

To sum up, the category “interest” is the objectification of an end,and has the following features. A. Once the end has become an inter-est, the will is no longer responsible for it. The human being under-stands it, but did not establish it. The cancellation of the freedom tochoose, of the freedom to exchange this end for an alternative, stabi-lizes the position of the end. B. The category “interest” enables norma-tive speech about others to acquire a cognitive image. I do not say: heacts in opposition to my advice (or to the advice I would have given,had he asked me); but: in opposition to his interests. C. The categoryfacilitates the obedience of one individual to other individuals throughthe mediation of an institution. The order does not come from anotherperson but from the institution, which acts in accordance with its in-terests.

The concept of interest is convenient: It does not require any hy-pothesis about the intentions of the person who is supposed to have theinterest. It is convenient precisely because of its fictitious character.The insight into the constructive and fictitious nature of this concept isnot incompatible with its scientific application. But it puts some limitsupon this application.

Chapter 3

The First Section: Valuation Accordingto Results. Caution

We value a deed and its executor as cautious or incautious. This isa type of values and valuations that belongs to the first section. A deedis valued as cautious if it is arranged to prevent certain possible results.In a goal-oriented deed, caution refers to a possible additional result(apart from the end) which possesses a negative value. In a deed whichhas value in itself, namely, one whose motive does not belong to thefirst section, caution comprises a modification, activated byconsideration for the result.

In all cases, the motive for caution accompanies the principal mo-tive. The reason to execute the deed which is valued as cautious, is notcaution. Accordingly, caution — as opposed to goal-orientation —does not make up a type of deed.

Health, for instance, is a type of value belonging to the type ofcaution-values. The person working towards an end, as well as theperson who eats and drinks out of need, may both be valued as beingcautious with regard to their health. For instance, a person who keepsto a diet (namely, foregoes dishes he likes because of his diet), exe-cutes by eating — like other people — a deed which is not performedfor the sake of its result, which is not measured by its efficacy, butwith him (or her) the deed undergoes a modification, in considerationfor the results of eating, or out of caution.

Chapter 4

The Second Section: ValuationAccording to the Activity Itself. TheNeed

Feeling Valuation

The first issue to address in order to understand the nature of aneed as a value is that valuation based on need is not made by valua-tion-sentences, but occurs within sensation and feeling. Valuing ac-cording to a need is not an act of judgment. I value the beverage infront of me by my sense of taste. Here valuation is but a feeling I ex-perience while drinking it. The sentence “the drink is tasty and refresh-ing” does not make the valuation; it posteriorly expresses it in con-cepts and words.53

What is the object that possesses the value-property of being tastyand refreshing? To be precise, the object is the act of drinking, whilethe beverage has value only in a secondary, mediating sense. And so itis in general: The act that satisfies a need has value, and by virtue ofthis act its object also possesses value; in a slight extension of theaccepted usage of these terms we may name the act “consumption”and the objects “goods.” As valuation according to need is a feelingthat accompanies the act or its absence, it is neither a valuation of the


act's motives, nor of its results, but refers exclusively to the act itselfand belongs, therefore, to value-section B.

The first characteristic of a valuation according to need itstherefore its involvement with feeling.

Fullness

The second characteristic of a need is its being a full value allalong its positive-negative range; it is full as a positive as well asnegative value. Satisfaction of the need is accompanied by pleasurethat fills its positive branch; the absence of satisfaction is accompaniedby discontent filling its negative branch. If the positive branch wereempty, satisfaction of the need would merely cancel the feeling of dis-tress and discontent. If the negative branch were empty, the absence ofsatisfaction would merely equal an absence of pleasure and not any-thing substantial, really felt. If someone enjoys playing chess but doesnot miss it when no suitable occasion arises, the value of this activityis not a need for him. Regarding this example: here we did not reducethe usual scope of the need concept, but there is an example from theopposing pole, in which the above description — which we treat as acomponent of a definition — involves such a reduction. If, for in-stance, breathing is not accompanied by pleasure, but the lack of airwould be felt as distress, there is no doubt that breathing represents avalue, but it is not a need in the sense described above. I believe, in-deed, that in the framework of typology it is better to label as “need”only the typical need which is full at both poles; thus, because of theimportance of this bi-polar fullness, which accords the need the specialweight it has in the life of human beings.

The Motive

A need is not only felt a), as a distressing absence, i.e., a negativevaluative value or b), as satisfaction or pleasure i.e., a positive valua-tive value, but also c), as a desire for a certain activity or a wish toengage in this activity, namely, it is felt as a motivative value. Themotive is embodied in an arousing and attractive, perceptual or con-ceptual idea of the goods and their consumption.

A simple and typical example of a need is the necessity to eat. It isfully bi-polar, because the absence of eating is a negative value in itsown right, actually felt. In other words: the negative value-property is

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full and felt as hunger, namely, a kind of distress; the act of eating is apositive value in its own right and not only felt as the cancellation ofhunger, the cancellation of distress, but also as something valuativelysubstantial because it involves pleasure, which is a full, positive feel-ing valuation of the activity. The motivative value, which as appetiteor as a wish to eat propels the activity, is also obvious. A person mayfeel appetite without feeling hunger: Here the motivative value appearsseparately from the valuative value (i.e., in this case, from the negativefeeling valuation), in order to assist the philosopher in drawing hisdistinctions.

The example of eating arouses the question how far the need isgeneral. The question is: to eat what? The need may be very specificand refer only to a certain dish, or it may be fairly general, so thatvarious dishes could equally satisfy it. Another question also comes tomind: Is this one need of eating in general or a number of specificneeds. Perhaps the need is but an abstract description. However, wewill not discuss these questions here.

A Given Value

A need is a given, another characteristic distinguishing it frommany other values. It is not the product of a decision. We do neithercreate it (consciously and deliberately), nor establish it. A person es-tablishes ends for him- or herself, but he finds his needs, prima facie,within himself, as if he became aware of them only posteriorly. Herethe words “as if” require an explanation: What I am conscious of pos-teriorly, should exist anterior to my awareness of it, and exist assomething else, not as conscious content. Theoretical consideration,however, teaches us to doubt the full identity between conscious con-tent and something which is not conscious content. A red stain, forinstance, is given to me by sensation, but we know that color existsonly in our consciousness; in terms of physics only electrical pulseswithin nerve-fibres exist, light waves of a certain length, but no redcolor. Nevertheless, be the theoretical interpretation whatever it is, theactual reality of a need, its reality as the experience of a given, is prop-erly distinct from an end.

The interpretation of the need as a given has to be qualified onthree counts:

A. As mentioned above, theoretically or ontologically the need be-ing a given should not be interpreted in a manner that accords it exis-tence before it is felt.


B. Being a given is not to be interpreted as being inborn. Not everyneed is inborn; not every need is wholly inborn.

C. Regarding the strength of a need as a motive: The need being agiven should not lead us to interpret the activity it arouses as dictatedto us (for instance, dictated by our nature). The motive is felt as adictum, but not the act. Like any motivative value, a need does notactivate a person automatically, but joins a totality of motives withinwhich it may be counterbalanced by opposed motives of the same typeor of other types. A person may forego the pleasant for the useful or tofulfill a duty, e.g. when he gets up to work at the expense of his needto rest, or he comes to the aid of someone else.

The response to a need is a matter for consideration and a decision.A person can decide to go on hunger-strike, can carry the decision outand persist in it. The given nature of the need will surface in his hun-ger; namely, in that he cannot implement a decision not to feel hunger,in the same manner that he implements his decision not to eat.

The Degree of a Need

A need is measured or accorded degrees in four aspects: A. Thepositive feeling-valuation of a commodity may be a matter of estimatefrom the angle of feeling intensity; that is to say, a comparative esti-mate of two pleasures is made with regard to degree. B. The sameholds for the negative valuation of an unsatisfied need; two states ofdiscontent are compared. C. The positive motive to satisfy a need maybe measured by its power in relation to another positive motive;namely, two states of attraction a person experiences towards satisfac-tion of a need, are compared. D. The same holds for the negative mo-tive to avoid non-satisfaction of the need; namely, two urges to escapestates of distress are compared.

Regarding A and B: Here we treat of comparisons conductedwithin a relatively small group of similar needs. The taste of one kindof chocolate is compared to another kind of chocolate, and not to thepleasure derived from satisfying the need in company. There are nogeneral standards here — only incidental comparisons of one pleasurewith a similar pleasure, or one kind of distress with a similar distress.

Regarding C and D, the power of attraction and urge is measuredby the contest between motives, based on the slightly simplistic as-sumption that the stronger motive tips the scales and makes the personact.

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Distinctness of the Need

A need is properly distinct when its owner precisely identifies theactivity which satisfies this need, as well as the objects necessary forthis activity. A somewhat objective interpretation would say that heidentifies the value-bearers. A need may be indistinct, even though itis conscious and powerful. In such a case a person is aware that hesuffers, but does not know what makes him suffer, what is wanting; orvice-versa, he feels content but does not know what causes his well-being. With young children, typical cases of indistinct needs are fre-quent. A three-year old has already mastered speech sufficiently toreport quite well what he feels. However, what he does feel seems tobe rather indistinct. To judge by a comparison between behavior andspeech, such a child does not identify the need for food, drink or sleep.In the course of its development, the child learns to distinguish itsneeds. While the young child does not yet distinguish its elementaryneeds, the adult fails at times to distinguish non-elementary needs. Itmay well be that phenomena of boredom, aggression or excessivegoal-oriented industry incorporate the element of an undistinguishedneed.

Another matter. If Freud was right in that humans repress forbid-den wishes, then inhibitions to distinguish the object of a need pre-cisely also exist in cases where it carries a taboo, or a distinction oncemade, may be forgotten.

On the face of it, there is proximity, or even congruence, betweenindistinctness and generality of a need, as well as between distinctnessand specificity. The need to eat fruit is a general need (relatively),while the need to eat grapes is a specific need The question arises:May not a somewhat indistinct need for grapes be identical with adistinct need for fruit? And if so, are these two distinctions, distinct-indistinct and specific-general, not congruent or identical?

It seems that the difference between the two distinctions is this:Whoever has an indistinct need for grapes will eat peaches (for exam-ple), but he will not be satisfied; the person having a need for fruit willbe satisfied by peaches as well as grapes. That is to say, indistinctnessaddresses disaccord between wish and satisfaction, or in other words,between the motivative and the positive valuative value. In generality,on the other hand, there is no disaccord and no conflict whatsoever isinvolved.

Let us now turn to the phenomenon of a substitute for a commod-ity. A person may have a need for something which possesses proper-ties a, b and c, but he will also extract some satisfaction from a thingwhich has only a and b. The thing possessing a and b is a substitute for


the one possessing a, b and c. Here we address the system of bordersthat circumscribe the sphere of objects. For a certain need, A forinstance, there will be two circles, one enclosed within the other: In theinner circle — the suitable object, in between the two circles — thesubstitute, and beyond the outer circle — a wholly unsuitable object.Need B will have three circles. There may even be a complex needwith countless circles, with the most suitable object in the center of thefield of objects, while the others will be near it according to theirdegree of suitability to what is required. A need whose objects have nosubstitute will only have one circle, with the good objects inside andthe bad ones outside, without differences in degree.

The possibility of substitutes is not explained by a difference be-tween distinctness and indistinctness, but by a special structure of theneed that reveals itself in its application qua valuative value to theobjects of consumption. This structure consists of a multiplicity ofgood-bad degrees.

Contracting the Meaning of the Word “Need”

The word “need” is usually employed in two different senses.These senses are closely connected, but they should nevertheless beconsidered as separate. We have been using the word only in one of itssenses, and it is appropriate to present both of them now.

A) A need is something that exists in mind. It is a feeling, a feelingof distress, aspiration or satisfaction, or the sum total of a severalfeelings, or a generalization made from the angle of the laws that gov-ern it, or a hypostasis of this generalization, namely, the establishmentof something like a permanent suppositional entity, residing in thebackground of these feelings, which unites them and reveals itselfwithin them. This entity belongs to the realm of values.

B) A need is a state of the organism, namely, its state when some-thing is required for its survival and its activity. In this sense, a humanbeing needs food as a car needs fuel, or a fire needs to consume wood.In these sentences we have applied the name “need” to somethingwhich is not a value, and in axiological discourse it is better not toattach the same name to something which is a value and to somethingwhich is not. It is therefore preferable to say that a person lackingappetite (say, because of an illness) requires food, not that he has aneed for food, and that a car requires fuel in order to travel, that thefire requires wood, etc. In this context we will speak of “requirements“ and not of needs.

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There is a considerable degree of congruence between needs (insense A) and requirements, so far that it begs the attempt to describethem as the subjective and the objective facet of the same entity. Thiscongruence arises from a connection between them. A species of ani-mals has a clear evolutionary advantage, if its members havecongruent needs and requirements, namely, they feel that they needwhat objectively promotes their existence and activity, they enjoy whataids their organism and suffer from what hurts it.

But actually need (in sense A) and requirement are not fully con-gruent. Furthermore: they may be opposed, namely, a person may feela need for something which hurts his health, or repulsion for some-thing that aids it.54

The requirement is some aspect of a causal connection, like therole certain foodstuffs play in human metabolism; this connection initself does not yet bestow value upon food, as the connection to fire(without a subject) does not bestow value on wood either. Somethinghas value only with regard to a subject and in relation to it.

Sense B of “need” acquires valuative significance as a requisite forhealth only by the mediation of reason. This mediated character doesnot prevent requisites for health from acquiring preference over feel-ings, when their positive or negative mark is the opposite of what aperson feels. The value health, as established by reason, is altogethernot a need, but belongs to the first section (i.e., to valuative valuesaccording to the result of an activity) and to the type of caution withregard to results, or of consideration for these; nor is it identical withrequirement, but merely relies on knowing it.

It is obvious therefore, that the theory of value must distinguishbetween the two senses and use “need” only in sense A, the subjectivesense, because it treats of the need as a value.

If a person interprets a toothache as a sign of decay in his tooth, ora good feeling as a sign of health, he does not refer to the ache or thegood feeling as values or as valuations, but as signals to be deciphered.One may also view an aspiration as a sign that the body needs what isaspired to in order to persist in its regular activities. Theseinterpretations may be true or false — they belong to the realm ofcognitive work, the work of knowing facts, not of valuing them. Thiswork is integrated with practical thought and serves the values of cau-tion. But pleasure and pain are not only signs of health or disease.Pleasure itself not only bears witness to the value beyond it, but be-stows value on the activity it accompanies. In the same way, distressnot only bears witness to objective damage, but bestows negativevalue on the activity it accompanies.55


When the word “need” is used in sense B, the feeling is seen as asign or a symbol of the objective “need,” namely, something externalto the valuing subject. The intellect has to decipher the feeling.

Can Anyone Know Better than I What Is Good forMe?

If we limit the question to the sphere of needs, we are in principleobliged to reply negatively, as no one knows better than I what I feel,nor could I possibly be mistaken with regard to what I feel. This replycertainly depends on our decision how to define a need, namely, itfollows our usage of the word need in sense A) and not in sense B, asexplained above.

Perhaps here an opponent of mine will argue: You have admittedthat a need may not be well-distinguished, and a need which is notwell-distinguished is but a need which is not well-known, i.e., notknown to the person who has this need; if so, this person does notknow what is good for him or her.

There is some truth in this argument, but first I have to point out itserror. If we have an “unknown need,” then this need would exist in itsentirety while it is unknown. The same holds for “the need that is notwell-known,” which also looks as if it existed “well” (or “properly”),namely, in its entirety. However, this is wrong.

While the unknown is not faulty, or shortchanged, or lackingsomething because it is unknown, the need which is not well-distin-guished lacks something, wants specificity, lacks being directed to-wards specific objects. It is the need itself that is wanting, not just theawareness of it is lacking specificity. In the not well-distinguishedneed, the valuative value does not match the motive. The indistinctnessrepresents an internal opposition, a kind of flaw in the need'smechanism, which prevents it from becoming a value that properlyguides the person who has the need. In consequence, knowledge aloneis no remedy in this case, but only a change of needs. All this wasunknown to the owner of the need, in any case, initially unknown, andmay be known to another person. Here is the element of truth in whatmy objectivist opponent claims.

This element of truth in the objectivist argument does not contra-dict the position that a need is subjective, i.e., resides in consciousness.The manner in which consciousness proceeds is not always conscious,or wholly conscious. That is to say, that within consciousness itselfthere is something which is not entirely conscious (mainly with regard

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to the “how” and not the “what”). The need as a negative valuativevalue, the need as a positive valuative value and the need as a motiveare conscious, but a) their interrelation is not conscious and b), thedistinctness of the objects (objects of consumption activities) is amatter of degree.

In order to assess the weight carried by the objectivist argumentregarding non-distinguished needs within the total axiological contro-versy between objectivists and subjectivists, we have to examine thestatus of knowledge encapsulated in the distinctions a person makes inthe sphere of his needs. Here we should distinguish between two kindsof knowledge: knowledge we name “cognition,” applying to objectswhich are in some respect independent of this knowledge, and knowl-edge that does not belong to the sphere of cognition. Say: A personknows how to play chess, i.e., there is knowledge here. But the gameof chess does not exist independently from the fact that people knowhow to play it, so that we cannot speak of cognition here. Even thoughthe game undergoes a certain objectification, the players do notestablish it as transcending knowledge. We will now apply this dis-tinction to the matter of needs. The organism's requirements are ob-jects of cognition. The adult may cognize that the child requires sleep,while the child is unaware of its want. However, I believe that in thiscase the adult does not cognize the child's need, but a requirement ofits organism.

The young child, learning to distinguish the objects of its need,perfects and develops the need itself jointly with the knowledge “aboutit.” This is valuative knowledge, knowledge on the valuative levelitself, but it is not cognizance. Cognizance of values resides only onthe meta-valuative level.

The Division of Needs According to the Object

A human being has proto-needs, a proto-need of its metabolismwith nature and a proto-need for human community. Each proto-needbranches out into multiple needs. The branches emerge, change, dieand replace each other. Accordingly, humans do not differ with regardto their proto-need, but they differ in their specific needs; here the dif-ference may be such that a certain object may possess positive valuefor one individual, and negative value for another. There are peopleaccustomed to consume live insects regularly, while others recoil atthe very idea of eating a live insect.

The proto-need of cooperation with other humans branches outinto the need for sex, the need for love, the need to be esteemed or


encouraged by others, the need to dominate or the need to bedominated, the need for revenge and similar needs a person has, whichdepend on other people. The power, the distinctiveness, the degree ofgenerality of these needs change; ultimately some of them are replacedby other needs which also grow from and feed on the same trunk.

The proposition that a person needs other people is opposed to themeta-valuative view of the other one merely as a means, namely, thatactually one person serves other persons exclusively as a means, andthat society (as well as any cooperation between humans) is but aninstrument. According to this view — presented, for example, byHobbes — a human being's needs are exclusively directed at nature,while he needs other human beings as the means to gain the productsof nature's materials.

The Shape of a Value and Its Matter

The need may dictate ends. For instance, the need to eat bread dic-tates bread as an end and this end dictates the means, namely, baking,milling, harvesting, sowing and plowing.

Bread is an object of need and an end. What is common to the needand the end will be named “the matter of the value,” while thedifference between them is “the shape” (or “figure”) of the value.

Whoever bakes or eats bread, steals it or gives it as a present to thehungry, whoever avoids eating bread because of a diet, all these referto bread as a value. What is common to them is the matter of thevalue, while its shape greatly differs.

Being a quasi-natural value, needs are a mine from which a human

being extracts the matter to create other types of values.The dictation of ends by the need obviously presupposes the dif-

ference between them, between the dictated ends and the dictatingneed. We should remember that the dish itself, not the act of eating it,is the end. Eating does not follow as a result of means. An end is cor-relational to means, so that anything not arising from the use of means,should not be addressed as “end.” Besides things, activities of otherpeople may function as ends. A deliberate act of my own would notfunction as an end for me, though the preconditions required for thisact to occur may, of course, be ends of mine.

Here one could ask: Is the category “the value matter” not in somesense congruent with the category “object of valuation” (or “the objectpossessing the value-property”), is “the value matter” not an abstract

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object of valuation? And if so, is this category not superfluous andthus also the distinction between the shape of a value and its matter?

In reply, it will be enough to give an example here. The means isvalued according to the end, but does not belong to the value matter ofthis end.

Chapter 5

The Second Section: ValuationsAccording to the Activity Itself.Inclinations and Constraints

Inclination and constraint are relatives of the need. They differ fromthe need in that they are full only in one half of their range or in otherwords, in that they have empty partners. Inclination is full in its posi-tive and empty in its negative half. For instance, a person is inclined toplay chess: if the occasion arises, he plays chess and enjoys it, but hedoes not suffer if there is no occasion to play. The inclination may, ofcourse, turn into a need for someone, namely, he will occasionallysuffer if he cannot play chess.

Constraint is full only in its negative half. When a smoker says Ido not enjoy the cigarette I smoke, but I would suffer if I did notsmoke now, he smokes under constraint. Let us assume that a persondoes not enjoy breathing but would, of course, suffer if he did notbreathe; we may say that he is constrained to breathe. Another exam-ple: a person is constrained to avoid the pain of a burn.

The word “constraint” is perhaps not the best term for the type thatlooks like a negative need, because it arouses the erroneous impressionthat a person cannot resist a constraint and avoid acting according to it.Yet, I cannot find a more suitable term for this type of value. One


could say that a constraint is “a negative inclination,” namely: X isnegatively inclined towards not smoking, or anyone is negatively in-clined towards not breathing and towards pain.

The motive accompanying an inclination is attraction, and the mo-tive accompanying a constraint is an impulse or an urge. Desire is acombination of attraction and urge.

Regarding the objects of inclinations and constraints: We findthem in all spheres where needs are found; they are directed at thingsin nature and at other people.

A need and an inclination may be intertwined. For instance, some-body has a need for fresh fruit and the inclination to prefer grapes toother kinds of fruit.

Constraints and inclinations differ from needs only in their beinghalf-empty. Valuation according to them is already carried out by sen-sation or by feeling and they are given to the individual. Here the valueis also encapsulated in valuations.

The particularity of inclinations and constraints is that in certaincircumstances they may arise from the organism's requirements andabilities, or from the personality's requirements and abilities and notfrom another value, while all other values arise exclusively from val-ues.

A person living where the air is clean may not specially value airin general and clean air in particular, even not from the angle offeeling attention; yet, should he lack air in general, or air of goodquality, he will clearly and distinctly feel constrained to breath cleanair. A person may not specially value the fact that his body has weight,but should he find himself in conditions of weightlessness, he will feelthe urge to regain his weight. A human being requires countlessfactors, but these requirements are not revealed to his or her feeling,emotion or thought; when one of these factors is absent, a new value,the constraint, comes into being.

The ability to perform a certain kind of action may not reveal itselfto its owner until the occasion for such an action arises; a new inclina-tion may develop in the course of this activity, namely, an attraction toand pleasure in the activity may emerge while it is going on. Theinclination to activate an ability for the sake of activity resides poten-tially in many abilities, as the constraint exists potentially in the or-ganism's requirements.

Chapter 6

The Second Section: ValuationAccording to the Activity Itself. TheIdeal

The ideal is a design of an action and the recommendation to act ac-cording to this design. The designed action is recommended as pos-sessing its own value, not conferred upon it by the circumstances orthe results of its realization. We use the phrase “design of an action” ina broad sense, so that it also refers to rules of behavior and models ofactivity. The design describes the manner of an action as well as itsobject; with certain ideals the emphasis is on the manner or the struc-ture of an action only, while others emphasize the embodiment of ac-tivities within an external object. The design may serve as a blueprintand may determine the action's course in detail, from beginning to end,as in the case of a ceremony in which one error voids the wholesequence; however, with ideals referring to creative activities, the de-sign has to leave room for innovation, so that in the course of the ac-tion realizing the ideal something is created which the ideal did notpossess initially. When an ideal does not determine the action's coursein detail, it is preferable to describe it as a rule and its realization asbehavior according to the rule.

When the ideal recommends some spontaneous activity, creativeactivities included, the rule may be mainly negative, namely, it statesthat there is no compulsion or constraint, or any external dictate, re-garding the recommended activity. Sometimes the ideal is a negative


design, a recommendation, or at times a demand or an order to avoid acertain deed, well-defined with regard to its manner and its object.That is to say that a taboo may be an ideal. A moral command of“don't” is also an ideal.

Utopias are ideals too. In the same manner that Thomas More'sUtopia presents a positive ideal, George Orwell's 1984 and AldousHuxley's Brave New World present negative ideals.

The ideal is a valuative value which guides deeds and actions ingeneral. It is usually joined by an aspiration to realize the ideal, i.e., amotivative value. This aspiration may be the main motive of a certainaction, so that realization of the ideal represents a type of action andthis aspiration may serve as an attendant motive accompanying themain motive, and leave its particular stamp on the action, whose mainconcern belongs to another type of value.

The accepted usage of the word “ideal” evokes the idea of some-thing sublime. Here we use the word in a somewhat broader sense, todepict a type also including actions which are in no way sublime. Forinstance, courtesy is an ideal, but courteous behavior is usually amundane matter, devoid of exaltation. Apropos, one could also saythat courtesy represents a group of ideals, because different societiespractice different sets of manners, i.e., this is a group of ideals whichfulfill a similar function, they meet the same question — how to be-have in order to shape a deed aesthetically, or what the accepted styleof behavior is. The motive to act according to a code of manners isusually an accompanying motive; for instance, a person eats in a well-bred manner, while the main motive is his appetite. A person may, ofcourse, eat out of courtesy, for example, being a guest whom goodmanners oblige to eat of what his host offers.

When the ideal is sublime and the person adhering to it considershimself called upon to play a special role in its realization, the emo-tional appeal of the sublime and the feeling of a mission combine toarouse a strong aspiration. The emotional appeal in the sphere ofvaluation, and a powerful aspiration in the sphere of motivation join tomake up enthusiasm.

The Ideal Compared with the End

The ideal differs from the end primarily in that it has no means.The ideal is realized immediately, in a deed or in an action which is nodeed (e.g. in thought guided by the ideal). The realized end is obtainedas a result; while the realization of an ideal cannot be obtained as theresult of an objective external process — it has to be carried out.

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In the second place a typical ideal differs from an end in that onceit has been established and stands firm, it does not require the media-tion or the aid of the will in order to be realized. An end requires theaid of the will, because there is no motive aimed directly at a deedwhich is only a means, so that the will has to stop the gap. In thisrespect, the ideal resembles the other values belonging to the secondsection. For instance, for a person behaving politely because his or herwill demands it, courtesy is not an ideal but a means to an end, orwariness with regard to the damage impolite behavior could cause.The compulsion the will imposes on the system of motivescharacterizes actions whose value resides in their results, or inpreceding factors (intention and ability), but not in the action itself.This compulsion is therefore characteristic for sections A and C.

In two aspects an end involves more cognitive work than an ideal.First, an end which cannot be realized causes damage to its owner,

who loses both ways: He employs means, namely, sacrifices resources(time, strength, assets), foregoes pleasures (he could have enjoyed atthe time), but does not receive compensation for his resources. Thesame holds for a common end which a number of people establish forthemselves. An unachievable end has no virtue whatsoever. Not sowith regard to an ideal: If it cannot be fully realized, even a tiny bit ofrealization is a good thing. The time devoted to the realization of anideal is not a means, realization is not obtained as a result of the deed,but as the deed itself; realization of an ideal is therefore not subject toefficiency, neither with regard to effectiveness, nor with regard toeconomy. A person realizing an ideal, namely doing what the idealrecommends, does not try to accomplish the deed as fast as possible(or as slowly as possible), but does it according to the nature of thedeed and the doer; in the same way as he does not hurry with a deed heaccomplishes by inclination. While the time devoted to an end is asacrifice, the time devoted to an ideal is no such thing; on the contrary,it possesses a positive value-property and is permeated by valuativeaffirmation. The establishment of an end must be followed by a checkthat answers the question whether this end is achievable. Not so withregard to an ideal.

Second, an end demands cognitive work in order to find the meansand choose the most efficient one, while the ideal does not requiremeans. The end requires prediction, namely, hypothetical prediction: IfI employ this means, this and that result will follow. The same doesnot hold for an ideal.

The suggestion to consider the ideal as an end for itself may arisehere, but what serves as an end for itself serves also as a means foritself, while with an ideal there is no division into means and end; the


ideal is beyond the relation between means and end. Because of theabsence of means it does not make sense to say that a person realizingan ideal is in a state that comprises an end for him or her, as one can-not say that something is a result, if it has no cause.

The Ideal Compared with the Need

The ideal differs from the need, the inclination and the constraintin that all these are given to a person, he does not choose them, doesnot create and establish them, but finds them within himself; he feelsthem as positive valuations (pleasure), as negative valuations (distress)and as a motive (desire and its derivatives); he also has the impressionas if all these already existed before he felt them. The ideal, on theother hand, is not a given. Reason (aided by imagination) creates andthe will establishes the ideal, namely, a person assumes a positionconcerning the idea of the pattern of an action his reason and hisimagination unfold for him. A person assumes a position, i.e., he doesnot find himself within it. It is true that the individual does not alwayscreate his own ideals; on the face of it, he sometimes adopts idealsothers have created. Yet the adopted value is not a given either: aperson does not adopt his or her needs. The individual has to re-createthe adopted ideal within himself and then to choose it, to establish itand to anchor it within his personal system of values. In the course ofthis proceeding, he may modify the ideal.

The aspiration to realize an ideal differs from desire (which is themotive of a need) and its derivations, the attraction of an inclinationand the urge of a constraint, in that this aspiration arises from the ad-herence to an ideal as a valuative value. In the sphere of ideals, thevaluative value begets the motive. The motive grows within a person-ality as a complement to the valuative value. This proposition is, ofcourse, utterly opposed to Christian von Ehrenfels' (and many others,who followed in his steps) value-theory, but it is affirmed, for instance,by the manner in which many religious and political movementsemerged, and by the attempts made by various groups of people torealize utopias in their own way of life.

Desire and its derivatives originate in requirements a person hasfrom outside, from nature or society, and they possess some independ-ence with regard to the system of valuative values. Their origin is notin valuative values — on the contrary, valuative values may emergefrom these requirements.

The action realizing an ideal may be accompanied by satisfactionwith its realization. Even though this satisfaction resembles the pleas-

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ure that accompanies actions motivated by need or inclination, it dif-fers from this pleasure in that it is not primary, like the latter, but arisesfrom the ideal, and thus from the action guided by the ideal. If we wishto describe this satisfaction as pleasure, we have to say that in this casenot pleasure determines what is good, but the good (an idea ofgoodness) determines what will be pleasurable.56

One can compare the striving for an ideal with given values fromanother angle, namely, the difference between an urge (in constraint)and attraction (in inclination). From this angle aspiration resemblesattraction and differs greatly from an urge, because aspiration as wellas inclination are positive motives, while the urge is a negative motive.As mentioned above, desire also incorporates an element of urge,which represents an additional difference between desire (directed atthe satisfaction of a need) and aspiration (to realize an ideal).

For the time being we will characterize the creation of ideals ingeneral outlines, leaving the characterization in a semi-raw state, inorder to return and refine it further on (see below, Part III, Chapter 4,under the heading “Value-Constitution”).

Reason does not create ideals out of thin air. Reason creates themfrom given values, as if separating the core of value from its givenshape, the content from the form, and shaping them in its own way.Reason takes its matter from inclinations, constraints and needs, proc-esses them, refines them and turns them into syntheses which possessentirely new qualities.

Some of the given values which serve reason as creative mattercomplement each other potentially, and prima facie reason only carriesout what nature has prepared for its work. Some values are opposed toeach other, wrangling in the arena between individuals or that withinthe individual, while reason is called upon to suggest settlements forthese conflicts; the will completes reason's work by establishing itssuggestion if there is only one, or by choosing and establishing one, ifthere are several. We will now turn to study some examples of ideals.

Justice as an Ideal

An example par excellence is justice. A distribution of goods andbenefits exists in fact, and thus the question what the proper distribu-tion is, what kind of distribution I will recommend to a group I do notbelong to but whom I wish well (and who may ask for my advice). Itherefore consider the various possible proportions between allotments(e.g. that the allotment be in direct proportion to the recipient'sweight), what methods of implementation are possible and how these


match certain proportions or serve their promise. For instance, if Irecommend equal allotments for two people, I will also recommend amethod for implementation: One of them divides the whole into twoportions, and the other one chooses his portion. The principle or theblueprint of the recommended distribution and their recommendationmake up the value of justice. And like the question of how to distributewhat possesses a positive value-property, there is the question how todistribute what possesses a negative value-property (sharing theburden of taxes etc.); here a blueprint or at least a principle is alsorequired.

I will value the distribution as a just or an unjust deed, according towhether it matches the recommended blueprint. To name a deed “just”not because its results aid the realization of justice, but because thedeed itself matches the required blueprint, is characteristic of justice. Itis also characteristic that I am not interested in the motive, i.e., I do notinquire into the purity of intention behind the just deed.

Furthermore, when I consider the just deed I do not feel pleasure,but think about it and value it positively in my thoughts; if I drawsatisfaction from the deed being just, the prevailing order is this: Iexperience satisfaction because the deed is just (or just in my view)and not vice-versa, it is not just because it gives me satisfaction.

A motive may attach itself to the idea of justice, namely, the aspi-ration to do justice. This may be the sole, or the decisive motive for adeed that belongs to a special kind, alongside goal-oriented deeds, ordeeds arising from need, inclination or constraint, namely, a deedwhich realizes an ideal; yet, the motive to do justice may also attachitself to other motives and thus bring about the modification of a deed,whether goal-oriented or propelled by a need.

Can justice dictate means, namely deeds which per se do not em-body justice, but serve it by their results? On the face of it, the answerto this question is in a certain sense positive; however, one shouldremember that justice does not dictate means directly, and in my opin-ion, the same holds for other ideals. Justice does not emerge (as ifautomatically) from a process we cause to occur. One cannot manufac-ture justice. It is realized by a deed which is at least carried out inagreement with justice, i.e., with an eye on the ideal too. One shouldtherefore be precise: Justice cannot be an end, because it does not arisefrom means, but is done. At the utmost, means may beget precondi-tions, necessary to the realization of justice, or remove impedimentsthat hinder it. For example, removing a dictatorial government, whichcauses injustice, is a means to create preconditions, or to pave the way,for the realization of justice. Only the preconditions necessary forjustice to prevail may be ends, not justice itself.

The Ideal 143

As justice is neither an end nor a means, the actions it guides arenot measured by their efficiency or in any case, efficiency is not rele-vant for an action so far as it is guided by justice.

What about punishment for the violation of a just law? Can thepenalty itself be just, i.e., a realization of justice, or is it a means toremove an impediment to justice? Some reply one way, others replydifferently, and each of the two ways can serve to advocate a certainpenalty. The person considering punishment a realization of justice hasa different ideal of justice from the person who believes that to causedamage to any living creature is not a realization of his or her ideals.Yet this person may also advocate some punishment, or demand itsimposition, as a means to teach the offender a lesson, or to deterothers, or as a means of self-defense, by isolating the offender, to wit:as a means to achieve preconditions required for justice to be im-plemented.

However, the person considering punishment merely as a meansmay also say, that some punishment is just or unjust, with regard to thedistribution of punishments: he may, e.g., consider it unjust to imposedifferent punishments on different delinquents guilty of the sameoffense.

And from punishment to laws — are laws ideals? Are laws of thestate and religious laws (commandments) altogether values and if so,are they ideals?

Laws which do not belong to the realm of means are ideals. Thereare laws which are not considered values but means (and perhaps alllaws in the eyes of some people). But a law which is not a means is ablueprint for an action (or the avoidance of an action), which is notonly recommended but also a commanded, namely, a certain kind ofideal. Behavior according to such a law, or arising from it, realizes anideal. The law as an ideal is a ramification of justice, or a kind of em-bodiment, placed on a special pedestal.

Legislation may be an end. For example, passing a motion in par-liament will be an end and will dictate means, like a give and takeagreement of the faction seeking this end with another faction, whichwill bind the latter's members to vote for the motion. If the set ofmeans is efficient, the said legislation will pass as a result. But re-member, the end is not the law, but its legislation. What the law dic-tates is behavior according to it, which is not measured by efficiencyor effectiveness, but by its accord with the design it contains. It makessense to say: “So and so is careful to obey the law”; it does not makesense to say: “So and so is efficient in obeying the law.” The law doesnot dictate means, but legislation does.


The implementation of laws, like their legislation, may be an endthat dictates means, for instance patrols or other police activities.These may again be the matter of a law, which refers to them specifi-cally and determines what is permitted and what is forbidden in policeactivities, but they do not refer to this law as a means either.

A propaganda campaign, demonstrating that the alternatives to acertain law would harm the public and that it should therefore bestrictly obeyed, may be aimed at an end, i.e., be a means, and thecampaign may be assessed as more or less efficient; but the end is toobey the law and not the law itself, namely, the end is to persuadepeople to adopt this law as a value, and to award this value a perma-nent place in their consciousness.

It is obvious that a law is neither a need, or an inclination, or aconstraint, nor does it belong to section C (dealing with the valuationof an action's causes).

To sum up — A law is an ideal to the extent that it is a value andnot a decree serving as a means. And now to the motive: The motive toobey a law may be identical in content with the law itself, namely, itmay be an aspiration to uphold an ideal (i.e., as a motive it will belongto the type “ideal”). It is, however, presumable that laws are morefrequently upheld and obeyed with an eye to expediency: to avoidpenalties, to be thought reliable, etc. Obviously, the law does notfunction as an end in these considerations either.

There is, however, a third possibility to consider. A person mayobey a law neither because he approves of it, nor out of goal-orientedconsiderations, but because he believes the state he lives in is a consti-tutional state, and in such a state a citizen should uphold all laws, evenif he disagrees with a specific one. Here some conception of law ingeneral and not the specific law belongs to the realm of ideals, namely,the ideal decrees that there should be laws. This, of course, does notprevent specific laws from becoming ideals. But there is a fourthpossibility, slightly different from the third: A person may decide tofollow the rule that makes up the third possibility up to a point, beyondwhich he would not obey laws that oppose his values.

Truth and Beauty as Ideals

Another example of an ideal is the value of speaking the truth.What stands out in speaking the truth is that it is neither a means noran end. Speech which is a means to some end will not always conveytruth; even if it does so, its efficiency and usefulness are not in itstruthfulness, but at best in that the listeners believe it to be true.

The Ideal 145

Speaking the truth and utility converge only incidentally. Accordingly,whoever recommends speaking the truth not in a certain case but ingeneral, does not recommend it as a means. On the other hand,speaking the truth is not an end, it does not arise (as the result of aprocess directed by means), but is done.

Knowledge may also be an ideal. That is to say, when the act ofobservation and the act of thinking are not the means to some end, theyare an action guided by inclination or the realization of an ideal.

Not only the value of knowledge rests on the borderline betweeninclination and ideal. Quite a number of values are not easily classifiedas inclinations or as ideals. Being or not being innate may sometimesserve as a demarcation line. An inclination may be inborn, but not anideal.

Is beauty an ideal or rooted in inclination, namely, the inclinationto distinguish the beautiful and to admire it? Presumably inclinationand ideal combine with regard to beauty, to wit: On one hand we havean inborn inclination to distinguish a certain kind of beauty and admireit; on the other hand we develop and extend this inclination or build ontop of it a layer of fashioned taste, of artistic style, which is to beviewed as an ideal.

It seems that humans are inclined to give sensory expression towhat they feel, namely, to shape what they sense into an expressionand the emotion into what is expressed. This inclination and the actionit propels undergo a stylizing process, from which ideals of expressionarise. A synthesis of the beauty ideal with the ideal of expressioncreates art, or rather the artistic ideal to fashion a beautiful expression.The artistic deed is the realization of an ideal and is also a spontaneousact by virtue of the inclinations embedded in the ideal.57

The Game

The Game will be our final example in this series. Embedded in itsbasis is the inclination to cope with a difficulty, while the basis of thisinclination is the organic requirement to activate various kinds ofpower. A game is stylized coping with a difficulty (or coping with astylized difficulty). As the basis of game includes the organism's re-quirement to activate power, reflection about power joins in and par-ticipates, whether more or less, not only in this or that individual caseof wrestling with a difficulty, but also in the very shaping of rules for agame, namely, the specific ideal regarding a certain game. Here wedeal with reflection that assesses and values the forces the self canmuster. The individual's attempt to measure its forces reveals itself in


the competitive element embedded in most games, namely, in that theplayer has to cope with a rival and not just with a difficulty per se.This element of reflection, present in many games, does not belong tosection B, i.e., to valuation of an action according to itself, but tosection C, valuing the action as evidence of strength or skill, as bearingwitness to the rate of this strength or skill. Tackling a rival by way of agame has therefore — apart from processing and stylizing a directspontaneous inclination towards the action itself (which belongs tovalue-section B) — a mediating element as well, the attempt of aperson to value him- or herself, and to use the rival as a valuativeyardstick (a matter belonging to section C).

It is common to art and games that both arise from an inclination toactivate power or skill for their own sake. They differ in that in art, asopposed to games, a creative power is activated (i.e., the creation ofsensational expressions). They also differ in that game, when it fash-ions a difficulty into a competitive field, leaves room for reflectionwhich assesses and values the rate of forces the individual can call up.Presumably, an element of self-valuation also appears in art, not withinthe artistic ideal itself, but as an accompanying element in the courseof its realization through the practice of art.

In the same way in which characteristics belonging to value-section C (the reflective section) intertwine with ideals of certaingroups, characteristics belonging to value-section A may intertwinewith ideals. Even though a game of chess is neither a means nor anend, within it, namely in the course of the game, a means and an endmay emerge: a certain move may be the means to achieve a desiredsituation, which in its turn will be a stage or the means to win thegame. For this goal-oriented characteristic not to mislead us regardingthe character of chess as an ideal, we should remember the typical caseof someone enjoying the game he loses against an able rival, muchmore than the one he wins against a poor rival. Accordingly, he willprefer the good rival not in order to learn from him, but as the partnerin a preferable realization of the action's design.

To conclude the discussion of ideals as a type of value we have toregister the following parameter, according to which ideals differ fromeach other. On one hand, or at one pole, there are ideals whose roledetermines their content to a considerable degree, or rejects from theoutset countless possible alternatives to the chosen ideal design, leav-ing only a few choices to the will. The role is, for instance, to settle agiven conflict, a role derived from the conflict's negative value, whichis a value of the reflection about the conflict. (Apropos: it is also pos-sible for reason within one of its historical or biographical figures toaccord a conflict per se, in a certain sphere — ethics, for example — a

The Ideal 147

positive value). In this case, the freedom of the will which draws onthe assistance of reason, is limited. Even though the relevant differencebetween the alternatives may be great, there are only two or three pos-sible answers to the question we face, and if we decide to answer it wehave to choose from these few (sometimes it is also possible to choosea certain mixture of these answers). Justice and moral values mayserve as examples.

On the other hand, or at the opposite pole, we find ideals whichwere chosen from an endless number of alternatives. Games, for exam-ple, belong to this group. That chess is played on a board of 8x8squares and with these and not other chessmen, is but the establish-ment of one out of countless possibilities for a game of intellectualcontest between two rivals. The ideal of an artistic creation in one ofthe arts and in a certain style, could also be taken as an example.However, here the freedom shows more in the creative spontaneity,recommended by the ideal, than in the choice and the establishment ofthe ideal itself. In other words: While the rules of a game compare ingeneral with a well-tailored garment that follows the body contours ofits wearer, and playing the game according to the rules compares withthe latter, the design recommended by an artistic ideal does not fit theartistic action so snugly. Accordingly freedom stands out in the sphereof art, mainly in the scope of continuous space the ideal grants theaction, while in the sphere of games freedom also shows in the numberof possible games, namely, in the space inhabited by the possibleideals themselves.

In any case, both games and art differ essentially from idealswhose role is to settle conflicts between values.

Chapter 7

The Third Section: ValuationAccording to the Activity's Factors.Valuation of Motives

Two Kinds of Motive Valuation

A person is induced to value motives when they oppose each other.He values other people's motives when these oppose each other as wellas when they oppose his own motives; he also values his own motivesbecause some opposition between them has broken out. A person'sreason is called upon to voice an opinion with regard to rival motives,his will is called upon to make a decision. And as the motive is valued,so is an action valued according to the motive that made someonecarry it out, and so is the person activated by this motive valued.

We can distinguish two kinds of valuative values, designated tovalue motives.

A valuative value of the first kind determines preferences. That isto say, it is not meant to distinguish between good and bad, which wasalready accomplished by valuative values of sections A and B. Themotives are attached to these values (of sections A and B) and arealready aimed only at what is good, i.e., either directly (as a positivemotive), at the realization of some positive value segment, or indi-


rectly (as a negative motive), at avoiding the realization of some nega-tive value segment. The valuative value of the first kind dealing withmotives determines what is better and what is worse, which motive issuperior and which is inferior; it determines the scale according towhich the quarrel between motives is to be settled so far as these be-long to one and the same person, and helps to form an opinion withregard to the clash of interpersonal motives.

According to the first kind of motive-valuing values, a person isnot condemned for harboring a certain motive, because no existingmotive is bad from his or her point of view (according to this kind ofmotive valuation); he or she are condemned only because they actedaccording to the inferior, and not according to the superior motive.They are condemned for the order of priority regarding the power oftheir motives, which the ensuing action revealed to be the wrong order.For instance, a person is not condemned because he was afraid in theface of danger, namely, was motivated to flee or hide, but because hedid not conquer his fear and did not prefer a motive prescribing acertain worthy action. The motive to avoid danger is not bad, but itmay be inferior to another motive with which it finds itself in rivalryunder given circumstances, be the rival motive negative or positive, beit a demand to avoid greater danger or aimed at an appropriate action.The adjective “worthy” belongs to the lexicon of preference in mo-tives: worthy behavior is behavior prescribed by the preferred motive.

While the valuative value of the first kind does not treat the timidseverely and even shows understanding for the human heart, the mo-tive-valuing value of the second kind goes beyond that, and judges amotive as a good one or as a bad one. More precisely, this valuativevalue makes up the measure according to which motives are acquittedor condemned. It is not satisfied with the proposition that one shouldnot act according to the motive which lost its case in court, but it statesthat this motive should be uprooted.

The motive-valuing value of the first kind resembles a judge in acivil action, dividing property between warring litigants. The secondkind is the judge in a criminal action, facing an alleged offender. Thisexample diverges from what it exemplifies only in that a judge applieslaws and consults precedents. For precision's sake the example may beamended in this manner: The motive-valuing value of the first kind isthe law according to which the property is divided, while that of thesecond kind is the law according to which the suspect is judged.

To sum up: The division into kinds occurs between rules of prefer-ence, i.e., arbitration, according to which the motive's place is allottedbut the motive is never condemned, and criminal law for motives,according to which a motive may be found guilty in court.

Valuation of Motives 151

Without valuative values designed to value preferring and arbitrat-ing motives a person could neither act nor exist, because he or shewould lack guidelines for cases of motive rivalry, while they couldvery well exist and act without a criminal law for motives. One mayinfer from this consideration that the second kind is perhaps an ex-trapolation of the first: a motive which was inferior turns negative, theone whose part of the disputed property equalled zero is now to pay afine. Perhaps abstention comes into being in this manner, by accordingthe status of a bad motive to a motive considered inferior in theabstaining person's environment.

Values of Preference

Preferences are material, typological or formal. Materialpreference of one motive over another arises from the special characterof these motives. The formulation of such a preference requires thatthe motives be named, or that at least one of them be named. Instead ofseparate names for each of the other motives the name of a group ofmotives will appear, i.e., the motive called by its name is preferableover or inferior to this group.

Let us present an example. Bravery as a value stands for the inferi-ority of fear to positive motives which call for risk-involving action. Ahero is the person who conquers his fear in favor of the risk-carryingdeed. The conquest of fear occurs by virtue of the will; that is to say,the will provides the motive opposed to fear with sufficient additionalpower to overcome fear in its role as a motive. Fear is not only a mo-tive, but also a valuative value, primarily on the feeling level. As amotive it is, for instance, the wish to get away from what frightens orto hide from it; as a valuative value it is a feeling of discomfort, orbetter yet, a feeling of some suffering in the presence of what fright-ens.

Heroism as a valuative value is therefore designed to valuemotives and to value will power or more precisely, it is the materialpreference of motives for risk-involving action (or of a certaincontingent of such motives) over fear.

We will now turn to typological preference. This is preference fora certain type of values over another type, to serve as motives; thedivision into types may be as suggested here or any other kind of divi-sion. As an example we may use the preference of an ideal as an illus-trious motive, over a need, an inclination or a constraint, and prefer-ence for an end accommodating this ideal (preparing preconditions forits realization), over an end serving a need, an inclination or a con-


straint. If X did something towards the realization of an ideal in whichhe and whoever comes to value him believe, for instance, the ideal ofjustice realized in a just deed, while Y did the same deed for his ownbenefit or — which is actually the same — because of external com-pulsion, X will be valued more than Y: X's motives are superior to Y'smotives. The word “superior” (or “illustrious,” “lofty,” “high-minded”) expresses a certain kind of preference for typological or for-mal motives.

Another example of type preference is to prefer ends over needs ingeneral, and the need for rest in particular. This preference value iscalled “diligence” or “industry.” We will say that a person who workshard, foregoing rest, entertainment and other activities propelled byneed or inclination, is “industrious” even if his end is utterly alien tous; that is to say, be the end whatever it is — an issue for materialconsideration — what matters is that the dominant motivative valuebelongs to the ends type.

A preference neither chosen according to the value itself nor to itstype but according to some formal criterion, is a preference formotives that match valuative values more than others, to wit, thedemand is that the motives determining a person's actions be identicalin content to the valuative values he upholds. The test-question iswhether this person's actions are induced by motives he valuespositively in other people, and not by those he values negatively inothers.

A special kind of preference, which may not fit the triple divisionmentioned so far, arises from the valuation of a system of motives, andincludes the valuation of single motives in accordance with a value-property of the system they belong to. As an example, we can takepreference according to the presence or the absence of oppositionbetween motives, i.e., the valuation of motives and their owner ac-cording to a structural property of the motivative value system. Somepeople prefer an individual motive system that incorporates conflicts(provided these do not prevent decisions) to a system without con-flicts. Let us assume that we agree with regard to all values within thethree sections required in order to value individuals X and Y, theirmotives and their actions. Both X and Y do what is right, and in iden-tical circumstances both behave in the same manner. Furthermore:Both do what is better. One of them however (Y), chose his prefer-ences only after some inner conflict, during which he had to overcomeinferior and less positive motives. The other one (X) acted accordingto the preferred motives without inner conflict, because he did nothave the inferior or less positive motive, or because it had so littlepower that no conflict was felt. Whoever prefers a motive system that


incorporates conflicts, will prefer Y over X (Let us now imagine twopeople, A and B, who both do what is bad, but A does so only after aninner conflict and B without. If in the case of X and Y the owner ofconflicts was to be preferred, the more so in the case of A and B).Nicolai Hartmann, for instance, believed that the conflict in itself haspositive value.

On the other hand, there are those who prefer a value system that isfree of conflicts and operates automatically. They believe humansshould arrange their values in a way that leaves no room for conflicts.Whoever meets this demand will be labeled “steady” and “rational.”The word “rational” serves positive valuation in a number of differentsenses, which cannot easily be gathered into a suitable definition.

Both parties will perhaps agree generally on the valuation of a statein which a conflict prevents a decision: it is preferable to a bad deci-sion and inferior to a good one.

Whoever prefers conflict will probably prefer people who are notself-satisfied to those who are. In contradistinction, whoever prefersthe absence of conflicts will consider self-satisfaction as a good thingper se (i.e., a special value) and also as a sign for a positive state ofmind (a system without conflicts).

Morality

Systems of morality are a certain kind of motive-valuing systems.That is to say that morality does not add motives to those it finds, andthat there is no special moral good which was not already good fromanother aspect (apart from the moral aspect), namely, there is no moralgood which does not rely on what was already good prior to reflectionabout motives. Something is good if it realizes a positive value; a goodmotive in the moral sense aims at the realization of a preferred positivevalue.

The distinction between moral values and those motive-valuingvalues which do not belong to morality, is not congruent with thedivision into kinds discussed at the beginning of this chapter, butcrosses it: Besides systems of morality that deal with arbitration, thereare also those that condemn or acquit. However, the latter can be de-scribed as arising from the former through more rigorous moral judg-ment; accordingly we limit our discussion and only treat of morality asa system of preference.

A system of morality is recognizable by three character traits.First, it prefers motives designed to realize ideals, or more specifically,certain behavior patterns in interpersonal relations. This is a


characteristic of typological preference. The end, caution, the need,inclination and constraint are inferior to ideal behavior patterns whichbear the seal of morality; for instance, they are inferior to behaviorpatterns embraced by the ideal of justice. Here we may distinguishbetween ethics and morality, according the name “ethics” to the set ofbehavior-valuing values, namely, ideals all or part of which serve mo-rality when it comes to value motives (because they are directed at therealization of these ideals). The name “ethics” would place the empha-sis on the deed and the way it is directed (although it may value notonly deeds but also other actions and emotions), while the name “mo-rality” would stress intention and preference, i.e., preference of onedirection over others, and therefore preference of the motive that suitsit over the rest of motives. Accordingly, ethics belong to the secondsection of values and morality to the third section (even if apart fromthis aspect they are identical in content).

The second characteristic of morality systems refers to the powerof preferred motives. The motives preferred by a system of moralityare often less powerful than their rivals. We should remember that thepower of a certain motive, held by a certain individual, is expressed invarious modes of readiness for sacrifice, or in marginal power atdifferent times. There are therefore many quite frequent states, inwhich the actual marginal power of a preferred motive falls below thepower of a rival motive, inferior in comparison to the first. We learnfrom this that among other traits, morality is characterized by anoccasional strong temptation to act in opposition to its demands, and inconsequence requires assistance from the will.

The third characteristic of morality systems addresses the com-mand form they acquire. They command behavior in the preferredmanner in the same way that a person's will is thought to command itsowner himself (a person's will is thought to appeal to its owner as“you”). The individual's will receives a ready-made formulation fromthe moral codex, and has only to adopt it and to instruct the will'sowner how to behave. Here we should note that the motive leading tothe deed morality commands, is directly tied to the valuative valuedesigned to value deeds and not to a value designed to assess motives.The motive for the deed morality commands as well as the valuativevalue bound up with it belong to the second section of values. Valua-tive values (of section C) designed to value motives do not require aspecial motive to be attached to them, i.e., a motive of the third sec-tion, in order to influence behavior; they directly influence the willwhich, as mentioned before, reinforces the positively valued motive.


An action performed out of duty is an action carried out by virtueof the will, which is guided by reflection that values motives, and it isperformed in opposition to strong motives.

Motives are attached to ideals included in ethics, while the will isattached to morality.

Why do we say that morality commands actions and do not saythat ethics command? Because the act of issuing a command, or givingan order, is the act of willing, namely, the will orders and commands.Adherence to an ideal, on the other hand, is bound up with theaspiration to behave accordingly, so that an aspiration and not a com-mand accompany the adherence to ethics. Ethics may, for example,accord a focal place to the emotion of love, while a moral framework,based on this ethics, will not demand love — not because motives forthe emotion are absent, but because the will does not govern emotion,and love cannot be ordered. 58 Thus, happiness may also occupy a focalplace in ethics, but not in morality.

Open and Closed Morality

Closed morality can be recognized in that it imposes different be-havior patterns on different people, or even different behavior patternson the same person in relation to or the presence of different people.The subjects of morality, i.e., those required to behave in a preferablemanner, are arranged in circles, so that contingents of human beingsremain outside the sum total of subjects. The objects of morality arealso arranged so that some of them receive a great deal of considera-tion, and there are groups which do not differ from each other in thedegree, but in the manner of consideration; and there are systems ofclosed morality in which contingents of human beings remain outsidethe circles, namely, they are not awarded any consideration.59 A sys-tem of closed morality draws its content from a certain concept of jus-tice, prevalent in the society which created this system. A circle ofsubjects as well as a circle of objects may be defined according to eth-nicity, a person's gender, his or her belonging to a certain class, pro-fession, etc.

Law often reflects morals. The legal codex of the Ripuarian andSalian Franks at the beginning of the Middle Ages provide a character-istic example of closed morality systems. Ripuarian law states:

7. A free person who kills a free Ripuarian will be sentenced to pay200 solidi...8. A person who kills a slave will be sentenced to pay 36 solidi...


10. A person who kills a church official will be sentenced to pay 100solidi...12. A person who kills a Ripuarian woman after she has begun to bearchildren and until the age of 40 will be sentenced to pay 600 solidi...

60

Morality as a codex for sexual behavior is also a proper example ofa closed morality system. The same holds for any professional ethics.

In its most salient form, closed morality is a system of materialpreferences which are not based on a particular principle, nor does thetypological element the system incorporates exceed the limits of mo-rality in general. Closure as well as materiality make a multiplicity ofmorality systems possible and indeed, history provides us with a hostof different morality systems; Eduard Westermark's books are illumi-nating in this respect.61 Confronting closed, material morality, there isformal62 and open, i.e., universal morality, and in between there are anumber of system figures, which have exceeded materiality and evenclosure on certain issues and to a limited degree. Kant presented andanalyzed open morality (if we overlook the remnants of materialitythat stuck to him).

What characterizes open morality is that its subjects do not divideinto kinds, or in other words: This morality has a single kind of sub-ject, including everyone able to understand it, namely, every reason-able being; nor do the objects of open morality divide into kinds, or inother words: There is only a single kind of object of moral consid-eration, defined so that any subject of morality (and nothing else) isalso its object. To a certain extent, these traits also characterize thepreferred behavior pattern. The same behavior pattern, or the samepractical rule, the reasonable being would recommend to a society or agroup of reasonable individuals, to which he himself does not belongand whose members he does not know, but whom he wishes well, isthe preferable behavior pattern that obliges himself (i.e., the personwho recommends it). The motive he prefers for an ideally-reasonablesociety he constructs in his thoughts without considering himself amember, he is to prefer for himself (within the reality of his life);however, as a motive is a individual entity, we must clarify this for-mulation and state that we deal here with kinds of motives, namely, ineach case a kind of motives is preferred — the kind to which all thosedirected at behavior according to some recommended pattern Abelong. The behavior pattern, or the practical rule, is formulated in asentence, somewhat like this: “If you are in this or that subjective state,and if you find yourself in these or those circumstances, you have todo the following deed...”; for example, if you can swim and seesomeone drowning, try to save him. Sometimes one can omit thepreamble (beginning with “if”) and state only the ending explicitly, oromit part of the preamble (and say: “Try to save a drowning person” or


“Save a drowning person”), on the assumption that the preamble arisesfrom the context; as a check it is sometimes a good idea to explicatethe conditions.

You ponder whether to perform or not to perform a certain deed,try it out in thought and ask yourself whether you would recommendto a society of reasonable strangers (i.e., recommend to each of them)to behave according to the pattern this deed is built upon, or whetheryou would recommend to avoid such behavior. Three results are pos-sible: You would recommend the pattern, you would recommend toavoid behaving according to this pattern, or you would not recommendanything on this matter (in any case, no “yes or no” recommendation).This consideration is the formal test through which you put thepractical notion. If you recommend avoidance, the idea to perform thedeed has failed the test. In the two other cases it has passed.

To sum up: Universal morality commands the individual to adapthis or her set of motives, by the aid of a formal test, to the ideal-uni-versal motive-valuing values, his or her reason finds within itself.

The matter of recommended legislation for a strange society63 (i.e.,to which the recommending person does not belong) is necessary foruniversal morality not to be interpreted as Schopenhauer64 interpretedKant's theory, as inverted egoism. 65 In my opinion, Schopenhauer didnot interpret Kant appropriately, but we will not go into the matter ofinterpretation here. The inversion of egoism embodied in the rule “donot do to your neighbor what you hate for yourself,” does not yet pro-vide full formalization. For example, I may be aware of hating some-thing, but I do not ask a member of the ideal society to be made up in amanner that will make him hate what I hate today. What I actually hateinvolves needs and constraints that are given to me, but not the idealswhich I constitute, and certainly not universal ideals. If X is disgustedby expressions of pity, this does not prevent him from upholding theideal of a society in which pity and its expression play a role.

Every ideal of justice includes the concept of impartiality or non-involvement and of an external vantage point, thus already incorporat-ing the idea which achieves full development in formal morality. Thegoddess of justice holds the scales of judgment while her eyes arecovered. It seems that every closed material morality already hints atthe principle of recommended legislation for an alien society.

The formality of formal morality resides in that it assumes only aminimum of pre-suppositions; (in some sense, it does not presupposeanything).

It assumes reasonableness, because it addresses everyone who un-derstands its appeal, namely, whoever possesses reason. Reasonable-ness is not a content that is added to the action of appeal itself.


It assumes the existence of the will, because the multiplicity ofreasonable individuals reveals itself already in the question how theytreat each other — a multiplicity created by the will and not by reason.The will is the individuation principle of understanding subjects.

Apart from these two assumptions, the question how one shouldbehave assumes nothing. The answer has to be developed from thequestion itself, without the aid of additional assumptions. That is tosay, there is no room here for assumptions concerning the nature ofsubjects or the nature of objects.

We save presuppositions when we refrain from clarifying thenature of various objects of moral consideration, but assume that thesubject is also the object, and that the state of being a subject ofmorality is constituted by the capability to understand morality'sappeal.

In formal morality, duty and right are defined together. What oughtto be done is a duty as well as a right.66 Any duty a subject has is alsohis right — the right of the same subject when it is the object ofanother's consideration. Any right is also a duty. The list of an in-dividual's duties is the list of his rights. We have to distinguish be-tween a duty according to formal morality and commitment. A personmay, for example, commit himself to a deed which is opposed to hisformal moral duty. In any case, a commitment to one person may, ofcourse, discriminate him or her in relation to others. Loyalty, for in-stance, is a value of closed morality which may be a matter of com-mitment (someone commits himself to be faithful to his king or hiswife). Another big difference between formal and material morality isthat failing in a duty of material morality is not necessarily to the det-riment of someone else. There may be no other subject who is a victimof the failure to uphold a duty. For instance, sexual mores determinebehavior patterns as a duty, even when these do not defend any body'sright — like the duty of unmarried women in general and girls inparticular to avoid sexual intercourse. Such duties, imposed by amaterial morality, may not be confirmed by formal morality.

The congruence of duty and right in formal morality expresses theequality already embedded in the absence of presuppositions, namely,in that we know nothing about the subject of morality (who is also itsobject) but that he possesses reason and a will. As there are only tworelevant properties, and all members of society possess these, eachmember has the same rights and duties as all his peers.

Reciprocity in formal morality shows itself in that the latter pre-sents its demands reciprocally, namely, it demands from person A andperson B to fulfill the same duty to each other, thus also determiningtheir reciprocal right. However, this reciprocity is not conditional: Ac-


cording to formal morality, A's duty towards B is not conditional on Bupholding A's right, i.e., on B fulfilling his duty to A. Formal moralitydoes not acknowledge conditioning, because this would excludesomeone from the circle of its objects. B cannot extract himself fromthe circle of objects by not fulfilling his duty to A. Accordingly, A isobliged to fulfill his duty to B, even though B does not fulfill his dutyto him. From this aspect a duty is presented to everyone separately.This is not so in closed, material morality: Here reciprocity may makea duty conditional upon the privilege.

The status of certain aesthetic values can be examined in the lightof this distinction between formal and material morality. The relationbetween aesthetics and morals varies in different systems of morality.Each of these systems treats of motives, so that we have first to findout which motives involve aesthetics, namely, ideals concerning whatis beautiful, becoming or appropriate.

Everyday usage employs expressions like “an ugly deed,” “unbe-coming behavior” etc. Impolite behavior may be considered unbecom-ing, and the same holds for attire that jars on accepted custom in gen-eral, or attire thought to be wrong for its wearer, as well as for theviolation of accepted rules in sexual behavior. We deal therefore withbehavior that violates aesthetic values. When a person has a strongmotive to behave in an unbecoming manner (unbecoming in terms ofthe society he lives in), and frequently this motive is stronger than itsopposite (the motive to behave becomingly), the intervention of mo-rality and the will is needed in order to conquer temptation. The mo-rality which accords aesthetic values a moral seal is, of course, aclosed, material morality. When the terms “inappropriate,” “unbecom-ing” describe immoral behavior, they may point out that the origins ofmoral prohibitions this behavior violates, are in aesthetics; this is inparticular valid for transgressions without a victim (i.e., according toformal morality they do not encroach upon the right of any member inthis society, nor do they cause damage to any of them).

The characterization of a value as ethical (i.e., meant to value be-havior) and its characterization as aesthetic (i.e., meant to value ap-pearance, looks, etc.) are not incompatible; on the contrary, many val-ues are being characterized in both ways. On the other hand, the rela-tions of suitability and opposition between formal morality and aes-thetics are always indirect and contingent.

In order to acquire the seal of morality, the aesthetic values thatwon it had previously to absorb multiple forces from the comprehen-sive value system actually prevailing in society (the society whichadheres to this morality). They may have been congruent with publicinterests, or with ends cherished by multiple members of this society


(for example, men whose wives were their chattels, may have beenable reinforce their privileges through suitable aesthetic principles).

Why Formal Morality Requires the Complement ofMaterial Morality

Formal morality cannot carry the burden of motive valuationalone, because (1) it is ambiguous with regard to a large group of casesand (2) it has no meaning with regard to another group, perhapssmaller but not less important; it requires the aid of a material moralityin order to choose one of its meanings (or understandings) when thefirst group is concerned, and in order to meet a want with regard to thesecond group. We will now list four “shortcomings” of formalmorality; the first two address multiplicity of meaning and the last twoits absence. (We put the word “shortcomings” in quotation marks,because these would be actual shortcomings only if we charged formalmorality with the role of morality as a whole).

A. A given deed is subject to many practical rules (or many deedpatterns, in Kant's terminology: maxims), some of them good andsome bad rules, namely, some pass the formal test and accordingly,prima facie, the deed is permitted but some fail the test and accord-ingly, prima facie, the same deed is forbidden. Doing some deed is aduty, because according to a certain pattern of it, or a certain maxim,avoidance of this deed does not pass the formal test; and, on the otherhand, duty demands not to do it, because according to another patternof it, or another maxim, the deed does not pass the test. The questionis, therefore, how to generalize a single or individual deed, and thiscannot be answered with the aid of a formal criterion.

Let us examine a few examples.First example. One, Reuben, asks himself whether to carry a

weapon. On one hand his wish is for no human being to carry arms, sothat in his opinion the maxim “carry arms (if you know how to usethem and possess some)” fails the formal morality test (according tothe first version of the categorical imperative in Kant's FundamentalPrinciples of the Metaphysic of Morals). Accordingly, if the carryingof arms is subject to this rule or maxim, it is disqualified and dutydemands to avoid it. On the other hand, Reuben would feel safer if hehad a weapon handy. It comes to his mind that the relevant rule states:“Carry arms to defend yourself when you expect danger.” The reserva-tion added to the rule reduces the opposition presented by his wish that


no arms be carried by anyone, and he cannot say anymore that turningthis rule into a general law opposes his wishes (their sum total). Thequestion arises to which practical rule, or behavior patter, the carryingof arms belongs.

Second example. Let us imagine someone who tends to condemnpeople, has a somewhat quick temper and is not inclined to shun vio-lence; this person beats his son because a trick he played has causedgrave damage to some property (we will assume that the deed does notinvolve the violation of a prevailing law). What is the appropriate rulefrom which this deed arose: “Beat your son when he plays a trick thatcauses damage,” or “beat any person if you believe he or she deservespunishment the authorities are not taking care of, and you are notcommitting a legal offense by doing so,” or “beat other people if youcan”?

Third example. A person in particularly difficult circumstanceswants to commit suicide but does not wish for all humanity, or allreasonable beings, to do the same. Does the deed he wishes to performcome under the rule “commit suicide if you can,” or under the rule“commit suicide if you have lost all hope and are fed up with life,” orperhaps “commit suicide if your suffering is unbearable and lengthyconsideration has shown you that all hope is lost.” This person maywish that some of these rules, at least the last one, be generally valid,but the other rules do not pass the test.

Fourth example. X likes people to pity him and express their pity.He asks himself: Would I like all people to proffer each other all thetime pity and consolations? The answer is positive. Along his way Xmeets Y who belongs to a type common in competitive society, helikes people to envy him. X tells Y that he pities him (he has foundsomething which is truly wrong with Y) and thus makes him miser-able. We will, perhaps, tell X: What you did does not apply to the ruleyou intended, but to the rule “do not treat your neighbor in the way heasks to be treated”; your error was in formulating a too specific, rule.

There are grades rising from the specific to the universal in all fourexamples. In all of them the special practical rule which specificallymatches the deed from the doer's viewpoint passes the test of formalmorality (according to the belief of the person who performs the deed),while the most universal practical rule fails the test. The special ruleswere these: “Carry arms when you expect danger, in order to defendyourself,” “beat your son when he plays a trick that causes damage,”“commit suicide, if your suffering is unbearable, and lengthy consid-eration has shown you that all hope is lost,” and also “tell anotherperson that you pity him or her for what is wrong with them.”


If we formulate the practical rule in a sufficiently specific manner,we will be able to justify many deeds.

The question I suggest the reader ask himself is not what rule tochoose as being relevant from a moral point of view, but whether thechoice can be arranged according to a formal criterion, which can be apart of the principle of formal morality.

We will now present an example in which the difference betweenthe practical rules in question is of another kind.

Fifth example. Crook X not only profits from swindling people,but it also amuses him. He usually succeeds in conning people, butfailure does not depress him. Having perused the appropriate chapterin Kant's theory, the crook asks himself if the next swindle he hatchesin his imagination comes under the maxim (or practical rule) “cheatpeople” or “try to cheat people.” The learned crook finds it difficult toimagine a state of affairs in which everybody cheats everybody else,but he can imagine a state in which everybody tries to cheat all otherpeople, and accordingly, everyone frequently speaks the truth in orderto be trusted, and thus be able to entrap the trusting person when theright moment arrives. As this crook loves a challenge, he definitelylikes the arena of conning attempts; he will be happy to be an amusedobserver, he is definitely prepared to be the object of a conning at-tempt he will try to derail, and needless to say, he is prepared to con-tinue doing what has become a habit. He also thinks that if society hasto pay dearly for undermining universal trust, the price will not beexorbitant and is to be preferred to the tedium created by the absenceof challenge. The learned crook has therefore decided which rulematches the categorical imperative and which does not, but he does notknow which applies to the deed he hatches in his imagination.

B. The same examples in which we found the same deed to besubject to different practical rules, may serve us to examine the multi-faceted relation between a practical rule and the categoricalimperative. This relation is not direct, but mediated by “ability of thewill,” which is individual. Even though we may, in the name ofmorality, command the will to follow reason alone, we cannot ignorethe dilemma, that should the will ignore the special properties ofhuman nature (those of the will's owner) it would be incapable oftaking a stand on many questions; thus, because jointly with humannature it would ignore material preferences altogether; on the otherhand, if the will does not ignore the nature and preferences of itsowner, a certain practical rule will be commendable as a general law inthe eyes of one individual, and inadmissible in the eyes of another.

Different individuals will suggest different laws to a society whomthey wish well. One likes order and discipline and will suggest laws in


this vein, including methods of severe punishment; another one,inclined towards individualism and loathing submissiveness, willsuggest laws that enhance individual freedom and reduce the severityof punishment. While the former will advocate strict and severe educa-tion, being prepared to imagine himself an object of such education,the latter will reject the view of a young person as a means to the endof molding his or her personality. The same holds for patterns recom-mended in relation to the life of a family.

Concrete reason is not a single one. There are multiple instances,or multiple figures of reason. The different instances, or the differentfigures of reason do not extract the same result from the application ofthe same categorical imperative to a given practical rule, because “theability to will,” or the sum total of reasonable wishes (which mediatebetween principle and practical rule) are different for each.

Kant believed that pure practical reason offers an unequivocal in-struction to a person facing the following alternative: Either to give into inclinations he can realize “in comfortable circumstances” in thepresent and “(like the South Sea islanders) should let” his “talentsrest,” or “to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy naturalcapacities”; .”…as a rational being he necessarily wills that his facul-ties be developed, since they serve him, and have been given him, forall sorts of possible purposes.”67 Kant's preference is a material or ty-pological preference, and can constitute a specific figure of reason, butit is not a formal preference, arising from rationality or reasonablenessin general. What is worthwhile to sacrifice for possible goals to bedetermined in future, is not a matter for pure reason; it belongs to whatconstitutes a specific, historical figure of reason.

This shortcoming of formal morality can also be viewed in the fol-lowing manner: The accord of a person's motives with his motive-valuing values and hence with his ideals, is not sufficient for moralityto be realized by a certain society, because such realization also re-quires far-reaching congruence of inter-personal ideals regardingissues like organization, law and order, or development, or thequestion what is just; it follows that in certain spheres the members ofthis society have to adhere to common ideals. To wit, a sharing ofvalues precedes preferences in general, and this is the basis of materialmorality which complements formal morality.

C. So far we have discussed formal morality's multiplicity ofmeaning; we will now turn to the limits of its application.

Let us imagine a person in time of war, facing a situation in whichhe has either to kill an enemy or be killed himself. If he kills his en-emy, he treats him and his life only as a means, thus violating thecategorical imperative. The enemy ceases to be an object of moral con-


sideration for him, in opposition to the universal character of formalmorality. But if he permits his enemy to kill him, he would violateformal morality in exactly the same manner. Accordingly, formal mo-rality does not instruct him how to behave in these circumstances, anddoes not show him how to avoid violating it.

You may say: Formal morality forbids human beings to enter upona situation in which they cannot behave in accordance with it. Butfrequently an individual has no way to evade such a situation; forexample, a youngster just out of childhood, finding himself on a bat-tlefield of a war that has been going on for generations. In such cases,formal morality is inapplicable. It still has meaning, because theclosed, material morality prevailing among warriors may be nearer toor farther away from formal morality , and these differences may bequite substantial. There is room here to complement morality (andethics) by the end of reducing the number and range of cases in whichformal morality is inapplicable, and do so, if possible, by preventingtheir emergence from the outset.

Closed morality corresponds with what may be named “group ego-ism” or “egoism of a group,” which may very well correspond withfar-reaching altruism of the individual within the group. Whoeverholds to the dichotomy egoism-altruism will find it difficult to explainbehavior informed by a closed morality, in which the individualproffers sacrifice not for his own sake but for another member of hisgroup (be the group a family, a people etc.). It seems that real-lifecases of proper moral action, namely, making a great sacrifice (at theexpense of a strong motive) are informed by a closed morality.

D. Open morality does not include reasonless human beingsamong the objects for consideration (foetuses, infants, senile or insanepeople or those in a state of protracted coma). On the other hand, manysystems of closed morality issue instructions how to treat such people.

A similar question arises with regard to animals in general, andthose resembling humans in particular. Should genetic engineeringsucceed in creating a species of apes who can perform certain tasks,and are able to fulfill the role the Delta People fulfill in Huxley's“Brave New World,” formal morality would probably not forbid it.According to the spirit of universal morality, it requires complementsfrom closed, material morality with regard to reasonless groups ofliving creatures.


Summarizing the Issue of Motive Valuation

The principle of formal morality is one and the same and its mul-tiple formulations serve to interpret each other; in a manner convenientfor axiological description, one can express it as an order to examineone's own motives (according to the formal test), and to adapt them (ifnecessary) to valuative values. The most salient expressions of thisprinciple are Kant's different formulations of the categorical impera-tive. It is also expressed by the statement that a person's duty to an-other person is identical in its content with the former's right to con-sideration (including assistance) by the latter, and that a person's dutyis but to hold up the other one's right; that is to say, there is no sinwithout a victim, and the victim — in order to be taken into account —has to be a real human being (or another reasonable creature, shouldwe come to know one), and not some institution, or a hallowed sym-bol, or an idea, or the truth (in other words: the victim of a sin issomebody and not something). By its very nature formal morality doesnot forbid material morality to impose additional duties, it does notforbid a person to shoulder duties and commitments apart from thoseembraced by formal morality. Incest, for example, is not a sin in therealm of formal morality, but formal morality leaves room for materialmorality to outlaw incest.

The formal character of formal morality shows itself in that it isnot sufficient for the valuation of motivative values. At best, it mayfunction as a necessary condition within a material and typologicalweb for the valuation of motives,68 and in such a case a motive may bepreferred only if it does not fail the formal test. And indeed, theactually prevailing morality in any society is a synthesis of formal andmaterial morality.69 And the difference between societies does notonly rest upon the ethical web itself, but also upon the role it accordsto the formal principle. Here an empirical axiological question arises,regarding the structure of present and past moral systems (professionalethics included): To what degree and in what manner do they fill theframework of formal morality systems, and to what extent do theyincorporate, apart from the typological preference characteristic forany morality, material preferences that are contingent to reason, likeduty without right (i.e., a duty of one person, which does not involvegranting a right to any other person).

A theoretical axiological question which requires clarification, ishow far material and typological preference is bound up with theclosed character of morality, and how far the complements of formalmorality (which it needs) change it necessarily from being open tobeing closed.

Chapter 8

The Third Section: ValuationAccording to the Activity's Factors.Valuative Values Directed at Abilities

People usually value various abilities and powers not only as a meansfor action, or as its precondition, but in many cases also as beingvaluable in their own right. That is to say, ability and power are values.The relatively large volume of an ability is a positive value-property ofthe person possessing that ability.

From the angle of ability valuation, neither a deed nor its resultpossess value themselves; they are valued positively or negativelyaccording to the ability they demonstrate. Here the presumably origi-nal and perhaps even most frequent valuative view is reversed.According to the reversal, the point and justification of the ability toact is neither the action nor its result, but the other way round: thevalue of both resides in that they bear witness to the ability, measure it,or even embody its objectification.

Consider the audience watching a sporting match and the mannerin which it usually values such an event. For example, they watch arunning contest and are glad to see that so far X is faster (so far as theyknow) than other runners. X has not been sent by them or by anyoneelse, nor will they derive any benefit from his skill. They do not be-


long to the circle of his friends either, nor will they share in the respecthe commands. They value X's running as an implementation of hisskill, they value X as the owner of this skill, and they value the skill asa skill.

The running contest is certainly accompanied by valuations of allother types. There is the aesthetic element concerning the style of run-ning, which is an ideal according to its figure, and belongs to the kindof beauty ideals. There is the sportive and amusing element, also anideal according to its figure. This element was more pronouncedbefore the advent of precision watches, before achievements in speedon different occasions could be compared, for instance, at subsequentOlympic Games. A t that time there was no room for competitiverunning of a single runner on the track. Runners needed each other forcomparison. Since the introduction of the stop-watch, other candidatesin the same contest are superfluous, and perhaps the same holds for allother contestants, because an athlete can contest his own achievementof the previous day. The sportive and amusing element prevailedprimarily among the contestants themselves.

Contestants and competition organizers share, of course, a numberof additional elements concerned with ends (income), but it seems thatthese would not exist, if the audience of a contest did not value it ac-cording to skill. To flesh the picture out one can mention additionalelements, like the inclination to the act of running itself which shows,for instance, in the pleasure the runner derives from it. It appears,however, that precisely the identification and pinning-down of allother values applied in competitive sports, emphasize the fact that theaudience values according to skill, i.e., makes the potential primaryand the action secondary, a measuring of the potential. Measuring apotential may, of course, be end-oriented, it may serve to plan the useof this potential; but here, with the audience watching a running con-test, it is not end-oriented.

Another example. Two people look at a drawing; one says: this is agifted droughts man; the other says: this is a handsome drawing.Perhaps the first sits on the committee that awards grants, perhaps hewishes to hint obliquely that the drawing is not handsome. If we as-sume that neither of these possibilities applies here, then the first oneadopts the viewpoint of a person watching a sports competition. Thesecond one is exclusively guided by aesthetic ideals.

Two individuals sat for an exam and were graded “very good.”One of them says that he did not prepare at all for the exam, becausehe had no time. The other one admits that he worked for the exam.What does the first one boast about? Obviously not his achievementbut his talent. The achievement alone, without the circumstances in

Valuative Values Directed at Abilities 169

which it was gained, does not demonstrate his talent sufficiently, so headds the circumstances: no preparatory work (in this vein one could, ofcourse, add impediments and difficulties which were overcome).

Chapter 9

Valuation of Humans. Emergence ofReflective Motives

There are special values, designed to value human beings. Thetypes of values we have so far discussed, are the matter from whichreason and imagination shape values that enable us to assess humanbeings. For example, reflection about the value type “end” yields thefollowing values: achiever, efficient, organized, disciplined, economi-cal and diligent. The fact that someone tries to show others that heenjoys life, indicates that to enjoy is a value-property, the owner of thisproperty is the owner of pleasures, or one who takes pleasure in life.Here we have a value that values human beings, made out of the type“need.” The value of being fastidious as well as the values ofpossessing a sense of humor or being sociable in general etc., arebased on the type “inclination.” The value “idealist” is based on theideal. The values of being a moral or immoral person, being responsi-ble, dignified, a hero, naive, cunning, possessing a strong will etc., arebased on reflection about motives and their shaping by the will.Valuation of ability yields the value successful, i.e., successful in acontest, and also talented, strong, possessing manual skills, intelligent,original, etc.

Values fit to value humans are, therefore, the product of reflectionby human beings about themselves in general, and about the valuesthey adhere to, in particular.


While values fit to value humans according to their content arebased on all other types of values, they resemble the ideal according totheir figure: a kind of comprehensive pattern equipped with touch-stones and yardsticks, first to examine the relation between variousactivities of a person, and then to examine the structure of personalitythrough this relation. The will, motives, ability, are examined throughthe mediation of acts of willing, motivations and various activities.

A value fit to value humans also resembles the ideal in that it is notgiven to people — they create it themselves.

Finally, this kind of value has an additional common characteristicwith the ideal, in that the adherence to such a valuative value gener-ates a new motive. The individual itself values not only others by thiskind of value, but also itself; he or she compares their self-image, whohe or she actually is, with the recommended pattern, with who theywish to be; he determines what within himself matches the pattern, andwhile doing so he feels self-satisfaction; but he also determines whathe finds wanting within himself and feels dissatisfied; this dis-satisfaction generates an aspiration to adjust to the recommendedmodel, namely, a new motive, the power of self-consciousness. Allmotives discussed so far were transitive, while a person's motive toadapt himself to an image is reflective.

Individual reflection sets its seal on a person's deeds and other ac-tions through its motives; it may encourage further action — for in-stance, the motive that joins the value “achiever” will encourage goal-oriented activity. The motive joining the value “owner of abilities”will generate training and competitions. However, individual reflectioncauses not only a quantitative addition of power, but frequently also achange in quality: The emphasis shifts from the issue to the subject,from the specific result to the subject achieving the result, theachiever; from the specific deed involving pleasure to the subjectbeing an owner of pleasures, from amusement and joking to hispossessing humor, from the ideal to his being an idealist, from duty tohis being responsible, reliable and moral, from the pleasant feeling ofstrength in an action to nurturing his strength for its own sake and tomeasuring it (not in the course of a game, not as a game, but to buildup support for his self-confidence).

A person assists someone else — an action which presents a num-ber of typological possibilities. He may do it to serve some end. Hemay be fond of the other person, or he may in general tend to comespontaneously to the rescue of someone in distress. He may do sobecause he believes this to be proper behavior, namely, he realizes anideal. The last case may involve reflection: He seeks to become a duti-ful person and he feels satisfaction not out of compassion, and not

Emergence of Reflective Motives 173

because a specific ideal has been realized, but because looking at him-self now, he feels gratified. This self-observation may occur in private,without to broadcast the good deed, but an individual may also requirethe reaction of another person in order to assess himself.

In typical competition, the decisive motive is reflective; namely, itarises from reflection about oneself. We have to distinguish betweentypical competition (which belongs to section C) and the activation ofpower, be it free or stylized activation (which belongs to section B) onone hand, and between typical competition and struggle (belonging tosection A) on the other hand. The word “competition” serves, for in-stance, to describe the relation between two people, selling identicalmerchandise at the same market, which is a kind of struggle, namely,end-oriented action. Our discussion, however, treats of competition ina very restricted sense; we discuss what we call typical competition. Itis not an end-oriented action, but a measure the competitor applies tohis strength and his talents. To what extent a game remains a stylizedactivation of power or skill or turns into typical competition, dependson the players' attitude.70

Other people serve a person as a mirror, to ask “is there anyonehandsomer than I, a greater achiever, a more respected individual” etc.Paradoxically a person sometimes loses his or her autarky or sover-eignty, precisely through their self-knowledge. The mirror tells them:“To become what you wish to be, you still lack this and that.” Forexample, the mirror reflects the absence of status symbols, thus caus-ing the observer to wear himself out in order to gain these. A young-ster wishing to be a proper man looks at someone else as a mirror anddiscovers that he lacks a motorcycle resembling a space ship, plus thematching suit and crash-helmet. Another example: In the past a do-mestic radio transmitter resembled a piece of furniture (and was evenconsidered elegant if a small sliding-screen covered the buttons andswitches, the glass panel and the metal parts); in time the mirror toldthe owner of this transmitter: to rule an electronic control center, to betechnologically powerful, your radio transmitter must show switchesand dials, buttons and measuring instruments. It turns out that goodsdo not anymore satisfy only or even mainly a need, but the wishes ofself-consciousness when it looks into the mirror; the instruments arenot anymore examined according to their usefulness, nor vehicles as ameans of transport, but according to their power to convince individualreflection that it may, indeed, feel pleased with itself. From hereonwards, prima facie, goods equal a self-image. By accepting the mir-rors dictate, the individual cancels its sovereignty.

When the reflective motive joins a motive belonging to anothertype, it changes the deed's quality, besides strengthening the heart and


adding power to this motive; this qualitative change is sometimesobvious and can be observed as the style of an activity and its objects.From this aspect style is a reflective residue, layering itself on top of aperson's world.

At the beginning of this part we discussed an axiological theorywhich claims that the valuative focus is not the issue at hand but theexperience enveloping or entertaining it; that is to say that only theexperience possesses value of its own and not what is being experi-enced. This theory is wrong with regard to the broad course of valua-tive experience to which original valuations belong, be they of feelingor conceptual, and to which actions whose motives are transitive be-long, i.e., actions directed from the subject to the object, and not backto the subject through the mediation of the object. Yet, once reflectivemotives enter the arena and overpower transitive motives, the realworld becomes a mediator between a person and himself. Even thesphere of ideas (in philosophy, science, art) may change: from being amatter on which a person focuses per se, the reference to this matterhas now become its focus and possesses value in its own right. Andsince the logic has been turned upside down, cases patterned on sub-jectivist axiological theory begin to occur: From now onwards thefocal point actually shifts to the place where according to this theory,it should have been from the outset. There is, perhaps, no need to saythat these cases do not constitute a confirmation of the theory.71

Self-valuation changes a person not only through special motivesthat arise from it, but also immediately, namely, its very presencecauses other factors within the individual to change.

Reflection bound up with self-valuation, which may lead to thecancellation of individual sovereignty, may do the same to spontaneityin action. Full spontaneity occurs in actions carried out for their ownsake, i.e., their motive belongs to section B and is directed at the actionitself (it occurs only to a much lesser degree in goal-oriented action).The spontaneity of an action for its own sake involves attention to thematter in hand and becomes flawed when attention is directed byreflection, whose aim is to convince itself that it has ground for self-satisfaction. Yet, valuative reflection may also reinforce sovereigntyand autarky, as well as remove obstacles from the path of spontaneousactivity.

A field of reflective emotions stretches over the area between theideal of the self, its application in self-valuation and the reflective mo-tive. The basic pair of reflective emotions (positive and negative) hasseveral grades. The first grade consists of confidence in one's ownstrength against the lack of such confidence. In the second grade wefind more saturated emotions (if one may put it this way): self-satis-

Emergence of Reflective Motives 175

faction (or conceit) against dissatisfaction with oneself. In the thirdgrade, self-consciousness achieves full emotional saturation: In prideor against it, in shame (which is perhaps, a kind of fear). The emotionsoverflow the banks of self-consciousness and flood its dams in thethird grade, namely, in arrogance (here the emotion gains its ownobjectifications) or against it, in depression (which paralyzes a person,as fear does to an animal which “feigns death,” in order to mislead thethreatening predator).

The higher the saturation grade of an emotion, the more changes itgenerates in the entire emotional system of the person who has thisemotion. First a change in grade; joy may increase when a person isglad that he is glad (he feels satisfaction because he is glad), or is sadbecause he is sad, or afraid of being afraid, or proud of his pride. Butthe grade may also change in the opposite direction, when a person isirritated with himself because he is irritated (angry with being angry)or because he is afraid. Qualitative changes may also occur in the envi-ronment of reflective emotions.

At a certain stage transitive emotions become fraught with a reflec-tive charge and lose something of their transitive character; throughthe emotions the same applies to thoughts whose form is emotional,until the core of a person's reference to his environment, namely histransitive stance, comes in a way to embody his reflection abouthimself.

In this manner a reflective value-deployment, or orientation,emerges. Value section C shifts to the center, while sections A and Bare marginalized. Within section C, values designed for self-valuationbecome the pivot on which everything turns. And indeed, it seems thata contingent of humans are made up according to this pattern.

Alternative orientations are transitive, i.e., objective: here the ob-ject is neither a mirror nor a instrument for measuring the self. Thereare two such orientations: (1) to section A, namely, the results of deeds(things and sets of issues), and (2) to the actions themselves. Theorientation to actions themselves seems also to be an orientation to thesubject (like reflective orientation), but in the course of an action theperson performing it is interested in the issue on hand and not inhimself, and the issue includes the action's object (be it an object ofconcept or an object of observation) In this respect orientation tosection B resembles orientation to section A, yet here the action is nota means, i.e. a part of the cause of what is desired, but has value in itsown right.

Whoever eats, thinking about health and vigor he wishes to gain byconsuming certain victuals, performs an action which apparentlybelongs to section B, but his orientation aims at the end. Whoever eats


expensive delicacies and indulges in showy consumption, may enjoythe self-satisfaction of feeling a king. His orientation is reflective.Reflective orientation may be compatible with actions of section A,because they lack spontaneity anyway (so far as they truly are ofsection A, and possess no elements of section B). On the other hand,reflective orientation does not go well together with actions of sectionB. That is to say, if reflective orientation were to be tried on section Bproper, it would diminish the section's original character.

An Outline of the Division

A remark in the margin of typological discourse: I do not believethat the division into sections and types enables us to capture andcharacterize all emotional values.72

I will now try to outline the division of values in a table (figure 1).

Sections and Types of Values

Section B Section C Valuation according to the action's result

Valuation according to the action itself

Valuation according to the action's factors

Section A

Values

end caution need inclination constraint ideal

Given values Constituted values

motive ability valuesvaluing valuing to valuevalues values humans

Figure 1

Chapter 10

The Typological Approach andReductionism

The approach I presented in this part is opposed to axiological reduc-tionism, which attempts to encapsulate all values in a single figure.Reductionism tries to present any variance or change as subordinate(or marginal) through which the common essence can be seen.Reductionism also claims a common measurability for all values, thusmaking all valuative problems soluble by measurement andcalculation. In addition to the general uniformity and measurability ofvalues, this approach considers them as being dictated to us, by ournature in one version, and by ideas existing per se in the other version.Reductionism does not view ideas as the creation of man.

The Utilitarians and Hobbes, Spinoza and Plato tried to implementthe reduction (its three characteristics, uniformity, measurability anddictate included), from various angles. I believe that these attempts,made by great thinkers, have failed, and that it is worthwhile to try thealternative, phenomenological typological way. The following partwill contribute to the presentation of an alternative for the two lastcharacteristics of reductionism.

From among the various directions of reductionism, contemporarysociety should in particular ponder the attempt to attach all values ofall types exclusively to the end. The reduction of duties to an end is


known in ethics as utilitarianism, and has been widely discussed. Ac-cordingly, we should here deal with the reduction of section B valuesto the end. Advocates of this reduction argue that enjoyable deeds,namely, deeds performed from need or inclination, are also merelymeans directed at an end, and their end is pleasure. There is no moreimportant task for typology, than to disentangle the threads of thisclaim, and to do so one should once again pay attention to the follow-ing points:

1. A realized end is a result of employed means, and follows themin time, while the pleasure from a pleasurable action is simultaneouswith it. (Another matter is that pleasure may stretch beyond the ac-tion's time span, if the valuations of the person performing the actionstretch beyond it; thus he enjoys himself prior to the action in its nar-row sense, as well as afterwards).

2. The realized end is alien to the action aimed at it and tied to itcausally according to the order prevailing in the world — a connectionwhose existence is known but not always comprehensible to us, be-cause it is not unfolded before our sight. In contradistinction, the con-nection between pleasure and the pleasurable action is subjective, ofcourse, felt by the subject, essential to him and not similar to the con-nection between the input and output of a black box.

3. Pleasure is specific to the pleasurable action. The word “pleas-ure” and its meaning belong to reflection and are the product of a gen-eralization which incorporates certain abstractions, while on the transi-tive level (the level reflection aims at) there is no single kind of pleas-ure. The end, on the other hand, does not require a specific deed as itsmeans. Different reasons may lead to the same result, and accordinglyan end may be achieved by different means. From the angle of the end,it does not matter which of these we choose, not the nature of the deedmatters, but only its result. (We will choose the most convenientmeans from among those we know, and we will exchange it for an-other, once we know more about the issue). However, the person seek-ing pleasure (on the original, transitive level) seeks a specific pleasure,and this can be gained only from a specific deed (of one kind). He isnot prepared to exchange it for another pleasure he himself feels attimes, and certainly not for a great pleasure people with utterly differ-ent inclinations seek or experience. We will return to this matter be-low, in Part IV, when we discuss the attempt to derive non-given val-ues from given values.

4. The doer does not seek pleasure at all while he himself and hisdeed remain on the original, transitive level, because his attention is onthe issue. With this formulation I am trying to hone in a slightlyparadoxical manner something that needs clarification: the doer of the

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deed does not seek pleasure, even not the specific pleasure, but seeksthe deed (or the action), and precisely because this is so, he can feelpleasure (original, transitive pleasure). An intense, profound and fruit-ful conversation about a theoretical topic may be pleasurable, it arisesfrom an inclination to seek theoretical comprehension, yet the peopleconducting it do not seek pleasure, but the theoretical discourse and theunderstanding that attract them. One could also say: If they conductedthe conversation with an eye on pleasure (which sounds rather absurdhere), they would not enjoy it. A person reading a poem may enjoy it,but his motive is the poem's attraction, if he has read it before, or thatof the particular poet. People of reflective orientation (on the valuativelevel itself) may try to imitate the original transitive action in order toextract pleasure from it, but it is reasonable to assume that if theyenjoy it, it is not the pleasure they initially sought. To seek pleasure isa quest of reflection, and this pleasure has lost its specificity.

Some of Antisthenes' statements lend themselves to the followinginterpretation: He used to drink wine only when he thirsted for wine,and water when he thirsted for water. He tries to remove the residuereflection and civilization have deposited on his inclinations andneeds, and on the inclination and needs of his peers. Antisthenes be-lieved that many needs of the latter were not properly diagnosed, thatthey exceeded their original limits and caused an unnecessary depend-ence on great quantities of goods, and on unnecessarily expensivegoods. By internal listening to his needs, he succeeds in becomingaware of his needs' original range and their specific quality.73

Among the actions belonging to section B, the deed motivated byconstraint comes close to end-orientation by its vagueness, or the ab-sence of specificity from the deed itself (above, in chapter 5 of thispart, I clarified my use of “constraint”), and it is more convenient forthe axiological school that aims at reduction to the end, than deedsmotivated by inclination or need. One may describe the relief felt by aperson performing the constraint-impelled deed, as if it were the deed'send. This description does not fit the action, but it distorts the truth lessthan reduction to an end of those values in section B, whose positivebranch is full and whose motive is attraction (and not an urge to escapefrom something). Accordingly, the reductionist axiologist describingan action motivated by need, whose character is two-fold (as bothbranches are full), stresses the aspect that resembles constraint, thewish to escape distress: a very hungry person is not particular withregard to the specificity of his food.

PART III

The Relative Weight ofValues and Conflicts

between them

Chapter 1

Measuring Values

The Platonic Theory of Measurement

In the Protagoras dialogue Socrates claims, that there is a commonmeasure for all that is good or bad; thus one cannot only state that thisaction is better than that action, but also that A is good to a higherdegree than B is bad, and that it is therefore worthwhile to suffer B inorder to gain A; to wit, we can compare the absolute numeric values ofgood and bad.

Socrates disputes the popular opinion that there are people whoknow what is good, but do what is bad because they give in to theirpleasures. For instance, a person who drinks to excess even though heknows it to be wrong, or one who shuns painful medical treatment,even though he knows that he needs it. The pleasures are good as suchand are said to be bad only because the deed they involve, like exces-sive drinking, is bound to cause suffering in the future. Pain is bad assuch and is said to be good only because the deed it involves, likemedical treatment, is bound to produce pleasure or pleasantness in thefuture.

However, Socrates argues that the person who seems to do wrongbecause he yields to pleasures, in truth does not exactly know what isgood, namely what is better and what is worse, what is the greater andwhat the lesser evil, nor does he compare good and bad correctly. Nev-


ertheless, whoever does wrong, does not claim that it is good, or thatgood is bad; he errs with regard to their absolute numeric values, andnot with regard to the previous mark, concerning plus and minus. Theheavy drinker errs because he does not know how to measure good andbad, he has not mastered the theory of measurement. Measuring errorsarise because what is remote in time looks smaller to us, in the samemanner in which what is remote in space looks smaller than it actuallyis; the drunk assesses his future suffering as less than it will be.

What is true for the individual also holds for society. From otherdialogues we learn that the person doing a wrong to another is like thedrunk who injures himself, he lacks knowledge of the degrees and pro-portions of value-properties. For example, we should not say of aniniquitous tyrant that he acts for his own good and dispenses iniquityto others, because he does himself greater wrong than good.

Plato believes that correct measuring provides the key to the solu-tion of all human problems. The same outlook is presented in a num-ber of variations by scholars of later periods.

Here some critical considerations are required.1. Plato did not show (nor did other disciples of the theory of

measurement) how to compare pleasures that differ in quality (for in-stance, how do we determine that the pleasure in reading a beautifulpoem equals four units, while the pleasure in consuming good ice-cream equals three units, or vice versa). He did not explain either howto compare different kinds of suffering.

2. It is doubtful whether pleasure and pain set each other off ingeneral. Is there no valuative difference between the life of a personwho suffered a great deal and enjoyed many pleasures and that of aperson who suffered little and enjoyed few pleasures? According toPlato — as application of the measurement theory ordains — there isno difference between them. One person sought adventure, wandered agreat deal, bore hardships and fears but found great interest in what hediscovered. Another one lived in comfort, suffered very little, butfound little stimulation in his surroundings. Once the good and badexperiences of these two have been set off against each other, we findthat according to the measurement theory their state is equal. Yet, isthis really true? How did the multiple shades of sorrow and joy theadventure seeker experienced, disappear?74 Is there no dimension ofqualitative depth — a blind spot for the theory of measurement —which foils this setting-off of joy against sorrow? Let us take anotherexample. One person is often sad, because he or she feels compassionwith the sorrow of others. However, they also gain much joy whentaking part in the joy of other people. Someone else is indifferent toothers — is their state truly equal? When asked whose fate, among

Measuring Values 185

these two, we would prefer, we have to take a valuative decision, andit turns out that the difference between the two is valuative. If valueswere spread out only in the positive-negative dimension, a commondenominator (i.e., common measurements) should exist as well as thepossibility of a counterbalance. But most values are not one-dimen-sional. The dimension of valuative depth, the dimension of whatmoves emotionally and what calms incorporate additional differences,some of them qualitative, and cannot be set off against each other.Indeed, in a number of cases, mainly in the sphere of goal-orientation,people behave as if there were such a counterbalancing. Yet, it is notreasonable to assume that every negative value may in someclearinghouse set off every positive value.

3. The theory of measurement presupposes that a valuativeinterest-rate of zero is the correct rate. Is this fixation not arbitrary? Ifail to see a single weighty argument favoring a zero interest rate, orfavoring any other interest rate. For numerous people the interest ratefluctuates. It is doubtful whether anyone actually holds to a zerointerest rate.75

4. The theory of measurement should be examined according to thedistinction between the valuative and the meta-valuative level. Appar-ently Plato may be understood in two ways (a and b). According to ahe claims that the measurement theory (including the counter-balanc-ing and the zero interest rate) is accepted by humans, but they fail inits application and interpret this failure wrongly. Instead of interpretingit as a lack of sufficient knowledge with regard to measuring, theyinterpret it as the surrender to pleasures. Understood in this way,Plato's claim refers to facts (in the sphere of adherence to values), andis meta-valuative (meta-ethical). According to b he recommends thetheory of measurement, but does not claim that everyone agrees withhim.

With regard to the claim arising from A, it is obvious that peopledo not, in general, adhere to a zero interest rate. Regarding the recom-mendation in B, it can be viewed as a legitimate suggestion of valuefrom among a variety of suggestions; as one approach among a seriesof possible alternative approaches from which we can choose, once ameasuring-instrument is presented to us.

Measuring Valuative Values

More than anything we need measurements of valuative values. Ifwe could measure them, we would gain an excellent guide for our life:we could find out what is better or less bad, chose them and try toarrange motivative values accordingly.


However, it is doubtful whether there is anything else so far out ofour reach. From Plato to the present day scholars voiced the need for atheory of measurement, but none pointed to a way to carry out suchmeasuring.

Even though in practice comparison, measuring and grading takeplace in the sphere of valuative values, these are never general; theyare not valid with regard to all values or all value-properties.Differences in quality between valuative values are so great that nocommon denominator for all quantitative propositions exists; we haveno way to compare the value of things with the value of actions andeven within each of these secondary spheres, there is no denominatorsuitable for all values they encompass. For example, how do wecompare the beauty of one thing with the benefit derived from anotherthing?

Here one could ask whether there are no situations in which a per-son has to choose between a beautiful and a useful thing, and whetherin such a case he or she would not compare the two.

Measuring by Means of Decisions

Motivative values may be measured by competition between them.The result of a competition tells us that a certain motive is strongerthan its rival. The motive measured in this manner has already beenshaped quantitatively and qualitatively by the will. The competitionleads to a deed and to be precise, this deed is not always in accordancewith a volition, i.e., the will's resolution: a person may, for instance,keep smoking or drinking excessively against his will. However, inorder to discuss the measuring of motives (and subsequently the issueof an exchange rate and of money), we will simplify the picture andlook at the outcome of the strife of motives as if it were identical withvolition. In this discussion, we therefore refer to the volition as if itwere final on one hand, and as if it measured the relative weight ofmotives (without influencing this weight!). In Chapter 9 of this part wewill drop this assumption (presented in order to simplify the dis-cussion) and discuss struggles between the will and motives. Here weassume that if a person decides to execute deed A and not the alterna-tive deed B and acts accordingly, this is a sign that the motive to do A(or to attain its result) is stronger than the motive to do B (or attain itsresult), for this person at this time (namely, within the complex set ofcircumstances prevailing at the time the deed is carried out). The sameholds for the choice someone made of the beautiful and not the usefulthing; this choice bears evidence of the relative weight of his motives

Measuring Values 187

at that time, and not of the relation between valuative values thisperson adheres to, or between the value-properties of this beauty orthat usefulness, as they reveal themselves to the same person.

In the sphere of motives, we have therefore a yardstick we lack inthe sphere of valuative values. And let us understand this yardstick inits broad sense, so that it also pertains to cases in which we are un-aware of a struggle between motives. Thus, a decision to carry out anunpleasant deed will also count as a yardstick for motives, even if itwas not preceded by an open struggle between the motives involved,because such a decision is a sign that a positive motive has overcome anegative motive.

As mentioned above, a positive motive is the quest for a certainobject, namely an action or a thing; a negative motive is a quest for theabsence of a certain object, for avoiding it, for the arrest of an ongoingaction, without including the affirmation of some alternative. In otherwords: The negative valuative value that matches the negative motive,is full. Let us take an action as example. X hates to correct exampapers. The valuative value “checking exam papers” is full in itsnegative segment, because this segment refers to the action, the object,and not to the absence of something; the positive segment of thisvaluative value is empty, because the absence of the hated action isapproved (its avoidance or arrest). The aspiration to avoid checkingexam papers or to cut it short belongs to the realm of motives and welabel this motive as “negative', because it does not include any af-firmation, namely the seeking of a specific alternative, even though itjoins various positive motives, directed at some alternatives to thehated action.

When a positive motive (A1) to achieve a goal (B 1) meets the op-position of a negative motive (C) to the goal-oriented action (lazinessmay serve as an example of a negative motive), and the positive mo-tive overcomes the opposition, this testifies to its strength. And ifanother positive motive (A2) to achieve a different goal (B2) meets thesame opposition (C) and fails to overcome it, we conclude that motiveA1 is in the given circumstances stronger than motive A2.

Negative motives of opposition to unpleasant tasks belong to thesame kind; qualitatively they have some common elements and there-fore common measurability; measuring them is relatively easy and theresolution is therefore made without much agonizing.

We measure positive motives directed at goal-oriented activities bymeans of negative motives. However, can we go beyond this point? Inthe field of motives one may sometimes exceed boundaries and com-pare a goal-oriented motive with a motive of another kind, but thesphere of valuative values is out of reach. Valuative values cannot be


compared by analogy with motives. One should not say: Valuativevalue A is superior to valuative value B, because the motive aimed at Ais stronger than that aimed at B. This would be wrong in the first placeand mainly because valuative and motivative values are, so to say,made up by different metaphysical matter (to employ Leibniz'slanguage), but also because the measuring of motives gives theirstrength at a certain point in time only. And as the weight of a valua-tive value cannot be derived from the strength of a motive, thus themotive's strength cannot inform us with regard to the “biological bene-fit” the organism gains from various objects. For this purpose, the pre-determined harmony revealed in our world is not sufficient. Not everyunhealthy dish has a bad taste and thus engenders a negative motive.

We should note that measuring through a resolution of the will (ora decision) which is realized, measures facts and not what ought tooccur; it tells what someone actually prefers, or what a certain groupof people prefer in their deeds and in fact; it does not tell what ought tobe preferred, it is meta-valuative and not valuative. A human beingcould be a more rational creature, if he or she could first measure rele-vant value-properties and decide afterwards.

Chapter 2

Money

Money is said to have no smell. In itself neither enjoyable nor un-pleasant, it can be good or bad only indirectly through its results, orthe results of its use. But the scope of its use is wider than that ofanything else. Thus, money is only a means, but a possible means toevery end. It can serve a certain objective as well as its opposite, whileother means serve specific ends. The value of money is limited only inquantity; one inquires after its quantity, not its quality (the exception tothis rule being the question concerning currency-stability). Money isthe means par excellence.

Among kinds of money, paper currency and bank money (demanddeposits) are typical. Other assets that served as money, like gold,silver, cattle, sheep or shells are also commodities. Being not onlymeans but also ends, they have a double nature. Commodities are ends,while typical money is a means only. Money which one can also eat oruse as an adornment is primitive. Typical forms of money appearedlate in history, only after the shortcomings of its primitive forms hadbecome obvious. The theory that money is a commodity wasrepresented by Karl Marx, but the development of money pointed inanother direction. Here also development moved towards specializa-tion, towards separation of money from commodities. Typical moneyis also not a representative of a certain commodity like gold, though itassumed also this figure.


In its more developed figures money is a kind of ownership certifi-cate for part of society's property, but not for a specific, physical part.

The very existence of a universal means is an embodiment of goal-orientation, an embodiment of what is typical for values which can berealized by employing means. It assumes its typical and unadulteratedform in goal-oriented society.

Money as a Cognitive Medium

As a yardstick, money is meant to measure means. Whatever themeasuring-instrument, it only measures items of its own kind. Any-thing measuring length has to possess length, anything measuringweight has to possess weight, and so on. Money, which in its typicalform is only a means, measures only means.

What is the common quality of all means which is the substancemeasured by money? For comparison: Should we ask about the com-mon quality of whatever is measured in meters, the answer would belength. The common quality we find in means is their valuative nega-tivity, namely, whatever only aims at an end and is not identical withit, involves a sacrifice in order to achieve the end. The sacrifice is anon-pleasurable effort, or suffering, or forgoing pleasurable things oractions. Instead of making one of these sacrifices, one can pay money;money is the universal, cumulative representative of sacrifices madefor the sake of ends, and it is the instrument that measures them.

Money measures an end only through the mediation of its means.When an end is measured by money, the resources invested are beingmeasured, or rather, the resources that should be invested now in orderto achieve this end. Measuring the end does not represent additionaluse of money, but is in a certain sense a reduction of the end itself tothe status of a means.

The relation between prices, namely, between the financial sacri-fices necessary to acquire goods on the market, is basically the relationbetween the sacrifices made before the goods came to the market, i.e.,the relation between non-financial sacrifices. These sacrifices are whatnature demands from us: to pay by means of labor.

Labor also serves as money. It is the original form of money. “La-bor was the initial price, the original purchase-money, paid for allthings,” says Adam Smith.76 By work, a human being buys his or herproducts from nature. Nature is the ultimate salesperson; it determinesprice tariffs according to the prevailing level of technology. It imposesits own minimum demand as the maximum tariff on all other sellers —

Money 191

compulsion by means of competition, because whoever can buycheaply from nature, will not buy dearly from another seller.

Supply and demand influence the price paid in labor, as they influ-ence market prices.

The supply mentioned here is basically the table of tariffs nature— following Adam Smith's parable — imposed for a certain producton a certain technological level; to wit: if you demand X quantity ofthis product, its price in labor will be so many hours; should you needa greater quantity, you will probably have to pay for each of the addi-tional units with more labor than for the previous units. For instance, agreater annual amount of wheat is needed so that farmers will have tocultivate poorer soil, which requires greater effort.

The demand discussed here is the readiness to invest efforts andtake trouble for an additional unit of the desired product. An additionalunit brings the point of repletion or saturation nearer. As we comecloser to this point, the readiness to sacrifice diminishes.

As nature demands progressively more, when the desired quantityof a product increases, and the human being is less and less ready toinvest effort, so even if humans were initially prepared to sacrificemore than actually required, we will usually arrive at a point wherethe minimum sacrifice demanded by nature, equals the maximum hu-mans are prepared to give; this point will designate the actual amountproduced and the actual price.

The significance of this topic is not just technical, it embraces aprinciple. So far as the sacrifice people actually make for a unit of acertain product is also the maximum they are prepared to give for it(under current circumstances and taking into account the actually pro-duced quantity of the item in question), the relation between the sacri-fices made for two products, A and B, also represents the proportion ofreadiness to make a sacrifice for A, to the readiness to do so for B.The relationship between the instances of readiness to make sacrificesfor two products expresses the relationship between the powers ofmotivative values, but only on the basis of a very complex set of cir-cumstances. The relation between these instances of readiness does notmake up the relation between the powers of motives. A person's readi-ness to sacrifice for a unit of product A will change once he has gainedan additional unit of A, while the motive's power is not altered by thischange in readiness. The same power of a motive determines differentdegrees of readiness to sacrifice under different circumstances; the dif-ference in circumstances also includes differences in quantity of theproduct in question (namely, in the amount already gained, to whichwe add a unit). The readiness to sacrifice is a point in the curve of themotive's power.


The following arises from this reservation: Although the power ofthe motive determines the price of a commodity (when nature's tariff-table is given), money is not a yardstick which enables us to saywithout reservation: the motive aimed at end A is stronger than themotive aimed at end B (or: the motive aimed at a unit of A is strongerthan the motive aimed at a unit of B).

To sum up: 1. Money measures motivative and not valuative val-ues; 2. Money measures motives directed at an end and not those in-volved in a positive value of an action itself (i.e., without taking itsresults into account); 3. Money measures the marginal power of a mo-tive, namely, the readiness to make sacrifices.

Regarding points 1 and 2: There is nothing in the entire realm ofvalues so convenient to measure like the motive for an unpleasant ac-tion. Near the area of these motives there is the field of motives forpleasant actions on one hand, and on the other hand the field of valua-tive values. Neither of these is measurable to the same degree, and inany case, they do not show a broad common measurability even withineach of these fields.

The motive is more measurable than the valuative value because itis measured by the will's arbitration between different motives, i.e.,through the act of choosing the motive to be preferred. The resolutionor the choice are the scales that weigh values, but they cannot help usin weighing valuative values. One could argue the comparison ofvaluative values by analogy to the motives attached to them. If motivesA2 and B2 are attached to valuative values A1 and B1, a decisionfavoring A2 shows, on the face of it, a resolution on valuative valuesfavoring A 1. However, the specific valuative values which lend them-selves more or less to quantitative comparison with each other, fail toconfirm the analogy. In the case of those needs that are satisfied byproducts of labor i.e., of goal-oriented activity, it may happen that theconsumption of a product which requires great sacrifice involves lesspleasure than consumption of something attained without such sacri-fice. Pleasure is a valuation and it cannot be measured by the sacri-fices made to attain the pleasurable object, while the motive can bemeasured in this manner.

In its ordinary use, the word “useful” designates a valuation. Ac-cordingly, “usefulness” or “utility” designate a valuative value. How-ever, economists since Alfred Marshal apply the word “utility” to des-ignate that which they measure by the willingness to pay. “Utility istaken to be correlative to Desire or Want.”77 Practically it is the sameas the power of a motivative value.

The motive for an unpleasant action is more measurable than themotive for a pleasant one because a decision is needed to carry out the

Money 193

unpleasant action, it is necessary to overcome opposing motives,which is not the case with regard to pleasant deeds. The will's arbitra-tion at the beginning of the deed and the overcoming of opposition inits course, serve as a measuring tool. But, a deed which requires noovercoming of obstacles does not involve a measuring of values.

Is measurability of values extended beyond the sphere of ends andmeans? Values which are not ends themselves but dictate ends as aprecondition for their realization, may prima facie be compared by aidof the ends they dictate. However, we have already discussed the satis-faction of needs by goods achieved through the use of means. Rejec-tion of the quantitative analogy between valuative and motivative val-ues leads to rejection of the analogy between the weight of an end-dic-tating value and the relative weight of the end it dictates. An idealdictating ends which are hard to achieve, does not play a greater role inthe life of a person who adheres to it than an ideal which does notdictate ends at all.

If money does not measure valuative values, it certainly does notmeasure value-properties of objects. As with the power of a motive, avaluation may also be marginal, for instance, an additional unit may bevalued less than previous units of the same kind, and this does notapply to value-properties. Needless to say that money does not meas-ure non-valuative properties of an object. Accordingly, properties ofthings and actions are not measured by money. The motive for an ac-tion to acquire a house (to build it or raise money to buy it) cannot beviewed as a property of the house. The price of a house does thereforenot express any property of this house. One may, of course, view theprice itself as a property of the house in the same sense that any rela-tionship an object occupies at some point in time, can be called “aproperty of this object at that point in time,” but this is only a mannerof speech. In any case, the semblance as if the price expressed the na-ture of the thing so priced is misleading.

From the general to the particular: In the same way that the pricedoes not express any property of what is sold, we must emphasize thatit neither expresses the latter's property to give pleasure. There is nodoubt a link between the pleasure derived from a thing and the factthat one is prepared to pay for it; there may even be a link between theintensity of pleasure involved in consuming some product, and thepower of the motive represented by its price. This intensity may beamong the factors influencing the power of the motive, which throughits mediation influence the price. But there may be an altogether non-pleasurable thing which has a price because it is, useful as a tool, andsomething else may be pleasurable but have no price, because it can begained without sacrifice.


I have now to point out some of the reservations applying to thisdiscussion, and will first mention two reservations concerning thequantitative propositions in this chapter.

First: we spoke, according to Adam Smith's metaphor, of purchas-ing from nature. Yet, until a product reaches the consumer, the pricecollected by nature is inflated by additional payments, demanded bythe social system. These additions may not stand in the same relationto each other as that which prevails between the prices nature collects.The most typical among this kind of additions arise from violence orpolitics, for example, the toll collected by a feudal lord from peoplewho cross a bridge held by his villeins, or the addition to the price of anatural substance like petroleum, collected by an association thatdominates its sources. These additions include custom duties andindirect taxes.

However, beyond these arbitrary additions there are others, for theeffort involved, directly or indirectly, in organizing the division oflabor. On account of arbitrary and organizational cum economic addi-tions, the relation between market prices is not congruent with therelation between the amounts of labor demanded by nature for the pro-duction of goods.

Second: what was said so far in this chapter referred directly to du-plicable products, namely, those of which multiple copies can bemade. However, the proposition that prices express the power of mo-tives, holds also for non-duplicable goods.

I do not deal with the details of quantitative qualifications becauseour aim is to clarify the relationship between the notion of value ineconomic life and the entire realm of values. Regarding this relation-ship one other point should be clarified: the additional role money hasacquired over recent generations. Before we present this role, we willdescribe its background.

Money as a Valuative Medium

Modern industrial society tends to excessive goal-orientation. Thisorientation shows in that everything is regularly measured by moneyand exchanged for money; accordingly, values which are not ends losetheir specifity in contradistinction to the end and even appear to as-similate in the sphere of ends; finally, this goal-orientation shows inthat, prima facie, the difference between ends and means tends to dis-appear. The hoarding of means, which in the form of money can beconveniently hoarded, becomes an independent end. Accordingly, endsthemselves appear as if they were accumulated means.

Money 195

From this point onwards a person also assesses in terms of moneygoods, in particular durable goods, kept for his own consumption, andnot only goods he offers for sale.

The difference between the pleasant and the useful is now hidden;not because the useful looks as if it were pleasant, but because peopletreat what is pleasant in a frame of reference appropriate to what isuseful as a means to an end.

All colors in the realm of values fade and do not differ much fromend-oriented grayness. Differences in quality become blurred.

Under these circumstances money assumes a new role. For the in-dividual it changes progressively from a yardstick that measuresvalues post factum, to a builder's-measure for values, participating intheir construction, from a picture of other people's motivative values tothe plotting of the alignment of his own, from a regulator of relationsbetween humans (in which it has already acquired an almost exclusiveposition), to a regulator of relations between the individual and him orherself, namely, between his or her different wishes. Money began itsitinerary as information for the individual about the rest of humans,neutral information to be taken into account while regulating one'srelations with them; it ends its journey as a dictate or a norm, shapingthe individual self.

In its normative role, money determines the relative weight of theindividual's motives (or participates in its determination). Whether, orhow far, money has actually gone through this paradoxical transforma-tion, to what degree it now produces what it was meant to depict, I donot know.

Money fulfills its first normative role when it measures efficiency.Efficiency is a matter of means. We will say a means is efficient if it iseffective (yields results of satisfactory quality), and economical(namely, it does not involve wasting time and other resources). Ameans is more efficient than another one, for instance, when their re-sult is the same, but one is more economical. However, when theproducts of goal-oriented deeds differ in quality, the efficiency ofthese deeds can only be compared by way of money and by means ofprofitability; the comparison is accurate as far as the market in which ittakes place is a free market (i.e., operating without monopolies andwithout violent intervention, be it legal or illegal). And as the efficientdeed is preferable to the non-efficient, it is feasible that precisely in itsrole as a measure of efficiency money began to strengthen its norma-tive role, i.e., forming motives while measuring them, and thus led toits paradoxical metamorphosis.

Money — paradoxically transformed — served as evidence for theopinion that means tend in general to become ends, or in a different


version: What was only a means for a long time acquires, by virtue ofhabit, the status of something desired in its own right.78 In its simpleform this opinion is unacceptable, because no one is likely to becomefond of every thing or every action. Drawn out repetition may evenhave the opposite result: something with no value-quality or evenpleasant may become loathsome. In my opinion, something may be-come desirable in its own right, when it was not only a means, but hadadditional characteristics already from the outset. A wealthy person,for example, does not only possess purchasing power; he is respectedand he enjoys the respect people feel for him; from this angle moneyawards pleasure even if one does not buy anything with it.

The paradoxical transformation of money has the following princi-pal aspect. The acceptance of a message formulated in terms of moneyas a valuative value establishes an order of priorities of motives as anorder of preference of valuative values. It is an adjustment of thevaluative to the motivative value, a preference of motives overvaluative values

Chapter 3

The Rate of Value Realization andValuative Grading

The Profile of a Valuative Value

Although different values are not commensurable, it seems thateach one of them has a quantitative aspect, namely, beyond its divisioninto good and bad it also divides into better and less good, into worseand less bad. A value contains an ideal possibility to be realized on ascale, i.e., that one of its realizations will be suitable for quantitativecomparison with other realizations of the same value; it also contains ademand to be completed by a scale, by a real measuring-rodpossessing a zero point and notches which mark degrees of good alongone side, and degrees of bad along the other side of zero. This demandmay be met only in part: there may be a scale without a zero point , butwith a positive and a negative direction and a comparison betweenbetter which is also less bad, and worse, which is also less good. Thescale or measuring-rod may consist of several objects which serve asnotches. When I say that Mr. X is as diligent as Mr. A, determiningX's rate of diligence by this comparison, then A serves as a notch onthe yardstick of value “diligence.”

When Nicolai Hartmann discusses the intermediate-virtue andAristotle's concept of mesotes, he describes (following an author


named M. v. Kohoutek) the realization of a value by means of a curvewithin a space defined by a set of axes; the horizontal axis is consid-ered ontological, designating units of value-matter, or the value-bearer,or the valuable object, while the vertical axis is considered axiological,designating the rate of the value.

The graphic description serving axiologists resembles the one usedby economists. We will now look at some examples of values pos-sessing different structures, by means of their graphic description.

rate of value

value-bearer

value A

Figure 2

The description of some value A (see fig. 2) as a straight lineclimbing up to the right (as shown above) claims a constant relationbetween the bearer of value A and the rate of this value. The pointwhere the value curve crosses the horizontal axis (point X 1), shows therequired minimum for the value-bearer; if we replace A by wisdom wereceive the version that whoever expands his wisdom increases hisown value, and that there is a minimum of wisdom a human beingneeds.

We will now turn to another example, value B. The value a personattaches to whatever can be bought for money, i.e., his or her attitudeto money and assets, can be described by a curve. We will compare theposition of two people (figure 3).

A attaches a constant value to money: should he gain assets in ad-dition to those he has, he would not take less pleasure in the new assetsthan he took in the previous ones. B, on the other hand, attaches a

The Rate of Value Realization and Value Grading 199

decreasing value to additional money, so that the rate of the positivevalue regarding the entire matter of money or assets remains for himbelow a certain limit (upper barrier).

rate of value position ofperson A

assets (neto)debts (neto)

position of person B

Figure 3Value C. Values A and B (figures 2 and 3) had a fixed direction

(climbing from left to right). However, there are values without a fixeddirection: their curve ascends in one section and descends in another.

Let us examine a convex curve, looked at from above, like the fol-lowing (figure 4):

rate ofvalue

value-bearer

Figure 4This curve represents a value constructed as a golden mean be-

tween two extreme, bad ways. It may, for instance, present an educa-


tional conception, the horizontal axis describing to what degree theeducator intervenes in the life of his ward. To the right of the axesintersection we find increasing intervention. To the left of the axesintersection we have events of increasing importance in the ward's life,with no intervention by the educator. The opinion expressed by thisupwards arching curve says that intervention is good, that there is acorrect degree of intervention (point X2), and that one should bewareof too much or too little intervention. (X1 and X3 show the minimumand maximum of appropriate educational intervention). The readerwill find discussion of values belonging to this group in Aristotle's andNicolai Hartmann's work.

Figure 5

Value D. A concave curve (looked at from above). This curve(figure 5) expresses an opinion saying that one should get away from acertain critical point . For example, a Machiavellian position on meansof oppression a ruler may use against an unsympathetic populationwould argue that the ruler should be wary of employing X 2 oppressivemeans because this amount is insufficient as a deterrent fordisobedience, but quite sufficient to irritate the population and make itrestive. The ruler has to choose between two good options (less thanX1 or more than X3), and avoid the middle way.

Curves help us to show the profile of a value, i.e., its structurefrom a quantitative angle, and we can compare the profiles of two val-ues. In this manner one can first of all compare two values with the


same name which answer the same question, like two different ap-proaches to education or two conceptions of the value of assets as pre-sented above, in the example of value B. In this case the conceptions(i.e., the values) are compared by means of curves drawn on the sameset of axes.

Values which do not answer the same question can usually not bedrawn on the same set of axes; nevertheless graphic description en-ables us to compare them, for instance, as straight, convex or concaveetc.

Comparison of Values According to Height andStrength

The height of a value represents the character of its positive sec-tion. A value is higher the more we value and praise its realization.Someone who risks his life to save another from drowning winsgreater acclaim than a person who helps another without risk to him-self and without really sacrificing anything. Accordingly, the valuerealized by the person who saved the drowning one, is said to be high.

The strength of a value represents the character of its negative sec-tion. A value is stronger the more we blame the person who fails torealize it, or violates it. Not to murder is a stronger value than not tosteal.

Nicolai Hartmann, who first made this distinction, claims that inthe sphere of ethics a value's height stands in inverse proportion to itsstrength, and he presents many reasons for this claim.79 As an exampleof a high value we brought the rescue of another, involving risk tooneself; we now ask whether this value is strong, namely, whether wewould strongly condemn someone who hesitates to rush into a fire orjump into stormy, ice-cold waters; it seems that the answer will benegative, namely, that this high value is weak. Avoidance of murderwas our example for a strong value; we now ask whether it is high,whether it accords great honor to a person if one says that he is not amurderer; from the obviously negative answer we learn that this strongvalue is low. Another example: heroism is a high value, but whoeverdoes not show himself a hero is not much censured. The value is weak.Nicolai Hartmann views values as arranged in tiers: strong values inthe lower tier carry the weak, higher values. This stratification tallieswith Hartmann's ontological theory about the stratification of reality.

Graphically height means that the curve describing the valueclimbs steeply beyond the point where it crosses the horizontal axis


(from below). It may, for instance, almost overlap with a parallel to thevertical axis in a certain section of it. Strength is graphically shown inthat the curve drops steeply beyond the point where it crosses thehorizontal axis (from above). It may, for instance, almost overlap witha parallel to the vertical axis in a certain section. Hartmann's claim willbe graphically expressed in that a value-curve which is steep on theupper half of the plane will continue flat on the lower half, and a curvethat is steep on the lower half, will continue flat on the upper half.

Comparison of value-profiles with regard to height or strength isdifficult in most cases, because the steepness depends on the manner inwhich the horizontal axis, representing value-matter, is arranged. Tocompare two values they must a) both have the same value-matter andb) the scale has to be the same. As the first condition is usually metonly when the two values are two different answers to the same ques-tion and have the same name, the exact comparison according toheight and strength refers to a comparison of different opinions on thesame matter; in other cases, however, gradation according to heightand strength is a matter of feeling and perspicacity.

Determining the proportion in which the curve in the upper half ofthe space stands to that in the lower half could perhaps replace a com-mon value-matter as a basis for comparison, because prima facie wecould compare this proportion in different values. But here a difficultysurfaces, because when a section of a value is empty it has no value-matter: Whoever avoids a deed altogether, does not avoid it more orless. If however, for the sake of description, we add a measuring-in-strument for avoidance (for instance, the length of time spent, or thesize of the sacrifice made by avoiding this deed), the instrument willnot be common, i.e., it will not be relevant for the full section.

Hartmann takes his examples from values possessing only one fullsection, which is the section described by a steep curve: The high val-ues are full in their positive and the strong ones in their negative sec-tion. Here, an argument against Hartmann could come to mind: Shouldwe join two values possessing one full section so that theycomplement each other and become a value which is full in both sec-tions (when proximity or similarity of the value-matter permit it), wecan achieve a high and strong value. For example, we join the avoid-ance of murder and saving a life, thus achieving the value “humanlife” — which will be strong and high at once.

I believe Hartmann would have replied as following: The value“human life” as a single value precedes ethics, it is in itself a basicvalue; ethics takes it as matter from which it constructs the two valuesin question. Hartmann would justify the separation of the two empiri-cally, basing it on prevailing custom of valuation.


Hartmann's rule about inverse proportion of height and strength isrelevant to ideals and duties. Beyond this sphere it has no clear mean-ing. If we try to examine this rule in its application to non-ethicalideals, a comparison between the aesthetic and the ethical comes to thefore. There are axiological reasons to consider the aesthetic as higherthan the ethical value (for instance, the acclaim of a paragon artist ex-ceeds the acclaim of someone who fulfills all his duties), and there isno doubt that it is weaker than the ethical.

When we value motives aimed at fulfilling a duty according toheight and strength, the risk consciously run by whoever fulfills hisduty becomes relevant, as does the general readiness to make sacri-fices. We have already met this readiness as an exchange regulator,while searching for factors that determine valuation in economic life;now we find it in the sphere of ethics among the factors determiningheight and strength. Is it the same readiness to sacrifice, that functionsin these different spheres?

The relevant factor in determining the value of a commodity arethe absolute quantities of resources necessary for its production, whilein the moral and not goal-oriented spheres in general, we deal with therelative quantity a person sacrifices from among his or her overall re-sources. From the angle of height and strength there is a differencebetween the person who gave his last dollar to aid someone else, whilehis next expected income was small and not imminent (this is realiza-tion of a high and weak value), and one who gave a dollar out of amillion at his disposal (realization of a strong and low value); yet,from the economic angle, the first dollar equals the second one.

Dependence of a Value on another Value

A value may depend on another value, or be conditioned by it intwo senses: a conditioning of content or a conditioning of realization.

A value-content is conditioned by another value if the first cannotbe understood without understanding the second. For example, onecannot understand the value that forbids stealing without understand-ing the value “property.”

The realization of a value is conditioned by another if it cannot oc-cur without first realizing the second value. Conditioning from theaspect of realization does not, of course, belong to pure valuativestructure, but to the structure of the valued world.

When we discover that the presence of thing A, which has novalue-property, is a necessary precondition to the realization of posi-tive value B, does A itself then acquire positive value (namely, a posi-


tive value-property)? The reply is yes, unless the presence of A is alsoa necessary precondition for the realization of negative value not-B —because it is possible for something to serve as a necessary precondi-tion for good and bad at once.

Chapter 4

Reason and Conflicts

The Distinction between Rivalry and Opposition

Two kinds of conflict can be distinguished in the sphere of values:rivalry and opposition

1. Rivalry prevails between values whose realization requires useof the same resources. This is a conflict between valuative valueswhich sometimes peaks in a struggle between motivative values in thearena of decisions. The conflict is “local” (namely, about specific re-sources) and passing. One and the same rivalry between two valuesmay surface in a number of “local” conflicts. Rivalry characterizes therelation between ends but it may also appear between other values,regardless to which type they belong. If you look at rivaling values inthemselves, namely, regardless of the resources they may require, youmay not find any opposition between them; they do not convey in-compatible messages.

2. Opposition between values is distinct from rivalry in that it isobjectively embodied. It is embodied in the fact that one and the sameobject has two value-properties, one positive, the other negative; theobject may be a thing, a process, an action or a state of affairs.

When there is opposition between values, we say that an object isgood and bad — good according to one value and bad according to theother. The opposition may involve an internal struggle, when opposed


valuations arise from conflicting instructions how to act, namely,whether to approve or reject a certain action. Internal struggle exists,for example, when the object valued positively and negatively at onceis an action, and when the same person values it in this manner.

But not every opposition between values involves internal strug-gles. Opposing values held by different people may also representopposition between values and may be felt as such, when these peopleoperate in the same society.

Opposition between ends prevails when a certain act aids theachievement of end A and impedes the achievement of end B. Suchopposition may prevail between different ends of the same person, orbetween the ends of different people.

The origin of valuative conflicts is twofold: in the first place, in thecomplexity of the human being, which generates a variety of tiesbetween the individual and the world, and second, in that the world isnot altogether made up for the convenience of humans. That is to say,a multiplicity of inconvenient ties between a person and his or herenvironment engenders a multiplicity of incompatible demands.

It is possible — even though it is not easy — to imagine a worldmade up without real conflicts, i.e., in which all valuative conflictsremain merely hypothetical; but even then conflicts are not canceledon the ideal level, because a valuative problem is not resolved bypreventing the case that serves it as a value-bearer.80

Value-Stages

There are three stages of value:1. The stage preceding the order of preference, which is a stage of

conflicts. 2. The stage of coalescence within a system; partial resolu-tion of conflicts. 3. Values beyond conflicts and preference; creationsof pure spontaneity.

1. To the first stage belong values of the first and second sections,i.e., mainly ends, needs and ideals. An unfulfilled need makes rea-

son establish the commodity which satisfies this need, as an end. Theemergence of new circumstances makes reason refine an inclinationuntil it becomes an ideal. Reason then harnesses itself once to onetendency and once to another, thus helping to develop partial sets ofgiven elementary values, namely, values of feeling and emotion, whichserve as a point of departure for the development of the first stage; yet,by the same token, it also exacerbates conflicts, and in particular,creates many new conflicts. For instance, the rivalries between endsdid not initially prevail between the needs which served as a point of

Reason and Conflicts 207

departure for the constitution of these ends. The same holds foropposition between ends. At this stage reason (by creating values) andunderstanding (by applying them) generate and exacerbate opposition.

2. At this stage, reason is not guided by feeling and emotion; onthe contrary, it tries to overcome conflicts it created while guided bythese. It creates value-grades and orders of preference and these arethemselves values which a priori assume the comprehension of first-stage values. Reason alters first-stage values and adapts them, or atleast tries to adapt them to the requirements arising from second-stagevalues, with the aim to consolidate values within a comprehensivesystem.

The concepts justice, right, and duty, money and prices, height of avalue and strength of a value, are values of the second stage. Thevalues height and strength did not acquire their names on the valuativelevel, but in discussions of meta-valuative character; however, thegradings that make up the meaning of these names emerged on thevaluative level.

When reason creates values according to which we prefer onevalue to another, a practical solution of conflicts emerges, namely, aninstruction how to behave. The practical solution is the only one re-quired by rivalry and therefore cancels it. In contradistinction, theopposition between values is not canceled by practical solutions. Al-locating a value an inferior position in the order of preference doesneither cancel not change it; as it were, it goes on saying what it saidpreviously, before the order of preference was introduced, now alsowith regard to cases in which its message opposes reason's judgment.Reason tries to change it in order to suit the value to its place in thesystem. At this juncture two variants of the same value may be pre-sent: the original value, belonging to the first stage and the second one,being built up according to the system's requirements and meant toreplace the first. They may exist alongside each other. For instance,one may be considered the voice of emotion and the other the voice ofreason.

It is also possible for the opposition between values of the firststage to reappear as opposition between values of the second stage.Attempts to resolve one kind of opposition may create new kinds ofopposition.

3. At the third value-stage, reason resides beyond conflicts and be-yond the role of settling these. Here it creates — for instance, aestheticideals, drawn from aesthetic inclinations, at times realizing them in theimagination and at times attaining them in reality. The spirit, namelyreason at this stage, is not urged by needs and constraints to performits work, nor is it attracted to work by the task of settling conflicts, but


on the contrary: being free of urges and tasks it is at liberty to observeits environment including previous value-stages, to take somethingfrom it and complete its figure. Reason is free to receive inspirationfrom what it can observe, in order to shape itself out of its ownmaterials; it is free to create something new which cannot be predicted.

In addition to a contingent of aesthetic values, the third stage in-corporates values guiding cognitive theoretical thought in general, andphilosophy in particular. For example, the value of methodical valua-tive neutrality belongs to the third stage.

Third-stage values are beyond conflicts from the angle of theirconstitution, from the angle of the subject who constitutes them, butnot from the angle of their results with regard to the system into whichthey integrate. In a roundabout way, they may contribute to the exac-erbation or the alleviation of conflicts.

At each of these stages, we find feelings and emotions as well asconcepts. An elementary, pre-conceptual, pure feeling and emotionallevel of values does not actually exist, because this pure pre-conceptual level should not be influenced by concepts, while emotionand feeling residing in a person are influenced by his or her concepts.Even in the abstract, it is difficult to find the contours a value which isnot at all influenced by concepts. The distinction between anelementary and a conceptual level comes therefore to indicate thedirection of an abstraction and not its finished product.

The division into an elementary and a conceptual level crosses thedivision into stages. It is required in order to examine reason's contri-bution to values.

The Constitution of Values

A value which is not given is not only the product of creativework, but also of its establishment. The establishment of a new valuedemands that the individual arrange himself accordingly, so that appli-cations of the new value, arising from its content and the nature of theobjects, indeed represent this individual subject's positions with regardto the object. To establish also means to believe that this content isindeed a value. Constitution consists of creation and establishment.

The individual may adopt value contents held by others, and thussave himself the effort of creation, but only he himself can establishhis values (so far as they are not already given to him on the elemen-tary level).


Values are created by reason but established by the will. Constitu-tion is therefore a joint endeavor of reason and will. The initiative forconstitution may come from reason or may come from the will.

The initiative comes from the will (a) in distress situations inwhich a qualitative change in a person's set-up is necessary, becausethe prevailing value-system cannot instruct his intellect how to escapethis distress; in a certain sense this is a situation devoid of guidance aperson happens upon, because the system of given values is not suffi-ciently rich to guide his valuations and lead the way; (b) when a per-son is disconcerted by a surplus of instructions, namely, when twovalues issue conflicting instructions with regard to an object possess-ing positive and negative value-properties; here an additional view-point is required in order to discover an additional dimension of theobject and to find, say, in its depth the value-property according towhich the person will treat the object.

The initiative comes from reason in states of composure, in the ab-sence of distress and disconcertion, fueled by its own motive, whichinitially is the motivation to understand. Intellectual understanding isan understanding of alternatives. Since understanding a negative sen-tence involves understanding of what is being negated, to understand apositive sentence means to do so against the backdrop of its alterna-tive, i.e., its negation. Reason therefore deals with the unfolding of aset of alternatives in general, and alternatives for the relevant disposi-tion of the personality in particular. And this already comprises con-struction work. Creative reason also builds in the sphere of sensoryintuition. We may describe reason's own motive as the motive to take aconceptual or perceptual figure and edit its variants. Such variationsmay not only be set up in imagination but also in reality, namely, in aperson's environment. In states of composure reason trails the will, tohave it establish ideals reason has created. When the will establishes avalue, it chooses one content out of the alternatives reason unfolds ascandidates for the status of a value, i.e., an end or an ideal. The willchooses a candidate according to which the subject will be able to ar-range itself. The will operates as a legislator who consults other agen-cies of the personality. It consults reason, or orders it to present thedevelopment of alternatives and the unfolding of alternatives. It needsinformation when the goal is not established but the ability to achieveit presumably exists; this ability is a combination of objective andsubjective factors.

However, a person creating a value may believe he is discoveringit, and a person who establishes a value may believe that he acknowl-edges it. This is even more likely when a person adopts the value-con-tent from other persons. That is to say, constitution may be accompa-


nied by self-consciousness which does not view it as constitution, butas the acknowledgment of a set-up external to the individual and inde-pendent of it. We will try to clarify where this illusion originates.

It is appropriate to label thinking in the sphere of values as “rea-son” when it creates values (ends and ideals), and as “understanding”when it finds the means needed for these ends (constituted by reason).

Reason participates in the constitution of valuative values. The willprovides these with the weight of motives, at times by divertingalready existing motives into the required direction; for example, itdiverts motives aimed at the satisfaction of a need to goal-orientedaction, namely, to the use of means required in order to gain thecommodity which satisfies this need. Reason influences the system ofmotives indirectly, by means of the will. The evidence that reason,indeed, influences motives, resides in all those goal-oriented actionswhich are definitely unpleasant and therefore involve self-compulsion.Such compulsion reveals itself daily in the life of human beings. Thewill implements this compulsion on the advice of reason, or perhapswe should say: on the advice of the reason of ends. Let us briefly stopto examine these differences in formulation.

I am trying to emphasize two different characterizationsconcerning reason.

At one end the emphasis is this: The role of thought is not only tosearch efficient means to given goals but also — and in the first place— to create goals, to shape contents the will establishes as goals, andbeyond goals — to create ideals; that is to say, reason which createsvalues plays an essential role in determining human behavior.

However, at the other end we must emphasize this: it is not reasonwrit large, i.e., reason in general, but always a certain figure of reason,or creative reason assuming a certain figure, or one instance of reason;it is an instance of reason that serves a certain individual will (even ifit is similar in many individuals, though not in all); the will not onlydetermines the task of a certain person's reason, it also participates indetermining its pre-assumptions and through these, in determining itsmanner of operation. Reason of a certain kind, having a special set ofrelationships with the will takes part in the compulsion (mentionedabove) that occurs in typical goal-oriented activities, while anotherkind of reason has a different set of relationships with the will. Whenwe speak of reason below, we refer to one of these instances of reason.

Let us consider the issue of creation, and ask: How does reasoncreate values? Does it create them out of nothing? One rather wishes toreply: Creation is the shaping of matter; reason takes the initial matterfor its work from the elementary level, namely, it imposes change onvalues it takes from feelings and emotions. This reply is correct to


some degree, but not sufficiently for axiology to accept it at face-value. It is correct when we refer to axiological inquiry becauseindeed, reason does not create something out of nothing, without anydata. We may also speak of shaping when we refer to perceptualvalues, or to the observational aspect of values.

However, the image of shaping matter is inadequate, because rea-son cannot directly mold concepts and sets of concepts from feelingsand emotions. It cannot requisition a lump of matter from the elemen-tary level, so to say, and transfer it to its own territory, the sphere ofconcepts. Concepts consist of different metaphysical matter from thatof feelings and emotions, while conceptual values as a point of depar-ture are not given to reason. For example, when reason creates a con-cept of justice it cannot shape it out of feeling or emotion, nor can it bederived from a given concept (an inborn idea) or from formal morality.

In practice, reason observes feelings and emotions and initiallyconstructs concepts in keeping with their example; it creates some-thing similar to a conceptual copy of feeling and emotion, or of theobjects which stimulate feeling and emotion, or of the behavior ex-pressing feeling and emotion. Reason can impose changes only onconcepts arranged according to this given lay-out; it can continue todevelop them and build them up into a whole lay-out; then reason canunfold the different variants of the conceptual lay-out as alternatives,one of which is subsequently established by the will.

Ends, for instance, are products of reason. A contingent of ends areidentical in their value-matter with needs. For example, a person needscertain food, say, bread, and his reason creates the end to gain bread,e.g. by producing it. Here bread makes up the value-matter of the endas well as of the need. Yet reason does not create the end from theelementary matter of the need, but from the need translated into itsown language, or copied in the sphere of concepts (the same holds forhoning an inclination into an ideal). A special act of the will is neededin order to make the effort and sacrifice resources for the goal drawnby reason; the will is necessary before the effort begins: to establishthe goal, to decide, “to sow in tears,” as well as it is necessary furtheron, to encourage the owner of the will.

Two characteristics, specific to the conceptual sphere, are relevantto the issue of values: (A) Going beyond the individual and (B), goingbeyond the present, namely, (A), generality and an outlook upon whatis individual and (B), breaking out of the course of time and an outlookupon it. From the vantage point of eternity, a pure, reasonable outlookdoes not distinguish between past, present and future. This distinctionarises from a synthesis between reason and observation: the point in


time at which reason breaks out of it serves as a kind of barrier thatdivides time for the sake of orientation.

It is true that beginnings of these two instances of transcendencecan already be found at the pre-reasonable level (in the same way thatother beginnings of form, specific to the conceptual level, exist on thislevel, like affirmation and negation, reality and absence etc.), but theyare never complete.

The degree of relevance of these two differences between thespheres to each and every value is so high, that the conceptual copy ofan elementary value cannot be “true” to the original in every aspect,nor should it be entirely true, because if it were it would have no ad-vantage, and would not help to settle conflicts. The difference betweena value of feeling or emotion and a conceptual value is therefore notonly a difference in the sphere in which the values reside, but also adifference in content.

We will now briefly examine the first difference. An elementaryvalue does not exist separately but is embedded in acts of valuation,i.e., the valuation of individual things, and it is different in differentvaluations. The value created by reason exists separately, as an objectof intentionality, and it may include the instruction how to apply it.The difference in value-content between the personal and the universalshows in particular with regard to ethical values (i.e., ideals concern-ing the behavior of humans to each other), because universality is es-sential to them, namely, their reasonable character. Divers ethics fre-quently differ in their degree of universality, but it characterizes all ofthem. As mentioned above, morality equals ethics applied to thevaluation of motives. Closed morality treats different groups of peopledifferently, while universal morality treats all humans equally; how-ever, even closed morality does not mention given names (of indi-viduals).

The difference in the degree of universality between various ethicsconcerns content, of course, and not just formulation. The propositionthat the valuative value, which is separate from valuation, is a productof reason, and that on the elementary level values exist within and onlyby means of valuations, should not be interpreted as saying that thevaluative value is an abstraction of valuations (Victor Kraft says thatempiricism claims values “are simply abstractions of valuations.”81

Even where on the thinking level itself a valuative value embedded inpredicative valuations precedes the separate valuative value,crystallized as a concept, reason does not merely extract this valuefrom valuations by means of analysis and crystallizes it into a concept,but introduces the changes necessary in order to integrate it into thevalue system.


We will now turn to the second difference between the elementarylevel and the level of reason, namely, that reason exceeds the present.This difference shows in that an end referring to the future resides onthe level of reason; even when this end is identical in content with aneed, it differs from the latter in its reference to the course of time.

The division of values into two levels only is neither acute noradequate. It is not acute because there are emotions whose existencedoes not reside in observation but on the thinking level, emotionsbelonging to the form of thinking, which guide the course of thought;accordingly these emotions belong in some sense to the level of rea-son, i.e., to the specific figure of reason. One of these is, for instance,an emotion arising from the thought that a severe wrong has beendone. The division into two is inadequate from this angle and alsobecause there are great differences between feeling and emotion (al-though even here intermittent phenomena exist).

Types of Opposition Between Values

Reason's task is to settle conflicts. However, as reason's horizon iswider in the second stage than in the first, new difficulties appear, partof them a reconstruction of former difficulties in the new stage, andpart of them entirely new ones. We will list seven types, or sevengroups of opposition between values:

1. Opposition in the valuative, positive-negative dimension and theproblem of radical evil.

2. Tension in the valuative dimension of emotionally moving-calming.

3. Friction between goal-orientation and spontaneity.4. The opposition between justice and other values.5. The struggle between the will and motivative values.6. Opposition between a value aimed at the valuation of humans

and a given value.7. Clashes between different duties.With regard to group seven I will point to the writings of Simmel,

Hartmann and Landmann,82 which succinctly explain that this is notmerely rivalry over resources, but true opposition. Regarding the firstsix groups, we will now tackle them one at a time.

Chapter 5

The Question of Radical Evil

Kant and Schopenhauer believed that the human being by nature in-corporates radical evil ; in other words, that the malice residing withinhumans cannot be uprooted (this alongside of other factors, whichoperate in the opposite direction). According To Kant, the human racetends to deviate consciously from virtue or in other words, to actknowingly in opposition to moral law,83 or to rebel against it.Schopenhauer stresses the material aspect: every human being tends(though in different degrees) to harm others independently of the pos-sible benefit to himself arising from the damage he causes, and per-haps even at the expense of some damage to himself.84

As we face a host of evidence testifying to acts of cruelty over dif-ferent periods and countries, which in each case are hard to explainexhaustively by the benefit presumed to be gained by their perpetrators(in their own opinion), we may accept the assumption (at least, for thesake of discussion). Thus we may assume that many people, in varioussocieties, harm others not in pursuit of some end, but as harm forharm's sake (apart from the harm they cause as a means to gain theirends), but we should also ask whether there is an alternative to theexplanation Kant and Schopenhauer offer (I ignore the differences be-tween them here).

Before we turn to the alternative, we will elucidate the thesis ofradical evil in its axiological context. Radical evil is a value-system


that includes not only motives, but also valuative values of feeling andemotion, which incorporate pleasure derived from harm done toanother and from schadenfreude at his expense, as well as sorrow forthe custom of keeping proper standards. It seems that conceptualvaluative values, demanding revenge against members of a group overgenerations — for example, an ethnic group — belong to this system.In contradistinction to the system of evil, a person incorporates acomprehensive value-system that matches proper standards (andalongside these two systems a third one, made up of values which inthemselves are neither moral nor immoral). It is clear that according tothis thesis morality is not a method of motive-preference (thusparalleling civil law), but a method that condemns or vindicates (thusparalleling criminal law).

According to this thesis, one and the same person simultaneouslyupholds two diametrically or categorically opposed values; one valuesays A and the other one says not-A, so that they indeed contradicteach other in the entire area of their possible application.

The thesis of radical evil accords malice the status of belonging tohuman nature, i.e., it does not emerge over time nor can it be uprooted.Yet, the status malice acquires fails to make it more understandable. Itis difficult to see the explanatory strength of this thesis.

Against this background of the unfolded thesis of radical evil, onecan sketch the outline of an antithesis. The antithesis says that valuesone and the same person adheres to simultaneously are not directly, ordiametrically, or categorically opposed; that perusal of the valuesthemselves does not necessarily reveal the opposition to whoever ex-amines them, but the matter unfolds in this way: In the field of value-application we also happen upon cases in which the same object pos-sesses a positive value-property according to value A, and a negativeone according to value B. In the issue we deal with the object is a deeda person does in relation to another person, or the behavior of oneindividual to another, while values A and B are the ideal of behaviorapproved by morality on one hand, and a value which has no suchapproval on the other. According to the antithesis morality need notparallel criminal law, but may be arranged as a morality of preference(see Part II above), namely, as preferring the said ideal to other values.From the angle of the antithesis the moot state of affairs looks likethis: a certain deed has a positive and a negative value-propertyaccording to different values, and the question whether to carry it outis a question of preference, answered by morality. The bad deed doesnot arise from a bad motive (according to the antithesis there is nosuch thing), but from an inferior motive and in opposition to thepreferable one.

The Question of Radical Evil 217

We will now examine a few kinds of cases in order to see whetherit is possible to defend the human race, and we will track the origins ofvalues demanding to harm others or to harm the doer himself; to somedegree we will also track the manner in which the opposition betweenan ethical and an anti-ethical value is settled in the consciousness of aperson adhering to both. I recognize five sources for the affirmation ofdoing harm to another. One will be characterized in the next chapter(on tension in the emotionally moving-calming dimension), while theother four are these: A. Utility, i.e., the harm done is the means to anend of the harm doer; this issue is sufficiently clear and will not bediscussed. B. Self-defense, namely, extending the need for self-defensebeyond the limit of usefulness, and according harm the status a value.C. Redressing the past, the mythological belief in a magic potential tochange the past. D. Competition. We will now discuss B, C and D.

Extensions of the Need for Self-Defense

The original need for self-defense is narrow, activating a personwhen he or she is being assaulted; after a number of assaults by thesame perpetrator, the latter's presence is sufficient to awaken the need.Reason turns self-defense into an end and understanding finds themeans that oblige the defender, for instance, to strike at the attackerprior to his assault and sometimes even prior to this attacker's initialassault, if the latter is to be expected on some grounds. Accordingly,Hobbes believed that non-reasonable creatures could exist together andcould even cooperate without violence, while precisely those who pos-sess reason are incapable of such behavior.85

This extension of self-defense by understanding is, of course, con-cerned with anticipated utility. Yet, there is another extension of theneed for self-defense not concerned with anticipated utility, namely, itoccurs in the dimension of needs themselves; this is the inclination, oreven the need to retaliate after an assault. When the need for retaliationexists, its owner suffers sorrow and distress so long as he has notcaused real damage to his attacker, he feels pleasure while he inflictsdamage, his pleasure increases the more the damage is felt by the re-cipient, and he feels satisfaction afterwards. Such retaliation, when itappears as a need, is revenge. The characteristics of distress, pleasureand satisfaction, accompanying progressive stages of revenge-matura-tion, are, of course, absent from the extension of self-defense by un-derstanding when it seeks utility. Furthermore, in many cases, the wishfor revenge is clearly opposed to the wish for utility, and the revenger


is fully aware of this. In extreme cases a person may be ready to payfor his revenge with his life, as Kleist's Michael Kohlhaas does.

If only humans (and no animals) feel a need for revenge, this doesnot mean that the need arises from goal-oriented extensions of self-defense engendered by understanding; perhaps it arises from a humanability to remember which animals lack; the memory of injury andinsult lives within the injured person even in the attacker's absence,and encourages a kind of need for self-defense in circumstances inwhich the original need does not arise at all.

Like other needs, revenge may be “translated” by reason into ends,or it may “dictate” to reason the establishment of ends, i.e., revengemay require means to prepare the ground for its realization. The state-ment that reason translates revenge into its own language and acceptsits dictate, may well grate on the mind. Whoever is unfamiliar withrevenge feelings, or rejects revenge altogether, may argue that reasondoes not behave unreasonably. However, this person's reason is differ-ent from the revenger's reason; we have different kinds of reason, or atleast different figures of reason. Each kind of reason has its own value-presuppositions, using these as major premises in its syllogisms.Different kinds of reason will therefore arrive at different conclusions,even if they adopt the same description of facts as a minor premise.Different presuppositions involve different procedures of analysis anddifferent kinds of reasoning. One may, therefore, speak of differentkinds of reason or at least, of different figures of reason.

Revenge, having been adopted by a certain kind of reason, be-comes a value according to which a person values others as well ashimself. The revenger is valued positively. Thus Lamech could boastto his wives: “...for I have slain a man to my wounding, and a youngman to my hurt. If Cain shall be avenged sevenfold, truly Lamechseventy and sevenfold” (Genesis, IV/23-24).

In a society in which revenge is a deeply embedded valuative valueit may become a means for the individual, for instance, in order tomeet expectations, or because the fame of the revenger deters potentialattackers. Yet revenge which has become a means is not revenge any-more.

However, revenge per se which is an extension of the need for self-defense, may itself keep expanding, and this so that the further exten-sion is felt as a need. The additional step of extension will be revengewreaked by the injured person — not upon the attacker, his partner ora so-called associate (a member of his family, tribe or people), norupon a descendant of his partner — but upon some person, or evensome creature, animals included. In certain cases, the injured personfeels a need for revenge without a specific target. This appears to me


the most plausible explanation for many cases of cruelty, inflictedupon victims the perpetrator never met before. For instance, when theinjured person cannot directly revenge himself upon his attacker, or hedare not do so, he finds relief in unspecific revenge and strikes atwhatever is within reach, a kind of substitute for the proper object.There is no doubt that the non-specific avenger is an evil doer, but ingeneral a furious evil-doer and in any case not an amused evil-doer; heis an evil-doer who keeps smarting from an injury he suffered in thepast.

The aspiration to retaliate or avenge, be it even unspecific and ran-dom revenge, lacks the characteristics Kant and Schopenhauerattribute to radical evil (this aspiration comes into being over time andagainst a background of circumstances, etc.), but it may serve as acausal explanation of deeds Kant and Schopenhauer considermanifestations of radical evil.

Magic Redress of the Past

There are deeds which tear other deeds out of the past and cancelthem. This is a value-property they possess, which apparently exists incertain traditional value-systems. The uprooted deed is canceled fromthe outset, so that it never was. Should you ask critically,” if the deednever occurred, was there no uprooting either?” — the reply will notdeny the uprooting, but interpret it as uprooting a semblance.

We deal here with an outlook on the nature of time in relation to uswhich does not consider the past to be behind us and not existinganymore; on the contrary, the past is in front of us and exists as past,while the future is behind us. The words for “before” and “after” inEnglish, Hebrew and some other languages originate in this outlook(also the old Hebrew word for “a long time ago”).86 We face the pastbecause we know it. The present acquires its meaning from the past itjoins. In the framework of such an outlook on time it is not so prepos-terous to extend your hand into the past and pluck out something alienthat encroaches on it.

A salient example of such a deed are killings carried out “to guardthe honor of the family.” A girl or a woman engaging in forbiddensexual intercourse stains the honor of the family. Killing the sinner notonly obliterates the stain but also her name, and when her name isobliterated she herself never was. At the utmost, she represented asemblance.

While the revenger hates his victim, this killer does not hate thegirl who has sinned. As reported, he feels profound shame and wishes


to be delivered from it; his deliverance arises from eradicating sin andsinner.87 Anger may accompany hatred as well as shame, but they aredifferent kinds of anger. Obviously the society endorsing this kind ofkilling does not consider it murder. In such a society preserving familyhonor may, like revenge, become a means for the individual, forinstance, in order to meet expectations, or because the killing maydeter other female members of the family from sinning. Once guardingthe honor of the family has become a means for an individual, thedeed, of course, loses its specific characteristics.

There are combinations of revenge and magic redress. A noblemanwho was insulted and offended, in particular if this happened in publicor if the honor of a lady under his protection was denigrated, revengeshimself ceremoniously, according to the rules of dueling if the of-fender is also a nobleman, or without ceremony if he is not. Yet, sub-jectively such revenge presumably involves shame rather than hatred,so that “objectively” it means utter obliteration of the offense.

An unspecific revenger, namely, someone who revenges himselfon a random creature, perhaps also eradicates an offense he suffered inthis manner; he may thus disburden himself of fear concerning a pastdeed which still distresses him, a kind of fear of the past. Shame mayin some sense also be fear of something already past.

With regard to redress of the past, we should not depreciate itssignificance by interpreting it as redressing the image of the past,namely a sort of “fabricated” evidence for a false report, or somethinglike printing corrected versions of old newspapers in George Orwell's1984. On the contrary — what is plucked out of the past becomes, ifremembered at all, a kind of bad dream we have already shed, or adecoy-dream that begins benevolently, pulling the dreamer into its webof events, a dream which subsequently reveals itself as painful. Killingthe sinner without hatred resembles the effort to wake up from a baddream. Keeping to the dream analogy and developing it, one can viewredress of the past as an extension of the need for self-defense, i.e., akind of self-defense against a bad dream.

So far, we have discussed shame caused by deeds committed byanother person. However, deeds a person did himself may fulfill asimilar function. Here he also wishes to uproot the deed entirely, andin order to achieve this even to cancel his individual identity involvedin the shame or causing dissatisfaction, by assimilating within a wider,collective subject. When the wider subject is a couple, the persondevelops symbiosis with his or her partner, which turns them into asingle subject. When the wider subject is a large group, like a nation oran ideological movement, the individual needs moments of solemnuplift during which he loses his personal identity and utterly identifies


with the nation or movement. Such a person needs to identify withsomething wider, or to find another identity for himself, and this needis distinct from the need to belong, or to be part of a group. The widersubject with which a person seeks to identify must be proud of itself,so that shame or self-dissatisfaction are exchanged for collective pride.Perhaps this explains the high degree of sensitivity people demonstratein matters concerning some collective pride (ethnic community, na-tionality, perhaps even the fans of a football team, etc.).

I do not know whether it is superfluous to say that collective sub-jects exist only in mythological imagination. Indeed, when peopletruly believe that something exists and even more so when their beliefarises from a strong need, they behave as if the thing were really there;thus it acquires a kind of existence, namely, a socially functional exis-tence (which perhaps may also be named “conventional existence”);when all individuals in a certain group believe this and behave accord-ingly, a person joining the group or being born into it finds himselfcompelled to acknowledge the existence of that thing. Such is the ex-istence collective subjects may gain.

Erich Fromm discusses the need to shed individual identity in hisbook “Escape from Freedom” and views it as sado-masochism.88

The term “sado-masochism” incorporates the possibility that theneed to shed one's identity will lead a person to hurt himself and oth-ers, while striving to realize his need. He will hurt himself becausesuch hurt represents self-cancellation; he will hurt those he wishes toassimilate to, because in this manner he appears to uproot the barrierssurrounding the other's personality, thus delaying his assimilation.

Competition and Envy

Till now we dealt with positive valuation of damage done to an-other so far as this valuation originated in value section B, i.e., thesection of values which refer to a totality valued according to the ac-tion itself, as opposed to its results or causes (we did not stop to dealwith the approval of damage originating in section A, i.e., damage toone person that equals benefit to another, because this matter is clearand easy to explain).

There is affirmation of damage that belongs to section C, namely,valuation according to an action's causes, or more precisely, valuationaccording to ability, which we will now examine. Valuation accordingto ability was already discussed above, as part of the typological issue;here we will focus on its crystallization as competition.


The competitor values himself in reference to the achievements ofothers. Damage to another — whether caused by the competitorhimself or by another agency — may diminish the other one as ayardstick for competitive values; the distance between notches, so tosay, decreases and the subject, i.e., the valuing competitor, growsrelatively to the measuring-instrument. Initially his quest is not todamage the other one, but to enhance his own value; alongsidesatisfaction he may therefore feel pity for the injured person. In acertain sense, this satisfaction represents schadenfreude. In acompetitive society the possibility of mixing schadenfreude with pitymay cause an individual to feel offended when someone pities him; hewishes to be envied (envy and pity do not go together, of course).

A combination of non-specific revenge with the wish to reduce theother competitor is also possible, for instance, a synthesis of envybelonging to competitive values and a certain degree of the need fortarget-less revenge; the amused malevolent person embodies some-thing resembling this synthesis. Amusement accompanies variouscompetitive acts (in particular, if the competitors keep a not-too-highdegree of eagerness); accordingly it is reasonable to classify theamusement of the malevolent person as belonging to the realization ofa competitive value. However, the amused malevolent (at least in mov-ies) is a frightening figure, so that he may have goal-oriented imitatorsamong those wishing to exploit the advantages of what is frightening.

To sum up: These and similar considerations lie at the root of myopinion that causing damage for its own sake is an offshoot of the needfor self-defense or of competitive inclinations, and that its origin is nota paradoxical aspiration to perform valuatively negative deeds fortheir own sake. All three value sections incorporate values whichdevelop an offshoot of affirmation for damage to others.

How the Conflict between Approval of Damage toOthers and Ethical Values Is Resolved

Affirmation of damage to others for its own sake, or affirmation ofkilling another for its own sake (i.e., beyond any usefulness to theperpetrator, or to whoever approves of the deed, or to someone thesetwo wish to benefit) is unequivocally opposed only to universal mo-rality. However, traditional moral systems are closed systems, judgingdifferent people by different criteria. Punishment, for instance, will bedetermined according to the status of the offender as well as that of thevictim. A person's right to become an object of moral considerations is


therefore a matter of degree. A contingent of humans — foreigners orindividuals belonging to certain peoples, or people whose skin has acertain color, or slaves — are not objects for consideration at all andtheir treatment is not modified by closed morality. Nor has closedmorality any difficulty in excluding a person temporarily, or within acertain context, from being an object for consideration, be it becauseof a deed this person has done, or on account of circumstances beyondhis control.

Values which demand (in certain cases) to hurt human beings(without any expected benefit) may therefore be compatible withclosed morality; when they refer to someone belonging to the objectsof consideration, they exclude him from this group to the degree whichis necessary in order to prevent a contradiction between valuativevalues. Furthermore: Such values may even integrate into a closedmorality ( for instance, the duty to retaliate or avenge may be incorpo-rated in such a morality system).

As mentioned before, traditional moral systems are closed. Themorality of groups in the criminal world is also definitely closed.However, moral views prevalent in developed countries among en-lightened contemporary populations, also embrace elements of closurein this or that manner and to varying degree. For example, what weperceive as professional ethics is not only (or primarily) an applicationof general ethics to a specific sphere, or its greater stringency withregard to the specific sphere, but also the license accorded in the spe-cific sphere to what is forbidden by general ethics. In many cases thisis borne out by the custom to establish internal disciplinary tribunalsfor population groups organized according to profession, trade or placeof work, in particular when such tribunals operate as surrogates forordinary courts of law. The difference between the internal and thegeneral court or tribunal expresses the difference between general andprofessional ethics, or between closed and universal morality.

The concepts of justice prevailing these days still include a notionof retaliation or revenge. It is not only that damage to another for itsown sake is utterly compatible with closed-morality values but fur-thermore, the moral rigorousness — i.e., the fanatical severity andstrictness of closed moralities — may paradoxically materialize in actsof cruelty. Following Nicolai Hartmann one should say that these actsof cruelty represent the sacrifice of elementary, low and strong valuesfor the sake of high and weak values. Such cruel moral stringency ap-pears in particular in ideologically informed totalitarian regimes (betheir ideology religious or non religious).

Chapter 6

Tensions in the Moving-CalmingDimension

As we found in Part I above, the division into emotionally moving andcalming crosses the division into positive and negative values. Wemust now examine a surprising phenomenon in the realm of values.Within a value-synthesis a negative emotionally moving value mayparadoxically enhance a positive value. That is to say, when positivevalue A, which is not very moving, combines with negative and mov-ing value B, we arrive at a synthesis A-B, whose positivity is greaterthan that of A. To depict it graphically: The curve describing A-Bpasses above the curve describing A (in the space above the horizontalaxis).

A salient example is taking risks. When an audience watchescircus acrobats performing without a safety net, it takes part insomething emotionally moving without sharing the negative aspect,the risk. Observing this audience (and similar examples), one mayreceive the impression that the emotionally moving element is positivein itself, as if it were separate from the risk (which remains with theacrobat). But this is not true. The audience probably participates in therisk, but only in its imagination and this is sufficient for it to enjoysome degree of the emotional movement it lacks; the fact that


audiences sometimes prefer acrobatics without a net does not makesense otherwise. Yet, the full emotional movement is experienced onlyby the person who also feels its full negativity.

In a dangerous adventure (like a trip from Israel to Petra in Jordan,before 1995) the moving element is not separate from the negativeone, the danger to the person's life. For many people the motive for theadventure is strengthened by greater danger (presumably to a certainlimit of increase); but not only the motive: Whoever returns safelyfrom this adventure gains higher esteem from many people the greaterthe danger was, namely they view it as a positive value.

An excursion to the red rocks of Petra devoid of danger is positiveand moving, but only to a low degree. A trip in an Alpine funicular ispositive and moving, but the risk a mountaineer takes is more emo-tionally moving and the degree of its positivity is higher.

In a synthesis the moving negative value functions as spice. Theperson risking his or her life does not seek death in the same sense thatone does not consume spices separately. Yet, this person seeks therisk, though in order to overcome it. The supposition that whoeverfreely chooses to take a great risk (in degree of danger as well as theprobability to be hurt) without any constraint unconsciously seeksdeath, is not necessary in explaining the phenomenon. The aspirationto take risks may exist without an underlying, unconscious death-wish— though not any risk but one embodied in an adventure which has apositive attraction as well (aesthetic, sporting, social etc.). On the otherhand, the risk should by no means be seen as the price an adventurerpays for the positive value he gains, but on the contrary, as somethingthat enhances the positive value.

The inclination to take risks may increase by a synthesis withcompetitive values. However, this should not lead to the conclusionthat the inclination itself arises specifically from competition, and ingeneral from value-section C. On the contrary, basically this inclina-tion appears to lean towards the action itself (i.e., belongs to value-section B).

How can something valuatively negative enhance the positivity ofa synthesis? The fact that it is emotionally moving only determines itslocation according to a different dimension, and does not refer to thedegree of positivity. And indeed, the very fact that valuative space hasmultiple dimensions does not provide an answer to this question.

However, it seems plausible that within a synthesis an additionalvalue achieves realization. That is to say, the addition of somethingmoving, which is negative according to one value, engenders (or en-hances) the realization of another value, which was not previouslytaken into account. The other, additional value involves the very struc-

Tensions in the Moving-Calming Dimension 227

ture of the subjective aspect in the moving-calming dimension. Hu-mans need emotional movement, and when this need is satisfied bysomething negative and moving, it incorporates, of course, some posi-tivity.

We remember that what moves the emotions involves, amongother elements, a sensitivity of the value to the valued object. In Part Iabove, at the end of the discussion concerning emotional movement,we said: Dealing with danger, in particular when only a short stepseparates success from failure, incorporates sensitivity to small differ-ences in the value-bearer.

The ability of something negative but moving to serve as spice, or— without the metaphor — to contribute positively to a value-synthe-sis, arises therefore from a special need of man (which may changeover different periods of an individual's life) for experiences of emo-tional movement; this need is a sort of ramification of the need forspontaneous activity. In contrast to the need for moving experiences,there is a need for calming experiences, and there is a kind of comple-mentary bond between these needs. A human being presumably re-quires a certain dispersal of experiences along the moving-calmingdimension, and a certain balance between the moving and the calming.

Such a balance is needed when a stratification of values has takenplace. A certain order of values on a basic plane (defined by the di-mensions moving-calming and positive-negative) becomes itself a newvalue, residing on a higher plane.

We may now pinpoint an additional source for what appears asradical evil, for instance the pleasure derived from combat betweengladiators in ancient Rome. Presumably, this meets a certain need foremotional movement (or a need for some kind of emotional move-ment). The spectator enjoys the risk involved in violent combat, but athis ease, without any risk to himself. As a spectator the Roman soldier,himself a survivor of violent combat in battle, had the opportunity toexperience the enjoyable aspect of this danger in isolation, a kind ofrisk without risk. It may well be that spectators of this kind areresponsible for the most cruel customs of entertainment. In our timesbullfights are probably also enjoyed by spectators who do not enjoydamage caused to a human being in the arena, and perhaps even notthe damage caused to the bull, but the convenient opportunity toexperience a dangerous situation, in which very much depends on verylittle (on a small difference in the value-bearer). In any case, I see noplausible alternative explanation.

In the same manner that humans incline towards emotional move-ment even if it involves a negative value-quality, we find in other


cases an inclination towards calmness even if it involves negativevalue-properties.

The tendencies Freud describes as Eros and Thanatos (death) arebasically identical with the inclination to emotional movement (Eros),and the inclination to the calming (Thanatos). The name “Thanatos,”(death) Freud chose as a label, is rather extreme. The tendency labeled“Thanatos” surfaces often, for instance, in that a reprimanded childcries and falls asleep (certainly not every child does so), namely, es-capes into sleep; or in that a person finds solace in being drunk. Ac-cording To Freud, this is a tendency to pass onto a lower plane ofexistence, to animality, then to vegetativeness and only in the end tothe utterly inanimate, real death.89

Suicide is the radical display of the quest for calm, and thereforethe reason Freud chose the name Thanatos — but the radical display ofcalm touches certain radical displays of emotional movement. WhenHeinrich von Kleist committed suicide, he did not seek calm beyondthe boundaries of life (he believed he and his partner were setting outtowards a wondrous adventure). In order to study the relation moving-calming (Eros-Thanatos) one has to examine cases of suicide whichwere not flight from an awful fate awaiting this person as the onlyalternative to death (i.e., which seemed to be the only alternative in theeyes of the suicide), but cases in which an inherent, internal inclinationwas the decisive factor, and not a course of external events in theenvironment of the suicide (though such a course always plays somerole, too). If the suicide asks for calm, proximity of the poles surfacesin that the person seeking movement seeks a death-risk, to come closeto death, yet not death itself. For Kleist the poles merged. It appearsthat the quest for the most moving and the most calming experiences isrelevant both to the explanation of damage a person causes himselfand the damage he inflicts upon others.

In any case, a great deal of valuative opposition or tension betweenemotionally moving and calming values adhered to by the same sub-ject, arises from the fact that humans have a penchant for both.

There is no opposition between a positive and a negative value,because both belong to the same valuative scale; they complementeach other and make up the segments of one and the same value. How-ever, a variety of values that oppose each other are scattered over themoving-calming dimension, because movement cancels calm.

Freudian terminology does not suit axiology, because it infringesupon valuative neutrality. The moving element was handsomelynamed, while the calming element received the daunting name “death”(“thanatos” in Greek,) which is misleading. The quite common questfor an easy and effortless, peaceful and harmonious life is by no means


a negation of life or a death-wish, but represents the choice of a differ-ent life-style from the one named “Eros.” One could turn this upsidedown: name the preference for emotional movement “a quest for agita-tion, tension, worry and risk,” name it “adventurousness,” and namethe preference for calm “the quest for harmony.” As there are positiveas well as negative values at both poles, the characterization of one byits radically negative component, or of the other by a positive valuewould be misleading.

We have now to clarify the relation between the opposition “mov-ing-calming” and the opposition prevailing, in Nicolai Hartmann'sview, between the high and the strong value, which according to himcomprises the fundamental antinomy of ethics. We have already dis-cussed this distinction Hartmann makes: As mentioned above, thesetwo gradings are not only different, but they usually appear in inverserelation. We should also remember that the strength of a value doesnot refer to the power of motives, but to the form of the curve describ-ing the valuative value: the steeper the curve describing the negativesegment of a valuative value, the stronger it is, and the steeper thecurve describing the positive segment, the higher the value is.

According to Hartmann, the fundamental ethical antinomy is actu-ally a meta-opposition between values, namely, the opposition be-tween two approaches to conflicts in the sphere of ethics, or betweendifferent methods to resolve these, or between different orders of pref-erence. That is to say, values and instances of opposition betweenthem reveal themselves to a certain level of reflection; reflection askshow to deal with them and faces two opposing proposals.

The order of preference according to strength says: In the firstplace one should avoid objects with negative value-propertiesaltogether, and in any case, begin by avoiding whatever is rejected bystrong values. The price paid for avoiding evil is waiving therealization of all high positive values (or of a part of them) as a luxury.A society which realizes such an order of preference — i.e., succeedsin behaving accordingly — will be devoid of bodily and mental harm(murder, physical injury and accidents), and devoid of hunger orshortages of vital products.

The order of preference according to height says: High values, orat least the highest, should be realized even at the expense ofabandoning elementary values.

Realization of the strength preference will accord us peace,security and tranquillity. Should we extend this beyond the publicsphere, to the individual in relation to itself, it would mean the absenceof sorrow and pain in exchange for waiving pleasures and joys, at leastvery rare or intensive pleasures and joys. Realization of the reverse


order of preference would gain us the rare, the sublime and theemotionally moving good.

According to Hartmann, the very existence of opposition betweenvalues bears a positive value in the sphere of ethics 90on two counts:for one, because deliberation between different duties embodies moralsensitivity, i.e., the realized opposition to ethical indifference, andsecond, because opposition, involving the aspiration to transcend thegiven state of a subject, encourages development. The affirmation ofopposition per se is doubtless a high and weak value (in some sense itis embodied in tragedies, in Leibniz's Monadology and in Goethe'sFaust).

Preference for height does not therefore, attempt to uproot valua-tive conflicts, but to propose solutions limited to the practical sphere,while preference for strength wishes to approach a state without con-flicts, namely, a state in which the subject does not aspire to transcendits given entity. Preference for height is itself a high and weak value,preference for strength — a strong and low value.

Thus, preference for height will not ask us to qualify single valuesso that their demands which involve conflicts be checked; but prefer-ence for strength will demand that the single value be shaped in a waywhich a priori reduces the possibility of clashes with other values inthe areas of application.

In developing the implications of the claim that height and strengthoppose each other, it seems that there is a considerable degree ofimbrication between this opposition, the emotionally moving-calmingopposition, and the opposition Freud found between Thanatos andEros. However, be this degree of imbrication whatever it is, we mustnow study the nature of solutions Hartmann's fundamental antinomysuggests.

I believe two points are obvious: this opposition reveals itself onlyon the level of reason, and reason, qua reason does not settle the con-flict. It reveals itself only on the level of reason because it is a meta-opposition, opposition between gradings, between preferences, be-tween methods of solution. Its fate is not decided according to purereason which reviews it, because pure reason has no suitable yardstick.The specific reason of real humans adopts this or that solution, or usu-ally some set of compromises, subject to some principle of compro-mise. We may, for instance, decide to let a few, very strong valueshead the order of preference, but following some minimal realizationof these arrange the other values according to their height, and do thesame with what remains to be realized of these very strong values,without considering their strength at all. Or we may do the opposite: Afew, very high values will head the list and the remainder be preferred


according to their strength. This specific, concrete reason, which is notconsistently attached to some formal principle, certainly still belongsto the realm of reason, but it operates according to rather complexprinciples, chosen by the will from among a larger group of principlesreason creates.

Concrete reason is one among a number of alternative figures ofreason which create other principles, or arise from a different choiceout of the same principles.

The fact that different societies differ in their grading according tostrength, and in particular differ in their grading according to height,does neither reduce the weight nor the permanence of the oppositionbetween these gradings. Indeed, it seems that these gradings exist in allvalue-systems, and that they not only fail to imbricate, but even standin inverse proportion to each other.

The aristocracy probably prefers grading according to height, oradvocates such preference (this refers, of course to values within therange of its sight, values which are high in its eyes). Popular moralitytends to prefer grading according to strength. Immanuel Kant incorpo-rates certain aristocratic values which fail to match ethics as he under-stood it, in aesthetics, but according to the value of the sublime, notthe value of beauty. War is in his eyes neither good nor beautiful, but itpossesses sublimity. Nietzsche probably accepted preference onlyaccording to height.

Chapter 7

Goal-Orientation and Spontaneity

We now continue the discussion of goal-orientation, begun within thecontext of value-typology (Part II, Chapter 2). We have to examine theconflict between the end and values of section B, which are realized inspontaneous action. This concerns needs, inclinations and ideals (i.e.,all section B values except constraints). A person guided by these val-ues acts on motives inherent to the various segments of his personality,while the values do not really deprive each other (with a constraint thisequilibrium may be disturbed) and the main point is that they are notrepressed by the will.

The end demands efficiency, namely, economy in time and re-sources. The need and the ideal on the other hand, do not demand thatthe actions they instruct be economical, and in particular they do notdemand economy in time; on the contrary, hurry, or reducing the timethe action takes, may oppose these values. The end considers the ac-tion negatively and therefore wishes to shorten it, while the need andthe ideal view the action positively and wish to shape it, each in itsown manner. The realization of an end demands that a person set him-self up accordingly: he is required to serve as an efficient tool in theimplementation of a plan which makes up part of the valuative value(in this case a mixed, and not a pure value); this tool is activated by thewill, which replaces (prima facie) the inherent motives. The humanbeing will therefore be organized, disciplined, his own master, not


subject to caprice, and he will also be economical in the way he thinksand speaks. On the other hand, the subject of actions whose raisond'être is in the action itself, need not drive himself forward and willaccordingly immerse himself in his activity — he acts spontaneously.These subjects are therefore differently organized. One lives for thefuture, his present is a means — the other lives the present in the pre-sent. The spontaneous subject does not subjugate his receptivity to hismotorial skills, he does not arrange the input according to the desiredoutput. Accordingly he may pay attention to his environment as wellas to himself, he may keep an open mind. He is interested in what hesees, hears and in what other senses in themselves have to offer, andnot only in what intellect extracts from them; he is spontaneous in hisreceptivity as well, and thus it is precisely this subject who is creative— not in the sense of finding efficient means, but in the sense of cre-ating something new, which cannot be predicted.

Because the active subject of an end differs from the active subjectof a need or an ideal, a mixed action will bring the opposition to thesurface: if the subject is set to achieve an end, the values of the actionitself will be shortchanged; if he is set to realize values of the actionitself, goal-orientation will suffer.

A person tending his or her garden engages in a mixed action.Shortchanging goal-orientation means they will not be efficient,namely, they will not hurry, neither be thrifty with time nor with ma-terials, their product will be slight in relation to the quantity of in-vested resources (mainly time). The same holds for an artisan wholoves his craft and is not exposed to competition (for example, if he isprotected by an association of artisans); he can afford to ponder theartistic shaping of his products.

Socially, islands of spontaneity may cause difficulties in a goal-oriented, or ends-oriented setup, by impeding regularity and disci-pline, and thus impeding efficiency. A spontaneous person, or a personso far as he is spontaneous, is not subjected to himself, and it is there-fore harder to subject him to his superiors. Subjection to oneself is aprecondition to subjection by others.91

From its initial use onwards the word “spontaneous” unites twomutually complementary characteristics: A. Spontaneity is devoid ofcompulsion and does not come from outside. B. Spontaneous actiondoes not implement a plan; it may realize an already existing idea,provided that the idea does not incorporate a plan which instructs exe-cution. The plan for the achievement of an end outlines precisely (fromthe relevant angles) the cause of action and its time-table. In thissense, suddenness is usually thought also to testify to spontaneity(although spontaneity is not always sudden). It is obvious that in a

Goal-Orientation and Spontaneity 235

goal-oriented social system (with regard to labor or war) there is noroom for action which does not execute a plan, and such action maydefinitely cause disturbance or damage.

The theories of morality, and mainly Kantian philosophy of moralsemphasized that man is not merely a means and that we should nottreat him as if he were. But for the goal-oriented system it would behighly convenient, if the individual treated himself as if he were merelya means, so that even the need would assimilate to the intended end:he would eat in order to be fit, he would be fit in order to work and tovanquish his enemies, he would work and win in battle in order to beable to eat (or, like Brecht's Mr. Keuner, who tells of his neighbor thathe listens to music in order to exercise rhythmically, exercises in orderto be strong, etc. Brecht names the anecdote: “Servant of Ends”).

So far the overall historical course has favored goal-orientation incontradistinction to the orientation on values of the action itself (i.e.,spontaneity). Industry is the crowning achievement of this course. Inindustrial society, the work process was exclusively subjected to thegovernance of ends, while all other values were exiled to leisure time.Whoever devotes his principal physical or mental strength to his workwhich is intensive and whose rhythm is externally imposed and there-fore exhausting, arranges his personality according to the type of val-ues that inform his work; he is incapable of turning about and chang-ing his personality structure in his spare time, and thus incapable ofrealizing some section B values which require a suitable attitude andpersonality setup. The subject is compensated for the progressivelysevere separation between work and leisure by a quantitative increasein spare time, but qualitatively leisure time remains a complement ofwork: what work produces, is consumed in spare time; leisure time isfor shopping and consumption. All other section B values are short-changed. Work may shortchange the ability to enjoy leisure.92

The achievement of goal-orientedness is not the number of work-ing hours it governs, but the strict separation between work and lei-sure.

The control goal-orientation has achieved over all economic lifeshows in that the entire economy has been made to turn on money.From there, in no time at all, goal-orientation becomes the axis of awhole new world of values. In previous generations an individualstrove to appear to his peers as noble, or loyal, a hero or an avenger,respected and dignified, or even as a moral person. These wishes for aself-image have faded and become marginalized. He now wishes to berational, talented and an achiever, and he wishes to be viewed in thislight. The value expressed by the praise-word “talented” is not an endand does not belong to the same section, but in modern society it


comprises a basic element in the synthesis with goal-orientation, whichwe will discuss further on.

It pays to remember in this context that all combat and struggle arebasically goal-oriented, and goal-orientation in its turn may thereforeacquire a more aggressive character, or in any case a more contentiousone. The orientation on inclinations and ideals, on the other hand, hasa creative and non-contentious character, namely, its concern is crea-tion for its own sake, with no goal in sight.

Goal-oriented people do not labor for goal-orientation per se ofcourse, but for specific ends and for increased efficiency of the meansto these ends. However, by doing so they aid some specific goal-ori-ented system in which human relations are also arranged as meanstowards ends, and thus they assist the reinforcement of goal-orienta-tion. They succeed in providing such aid because, among other factors,the non-contentious character of spontaneity-geared orientation, andalso because of the latter's unorganized character, which is part of itssubstance.

However, we also find some development in the opposite direc-tion, against the reinforcement of goal-orientation, for example devel-opment in which a certain, much repeated, goal-oriented deed (likehunting, or even battle)93 progressively sheds its goal-orientedness,namely, becomes a game, an art or a kind of ceremony, or engenders arefined offshoot of this type.

Finally, one should point to an internal affinity prevailing betweenthe opposition goal-orientation-spontaneity, and the opposition calm-ing-emotionally-moving. goal-orientation, in wishing to economizeeffort and to justify every effort, inclines towards the calming element.What on the other hand, moves emotionally will not offer guidance ina goal-oriented framework, but only for a spontaneous action.Translating this thesis into Freudian language, we find that spontaneitybelongs to the sphere of Eros and goal-orientation to the sphere ofThanatos. In Hartmann's terminology: goal-orientation belongs tostrong and spontaneity to high values.

The fact that in a rough outline history has so far traveled towardsprogressive reinforcement of goal-orientation, does not necessarily tellus that the same will go on indefinitely. With regard to the future,there are two main broad possibilities or prospects:

Prospect A is the continuous reinforcement of goal-orientation or“rationalization” of the individual and society. This means that thefactory, the office and other bodies of the same type, as well as theinstitutions that serve them, will continue to develop in the directionprevailing now.


Prospect B means that the expansion of goal-orientation will reacha point of exhaustion, for the individual on account of the valueswhich are not ends, and for society because of a multiplicity of rival-ing ends individuals possess (the answer to whether a certain govern-ment office is efficiently organized depends on the end you choose:the end valid for the official working there, the end desired by thepublic the office serves, the end envisaged by the incumbent minister,etc.). Prospect B also embraces the case in which goal-orientednesshas not yet reached its limit of growth, but has come sufficiently closefor us to see it. At that juncture, humans may turn about to movetowards abolishing the divide between work and leisure, towards theshaping of post-industrial technology. That is to say, they may shapetechnology and its direct uses with the tendency to redress interest inthe act of producing goods from natural materials, namely, interest inthe action itself and not merely in its results. Should this happen,humans would not wish anymore to reduce their working hours as faras possible, as they do not wish to reduce the time spent onspontaneous activities.

Prospect B means therefore that instead of shaping technology andits uses towards greater efficiency, i.e., additional products from givenresources, or additional leisure time, we wish to shape it so as to offeradditional satisfaction, interest, emotional movement while we use it,and so that working together would create bonds between peopleinstead of friction. Prospect B therefore deals with paving the way foracts of production and creation in general to become spontaneousactivities.

It may well be that the opposition between the prospect of contin-ued industrial development and the prospect of passing to post-indus-trial activity is not of the kind to prevent their simultaneous existencein one and the same society; in that case individuals would be able tochoose the most congenial direction for themselves.

However, we will not further discuss the question which prospectsare realizable in the future. Suffice it to have drawn an alternative tothe prevailing state of affairs, and thus to have created the contrast andthe background against which the figure of industrial society's value-system stands out. Against the background of an alternative, the pre-vailing value-system presents its profile.

Regarding the causes for the development prevailing so far, onetends to ask whether want, which is the cause for goal-oriented activity(because man establishes as an end only what he lacks), is not also thecause for the relative weight of the end within the value-system. Wantis a good reason for the will to declare a state of emergency, duringwhich all personality sections labor under pressure and are obliged to


obey the time-table dictated to them. It seems therefore as if the effec-tive cause of goal-orientation in general were also rooted in want, andonce the goal-oriented effort yields the desired result, i.e., the abolitionof want, the state of emergency would be canceled for the individualas well as for society. The development of methods in goal-orientedactivity, i.e., technological advance and the ensuing rise inproductivity, reduce want; thus, on the face of it, they reduce the in-centive for goal-oriented activity and furthermore, the efficient causefor an overall ends-directed orientation. According to this line of rea-soning, the historical development of goal-orientation itself shouldhave led to its reduction in favor of spontaneity. Yet it appears that thecourse of history has moved in the opposite direction — to an exclu-sive orientation on ends and their measure, efficiency. How are we toexplain this fact?

We find some contribution to the solution of this problem in thesynthesis that broadens original goal-orientedness by joining it to anadditional value. We will now discuss this issue.

The Synthesis of Goal-Orientation andCompetitiveness

A synthesis between goal-orientation and competitiveness prevailsin contemporary society, even though the two are alien to each otherfrom a comparative point of view. goal-orientation values a proceedingaccording to its results and its degree of economy, and values intentionand ability according to the proceeds they yield; it also values manhimself according to the results of his deeds, while the opposite orderholds in the competitive manner of valuation. Here ability is valued initself even if it serves no end, like the ability to run a certain distancein a fraction of a second less than a rival, or less than one's ownprevious score. The deed, on the other hand, is valued only as atestimony of ability, whatever the result may be. From a goal-orientedpoint of view contests are irrational but may still be justified as gamesor leisure activities, while valuation in the competitive manner is anti-rational (see Part II, Chapters 8 & 9 above).

Initially alien values join in a synthesis whose success is recogniz-able in its persistence, its tightness and its strength as a bearer. Thesynthesis of ends and competition persists in contemporary society andappears to prevail increasingly among large population groups. Thetightness of this combination shows in that people adhering to it viewit as one piece, whose components they fail to distinguish. It bears the


principal part of the achievement-oriented value-system and instructsthe active nucleus of modern society.

Historically the merger of goal-orientation and competition camelate. In ancient Greece, especially in its polis, competition was forfree-born citizens, while goal-orientedness was proper for slaves. Thefree-born, mainly youngsters, competed with each other in sportive aswell as other contests, and considered this an entertaining and benefi-cial occupation, while they considered goal-oriented activity as suit-able for slaves. As the slave was a means, his activity was also merelya means, while his master needed only the goal, i.e., the results. Themaster himself does things whose value lies in themselves, because theslave bears the goal-oriented activity; the master is therefore free todispose of his time as he wishes. The actual distribution was not sosharply divided, but it appeared in this figure to contemporaries, if weconsider Aristotle as their spokesman.94

It turns out that goal-orientation and competitiveness were alien toeach other not only in substance but also historically (until moderntimes).

Goal-orientation is the most suitable value-figure in times of pres-sures and distress, when a gap prevails between wishes, needs andinclinations on one hand, and reality on the other. In such times it ispreferable to any other value-figure with regard to the solution ofproblems facing the subject, i.e., bridging the gap. Other values, underconditions which do not suit their realization, engender ends to cometo their aid. Under stress, even some animals can behave in a goal-oriented manner.

Once pressure is removed and distress disappears goal-orientation(the pure value, prior to the synthesis with competition ) becomes non-saturated from the angle of feelings, emotions and motives. Its motivesare not sufficiently strong to sustain a civilization that depends on it.Even when want on one hand and temptation on the other are great, themotive for goal-oriented activity is not strong enough to compare withspontaneous activity in regard to the doer's enthusiasm for what hedoes and his devotion to doing it. However, when want is neithersufficiently painful nor the temptation of goods and social status tooattractive, the motive is not strong enough to persist in the goal-oriented action and accomplish it. Internalization of values ofdiligence, of the fear of poverty, of the value of new products civiliza-tion offers, even if it reaches far enough to suppress desires which di-vert the mind from the end, even if it is reinforced by a matching ide-ology, is not strong enough to sustain a goal-oriented society.

Goal-orientation therefore needs the synthesis with a value satu-rated in its emotional aspect and possessing a strong motive. Yet, all


values concerning love of or interest in creative activity incorporaterivalry with goal-orientation, and especially with efficiency. Whoeverloves his work does not seek to save time and may even fail to bow todiscipline. goal-orientation has to combat hatred of labor without mo-bilizing the love of work to aid it, or perhaps more succinctly, the loveof that creative activity which, being only a means (or mainly ameans), belongs to the realm of work. The synthesis of ends with in-clinations towards the action itself prevails occasionally, but it limitstechnological advance towards additional efficiency. The medievalartisan, well-protected from competition by his guild, presumablyloved his craft (at least in many cases) and incorporated artistic ele-ments in his product; however, this synthesis of goal-orientation andlove for a craft would not have allowed for the industrial revolution tooccur.

Section B values are therefore not very suitable as partners for sec-tion A values. Goal-orientation now turns to section C, where a syn-thesis with the notion of duty is possible. But duty implies a degree ofcompulsion and goal-orientation is already overloaded with com-pulsion; historically this synthesis also existed (for instance, in Cal-vinism), but it suffers from the same anemia that afflicts pure goal-orientation.

This leaves competition, namely, the valuation of ability, which isnot a rival of goal-orientation. Not only does it not prolong an action,it even pushes and accelerates on its own. In addition, it possesses thecomplement necessary to ensure persistence: one receives the rewardfor the end only when the task is accomplished, while pleasure in theact of competing is already gained on the way. The opposition betweenthe logic of goal-orientation and that of competitiveness seems not topresent an impediment. Competitive actions demands that ability bestretched to the utmost, as well as utter devotion to the action, andwithin a synthesis this demand assists the tyrannical disposition ofgoal-orientation to turn the individual into a means.95

The synthesis with competition saturates goal-orientation not onlyfrom the angle of its motives. As a valuative value, goal-orientationhas no emotionally moving component, the notion of thrift does notgenerate enthusiasm. Competition, on the other hand, is an moving andenthusiasm-arousing value, and it contributes these elements to itssynthesis with goal-orientation. Pure competition belongs to the realmof amusement; within the synthesis it becomes serious, not just atemporary game, while the laborer's serious goal-orientation acquiresan entertaining feature.

Chapter 8

The Oppositions between Justice,Freedom and Other Values

In the frame of typology (Part II, Chapter 6) we briefly discussed jus-tice and its character as an ideal. We will now turn to a more detailedstudy of justice, the instances of opposition between justice and othervalues, and its placement within the value system.

Justice is a value that answers the question how to distribute,namely, how much to allocate to whom. The issue is the distribution(also, if requested, the re-distribution) of objects possessing a positiveor a negative value, including rights and duties. The word “how” (inthe phrase “how to distribute”) refers both to the procedure of distribu-tion and to the pattern according to which the action's result is ar-ranged. The value justice already incorporates the answers to whenand what to distribute: when the dispersal (or the division) ofpossession (or ownership) already matches the pattern with regard to acertain object, there is, of course, no need to divide.

The value justice does not belong to the elementary level, i.e., thelevel of given values (feeling and emotion). It belongs to those reasonhas created with the tendency to regulate behavior liable to beingpushed in opposing directions. Even though there is an emotion con-cerning justice, and in particular an emotion concerning injustice,


these cannot exist without reason; they accompany what reason andthe will constitute.

The vantage point from which justice, or reason that participates inits constitution, observes its objects, about to be distributed amongindividuals, is an inter-individual and general vantage point, while thevalues already adhered to by individuals in a certain society areaccepted as givens; that is to say, justice does not come to determinewhat is a good or a bad object, what is better and what worse, butaccepts these as an already known given. The first value-stage func-tions as a given for the second stage.

Justice is an ideal, namely, it has to be done, to be directly real-ized; its realization does not arise from means a person employs or byany kind of mediation. One may employ means in order to create thepreconditions necessary for the realization of justice, but the realiza-tion does not arise by itself as a result of these means.

So far for a brief characterization of justice in general. Yet, justiceis not one and the same; from the axiological point of view, we shouldsay that there are many “justices.” Language has no plural form forjustice because it is structured for the valuative and not for the meta-valuative use of words; whoever holds up justice, holds up one ofthese “justices” as the only, unique justice.

What we have said so far about justice in general belongs thereforeto the outline of a value every society needs. The single concepts ofjustice (we will avoid the jarring term “single justices”), namely, thenotions of justice accepted by various societies, are but concrete con-tents that fill the outline, i.e., the different, alternative answers to thequestion how to distribute.

All concepts of justice divide into two kinds: the salient concepts,which determine the desirable proportion of allocations, and thosewhich are not salient, i.e., they do not recommend a certain proportion.

Salient notions of justice determine that the object for distributionbe divided into portions according to an already existing division (oran already existing dissemination) among those who receive portionsof something else, that makes up a given basis for distribution. Thedistribution basis, so to say, is already established and now guides thedivision of what has to be distributed, named “the object” or “the ob-ject of distribution.” The basis may be individual human existencealone: assuming that no member of a society is either less or more anindividual than all other members, the portions (i.e., the allocatedquantities) will be equal; this kind of justice is salient as well as non-discriminating. However, there is salient justice that discriminates,namely, reference to birth may be the accepted basis, i.e., a referenceto race, nation, the rank in aristocracy, etc.; achievements (or a certain

Oppositions between Justice and Other Values 243

kind of achievement) or needs may be chosen as a basis for distribu-tion. The equality required by all salient concepts of justice is not theequality of portions (which characterizes only the non-discriminatingconcept), but equality of proportion in relation to the basis of distribu-tion; that is to say, the quantity of the object allocated to person A,divided by the quantity of person A's share in the basis of distribution,will equal the quotient of the quantity of object allocated to person B,divided by person B's share in the basis of distribution.

Non-salient concepts of justice may recommend a distributionprocedure, like drawing lots (for instance, the lots drawn for officialpositions in ancient Athens). Whoever advocates lot drawing does not,of course, support a certain proportion, but only the procedure of lotdrawing in general, or a specific procedure whose details are predeter-mined, with regard to the manner of lot drawing. Non-salient conceptsof justice also embrace the recommendation to reduce the volume ofdistributed objects deliberately, namely, not to distribute certain ob-jects on society's behalf, but to leave matters in this sphere of objectsto develop on their own, through the actions of individuals belongingto this society; thus, on condition that these actions be restrained bypermanent general-rules, and that they yield some distribution of theobjects among the members of the same society. These general rulesmay also be considered as a procedure in a broad sense of the term.

Finally one may join one principle of justice in a certain sphere ofobjects to another principle in a different sphere; for example — equalportions regarding the allocation of voting and election rights (whilecontingents of society are excluded because they are too young, orforeigners, or woman, etc.), and no organized distribution in the eco-nomic sphere (with restraints imposed on economic activity by generalrules, supervised by the courts and the police). By joining the twoprinciples, we arrive at a heterogeneously composed concept ofjustice.

The different and rival notions of justice are constituted by differ-ent figures of reason; each notion constituted by reason in one of itsspecial historical shapes. However, in some sense they are those thatconstitute the different figures of reason (or the different kinds of rea-son). In short: By means of the justice concept the will chooses, thespecific reason constitutes itself, i.e., the way it arranges its valuativeconsiderations.

Some features are common to all concepts of justice. We will nowelaborate two of these, namely, the point of view justice takes and theapproval of society's intervention in the life of individuals. Here wehave to return to what was said above, to wit: Justice observes its ob-jects from a universal, inter-individual point of view, while the view-


point of individuals has to determine which object is good and whichis bad. The issue of this special, non-personal, universal viewpointrequires clarification. In order to go beyond the personal and arrive atthe universal viewpoint, I have to execute a kind of thought experi-ment. However, the experiment is not to say: let me assume that fromnow onwards everyone in my society will behave like me, will treatme as I treat others — may I now say that my behavior is good? Sucha thinking experiment certainly makes up one stage in the developmentof valuative deliberation, but it is by no means sufficient, because wearrive at an inverse egoism which says, treat others as you wish themto treat you. To achieve the universal point of view you must askyourself: what kind of distribution rules would you recommend to analien society, to which you do not and will not belong, but whom youwish well; that is to say, you are neither involved as a subject nor as anobject of behavior, and you do not favor one of this society's membersmore than the others. Furthermore, you do not know what members ofthis society consider a good or a bad object; you legislate for themhow to distribute good objects (goods, services, rights) and bad objects(burdens and duties), while you leave it to them to determine whichobjects are good or better and which are bad or worse.

Whoever falls victim to a violation of rules says that he has suf-fered a wrong; he does not say: damage was inflicted on me. He dis-tinguishes between damage and wrongs as two different negative val-ues. The utterance “wrong” already includes the statement that the is-sue is damage, but it also includes a violation of justice. The benefit towhoever does the deed and the damage to the deed's object are amatter for their personal points of view, while the proposition that thedeed is a wrong already incorporates a third viewpoint, i.e., incorpo-rates the existence of a universal, non-personal viewpoint. The latterdoes neither belong to someone nor to society, because society mayalso exercise injustice. Philosophical discourse comes to extract thisassumption from the specific issues with regard to which it is applied,and which thus keep it out of sight.

Yet, even in concepts of justice that are utterly alien to universalmorality and which receive no philosophical exposition by whoeveradheres to them, this assumption is embedded — the assumption thatjustice equals a non-personal viewpoint, residing beyond and above allviewpoints of whoever is involved in events, viewpoints which are tobe judged according to justice. A viewpoint of non-involvement,which we verify to ourselves by the model of proposing legislation foran alien society.

A person or a society may stand at a vantage-point of justice andlook out from there, they may abandon it, come closer or back away


further; all this occurs against the background of the valuative view-points attached to the observing subject — be it a real, individual sub-ject or a social quasi-subject (as when one speaks of a family's welfare,the honor of a tribe, or of benefit to an entire society or nation). About“good” one may ask “good for whom?,” about “useful,” “useful towhom?” — but it is improper to ask “justice to whom?” or “just towhom?.” Justice is not “of someone,” not “for,” not “to...”

All this is not extraordinary according to the logic of universalmorality, but it is also embedded in the justice concept of closed mo-rality. That is to say, even specific and discriminating justice whichimposes different laws on people belonging to different categories,allocates punishment according to the rank of the offender and therank of the victim — even such justice is not structured according to asubjective viewpoint, and those who accept it understand this.

In traditional societies, earlier laws are sometimes considered pref-erable to later ones,96 and even when leaders pass new laws which areclearly opposed to the old ones, they do so to restore validity to some-thing even older than the repealed law. That is to say, members of suchsocieties do not perceive laws as an expression of the legislator's will,because then the legislator's later will would cancel what came before.The law is perceived as an exposition of justice and not as anexpression of will. In contradistinction to justice, the will is someone'swill and belongs to a certain period of time. It seems that preciselysocieties adhering to closed morality and salient, discriminating justiceconsider not only justice as independent of the people in the arena seenfrom justice's vantage-point, but by proxy also the law, which is but anexpression of the former.

We now turn to an additional characteristic of justice concepts. Atendency to approve intervention in the course of events between indi-viduals lies at the root of all justice concepts, the tendency to regulateor even direct them, namely, not to let events just take care of them-selves. However, in the most salient justice concepts this tendency isstronger than in less salient concepts, though it is present there as well.The said intervention is to be carried out by organized society,including bodies invested with compulsory powers.

Values of freedom also vary in different value-systems, but theyhave a common tendency, opposed to the tendency of justice concepts;they are poised against intervention in the individual's life, againstexternal regulation or direction. The more salient values of freedomand values of justice (be this salient justice discriminating or not) are,the more a collision between them becomes inevitable.

If your concern is justice alone, nothing will induce you to limit orto qualify it. If your concern is individual freedom alone, you will not


find anything in its nature that obliges you to reduce it. Safeguardingthe freedom of an entire public certainly requires that the freedom ofindividuals be curtailed, so that the realization of one person's freedomdoes not injure others; however, this consideration may already beguided by justice: how to distribute the right to freedom.

The relative weight of justice as opposed to freedom increases thegreater want is and the more it is want of necessities, namely, thegreater the suffering is of whoever bears the injustice (the issue here isthe weight of a certain justice-concept for those who adhere to it). InNicolai Hartmann's terms, one should say that justice is a lower andstronger value than freedom.

The value justice tends to clash not only with freedom but alsowith utility, i.e., with goal-orientation. In the first place, there is utilityfor the individual, namely, the individual who loses out by justintervention. This aspect is obvious. However, there is also compre-hensive utility, or the sum total of utility society achieves. goal-orien-tation already requires that the goal-oriented individual tyrannize him-self, and there is no goal-orientational reason for organized society notto harness self-tyrannization to its wagon; on the contrary, it seemsthat a goal-oriented viewpoint will encourage the tendency for self-tyrannization, whether by threats (of want or other mishaps), or bytemptation (with goods or other benefits); as justice plays a restrainingrole in general, it will impose far-reaching restraint on these means aswell.

If, to aid this discussion, we include pleasure in the concept ofutility — as economists do — and if we assume for a moment thatutility, perceived in this manner, can be measured, there is no reasonnot to assume that certain forms of slavery, or other kinds of bondage,may yield a greater overall quantity of utility than a just society (ac-cording to a number of justice-concepts). That is to say, the sufferingof the oppressed is set off by the surplus of pleasures for those who arefree (not by the somewhat negligible pleasures of the former).97 This isespecially valid for the less cruel and outrageous forms of slavery. Anyprinciple of justice which is not initially structured according to theheterogeneous viewpoint of compromise with the demands of utility,may find itself on a collision course with the latter. Bondage may benon-efficient and not useful if it does not fit the kind of work given tothe bondsman. For instance, the rough form of latifundia slavery, suit-able for rather simple technology which does not require initiative onthe laborer's part, will not be efficient when more complex tasks aredemanded from the bondsman. However, bondage is not flawed fromthe angle of efficiency and utility because it is unjust.


Justice does not only clash with freedom and utility, but also withthe care for humans and the inclination to treat people with benevo-lence. Such a clash may occur, for example, when punishment is de-termined by justice but is too severe for a common emotion of com-passion, or the inclination to benevolence. Such clashes will increasein number under discriminative justice which, for instance, allocatesslaves few rights and heavy punishment.

According to Nicolai Hartmann the kinds of opposition justiceconcepts encounter, embody ethical antinomies which can be formu-lated as paradigmatic contradictions — when one value obliges us tosay “deed A should be carried out,” while another value rejects thestatement.

In some sense, there is no solution for a value-antinomy; in reality,a person chooses this or that way, thus perforce violating some othervalue he adheres to and not resolving the antinomy. In another senseantinomies “resolve themselves” for you when you abandon theantinomian values (or one of them), namely, abandon them as valua-tive values and replace them by others; the antinomy is not resolved inthis manner, but loses relevance. Other instances of opposition becomerelevant. When one exchanges one justice-concept for another, oneexchanges one opposition for another.

A value-system that contains opposition will instruct the doerwhich course to choose; in the most frequent real cases in which oppo-sition appears, the system will, for instance, say: in case A act accord-ing to justice, in case B act according to values that oppose justice(care for human beings, utility or freedom). In this manner the systemdoes not resolve the antinomy, but nevertheless fulfills its role as theprovider of guidance.

For the peace of mind of those who adhere to a value-system, itmay not call things by their proper name, i.e., refrain from saying thatthe recommended behavior in case A sins against the duty to care forhuman beings etc., because the recommendations of a value-systemshould not include sin. In order not to become entangled in contradic-tions, the declared formulation of clashing values is sometimes altered.A heterogeneous course of reasoning is integrated in (at least) one ofthem, and it qualifies the value's own logic. On the face of it thesequalifications do not reduce the value's field of validity, but are laterparagraphs of the value's content, which qualify earlier paragraphs ofthis content. Instead of saying we reduce the value's area of validity,and we recommend unjust behavior in case B (a sharp formulation,liable to arouse doubts), one says: In case B justice requires what theopposing value prescribes (care for humans, utility, freedom).


Arguments conducted on a normative (not meta-valuative) levelprovide a good data source for axiology. The controversy on justicebetween John Rawls and Robert Nozick may serve us as an example.Rawls proposed a detailed normative theory of justice which recom-mends a salient justice (with built-in qualifications, expressing othervalues). Nozick developed a non-salient concept of justice which leftconsiderable room for utility and mainly for freedom. Both underpintheir recommendation with arguments which address the proper inte-gration of the recommended justice concepts within a comprehensivevalue-system. The proximity between Rawls's and Nozick's value-sys-tems shows in many common features; in the first place both adhere touniversal morality as well as to a moralistic and not to a utilitarianmanner of consideration. This proximity seems to bear evidence to oneand the same comprehensive value-system upheld by both but modi-fied by each alternatively, in order to try and resolve the oppositionbetween justice and freedom and utility. As Rawls and Nozick have acommon basis to a degree, their debate may be viewed as the expres-sion of an antinomy within a common comprehensive system. It ischaracteristic for the debate that it remains open: the arguments sup-porting the two alternatives do not cancel each other, but exist onealongside the other.

The detailed debate is interesting because it unfolds the nature ofvaluative argumentation, or the founding of values. To sum up: Ar-gumentation deals with placing a value within a value-system, so thatvaluative deliberation becomes possible in cases which are not specifi-cally mentioned by the value codex.

Value's Place in a System and its Essence

Axiologically it is worthwhile to examine a value not only from itscontroversial-normative aspect. Whoever defends a value (as Rawlsand Nozick defend their concepts of justice), presents it with all thesurrounding auxiliary structures which come to defend the buildingitself. Some of the auxiliary structures are closely attached to thebuilding and hide part of it, thus distorting its contours, its figure. Andit is appropriate to present a value in this manner. Whoever attackswhat he considers an unworthy candidate for a value, also deals withauxiliary structures he wants to demolish. Therefore, what isprominent in a debate is the consideration for additional values in thesame system. In a debate placement within a system is prominent.

However, axiologically not only the place of a value in the systemis of interest, but also its own inner logic. That is to say, axiology also


wishes to see the building without the structures surrounding it, totrace its contours, to gain an impression of its own figure, to under-stand a value's own pure tenor. Let us take an example. The pure tenorof salient justice does not include any consideration for absolute quan-tities of utility, of pleasure, of freedom, but only for the proportionbetween the allotments people receive.

The tenor of the value >not to murder< is >not to kill humans<.Martin Luther and later the authors of the King James Version trans-lated the Biblical commandment that expresses this value (Exodus,20/13) according to its pure tenor: “thou shalt not kill,” even thoughthe original text uses the Hebrew word for murder. The differencesbetween killing and murder are that murder refers only to humans (asobjects of the deed), only to deliberate deeds, and only to unlawfuldeeds (not any deliberate killing of humans is considered as murder).

The value >not to murder< is made up by the skeleton >do notkill< and all the soft tissues that envelop it, consisting of rules whichpermit killing, sometimes even demand it, and state that it is notmurder. The skeleton remains unchanged over generations, while thesoft tissues surrounding it change or are replaced. Some manslaughterwhich is not considered as murder by a person adhering to one value-system, will be viewed as murder by someone adhering to a differentvalue-system. Take two newspapers, representing opposing positionsand study their description of one of the frequent cases of manslaugh-ter which occurred in insurrections or civil wars, and you will learn thedifference between the killing of human beings and murder.

Every value, so to speak, considers itself the only one within thesystem. It does not find arguments within itself for the reduction of itsvalidity or its demands. Whoever holds a value will not find restric-tions for its validity but in other values. In order to discover theserestrictions one has to think about ones surrounding reality, aboutfeasible ways within this reality to realize the various values he ad-heres to; to think about relations of dependence on one hand and rela-tions of opposition on the other, prevailing between the realization ofone value and the realization of another (or rival) value. That is to say,discovery of a value's possible qualifications and the establishment ofsome of them requires a replacement of the valuative point of view.But the fixation of a person on a single point of view occurs. He willnot see any qualifications for value V, he will adhere to V's skeletonwithout its enveloping tissues.

The skeleton of a value exists therefore not merely as an abstrac-tion; it is exposed, so to say, not only to the axiological X ray appara-tus (which is value-neutral), but also to a special kind of valuative, ornormative look; the look of whoever is fixated on a certain value.


The fixation of a viewpoint and the subsequent focusing of a sys-tem on a single value appear in the sphere of individuals as an obses-sion with a single issue, and in the sphere of society as fanaticism orfundamentalism. The single value may be a goal or may be an ideal.For a person who fanatically adheres to Value W, W will be higher aswell as stronger than other values. The positive value-property W isbetter than other positive properties compared to it, and the negativevalue-property W is worse than other negative value-properties.

When the unqualified value is a goal, all means serving it becomesanctified.

However, the unqualified value may be an ideal, for instance, non-violence or peace, justice or order, efficiency or freedom, speaking thetruth or aiding sufferers. As a person cannot live only according to onevalue (by employing only one value), the idea-fanatic usually makesallowances without admitting it, namely, by using pretexts aided bylinguistic maneuvering.

Fanaticism (and also other kinds of fixated focusing) leans onemotion and does not try to defend the value which is its object byarguments. Argumentation in favor of one value employs the aid ofother values, and shows integration of the defended value within thesystem, its adaptation to other limbs of the system. Accordingly ar-gumentation in favor of a value qualifies it, limits the sphere of itsvalidity in the case of conflict with others. Fanaticism is not ready topay the costs of defending its cause by reasons.

In contradistinction, a value-system built on some degree of bal-ance between opposing values requires a shift of the valuative view-point from one value to another, releasing the bargaining to some de-gree, and thus reason itself, from emotional bonds.

A valuative value's own course of reasoning belongs to the realmof essence. Accordingly, whoever adheres to a value acknowledgesthat the value's validity is not externally awarded, by the system or thesubject; it is not awarded by virtue of arguments, it is founded onitself. The typical single valuative value is its own master and treatedaccordingly by the person adhering to it.

A value-system, on the other hand, including the placement of thisor that value within it and the compromises which cement one value toanother, does not possess its own essence: It is not a principle and isnot a table of values, which some philosophers searched for (theysearched for the table of values, writ large); it is the deliberation whichreason employs to examine applications and their realization, to exam-ine the power of motives, to check which hypothetical opposition be-tween valuative values has become real by virtue of the circumstances.


A value-system is a process of reason's crystallization into one of itshistorical figures, which instructs one society among others.

However, in the same manner in which the focus on a single valuemay become fixated and acquire an extreme (and emotional) figure,the position opposed to this fixation, advocating a balanced system,may also acquire an extreme (though not emotional) figure; it maydeny the existence of opposition between values in every sphere ofvalues founded in reason (i.e., between values of ethics themselves andbetween these and utility). According to this viewpoint opposition be-tween values in the sphere of reason is but a semblance; stringent scru-tiny of the opposing values will reveal in at least one of them an addi-tional content concerning the manner of its application, and this con-tent annuls the value opposition. Opposing demands were based on thefailure to distinguish more delicate features of these values, namely,were not rooted in the values themselves. This belief in harmony thatexplains away conflicts of values, requires to regard the qualificationsadded to a value by the system as this value's own tenor; the softtissues replace the skeleton and the boundaries between values withinthe system become blurred.

Axiology takes interest in one point of view while it draws thepicture of a single value, and in the other point of view while it exam-ines the system and the basis of the valuative deliberation.

A certain fear has been voiced, that by perceiving values asbelonging to a subject, and by the admission that there are differencesof opinion about them, values are relativized. Actually, a value doesnot become qualified by its “attribution” to a subject in general, and toa real, individual subject in particular. We will return to this issue fur-ther on. Only another, opposing value can relativize a value. Thequalification of a value within a value-system may express such rela-tivity. When a definition of justice does not only refer to the propor-tion between the rations individuals receive but to their size as well,this expresses a relativity of justice and an attempt to resolve opposi-tion between it and other values.

From a certain point of view a value may not change, but be re-placed by another; it does not belong to the sort of beings that canchange. From this angle the value as an intent is detached from inten-tionality and becomes absolute. This is the viewpoint of the intentiontowards the value's own, pure tenor. Axiology takes an interest in thispoint of view and in what it reveals, but cannot adopt it.98 It is con-venient for axiology to describe the replacement of soft tissues — inthe metaphor above — as continuous change. It will consider as areplacement only a case in which continuity is manifestly broken.


Conflicts and the Relation between What Should Beand What Is

Opposition between two values adhered to at the same time by thesame individual occurs only in the sphere of application (obviouslyrivalry also occurs only in this sphere). That is to say, a person doesnot approve and disapprove of the same value, but he or she appliesdifferent values that at first sight do not seem to oppose each other. Inthe course of applying them the person comes up against an object (beit a thing or a deed) which turns out to be good from the angle of onevalue and bad from the angle of another value. If this object is a deed,then as far as it is good, it is to be done, and as far as it is bad, it is notto be done. A contradiction appears and requires to change one of theopposing values. If the valued object is a thing (and not a deed), it mayindirectly imply a contradiction.

This opposition may refer to an object which is only imagined andnot real, and in this case the opposition is only hypothetical; but it mayrefer to an existing object and then the opposition is real. Within everysystem, many instances of opposition are merely hypothetical, and donot trail changes in opposing values or restrict their validity. Realopposition however, trails qualification of values and restriction oftheir validity, because without this the system would not be able toguide a person's actions.

As objects of intentionality, existent things cannot directly influ-ence the value according to which they are valued. However, the an-swer to the question what things exist determines the answer to thequestion which hypothetical instances of opposition between valuesare purely hypothetical, and which among them are real. This answerincorporates a demand to restrict the validity of certain values. changein evaluated reality turns a purely hypothetical instance of oppositioninto a real one. For example, an improvement in medical technologymakes it possible to do things which according to the existing systempossess opposing value-properties; thus, in order to settle the conflict,a demand for the creation of a new value emerges. Here the questionarises, whether the causal connection between change in reality and achange of values does not undermine the distinction between whatshould be and what is, between value and reality.

It seems that through the mechanism of settling conflicts valuedreality trails a change in the values applied to it, and thus cancels theborder between what is and what should be. But if we are meticulouswe will find that as an object of valuation, reality influences the ad-herence to values (i.e., determines if the adherence is qualified), whilethis adherence belongs to reality. This adherence is part of the form of


values, i.e., of value-thinking. The difference between value and itsform is revealed in the following state of affairs: An exposition of avalue cannot be made in a neutral language, while its form may bedescribed, and this can be done in a neutral language. The form is thefactual aspect of value thinking. What changes as a part of real proc-esses is the form of values and not the values as intentional content.Value's mode of application, its place in the system and its soft tissues— all these belong to its form. If we distinguish meticulously betweencontent and form of intentionality, considerations concerning valueconflicts will not undermine the logic of the distinction between whatis and what should be.

Now to a related issue: The collision between motivative values isalways influenced by the environment as well. Even if the power ofmotives is given to us, we still do not know which motives will col-lide, with how much power this will occur, and which is the strongerone. Here the marginal power of motives is relevant, as this is theirreal power (the general power of a motive is purely hypothetical). Themarginal power, however (which is identical with the readiness for asacrifice in given circumstances), is determined by the reality sur-rounding a human being, namely, by the supply it offers. The order ofpriorities of motives, determined by the will, refers to their marginalpowers.

Reason, trying to settle conflicts between valuative as well as mo-tivative values, needs therefore information about value-bearers, orabout objects of valuation, and not only crystallized and defined val-ues.

A Model for Opposition and Mutual Conditioning inthe Realization of Values

The environment may contribute to the shaping of a value-opposi-tion on two counts. It may dictate a certain ceiling above which oppo-sition between the realization of two values, V and W, prevails. Abovethis ceiling realization of value V impedes the realization of value W,but up to this ceiling — not; value W will also have such a ceiling.Both ceilings together make up the upper limit for a possible jointrealization without the need to choose.

The environment also contributes to the shaping of value-opposi-tion when it makes realization of value V a precondition for the reali-zation of the opposing value W. This means that the same valueswhich oppose each other above a certain ceiling, L2, will stand in a


dependence relation beneath another ceiling, L1, when L1 is not higherthan L2. That is to say, realization of V up to L1 is necessary if W is tobe realized. Such conditioning may be reciprocal (similar limits mayalso occur in rivalries).

The integration of both contributions into a reciprocal systemyields a model, in which each of the scales of the opposing values willhave four special notches: minimum, two optimum notches (from theangle of the system's harmony and from the angle of its output,namely, from the angle of maximal realization of the system's values),and maximum. We will thus gain five areas, which we will mark bythe letters a, b, c, d, e. In area a (up to the minimum) the realization ofvalue A and value B aid and are necessary for each other. In area b (upto the harmony optimum) they neither aid nor impede each other. Inarea c (between the two optimum notches) the realization of A pre-vents further realization of B (above its first optimum), but does notcancel what has already been realized of B; the same holds for the in-fluence of B's realization on A. In area d (above the second optimum)the value becomes tyrannical within the system, and cancels an al-ready prevailing realization of its opposition (beneath the first opti-mum notch). Area e (above the possible maximum) is a paradoxicalarea: should I try to realize A in this area, I will cause the cancellationof what was already realized of A itself, because here the realization ofA cancels the realization of B beneath the minimum notch — and asthe minimum of B is necessary for A, A is in reality canceled togetherwith B.

The drawing of the scale is therefore like this:

L1 L2 L3 L4

a b c d eCondi-tioning

possibil-ity ofjoint re-alization

Impossi-bility offurtherjoint re-aliza-tion

cancels re-alization ofthe oppos-ing value inarea b

cancels reali-zation of theopposingvalue in areaa, and thuscancels itself

When V arrives at L2, W can also arrive there. When V stands atL3, W remains at L2. When V stands at L4, W has returned to L1.

There is good reason to believe that in modern society importantvalues are arranged according to this model. For instance, mutual con-ditioning will prevail, when both values are vital, namely, when aperson cannot function within the social system without their realiza-tion. Limitation of the opposition by a bottom line will prevail, for


example, when the more-vital realization of value V resides in a differ-ent sphere of objects than that of the more-vital realization of value W.

The opposition between salient justice and other values has a focalplace in modern reality, and I believe that in its general outline it isarranged according to the model described above. A minimum of sali-ent justice, for instance, conditions the realization of other values fromthe aspect that non-salient justice allows for individuals to die of want(of food, clothing, medical care); for whoever is liable to die of wantunder the rule of non-salient justice, achieving a minimum of salientjustice is a necessary condition for the realization of any other value.In circumstances in which want looms over a considerable part of soci-ety, the stability of the social-political system also requires a minimumof salient justice.

When salient justice nears its maximum mark it turns into tyranny;when it passes this mark it cancels itself, namely, what is to be itsrealization is perforce something else, i.e., is not at all a realization ofjustice.

The same holds for freedom. Without a minimum of freedom, allother values lose their relevance, while a maximum of freedom trailsanarchy, which cancels freedom itself.

The model described above is also relevant for the analysis of spe-cific instances of opposition which at their root are offshoots of thefocal kinds of opposition, as well as for criticism of the aspiration tomaximize the realization of a single value. For instance, the oppositionbetween an individual's conscience and the law of the land is anoffshoot of the opposition between freedom and justice. A law whichleaves no room for conscience to express itself could deprive a state ofits character as a state ruled by law. Obeying conscience while break-ing laws (in a state ruled by law) leads to a breakdown of society,which is the object conscience refers to.

Chapter 9

Struggles Between the Will andMotivative Values

The will, whether consulting reason more or whether less, decides inconflicts between motives. The motive the will has rejected often notonly continues to exist, but even challenges the will and engages it instruggles.

We find the will fighting for the sake of values of all types. Theend, obviously, need not be mentioned here again. The will is mobi-lized for the sake of prudence. When rivalry occurs within the familyof needs, inclinations and constraints, the will supports one of therivals. The same holds for rivalry between ideals and for rivalry oropposition between duties. These struggles frequently create complexsituations demanding sophisticated maneuvering from the strugglingparties, as if it were a struggle between two different persons. In orderto analyze these complex situations we have to distinguish between thedifferent factors involved in the struggles, i.e., reason, will, andmotives, and treat them as different agencies or components of thepersonality.

When Ulysses' ship approached the place where the sirens sang, heasked his mates to tie him to the mast. He stopped their ears with wax,having ordered them beforehand to go on and tighten his bonds, if hegave signs that he wanted to be released. Ulysses wanted to sail on and


reach home, but he knew that the sirens' song would arouse his desireto leave the ship and join them; he therefore outwits his future desireby means of the orders he gave to his mates. He does not wish to forgohearing the sirens sing, and he believes that paying this price is notnecessary.

The power of the opposed motives undergoes changes from onehour to the next. Ulysses' will and wisdom anticipate the reinforcementof some motives and create an objective situation in which thesemotives' superior power cannot lead to action. John Elster in his bookUlysses and the Sirens acutely and in a scholarly manner analyses aseries of struggles going on within the personality; however, he doesso without acknowledging the existence of different agencies within apersonality, i.e., without a suitable theoretical model.

A subject made up of a single agency, a uniform and rational sub-ject, will not limit the number of options he may have at his disposal infuture. A monolithic Ulysses would tell himself: when the time comesI will see whether it is worthwhile to leave the ship for the sirens, evenat the cost of forgoing the return home. In the future he will have notless but more information then now and therefore a better basis formaking decisions.

Numerous people who decide to stop smoking, or to wean them-selves of overeating or the use of alcohol, create circumstances thatlimit their freedom to give in to their desire when, as expected, itovercomes the will. A person will avoid passing the tobacco shop, willthrow the key to his bar behind his back when he goes to bed (so thathe will not be able to find it and drink when he gets up during thenight), etc. Here the will does not tie itself but ties the motives. Instrict sense, we have in these cases no self tying as we have in othercases no self deception. The ideas of such reflexive actions are conven-ient in describing some phenomena, but not appropriate for analyzingand explaining them.

One may argue as follows: Any voluntary action is guided by thewill. As smoking, eating and drinking are voluntary actions, they cannot be done against the will. When motives opposed to a decision thathas already been made gain additional power, they do not circumventthe will to generate action, but cause the will itself to surrender andorder the action. We have then to develop the idea of will in accor-dance with the use of the phrase “voluntary action.” It is anappropriate starting point, since there are no differences of opinionabout what for instance voluntary muscles are. According to thiscourse of reasoning, we have to say that in some cases mentionedabove the will indeed ties its own hands in order not to obey themotives.

Struggles Between the Will and Motitative Values 259

While the wider meaning of the word “will” is connected with thephrases “voluntary action” and “voluntary muscles,” the narrow mean-ing is tied to decision and judgment. What is done “against the ownwill” is according to the narrow meaning a deed opposed to a decisionand to valuative judgment. According to the wider meaning of “will,”it is impossible that a person will do something against his or her ownwill.

The simpler model can do with the will in its limited sense. And Iwill use here the word “will” only in its narrow meaning. I have thento say that whoever smokes in opposition to his own decision, smokesin opposition to his will, although smoking is a voluntary activity.According to this model, the phrase “voluntary action” is to be takenas one word.

Elster presents the case of a state tying its own hands by a consti-tution.99 The legislator does not tie his own hands by an ordinary law,because he is free to change it, while constitutional change requires aspecial majority. If we look at it more carefully, we will see that herealso one factor ties another factor: The adherents of position A aretoday a majority in the law making body and they tie by constitutionthe opponents of position A who will perhaps be tomorrow a majority,but not a sufficient majority to change the constitution. A possiblejustification in some cases is: The decision we passed with a greatmajority should not be annulled by a smaller majority.

The will vanquishes motives by virtue of its strength or by virtueof its cunning (the cunning of reason it calls to its aid). When the willloses this is caused by weakness or by the absence of sophistication.

The twentieth century tendency not to admit the existence of awill, but only the existence of intellect and motives (or reason anddesires), gives rise to the question whether perhaps the opposition pre-vails not between the will and motives, but between one motive andanother one. However, opposition between motives themselves fails toexplain the situation in which a person acts in explicit opposition towhat he believes to be good for himself. A description of the opposi-tion as prevailing between different motives ignores the qualitativedifference between the warring forces.

Discussion of willpower and in particular of the will's weaknesshas sometimes been introduced into discussions of moral theory. Itbelongs to the very issue of morality that the motive it commands toprefer is in relevant situations also the relatively weak motive, namelymorality, by its nature, finds itself prima facie struggling with motives(or the individual's aspiration to behave according to morality findsitself struggling); by its nature morality needs the aid of the will in its


struggle, and the will, therefore, appears in these discussions asmorally good.

However, it is possible that in some case a person's will, whilebattling with motives that block its way, will serve what is morallywrong. One may reckon that this individual acknowledges morality (asaccepted by his society) but scorns its validity under circumstancesprevailing at the time ( when he thinks that others do not behave ac-cordingly), and decides to act in opposition to morality in a mannerthat serves one of his ends; thus, although the motives opposing hiswill, for instance motives of compassion, are morally preferable.100

However, we return to the case in which the will commands whatmorality requires and fails in its struggle with a motive blocking itsway (a case often discussed under the heading “akrasia”; the term de-notes a property of unbridled behavior, while the will is weak andcannot hold on to the reins). The question arises whether the owner ofthe will could in this case behave according to his will and morality'scommandment. We now shift our attention from willing to ability. Thequestion arises because duty a priori assumes ability.

Here we have to distinguish between ability in a limited sense, in-cluding the skill to act and an objective opportunity to do the deed, andability in a very broad sense, including willpower as well, namely,sufficient strength to overcome rival motives. Ability in its very broadsense lies at the root of a tenet: If X fails to do a certain deed, he doesnot want (has not the will) to do it or cannot do it (he may, of course,neither want nor be able to do the deed). From this sort of tenet itarises that if a person wants to do a deed and does not do it, he cannotdo it; and one could continue paradoxically: and if he cannot, he is notobliged to do it either.

The inner logic of the distinction between will and ability as fac-tors preceding action, requires us not to consider the strength of thewill as belonging to the factors of ability, but as a factor attached to thewill; thus we will say that a person can do a deed if he has thenecessary skill (and if the necessary objective circumstances arethere); we will say so independently of the system of motives thisperson possesses, and independently of his decisions or his willpower.According to this course of reasoning ability is understood as a factorwhich is not dependent on the will (this does not prevent us from ac-knowledging the existence of a volition to gain ability). Accordingly,we will reject the conclusion structured in the following manner: If Xwants to do A and fails to do A, it shows that he cannot do A.

I believe the categories whose application is fruitful in the analysisof struggles between the will and motives, are the categories of thewill in its limited sense (namely, not everything that stands behind

Struggles Between the Will and Motitative Values 261

every action called “voluntary”), and ability in a limited sense (whichdoes not include willpower). These categories do not create a dichot-omy: the motives which deflect a person from his decisions do neitherbelong to the will nor to ability. These categories do not lead theanalysis of personal cases into a paradoxical maze.101

Chapter 10

Repression

In our discussion of typology (Part II, Chapter 9) we already men-tioned the existence of special values (belonging to section C) aimed atthe valuation of humans, by which a person measures himself, namely,he compares his self-image with these values. The sum total of valuesaimed at the valuation of humans a person adheres to and applies tohim or herself, comes together in an ideal this individual seeks torealize. However, a certain stratification may emerge in this manner,i.e., this person's ideal will include the values he adheres to and alsostate which values he does not adhere to (in other words: what contentshe will not uphold as values). For example, X wishes not to belong tothose who adhere to a certain value A, or who maintain a certainopinion B.

Yet there are values humans do not constitute, namely, values aperson adheres to which were not established by his will but weregiven to him; he finds them within himself and only subsequentlybecomes aware of them. These are needs, inclinations and constraintsgiven to him as desires arising within him. And among such givenvalues, there may be one the adherence to which is opposed to thisperson's ideal. He or she wishes not to be a person who has this desire.

A state of self-dissatisfaction therefore emerges during the valua-tive reflection of a person about himself: The value according to whichhe values himself defines the fact that he upholds a certain given value


as a negative value-property. The given value this person finds withinhimself will be faulty in his eyes both as a valuative and a motivativevalue. If the will decides in favor of the ideal and against the givenvalue, it faces a special task because the issue is not avoidance of ac-tion according to the given value, but uprooting it completely.

This task resides on the border of the will's ability and perhaps be-yond it. Anyway, in numerous personal cases it is certainly beyond thecapacity for self-shaping. Now, to replace the task it cannot manage,the will may settle the conflict by adjudging that in fact its owner doesnot uphold the given value in question. That is to say, a persondeceives himself and thus removes a negative self-valuation from hisconsciousness. When this kind of self-deception succeeds, it representsrepression. The repressing will seeks to tear the forbidden wish out ofmemory. It alters the picture of its past.

The repressed value exists as an inclination to integrate elementsof the forbidden content with other, legitimate values, i.e., to insinuatesomething of the repressed wish into various syntheses. This circum-vention of censure may be far-reaching enough to license a forbiddendrug, while on the other hand repression may be radical.

Freud discovered repression in cases in which sexual wishes wererepressed. However, the mechanism he describes may also serve therepression of other wishes, like the desire to hurt another person cru-elly, be it a specific individual or a random target; the basis of such awish is the desire to avenge an injury suffered by the repressor, or apropensity for magic alteration of his past, because the latter interfereswith his self-image. In the same manner, feelings of hatred may besuppressed in a society that condemns hatred. These repressed valuesmay insinuate themselves into syntheses and confer aggressivenessupon non-repressed values, some of which are utterly

different from the repressed ones and even from each other. Love,for example, or moral rigor may acquire an aggressive coloring. Thisconsideration may aid the explanation of random cruelty, exercised byhumans throughout very different periods, in far-flung localities and indifferent social strata, i.e., it may help to explain why the values op-posing cruelty fail to gain the upper hand.

A repressed value is non-saturate — it saturates itself by a synthe-sis with conscious values. The person repressing a value is aware ofthe syntheses that include the forbidden content, but he does not iden-tify it as such.

Chapter 11

Ideology

The core of ideology is that it helps human beings to live with theopposition prevailing between his values.

A value's own course of reasoning continues to protest againstqualifications attached to it in order to adapt it to the system. Opposingvalues are dissatisfied, so to say, with the compromise imposed uponthem by the necessity to adopt a position, the necessity to cope withsituations in our environment. All these make consciousness uneasy.

Opposition may also prevail between a system of valuative valuesand a system of motives. The order of preference of valuative values isnot congruent with the order of priorities of motives according to theirpower; furthermore, the order of priorities is arranged according to themarginal power of motives in a given moment and therefore changesfrequently, while the order of preference does neither change much norquickly. The opposition between valuative and motivative valueswhich appears as knowing what is good and doing what is bad alsoirritates self-consciousness. It saddles the subject with a self-portrait heor she does not like at all.


Simple Ideology — Justifying Actual Prevailing Value-Systems

A simple Ideology draws a picture of the world and the subjectthat makes it easier to explain away the main modes of value-opposi-tion, creating an impression that the cases of opposition are lessweighty, and putting the remaining blame on factors which do notdepend on the subject.

A certain kind of ideology — we will call it transcendent — arguesfor the existence of an additional reality, beyond empirical reality. Thisreality incorporates things good in every sense and things bad in everysense; the object has no opposing value-properties. In this reality whatis present is present as a whole and in every sense, what is absent isnot there in any sense. This additional reality is therefore devoid ofcases in which our values oppose each other, and there are nocontradictions in the subject's thinking when applied to this reality. Inthe light of the reality beyond reality, all instances of oppositionbetween values turn out to be merely hypothetical and thereforenegligible.

The reality beyond functions as what truly exists, while the statusof empirical reality is reduced — sometimes slightly reduced to a levelof contingency, but sometimes much reduced to that of a mere phe-nomenon or even to what is only a semblance. Transcendent ideologymakes the phenomenon transparent and points to what truly existsbeyond it; this ideology provides a running interpretation of events,explaining them against its transcendent background. This interpreta-tion reduces real value-opposition till it becomes merely hypotheticaland till it finally cleans the value-system entirely of real opposition.

Addressing human reality, people's empirical practice which de-parts from what their trans-empirical essence dictates, is explained asan error, not on the part of the explaining subject, but an error of theperson whose practice has to be explained. For example, if humanbeings in general or a certain person is good on the trans-empiricallevel, then his being empirically bad arises from ignorance (not minebut his). And when a bad person behaves well it is also a mistake,namely, empirical contingency. The same holds when explaining thepractice of an entire human group, a people or a class; when membersof the group behave in opposition to their essence, they err or do notknow what is required.

Many religions also include, apart from value-concepts, a clearlytranscendent ideology; but not only these religions create an additionalreality, some secular political ideologies do the same.

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The man who called himself Junius Brutus (so let us call him so),author of “A Defense of Liberty against Tyrants” which was publishedin the sixteenth century, claiming that a rebellion could be legitimate,wrote: “The whole body of the people is above the king.”102 Did Bru-tus believe that the people of England or the people of the Ottomanempire in his time were above the king (or the queen)? No, of coursehe did not believe this, but in trans-empirical England, the proper one,the people were already above the queen and in the Ottoman empirethe people were above the sultan.

You may ask why Brutus does not say “In my opinion it is alwaysbetter for the people as a whole to be superior, and for the king to besubject to it.” The reply lies in the music of these sentences. “Thewhole body of the people is above the king” may be rendered withpathos in a speech, while striking the table with your fist. The sentencesuggested to Brutus instead, however — try saying it with the samedegree of pathos!

There is of course, no legitimate rebellion against the king in trans-empirical reality, because he will always bow to the authority of thepeople as a whole. The rebellion exists only on the empirical surface.What is, on the face of it, illegitimate in the rebellion is set-off by theillegitimacy of the tyrant — one error is set off by the preceding one.And not only the relation between king and people differs here andthere, but the people itself and the king himself are different. This doesnot mean that the people should be different from what it is, but that inits transcendent essence it already is different today.

Transcendent ideology need not become entangled in lies when itdescribes the empirical environment in which the subject lives. What itneeds is provided by the transcendent interpretation of this description.

The soothing picture of his or her value-system a person gains inthis manner incorporates an element of illusion — but the illusionrequired for the self-portrait is smaller the lesser the internal contradic-tions within the system are in number and in weight.

Ideology in general has two principal characteristics:1. It appears as a mixture of valuing thought and cognitive thought

(thought that demands the status of cognition for itself), similar topractical thought. However, if we examine it meticulously, we willfind that it incorporates no values and no cognition in their rigoroussense, but a free creation, like a work of art.

2. Ideology satisfies a human need, or more precisely, the need ofthe reflection a person engages in about himself or herself: if it suc-ceeds it enables him to approve of himself; in any case, it frequentlysaves his or her superego from dissatisfaction, and the minimum it is


required to provide is to calm the superego or self-consciousness as awhole.

In his consciousness, a person draws a picture of what he wishes tobe as well as a picture of himself as he actually is, and he estimates thediscrepancy. This self-portrait includes a picture of his value-system.The latter in its turn is in a certain sense made up — among otherfactors — by the world it is applied to. This is so because a value-system whose internal conflicts are merely hypothetical, is differentfrom one in which the conflicts are real. Accordingly, a different worldpicture requires a different system of values (even if each valueremains valid), and thus, of course, a different picture of the subjecthimself emerges — a picture in which the discrepancy between whathe is and what he wishes to be is different from what it was before-hand. Ideology molds the world picture in a manner that reduces thisdiscrepancy: A person devoid of ideology — if such a person exists —will be dissatisfied with himself and his value-system will be prone todeeper and conscious changes.

Apart from transcendent there are also immanent ideologies. Im-manent ideology can also work without clashing with phenomena,because the field of possible explanations for phenomena is wide evenwithout colliding directly with the scientific explanation of these phe-nomena.

It is quite common for immanent ideologies to ascribe certain val-ues and intentions to people. A person who harms others deliberatelyand dislikes to appear malicious in his own eyes, attributes malice toothers and thus justifies his actions by the claim, that under prevailingcircumstances his survival depends on these. Other instances of valueopposition can also be justified by ascribing values and intentions topeople. Here the ideologue persists even when these not only contra-dict what people say, but also what they do; he gives a special status tothe ascribed values and intentions — for instance, the status of aninterest (which is a kind of end dictated by the object) awarded to theends attributed to a person or a group; it then turns out that the ownerof this interest has not yet acquired knowledge concerning his objec-tive interest and has therefore acted against it (the ascribed intentionbecomes potential and is realized when the self-interest has been ac-knowledged). Some even establish true needs in the idea they have ofother people, needs which are invisible because they are hidden byfalse needs or reside in their shadow. The principle is the same as intranscendent ideologies. The individual or the group who know theirinterests and their true needs differ from the empirical individual orgroup. They are trans-empirical. If so, what is the difference betweenthe immanent and the transcendent ideology? The main difference is

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but one of degree: In one kind a whole sphere is separate from the en-tire empirical sphere, and transcendency is declared; the other does nothave a whole sphere designated for establishments, and mainly there isno declaration that these exceed the domain of experience.

It is not easy to distinguish between immanent ideology and prac-tical thought. While transcendent ideology is declaredly separate fromeveryday practical thought by virtue of the topics it treats of, it is dif-ferent with immanent ideology. The latter and practical thought dealwith the same matters, and both do so, prima facie, as a mixture (or acompound) of cognition and valuation. The difference we are lookingfor resides mainly in that practical thought precedes and dictates ac-tion, while ideology justifies it after its completion, ex post facto.103

Let us take a simple example from hypnosis. The hypnotist orders thehypnotized person to respond to a certain signal, after he awakes, byopening the window. He awakes, the signal is sounded and he re-sponds as ordered. When afterwards he is asked why he had openedthe window, he answers that the room was stuffy or that he wanted tosee something outside etc.; he invents a reason, according his behaviora rational character after the event, and he believes in what he says —he succeeds in deceiving himself.104

In another society, in which not rationality but honor is the domi-nant aspiration, ideology will wrap behavior post-factum in a cloak ofrespectability.

The boundary between the aspect of before and the aspect of afterthe event is not always clearly marked. Ideology can engender doings,namely a special residue of an ideological-ceremonial deed layeredupon the original deed that needs justification, or something like aspecial style of the original deed which adds an element of charm. Ascommon practical thought is not a mixture whose components of cog-nition and valuation are distinct, and because the deliberations of prac-tical thought are arranged in terms into some of which ideology hascast its contents, it is not easy for axiology to separate these two.

The characterization of ideology as justification ex post facto hastwo meanings. The first meaning is that the deed being justified oc-curred in the recent or the remote past. And indeed, the picture of one'sown past, be it of an individual or of a nation, often presents an ideo-logical character. The second meaning is that the value instructing acertain kind of deeds (including deeds present and future) gains justifi-cation by being integrated into the system, namely, by blurring theopposition between this value and the other limbs of the system.

What is common to ideology and repression is that both aid value-systems in fortifying themselves and persisting in their existence; both


save the person adhering to a value-system hesitation and confusion. Itis doubtful whether human beings could do without them.

Compensating Ideology

There are ideologies (among the transcendent as well as among theimmanent) which, on the face of it, neither explain away value-opposi-tion nor provide grounds for recommending the dominant values in thesystem that informs active life. On the contrary, they provide groundsfor recommending values that are practically inferior within thesystem, even for vigorous pleading on their behalf, and accordinglythey exacerbate the picture of opposition between values. For example,a spontaneous individual who does not plan his actions, who is notstructured towards ends and is no egoist, may advocate an ideology ofindividual goal-orientation and even preach it. It is possible for asociety in which much violence between individuals prevails and iseven considered legitimate, a society that values its members ac-cording to their success in violent encounters (for example, medievalknights), to espouse avoidance of violence and even of violent self-defense.

For an adherent of a value-system such an ideology, which is builtas an infrastructure for practically inferior values, may function as akind of compensation for the fact that some of his or her values areneglected by the system, or are deprived of their practical impact.Compensation may exceed the degree of deprival, i.e., the ideologymay aid a radical version of the practically inferior value: The short-changed individual goal-orientation of the first example may bestrongly recommended as enlightened egoism; the rejection ofviolence in the second example will be recommended in its extremefigure, namely, turning the other cheek. Ideological compensation isgenerously awarded because it remains on a purely ideological level,while the deprival is real.

Here a question comes to mind: Why is the superego prepared tomake do with ideological compensation? The manner in which com-pensation is received can be understood with the aid of Hartmann'snotions of height and strength. As mentioned above, a value is weakwhen not realizing or violating it is relatively not a severe offense andmay be forgiven. The less severely the offense against it is valued, theweaker the value is. However, according to Hartmann the relation ofheight to strength is inverse. Accordingly, when we add to the heightof a deprived value, we will not expect it to remain as strong as it was,i.e., offenses against this value will be less severe. One may continue to

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extol a sublime value even though one commits small offenses againstit in everyday life.

The picture that compensating ideology creates in self-conscious-ness shows, that the deprived value was awarded great height. Yet thedeprival arises from the relatively little weight the deprived motivescarry, while the strength of valuative values is subsequently reducedby ideology, thus adapting it to the order of motives; compensation byadding height to these values comes last in this procedure.

Compensating ideology does neither blur nor camouflage the de-prival of a value's practical impact, but it provides a reason to view itleniently. Sometimes it even provides a reason to justify the deprival— when the choice is between foregoing the realization of a strongvalue and sinning against a value that ideology has made higher andelevated it in rank. The realization of strong, vital values is perceivedas a precondition for the realization of high values. Realization of thehigh value is postponed until another time and for other cases.

A person adhering to an ideology is not aware of its function, he isnot aware that ideology stands for justification after the event. He isaware of its contents and of the fact that he feels at home with it.

An idea serving one person as ideology may be a real value for an-other, for instance, it may guide his actions and be accompanied by amatching motive. Preaching a certain idea that serves an entire publicas compensating heightening, may move an individual emotionally,may motivate and guide him to realize the idea. In a certain sense, thechoice of a high value at the expense of a strong value resembles therisk involved in an interesting adventure. However, in the same waythat a certain idea (we will call it A) functioning as ideology may betaken with utter gravity by one of its disciples, it is also possible for anindividual to take A less seriously than generally accepted by thepublic upholding this ideology; this will occur when a number ofideologies suit the somewhat vague needs of this person and hechooses to adopt idea A because he wishes to belong to the publicadhering to A; that is to say, this person treats A like a garment hewishes to be seen wearing, in order to belong to those who dress in thismanner.

Originally, ideology is not a tool for statesmen, but man's dailybread. It is an object of mental consumption that satisfies a vital need.Its vitality shows in that people are angered when they hear somethingliable to undermine their belief. However, statesmen have alwaysknown that their endeavor cannot be maintained by force alone, andthat they also need the proper use of ideologies. Originally ideologyneeds no deceit, it maneuvers beyond the territory of truth (the alreadyknown truth), while honoring the latter's sovereignty. However, in


many cases the statesman cannot make do with this space, so he triesto steep the ideological bread in his own potion.

What has been said about statesmen would be misleading if wefailed to add that with regard to this issue there are extreme differencesin degree between different statesmen, different states and differentpolitical streams. There is political usage of ideology that distorts thetruth but a little, and there is usage utterly opposed to truth.

There is a rationalistic, anti-ideological ideology, on the face of itpragmatic, that recommends science as the exclusive guide of action,i.e., as a replacement for values, and experts as a replacement forstatesmen in government. However, as science deals only with whatexists, it can dictate but means for hypothetical goals, and experts canonly apply knowledge regarding means, but cannot say anything aboutgoals (as experts), and even less determine what goals are to be; thisanti-ideology is but an ideology whose inner logic is not properlystructured.

Finally we have to remark on the following issue: Ideology doesnot always exist separately, as an organized set of ideas; more fre-quently it appears as a certain coloring of other thoughts, or a kind ofspice added to consciousness, or to value-thought, or to practicalthought. In such a case, it will show in terminology, in hidden prem-ises or in a method of selecting facts under discussion.

PART IV

Objectivism andSubjectivism

In this part we will first treat two rival modes of thought prevailing inpeople's everyday consciousness — objectivism and subjectivism.These precede the philosophical theories known by the same name.These modes of thought prevail in the sphere of cognition as well as inthe sphere of valuation. The reflection we are going to discuss in thenext two chapters is non-philosophical reflection.

Chapter 1

The Objectivist

Popular objectivism (i.e., the mode of objectivistic thought common ineveryday consciousness) emerges when the mechanism of objectifi-cation, natural to consciousness, is expanded. This mechanism crystal-lizes the instances of what is intended, organizes them as objects andestablishes them beyond the subject.

When a person views the contents of his sensation or better, hissensory observation as well as the contents of his thought as entitiesindependent of his sensations or his thought, when he believes in thatindependence and expresses this belief in his treatment of what hesenses and thinks, we say that he objectifies these contents.

Objectification is usually applied to intentional content. In anycase, intentional content is always a candidate for objectification

Here I direct the reader to Chapter 6, Part I above, because we goon and twine threads begun there, and we use terms coined and ex-plained in that chapter.

We can distinguish two stages of objectification: Arranging the ob-ject and establishing it as an object. The arrangement or the construc-tion is the work of observing and understanding, while establishmentis the work of judgment, i.e., of the will.

Objectification occurs in grades: from the grade of the object'sutter indifference to the subject to a stage of some sensitivity towardsit. These are different levels of reality. Fictional reality we read about


or watch in a movie has also undergone some process of externaliza-tion. Children refer in their games to figures from a fictional realitywhich is also external in relation to consciousness (for them, whilethey play the game), but it is properly separate from the reality each ofthem shares with all other people.

A remark in the margin of this discourse: In describing an object asemerging from objectification I do not assume a position of episte-mological subjectivism (of idealism versus realism), because I do notrefer to the question of what relation this object (the concrete object)has to the thing in itself (whether they are identical, or similar; whetherone may speak meaningfully of similarity between a phenomenon andthe thing itself, etc.). For the present phenomenological discussion, Ineed not assume a position regarding the character of this relation. Inother words: we can use the idea of “objectification” without deciding,what its ontological interpretation is: whether objectification is theproduction or the reproduction of an object.

Naive Objectivism

Objectivism is a mode of thought that establishes, in addition toand together with intentional content, forms of intention apart from thesubject, i.e., apart from the intention. Naive objectivism does soimmediately, namely, the form is not separate from the content prior toits establishment, but is established jointly with the intentional contentwhich it serves as form.

What is being established of the form is its conscious part, namely,in the first place what is immediately conscious (is perceived). Theelements established beyond the subject include the formal aspect ofwhat is intended, the patterns in which it is cast, but alsocharacteristics of the intentional act. The established concepts carry themark of the intellect's casting patterns: patterns like properties andsubstance, species and genera, laws and events. In extreme cases ofnaive objectivism, the name of a thing is also externalized.

Objectivism is the inclination to raise the degree of objectification,namely, to confer upon the object utter independence of the subject.

An attitude of naive objectivism is natural to human beings: It isnatural to align oneself towards the outside, towards the environment,and not towards oneself, i.e., to pay attention to what is external, andtherefore to view as external what one pays attention to. The strugglefor survival encourages human beings to turn outward. When he per-ceives certain sections of himself in the context of an outward inten-tion, he keeps turning outward and externalizes them as well.

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Reflective Objectivism

Reflective objectivism does not represent an immediateexternalization of the form of intention but of reflection's intentionalcontent, which is more or less congruent with the form of transitiveintention. This kind of reflection does not consider itself as reflection,but as cognition of external reality.

Reflective objectivism is already present in popular thought and ar-rives at its salient expression in objectivistic philosophy, which estab-lishes the forms of intention as the structure of all that exists. A salientrepresentation of philosophic objectivism appears in the ontology ofideas ( Plato, Frege and Nicolai Hartmann). However, our theme inthis chapter is popular objectivism, naive as well as reflective, and notobjectivistic philosophy.

Popular Objectivism in the Sphere of Values

The objectivist considers an object's value-property as fundamentalto the object, and not as something made up by the relation to man.The cherry is tasty and beautiful not only for the subject. This objec-tivism with regard to values is analogous to popular objectivism in thesphere of cognition: For objectivistic reflection, the cherry's redness isalso a fundamental and not a relational property of the cherry. Thesame holds for conceptual values and value-properties (like a deedbeing just or unjust); these are also characteristics of reality and notsomething we constitute. The same approach appears on the level ofreflection about reflection, of course without being aware of this strati-fication.

For the objectivist as an individual values are a matter of learning,similar to arithmetic, and not a matter of decision or will. The applica-tion of values as well as their establishment are not a matter for hisdecision and willing, but are dictated to him/her. The radically naiveobjectivist has no will, i.e., he does not consider his will as will; insome aspects his will cancels itself and he adopts (though this is alsoan act of the will) the values of the society that surrounds him. Heneeds an authority which he can obey. In his view, this authority doesnot pave his way but shows it to him. He may use the word “will,” buthe strips it of some of its roles and on the other hand, attaches variousmotives to the same will.


He considers some features of his self-image as images of his envi-ronment; to achieve this his reflection must alter them, so that they canbe considered images of the environment.

So far as the objectivist cannot externalize something of his or herself and view it as part of the environment, he or she considers it aspossessions. The hand he uses is his, it is his closely attached property;it is not a part of the self. The same holds for his body in general, hisstrength, and the talent he finds in himself.

Having turned part of himself into a set of properties andcharacteristics of the environment and part of himself into possessions,what is left of himself is but an empty sphere. Accordingly theconsistent objectivist does not occupy himself with self-valuation; asnothing of himself is left, nothing has to be valued. His characteristicsand his patterns of observation which have become part of theenvironment are valued jointly with the latter, and what has becomepossessions is valued as possessions. Nor is he liable to be swept awayby a whirlpool of reflective emotions, because such emotions will notdevelop at all.

The objectivist is well-suited to goal-oriented activity. In goal-ori-ented activity that meets the requirements it establishes, the personcarrying it out is merely a means. Here lies the difficulty we discussedin the chapter dealing with opposition between goal-orientation andspontaneity. For the objectivist this difficulty shrinks, because accord-ing to his view only his possessions are left of his self, and possessionsare bound to function as means. The hand and the arm, the leg, the restof the body, strength and talent belong to him and he uses them andnot himself.

Focusing on the end as a dominant type of value matches the ob-jectivistic outlook from another important angle. A value-property hasto be the property of an object, which according to this outlook canonly be an external object, because only what resides outside the mindor consciousness possesses original content (in contradistinction toconsciousness, whose contents come from outside). And thus valua-tions of section C (i.e., valuations according to what precedes action)have no real value-bearer, because they value the subject; valuations ofsection B, valuing human actions, are not real either, apart from thetraces they leave in the external world. Section A, on the other hand,suits this outlook because here valuations are rooted in the value-prop-erties of reality. Here, in the external results of an action, the activeobjectivistic subject finds himself on solid ground.

Objectivism confers a certain stability on a person, because hisvalues and his character appear to him as characteristics of the worldand thus he cannot alter them. Changes in his values, changes in his

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character, or a change in himself are completely beyond his horizon;he changes without being aware of it, he neither shapes his values norhimself. However, unconscious change is usually slow and continuous,without sharp turning points.

The degree of stability objectivism confers upon a social system iseven higher, because it makes its members view the existence of soci-ety's values and their expression in laws as independent of any will.The wise legislator discovers laws, he does not invent them. Nymphsmay aid him (as they aided Numa Pompilius, king of Rome), but theydo not constitute values, or their manifestation in laws. Even God,according to popular prevailing monotheism, does not constitute theprinciple of the good, he can not choose that the bad will be the good,that the content of badness will be the content of goodness. Godchooses the good, because it is good, and it is not the other way round:what he chooses will be good post factum, by virtue of his willing it.In contradistinction to popular objectivistic monotheism, certainphilosophers (as for example, Descartes) present a subjectivemonotheism; according to them, God constitutes good from the outset:if God had wished something else, this something else would be thegood. However, in prevailing objectivism the good bears no arbitrarycharacter.

Popular objectivism is not only the manner in which a subjectviews itself; it also participates to a degree in constituting this subject.The objectivist does not merely consider himself an object — in acertain sense he actually turns himself into an object, at least as a po-tential. We say that he considers himself an object because in his cog-nitive judgment he establishes the forms of valuative thinking, dis-covered in the course of reflection, outside himself; in this manner,however, he establishes something of his subjective entity, his charac-ter, outside himself — he externalizes his character. His selfhood losessubstance. Accordingly he is a convenient object for goal-oriented us-age, be it himself or others who make use of him.

However, popular objectivism does not turn itself into truth in thismanner. The subject does not cease to be a subject when it becomes anobject; nor does it actually become pure understanding without will, oras understanding, a tabula rasa on which external dictates are in-scribed.

About Internalization and Externalization

When axiology wishes to explain the formation of a value it is notallowed to employ a theory of internalization of values because the


latter assumes that the value already exists, that a certain public al-ready adheres to it and implants it in the individual with the help ofcoercion; “…external coercion gradually becomes internalized; for aspecial mental agency, man's super-ego, takes it over and includes itamong its commandments.”105 Yet, the fact that internalization fails toexplain the formation of a value in a certain public is not the only flawthe internalization concept presents. This concept treats the individualas if it were a tabula rasa; a piece of soil waiting to be planted. But thisis wrong. Even to say that for the seedling to take root, the individualmust be inclined towards the thing to be planted is not satisfactory.People can modify a process already taking place within anotherperson, they can intervene in a process of value-change, or value-formation actually proceeding within another one. We could rightlyspeak of internalization, if it were possible for the same individual tointernalize alternative values, namely, value V would have been inter-nalized by an individual, if instead of V he could be made to internal-ize value W which is incompatible with V. If he cannot be made toadopt W, then V is already present within him (to some degree ofmaturation).

Internalization not only fails to explain how a value is createdwithin a society, it also assumes something about the nature of hu-mans, and it is doubtful whether this assumption matches any expla-nation of value-formation; that is to say a person made up so that val-ues could be implanted in him, or insinuated into him in some otherway by threat or temptation would not be able to create values, or con-sciously to alter values he adheres to. However, if the entire public iscomposed of individuals in whom values are implanted, or individualsresembling the latter, one cannot understand where the implanted val-ues come from. To make the category of internalization viable one hastherefore to assume that the public also includes real people, apartfrom those who function as plant nurseries, and that with regard tothese real people the internalization theory does not apply. Presumablyit does not apply to anyone, even to the adherent of naive objectivism.

When internalization of values of a certain culture is under discus-sion and these values are accepted by the parties discussing the issueof internalization, the concept's weakness is not apparent, because usu-ally people do not ask what the origin of a value they accept is; theyonly ask for the origin of an alien value, a value held up by others. Acertain degree of wonder is needed for someone to ask what the originis.

In contradistinction to internalization, the externalization of valueshelps to adapt processes of value-change in individuals. A person ex-ternalizes a value which resides within him on the level of reason, at-

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tributing to this value an existence independent of human conscious-ness, not necessarily as a Platonic idea, but as a fundamental (i.e., notrelational) value-property of things. thus, when he truly believes in thisexistence. In a society whose members externalize values, they areprepared to learn value contents from others as they learn facts fromother people — in both cases the issue is knowledge. The readiness tolearn contents improves communication in the valuative sphere. Oneshould, however, remember that even though one can teach a personthe content of values, one cannot establish them for him or her as val-ues; only they themselves can do so.

A theory of change in public values can therefore rely more on ex-ternalization then on internalization. But internalization may occur in acertain marginal sphere. There are values which do not guide man inhis actions and thought, which are not accompanied by a motive andcan be changed or replaced by another value without any change in thevalue system. Such values may in a certain sense be implanted or in-ternalized. For instance “opinions.” A person may adopt these andvoice them in order to make a certain impression on his audience. If hewishes to satisfy their expectation, he will say what is expected; if hewishes to appear original, he will express a surprising opinion. Hereopinion is a kind of garment for the mind, and the garment is donnedwith consideration for custom and expectations (whether by acceptingcustom or by opposing it). The snob will voice an opinion favored bythe aristocracy and whoever wishes to appear bourgeois, an opinionconsidered as bourgeois (he will morally resent industrial action othersengage in, even if he himself sometimes goes on strike). And they willnot only voice these opinions, but uphold them among themselves.That is to say, one does not only don the garment, but considers ithandsome and appropriate and feels comfortable wearing it. And asthere is fashion in clothing, it also exists in the narrow or wide marginsof a value system.

Yet, even in such cases of internalization (or implanting) somekind of valuative clue already exists within the person, this is a valueaimed at self-valuation, namely, an ideal of reflection (for example,the ideal to become an aristocrat etc.). Actually, this is more than avaluative clue: it is reflection's inclination to adopt certain values fromcertain people.

Society

In Part I above we already said that relations between people arenot between them, and one may add that society is not above them, not


does it include them (only in a subordinate sense, or a certain aspect ofthem). Society exists within the consciousness of individuals and itexists there in the first place as a form of intention, or rather as asystem of intentional forms.

From this point of departure we go on to twine the thread of dis-cussion. Society is not the original system of these forms, but anexternalization of the system.

It is not the individual which is formed by the internalization ofsociety's values; it is rather society which is created by the externaliza-tion of individual ways of valuation, namely, feeling, emotional andconceptual ways of valuation. The very community between people isof course not created by externalization, as it comes into being to-gether with humanity itself and it involves conjoint and mutual under-standing. Externalization but takes part in creating the organized figureof community as a society, as a family or a clan or as some economicbody, or as a partnership and so on. This organized figure isconsciously, actively and with purpose shaped and institutionalized byindividuals (and groups), who know society but need not know that itis a result of externalization.

A concrete society may be described as arranged in three layers.The basic layer is the community of understanding among people andthe need for this community. The second social layer is externalizationof the forms in which people are aware of each other. The top layer isgiven to society by virtue of shaping and institutionalizing activity.

Evil as a Value-Property

The objectivist has to meet a challenge presented by the distur-bance of his orderly and stable world by some of its inhabitants, whoare openly and sometimes demonstratively belittling the valuativeorder of the world and society.

Plato's philosophical objectivism explains these disruptions by lackof knowledge. However, the popular version of objectivism, whoseobjectivations are value-properties and not Platonic ideas, considersknowledge as information (and not as the comprehension of ideas),while malicious people do not always, or in particular lackinformation.

A person who is not an objectivist may try to explain the disrup-tion by a system of different values. That is to say, people who belittlemy values, adhere to other values. But such an idea does not fit intothe objectivist's horizon.

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The objectivist accepts the disruption (so far as its origin is notlack of information or skill) as something finite and final, which can-not be explained. An explanation reveals the structure of what is ex-plained, presents the structure in a model. The disruption of valuativeorder on the other hand, exceeds any structure. It cannot be presentedin a model. The image fitting valuative disruption is the crooked andconvoluted, in opposition to the straight.

The words “to understand” and “to justify” and their derivationsare in many cases used as synonyms. There are the things that disruptvaluative order which cannot be explained (for instance, by lack ofinformation); there is therefore something which can neither be justi-fied nor understood from any valuative angle. This is evil as a value-property, or malice. Mythological imagination substantializes it inSatan. Philosophical imagination reveals it as radical evil.

According to the above the objectivist inclines towards condemn-ing morality and not morality of preference, namely (following ourclarification above, in Part II), his morality parallels criminal and notcivil law.

In folk tales and popular movies the protagonists divide into goodand bad ones; children accept this easily and without questions (evenat the question-asking age); this means that for them evil is also avalue-property, and a property that cannot be reduced.

Evil is therefore a reservoir into which everything basically notunderstandable can be drained off, to avoid breaching the dams of anobjectivistic outlook.

Apart from this cognitive role, evil serves as an objectification ofhatred. Evil is what one hates, but for the objectivist it is the other wayround: he hates somebody because that one is evil.

In this manner, a link between the incomprehensible and the hatedis established.

Chapter 2

The Subjectivist

While objectivism is a mode of thought that treats the form of inten-tion as if it were content, subjectivism represents an inclination to treatintentional content as if it were form. Accordingly one may viewsubjectivism as reflection's orientation on form and name it “formal-ism,” and view objectivism, so far as it engages in reflection, as anorientation on content, and name it “anti-formalism.”106

So far as the objectivist is consistent, he denies reflection legiti-macy, because if there is no form of intention, reflection has no object.Accordingly his reflection about himself is a) either not considered asreflection ( but as cognition of an external object), or b), it concernshim so far as he is bad, so far as something within him is faulty anddoes not function as tabula rasa, or c), reflection and its object (theform) are transient and incidental, thus needing neither legitimacy norattention to their status.

The subjectivist, on the other hand, can legitimately reflect abouthimself (he receives confirmation from reflection on a higher floor).

The subjectivist finds selfhood not mainly in his intellect but in hiswill, not in his observation but in his emotions and feelings. He alsoviews his cognition as his own reaction, expressing him himself, andnot as a dictate he receives, or the depiction of what exists. While theobjectivist views valuation as cognition, the subjectivist views


cognition as valuation; the reduction occurs in opposite directions, butneither keeps the two spheres separate.

The subjectivism we discuss here is not epistemological subjectiv-ism; the latter denies that the things surrounding us are independent ofcognition, namely, they are phenomena appearing to us.

As opposed to the objectivist, who considers himself a tabula rasa,the subjectivist considers himself as an entity abundant in originalcontent, not less than any other entity in his environment; accordinglyhe is a being among all other beings in nature.

In contradistinction to the objectivist, he does not view society asresiding outside the particular individuals part of whom are familiar tohim, or between them; he does not view society as something finiteand given to individuals, nor does he view social factors as anonymousforces. He views society as an expression of the will of individuals, andmakes an effort to express his own will.

In the same manner that the subjectivist does not view himself as atabula rasa but as a source of content, he views other people as con-crete subjects too, as beings abundant in original content, but thereforealso as his rivals, and as objects of his actions. As subjects they are aspecial kind of objects. The more this attitude is transposed fromthought to the arena of reality, i.e., the more he exercises his authorityover others, or succeeds in maneuvering and manipulating them ontothe desired track, he cognizes the concrete subject in the manner a pot-ter cognizes his clay. He concretely cognizes himself only later, byanalogy with the subjects which are his objects. While he occupieshimself consciously and with purpose (goal-orientation included) withthe shaping of social relations, he uses ready-made raw-materials, butthese are supplied by the objectification of forms of consciousness.

The subjectivist, who has turned others into his objects, cognizesthem — so far as they are objectivists — not in the manner they cog-nize themselves; thus, because they cognize themselves only in theirexternalizations and in the abstract, their selfhood scattered over thingsin their environment. The subjectivist, on the other hand, cognizesthem as living creatures who respond and react in a particular manner.Their cognition converges to a degree only in one sense: so far as theobjectivist externalizes himself into a crystallized natural entity whichis his property (his body, his strength, his talents). The subjectivist alsoconsiders the objectivist as property, but he stakes claims of ownershipto him.

The analogy he draws between the objects of his social activity andhimself refers both to the same kind, i.e., living, thinking creatures,who react in particular ways; however, this does not cancel the differ-ence between him and them, a difference he recognizes and seeks to

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fortify, both for goal-oriented reasons and in order to fortify his trust inhimself. The question of trust in himself is of no concern for theobjectivist, while the subjectivist, who is aware of his reflection asreflection, also possesses values of reflection, namely, to have this orthat character; he vacillates between the pleasure of self-approvalwhen these values are realized and despondency when they evaderealization.

For the subjectivist these values are not only full in their positivesegments (as in ideals and inclinations), but also in their negativesegment. That is to say, from the angle of their structure they havebecome needs. The axis of a subjectivist's life are his inward directedneeds.

The subjectivist competes all the time with people who resemblehim; they are the yardstick he uses to measure himself in order to de-termine how far his inward-directed needs have been satisfied.

The satisfaction of an ordinary need (belonging to section B) isgiven, as its non-satisfaction is given. Whoever ate to capacity, feelsreplete. This is different with regard to needs (perhaps only quasi-needs) belonging to the individual's reflection about himself. He has tocompare himself to his rivals in order to know whether he may ap-prove of himself, whether he is permitted to feel replete.

At the end of Part II above (Chapter 9), we found three orientationsaccording to sections, namely, the value system may focus on one ofthe three sections. The objectivist characteristically focuses on sectionA, principally on ends, while the focus on section C values, aimed atthe valuation of humans, characterizes the subjectivist.

Besides reflection, the subjectivist also emphasizes immediate self-awareness, namely, his entire self-consciousness. He lays emphasis onhis passing through an experience, and not on what is experienced;accordingly the shades of what is experienced are less distinct; differ-ences in what is intended disappear because of the attention paid to theact itself.

Objectivism and subjectivism are propensities of self-conscious-ness which influence the value-system, and stamp the character of peo-ple inclined by these propensities as well as the position they assumewithin the social system. Paradoxically, the development of self-con-sciousness in both manners shortchanges personal autarky. The objec-tivist comes close to whom Hegel describes as a slave in “Phenome-nology of Spirit,” and the subjectivist comes close to whom Hegeldescribes as a master.

A person is not necessarily an objectivist or a subjectivist in thesense described here. On the other hand, he or she may combine the


two inclinations, so that in certain matters they will behave accordingto one propensity, and in other matters according to the other.

Chapter 3

The Validity of Values and theQuestion of their Foundation

Disagreement and Relativity

A certain qualification, regarding the distinction between what isand what ought to be, arose in one of our previous discussions. It didnot upset the line of reasoning involved in this distinction. Neverthe-less, before we apply this distinction to the problem of consensus con-cerning values, we have to say again what the qualification is.

In our discussion of value opposition (Part III, Chapter 8), we sawthat cognition of what is can influence a statement of what ought to beonly through the opposition prevailing between values of one and thesame person, and that this possibility is also qualified as following: Onthe part of cognition, this is only a meta-value-cognition, on the part ofwhat ought to be it does not deal with the skeleton of values but withtheir soft tissues (according to the metaphor we used); that is to say,we deal with the alignment of the border dividing a certain field ofapplication in which there is conflict between two values, betweenthese two. In other words: rather than dealing with the shaping of purevalues, we deal here with the shaping of mixed values (whichincorporate a cognitive element). Now to the theme of the currentchapter.


For whoever adheres to a value, its validity belongs to the inten-tional content. It belongs to the essence of the distinction between theintentional content of a valuative value and a fact — that a fact can byno means strengthen or weaken a value's validity. For the valuativevalue, the fact remains a field of application and nothing else. The factmay be valued positively or negatively, or it may reside at thevaluative scale's zero point — it can in no case influence the valueapplied to it.

Adherence to a value is in itself a fact and from the angle discussedhere, it should be treated like all facts.

To be sure, it is also a fact that others adhere to some of my values;yet, as a fact can neither strengthen nor weaken the validity of a value,this specific fact cannot strengthen the validity of my values either.

On the other hand, the fact that other people uphold values whichdiffer from mine, or even values which are incompatible with them,cannot restrict the validity of my values at all, nor can it lead to a rela-tivization of the values I adhere to.

One says at times that a society or an individual possess values, orthat a certain value belongs to a society (to which this society and noone else adheres). However, this metaphor refers only to the form ofthe value and not to its content, while validity belongs to the content.Such utterances describe the form of valuative intention. They do notgive an exposition of the content. With people who accept thesestatements at face value, they may leave the impression that the con-sensus question is relevant to the validity of values; thus, if we admit alack of consensus, we “relativize” the value. However, the adherenceto a value cannot become more relative then it already is, because it isa pure matter of factual being, not a matter of validity, and the state-ments about the possession and belonging of values do not refer to thevalue itself.

A state maintains a certain system of currency. The currency be-longs to the state. This kind of ownership has to be taken at face value:paper money not used by any state known today, has no validity todayfor me either. Here we have a link between belonging and some kindof validity, which can be reduced to the validity of cognitivestatements. But in the sphere of values, the absence of consensus is notdirectly relevant to the question of their validity or possible relativity.

However, a person may have a special motive to uphold valuativevalues prevailing in his community, i.e., he has a motive for valuativeadjustment. This motive joins a value aimed at self-valuation. If thisperson's will aids the said motive, part of his values may undergo someadjustment to what prevails in his community. Should he discover thatone of his values opposes the prevailing values, doubts will surface

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and that value may be relativized. Yet, even in such a case it is stilltrue that only the opposition between values upheld by the sameperson (at the same time) may lead to a restriction of their validity.Yet, while on one hand a conflict between values residing on the samelevel (for example, values belonging to sections A and B) need notdislodge one of them, but requires to forego the realization of one ofthe two in each case of application, namely, to forego one value, notnecessarily always the same. On the other hand, a conflict between avalue aimed at self-valuation which requires adjustment to what isaccepted (and is accompanied by a motive) and a value opposed to thelatter, is bound to undermine one of these — a process that sometimesappears as “relativization” of the value.

Furthermore: The fact that a value is common to many people doesnot confer a more objective character upon it than it had before.

The value of uniformity, or of everyone accepting the same norm,is a meta-value directed at the system and demanding that everyoneadhere to the same value-system. It does not demand of all peopleequally to realize the universal system, but it demands that they ac-knowledge it; at best, acknowledgment in theory and practice, but atleast it demands not to adhere to an alternative system. This valueprevails in modern times, accompanied by a motive to adapt personalvalue-systems to the prevailing one. Here the value shapes the factsand not vice versa.

The Theoretical Problem of Value Foundation

In everyday thought, when a person feels called upon to justifysome valuation, he declares the value according to which he hasvalued as well as the yardstick he uses. Presentation of the value andthe yardstick is the required reason. On the other hand, a request forreasons that justify the value itself is usually beyond the horizon of thisthought ( the response to such a request may also merely yield a pres-entation of the value). The subject feels no need to ground a value inhis everyday practice of life, even if it contradicts another value in oneof its actual applications; feeling obliged to resolve the contradictionhe perceives this as a demand to forego the realization of one of thesevalues.

Cognition and values were not perceived as separate in theoreticalthought until the Renaissance; accordingly, foundation of a value wasnot separate from the foundation of cognition. However, since value-neutral science came into being, the question of grounding guidingvalues became a particular problem for theoretical thought: Values


cannot be founded on cognition if the latter is value-neutral. Subse-quently theoretical reflection about values divided in two broad direc-tions: the attempt to achieve value-neutral knowledge of the valuesthemselves within the framework of sciences about man, and the at-tempt to found values, which, of course, is not valuatively neutral. Tofound values is to discover the source of a value's validity and therebyenable us to set priorities and solve conflicts between values.

Chapter 4

Attempts to Solve the Problem ofValue-Foundation

We will now briefly review and examine five different approaches tothe issue of value foundation, as following:

1. Metaphysical deduction of values (the metaphysical approach).2. Their derivation from the essence of reason (the transcendental ap-proach). 3. Reduction to given values (naturalism). 4. Reliance upon aparticular faculty of knowledge (intuitionism). 5. Hypostasis of values(axiological objectivism).

Metaphysical Deduction of a Value from Cognition

The first attempt to ground values deals with re-unification of thespheres whose division generated the problem of value foundation.Unification is achieved by changing the character of the division andthe character of the spheres, until the derivation of values from cogni-tion seems to become possible and thus the neutrality of science iscanceled. This course does not begin by canceling neutrality. In itselements cognition will remain valuatively neutral in the sense that itwill not set out with a valuative presupposition; but it will not remain


valuatively neutral in its conclusions: The values are not invested inthe research, but revealed by it. In the course of cognition what oughtto be will be derived from what is. This kind of cognition is thereforenot identical with modern science; in contradistinction to the latter ittreats not only what actually exists, but also what potentially exists,and it understands this potential as something which already includes avaluative dictate, telling us whether the potential ought to be realized.In contradistinction to inductive science, which applies mathematics ingeneral and probability calculations in particular to experience, wedeal here with cognition that interprets inductive sciencemetaphysically.

The sphere of values also changes: It loses the independence itachieved, prima facie to its own detriment, in the course of its separa-tion from science.

For this philosophy, the typical value is the mixed value, the endand duty, and not the pure value, namely, the ideal, the need or the netvaluative element of the end or duty. Here pure values are not reallyvalues but a kind of abstraction of values, or a one-sided and distorteddescription of values.

According to the above, value sentences are true or false. Factualsentences on the other hand, incorporate the explicit or implicit as-sumption of a stand. The borderline is canceled. If the study of realitytakes a stand, certainly the more so does the study of values. That is tosay, that there is no room left for axiology as a neutral study of values.

Spinoza is an exponent of this philosophy. Although he argueswith the view that the world is ordered, suited to the end, beautifuletc., namely, with the traits the thought of earlier periods attributed tothe world, he nevertheless tries to derive values from this world. Thetransition from the cognition of facts to values was to be presented inthe course of passing from Part III of his Ethics” to Part IV; only sucha presentation would show whether cognition incorporates the seedfrom which a value grows, but actually this presentation is missing.107

A quite similar attempt was made in the 20th century by ErichFromm,108 who establishes psychoanalysis within this system insteadof Spinoza's psychological theory (in Part III of the “Ethics”). How-ever, he does not clarify either what Spinoza failed to illuminate.

Hegel's absolute idea is also an instance of metaphysicalprevalence over the gap between cognition and values. Yet, in thechapter discussing the absolute idea Hegel limits himself to adescription of its characteristics in comparison to previous stages inspiritual development; actually, these are postulates regarding the rolesthe absolute idea is to fulfill and not an exposition of the idea itself.The content is missing. As if we were told that the idea answers such

Attempts to Solve the Problem of Value-Foundation 295

and such questions, but we are not told what the answers are. Hegel'sdisciples accepted his metaphysical orientation but failed to accom-plish his work.

In my opinion, we deal here with an abstract logical utopia whichcannot serve as a methodological guide.

While in positive arguments for metaphysical derivation the con-tent is missing, its followers are on the face of it well-equipped withnegative evidence, namely, arguments against the separation of value-thought from neutral cognitive thought. These arguments point tocognitive elements in mixed values and to the violation of valuativeneutrality by the sciences. And indeed, there is no doubt that thesepointers are valid and show us where borders are crossed. However,the very fact that these border-crossings can be identified, shows usthat the border is visible, and this is all that adherents of separationneed. If we can point to a cognitive element in values and to avaluative element in science, it shows that these elements can beidentified. No reasonable adherent to the separation between cognitionand values will forbid to mix them; he will demand that mixing,whenever necessary, will be carried out so that the elements remainidentifiable. Those who present negative arguments do not claim thatthought (a text or a lecture) should not be arranged in a manner thatseparates valuation from cognition, but that this is impossible, theirargument being that actually such an arrangement does not exist; herethey point to the border-encroachments and thus manifestly prove theopposite of what they set out to show.

The Derivation of Values from the Nature of Reason

We now have to examine whether Kant's theory of the CategoricalImperative can serve as a foundation for ethical values. This questionis not dependent on Kant's own intention: whether it was ethical (toprovide ethical values with a foundation and a touchstone for practicaluse), or whether it was meta-ethical (to present an axiological analysisof moral thought). The position based on Kant proffers the followingargument. Values that require foundation are values created by reason.And indeed, it arises from the nature of reason that it gives the sameadvice to everyone, imposes the same imperative on everyone; thus,according to reason you are not permitted to recommend a practicaltenet unless you recommend it to everyone, and you are not permittedto let yourself behave according to a rule, if you harbor the wish thatnot everyone behave in the same manner. By that token we gain atouchstone for the examination of tenets which guide action.


We already discussed the Categorical Imperative in Part III, Chap-ter 7. In the course of this discussion, we found that duties cannot bederived from the Categorical Imperative, that the latter requires somecomplements, and that various incompatible complements are possi-ble. Accordingly, the Categorical Imperative cannot serve as a founda-tion for moral values.

The Reduction of All Values to Given Values

Naturalist philosophy tries to derive non-given values from thosethat are given. It denies therefore that reason and the will it guidesconstitute values and claims that reason only transfers values into itsown sphere and turns them into abstractions, or in other words: it pro-vides them with linguistic expression.

Given values can be recognized in that the positions they instructare feelings and emotions immediately apprehended in the field ofself-perception in which the individual is aware of him or herself.Needs, inclinations, constraints — fear and anger, joy and sadness —are examples of given values a person is aware of, prima facie, onlyafter the event, i.e., as if the values existed before he or she becameaware of them. They do not choose these values.

I have indeed no doubt that a given value precedes a value of rea-son precisely from the angle of perception: To be altogether able tounderstand values of reason, one has to be familiar with given values.Whoever felt neither pleasure nor pain, nor joy or sadness etc., will notapprehend what justice is — as a person born blind fails to understandtalk about colors. However, can we derive justice from pleasure orpain, from love or hate?

Consistent reductionism seeks not only to derive non-given fromgiven values, but also to derive the expression of these values in thesame manner; for example, a declaration of justice and utterancesabout what is and what is not just, namely, the expression of a value isalso instructed by a value, i.e., it also possesses value.

Naturalists divide into two parties: Those who believe in the foun-dation of morality in altruism and those who believe it is founded onegoism. We will begin by discussing altruism.

Arthur Schopenhauer, who believed in foundation in altruism,considered morality as an expression of man's propensity to commis-erate with others. Sometimes a person suffers because he witnesses thesuffering of someone else; of course, his suffering does not arise fromdeliberations, nor is it derived from a decision or from choice; it is animmediate response that embodies a propensity of human nature.


When a person aids another or forbears hurting him or her, and doesnot benefit from the aid he provides or even suffers damage from hisforbearance, he does not do so by virtue of reasonable considerationaccording to Schopenhauer, but by virtue of compassion. Reason'sconsiderations give expression to an already existing emotion in thefigure of moral values.

The more common behavior of humans is devoid of moral value oreven opposed to morality. This kind of behavior is also explained bySchopenhauer as an expression of human inclinations. Apart from pityor commiseration, man has two additional basic motives: egoism orthe love of life and malice, which seeks to damage others. Egoism isindifferent both to other people's sorrow and joy; it views them only asmeans to a personal, self-serving end, while pity and malice are notindifferent to others.

Whoever does not possess a little of all three basic motives is not ahuman being.109 Egoism is the animal element, malice is the satanicelement. While these fail to arouse amazement in Schopenhauer, pitydoes arouse amazement — it is the mystery of ethics. This mysteryacquires its full significance in the framework of Schopenhauer's meta-physics.

However, these three motives, incorporated by each individual in aparticular and permanent proportion, make up his or her unchangingcharacter (character is the individual essence and essence does notchange). The differences between individuals with regard to these pro-portions are, of course, radical (with one person this motive is verystrong, while with another person another motive is strong, and it mayhappen that one element leaves only a trace).

Here the following critical remarks are indicated:1. Even if Schopenhauer is right in explaining human behavior as

arising from three permanent motives, this cannot provide a foundationfor morality (or any other value). Indicating that a certain motive is thecause of a deed is not a reason for the valuation of this deed, or moreprecisely, it is not a reason to uphold a certain valuative value thatserves to value the deed.

How can commiseration, being a basic motive, become an argu-ment for behaving according to this motive? Is to point out the othertwo basic motives also a reason to fulfill their requests, to behaveaccordingly, i.e., to value deeds that embody these two motives posi-tively? Cruelty is also explained by analogy to a morally valuabledeed, namely, as an expression of essential malice, though in contra-distinction to Nietzsche,110 Schopenhauer does not admire it, nor doeshe believe that his explanation justifies cruelty.


Schopenhauer's theory suggests no reason why I should help a per-son whom I do not pity (and I would not benefit by coming to his aid).Yet, if I pity him, I need no argument in order to help him, nor doespity's status as a basic motive strengthen the actually existingmotivation.

One may perhaps accord some merit to Schopenhauer's thesis andsay that his intention was in fact meta-ethical and not ethical, but thatits expression became distorted by the conditions attached to the con-test for the prize of the Royal Danish Society of Sciences. However, aswe wish here to clarify positions regarding the foundation of values ingeneral and of morality in particular, I refrain from engaging in inter-pretive considerations.111

2. On the meta-ethical plane, it is hard to understand what argu-ments made Schopenhauer acknowledge only the propensity for com-miseration as an altruistic motif, and not acknowledge the existence ofan inclination to participate in another's joy. This stand is part ofSchopenhauer's comprehensive position, which accords positive exis-tence only to pain and suffering, while pleasure and joy are but thecancellation of pain and suffering and the relief involved in it.112 Hebelieves therefore that values (at least elementary values) are empty intheir positive section and full only in their negative section. Schopen-hauer tries to cancel or explain away cases that clearly demonstrateparticipation in another's joy. This outlook contradicts multiple phe-nomena and does not help to explain others.

3. Is there a mystery in individual's propensity to commiserate withothers (or to share their joy). An animal's inclination to help itsdescendants and others of its own kind, its readiness to fight for itsfamily or its herd aids the survival of its species, and therefore pro-motes evolution. To what extent does mutual aid arise from a herdelement and what is its figure; is it aimed specifically at certain actionsor is it directed towards the creation of a general propensity to helpmembers of the same species? Whatever the answer to this question,there is no mystery involved. It is reasonable to assume that aconsiderable contingent of animals possess such a hereditary element.Up to this point, we have discussed the attempt to found morality onan altruistic motive.

The orientation on egoism as the foundation of morality also errsby taking the cause of the motive as a reason for the valuative value;however, this orientation also incorporates shortcomings absent fromaltruistic naturalism, which explains altruistic behavior by a specialmotive. Egoistic naturalism is compelled to explain the aid man offershis descendants, his family, his people or the rest of humanity as self-aid — it must explain how altruism is actually egoism in disguise.


Apart from the controversy between followers of the egoistic andthe altruistic orientation, and apart from their common error of consid-ering cognition that explains motives as a justification of valuativevalues, the basic error both branches of naturalism commit arises froma third issue, on the meta-valuative level. This issue is the character ofgiven values. Given values are not sufficient to evolve a system, and toinstruct a person's actions. When someone asks these values forguidance, he receives too many or too few answers: Either the givenvalues proffer contradictory instructions (when a person harborswishes that contradict each other in reality) without suggesting ayardstick for a decision, or they offer no answer at all when thequestion is somewhat complex like, for instance, “how to distribute.”Values reason constitutes provide what given values lack, andaccordingly the values of reason cannot be derived from given values.Finally one should consider that in a certain sense given values alsorequire foundation (and not only constituted values), because a personcan refrain from acting according to them — as a hunger-strikerrefrains from the action demanded by the need to eat and drink.

I will now remark briefly on additional meta-valuative issues thatinvolve naturalism.

A certain variation of naturalism deals with the calculation ofpleasure quantities. Even if we agree that any contentment aroused bythe realization of values is a kind of pleasure, and if we say that pleas-ure accompanies any realization of values, we have to consider onceagain that this pleasure is specific. We will not always agree to ex-change it for another specific pleasure, and we will by no means agreeto exchange it for pleasure in the realization of values we do not up-hold, be the quantity it yields even the double of ours (let us assumefor a moment that one can indeed calculate quantities of pleasure, andthat in our imagination we can exchange pleasures with others). AdamSmith remarks that we pity a merry lunatic who laughs and sings.113

Since pity and envy are incompatible, we do not envy the merry luna-tic for his joy, because he frolics in his lunacy. When I see a mountain-climber who enjoys hanging on a fragile outcrop above an abyss, I donot envy him. Should I see someone enjoying food I detest, I cannotenvy him for his pleasure. That is to say, a person seeks to realize hisown values and thus also seeks the pleasure and satisfaction involved,but he does not seek unqualified pleasure; accordingly he does not askgreat quantities of pleasure for himself, be the pleasure whatever it is;thus A does not envy B, who derives great pleasure from therealization of his values, so far as these are not his own values as well.

However, a special case is possible (at least on the face of it): thata special value of reflection which demands to multiply pleasures joins


a person's set of values and then, probably only then, he may envysomeone who enjoys a value he does not share. This value of reflec-tion may even possess sufficient weight for the specific shades ofpleasures to fade, so that the difference between them shrinks and theperson adapts himself to his self-portrait.

The egoistic, utility-oriented variation of naturalism tends to mixpleasure and utility, need and end; thus, in order to anchor ends inman's nature and treat them as if they were given to him and not estab-lished by himself. Mixing the two absolves it from the need to refer tothe constitution of ends.

Foundation in a Special Faculty of Knowledge

A fourth position regarding value-foundation claims the existenceof a special cognitive faculty in which values are revealed to us.Knowledge of values which prima facie require foundation, namely,moral values, arises in particular from this faculty within us; whatevercomes from this source is free of error and accompanied by the aware-ness that it is free of error, i.e., it is evident. Some call this sourceintuition while Franz Brentano identifies it with inner perception,which is but the mind's perception of itself and the meanings at whichit directs its intentions.114

Inner perception is the source of what is evident, because within itthe conceiver and what is conceived are fully identical, without media-tion; it leaves no room for perspectival distortion and accordingly, noroom for error. Other instances of evident knowledge which lie at thebasis of knowledge in other spheres also arise from this source like, forinstance, the principle of causality.

Brentano does not claim that nobody can deny evident truths, butthat whoever denies them — if such a person exists — judges blindly,i.e., he lacks the necessary cognitive faculty. This resembles a contro-versy about colors with a color-blind person.

The position described here is of cognitive orientation and similarto the position of metaphysical deduction. Self-awareness with regardto the source of evident truths is therefore the foundation of values.

The fault-line of this outlook is that it assumes a consensus withregard to values at least among those who understand the issue at hand(those who do not judge blindly). However, not only all societiesthroughout all generations lack such a consensus with regard to values,but it does not even exist in civilized societies (we discussed this mat-ter above, in Part III, Chapter 8, the paragraph on “Value's place in aSystem and Its Essence”). Aristotle was in favor of going to war in


order to capture slaves, provided those were destined by their nature tobe slaves. To kill someone in such a just war is therefore not consid-ered as murder. Needless to say that in the eyes of many killing as ameans to enslavement belongs to the worst kinds of murder. Manyerudite people supported Aristotle's outlook until the middle of the lastcentury. Should we say that the source of evident truths sprang up onlythen?

Hypostasis of Values

The hypostasis of a value is turning it into a self-reliant unit, in-dependent of any other entity, namely, man, God or nature. This unitexists beyond space and time and beyond people. The value thereforeacquires the status of a Platonic idea.

The above already says that values cannot acquire foundations, butthat they do not need them either. If a value has a foundation it relieson it and is not wholly self-reliant. Yet, the value acquired its statusprecisely by virtue of its wholeness and self-reliance, i.e., its inde-pendence. If one wishes nevertheless to employ the term “foundation,”one should say that any value, being a value, is already founded withinitself, and therefore needs no further foundation.

The independence of a value resides in its wholeness, its indivisi-bility, in the impossibility to separate parts of the value-content fromeach other. One cannot, for instance, know a part of the value withoutknowledge of the whole. Distorted knowledge of this value is impos-sible.

The specific content of a value and its valuative character are ofone piece; it is therefore impossible for a person to understand thespecific content of a value without knowing that he deals with a value.A person cannot, for example, understand a distribution method whichembodies justice without knowing that it is a value. He is not liable toerr and consider the valuative content as value-neutral, as if it did notinvolve taking a position.

Accordingly, there is no room for error in the area of value knowl-edge. An individual or even a society may not be aware of a certainvalue at all — and indeed, throughout history attention shifts fromcertain values to others. Our spirit alternately illuminates these orthose values, which explains while there is no consensus with regard tothem.

Errors may occur regarding the comprehension of messages con-veyed by feelings and emotions, namely, with regard to what reasontries to extract from them in specific cases, or with regard to the appli-


cation of values. The field of possible errors therefore surrounds val-ues, all threads connecting values with subjective and objective realitypass this field, but the reference of intellect to valuative values cannoterr, the conceptual picture of a valuative value is inevitably true to itsreferent.

The hypostasis of values leaves no room for volition in the consti-tution of values.

Nicolai Hartmann developed this theory.115 It corresponds partlywith the theories about a special source of knowledge (innerperception or intuition) with regard to evidence; it differs from these inthat it builds the solution to the foundation problem on the nature ofthe object of knowledge, and not on the nature of its subject.

One may argue against the ontological status of value-independ-ence, that a value always refers to a subject; it states what is good for asubject, how it should act, what it would regard as beautiful or as sub-lime, so that the value cannot be understood without understanding theessence of the subject — which indicates that the value depends on thesubject. Hartmann replies that as the validity of a natural law whichapplies to a specific event does not depend on the occurrence of thisevent, so the validity of a value should not be interpreted as any kindof dependence on man.

It is of interest that the first, wide-ranging development of the the-ory of ethical antinomies occurred in the framework of this outlook;these were also ontologized and are not understood as a matter of his-tory.

The outlook described in this chapter represents a more radical ob-jectivism than that described as metaphysical deduction; the lattertreats knowledge whose object is man as a transition stage fromknowledge of what is to knowledge of what ought to be, while here wedeal with something which does not depend on man being what he is.The value which achieved hypostasis refers to various hypotheticalsubjects and among them also to this or that existing man, in these orthose circumstances.

Extreme ontological objectivism is largely on a par with prevailingpopular objectivism (even though they are not congruent), and mayfind a kind of phenomenological affirmation in the latter. (Popularobjectivism does not separate the sphere of values from other spheres,and of course, does not employ Platonic ideas. It is not difficult foraxiological objectivism to explain these differences away).

The fault-line of extreme axiological objectivism lies in the imagi-nary assumption that perfect answers are available for all practical andemotional problems we will meet, and that these answers exist as Pla-tonic ideas. The ontologizing of antinomies is even more fantastic,


because the perfect answers to our problems contradict each other. If amortal being is caught up in a contradiction, alright, but for eternalideas to be thus entrapped seems not to tally with their perfection;accordingly Plato believed that these ideas reside beyond contradic-tion.116

To the merit of radical objectivism one should say that Hartmanndid a great deal of axiological work on value-description within thisframework. This was possible because this objectivism is not subordi-nate to systematic constraints requiring it to ignore certain facts, whileintuitionism, for example, has to ignore the lack of consensus, andegoistic naturalism has to ignore altruistic deeds which do not lendthemselves to reduction. Precisely because of its fantastic character,radical objectivism can interpret every fact, and therefore it never findsitself in contradiction to value-neutral axiology.

Chapter 5

Waiving the Attempt to AchieveUltimate Foundation

As a motto for his treatise “on the basis of morality,” Schopenhauerchose this sentence (taken from The Will in Nature): “To preach mo-rality is easy, to found morality is difficult.” About a hundred yearslater, during a discussion with the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein re-sponded by saying: “To preach morality is difficult, to found moralityis impossible.” 117

The first four approaches (out of the five described above)represent attempts to find a foundation for values; radical objectivismemerged when these had failed in their endeavor and alreadyrepresents the waiving of value foundation. Yet, radical objectivismdoes not consider itself a waiver, but claims that values need nofoundation at all.

However, returning values from an imaginary objective sphere tothe solid ground of subjective reality, the life-fabric of reasonablecreatures who become entangled in contradictions between their ownvalues and change these, we discover that values are not sufficientlyperfect entities in order to pre-empt the request to justify them. Yet,they cannot be justified without the mediation of other values, alsoneeding foundation, so that we cannot provide foundation for thevalue-system as a whole. Reflection may perceive this inability as a


shortcoming. True, not popular but only philosophical reflection willsense this disadvantage, when it accounts for value-opposition and hasto face the separation of value-neutral science from the sphere ofvalues. Philosophical reflection's wish to found values should not berejected as being based on an error; but it is possible that it expresses avalue of universal uniformity.

We may call the direction emerging from these considerations “ax-iological pragmatism”; actually, those who engaged in value-neutralaxiology tended to take this direction.118

Pragmatism points out that the state of affairs we discovered is nota particular feature of the sphere of values; cognition also relies onpresuppositions which on one hand are not self-evident, are not devoidof alternatives, and accordingly we may demand their foundation; onthe other hand they have no proper foundation. The lack of a proper orultimate foundation and accordingly the absence of absolute certaintytherefore characterizes all human thought and may be experienced byphilosophical reflection as a disadvantage, wherever human thoughtlays claim to validity.

We will review this state of affairs in the sphere of cognition as itappears in Clarence Irving Lewis' pragmatism,119 in order to try andderive an analogy for the sphere of values.

Experience presupposes a system of concepts and rules, namely, itcannot confirm or refute them. Empirical cognitive thinking is impos-sible without an a priori tools. C. I. Lewis characterizes the a priori asanalytical, but for him this does not mean that it has no alternative. Onthe contrary, we choose from alternative a priori systems the one bestsuited for its role, and it helps us to interpret the data we sense. Thecognition achieved by this interpretation is sometimes powerless in theface of something which is prima facie a given; to deal with this thesystem is equipped with drainage channels which help it to remove theprima facie given that does not fit in: a channel of illusion, of a dream,of a semblance, in short: the channel of unreality; thus we are told thatthis sensation, which cannot be interpreted, is not a given at all, but aninappropriate addition, or in any case not an ordinary given. Whencognition over-uses excusatory drainage-channels, it shows ashortcoming of the a priori system. A system will be successful if itsapplication does not require frequent use of such drainage-channels.This is one example of a pragmatic advantage of one a priori systemover another. The pragmatic criterion for the choice of presuppositionsis whether they are applicable to the given, convenient to apply, andwhether their application enables us to predict aspects that interest us.

Instead of the metaphor we used, a drainage-channel, C. I. Lewisemploys the image of a scrap-basket, and acknowledges that this cate-

Waiving the Attempt to Achieve Ultimate Foundation 307

gory plays a special role in the system of categories: a scrap-basketcategory. 120 From here onwards no given (or prima facie given) re-mains outside the a priori sorting containers. A system that removes alarge contingent of experience to this basket will be replaced by an-other one. However, the difference between systems resides not onlyin the absolute or relative quantity of unprocessed scraps among theraw-materials of experience, but also in the identity of these remnants.What kind of data are removed? In one system (or one method) certaindata will go to the scrap-heap (unprocessed or only partly processed),while in an alternative system other data will be removed. Therefore adifferent world picture, different experience and testing will emerge,i.e., people's lives in the world will also differ from what they were.When you admit the existence of a scrap-basket category, you admitthat the a priori definitely imposes a dictate on experience, a dictatethat concerns the content of experience.

Lewis' characterization of the a priori as analytical is liable to mis-lead on two counts. A. This characterization could be interpreted as ifthe a priori were imposed on human thought; that we cannot avoidthinking accordingly, for instance, that we cannot think but accordingto logic. Lewis believes otherwise: Our logic also has an alternative.Man chooses the a priori. B. The characterization of the a priori asanalytical could be interpreted as if it neither dictated anything to ex-perience, nor shaped a world picture, but existed as a framework.However, the notion that a certain a priori system has a particularscrap-basket is incompatible with such an interpretation.121

There are two types of pragmatism in Epistemology. One claimsthat the a posteriori element in cognition is pragmatically examined,and it exchanges truth for utility, namely, it argues that what we call“true” is but a useful proposition; it actually cancels truth. The othertype of pragmatism claims that the a priori element in cognitivethinking is the one chosen by pragmatic considerations; it turns outthat we should not say that this element is true or false (at least not inthe same sense as the a posteriori element is true or false) but that it ismore or less prolific, more or less convenient, etc. The a priori servestruth, which always incorporates an a posteriori element, but it is nei-ther true nor false in itself. The second type of pragmatism does there-fore not deny the possibility to think the truth.122

The first type of pragmatism may be called “radical pragmatism”and the second “moderate pragmatism,” as it claims that only a certainelement in cognition is pragmatic. The discussion of the attempts toprovide a foundation for values leads to pragmatism, but to its moder-ate form.


As mentioned above, the characterization of the a priori as analyti-cal is weakened by Lewis himself. However, in my opinion, moderatepragmatism altogether needs no such limitation of the a priori. Thepragmatic choice can be referred to the synthetic a priori principlesKant pointed out (of course not in the context of interpreting Kant),and to the a priori postulates which lie at the root of science accordingto Bertrand Russell's analysis in his book Human Knowledge — itsScope and Limits . When moderate pragmatism admits the existence ofa synthesis a priori in cognitive thinking, it moves one step nearer toradical pragmatism, but it does not close the gap; it admits in thismanner a certain relativity of truth, but without uprooting the conceptof truth.

I believe that moderate epistemological pragmatism is a goodmodel for the construction of an axiological solution to the problem ofvalue-foundation. Given values parallel the sensory given in the sphereof cognition; values constituted by reason and will are the a priorielement of value thought; the pragmatic test lies in the application ofvalues and their realization, and mainly in the degree to which in-stances of opposition, emerging in the course of value-application, areovercome. Value-systems that pass the pragmatic test are acceptedthroughout the history of societies, and they vacate their position whenthey fail the same test.

Moderate axiological pragmatism is the view that values possessfoundation in the sense that they are arranged in a comprehensive sys-tem and that instances of opposition between them, emerging in thecourse of their application to reality, can be practically settled (even ifnot on an ideal level); and that this practical settlement matches thesystem's inner logic. According to this outlook, there is no final foun-dation, no theoretically sufficient foundation, namely, the foundationthat many philosophers searched for in modern times. Yet, the sense inwhich value foundation according to pragmatism exists is important,because it incorporates the possibility to elucidate alternatives on thelevel of reason, the possibility for a value difference between humansto mature into an explicit disagreement, which by definition involvesthe understanding of alternatives.

In an argument about values I will call my adversary's attention tothe fact that in prevailing circumstances, or in circumstances that mayreasonably prevail, two of his values contradict each other; that a cer-tain mixed value (a goal or a duty) among his values cannot be real-ized, and that his value-system has no answers at all for some actualproblems. All these arguments refer indeed more to the systems powerto rule a certain society than to its value-character. Even if they fail toconvince my adversary, they may arouse doubts and reservations in


him, which may enable him to think of alternatives and understandthem.

There is an important difference between the emotive doctrine ofvalue — also called “emotivism” — and moderate pragmatism. Ac-cording to emotivism, value-terms are used as expression of emotionsand this is all their meaning; in this way values are reduced to emo-tions. According to emotivism, there is no point in arguing aboutvalues and valuations, while pragmatism opens a broad area for dis-cussion and argument in the sphere of values. In contradistinction toemotivism, Pragmatism considers values and valuations as a matter ofjudgment.

When a person admits that his values have no foundation, he doesnot deprive them of their validity. An object is valuable in virtue of avalue, but does this value have its value-character in virtue of anothervalue? When we attribute a value-property to an object we may need ajustification based on the distinctive marks of having this property, butwhen we treat a value as a value, we have no distinctive marks ofbeing a value, which we could rely on. In other words: The object hasvalue, but a value has no value; on the other hand it does not lackvalue either, it does not resemble a valueless object.

The logical demand for direct justification stops in the face of val-ues. Yet, as instances of opposition between them occur, reflectionfeels the need to justify them, which is a different kind of justification— indirect justification that deals with adjustment to the system ingeneral, and to the system as it is actually applied to circumstancesprevailing at the time, in particular.

It is important to realize that indirect justification is circular, as itis, of course, carried out according to a value, namely, the value of theabsence of valuative conflicts. This is an ideal which cannot be fullyrealized, but in its realization to some degree of proximity it is a strongand not a high value. Whoever prefers a certain value within thesystem according to its height, may consider conflicts a fair price foravoiding the deprivation of the high value; he will reject pragmaticconsiderations of indirect foundation, but he will not be able to offerthe system any ultimate foundation.

The overall contribution of indirect justification goes to man'sawareness of his value-system and to the sovereignty of reason. Yet,the sovereignty of reason is not a universally accepted value either;even an intelligent and learned person may reject it.

Finally, we have to approach the question whether moderate prag-matism is a kind of conventionalism. Conventionalism views values asconventions, namely, as the result of an agreement. Convention is adisplay of will, i.e., the will of the individuals belonging to a society.


Many individuals may not offer their agreement on their own initia-tive, but accept what others decide and the agreement may not be speltout, yet in any case conventions depend on the will. Accordingly, thelimits of the will are also the limits of any possible convention. Theselimits are the following:

A. The feeling and emotional given, which includes needs, inclina-tions and constraints, does not depend on the will. B. Values estab-lished by the will are not something the will creates in a void; somevalues (for instance, ideals) are fully compatible, while some opposeeach other in their possible applications, some hypothetical instancesof opposition between values are in the realm of real opposition; whatprice will a value, on the face of it, have to pay in order to integratewithin the system with opposing values, or what price will the oppos-ing values have to pay; what is the depth of required concessions orwhat is the tariff of these concessions — all these and similar issuesare not determined by the will.

The will is limited by the empirical sphere of data in the environ-ment as well as by the needs, constraints and inclinations of man him-self; on the other hand the will is limited by the essence of values,namely by the content's own logic, found by reason when it looks forthe solution of conflicts between values — whether these are contentsto be established by the will as new values, or already established val-ues that require qualification because real new instances of oppositionbetween them and other values have emerged.

On one hand it would be excessive reduction to say that the willonly chooses, because this description shortchanges the spontaneity ofthe will's initiative; on the other hand it would be excessive expansionto view the will as an authority that creates something out of nothing,even in the sphere of constituted values.

In any case, moderate pragmatism acknowledges the role of con-vention. It seems, however, that conventionalism tends to deny theexistence of the given, or to belittle its weight, in order to expand thesphere of conventions, while moderate pragmatism has no such ten-dency.

An additional difference between moderate pragmatism and con-ventionalism also involves the will, but from the angle of its nature,and not from the angle of the sphere and the degree of its dominance.The difference lies in conventionalism's propensity to stress a certaincharacteristic of the will at the expense of other characteristics; thischaracteristic is expressed by the term “arbitrary” attributed to thesphere of the will; it is expressed by drawing an analogy between val-ues and the rules of a game,123 while the game is confronted with seri-ousness.


The will has two facets: a facet guided by reason and a facet not soguided. The first represents the will's appeal to reason and the aid itdraws from it: the will activates reason, orders an examination of is-sues, asks it to look for additional possibilities and in a certain senseasks it to invent them, to look for new observation points and finally,to unfold alternatives. And it is the will guided by reason which turnsa reason into a cause.

The facet not guided by reason concerns a situation in which, onthe face of it, reason throws the ball back to the will and stops work-ing; it arrests the process of argumentation, the process of justification,and a cause is established instead of a reason. With the will the causebecomes a reason. Reason faces the question why is A preferable to B(in material and typological preferences, which make up the cohesionof values into a web), and passes this question to the will, whichreplies, “just so,” thus I am determined to act.

The facet of the will guided by reason founds reality in essence: bymeans of the deed, essence becomes reality. In contradistinction, thefacet not guided by reason founds essence in reality by replying “justso” to the question “why.”

It seems that the facet guided by reason reveals itself in that thewill decides in favor of the value-system, namely, in turning the arenaof conflicts between values into a field of give and take, and in favorof qualifying both parties to these conflicts. The facet not guided byreason reveals itself in an acute decision that favors a single value inall instances of opposition the latter meets, a decision that saves reasonthe process of give and take, or compels it to provide ideologicalpretexts for canceling in practice the validity of values within the sys-tem.

It seems that the facet guided by reason reveals itself in that thewill takes all other segments of the personality and their own inclina-tions into account, while the facet not guided by reason reveals itself incapricious tyranny of the will.

In Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's philosophies and in convention-alism the will shows us only, or mainly, the facet which is not guidedby reason. Moderate pragmatism is not hindered from acknowledgingboth facets of the will nor does it incorporate any systemic constraintto stress the facet not guided by reason.

Chapter 6

The Ontological Status of Values,Relationism

The analogy we drew between epistemology and axiology helped us tocrystallize a pragmatic position concerning value foundation; we cannow expand this analogy in order to clarify the ontological status ofvalues.

Regarding this status, there is widespread support for the opinionthat science is more objective than valuation; that is to say, scienceemploys concepts to draw a portrait of objects in space and over time,while valuation expresses a subjective response to the meeting withthese objects. According to this opinion, value-neutral thought is moreobjective than valuing thought. I do not accept this opinion.

A value-property may be as objective as any other property,namely, it is the property of an object residing in space and time. Theproperty of a cherry in being tasty and its property of being red areboth made up by the relation between the specific cherry and the spe-cific person; in both cases we deal with the response of a human beingto the cherry. The cherry's valuative property lies in that it arouses avaluative human response, its value-neutral property lies in that itarouses a value-neutral response (let us suppose that the person inquestion does not respond to differences in color). The questionwhether people resemble each other with regard to the response under


discussion, or to what degree they are similar in this regard is an issuein itself. A common response of all humans to the same stimulant isnot more objective than the response specific to a certain individual: inboth cases the response is determined by the nature of the respondentas well as the nature of the thing that elicits the response, i.e., both bythe nature of whoever looks at the cherry or eats it, and the nature ofthe cherry. The question whether people resemble each other in theirresponse to a cherry is not more relevant to the status of the responseas a property than the question whether all cherries arouse the sameresponse in a certain individual.124

In this respect, what is true for feeling is also true for thought.Cognitively neutral thought and valuative thought about an object areboth thinking responses that bear the stamp of thinking procedures andpatterns as well as the stamp of the object. From an ontological angleone should therefore not say that value-neutral knowledge is closer tothe object or even to the thing in itself than valuation, be it emotional,feeling or conceptual.

Cognition as well as valuation embody relations between subjectand object. One cannot distinguish between the relative weight of thesubject's and the object's contributions to the relation between them.One cannot assert, for example, that the contribution of the subject tothe character of this relation is greater than that of the object; becauseit is impossible to separate these contributions. In order to do so onewould have to remove the subject or the object, and thus cancel therelation between them which is the subject-matter of the inquiry.125

This means that we must reject subjectivism and objectivism withregard to cognition as well as with regard to valuation.

It is not only impossible to isolate one of the factors, it is evendifficult to fixate one while examining a variation in the other along anadequate scale. Accordingly, I maintain that against both objectivismand subjectivism we should recommend relationism in epistemologyas well as in axiology.

Perhaps you will say the following: Even if this holds with regardto valuation, what about the value? Valuation is a subject-object rela-tion, but is the value not purely subjective and not a relation? Here wehave to focus attention on two matters.

A. We have seen that a value is influenced by the value-system towhich it belongs, and the system is influenced by valuations, i.e.,mainly by the valuation of existing external objects; that is to say thathypothetical value opposition does not trail a re-shaping of the oppos-ing values, while actual opposition between values trails re-shaping.With valuation as the mediator, the object's specific nature influences

The Ontological Status of Values. elationism 315

the shape of the value. This is influence in reverse, because throughthe will and the deed the value directly influences the external object.

B. This situation in the sphere of values has some kind of analogyin pure cognition. The presuppositions of cognition (of course these donot include hypotheses requiring examination) are certain formulationsthat express the set of molds into which cognition casts its conceptsand the procedure of using these molds. This set of molds in its turnhas to be applicable to objects, i.e., it has somehow to fit them.Accordingly, in the same sense in which a value is antecedent tovaluation, reside more intricately within the subject but be indirectlyinfluenced by objects, there are presuppositions to cognition and itsbasic concepts which possess the same characteristic: they are in thesame sense antecedent to cognition, they reside more intricately withinthe subject, but they are indirectly influenced by objects.

It is to the credit of Clarence I. Lewis that he clarified this ax-iological issue and demonstrated how accurate the analogy betweenthe two spheres is.126 We can go on and trace it in detail. Cognition aswell as valuation has sensory data; these are involved with each otherand cannot really be separated. In both spheres, data are interpreted.are “facts” present in both spheres, or perhaps only a neutral fact is tobe considered a fact — this is a matter of nominal definition. In anycase, we are permitted to speak of prediction or a forecast in bothspheres; valuative prediction will say the fruit will be tasty when itripens, or the results of a deed will or will not justify the deed, to wit:Valuative prediction is a conjecture as to valuative properties of futureresults, yielded by a process or a deed (a sort of prediction alreadysurfaces in the sphere of perception, i.e., the expectation of something;perceptual expectation is attached to both valuative and value-neutralproperties). The valid analogy between cognition and value-thoughtpermits us to speak of knowledge in both spheres. There is a process oflearning in the valuative sphere, so there is valuative knowledge(which is not cognition).

So far, we dealt with the opinion that science is more objectivethan valuation. By rejecting this opinion I do not wish to say that in aphenomenological context one should not distinguish between theobjective and the subjective. We can characterize the differencebetween content and form of intention with the aid of this distinction,because the concrete object is constituted out of intentional content,while the concrete subject is made up by a totality of intentional forms.In other words: The perceptual and conceptual idea we establish as anobject consists mainly of intentional content, and in this sense thecontent is objective; on the other hand, our idea of the cognizing andvaluing subject is the sum total of ideas we harbor with regard to


intentional forms, and in this sense the form is subjective. However, letus return to the difference between the two spheres.

Considerations against the opinion that cognition is more objectivethan valuation do not lead to the conclusion that there is no differencebetween the spheres, but that the difference does not reside in thedimension in which the search took place. These considerations do notcancel the possibility to draw a border between cognitive and valuativethought, nor can they blur the border. Even though there is noontological difference between the spheres, from a phenomenologicalangle the difference is obvious. The approach of the cognizant subjectexpresses the wish to observe without being involved with the objectof observation, while the approach of the valuing subject looks forinvolvement or participation in the object. Cognition is objective to theextent that it wishes to picture the object, while valuation is objectiveas long as it is involved and partakes in the object, and throughmediation of the deed participates in shaping it within reality. That isto say, each sphere has a different kind of objectivity according towhich the subject arranges itself differently while dealing with eachsphere; accordingly each sphere has a different kind of subjectivity.

Because the cognizant subject wishes to observe without involve-ment with observation's object, he or she seeks to create a sensory andconceptual idea of the object which is devoid of any individual contri-bution by him- or herself (apart from the metaphysical matter he usesto reproduce the object; this matter is said to be indifferent to whateverimage it is given). This is the cognizant subject's original wish, whichis expressed in its strict sense as long as the subject is naive. When hediscovers any contribution of his in the object's image, he seeks toremove it if possible, and if not he tries at least to mark its bordersclearly, to stress: this is only the picture's frame, not part of it; beyondthe framed picture there is another one without a frame, and this is thetrue picture. Accordingly he finds it difficult to accept what the theoryof cognition teaches, namely, that he possesses no idea devoid of sub-jective contribution; he feels that truth, as he originally sought it, re-sides beyond his reach.

In brief, cognition feels uncomfortable with its relational ontologi-cal status.

However, value-thinking also seeks objectivity but a different kindof objectivity, which is compatible with subjectivity and even withindividuality, i.e., a particular personal feature. Value-thought is notsurprised when it discovers its ontological status, namely, that it isrelational. On the contrary, a value's objective absolute status as anidea appears to be strange; accordingly even Nicolai Hartmann himself


tries here and there to soften the core of his theory (and this core doesnot lend itself to softening), as he shies away from its strangeness.

In epistemology objectivism expresses a natural wish of cognition,the original level upon which epistemology is layered; while in axiol-ogy Hartmann's version of objectivism does not express a wish of theoriginal level, but a way out from the problem of value foundation.

In short, value-thinking does not try to overcome the subjectiveelement in its ideas, nor does it establish an idea without a subjectiveframe behind them. What it sometimes does try is to overcome actualopposition between two groups of values: one of them in favor of acommon inter-individual framework, and the other in favor of personalautonomy. But neither of the opposing sides represents value-thoughtin general.

Cognition's subjectivity consists of perceptual and conceptualforms, which can be devoid of emotion, while valuation's subjectivityalways incorporate emotion. Even when reason applies a conceptualvalue it has created itself, like justice, it is accompanied by emotion.When an intentional, purely cognitive act is observational, the ar-rangement of what is perceived in a figure and a background will serveas its form; when the act is conceptual the casting patterns of conceptwill function as form. In a pure valuative intentional act the form willbe emotional, i.e., a form in which one of the important components isemotion.

When a pure cognitive act of intention incorporates an emotionalelement, the latter refers to cognition's action and not to its object, towhat is cognized; it refers to how a person feels at the time of his cog-nitive action. In contradistinction, even if the emotional element in anintentional valuative act is formal, it may refer directly to the objectand appear to us as the form of the object: if I am angry with the ob-ject, the object is irritating. This irritation determines my manner ofthought about this object.

However, the principal difference regarding the function ofemotion in these two spheres, lies in that in the sphere of cognitionemotion can function only as form, while in the sphere of valuationemotion functions also and primarily as intentional content, andundergoes objectification, and becomes part of the object. (Eventhough in the course of objectification something like a partialshedding of the emotional content occurs, namely, shedding of itstransitory and exchangeable shades, which do not become part of theexternal object).

While from a cognitive point of view the object is mute and wetalk about it, from a valuative point of view the object appeals to us,


talks to us; it smiles or frowns at us, attracts or repels us, encouragesaction or warns against it.

All these are considerations and observations that prima facie sup-port the emotive doctrine of value, but its flaw is that it ignores rea-son's role in the sphere of values, namely, that reason creates values. Iterrs in its pretension to base reason on emotion. Eduard Westermarck,a disciple of this doctrine, contributed a great deal to the comparativeresearch of value-systems. The framework of the emotive theory ofvalue made this contribution possible, because of the weight the emo-tional element actually has.

Because of its emotional character, the sphere of values differsfrom the cognitive sphere in another aspect. Under usualcircumstances it is impossible to adhere to a value tentatively, in orderto learn its nature. It is difficult to apply a value hypothetically withoutbelieving in it. A person can consciously change his values when hefeels that they oppose each other; however, so long as he assumes theusual or natural position in the sphere of values on its transitive level,he cannot exchange his values temporarily for those of another personin order to apply and try them out. In the cognitive sphere on the otherhand, there is not impediment to the thinking of a conditional sentence,or even to thinking an unrealizable condition.

The above begs a question: does not the actor in a certain kind oftheater try to feel the emotion belonging to the role he plays; is this nota case of him experiencing this emotion hypothetically? This concernsan actor whom the director requires to identify with the protagonist herepresents and not just to imitate him.127

It is quite probable that the actor can adopt the information aboutthe state of the figure he embodies while he plays his role, as if it wereabsolute truth. If the director tells him look at this ball until you see amouse, he is capable of seeing a mouse, yet his emotional response tothe mouse will be his own. An actor can make himself believe for awhile that another actor on the stage is his enemy and wishes to killhim, but the manner of his emotional response is not something he canchange temporarily for the sake of the play. He can love an actress onthe stage “hypothetically” only if he manages to believe certain factsfor a while, namely, that she possesses the looks and the style ofbehavior he likes. He cannot decide for the sake of the play what kindof looks and style of behavior he will like. That is to say, the mannerof emotional response is not subject to the will. The action of the in-tellect, on the other hand, is subject to the will.

Various reports on hypnosis bear evidence that it is easier to im-plant or to uproot information in a person during hypnosis, than toimplant or uproot values. A person may not only change his opinion


quite quickly with regard to neutral, factual matters, but even exchangeit for an utterly different one, if he receives reliable evidence to foundthe new opinion; yet this is not so in the sphere of values. The valua-tion of an object will certainly change if the object changes, or in anycase, if the picture of the object changes in the eyes of the valuing per-son, but neither the value nor the method of its application havethereby been changed. A change of values is a relatively slow process,as distinguished from change in cognitive thinking.

One can therefore, apart from categorical agreements, also achievehypothetical agreements in the sphere of cognition, to wit: If we as-sume assumption A, we will by its application receive such and such apicture of the circumstances, and if we assume B, we will receive adifferent picture. When there is no categorical agreement with regardto a certain issue, a hypothetical agreement enables us to outline theborder of the controversial area. In contradistinction, in the sphere ofvalues the emotional load bears down on the thinking subject, reducingflexibility and mobility. Accordingly the person involved in a valua-tive argument has usually no picture of the valuative difference at theroot of the argument, and in this case one cannot rightly speak of acontroversy about values; thus, because in order to oppose what some-one says I have to understand it; I must pinpoint what I oppose andreconstruct it in my mind; but the reconstruction of another's valuesinvolves the reconstruction of the emotions that belong to these values,i.e., feeling, or quasi-feeling these alien emotions, at least on the faceof it. And the more alien the values a person tries to reconstruct, thestronger the resistance to the feeling involved in the reconstruction willbe, and the less the other's values will fit into his own value system(and precisely in such cases the understanding of the emotional aspectis even more necessary).

However, we deal here not only with the inter-individual spherebut with the character of the choice made when one assumes a posi-tion. Taking a stand in the cognitive sphere requires understanding thealternative, because If I pronounce a negative sentence, I must under-stand its positive opposite, otherwise I will not know what I negate;the same is true if I pronounce a positive sentence, because what ispositive is the negation of the negative. Whoever does not understandthe alternative to what he states, does not understand what he is talkingabout. This rule is valid with regard to intellectual cognitive action.But the expression of an emotion does not necessarily involve theunderstanding of an alternative emotion.

To sum up — the difficulty a person meets in trying to understanda position opposed to his own in the cognitive sphere is not great, andin any case does not arise from the nature of this sphere, while in the


sphere of values this difficulty is based on a principle, because emo-tion is not subject to the will.

Chapter 7

Phenomenology of Values

The difficulty in understanding a rival position, inherent to the sphereof values, presents a challenge to its phenomenology.

We will outline a few characteristics of this phenomenology beforewe return to discuss the obstacles that stand in its way.

The phenomenology of values is based on observing them whiletheir valuative validity is bracketed, thus paralleling the bracketing ofexistence in general phenomenology. When we enclose valuativevalidity in brackets, we do not bracket the entire valuative matter, notthe very function of content as a value, nor the specific ways in whichcontents function as values. Should we bracket the whole valuativematter we would not, for example, discuss the dimensions of valuativespace and type differences, which are essential for the description ofvalue-thought phenomena. We certainly should not say, let us bracketgood and evil, because these are the issues to discuss; we will bracketonly the validity of the statements that these are the good and the evil.The phenomenology of values is therefore value-neutral reflection.

Of course, when we ignore validity, we also ignore invalidity, forexample, that value X, prevailing in another society or generation, isinvalid to us. We also ignore the question of factual adherence tovalues and this is part of our disregard at this stage and in this discus-sion for the question of what factually exists (both from the aspect ofthe valued object and the value applied to it). In this sense, the ab-


straction of valuative validity (the valuative status) is close to the ab-straction of reality (the cognitive status), and accordingly they can bejoined. However, here we have to remember that even at this stage wedo not ignore what kind of value-system a certain value belongs to,because the link with the system belongs to the value's figure. We doneither ignore its adjustment to the other limbs of the system, nor theinstances of opposition between this value and other limbs. Our con-cern is the distinction between a value's own logic (its skeleton) andthe set of qualifications attached to it and even incorporated within it,which aids its adjustment to the value-system.

As long as I have not bracketed validity, the values of another per-son which are incompatible with my own, are not values at all in myeyes, I cannot describe their valuative character, their figure. Once Ihave bracketed value-validity, a series of alternatives presents itself tomy mind. Understanding values that are incompatible with each otheris the first step towards the description of value figures.

Not only the values of another person elude my cognition as longas I have not bracketed value validity, but I do not cognize my ownvalues, because I cannot describe their form as long as I have not com-pared them with alternatives. I have no meta-valuative cognition of avalue-system that rejects revenge altogether, if I do not understand asystem that approves of it. To understand one of the opposing systemsone has to understand the other one as well.

Here we find the difference (discussed at the end of the previouschapter) between cognizant thought that thinks in contra factual condi-tional sentences (i.e., “if it were..., then...”), and value-thought thatfinds it difficult to think in contra factual conditional sentences, be-cause of the emotions attached to it. It is easy to imagine that what isthere is not there, and that what is not there is, but it is hard for a per-son to imagine that good is bad and bad is good. That is to say, we seea special obstacle blocking the road of value phenomenology alreadyat its beginning, an obstacle which does not stand in the way of generalphenomenology.

This obstacle is paradoxical: For one and the same reason a personcannot describe the values he adheres to and those he does not adhereto. He cannot describe the value he upholds because the precisely de-scribed object is the form of the value which he has to isolate in orderto describe it; it cannot be isolated without comparing it to alternatives,and this comparison, in its turn, requires understanding of thealternative. Therefore, one cannot describe a value without understand-ing its alternatives (one can, of course, preach a value without under-standing its alternatives, but this is a different story). On the otherhand, one cannot describe the alien value if one does not understand it,

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namely, one cannot describe its form without understanding its con-tent. But the path to comprehension of an alien value, opposed to aperson's own values, is closed to ordinary thought. That is to say, inorder to deal with axiology in general and with the phenomenology ofvalues in particular, a person has to understand the alternatives to hisown values and he has to remove the obstacle blocking the path ofordinary thought or to bypass it. (Ordinary thought — i.e., thought notguided by phenomenology does not view the obstacle as an obstacle,but tends to imagine that it has no alternative at all. This is inparticular true with regard to popular objectivism).

A certain difference that exists here and there in everyday con-sciousness on the transitive level may serve the phenomenologist assomething to hold on to in order to remove the obstacle: the differencebetween experiencing and understanding an emotion. When a personsees a face expressing joy he can understand the joy without sharing it,he can understand sadness without being sad, for example, when helistens to sad music. It is doubtful whether schadenfreude could existwithout this difference, because whoever enjoys another's sorrow, un-derstands the sorrow without sharing it. A person cannot only under-stand that another suffers without suffering himself, he or she can alsounderstand the specific quality of the other person's suffering. Thewhole specifity of an emotion may be understood without sharing thesame emotion.

We deal here with the understanding of an emotion which does notbelong to reflection but occurs on the original level of intention. Ini-tially this understanding was perhaps integrated with experience of theemotion, but the development of consciousness involves ramifications.

The phenomenologist can use this understanding of another's emo-tion in order to understand values opposed to his own; in the course ofthis process he will behave as if he had exchanged the experiencing ofhis own emotions (as far as they present an obstacle to him) for under-standing them (a temporary exchange).

One may argue: You can understand an emotion withoutexperiencing it if you have already experienced it in the past. Theanswer is that on the basis of emotions a person has experienced hecan also understand different emotions, perhaps up to a certain degreeof difference.

Ordinary consciousness includes the understanding of emotionswithout sharing them, but probably only emotions the experience ofwhich is not incompatible with a person's own system (the system thisindividual consciousness adheres to). Without methodical guidance, aperson understands emotions which he himself could have experiencedunder certain circumstances, but this is not sufficient for


phenomenology. It has to expand understanding, namely, it has toenable the phenomenologist to understand emotions which are incom-patible with his own value-system.

Understanding an emotion is not intellectual or conceptual com-prehension, but it may make the latter possible. The former itself oc-curs in the emotional sphere. The intellect may face emotions fromtwo positions: in its reference to some object it may be guided by theemotion felt towards this object, or it may cognize the emotion, i.e., itsform (cognition based on emotional understanding). The intellect iscapable of immediate conceptual understanding only with regard toconceptual entities made out of its own metaphysical matter, but notwith regard to emotion. Immediate understanding of emotion means tolook at it while it remains in its own sphere. This observation of emo-tion may be constructive and instructed by the intellect, but it does nottransfer the emotion into the intellectual sphere; accordingly, con-ceptual knowledge that relies on the observation of emotions is neitherevident nor finite.

Let me now, in the following lines, use the words “objective” and“formal” in the sense they have in Descartes' and Spinoza's writings.In so far as an emotion is experienced it exists formally, and in so faras it is the content of emotional understanding it exists onlyobjectively, not formally. Emotional understanding reconstructs theemotion on an objective plane. When a person formally reconstructsanother's joy he is happy himself, when he formally reconstructs lovefor a certain object, he loves it himself. However, understanding anemotion without experiencing it is objective reconstruction. But evenobjective reconstruction can be full reconstruction. In the reconstruc-tion of an emotion directed at an object, the intention directed at theobject also takes place, i.e., transitive intention, and this occurs even inunderstanding without experiencing. This understanding is immedi-ately accompanied by awareness of the reconstruction's imaginarycharacter, or as exclusively objective reproduction.

Between understanding an emotion while and while not experienc-ing it, there may be intermediate cases of undergoing the experience ina weaker form. But it would be a mistake to assume that the degree ofunderstanding is the same as the degree of experiencing the emo-tion.128

The understanding of an alien value is possible not because peopledo not differ much, but because valuative differences occur betweenbranches that grow out of the same trunk, namely, because a valuegrows out of a value. Whoever occupies one branch has therefore toreach the other branch and finally to occupy a suitable observationpoint on the trunk. The ability to understand alien values enables the

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phenomenology of values to construct its first stage, the stage of ob-serving alternative values as they reveal themselves in acts of valua-tion.

The first, or the preparatory stage of value phenomenology residesmidway between the given valuation phenomena and the methodicalreflection by which it is guided. In principle, it resides on the inten-tional level of the phenomena of consciousness which are to be de-scribed and analyzed in the following stages. That is to say, when wetreat of the valuation of an external object, the preparatory stage alsoresides on the level of intention towards the object. When we treat ofvaluing reflection (for instance, of the objectivistic-naive kind) in eve-ryday thought, the preparatory stage also resides on the same level.The preparation we discuss is not reflection about the phenomenon, asif it were spread out fully accomplished in front of the phenomenolo-gist; it is a work of reconstruction and adjustment of valuations basedon alien values.

After the first stage come two stages of phenomenological reflec-tion. At the second stage we bracket every status, be it valuative orcognitive, in order to arrive at pure contents of thought and imagina-tion. Thus, we also bracket whatever specifies objectivism and subjec-tivism as well as the controversy between them. For example, we roamthe sphere of the justice concept, examine ways of salient justice andof non-salient justice and what is beyond justice and wrong (whenthere is no shortage and no problem of distribution); having walked thelength of all these pathways, we look at the place justice occupies inthis or that system. One can describe these procedures as metaphysicalunfolding and metaphysical analysis of justice. At this stage thoughtfreely exchanges hypothetical courses, hypothetically applies onevalue and subsequently replaces it with its alternative. It unfolds theinstances of opposition between values that meet various questions(like justice and liberty) and arranges possible “solutions.” It is free ofthe manacles of reflection which prevails over values. It is free ofemotions, free of the ontological slant towards objectivism orsubjectivism, and free of the need to found values.

At the third stage, phenomenology takes cognitive statuses out ofbrackets, leaving only the valuative ones bracketed. At this stage, wecan refer to the reality researched by psychology, history, ethnographyetc. We can approach the explanation of existing value-systems. Thisis not a predictive explanation as usual in natural science, but a post-factum explanation. It does not predict because what is truly new can-not be derived from what is old because it is not included in the latter;in the sphere of values as in the rest of spiritual spheres, new things arecreated. Yet, what is novel, be it even utterly novel in part, is con-


nected to what is old, and sometimes one may say that it fits one of theold factors. For instance, a new answer to an already existing questionis possible, an answer which is not derived from the question and notderived from another existent factor, but one may say that it fits thequestion. Awareness of the question causes the creation of the answer.We deal therefore also with causal ties, but part of them are unique intheir concrete figure and do not enable us to predict.

Epilogue

The pragmatic position regarding the question of value foundation, therelational position regarding the question of their ontological statusand the phenomenological approach to the work of axiology may wellcombine into a single outlook.

At a future and more advanced stage of axiology it may achievemethodological lessons for the valuative level.

Glossary

The following technical terms are used in this book in the senseroughly explained here. In some cases an example replaces direct ex-planation.ACTION (synonym: act). Something recognizable by a certain dis-

tinct feeling. A person feels whether he or she is passive or active.Action is being active. There is no need for a further characteristicto regard something as an action. For example, there is no need tocheck whether the entrant for the status of an action may occur inresponse to an order. Willing is an action.

AXIOLOGY is the general theory of value; it studies the ways inwhich we value possible objects, and the ways in which the mannerof valuation influences motivations and is being influenced bythem.

END (synonym: goal) and MEANS. These are correlative concepts,like left and right. Not everything which is desired is labeled “end”here, but only what is gained by the use of means. The means is thecause for the realized end.

EMOTION and FEELING. Feeling is the valuative facet or part ofsensation. It may be located in the body. Pleasure and pain are feel-ings, while love and hate as well as joy and sadness are emotions.Wonder at what is beautiful or exalted belongs to the realm of emo-tion.

EMOTIONAL MOVEMENT is a kind of emotional valuation. It isneither positive nor negative, although it may accompany a positiveas well as a negative valuation. The sublime is emotionally movingand so is the mysterious. An esthetical experience may belong tothe realm of emotional movement. We have to distinguish between


emotional movement and agitation. Anger, for instance representsagitation, but not emotional movement. Antonym: Calmness.

GOAL-ORIENTED action. An action taken as a means and measuredby efficiency. It is not desirable in itself, but required on account ofits results.

IDEAL. The ideal differs from the end in that it is not achieved by theuse of means. It is not achieved as the result of a process maninitiates. The ideal is directly realized by the action it informs, evenif this action does not realize it fully. The ideal differs from theneed in that man creates it, chooses and establishes it; that is to say,it is the product of constitution, while the need is given to man: Aperson does not choose what his or her needs will be. Justice is anideal.

INTENTION. The word “intention” signifies an elemental act of themind that assumes different specific forms: the form of (a person)meaning something, of understanding something, or perceiving it,or being aware of it. The mind, as it were, stretches itself in allthese forms towards something (towards an object or an idea). Inthis use of the word we follow Franz Brentano (in the manner heused the German word “Intention”). We also use the derivatives “tointend” and “intentional.”FORM AND CONTENT of intention. This is the distinction be-tween the “how” and the “what” of the intentional act. Attention isfocused on the content, namely, on what is intended and not on theways and manners of the intention. However, the form of one actmay be referred to by another intentional act, namely, a reflectiveact.TRANSITIVE intention and REFLECTIVE intention. Inten-tional acts are characterized as transitive when they refer to some-thing outside consciousness; they are characterized as reflectivewhen they refer to other intentional acts.INTENT. That which is intended. The intent is what we intend, butnot from the aspect of its existence outside intending mind, but asfar as it belongs to the latter's contents. We can repeat the proce-dure and intend the same intent again. Intent is a crystal of inten-tional content.

KNOWLEDGE and COGNITION “Knowledge” appears in itsbroad, generally accepted sense, while “cognition” designatesvalue-neutral knowledge. Its object is whatever exists. It treats itsobject as something not dependent on it. Cognition includes adescription and an explanation of its object.

TYPICAL. The typical of a group of phenomena is not the more fre-quent combination of properties to be found in this group. Not the

Glossary 331

statistical characterization is here decisive. Typical is that which isfree from disturbances. As a melody could be disturbed by back-ground noises, so a combination of affinitive properties may be dis-turbed by some addition to it or subtraction from it emerging fromthe background. As auditive understanding discerns between themelody and attending noises, so does the observation distinguishbetween typical and contingent phenomena.

VALUE. A value is the stance we assume in relation to things andideas, considering them good or bad, just or unjust, loved or hated,exalted or contemptible, beautiful or ugly, pleasurable or painful.These are conceptual, emotional or feeling stances. They includestands taken in practice and such which do not involve action.Note: I provide this explanation here for the sake of convenience,even though it overemphasizes the individual-subjective aspect.VALUE-BEARER. A value-neutral property always accompaniedby a certain value-property.FORM OF VALUE. The Form of a value is a section of the inten-tional form of value thinking. It is the aspect of the value that isseen by the reflection on it, i.e. the factual aspect of value thinking.The form includes the transitive intentional act, the adhering to thevalue, and the role of the value in the system of values.FULL and EMPTY valuative values. A full value requires theexistence of a certain thing, or a certain deed, or the presence of acertain sensation, feeling or emotion. An empty value requires thenon-existence, or the non-presence, of a certain something. Not tosteal is an empty (positive) value.GIVEN and CONSTITUTED valuative values. A given value isa value we neither create nor choose, but become aware of post-factum, namely, we find it within ourselves by means of a feelingor an emotion. The constituted value is created by reason (in aseries of alternative possibilities), and the will chooses andestablishes it.POSITIVE and NEGATIVE MOTIVATIVE VALUES (also:positive and negative motives). A positive motivative value is thedesire for or the aspiration to something, the attraction it exercises;a negative motivative value is the opposition to something, the urgeto escape a certain situation, to get away from something.POSITIVE and NEGATIVE VALUATIVE VALUES. Thepositive valuative value praises something. It serves as a norm (or aquasi-norm) for according praise. It is the content of a specificgood. The negative valuative value condemns. It is the content of aspecific evil.


PURE and MIXED valuative values. The pure value does not in-clude cognition (i.e., value-neutral knowledge of facts). A wish is apure value, while a goal or a duty include cognition of the ability torealize them.HIGH and LOW, STRONG and WEAK valuative values. Wedeal here with two scales of preference according to Nicolai Hart-mann. The scale of high-low treats of the positive part of the valua-tive scale: High is whatever receives greater praise. The scalestrong-weak treats of the degree of condemnation involved in thenegative part of the valuative scale.VALUATION. Valuation can be described as assuming a position.It is the application, or quasi-application of a value. The statementthat a certain deed is just is its conceptual valuation. Love is anemotional valuation. The taste of a dish a person enjoys is his feel-ing valuation of the dish. Some valuations are neither positive nornegative, for instance, considering something as mysterious (seeexplanation of “emotionally moving”).VALUATIVE values and MOTIVATIVE values. A valuativevalue is whatever serves as a basis for valuation, or the element ac-cording to which a person values. A valuing person may only pos-sess his valuations, while he does not formulate the rule, the valua-tive value, according to which they are carried out (similar to gram-matical rules). A motivative value is a force that accompanies(though not in every case) the valuative value; it is felt as a desire,an aspiration, an attraction or repulsion.Value NEUTRALITY. The text of a chemistry book is value-neu-tral.Value PROPERTY. The objective correlate of the act of valua-tion. Beauty is a value-property of a beautiful woman, justice is thevalue-property of a just deed.

VOLITION, WILL . Willing is an intentional act that requires a cer-tain (future) action from the person who wills, and expresses readi-ness to bear certain sacrifices (which, according to this person'sknowledge, the action involves), so that this intentional actbecomes the cause of the action's occurrence (if the action can becarried out, namely. if the ability and certain circumstances arethere). A decision is a kind of volition (it is a verbal volition). Awish not accompanied by readiness for the necessary sacrifice isnot a volition. The term “will” denotes the human faculty tomediate between the sphere of valuative values and the sphere ofmotivative values and to turn a reason into a cause.

Notes

The emphasis by italicization in quotations is mine; the spelling is according tothe original. Bibliographical details appear in the bibliography.

Introduction (pgs. 1-10)

1. Se e : Ar i s t o t l e , Po l i t i c s , Bo o k I , C h a p t e r 2 , 1 2 5 2 b .

2 . Ar i s t o t l e , Ph y s i c s , Bo o k I I , Ch a p t e r 8 , e s p e c i a l l y 1 9 9 b a t t h e b e g i n -

n i n g .3.

Wi t h r e g a r d t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t we e n t h e v a l u a t i v e a n d t h e me t a -

v a l u a t i v e l e v e l , c o mp a r e Hu s s e r l , Hu s s e r l i a n a XXVI I I , p p . 5 6 - 5 7 .4 .

J . La i r d , Th e I d e a o f Va l u e , p . XVI . I n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h i s b o o k ,

t h e r e a d e r wi l l f i n d a r e v i e w o f t h e t e r ms d e s i g n a t i n g v a l u e i n a n u mb e r o f l a n g u a g e s .

5. Th e h i s t o r y o f t h e g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f v a l u e ( o r o f wr i t i n g s i n t h i s

s p h e r e ) b e g i n wi t h a p a p e r b y Ch r i s t i a n v o n Eh r e n f e l s i n Ri c h a r d Av e - n a r i u s ' Ph i l o s o p h i c a l Qu a r t e r l y i n 1 8 9 3 a n d 1 8 9 4 . Th e t i t l e o f t h e p a p e r i s “ We r t h t h e o r i e u n d Et h i k .” I t a p p e a r e d a s a s e r i e s o f a r t i c l e s i n f i v e i n s t a l l me n t s . Th e wr i t i n g o f t h i s p a p e r wa s p r e c e d e d b y d i s c u s s i o n s a t Al e x i u s Me i n o n g ' s s e mi n a r s . Eh r e n f e l s t r i e s i n t h i s p a p e r t o i n c o r p o r a t e s t u d i e s f r o m t h e e c o n o mi c f i e l d ( mo r e p r e c i s e l y , d i s c u s s i o n s i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e Au s t r i a n s c h o o l o f Ka r l v o n Me n g e r a n d Fr i e d r i c h v o n Wi e s e r ) , a n d f r o m t h e s p h e r e o f e t h i c s . Th e t e r m “ a x i o l o g y ” wa s d i s s e mi n a t e d b y Wi l b u r Ur b a n , o n e o f t h e s c h o l a r s wh o i n t r o d u c e d t h e t h e o r y o f v a l u e i n t o t h e E n g l i s h s p e a k i n g wo r l d . A d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t o f t h e h i s t o r y o f v a l u e - t h e o r y a p p e a r s i n O. Kr a u s , Di e We r t t h e o r i e n — Ge s c h i c h t e u n d Kr i t i k . Th e s u b t i t l e i n f o r ms u s t h a t h e n o t o n l y d e a l s w i t h h i s t o r y . Th e r e a d e r wh o s e e k s a c o n v e n i e n t p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e v a r i o u s t h e o r i e s a n d t h e i r i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n , wi l l me e t a n o b s t a c l e : Kr a u s f r e q u e n t l y b e g i n s t o a r g u e wi t h a s c h o l a r b e f o r e h e f i n i s h e s t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f h i s t h e o r y ( a t t i me s , mu c h e a r l i e r ) , s o t h a t t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e


c o n t r o v e r s y . Ch r i s t i a n v o n Eh r e n f e l s ' s p e c i a l p l a c e i n h i s t o r y i s s e v e r e l y s h o r t c h a n g e d i n Kr a u s ' d e s c r i p t i o n .

6. Se e e n d n o t e n u mb e r 8 2 .

7. Th o ma s Ho b b e s , Le v i a t h a n , Ch a p . X, p . 6 7 .

Part I, Ch ap ter 1 (p gs . 13-25)

8. Se e : I mma n u e l Ka n t , Fu n d a me n t a l Pr i n c i p l e s o f t h e Me t a p h y s i c o f

Mo r a l s , p .3 8 . Th e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f d e v i a t i o n s f r o m Ka n t ' s v e r s i o n i s n o t n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n . Wi t h r e g a r d t o t h i s ma t t e r s e e : Le o He n r i Wi l d e , Hy p o t h e t i s c h e u n d k a t e g o r i s c h e I mp e r a t i v e , p .8 0 .

9.

Eh r e n f e l s b e g i n s h i s p a p e r “ We r t h t h e o r i e u n d Et h i k ” wi t h a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e e x c h a n g e v a l u e ; f o l l o wi n g t h e Au s t r i a n e c o n o mi s t s h e s t a t e s ( 1 7 , p . 8 1 ) t h a t t h e e x c h a n g e v a l u e o f t h i n g s s t a n d s i n p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e i r m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y . He b a s e s u t i l i t y o n s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e n e e d ( 1 7 ,p . 8 4 ) . Th e n e e d h a s t wo a s p e c t s : A. De s i r e o r a s p i r a t i o n , n a me l y , t h e mo t i v a t i v e v a l u e . B. Th e f e e l i n g o f d i s t r e s s , n a me l y , a f e e l i n g v a l u a t i o n .He r e Eh r e n f e l s p o s e s t h e q u e s t i o n o n wh i c h o f t h e s e t wo a s p e c t s a v a l u e s h o u l d b e b a s e d . Su mma r i z i n g t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f p r o s a n d c o n s h e s a y s : “ We r t h i s d i e v o n d e r Sp r a c h e i r r t h ü ml i c h o b j e c t i v i r t e Be z i e h u n g e i n e s Di n g e s z u e i n e m a u f d a s s e l b e g e r i c h t e t e n me n s c h l i c h e n Be g e h r e n ” ( “ Va l u e i s t h e b y l a n g u a g e mi s t a k e n l y o b j e c t i f i e d r e l a t i o n o f a t h i n g t o a h u ma n d e s i r e a i me d a t i t ,” 1 7 , p . 9 8 ) . Th a t i s t o s a y , h e t i p s t h e s c a l e s f r o mt h e f e e l i n g a s p e c t ( i .e ., f r o m t h e a s s u mi n g o f a f e e l i n g p o s i t i o n , o r f r o mt h e v a l u a t i v e v a l u e ) t o wa r d s t h e d e s i r e ( i .e . t h e mo t i v e ) . An d h e r e v e a l s h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e o b j e c t i v i s m o f p o p u l a r t h o u g h t , wh i c h r e f e r s t o v a l u e a s a p r o p e r t y t h i n g s p o s s e s s . Eh r e n f e l s e x t e n d s t h e c o n c e p t o f d e s i r e t o i n c l u d e wi s h e s , a s p i r a t i o n s a n d v o l i t i o n ; t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e d e s i r e d t h i n g i s e x t e n d e d t o b e c o me a c a t e g o r y wh i c h i n c l u d e s p r o c e s s e s ,s i t u a t i o n s , r e l a t i o n s a n d p o s s i b i l i t i e s ( S y s t e m d e r We r t h t h e o r i e , I , p . 5 3 ) .No t l o n g a f t e r t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f Eh r e n f e l s ' f i r s t a r t i c l e o n v a l u e t h e o r y ,Al e x i u s v o n Me i n o n g r e a c t e d t o i t . A r e v i e w o f t h e c o u r s e o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s y b e t we e n t h e t wo a r i s t o c r a t s ( Me i n o n g a v o i d e d t h e u s e o f h i s t i t l e “ v o n ” ) a p p e a r s i n R. Fr o n d i z i , Wh a t i s Va l u e , p p . 4 3 - 4 7 . Me i n o n g ' s l o g i c s a y s t h a t o n e d o e s n o t d e s i r e s o me t h i n g u n l e s s i t i s p l e a s a n t ( o r i t s a b s e n c e i s u n p l e a s a n t ) a n d n o t v i c e v e r s a — i t i s n o t p l e a s a n t , o r g o o d b e c a u s e o n e d e s i r e s i t . Th e a s s u mi n g o f a f e e l i n g p o - s i t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e t h e d e c i s i v e f a c t o r . He a r g u e s a g a i n s t Eh r e n f e l s t h a t a p e r s o n d o e s n o t a s p i r e t o s o me t h i n g h e h a s a t h i s d i s p o s a l , a n d t h e r e f o r e i t s h o u l d h a v e n o v a l u e f o r i t s o wn e r . Me i n o n g ' s o p i n i o n s a r e p r e s e n t e d i n h i s b o o k Ps y c h o l o g i s c h - Et h i s c h e Un t e r s u c h u n g e n z u r We r t t h e o r y ( 1 8 9 4 ) , a n d i n a b o o k p u b l i s h e d p o s t h u mo u s l y wh i c h r e p r e s e n t s h i s l a t e r o u t l o o k ( m e a n t t o c o me i n s t e a d o f a s e c o n d e d i t i o n o f t h e b o o k me n t i o n e d a b o v e ) : Zu r Gr u n d l e g u n g d e r a l l g e me i n e n We r t t h e o r i e ( 1 9 2 3 ) .

Notes 335

I n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e d i s p u t e a b o u t v a l u a t i v e a n d m o t i v a t i v e v a l u e s b o t h p a r t i e s a me n d e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s i n o r d e r t o m a k e t h e m d e f e n s i b l e , u n t i l t h e g a p b e t we e n t h e m b e c a me i n d i s c e r n i b l e h e r e a n d t h e r e . On e wa s c o mp e l l e d t o a d mi t t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f v a l u a t i v e v a l u e s , t h e o t h e r wa s c o mp e l l e d t o a d mi t a u t o n o my o f t h e mo t i v e . Me i n o n g ' s r e a c t i o n wa s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c — h e wa s s o me wh a t s u r p r i s e d t o d i s c o v e r t h a t t h e g a p h a d b e c o me i n d i s c e r n i b l e . Se e : A. Me i n o n g , On As s u mp t i o n s , p p . 2 3 1 - 2 3 4 .Th e ma i n b e n e f i t a x i o l o g y c a n d e r i v e f r o m t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y d o e s n o t a r i s e f r o m d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s h o r t c o mi n g s o n e a c h s i d e , a n d e v e n l e s s f r o m t h e a t t e mp t s t o a me n d p o s i t i o n s , b u t p r i n c i p a l l y f r o m t h e r e s u l t o f a d r a w, wh i c h t e l l s u s t h a t t h e r e d u c t i o n s h a v e f a i l e d a n d t h a t t h e b a r r i e r b e t we e n v a l u a t i v e a n d mo t i v a t i v e v a l u e s d o e s n o t p r e v a i l o n l y o n t h e s u r f a c e . M a n y p h i l o s o p h i c a l a r g u me n t s e n d i n a d r a w a n d a r e l e f t t h e r e ,b u t t h e r e s u l t o f a d r a w ma y a l s o b e a r f r u i t .A q u i t e c o mp r e h e n s i v e a t t e mp t a i mi n g t o b a s e t h e v a l u a t i v e v a l u e o n t h e mo t i v e ( wi t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o E h r e n f e l s ) wa s ma d e b y W. D. La mo n t . Se e h i s Th e Va l u e J u d g e me n t , p p . 2 1 0 - 2 4 6 . He wi s h e s t o s h o w t h a t v a l u a t i o n i s n e i t h e r b a s e d o n c o g n i t i o n n o r o n f e e l i n g a n d e mo t i o n , b u t o n a s p i r a t i o n ( o r c o n a t i v e a t t i t u d e ) .Amo n g c o n t e mp o r a r y wr i t i n g s d e a l i n g wi t h t h e r e l a t i o n b e t we e n v a l u a t i v e a n d mo t i v a t i v e v a l u e s , E. J . Bo n d ' s Re a s o n a n d Va l u e , p p . 1 - 8 3 ,i s s o me wh a t c l o s e t o o u r p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n . On e s h o u l d n o t e t h a t h i s d i v i s i o n i n t o “ mo t i v a t i v e r e a s o n ” a n d “ g r o u n d i n g r e a s o n ” ( s e e t h e r e p p .3 0 - 3 1 ) i s n o t c o n g r u e n t wi t h t h e d i v i s i o n mo t i v a t i v e - v a l u a t i v e v a l u e .


10. Th i s i s De s c a r t e s ' p o s i t i o n a n d I f o l l o w t h e p a t h h e o u t l i n e s . Se e

De s c a r t e s , Th e Pr i n c i p l e s o f Ph i l o s o p h y , Pa r t I , Pr i n c i p l e s 3 2 - 3 5 .11.

Ps y c h o l o g y wa s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e r e l a t i o n b e t we e n t h e d e g r e e o f

s u b j e c t i v e c e r t a i n t y p e o p l e a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e a n s we r s t h e y g a v e t o q u e s - t i o n s p o s e d t o t h e m, a n d t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e s e a n s we r s we r e t r u e . Em- p i r i c a l f i n d i n g s s h o we d t h a t a b o v e a c e r t a i n t h r e s h o l d p e o p l e d e mo n - s t r a t e i n ma n y c a s e s o v e r c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e t r u t h o f t h e i r a n s we r s , i .e ., t h e s u b j e c t i v e c e r t a i n t y t h a t t h e i r a n s we r s a r e t r u e e x c e e d s p r o b a b i l i t y , wh i l e b e l o w t h i s t h r e s h o l d t h e y s h o w u n d e r c o n f i d e n c e , i . e ., s u b j e c t i v e c e r t a i n t y f a l l s b e l o w p r o b a b i l i t y . I b e l i e v e t h i s f a c t ma y b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e f o l l o wi n g ma n n e r : Wh e n c e r t a i n t y , b a s e d o n t h e i n t e l l e c t ' s a n d o b s e r v a t i o n ' s wo r k p a s s e s t h e p o i n t we wi l l n a me “ c o n f i d e n c e t h r e s h o l d ” ( s a y , 7 0 % i n a c e r t a i n c a s e ) , t h e p o we r o f j u d g me n t a l l o c a t e s ( i n t h e s e c a s e s ) a c o n s i d e r a b l e a mo u n t o f a d d i t i o n a l c o n f i d e n c e ; t h i s a d d i t i o n e n a b l e s a p e r s o n t o i n i t i a t e t h e a c t i o n n e c e s s a r y t o i mp l e me n t t h e d e c i s i o n w h i c h a r o s e f r o m a s i t u a t i o n a s s e s s me n t ( wh o s e p r o b a b i l i t y e x c e e d e d 7 0 %) , wi t h o u t f u r t h e r d o u b t s . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , wh e n we l l - g r o u n d e d c e r t a i n t y s t a y s b e l o w t h e c o n f i d e n c e - t h r e s h o l d , t h e p o we r o f j u d g me n t d e d u c t s a p o r t i o n o f c o n f i d e n c e , n a me l y , i t c a s t s d o u b t u p o n


t h e i n t e l l e c t ' s wo r k , i n o r d e r t o c o n t i n u e t h e e x a mi n a t i o n f r o m a n a n g l e o f e mp h a s i z e d u n c e r t a i n t y . I n s u c h c a s e s , t h e p o we r o f j u d g me n t c r e a t e s a b r e a k i n t h e c o n t i n u i t y o f t h e c e r t a i n t y d e g r e e t h e s u b j e c t a t t r i b u t e s t o h i s o r h e r j u d g me n t s . We s a i d t h a t t h e a d d i t i o n i s a l l o c a t e d “ i n o r d e r t o ...” a n d t h e d e d u c t i o n i s ma d e “ i n o r d e r t o ...” b u t t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s n e i t h e r c o n s c i o u s , n o r d o e s i t a c t u a l l y e x i s t a s a c o n s i d e r a t i o n ; t h i s i s t h e f o r mu l a t i o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e f l e c t i o n e mp l o y s t o d e s c r i b e a n u n c o n s c i o u s t e l e o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f a d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . Th i s s t r u c t u r e p r e v a i l s a t a n e a r l y s t a g e o f t h e p r o c e s s , a t wh i c h t h e d e g r e e o f c o n f i d e n c e o r b e l i e f i s c r y s t a l l i z e d . I t r e v e a l s i t s e l f i n t h a t we r o u n d o f f t h e d e g r e e o f c o n f i d e n c e , o n c e u p wa r d s a n d o n c e d o wn wa r d s . I t h e l p s a p e r s o n t o a c t d e c i s i v e l y a n d e n e r g e t i c a l l y d e s p i t e u n c e r t a i n t y ( p u r e l y c o g n i t i v e ) , a n d f a c i l i t a t e s t h e me e t i n g o f c h a l l e n g e s . Th e wi l l n e e d s o n l y a y e s o r n o a n s we r f r o m t h e i n t e l l e c t : a b o v e o r b e l o w t h e t h r e s h o l d . T h e i n t e l l e c t r e p l i e s i n i t s o wn w a y wi t h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f p r o s a n d c o n s . We ma y a l s o f o r mu l a t e t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e e mp i r i c a l f i n d i n g s t h u s : t h e r e i s a c e r t a i n mi d wa y p o i n t b e t we e n wh a t i s c l o s e t o c e r t a i n t y a n d wh a t i s c l o s e t o d o u b t , a n d t h e p o we r o f j u d g me n t a p p a r e n t l y t e n d s t o a v o i d t h i s mi d d l e , t e n d i n g t o t i p t h e s c a l e s i n t h i s o r t h a t d i r e c t i o n . Th e p o we r o f j u d g me n t i s b u t t h e w i l l i n o n e o f i t s r o l e s .Th e e x p e r i me n t a l f i n d i n g i s u s u a l l y d e s c r i b e d g r a p h i c a l l y b y a s e t o f a x e s , i n w h i c h t h e h o r i z o n t a l a x i s d e s c r i b e s c o n f i d e n c e , i .e ., t h e c e r t a i n t y s u b j e c t s a t t r i b u t e t o t h e i r a n s we r s , e x p r e s s e d b y n u mb e r s f r o m 5 0 t o 1 0 0 ,wh i c h t h e y a l l o c a t e t o a n s we r s ( 5 0 = t o t a l u n c e r t a i n t y , 1 0 0 = a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y ) ; t h e v e r t i c a l a x i s d e s c r i b e s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e a n s we r s a r e t r u e , a n d t h i s p r o b a b i l i t y i s c a l c u l a t e d a s t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f t r u e a n s we r s a mo n g a l l a n s we r s . Th e r e l a t i o n b e t we e n c o n f i d e n c e ( s u b j e c t i v e c e r t a i n t y ) a n d p r o b a b i l i t y ( o b j e c t i v e c e r t a i n t y ) i s e x p r e s s e d i n a c u r v e . I n a q u i t e c o mmo n f o r m, t h i s c u r v e c r o s s e s t h e 4 5 d e g r e e l i n e f r o m a b o v e ,a s c e n d i n g t o t h e r i g h t . Th e f o l l o wi n g p i c t u r e o f t e n e me r g e s ( Se e f i g . 6 ) . I f t h e c u r v e we r e c o n g r u e n t wi t h t h e 4 5 d e g r e e l i n e ( p a s s i n g d i a g o n a l l y b e t we e n t h e a x e s ) , “ s u b j e c t i v e ” c e r t a i n t y ( c o n f i d e n c e ) wo u l d b e c o n - g r u e n t wi t h “ o b j e c t i v e ” c e r t a i n t y ( p r o b a b i l i t y o r t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f t r u e a n s we r s ) . Th e f a c t t h a t t h e c u r v e s a s c e n d f r o m l e f t t o r i g h t t e l l s u s t h a t i n a g e n e r a l ma n n e r s u b j e c t i v e a n d o b j e c t i v e c e r t a i n t y a c c o r d . Th e i n - c l i n a t i o n t o d i v i d e a n s we r s b y t wo , i n t o c e r t a i n a n d u n c e r t a i n o n e s , i n - f l u e n c e s t h e f o r m o f t h e c u r v e a n d i s e x p r e s s e d i n i t s f l a t n e s s , n a me l y , i n t h a t i t a s c e n d s o n l y s l o wl y f r o m l e f t t o r i g h t . A f l a t c u r v e b e a r s d i r e c t e v i d e n c e t o t h e f a c t t h a t c o n f i d e n c e g r o ws f a s t e r t h a n p r o b a b i l i t y .Ho we v e r , s h o u l d a s t e e p c u r v e ( a s o p p o s e d t o a f l a t o n e ) a p p e a r i n t h e s p a c e d e s c r i b e d b y t h e s e t o f a x e s ( i n t h e a b o v e d r a wi n g ) , t h e i n c r e a s e o f t h e s u b j e c t ' s c o n f i d e n c e i n h i s a n s we r s wi l l i n v o l v e a n i n c r e a s e i n h i s u n d e r c o n f i d e n c e i f i t e x i s t s , o r a s h r i n k i n g o f h i s o v e r c o n f i d e n c e , i f t h i s p r e v a i l s . Su c h a c u r v e a s c e n d i n g t o t h e r i g h t ma y c r o s s t h e l i n e o f g o o d c a l i b r a t i o n ( t h e 4 5 d e g r e e l i n e ) f r o m b e l o w. Th e f o l l o wi n g f a c t o r s , f o r e x a mp l e , a c t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f a s t e e p c u r v e :

Notes 337

A. Th e f a c t o r d i c t a t e d b y t h e t e c h n i q u e o f t h e d e s c r i p t i o n ( u n d e r c o n f i - d e n c e i s i mp o s s i b l e i f h a l f t h e a n s we r s a r e wr o n g , a n d o v e r c o n f i d e n c e i s i mp o s s i b l e i f a l l a n s we r s a r e c o r r e c t ) .B. Wh e n t h e s u b j e c t s a r e n o t a wa r e h o w e a s y t h e e a s y q u e s t i o n s a n d h o w d i f f i c u l t t h e d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n s a r e , t h i s u n a wa r e n e s s c a u s e s t h e c u r v e t o b e c o me s t e e p e r .

Fi g u r e 6

On t h e ma t t e r o f o v e r c o n f i d e n c e s e e Sa r a h Li c h t e n s t e i n , B. Fi s c h h o f f & L.D. Ph i l l i p s , “ Ca l i b r a t i o n o f P r o b a b i l i t i e s : Th e St a t e o f t h e Ar t t o 1 9 8 0 .” Se e a l s o G i d e o n Ke r e n , “ On t h e Ab i l i t y o f Mo n i t o r i n g No n - Ve r i d i c a l Pe r c e p t i o n s a n d Un c e r t a i n Kn o w l e d g e : So me Ca l i b r a t i o n St u d i e s ” ; a n d b y t h e s a m e “ Ca l i b r a t i o n a n d P r o b a b i l i t y J u d g me n t s : Co n c e p t u a l a n d Me t h o d o l o g i c a l I s s u e s .”

12. Sp i n o z a t o Bl y e n b e r g h , 2 8 J a n . 1 6 6 5 ; Th e Ch i e f Wo r k s o f Be n e d i c t

d e S p i n o z a , v o l . 2 , p . 3 4 3 .13.

Pl a t o , Re p u b l i c , I I , 3 6 8 - 3 6 9 .


14. Th e p i c t u r e ma n y a u t h o r s d r a w o f t h e h u ma n mi n d , a s i f i t we r e

ma d e u p e x c l u s i v e l y b y t h e i n t e l l e c t , n a me l y , o f o n e s e c t i o n o n l y , l e a v e s n o r o o m f o r s e l f - d e c e p t i o n . Th i s i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t p i c t u r e g e n e r a t e s t h e f o l - l o wi n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n : Th e c h e a t e r k n o ws t h e t r u t h , t h e r e f o r e h e i s n o t l i a b l e t o b e c h e a t e d e i t h e r b y a n o t h e r o r b y h i ms e l f . J o h n El s t e r wr o t e i n 1 9 8 3 a b o u t a s e r i e s o f t h e o r e t i c a l t r i a l s c a r r i e d o u t b e f o r e : “ ….t h e y a l l t e n d t o r e p r o d u c e t h e b a s i c p a r a d o x i n e v e r - s u b t l e r f o r ms ” ( S o u r Gr a p e s ,p .1 4 9 ) . Hi s a p t c r i t i c i s m i s a l s o v a l i d f o r ma n y t h i n g s wr i t t e n l a t e r o n . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e a r e a t t e mp t s a t r e d u c t i o n wh o s e t e n d e n c y i s t o d e n y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f p a r a d o x i c a l c a s e s . Th i s d e n i a l wa s c o n g e n i a l t o J o h n El s t e r ' s o u t l o o k , b u t h e a d mi t s ( i n Ul y s s e s a n d t h e S i r e n s , p .1 7 7 ) t h a t h e f a i l e d i n t h i s a t t e mp t . J o h n s t o n t o u c h e s t h e r o o t o f t h e p r o b l e m wh e n h e wr i t e s : “ . ..t h e s u r f a c e p a r a d o x a n d t h e d e e p e r p a r a d o x e s o f s e l f - d e c e p t i o n ( ...) a r i s e b e c a u s e a s t h e o r i s t s o f s e l f - d e c e p t i o n we t e n d t o o v e r r a t i o n a l i z e me n t a l p r o c e s s e s t h a t a r e p u r p o s i v e b u t n o t i n t e n t i o n a l ” ( “ Se l f - De c e p t i o n a n d t h e Na t u r e o f Mi n d ,” p .6 5 ) . A s y s t e ma t i c s u r v e y o f v a r i o u s wo r k s i n t h i s s p h e r e a p p e a r s i n : Al f r e d Me l e , “ Re c e n t Wo r k o n Se l f - De c e p t i o n .”

15. Th e r e a d e r wi l l f i n d t wo e x a mp l e s o f t h i s k i n d o f s e l f - d e c e p t i o n i n

Ev a n Hu n t e r , S t r a n g e r s Wh e n We Me e t , Ne w Yo r k , 1 9 5 8 . Do n ( Ma r g a r e t ' s h u s b a n d ) a n d Ev e ( La r r y ' s wi f e ) d e c e i v e t h e ms e l v e s wi t h r e g a r d t o t h e f i d e l i t y o f t h e i r s p o u s e s .

16. Se e : B. Wi l l i a ms , “ De c i d i n g t o b e l i e v e ,” p p . 1 4 7 - 1 5 1 .


17.

Ma x Sc h e l e r , Fo r ma l i s m i n Et h i c s a n d No n - Fo r ma l Et h i c s o f Va l u e s , p p . 1 7 - 1 8 . Sc h e l e r c l e a r s a p a t h f o r a x i o l o g y b y me a n s o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t we e n a v a l u e - p r o p e r t y ( o r a v a l u e - q u a l i t y ) a n d t h e v a l u e - b e a r e r , b u t h e i s n o t me t i c u l o u s i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t we e n a v a l u e a n d a v a l u e - p r o p e r t y e v e n wh e r e s u c h me t i c u l o u s n e s s i s n e c e s s a r y . So f o r e x a mp l e , w h e n h e s p e a k s o f t h e e x i s t e n c e a n d n o n - e x i s t e n c e o f a p o s i t i v e v a l u e , wh e n h e me a n s t h e e x i s t e n c e a n d n o n - e x i s t e n c e o f a p o s i t i v e v a l u e - p r o p e r t y . Se e , f o r i n s t a n c e , i b i d ., p .2 6 .

18. A p e r s o n c e r t a i n l y k n o ws wh a t i s f u n n y a n d wh a t i s n o t , b u t h e

c a n n o t s a y wh a t t h e v a l u e - b e a r e r o f t h i s f u n n i n e s s i s . Th a t i s t o s a y , t h e f a c t t h a t s o me t h i n g i s f u n n y i s a v a l u e - p r o p e r t y o f t h e l a t t e r , wh i c h a c t u - a l l y h a s n o v a l u e - b e a r e r ( o r i n a n y c a s e , we d o n o t k n o w s u c h a p r o p e r t y ) .

19. C .I . Le wi s , An An a l y s i s o f Kn o wl e d g e a n d V a l u a t i o n , p p . 4 1 9 - 4 2 3 .


20. Sp i n o z a e x p l a i n s p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n a s a p a r a l l e l . As p a i n i s a

s a d n e s s l o c a t e d i n s o me p a r t o f ma n , s o i s p l e a s u r e a j o y l o c a t e d i n o n e o f h i s p a r t s . Se e : Et h i c s , Pa r t I I I , Pr o p . 1 1 , Sc h o l i u m.

21. I n a c e r t a i n s e n s e , t h e r e a r e n o n o n - me n t a l p h e n o m e n a , b e c a u s e t h e

p h e n o me n o n i s ma d e u p b y ma t e r i a l s o f t h e mi n d t o wh i c h p h e n o me n a

Notes 339

a p p e a r , i t i s ma d e u p b y s e n s a t i o n s wh i c h d o n o t e x i s t b u t i n t h e s e n s i n g s u b j e c t . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , wh a t i s p h y s i c a l d o e s n o t a p p e a r , i t i s n o t g r a s p e d b y a s e n s e , b u t i s t h o u g h t b y t h e s c i e n t i s t a n d b y me a n s o f s y mb o l s a n d s i g n s . Th e p h y s i c i s t Ar t h u r Ed d i n g t o n e x p l a i n s t h i s v e r y we l l i n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o h i s b o o k Th e Na t u r e o f t h e Ph y s i c a l Wo r l d ,wh e n h e c o mp a r e s t h e r e a l t a b l e h e wr i t e s o n t o i t s p h y s i c a l c o r r e l a t e : Th e t a b l e h e w r i t e s o n i s s o l i d , i mmo b i l e a n d i s a t h i n g ( o f s u b s t a n t i a l c h a r a c t e r ) , wh i l e i t s p h y s i c a l c o r r e l a t e ( t a b l e N. 2 ) c o n s i s t s ma i n l y o f e mp t y s p a c e ( i t i s ma d e u p o f a t o ms a n d t h e v o l u me o f e a c h a t o m i s mo s t l y e mp t y ) , wh i l e t h e ma s s i t i s ma d e o f c o n s i s t s o f mo v i n g p a r t i c l e s .On e ma y a d d h e r e t h a t t h e p h y s i c a l s p a c e i s n o t t h e s p a c e i n wh i c h t h e s e n s e d t a b l e r e s i d e s . Th a t i s t o s a y , t h e p h y s i c a l c o r r e l a t e o f t h e s p e c i f i c t a b l e i s n o t s i mi l a r t o i t . So f a r a s n o n - me n t a l e n t i t i e s d o n o t a p p e a r , o r s o f a r a s a l l p h e n o me n a a r e me n t a l , i t wo u l d b e mi s l e a d i n g t o s p e a k a b o u t me n t a l p h e n o me n a s o a s t o l e a v e t h e i mp r e s s i o n t h a t t h e y a r e a k i n d o f p h e n o me n a .

22. Th e p h r a s e s “ wh a t t h e s e n s e s a b s o r b ” o r “ a c t s o f r e c e p t i o n ” a r e

me t a p h o r s e x p r e s s i n g t h e mi n d ' s p a s s i v i t y , s o f a r a s i t i s a wa r e o f i t s e l f i n t h e s p h e r e o f s e n s a t i o n . Fr o m c e r t a i n a s p e c t s , t h e e x a mp l e d o e s n o t ma t c h t h e e x e mp l a r . So me t h i n g o n e a b s o r b s e x i s t s p r i o r t o b e i n g a b s o r b e d a n d t h e s a me h o l d s f o r t h e i ma g e i n v o l v e d i n t h e t e r m “ g i v e n ” : So me t h i n g o n e g i v e s e x i s t s b e f o r e i t i s g i v e n . Re d c o l o r a n d a h i g h - p i t c h e d t o n e ,l i k e p a i n a n d p l e a s u r e , d o n o t e x i s t b e f o r e t h e y a r e g i v e n t o o r a b s o r b e d b y t h e mi n d . Th e i ma g e s c o n c e r n i n g wh a t i s a b s o r b e d a n d wh a t i s g i v e n a r e t h e r e f o r e t o o o b j e c t i v i s t i c i f u n d e r s t o o d a t f a c e v a l u e . Wh a t i s g i v e n t o e x t e r n a l p e r c e p t i o n , o r a b s o r b e d b y i t , h e l p s u s t o u n d e r s t a n d o u r e n v i r o n me n t a n d t h i s c o mp r e h e n s i o n i s p a r t l y i mme d i a t e ; i t a l s o h e l p s u s b y i t s v a l u a t i v e q u a l i t y t o f i n d o u r b e a r i n g s i n t h i s e n v i r o n me n t .

23. Th e ma n c o n c e r n e d f i n d s i t d i f f i c u l t t o f i t i n t o a wo r k p l a c e a n d n e -

g l e c t s h i s d u t y t o e a r n a l i v i n g f o r h i s f a mi l y . A c c o r d i n g l y t h e r e i s a f a c t u a l c o n n e c t i o n i n t h i s c a s e b e t we e n t h e ma t t e r f r o m wh i c h h i s a t - t e n t i o n i s s h i f t e d ( t h e n e g l e c t e d d u t y ) a n d t h e ma t t e r t o wh i c h i t s h i f t s ( h i s b e i n g s i c k a n d t h e r e f o r e i n c a p a b l e o f f u l f i l l i n g t h e d u t y ) ; t h i s c o n n e c t i o n a c c o r d s e f f i c i e n c y o f e x p u l s i o n . Ps y c h o l o g y i s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e d i s p l a c e me n t wh i c h p r e v a i l s h e r e . Fo r o u r d i s c u s s i o n we n e e d o n l y o n e f a c e t o f t h e d e s c r i b e d d i s p l a c e me n t wh i c h b e a r s e v i d e n c e t o a r e l a t i v e l y s i mp l e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s , n a me l y , t h a t t h o u g h t s a r e p l e a s a n t t o t h i n k o r u n p l e a s a n t , a n d a c c o r d i n g l y a t t r a c t o r r e p e l , i .e ., t h e y a r o u s e a p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e mo t i v e , t o t h i n k o r t o i g n o r e t h e m. Th e p s y c h o l o g i s t wh o t o l d m e o f t h i s c a s e i s Ez e k i e l Av s h a l o m. An o t h e r c a s e I k n o w o f i s a p e r s o n wh o wo r k e d d u r i n g h i s v a c a t i o n e v e n t h o u g h f i n a n c i a l l y h e d i d n o t n e e d i t a t a l l , a n d i n s p i t e o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e wo r k d i d n o t a t t r a c t h i m. He e x p l a i n e d i t b y s a y i n g t h a t d u r i n g v a c a t i o n s h e i s b o t h e r e d b y b a d t h o u g h t s a b o u t p a s t d i s a p p o i n t me n t s a n d wr o n g s d o n e t o h i m ma n y y e a r s b e f o r e , wh i l e t h e s e d o n o t b o t h e r h i m wh i l e h e wo r k s . Th i s c a s e i s t h e o p p o s i t e o f t h e p r e v i o u s o n e : He r e a p e r s o n f l e e s t o wo r k , t h e r e h e f l e e s f r o m wo r k .


24. Se e Os k a r Kr a u s , Da s Be d ü r f n i s — Ei n Be i t r a g z u r b e s c h r e i b e n d e n

Ps y c h o l o g i e , p p . 8 - 1 0 .25.

Hu s s e r l d i s c u s s e s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t we e n f e e l i n g a n d e mo t i o n a s

t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t we e n “ p a s s i v e s i n n l i c h e Ge f ü h l e “ a n d “ Ge f ü h l s a k t e a l s we r t e n d e A k t e .” Se e : Al o i s Ro t h , Ed mu n d Hu s s e r l s e t h i s c h e Un t e r - s u c h u n g e n — Da r g e s t e l l t a n h a n d s e i n e r Vo r l e s u n g s ma n u s k r i p t e , p p . 4 9 - 5 0 .

26. I n h i s p a p e r “ Wh a t i s a n Emo t i o n ? ” J a me s wr i t e s : “ ...We f e e l s o r r y

b e c a u s e we c r y , a n g r y b e c a u s e we s t r i k e , a f r a i d b e c a u s e we t r e mb l e , a n d n o t t h a t w e c r y , s t r i k e o r t r e mb l e b e c a u s e we a r e s o r r y , a n g r y o r f e a r f u l ...” ( Wi l l i a m J a me s “ Wh a t i s a n Emo t i o n ? ” p .1 7 0 ) . “ I n o w p r o c e e d t o u r g e t h e v i t a l p o i n t o f my wh o l e t h e o r y , wh i c h i s t h i s . I f we f a n c y s o me s t r o n g e mo t i o n , a n d t h e n t r y t o a b s t r a c t f r o m o u r c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f i t a l l t h e f e e l i n g s o f i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c b o d i l y s y mp t o ms , we f i n d we h a v e n o t h i n g l e f t b e h i n d , n o ' mi n d - s t u f f ' o u t o f wh i c h t h e e mo t i o n c a n b e c o n s t i t u t e d ,a n d t h a t a c o l d a n d n e u t r a l s t a t e o f i n t e l l e c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n i s a l l t h a t r e ma i n s ” ( i b i d . p .1 7 3 ) . H e n r i Be r g s o n , i n Ti me a n d F r e e Wi l l , Ch a p t e r I ( e s p e c i a l l y p p . 2 8 - 3 1 ) ma y s u r p r i s e t h e r e a d e r b y a s s u mi n g a p o s i t i o n t h a t i s c l o s e t o J a me s . I n o r d e r t o s h o w t h a t t h e mi n d p o s s e s s e s n o q u a n t i t a t i v e e l e me n t o r a s p e c t a t a l l , h e h a s t o a n s we r t h e q u e s t i o n w h a t t h e i n t e n s i t y o f f e e l i n g s a n d e mo t i o n i s , t h a t d i f f e r s i n d e g r e e . An d h e e x p l a i n s : Th e d i f f e r e n c e s i n d e g r e e d o n o t b e l o n g t o t h e mi n d t h a t p e r c e i v e s o r e x p e r i e n c e s f e e l i n g s a n d e mo t i o n s b u t t o t h e p e r s o n ' s o wn b o d y , wh i c h i s p e r c e i v e d b y t h e mi n d ; mo r e p r e c i s e l y : t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s i n d e g r e e a r i s e f r o m t h e s i z e o f t h e a r e a s o f t h e o wn b o d y , o r f r o m t h e i r n u mb e r ; t h e s e e x t e n s i v e d i f f e r e n c e s i n s i z e a r e f e l t a s i n t e n s i v e d i f f e r e n c e s i n d e g r e e . I n t h i s ma n n e r h e t r i e s , s o t o s a y , t o e x i l e q u a n t i t a t i v e e l e me n t f r o m t h e r e a l m o f t h e mi n d . I n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o J a me s ' a n d Be r g s o n ' s o u t l o o k , y o u f i n d i n Be n - Ze ' e v a d e s c r i p t i o n o f e mo t i o n a s b e l o n g i n g t o i n t e n t i o n a n d a s a v a l u a t i v e a p p r o a c h . Se e : A. Be n - Ze ' e v , “ Th e Na t u r e o f Emo t i o n .”

27. Pl a t o , 2 0 6 e .

28. Ac c o r d i n g t o J . Or t e g a y Ga s s e t , On Lo v e , p .1 0 .

29. i b i d . p p . 1 0 - 1 2 .

30. Th a t i s t o s a y t h a t a c c o r d i n g t o Sp i n o z a t h e v a l u a t i v e a s p e c t o f

i d e a s b e l o n g s t o t h e i r f o r ma l e n t i t y , wh i l e t h e i r c o g n i t i v e a s p e c t i s t h e “ o b j e c t i v e e n t i t y ” o f t h e i d e a t u m . Th e c o g n i t i v e a s p e c t a l o n e ma k e s u p t h e c o n t e n t o f i d e a s . Se e : Sp i n o z a , On t h e I mp r o v e me n t o f Un d e r s t a n d i n g ( Br u d e r , § 3 3 - 3 4 ) i n : Ch i e f Wo r k s o f S p i n o z a , v o l . I I , p p . 1 2 - 1 3 .

31. Sp i n o z a , Et h i c s , Pa r t I I I , d e f i n i t i o n s o f e mo t i o n s ( a f f e c t s ) , d e f i n i -

t i o n s 6 , 7 , s e e a l s o : Pa r t I I I , s c h o l i u m t o p r o p o s i t i o n 1 3 .32.

i b i d ., i b i d .

33. Or t e g a Y G a s s e t , On Lo v e , p .1 2 .

34. Ac c o r d i n g t o Br e n t a n o j o y i s a n a c t i v i t y o f l o v e a r i s i n g f r o m b e l i e f

t h a t wh a t o n e l o v e s i s r e a l i z e d . He s a y s : “ Di e g ü n s t i g s t e La g e i s d i e d e r Fr e u d e . Si e h a t d a s Ei g e n t ü ml i c h e , d a s s i e d i e Be t ä t i g u n g d e r Li e b e i s t i m

Notes 341

Gl a u b e n , d a s , wa s ma n l i e b t , s e i v e r wi r k l i c h t .” Gr u n d l e g u n g u n d Au f b a u d e r Et h i k , p .1 8 5 . “ Th e mo s t a d v a n t a g e o u s s i t u a t i o n i s t h a t i n wh i c h we f e e l j o y . I t i s u n i q u e i n b e i n g t h e f o r m i n wh i c h o u r l o v e i s ma n i f e s t e d wh e n we b e l i e v e t h a t i t s o b j e c t i s r e a l i z e d ”) . Th e Fo u n d a t i o n a n d Co n s t r u c t i o n o f Et h i c s , p .1 7 0 . A d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n c a n b e f o u n d i n h i s b o o k Ps y c h o l o g y f r o m a n Emp i r i c a l S t a n d p o i n t .


35. Vi c t o r Kr a f t , Fo u n d a t i o n s f o r S c i e n t i f i c An a l y s i s o f Va l u e , p p . 1 2 -

1 3 ( I n t h e o r i g i n a l : Gr u n d l a g e n e i n e r Wi s s e n s c h a f l i c h e n We r t l e h r e ; Wi e n 1 9 3 7 ) .

36. “ I t i s , t h e n , t h e ma t e r i a l c o n t e n t t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e s e a c h v a l u e a n d

d i s t i n g u i s h e s o n e f r o m a n o t h e r . B u t t h i s c o n t e n t i s c o mp l e t e l y n e u t r a l , a s i s e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s p u r e l y m a t e r i a l .” i b i d . p .1 3 .

37.

“ ...[ T] h e v a r i e t i e s o f v a l u e , t h e v a l u e s , a r e n o t r e a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s o f v a l u e ...” i b i d . p .1 6

38. i b i d . p p . 4 0 - 4 5 .

39. i b i d . p . 4 4 .

40. Be c a u s e t h e p h e n o me n o n o f f a mi l i a r i t y c a n n o t b e b r o k e n d o wn

i n t o n e u t r a l ma t t e r a n d a p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e p o s i t i o n ( i b i d . p . 4 3 ) , a n d b e c a u s e t h e r e i s n o g u a r a n t e e t h a t s i m i l a r c a s e s d o n o t o c c u r i n t h e e mo - t i o n a l s p h e r e , Kr a f t p r e f e r s t o ma k e a s h a r p d i s t i n c t i o n b e t we e n a s s u mi n g p o s i t i o n s i n t h e s p h e r e o f t h i n k i n g e x p r e s s e d i n l a n g u a g e , a n d t h o s e i n t h e s p h e r e o f f e e l i n g a n d e mo t i o n ; t h u s a l l t h e c a s e s t h a t r e p u d i a t e h i s t h e s i s wi l l r e s i d e i n t h e l a t t e r s p h e r e , wh i c h wi l l b e f e n c e d i n a s f a r a s p o s s i b l e , wh i l e i n t h e s p h e r e o f t h o u g h t , t h e s p h e r e o f v a l u e - s e n t e n c e s , h e wi l l b e p e r mi t t e d u t t e r l y t o r e j e c t t h e a p p r o a c h t h a t c l a i ms t h e e x i s t e n c e o f v a l u e q u a l i t i e s . He ma k e s t e r mi n o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s a i me d a t s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e b o r d e r b e t we e n s p h e r e s ( t h e wo r d s “ v a l u e ” a n d “ v a l u a t i o n ” r e f e r o n l y t o p r e d i c a t i v e t h o u g h t wh i l e “ a s s u mi n g a p o s i t i o n ” i s a l s o u s e d i n r e f e r e n c e t o t h e f e e l i n g a n d e mo t i o n a l s p h e r e ) .

41. Se e i b i d . p . 3 0 .

42. “ A b i r d l o v e r o u t b i r d wa t c h i n g s e e s a g o l d e n e a g l e i n f u l l f l i g h t .

Sh e t h i n k s i t ma r v e l l o u s , r a r e a n d b e a u t i f u l , a n d t h i s s t r o n g l y a f f e c t s h e r p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y . Bu t t h i s d o e s n o t l e a d h e r t o wa n t t o d o a n y t h i n g . Sh e d o e s n o t s a y a n y t h i n g a n d n o t h i n g u n u s u a l s h o ws i n h e r e x p r e s s i o n a n d s h e ma k e s n o g e s t u r e s . To a n o b s e r v e r s h e wo u l d a p p e a r me r e l y a s a wo ma n g a z i n g a t a b i r d i n f l i g h t . I t ma y e v e n b e t h a t s h e i s s o t a k e n u p wi t h t h e s i g h t t h a t s h e d o e s n o t a d v e r t t o h e r o wn e mo t i o n ” Wi l l i a mLy o n s , Emo t i o n , p . 5 8 .

Part I, Ch ap ter 6 (p gs . 79-100 )

43. Th e a t t r i b u t e “ t r a n s i t i v e ” wa s g i v e n t o t h e p r e - r e f l e c t i v e l e v e l b y

Al e x a n d e r Pf ä n d e r ; s e e h i s Di e S e e l e d e s Me n s c h e n , Ve r s u c h e i n e r v e r s t e -


h e n d e n Ps y c h o l o g i e , p . 2 8 . Wi t h r e g a r d t o t h e n a t u r e o f r e f l e c t i o n s e e : Na t h a n Ro t e n s t r e i c h , Re f l e c t i o n a n d Ac t i o n , Ch a p t e r o n e : At t i t u d e a n d Ho r i z o n . A n d Mi c h a e l St r a u s s , Emp f i n d u n g , I n t e n t i o n u n d Ze i c h e n ; VI : Di e Re f l e x i o n .

44. Se e F. Br e n t a n o , Ps y c h o l o g y f r o m a n Emp i r i c a l S t a n d p o i n t , v o l . I ,

p p . 2 9 - 3 4 . 45.

I n Br e n t a n o ' s s c h o o l o f t h o u g h t a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r i n Os k a r Kr a u s we

f i n d a d i s t i n c t i o n i n p r i n c i p l e b e t we e n q u a l i t a t i v e p r e f e r e n c e a n d o t h e r v a l u a t i o n s . Se e : O. Kr a u s , Zu r Th e o r i e d e s We r t e s , p p . 8 2 - 8 5 . Kr a u s b a s e s t h e t h e o r y o f e x c h a n g e v a l u e o n t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n .

46.

Th e s e n t e n c e “ t h i s i s a wo r t h w h i l e d e e d ” e x p r e s s e s u s u a l l y a s t a t e me n t o n t h e v a l u a t i v e l e v e l , wh i l e t h e s t a t e m e n t “ X j u d g e s t h a t t h i s d e e d i s wo r t h wh i l e ” s t a t e s a m e t a - v a l u a t i v e f a c t . Th e f i r s t s t a t e me n t ma y b e v a l u a t i v e l y c o r r e c t , t h e s e c o n d ma y b e t r u e . Th e f i r s t ma y e x p r e s s v a l u a t i v e k n o wl e d g e , t h e s e c o n d p u r e c o g n i t i o n ( v a l u e - n e u t r a l ) . A p e r s o n ma y , h o we v e r , e x p r e s s i n t e n t i o n o n t h e v a l u a t i v e l e v e l i n s a y i n g “ I b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s d e e d i s wo r t h wh i l e ,” b u t b e c a u s e h e mi x e s i t wi t h me t a - v a l u a t i v e i n f o r ma t i o n ( a t f a c e v a l u e t h e s t a t e me n t ma t c h e s t h e p a s s i n g o f me t a - v a l u a t i v e i n f o r ma t i o n ) , t h e i n t e n t i o n i s e x p r e s s e d i n a we a k e n e d ma n n e r . Th a t i s t o s a y , t h e a s s u me d p o s i t i o n i s q u a l i f i e d .

Ra l p h Ba r t o n Pe r r y wr i t e s a b o u t s u b j e c t i v i s t i c r e l a t i v i s m, t a k i n g h i s c u e f r o m M o o r e : “ A s e c o n d s t a t e me n t o f t h i s v i c i o u s r e l a t i v i s m i s t h e a s s e r t i o n ` t h a t wh e n we j u d g e a n a c t i o n t o b e r i g h t o r wr o n g wh a t we a r e a s s e r t i n g i s me r e l y t h a t s o me b o d y o r o t h e r t h i n k s i t t o b e r i g h t o r wr o n g .̀ Ge n e r a l i z e d a n d s i mp l i f i e d , t h i s a s s e r t i o n i s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t c o n s i s t s i n b e i n g t h o u g h t t o b e v a l u a b l e — ` t h e r e i s n o t h i n g e i t h e r g o o d o r b a d , b u t t h i n k i n g m a k e s i t s o .̀ No w t h e f u n d a me n t a l d i f f i c u l t y wi t h t h i s v i e w l i e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t o n e wo u l d t h e n h a v e n o t h i n g t o t h i n k a b o u t . I f a t h i n g i s v a l u a b l e b y v i r t u e o f b e i n g b e l i e v e d t o b e v a l u a b l e , t h e n wh e n o n e b e l i e v e s a t h i n g t o b e v a l u a b l e , o n e b e l i e v e s t h a t i t i s b e l i e v e d t o b e v a l u a b l e , o r o n e b e l i e v e s t h a t i t i s b e l i e v e d t o b e b e l i e v e d t o b e v a l u a b l e ,a n d s o o n a d i n f i n i t u m. I n s h o r t , t h e r e c a n b e n o j u d g me n t a b o u t v a l u e , o r o b j e c t o t h e r t h a n t h e a c t o f j u d g me n t i t s e l f — a j u d g e d a s we l l a s a j u d g i n g .” R. B. Pe r r y , Ge n e r a l Th e o r y o f Va l u e , p p . 1 2 9 - 1 3 0

Pe r r y ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a r e we l l a r r a n g e d . He b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e f u t a t i o n h e p r e s e n t s u n s e t t l e s Ed wa r d W e s t e r ma r c k ' s t h e o r y , b u t n o t h i s o wn . I n o r d e r n o t t o b e a f f e c t e d b y t h i s r e f u t a t i o n , a n a x i o l o g i c a l t h e o r y h a s t o c h o o s e o n e o f t h e f o l l o wi n g t w o c o u r s e s : Ei t h e r ( A ) , t h e c o u r s e o f a c o n s i s t e n t a x i o l o g i c a l o b j e c t i v i s m a s f o r mu l a t e d b y Ni c o l a i Ha r t ma n n .Or ( B) , t h e c o u r s e o f a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t we e n a v a l u a t i v e a n d a me t a - v a l u a t i v e l e v e l , b a s e d o n t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t we e n c o n t e n t a n d f o r m i n t h e i n t e n t i o n a s a wh o l e . A t h e o r y wh i c h d o e s n o t s e t o u t o n o n e o f t h e s e c o u r s e s wi l l i n e v i t a b l y d r i f t t o wa r d s c a p r i c i o u s i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c s u b j e c t i v i s m. Pe r r y h i ms e l f d o e s n o t wa n t t o d r i f t i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , h e c o n s i d e r s i t d a n g e r o u s , b u t n e i t h e r d o e s h e c h o o s e o n e o f t h e c o u r s e s

Notes 343

me n t i o n e d . Ac c o r d i n g l y , h e r u n s t i me a n d a g a i n i n t o d i f f i c u l t i e s i n d e f e n d i n g h i s p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t c o mp l a i n t s h e h i ms e l f p r e s e n t s s o w e l l .

47. Se e : M. St r a u s s , Emp f i n d u n g , I n t e n t i o n u n d Ze i c h e n , § 9 - 1 2 .

48. Se e , f o r i n s t a n c e , H. Be r g s o n , Th e t wo S o u r c e s o f Mo r a l i t y a n d

Re l i g i o n , p .2 1 9 .

Part II , Ch ap ter 1 (p gs . 103-1 08)

49. Cl a r e n c e I r v i n g Le wi s wr i t e s : “ I n t h i s s e n s e o f ' i n t r i n s i c v a l u e ' a s t h e v a l u e o f t h a t wh i c h i s v a l u e d f o r i t s o wn s a k e , n o o b j e c t i v e e x i s t e n t h a s s t r i c t l y i n t r i n s i c v a l u e ; a l l v a l u e s i n o b j e c t s a r e e x t r i n s i c o n l y . Th i s i s s o b e c a u s e t h e e n d , b y r e l a t i o n t o wh i c h a l o n e a n y t h i n g i s u l t i ma t e l y t o b e j u d g e d g e n u i n e l y v a l u a b l e , i s s o me p o s s i b l e r e a l i z a t i o n o f g o o d n e s s i n d i r e c t e x p e r i e n c e ” ( An An a l y s i s o f Kn o wl e d g e a n d V a l u a - t i o n , p .3 8 7 ) . St u d y i n g Le wi s n o t e t h a t h e d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t we e n i n t r i n s i c a n d i n h e r e n t v a l u e , t h e l a t t e r b e i n g a k i n d o f e x t r i n s i c v a l u e wh i c h i n c l u d e s o b j e c t s t h a t a c c o r d u s d i r e c t p l e a s u r e , a n d d o e s n o t i n c l u d e u s e f u l me a n s wh i c h a c c o r d p l e a s u r e o n l y t h r o u g h t h e i r r e s u l t s .Mo o r e wr i t e s : “ By f a r t h e mo s t v a l u a b l e t h i n g s , w h i c h we k n o w o r c a n i ma g i n e , a r e c e r t a i n s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , wh i c h ma y b e r o u g h l y d e - s c r i b e d a s t h e p l e a s u r e s o f h u ma n i n t e r c o u r s e a n d t h e e n j o y me n t o f b e a u t i f u l o b j e c t s ... —I h a v e m y s e l f u r g e d ... t h a t t h e me r e e x i s t e n c e o f wh a t i s b e a u t i f u l d o e s a p p e a r t o h a v e s o me i n t r i n s i c v a l u e ; b u t I r e g a r d i t a s i n d u b i t a b l e t h a t Pr o f . Si d g wi c k wa s s o f a r r i g h t i n t h e v i e w... t h a t s u c h me r e e x i s t e n c e o f wh a t i s b e a u t i f u l h a s v a l u e s o s ma l l a s t o b e n e g l i g i b l e ,i n c o mp a r i s o n wi t h t h a t wh i c h a t t a c h e s t o t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f b e a u t y ” ( Pr i n c i p i a Et h i c a , p p . 1 8 8 - 1 8 9 ; § 1 1 3 ) . Se e a l s o : G. E. Mo o r e , Et h i c s , p p .1 5 3 - 1 5 4 .Ke y n e s wr i t e s i n h i s me mo i r s a b o u t t h e o u t l o o k t h a t p r e v a i l e d i n Mo o r e ' s c i r c l e : “ N o t h i n g ma t t e r e d e x c e p t s t a t e s o f mi n d ” ( My Ea r l y Be l i e f s , i n Two Me mo i r s , Lo n d o n 1 9 4 9 , p .8 3 ) . Ma r y Mi d g l e y c r i t i c i z e s t h i s o u t l o o k .Se e : Ma r y Mi d g l e y , He a r t a n d Mi n d , p p . 6 5 - 6 7 .

50. Ed mu n d Hu s s e r l a l s o t a k e s t h i s s t a n d . I n h i s s u mma r y o f Hu s s e r l ' s

ma n u s c r i p t s Al o i s Ro t h , p .1 1 0 , wr i t e s : “ De r We r t — d a s i s t d e r g r o ß e I r r t u m j e d e r h e d o n i s t i s c h e n Th e o r i e — i s t n i e d a s I c h e r l e b e n , d e r p e r - s o n a l e Ak t d e s We r t e n s , d a s Ge f ü h l , s o n d e r n d a s a m Ob j e k t d e s We r t e n s Er f ü h l t e ” ( “ Th e v a l u e — t h i s i s t h e g r e a t e r r o r o f a l l h e d o n i s t i c t h e o r i e s — i s n e v e r t h e s e l f ' s e x p e r i e n c e , t h e p e r s o n a l a c t o f v a l u a t i o n , t h e f e e l i n g ,b u t t h e o b j e c t o f wh a t i s f e l t b y v a l u a t i o n .” Fu r t h e r o n , o n t h e s a me p a g e h e q u o t e s Hu s s e r l ' s ma n u s c r i p t : “ Ni c h t d a s Si c h f r e u e n i s t d a s Wi l l e n s z i e l , s o n d e r n d a s Er f r e u l i c h e ” ( “ Th e g o a l o f t h e wi l l i s n o t b e i n g g l a d , b u t wh a t g l a d d e n s ” ) . On e s h o u l d n o t e h e r e t h a t t h e s h i f t o f e mp h a s i s f r o m t h e o b j e c t t o t h e s u b j e c t , f r o m wh a t i s e x p e r i e n c e d t o t h e e x p e r i e n c e , i s n o t o n l y u p h e l d b y h e d o n i s m; o n t h i s s e e t h e p r e v i o u s n o t e .



51. Co mp a r e : D e r e k Pa r f i t , Re a s o n s a n d Pe r s o n s , p p . 1 5 8 - 1 6 3 .

52.

Ar i s t o t l e , Ni c o ma c h e a n Et h i c s , 1 1 6 1 b . S o me d i f f i c u l t y o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r i s e s f r o m c o mp a r i s o n wi t h Po l i t i c s , 1 2 5 5 b .

Part II , Ch ap ter 4 ((p gs . 123- 133)

53. Ha r e wr i t e s : “ Th e p r o b l e m ma y a l s o b e p u t i n t h i s wa y : i f we k n e w

a l l t h e d e s c r i p t i v e p r o p e r t i e s wh i c h a p a r t i c u l a r s t r a wb e r r y h a d ( k n e w , o f e v e r y d e s c r i p t i v e s e n t e n c e r e l a t i n g t o t h e s t r a wb e r r y , wh e t h e r i t wa s t r u e o r f a l s e ) , a n d i f we k n e w a l s o t h e me a n i n g o f t h e wo r d “ g o o d ,” t h e n wh a t e l s e s h o u l d we r e q u i r e t o k n o w , i n o r d e r t o b e a b l e t o t e l l wh e t h e r a s t r a wb e r r y wa s a g o o d o n e ? On c e t h e q u e s t i o n i s p u t t h i s wa y , t h e a n s we r s h o u l d b e a p p a r e n t . We s h o u l d r e q u i r e t o k n o w, wh a t a r e t h e c r i t e r i a i n v i r t u e o f wh i c h a s t r a wb e r r y i s t o b e c a l l e d a g o o d o n e , o r wh a t a r e t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t ma k e a s t r a wb e r r y a g o o d o n e , o r wh a t i s t h e s t a n d a r d o f g o o d n e s s i n s t r a wb e r r i e s . W e s h o u l d r e q u i r e t o b e g i v e n t h e ma j o r p r e mi s e .” ( R. M. Ha r e , Th e La n g u a g e o f Mo r a l s , p . 1 1 1 ) . Th e q u e s t i o n wh e t h e r t h e s t r a w b e r r i e s a r e g o o d i s d e t e r mi n e d wh e n t h e y a r e e a t e n , i .e ., n o t o n t h e v e r b a l ( o r p r e d i c a t i v e ) l e v e l . Th e u t t e r a n c e t h a t c e r t a i n s t r a wb e r r i e s a r e g o o d e i t h e r e x p r e s s e s p o s t - f a c t u m t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f e a t i n g t h e m, o r a g u e s s t h a t wi l l b e v e r i f i e d o r r e f u t e d b y f u t u r e e a t i n g .Th e q u e s t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e n o t d e t e r mi n e d b y t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f c r i t e r i a ,u n l e s s y o u s a y t h a t t h e a c t o f e a t i n g i s a l s o a c r i t e r i o n . Bu t i f y o u s a y t h i s , y o u b l u r t h e b o r d e r b e t w e e n v a l u a t i o n t h a t t a k e s p l a c e o n t h e p r e d i c a t i v e l e v e l , wh i c h r e q u i r e s j u d g me n t , a n d v a l u a t i o n t h a t i s o n l y e x p r e s s e d p o s t e r i o r l y o n t h e s a me l e v e l .

54. Th e s t u d y o f b i o l o g y s o f a r a s i t i s r e l e v a n t t o t h e t h e o r y o f v a l u e ,

s h o u l d b e g i n wi t h t h e f a c t o f n a t u r a l d e a t h a n d t h e d e t e r i o r a t i o n l e a d i n g t o i t . Th e s c i e n t i s t , Ca r l Fr i e d r i c h v o n We i z s ä c k e r wr i t e s t h a t h e s e e s n o b i o - c h e mi c a l r e a s o n wh y i n d i v i d u a l s wh o l i v e o n wi t h o u t a t i me l i mi t ( u n l e s s k i l l e d b y v i o l e n c e ) s h o u l d n o t b e p o s s i b l e . Bu t a l i mi t e d ( o r e v e n s h o r t ) l i f e e x p e c t a n c y i s i n h i s o p i n i o n f o r t h e g o o d o f t h e s p e c i e s o r t h e r a c e , a n d r a p i d n a t u r a l r e p l a c e me n t o f g e n e r a t i o n s ma k e s r a p i d d e v e l o p me n t p o s s i b l e : “ Th e mo r e g e n e r a t i o n s a s p e c i e s p r o d u c e s wi t h i n a g i v e n p e r i o d o f t i me , t h e mo r e mu t a t i o n s , o r c o m b i n a t i o n s o f mu t a t i o n s , wi l l h a v e a c h a n c e o f b e i n g t r i e d o u t .” We i z s ä c k e r , Th e Re l e v a n c e o f S c i e n c e , p .1 3 4 . Wh e n a d r a s t i c c h a n g e i n c l i ma t e a n d f l o r a o c c u r s , t h e r a c e wh o s e g e n e r a t i o n s a r e r a p i d l y r e p l a c e d , i . e ., wh o s e me mb e r s h a v e a s h o r t e r l i f e e x p e c t a n c y , wi l l a d j u s t mo r e e a s i l y . An d i n d e e d , a n i ma l s u s u a l l y t a k e c a r e o f t h e i r y o u n g b u t n o t o f t h e i r p a r e n t s ,a n d wi t h t h i s b e h a v i o r r e p r e s e n t t h e s p e c i e s ' “ i n t e r e s t .” T h e r e f o r e t h e t e n d e n c y , i n h e r e n t t o a n i ma l s wh i c h mu l t i p l y s e x u a l l y , t o d e t e r i o r a t e a n d d i e wh e n t h e y h a v e e s t a b l i s h e d a n e w g e n e r a t i o n , a i d s d e v e l o p me n t .

Notes 345

I t ma y we l l b e t h a t p a r t o f n a t u r e ' s p r o p e n s i t y t o f a v o r y o u n g c r e a t u r e s a r i s e s f r o m t h e c o n g r u e n c e ( t h o u g h n o t c o mp l e t e , i t i s c o n s i d e r a b l e ) o f t h r e e f a c t o r s : o f ( A) wh a t t h e y a s p i r e t o a n d d e s i r e , o f ( B) wh a t g i v e s t h e mp l e a s u r e a n d o f ( C) wh a t i s u s e f u l f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e ( i n d i v i d u a l ) o r g a n i s m ( a n d t h u s , o f c o u r s e , t h e o p p o s i t e — f r o m wh a t t h e y r e c o i l , w h a t ma k e s t h e m s o r r y a n d wh a t h a r m s ) . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , p a r t o f t h e d i s f a v o r n a t u r e s h o ws t h e o l d a r i s e s f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s t h r e e f o l d c o n g r u e n c e n o l o n g e r p r e v a i l s . Fo r e x a mp l e , t h e o l d p e r s o n e n j o y s t h e s a me f o o d h e e n j o y e d i n h i s y o u t h , b u t n o w t h i s f o o d h a r ms h i m a n d t h u s — a c c o r d i n g t o We i z s ä c k e r — b e n e f i t s t h e r a c e . Th e a b s e n c e o f t h i s c o n g r u e n c e ( wh i c h p r e v a i l s f o r t h e y o u n g ) g e n e r a t e s a s t a t e o f d e t e r i o r a t i o n a n d ma k e s i t g o o n t i l l d e a t h o c c u r s .

55. I n h i s b o o k Et h i k d e s r e i n e n Wi l l e n s He r ma n n C o h e n c o n d u c t s a

b a t t l e a g a i n s t t h e p r i n c i p l e o f p l e a s u r e ( - d e s i r e ) a n d s o r r o w. Se e p p . 1 5 0 - 1 6 0 . ( I n t h e Ge r ma n o r i g i n a l p l e a s u r e a n d d e s i r e a r e d e s i g n a t e d b y t h e s a me wo r d “ Lu s t ” ) .Co h e n d o e s n o t d i s t i n g u i s h b e t we e n t h e v a l u a t i v e a n d t h e me t a - v a l u a t i v e l e v e l , a n d t h e r e f o r e e mp h a s i z e s t h e v a l u a t i v e l e v e l i t s e l f . He t r i e s t o d e n y t h e r o l e f e e l i n g p l a y s i n t h e s e t o f e t h i c a l r u l e s i n t h e s a me ma n n e r i n wh i c h h e d e n i e d t h e s e n s o r y g i v e n i n h i s t h e o r y o f c o g n i t i o n . I n t h e c o u r s e o f t h i s b a t t l e h e s e e s t h e r o l e a c c o r d e d t o p l e a s u r e , d e s i r e a n d s o r r o w a s a v a l u e - ma r k ( We r t z e i c h e n ) a n d a v a l u e - m e a s u r e ( We r t me s s e r ) . Se e p p . 1 6 2 - 1 6 5 . Th e v a l u e - ma r k b e a r s e v i d e n c e t o h e a l t h a n d d i s e a s e a n d i n g e n e r a l t o t h e v a l u e o f a s e g me n t i n t h e r e a l c o u r s e o f l i f e . Ye t , t o a t t r i b u t e s u c h a r o l e t o f e e l i n g i s a c c o r d i n g t o C o h e n a l s o o p p o s e d t o t h e s o v e r e i g n t y o f p u r e wi l l . Th u s , a s o n e s h o u l d d e n y t h e d i r e c t v a l u e o f f e e l i n g , o n e s h o u l d a l s o d e n y i t s i n d i r e c t v a l u e . Co h e n d o e s n o t p r e a c h a b s t i n e n c e f r o m l i f e ' s p l e a s u r e s , b u t r e j e c t s t h e m a p l a c e i n t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n . Co h e n ' s i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m s u r f a c e s i n t h a t h e d o e s n o t s p e n d a r g u me n t a t i v e e f f o r t t o r e f u t e t h e d i r e c t v a l u e o f f e e l i n g ( t h e g o o d i n f e e l i n g g o o d ) , wh i c h h e v i e ws b u t a s t h e e mb o d i me n t o f a h e d o n i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y , b u t s p e n d s s u c h e f f o r t a g a i n s t t h e r i v a l i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m, wh i c h v i e ws t h e f e e l i n g s o f d e s i r e , p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n a s s i g n s o f t h e v a l u e o f t h e l i f e - c o u r s e , t h a t r e q u i r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .

Part II, Chapter 6 (pgs. 137-147)

56. “ I n my o p i n i o n , t h e r e a r e t wo t h i n g s wh i c h h a v e l a i d a s t r a y t h o s e

p h i l o s o p h e r s t h a t h a v e i n s i s t e d s o mu c h o n t h e s e l f i s h n e s s o f ma n . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , t h e y f o u n d t h a t e v e r y a c t o f v i r t u e o r f r i e n d s h i p wa s a t t e n d e d wi t h a s e c r e t p l e a s u r e ; wh e n c e t h e y c o n c l u d e d , t h a t f r i e n d s h i p a n d v i r t u e c o u l d n o t b e d i s i n t e r e s t e d . Bu t t h e f a l l a c y o f t h i s i s o b v i o u s . Th e v i r t u o u s s e n t i me n t o r p a s s i o n p r o d u c e s t h e p l e a s u r e , a n d d o e s n o t a r i s e f r o m i t ... ” Da v i d Hu me , “ Of t h e Di g n i t y o r Me a n n e s s o f Hu ma n Na t u r e ,” p .8 7 .


57. Ae s t h e t i c v a l u e s a r e b a s e d o n v a r i o u s v i t a l v a l u e s , a mo n g t h e m t h e

s e x u a l u r g e , a n d i n t h e i r t u r n t h e y s h a p e t h e s e v i t a l v a l u e s . Ha r t ma n n d i s c u s s e s t h e i s s u e f r o m t h e v i e wp o i n t o f v a l u e - t h e o r y . N. Ha r t ma n n ,Äs t h e t i k , p p . 3 5 1 - 3 5 6 .


58. Ga d a me r i s v e r y c r i t i c a l o f u n i v e r s a l i t y a n d a p r i o r i s m i n e t h i c s , a n d

i n p a r t i c u l a r o f t h e a - p r i o r i u n i v e r s a l i n n o n - f o r ma l e t h i c s , n a me l y , t h a t a r r a n g e d a s a ma t e r i a l e t h i c s o f v a l u e s . Fr o m t h e p r a c t i c a l a n g l e t h i s u n i v e r s a l i t y s i n s i n h i s o p i n i o n mo r e a g a i n s t t h e c o n c r e t e s i t u a t i o n t h a n t h e Ca t e g o r i c a l I mp e r a t i v e d o e s , a n d f r o m t h e t h e o r e t i c a l a n g l e i t c r e a t e s a t a n g l e o f p r o b l e ms wi t h r e g a r d t o t h e r e l a t i v i t y a n d a b s o l u t e n e s s o f v a l u e a n d t h e s c a l e o f v a l u e s . Ga d a m e r s e e s t h e f a c t t h a t a d u t y t o l o v e i s i mp o s s i b l e a s a we a k n e s s i n h e r e n t t o t h e mo r a l i t y o f d u t y . I t i s a we a k n e s s , b e c a u s e l o v e i s s u p e r i o r t o a d e e d b e n e f i t i n g a n o t h e r , wh i c h i s d o n e o u t o f d u t y ; l o v e i s s u p e r i o r t o t h i s d e e d f r o m t h e mo r a l a s p e c t a s we l l . Se e : H. G. Ga d a me r , “ Üb e r d i e Mö g l i c h k e i t e i n e r p h i l o s o p h i s c h e n Et h i k ,” p . 1 8 5 . Wi t h r e g a r d t o t h e s t a t u s o f l o v e i n v a l u e - t h e o r y , s e e wh a t Ga d a me r s a y s a b o u t t h e t h e o r y o f t h e 1 9 t h c e n t u r y p h i l o s o p h e r Ru d o l f He r ma n n Lo t z e : H. G. Ga d a me r , “ Da s o n t o l o g i s c h e Pr o b l e m d e s We r t e s ,” p p . 2 0 8 - 2 1 3 . Ga d a me r p o i n t s t o Lo t z e ' s i n f l u e n c e o n Fr a n z Br e n t a n o wh o b a s e d e t h i c s o n l o v e f o r wh a t i s wo r t h wh i l e t o l o v e ( a n d h a t e f o r wh a t i s wo r t h wh i l e t o h a t e ) . Th e r e i s n o d o u b t t h a t Br e n t a n o ' s t h e o r y i s t h e s o i l i n wh i c h t h e g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f v a l u e g r e w. “ Th e c a p a c i t y f o r e mo t i o n a l j u d g me n t ” a c c o r d i n g t o Lo t z e a n d f r i e n d s h i p , a s d i s c u s s e d b y Ar i s t o t l e ( wh i c h i s n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e w i l l e i t h e r , a n d c a n n o t b e o r d e r e d t o e me r g e ) i n Ga d a me r ' s o p i n i o n ma k e u p t h e n u c l e u s o f a c o n c r e t e e t h o s a n d p o i n t s o f s u p p o r t f o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c o u r s e a b o u t i t . B u t t h e c o n c r e t e e t h o s n e e d s n o p h i l o s o p h y , n e i t h e r i n o r d e r t o e me r g e , n o r i n o r d e r t o g a i n a u t h o r i t y . Se e : H. G. Ga d a me r , “ We r t e t h i k u n d ' p r a k t i s c h e Ph i l o s o p h i e ' ,” p p . 1 1 6 - 1 1 9 . So me p h i l o s o p h y ma y e r r b y a p p e a l i n g a g a i n s t e t h i c s , a n d c u l t u r e t h e r e f o r e n e e d s a n o t h e r p h i l o s o p h y wh i c h c a n c e l s s u c h a n e r r o r o u t ; t h i s r o l e i s f u l f i l l e d b y Ka n t i a n f o r ma l i s m. On t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y Ga d a me r s a y s : “ ...d i e e i g e n t l i c h e Re c h t f e r t i g u n g ... Si e b e s t e h t d a r i n , d a s ... d e r Ge b r a u c h d e r Ve r n u n f t i mme r d e r Kr i t i k b e d a r f . Si e d i e n t i m Th e o r e t i s c h e n d a z u , d e m t r a n s z e n d e n t a l e n Sc h e i n n i c h t z u v e r f a l l e n , d e r i n d i e I r r u n g e n d e r Me t a p h y s i k v e r f ü h r t , u n d i m Mo r a l i s c h e n d a z u ,d a s Ve r n ü n f t e l n g e g e n d i e k a t e g o r i s c h e Ve r b i n d l i c h k e i t d e s Si t t e n g e - s e t z e s z u u n t e r b i n d e n ( ...) De r Fo r ma l i s mu s d e r Ka n t i s c h e n Et h i k s c h i e n mi r d i e s e r n e g a t i v e n i n d i r e k t e n Fu n k t i o n d e r p h i l o s o p h i s c h e n Re f l e x i o n g e r a d e a n g e me s s e n ” ( “ ...t h e a c t u a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n .. . ma n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n t h a t ...t h e u s e o f r e a s o n a l wa y s n e e d s c r i t i c i s m. Th e o r e t i c a l l y i t s e r v e s t o e v a d e t h e t r a p o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e s wh i c h e n t i c e u s i n t o t h e e r r o r s o f me t a p h y s i c s , a n d mo r a l l y i t s e r v e s t o p r e v e n t i n t e l l e c t u a l ma n i p u l a t i o n a i me d a g a i n s t t h e c a t e g o r i c a l v a l i d i t y o f e t h i c s . ( ...) Th e f o r ma l i s m o f

Notes 347

Ka n t i a n e t h i c s a p p e a r s t o me a s a p p r o p r i a t e t o f u l f i l l t h i s n e g a t i v e ,i n d i r e c t f u n c t i o n ” ( i b i d ., p . 1 1 7 ) . Wh i l e Ga d a me r , a c c o r d i n g t o h i s o wn l i g h t s , f i n d s a l e g i t i ma t e p l a c e f o r Ka n t ' s d i s c o u r s e , h e f a i l s t o f i n d s u c h a p l a c e f o r Sc h e l e r a n d Ha r t ma n n . I n my o p i n i o n t h i n k i n g i n g e n e r a l a n d r e a s o n i n p a r t i c u l a r f u l f i l l a mu c h b r o a d e r , i n d e p e n d e n t r o l e i n t h e s p h e r e o f p o s i t i o n s a c t u a l l y a s s u me d b y h u ma n s wi t h r e g a r d t o e a c h o t h e r , t h a n t h a t wh i c h e me r g e s i n Ga d a me r ' s t h r e e wo r k s me n t i o n e d h e r e . Re g a r d i n g t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f l o v e o v e r a d e e d d o n e o u t o f d u t y , t h e q u e s t i o n a r i s e s wh e t h e r t h e y c a n b e r a n k e d o n t h e s a me s c a l e . We c a n c o mp a r e a c t i o n s s u b j e c t t o t h e wi l l a n d r a n k t h e m o n o n e s c a l e f r o m i n f e r i o r t o s u p e r i o r ; i n a d i f f e r e n t s e n s e we ma y p e r h a p s r a n k e mo t i o n s f r o m a n e t h i c a l a s p e c t ( f o r i n s t a n c e , wh e n o n e a s k s wh a t i s wo r t h wh i l e t o f o s t e r i n a p u p i l ) , b u t I d o n o t s e e h o w o n e c a n c o mp a r e a n a c t i o n o u t o f d u t y wi t h a n a c t i o n t h a t e x p r e s s e s e mo t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r h e i g h t , a n d e v e n l e s s h o w t o c o mp a r e i t wi t h t h e e mo t i o n i t s e l f . Et h i c s t r e a t s o f i d e a l s wh i c h a r e a p r o d u c t o f r e a s o n a n d a c c o r d i n g l y ma r k e d b y t h e s t a mp o f u n i v e r s a l i t y .An d t h e y b e a r t h i s s t a mp a l s o wh e r e i t i s n o t l i k e l y f o r e t h i c s t o b e t r a n s l a t e d i n t o t h e l a n g u a g e o f c o mma n d s . Wh e n a n e t h i c a l v a l u e i s c r e a t e d b y r e a s o n o b s e r v i n g e m o t i o n s l i k e f r i e n d s h i p a n d l o v e , i t r e ma i n s a v a l u e c r e a t e d b y r e a s o n a n d e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e w i l l . A v a l u e o f l o v e , l i k e t h a t f o s t e r e d b y Ch r i s t i a n i t y , n a me l y , l o v e f o r t h e a l i e n h u ma n b e i n g , i s a n i d e a l c r e a t e d b y r e a s o n i n o n e o f i t s h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e s ; i t i s ma r k e d b y t h e s t a mp o f g e n e r a l i t y a n d i s n o t i d e n t i c a l wi t h i t s p e r s o n a l r e a l i z a t i o n s ; a c c o r d i n g l y , i t i s n o t i t s e l f a n e mo t i o n , n o r i s i t “ a c a p a c i t y f o r e m o t i o n a l j u d g me n t ” wh i c h l e a n s o n e mo t i o n s a s t h e y a r e a c t u a l l y e x p e r i e n c e d . An e t h i c a l v a l u a t i o n i s b y i t s v e r y n a t u r e n o t a p r e - p r e d i c a t i v e v a l u a t i o n t h a t f i n d s i t s e x p r e s s i o n p o s t - f a c t u m o n t h e p r e d i c a t i v e l e v e l ; t h u s , b e c a u s e e t h i c a l v a l u e s a r e s e t o u t i n a we b g r o u n d e d i n r e f l e c t i o n ( wh i c h d o e s n o t p r e s i d e o n t h e p r e - p r e d i c a t i v e l e v e l ) . Th i s p r o p o s i t i o n i s c o r r e c t e v e n wh e n t h e o b j e c t o f v a l u a t i o n i s a n e mo t i o n , a n d a l s o wh e n t h e v a l u e i t s e l f i s c r e a t e d wh i l e e mo t i o n s a r e b e i n g o b s e r v e d . Le t u s p a s s f r o m t h i s me t a - e t h i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t r o v e r s y b e t we e n e mo t i o n a n d r e a s o n t o t h e p o l a r i z a t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d s o c i e t y i t i n v o l v e s — t h e i n d i v i d u a l a s t h e o n e wh o e x p e r i e n c e s t h e e mo t i o n a n d s o c i e t y a s a c o mmu n i t y o f r e a s o n . Th e c a p a c i t y f o r e mo t i o n a l j u d g me n t wh i c h l e a n s o n e mo t i o n s a n d t h e i r r e l a t i v e we i g h t , i s r e q u i r e d a s a c o mp l e me n t o n p a r t o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o t h e e t h i c s c o mmo n t o h i m a n d t o o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s wh o a r e me mb e r s o f s o me s o c i e t y . Un d e r r e a l - l i f e c i r c u ms t a n c e s t h e e me r g e n c e o f a c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t we e n t h e s e c o mp l e me n t a r y p o l e s i s a l s o p o s s i b l e . Ye t I s e e n o wa y i n wh i c h e mo t i o n a n d t h e c a p a c i t y f o r e mo t i o n a l j u d g me n t c a n r e p l a c e ma t e r i a l a - p r i o r i u n i v e r s a l i t y i n e t h i c s . To ma k e u s a d mi t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m, we wo u l d h a v e t o b e s h o wn t h a t a t t h e i r b a s i s t h e r e l a t i o n b e t we e n t h e m i s r i v a l r y a n d n o t c o mp l e me n t .Fi n a l l y I b e l i e v e t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l v a l u e - t h e o r y h a s t o b e a v a l u e - n e u t r a l d i s c i p l i n e ( wh i c h t h e r e f o r e d o e s n o t a s p i r e t o a n y “ a u t h o r i t y t o d i c t a t e ,” wh i c h Ga d a me r d e n i e s p h i l o s o p h y ) , b u t I s e e n o i mp e d i me n t p r e v e n t i n g t h e p h i l o s o p h e r f r o m p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n h i s p a r t i c u l a r ma n n e r a s


p h i l o s o p h e r i n a d i s c u s s i o n , f o r e x a mp l e , o f wh a t j u s t i c e i s , e v e n i f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i s s a l i e n t l y n o r ma t i v e , n a me l y , s e t s o u t t o c r y s t a l l i z e n o r ms .

59. I n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t we e n c l o s e d mo r a l i t y ( a n d c l o s e d e t h i c s ) a n d

o p e n mo r a l i t y ( a n d o p e n e t h i c s ) I s e t o u t i n t h e w a k e o f He n r i Be r g s o n ' s Th e Two S o u r c e s o f Mo r a l i t y a n d Re l i g i o n . Ho we v e r , i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o c l o s e d mo r a l i t y ( o f a t r i b e o r a g r o u p ) Be r g s o n d o e s n o t e s t a b l i s h f o r ma l mo r a l i t y , a s p r e s e n t e d b y Ka n t , i n t h e r o l e o f o p e n a n d u n i v e r s a l mo r a l i t y , b u t a n e t h i c s b a s e d o n e mo t i o n s a n d o n p e r s o n a l c r e a t i o n o f v a l u e s d e r i v e d f r o m t h e m. I n t h i s ma t t e r I d i d n o t f o l l o w i n h i s s t e p s .Al t h o u g h I l e a r n t f r o m Be r g s o n wi t h r e g a r d t o t h e c r e a t i o n o f v a l u e s a n d t h e p r o c e s s i n g o f v a l u e - b o d i e s b y r e a s o n r o o t e d i n e mo t i o n , I b e l i e v e a x i o l o g y s h o u l d n o t i g n o r e f o r ma l mo r a l i t y a n d i t s s p e c i a l l o c a t i o n i n t h e v a l u e - s y s t e m. Be r g s o n b e l i e v e s t h a t i n b o t h k i n d s o f mo r a l i t y t h e i n t e l l e c t , i n i t s o wn wa y , p r o c e s s e s v a l u e s wh o s e s o u r c e i s e x t e r n a l t o t h e i n t e l l e c t . Th i s s o u r c e i s n a t u r a l a n d i n f e r i o r t o t h e i n t e l l e c t wh e n we d e a l wi t h t h e m o r a l i t y o f a t r i b e , wh i c h i s a n i n t e l l e c t u a l e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e i n s t i n c t t h a t k e e p s t h e a n t a t i t s t a s k o n t h e a n t h e a p , a n d t o a d e g r e e a s u r r o g a t e o f t h i s i n s t i n c t . Bu t t h e s o u r c e o f v a l u e s i s h u m a n a n d s u p e r i o r t o t h e i n t e l l e c t wh e n we d e a l wi t h o p e n mo r a l i t y , wh i c h i s t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o c e s s i n g p i o n e e r i n g i n d i v i d u a l s a c c o r d t o e m o t i o n s t h a t o p p o s e d e e d s o f i n j u s t i c e . Mo r a l e mo t i o n i s r i c h i n c o n t e n t , a b o t t o ml e s s s o u r c e o f i d e a s , a n d “ mo r e t h a n a n i d e a ” ( p .7 6 ) .

60.

Ka r l A. Ec k h a r d t ( e d .) : Ge r ma n e n r e c h t e — Te x t e u n d ü b e r s e t z u n g e n , Vo l . 2 , p p . 1 4 1 - 1 4 3 .

61.

Ed wa r d We s t e r ma r c k c o l l e c t e d a n d a n a l y z e d a l a r g e a mo u n t o f e mp i r i c a l ma t e r i a l a x i o l o g y n e e d s . O f p a r t i c u l a r i mp o r t a n c e a r e h i s Th e Or i g i n a n d De v e l o p me n t o f Mo r a l I d e a s , a n d Ch r i s t i a n i t y a n d Mo r a l s .Hi s o wn , e mo t i v i s t i c c o n c l u s i o n s d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a r i s e f r o m t h e s e wr i t i n g s .

62. I l e a r n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t we e n t h e ma t e r i a l a n d t h e f o r ma l i n e t h i c s

f r o m Ma x S c h e l e r , a n d ma i n l y f r o m h i s b o o k Fo r ma l i s m i n Et h i c s , a n d No n - Fo r ma l Et h i c s o f Va l u e s .

63. I n Th e S o c i a l Co n t r a c t , Bo o k I I , Ch a p t e r VI I , p . 3 3 , Ro u s s e a u d e a l s

wi t h t h e f o r mu l a t i o n a n d s u g g e s t i o n o f l a ws b y s t r a n g e r s . Wh o e v e r s u g - g e s t s l a ws a s a s t r a n g e r s e r v e s t h e l e g i s l a t o r b e c a u s e i n o r d e r t o l e g i s l a t e a p p r o p r i a t e l y h e mu s t e x p r e s s t h e g e n e r a l wi l l , b u t “ t h e g e n e r a l wi l l t o b e r e a l l y s u c h , mu s t b e g e n e r a l i n i t s o b j e c t ( p .2 5 ) . Th a t i s t o s a y , i t mu s t n o t b e a i me d a t a p e r s o n a l o b j e c t ( p p . 2 9 - 3 0 ) ; b e c a u s e t h e s t r a n g e r i s i g n o r a n t o f p e r s o n a l ma t t e r s , t h e s e wi l l n o t d i v e r t h i s i n t e n t i o n f r o m t h e g e n e r a l o b j e c t .

64.

I n t h e Pr i z e Es s a y On t h e Ba s i s o f Mo r a l i t y § 7 ( p p . 8 8 - 9 1 ) Sc h o p e n h a u e r t r i e s t o s h o w t h a t e g o i s m i s n e c e s s a r y f o r u s i n o r d e r t o i n t e r p r e t o u r “ b e i n g a b l e t o w i l l ,” i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e Ca t e g o r i c a l I mp e r a t i v e . He f i n d s s e v e r a l p o i n t s o f s u p p o r t f o r t h i s i n Ka n t ' s wr i t i n g s .Su c h l e a n i n g o n e g o i s m ma y s u c c e e d i n t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e

Notes 349

o f p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n b u t n o t , a c c o r d i n g t o Sc h o p e n h a u e r , i n t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e mo r a l i t y p r i n c i p l e , a n d h e i s r i g h t .

65. He r e we d e a l wi t h a n o p i n i o n I c a l l “ e g o i s m i n r e v e r s e .” Th i s i s n o t

a g o a l - o r i e n t e d e x t e n s i o n o f e g o i s m, l i k e “ d o n o t wr o n g y o u r n e i g h b o r , s o t h a t h e wi l l n o t r e p a y y o u i n k i n d ,” b u t a n o p i n i o n wh i c h t r u l y u p - h o l d s a n o n - e g o i s t i c p o s i t i o n , b u t c a n n o t c o n s t r u c t t h i s p o s i t i o n wi t h o u t a s s u mi n g f r o m t h e o u t s e t t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d wh a t e g o i s m i s , a n d f u r t h e r mo r e , t h i s e g o i s m h a s t o r e p r e s e n t s o me t h i n g p e r ma n e n t . Fo r e x a mp l e , a n o p i n i o n a s s u mi n g t h a t t h e a d o p t i o n o f a n e g o i s t i c s t a n d r e q u i r e s — f o r e v e r y p e r s o n a d o p t i n g i t — t o wi s h ( u n d e r c i r c u ms t a n c e s o f d i s t r e s s ) t o b e a i d e d b y o t h e r s . On a s u c h s o l i d me a n i n g o f e g o i s m t h i s o p i n i o n b u i l d s mo r a l i t y a s t h e f o r me r ' s n e g a t i o n , n a me l y , a s r e s t r a i n t o f t h e s e l f ' s e g o i s m a n d c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h e e g o i s m o f t h e o t h e r o n e . He r e o n e c o u l d a r g u e t h a t e g o i s m i s n o t s o s o l i d , i .e ., u n e q u i v o c a l , p e r ma n e n t a n d b e a r i n g t h e s a me me a n i n g f o r e v e r y i n d i v i d u a l t h a t a d o p t s i t . Fo r e x a mp l e , t h e r e ma y b e a n i n d i v i d u a l , s a y , n a me d Re u b e n , wh o i n c a s e h e a d o p t e d a n e g o i s t i c s t a n c e , wo u l d p r e f e r t o s u f f e r d i s t r e s s t o h u r t i n g h i s p r i d e b y a c c e p t i n g t h e a i d o f a n o t h e r p e r s o n . Fo r Re u b e n c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h e e g o i s m o f a n o t h e r p e r s o n f o u n d i n d i s t r e s s , wo u l d me a n t o i g n o r e t h e l a t t e r a n d n o t t o h e l p h i m . We wi l l a s k Re u b e n : Ca n y o u wi l l t h a t a l l me mb e r s o f y o u r s o c i e t y a v o i d h e l p i n g e a c h o t h e r ? Hi s a n s we r wi l l b e f u l l y p o s i t i v e . Ye t , s h o u l d h e b e a s k e d t o p r e p a r e l e g i s l a t i o n f o r a n a l i e n s o c i e t y a n d q u e s t i o n e d a b o u t t h e c h a r a c t e r o f i t s me mb e r s , h e wo u l d n o t r e p l y wi t h c e r t a i n t y t h a t t h e s e a l s o a r e , l i k e h i m, v e r y p r o u d a n d v u l n e r a b l e i n t h e i r p r i d e . Wi t h r e g a r d t o t h i s i s s u e s e e t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f v a r i o u s c r i t i q u e s a i me d a t Ka n t i n Le o Wi l d e ' s b o o k Hy p o t h e t i s c h e u n d Ka t e g o r i s c h e I mp e r a t i v e , p p . 1 9 4 - 2 1 8

66.

“ ...[ A] n d i n d e e d , t h e c o n c e p t s o f d u t y a n d r i g h t a r e n o t o n l y c o n c e p t s t h a t c o mp l e me n t e a c h o t h e r ... t h e c o n c e p t o f d u t y i s i n t r u t h a c o n c e p t o f r i g h t , b e c a u s e t h e d u t y i s a l s o b a s e d o n t h e j u s t i f i e d d e ma n d t o r e s p o n d , a n d t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n r i g h t a n d d u t y i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e d e ma n d ... ” Na t h a n Ro t e n s t r e i c h , Po we r a n d i t s Mo u l d ( He b r e w) , p . 2 6 4 . On d u t y a n d r i g h t s e e a l s o : W. D . La mo n t , Th e Pr i n c i - p l e s o f Mo r a l J u d g e me n t , p p . 7 8 - 9 5 .

67. I . Ka n t , f u n d a me n t a l p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e me t a p h y s i c o f mo r a l s , p . 4 0 .

68. Su mma r i z i n g Hu s s e r l ( a c c o r d i n g t o h i s ma n u s c r i p t ) , Al o i s Ro t h

wr i t e s : “ D a s b e d e u t e t ... d a ß d i e e c h t e I d e e e i n e r f o r ma l e n Et h i k e i n e ma t e r i a l e n i c h t a u s s c h l i e s s t , s o n d e r n g e r a d e z u f o r d e r t ” ( “ Th i s me a n s .. .t h a t t h e g e n u i n e i d e a o f a f o r ma l e t h i c s d o e s n o t e x c l u d e a ma t e r i a l o n e ,b u t a c t u a l l y d e m a n d s i t ” ) , p . 4 3 .

69. Aa r o n Be n - Ze ' e v , i n “ On t h e Su b j e c t a n d Ob j e c t o f Mo r a l i t y ” s h o ws

t h a t i n t h e a c t u a l l y p r e v a i l i n g mo r a l i t y i n k n o wn s o c i e t i e s ( i .e ., t h e i r me mb e r s v a l u e a c c o r d i n g l y ) t h e r e i s n o e q u a l d e g r e e o f b e l o n g i n g t o t h e c a t e g o r y m o r a l s u b j e c t , n a me l y , o n e p e r s o n b e l o n g s mo r e t o t h i s c a t e g o r y a n d a n o t h e r o n e l e s s ; a n d t h e s a me h o l d s f o r t h e c a t e g o r y mo r a l o b j e c t .Th e c a t e g o r i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f a c t u a l l y p r e v a i l i n g m o r a l i t y i s n o t a r r a n g e d


a c c o r d i n g t o t h e mo d e l o f Ar i s t o t l e ' s c a t e g o r y o f s u b s t a n c e . I t t u r n s o u t t h a t i n s y n t h e s e s o f ma t e r i a l a n d f o r ma l mo r a l i t y t h e c a t e g o r i c a l s t r u c t u r e i s d e t e r mi n e d b y t h e ma t e r i a l mo r a l i t y s p e c i f i c t o a g i v e n s o c i e t y . Th i s s p e c i f i c m a t e r i a l mo r a l i t y a l s o d e t e r mi n e s t h e s t r u c t u r e o f e t h i c a l r u l e s ,wh i l e f o r m a l mo r a l i t y g u i d e s t h e c a p a c i t y f o r e t h i c a l j u d g me n t b y a p p l y i n g a n d i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s e e t h i c a l r u l e s ; i t d o e s t h i s a c c o r d i n g t o i t s r e l a t i v e w e i g h t wi t h i n t h e c o n c r e t e s y n t h e s i s . Wh e n p a s s i n g f r o m Ka n t t o Ma x Sc h e l e r ' s p h i l o s o p h y , i t l o o k s a s i f ma t e r i a l mo r a l i t y i s t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f o r ma l mo r a l i t y , o r mo r e p r e c i s e l y : t h e a c c o mp l i s h me n t o f t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e f o r ma l . Ho we v e r , t h e a n a l y s i s o f p r e v a i l i n g mo r a l o r e t h i c a l j u d g me n t p r o b a b l y r e v e r s e s t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f r o l e s a n d a c c o r d s f o r ma l mo r a l i t y t h e t a s k o f i n t e r p r e t i n g m a t e r i a l mo r a l i t y ' s r u l e s ,o r o f a c c o mp l i s h i n g t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I n o t h e r wo r d s : t h e r o l e o f t h e s p i r i t p r e v a i l i n g i n t h e s p e c i f i c e t h i c a l r u l e s ( i n a s i mi l a r s e n s e t o “ t h e s p i r i t o f t h e l a w,” a s d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e l a w) . An d i n d e e d ,t h e c l a s s i c a l Ka n t i a n f o r mu l a t i o n — “ So a c t a s t o t r e a t h u ma n i t y , w h e t h e r i n t h i n e o wn p e r s o n o r i n t h a t o f a n y o t h e r , i n e v e r y c a s e a s a n e n d w i t h a l ,a n d n e v e r a s me a n s o n l y ” ( Ka n t , Fu n d a me n t a l Pr i n c i p l e s o f t h e Me t a p h y s i c s o f Mo r a l s , p . 4 6 ) — I s b e t t e r s u i t e d t o e x p r e s s “ t h e s p i r i t o f a ma t t e r ” b e t t e r t h a n t o “ d i c t a t e b e h a v i o r . ” Th i s f o r mu l a t i o n i s n o t s u i t a b l e a s a t o u c h s t o n e , b e c a u s e t h e “ wi t h a l ” a n d t h e “ n e v e r ... o n l y ” i t i n c l u d e s l e a v e t o o mu c h o p e n u n d e t e r mi n e d s p a c e , b u t i t i s s u i t a b l e a s a k i n d o f r e mi n d e r t o t i p t h e s c a l e s t o wa r d s wh a t i s h e r e c a l l e d “ e n d ” ( n a me l y , w h a t h a s v a l u e n o t a s a me a n s a n d n o t a s a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a v a l u e ) . Th a t i s t o s a y , wh e n t h e ma t e r i a l r u l e s l e a v e r o o mf o r s e v e r a l p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n s i n a n i n d i v i d u a l c a s e h e l d u p f o r v a l u a t i o n ,t h e f o r ma l p r i n c i p l e r e c o mme n d s t o c h o o s e t h e s o l u t i o n t h a t i s c l o s e s t t o t h e v i e w o f p e o p l e a s “ e n d s .”


70.

Re g a r d i n g g a me s a n d c o mp e t i t i o n s e e J o h a n Hu i z i n g a , Ho mo Lu d e n s , Ch a p t e r I I I . I b e l i e v e t h e t y p o l o g y o f v a l u e s r e q u i r e s a mo r e a c u t e d i s t i n c t i o n t h a n f o u n d i n Hu i z i n g a ( wh i c h h i s r e s e a r c h d i d n o t n e e d ) b e - t we e n g a me s ( b e l o n g i n g t o Se c t i o n B) a n d c o mp e t i t i o n ( b e l o n g i n g t o Se c t i o n C) . Al t h o u g h t h e r e i s a b r o a d a r e a i n wh i c h g a me s a n d c o mp e t i - t i o n a r e c o n g r u e n t , t h e r e a r e n o n - c o mp e t i t i v e g a me s , a n d t h e r e i s c o m- p e t i t i o n w h i c h i s n o g a me a t a l l b e c a u s e i t i s c a r r i e d o u t i n d e a d e a r n e s t .

71.

Ma x Sc h e l e r c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e d i v e r s i o n o f f o c u s f r o m wh a t i s e x p e r i e n c e d t o t h e e x p e r i e n c e a s p a t h o l o g i c a l . He d i s c u s s e s t h e i s s u e i n t h e l a s t c h a p t e r o f h i s p a p e r “ Di e I d o l e d e r Se l b s t e r k e n n t n i s .” ( s e e e s p e - c i a l l y p p . 2 6 2 - 2 6 4 ) . Ho we v e r , i f a p a t h o l o g i c a l p h e n o me n o n i n a n i n - d i v i d u a l i s b y d e f i n i t i o n o n e o f wh i c h t h i s i n d i v i d u a l s u f f e r s , o n e s h o u l d n o t s a y t h a t t h e r e f l e c t i v e c o n f i g u r a t i o n i s p a t h o l o g i c a l , e v e n i f t h i s o r t h a t p a t h o l o g i c a l p h e n o me n o n m a y a r i s e f r o m i t .

Notes 351

72. As a s e q u e l t o t h e t y p o l o g i c a l d i s c u s s i o n I wi l l r e f e r h e r e t o t h e

r e q u e s t f o r e s t e e m. We f i n d i t i n a l l t h r e e s e c t i o n s . I n t h e f i r s t s e c t i o n we f i n d t h e r e q u e s t f o r e s t e e m b o t h a s a n e n d t o b e a c h i e v e d b y t h e u s e o f me a n s , a n d a s a me a n s a i me d a t a c h i e v i n g o t h e r e n d s ( wh e n a p e r s o n h o p e s s o me h o w t o p r o f i t f r o m t h e e s t e e m o t h e r s a c c o r d h i m o r h e r , a n d d o e s n o t s e e k r e s p e c t f o r i t s o wn s a k e ) . An d we f i n d i t , o f c o u r s e , i n t h i s s e c t i o n a s a ma t t e r t o b e t r e a t e d wi t h c a u t i o n , i . e ., a s a r e s t r a i n i n g f a c t o r ( i n s o me c u l t u r e s a t t e n t i o n t o o n e ' s s e l f - e s t e e m r e s t r a i n s i n a s i mi l a r ma n n e r t o t h e r e s t r a i n t e x e r c i s e d b y a n a t t i t u d e o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n a n o t h e r c u l t u r e ) . I n t h e s e c o n d s e c t i o n we f i n d t h e r e q u e s t f o r e s t e e m f i r s t o f a l l a s a n o f f s h o o t o f t h e n e e d t o b e l o n g t o a s o c i e t y . He r e a p e r s o n d i r e c t l y e n j o y s t h e ma n i f e s t a t i o n s o f r e s p e c t h e r e c e i v e s ; h e , s o t o s a y ,c o n s u me s t h e m. Th i s i s t h e s a l i e n t r e q u e s t f o r e s t e e m, c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y i t s r e c i p r o c i t y : f r o m t h i s a s p e c t a p e r s o n d o e s n o t a s k t o b e e s t e e me d b u t b y t h o s e h e e s t e e ms , a n d i n wh o s e s o c i e t y h e wi s h e s t o b e we l l - p l a c e d . I n t h e t h i r d s e c t i o n t h e r e q u e s t f o r e s t e e m ma y e x i s t i n s e v e r a l ma n n e r s . Fr o ma mo n g t h e s e we wi l l h e r e r e f e r t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y f o r t h i s r e q u e s t t o e x i s t a s a k i n d o f c o n s t r a i n t o n r e f l e c t i o n . I n t h i s c a s e t h e c o mp a n y o f o t h e r s wh o c o n f e r r e s p e c t i s n o t s o u g h t f o r i t s o wn s a k e , b u t i n o r d e r t o o v e r c o me f e e l i n g s o f i n f e r i o r i t y a n d t o r e l i e v e t h e s u f f e r i n g t h e y c a u s e . I f a p e r s o n i s h o n o r e d b y mi s t a k e , wi l l t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n t h i s h o n o r b r i n g s , b e f l a we d ? We a s s u me t h a t t h e p e r s o n h i ms e l f k n o ws t h a t i t wa s a mi s t a k e ; p e r h a p s h e e v e n d e l i b e r a t e l y m i s l e d t h o s e wh o h o n o r e d h i m. I f t h i s i n d i v i d u a l s e e k s r e s p e c t i n t h e f r a me wo r k o f s e c t i o n s A o r B( e x c l u s i v e l y ) , t h e v a l u e o f t h e ma n i f e s t a t i o n s o f e s t e e m wi l l n o t b e f l a we d i n h i s e y e s . Bu t i f t h e q u e s t f o r e s t e e m b e l o n g s t o s e c t i o n C, n a m e l y wh e n a p e r s o n n e e d s t o r e i n f o r c e s e l f - e s t e e m, i t ma y we l l b e t h a t k n o wl e d g e o f t h e mi s t a k e wi l l s p o i l h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . Bu t f i n a l l y we ma y a l s o i ma g i n e a c a s e o f a s e c t i o n C r e q u e s t f o r e s t e e m, i n wh i c h t h e p e r s o n h o n o r e d b y mi s t a k e s u c c e e d s i n d e c e i v i n g h i ms e l f a n d b e l i e v e s t h a t h e i n d e e d d e s e r v e s w h a t h e r e c e i v e d .

Part II , Ch ap ter 10 (p gs . 177- 179)

73. Re a d An t i s t h e n e s i n Xe n o p h o n ' s “ Th e Di n n e r Pa r t y ” ( p p . 2 4 5 - 2 4 7 ) .

An t i s t h e n e s ' wo r d s d o n o t i mp l y t h a t h e s h u n s l i f e ' s p l e a s u r e s ; o n t h e c o n t r a r y , h e g a i n s p l e a s u r e s w h i c h a r e n o t i n f e r i o r , wh i l e h e f o r e g o e s p a r t o f t h e g o o d s d e s i r e d b y o t h e r me mb e r s o f h i s s o c i e t y . Th e c y n i c a n d t h e s t o i c t r a d i t i o n i n t e r p r e t e d t h e a b o v e a s a n a s p i r a t i o n t o r e t u r n t o n a t u r a l n e e d s a n d t o r e s t o r e t h e m.

Part II I , Ch ap ter 1 (p gs . 183- 188)

74. So me c r i t i c i s m o f t h e i d e a o f c o u n t e r - b a l a n c e c a n b e f o u n d i n : M.

St o c k e r , Pl u r a l a n d Co n f l i c t i n g Va l u e s , p p . 8 0 , 8 2 , 3 0 3 .


75. Ab o u t t i me a n d v a l u e r e a l i z a t i o n s e e a b o v e p a r a g r a p h e a b o u t “ Th e

Pr o p o r t i o n o f a Sa c r i f i c e i n t h e Pr e s e n t t o a Re wa r d i n t h e Fu t u r e ” a n d o n t h e g e n e r a l b a c k g r o u n d t o t h i s p r o b l e m s e e : M. Sl o t e , Go o d s a n d Vi r t u e s ,Ch a p t e r s 1 a n d 2 .


76.

“ Wh a t i s b o u g h t wi t h mo n e y o r wi t h g o o d s i s p u r c h a s e d b y l a b o u r ... a s mu c h a s wh a t we a c q u i r e b y t h e t o i l o f o u r o wn b o d y . Th a t mo n e y o r t h o s e g o o d s i n d e e d s a v e u s t h i s t o i l ... L a b o u r wa s t h e f i r s t p r i c e , t h e o r i g i n a l p u r c h a s e - m o n e y t h a t wa s p a i d f o r a l l t h i n g s .” A. S mi t h ,Th e We a l t h o f Na t i o n s , p . 3 0 , C h a p t e r V) . Th e e x c h a n g e v a l u e a n d mo n e y a r e d i s c u s s e d f r o m a p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e wp o i n t i n t h e f o l l o wi n g wo r k s : W .D. La mo n t , Th e Va l u e J u d g e me n t , Ch a p t e r s I - V. Ge o r g Si mme l , Th e Ph i l o s o p h y o f Mo n e y .

77. Al f r e d Ma r s h a l , Pr i n c i p l e s o f Ec o n o mi c s , v o l . I , p . 9 2 .

I d o n o t r e c o mme n d t h i s u s a g e o f t h e wo r d “ u t i l i t y ” i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c o u r s e , b e c a u s e t h e p o we r o f t h e mo t i v e e x p r e s s e d i n d e ma n d , u t i l i t y a n d p l e a s u r e i s a l l t i p p e d t o g e t h e r i n t o a n i n d i s t i n c t wh o l e l a b e l e d “ u t i l i t y .” Ac c o r d i n g t o t h i s c o n c e p t o n e wo u l d h a v e t o s a y , f o r i n s t a n c e ,t h a t a p e r s o n i n c r e a s i n g l y a d d i c t e d t o h e r o i n wh o a c c o r d i n g l y i s p r e p a r e d t o p a y mo r e a n d mo r e f o r t h e d r u g , g a i n s g r e a t e r a n d g r e a t e r b e n e f i t ( “ u t i l i t y ” ) f r o m i t s c o n s u mp t i o n — e v e n i f a c o mp r e h e n s i v e b a l a n c e s h o ws t h a t c o n s u mp t i o n o f t h e d r u g c a u s e s t h e a d d i c t mo r e mi s e r y t h a n p l e a s u r e . Se e La mo n t o n u t i l i t y : W. D. La mo n t , Th e Va l u e J u d g e me n t , p p .8 8 - 9 0 , ( i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e s e c o n d n o t e o n p . 8 9 ) .

Ma r s h a l h i ms e l f h a d h i s r e s e r v a t i o n s a s t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t we e n t h e p o we r o f a mo t i v e a n d t h e g r a d e o f b e n e f i t f r o m i t s r e a l i z a t i o n s e e Pr i n c i p l e s o f Ec o n o mi c s , v o l . I , f o o t n o t e o n p a g e s 9 2 - 9 3 .

78.

Ch a r l e s St e v e n s o n d i s c u s s e s t h i s i s s u e . Se e : C. L. St e v e n s o n ,Et h i c s a n d La n g u a g e , p p . 1 9 2 - 1 9 8 . He a l s o p r o v i d e s r e f e r e n c e s t o o t h e r a u t h o r s wh o d i s c u s s e d t h e ma t t e r .


79. Se e : Ni c o l a i Ha r t ma n n , Et h i c s , I I , Ch a p t e r XXXVI I I ( LXI I I ) , p p . 4 4 4 - 4 6 3 .


80. Wh e n we s u c c e e d t o c o n s t r u c t ( c o n s i s t e n t l y ) i n o u r i ma g i n a t i o n a

s i t u a t i o n i n wh i c h a n a t p r e s e n t p r e v a i l i n g c o n f l i c t v a n i s h e s , t h e r e i s s o me t h i n g i n c i d e n t a l i n t h e c o n f l i c t . On t h i s ma t t e r s e e : Be r n a r d Wi l - l i a ms , “ Et h i c a l Co n s i s t e n c y ,” p p . 1 6 7 - 1 7 0 .

81. V. Kr a f t , Fo u n d a t i o n s f o r S c i e n t i f i c An a l y s i s o f Va l u e , p . 5 .

Notes 353

82.

Ba s i c a l l y Si mme l , Ha r t ma n n a n d La n d ma n n a s s u me t h e s a me p o s i t i o n . I n o r d e r t o b r o a d e n t h e p i c t u r e , I wi l l a l s o l i s t h e r e s o me o t h e r wo r k s t h a t d e a l wi t h c l a s h e s b e t we e n d u t i e s a n d b e t we e n t h e m a n d o t h e r v a l u e s :

Ge o r g Si mm e l , Ei n l e i t u n g i n d i e Mo r a l wi s s e n s c h a f t , Ch a p t e r 7 .Ni c o l a i Ha r t ma n n , Et h i c s , Vo l . I I , Ch a p t e r s VI - VI I I ( 3 1 - 3 4 ) , XXXVI ( 6 1 ) .Mi c h a e l La n d ma n n , “ Ph ä n o me n o l o g i s c h e Et h i k .” Mi c h a e l Sl o t e , Go o d s a n d Vi r t u e s , Ch a p t e r s 4 a n d 5 .St u a r t Ha m p s h i r e , Mo r a l i t y a n d Co n f l i c t .Ch r i s t o p h e r W. Go wa n s ( e d .) , Mo r a l Di l e mma s .Be r n a r d Wi l l i a ms , “ Co n f l i c t o f Va l u e s .”

Part III, Chapter 5 (pgs. 215-223)

83. Se e : Da s B ö s e , i n : Ru d o l f Ei s l e r , Ka n t - l e x i k o n — Na c h s c h l a g s we r k

z u Ka n t ' s s ä mt l i c h e n S c h r i f t e n / Br i e f e n u n d h a n d s c h r i f t i c h e n Na c h l a ß ,Hi l d e s h e i m 1 9 6 4 ( 1 9 2 9 ) , p p .7 1 - 7 5 . Se e a l s o : I mma n u e l Ka n t , Re l i g i o n Wi t h i n t h e Li mi t s o f Re a s o n Al o n e , p p . 2 3 - 3 0 , 4 6 .

84. Se e : Sc h o p e n h a u e r , On t h e Ba s i s o f Mo r a l i t y , p p . 1 3 5 - 1 3 6 , 1 4 5 ,1 9 2 .

85. Ho b b e s d i s c u s s e s t h e q u e s t i o n wh y b e e s a n d a n t s c a n l i v e i n a s o c i e t y d e v o i d o f v i o l e n c e o r c o mp u l s i o n a n d h u ma n s c a n n o t d o s o ; i n a n i n t e r e s t i n g p a r a g r a p h h e s h o ws h o w r e a s o n e x a c e r b a t e s o p p o s i t i o n b e - t we e n h u ma n s . Se e : Le v i a t h a n , Ch a p t e r 1 7 , p p . 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 .

86. M. La n d m a n n , Re f o r m o f t h e He b r e w Al p h a b e t , p p . 2 9 8 - 2 9 9 .87. I n c e r t a i n c u l t u r e s , g r e a t l o v e o f p a r e n t s t o t h e i r d a u g h t e r i s

c o mp a t i b l e wi t h k i l l i n g h e r i n o r d e r t o ma k e u n d o n e s o me t h i n g s h e h a s d o n e . I n h i s n o v e l S h a me Sa l ma n Ru s h d i e t e l l s a b o u t a Pa k i s t a n i i n Lo n d o n wh o k i l l e d h i s b e l o v e d d a u g h t e r , h i s o n l y c h i l d , i n o r d e r t o s a v e t h e h o n o u r o f h i s f a mi l y .

88. Er i c h Fr o mm, Es c a p e f r o m Fr e e d o m, p p . 1 4 1 - 1 7 9 . Se e , f o r i n s t a n c e ,o n p . 1 7 6 t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f a s t a t e i n wh i c h a “ t e n d e n c y t o g e t r i d o f o n e ' s i n d i v i d u a l s e l f ” a wa k e n s i n a p e r s o n .


89. Fr e u d d i s c u s s e s d e a t h i n s t i n c t s i n : Be y o n d t h e Pl e a s u r e Pr i n c i p l e ,

p p . 3 0 - 5 0 . 90.

Ha r t ma n n , Et h i c s , v o l . I I , p p . 9 3 - 9 5 .


91. Mi c h a e l La n d ma n n , Al i e n a t o r y Re a s o n , p . 2 9 .92.

Ma x Sc h e l e r d i s c u s s e s t h e r e l a t i o n b e t we e n u t i l i t y a n d p l e a s u r e i n

h i s Re s s e n t i me n t ( s e e e s p e c i a l l y p p . 1 4 9 - 1 5 2 ) ; h e p o i n t s t o t h e p o s s i b i l -


i t y t h a t w o r k ma y c o mp r o mi s e t h e wo r k e r ' s c a p a c i t y f o r p l e a s u r e . Ac - c o r d i n g t o Sc h e l e r , t h i s i s t h e e n s l a v e me n t o f t h e e n d t o t h e me a n s .Mo d e r n a s c e t i c i s m wi t h wh i c h S c h e l e r a r g u e s , t r i e s t o j u s t i f y t h i s b o n d a g e .

93. Hu i z i n g a d i s c u s s e s t h e q u e s t i o n wh e t h e r i n a n c i e n t Gr e e c e t h e r e wa s a r e a l t r a n s i t i o n f r o m b a t t l e t o p l a y , o r o n l y “ a d e v e l o p me n t o f c u l t u r e i n p l a y ,” i n Ho mo Lu d e n s , p . 7 5 . O n p . 4 7 Hu i z i n g a t e l l s t h a t “ At t h e Ol y mp i c g a me s t h e r e we r e d u e l s f o u g h t t o t h e d e a t h .” Se e a l s o p . 7 4 o n g l a d i a t o r s . Th e f i f t h c h a p t e r , e n t i t l e d “ Pl a y a n d Wa r ” i s ma i n l y d e v o t e d t o t h i s ma t t e r . Wi t h r e g a r d t o a g a me a s p a r t o f a b a t t l e , o n e r e me mb e r s Ab n e r s a y i n g t o J o a b “ Le t t h e y o u n g me n n o w a r i s e a n d p l a y b e f o r e u s ” S a mu e l I I , 2 / 1 4 .

94. Se e : Od e d Ba l a b a n , “ Pr a x i s a n d Po e s i s i n Ar i s t o t l e ' s Pr a c t i c a l Ph i l o s o p h y .”

95. Fo r t h e s a k e o f b r e v i t y I b r i n g t h e f o l l o wi n g q u o t e f r o m Ad a mSmi t h wi t h mu l t i p l e o mi s s i o n s : “ Th e p o o r ma n ' s s o n , wh o m h e a v e n i n i t s a n g e r h a s v i s i t e d wi t h a mb i t i o n ...a d mi r e s t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e r i c h . … He d e v o t e s h i ms e l f f o r e v e r t o t h e p u r s u i t o f we a l t h a n d g r e a t n e s s . To o b t a i n t h e c o n v e n i e n c e s wh i c h t h e s e a f f o r d , h e s u b mi t s i n t h e f i r s t y e a r , n a y i n t h e f i r s t mo n t h o f h i s a p p l i c a t i o n , t o mo r e f a t i g u e o f b o d y a n d mo r e u n e a s i n e s s o f mi n d t h a n h e c o u l d h a v e s u f f e r e d t h r o u g h t h e wh o l e o f h i s l i f e f r o m t h e wa n t o f t h e m. He s t u d i e s ... Wi t h t h e mo s t u n r e l e n t i n g i n d u s t r y ,

h e l a b o u r s n i g h t a n d d a y t o a c q u i r e t a l e n t s s u p e r i o r t o a l l h i s

c o mp e t i t o r s — h e s e r v e s t h o s e wh o m h e h a t e s , a n d i s o b s e q u i o u s t o t h o s e h e d e s p i s e s . Th r o u g h t h e wh o l e o f h i s l i f e h e p u r s u e s t h e i d e a o f a c e r t a i n a r t i f i c i a l a n d e l e g a n t r e p o s e ... wh i c h , i f i n t h e e x t r e mi t y o f o l d a g e h e s h o u l d a t l a s t a t t a i n t o i t , h e wi l l f i n d t o b e i n n o r e s p e c t p r e f e r a b l e t o t h a t h u mb l e s e c u r i t y ... wh i c h h e h a d a b a n d o n e d ... i n t h e l a s t d r e g s o f l i f e ,h i s b o d y w a s t e d wi t h t o i l ... h i s mi n d g a l l e d a n d r u f f l e d b y t h e me mo r y o f a t h o u s a n d i n j u r i e s ... f r o m t h e i n j u s t i c e o f h i s e n e mi e s , o r f r o m t h e p e r f i d i t y a n d i n g r a t i t u d e o f h i s f r i e n d s ...” Th e Th e o r y o f Mo r a l S e n t i me n t s , p .1 8 1 ) . S mi t h v i v i d l y d e s c r i b e s a n e x t r e me c a s e , b u t t h i s c a s e i n f o r ms u s a b o u t t h e r u l e , a n d t h e r u l e i s t h a t c o mp e t i t i v e g o a l - o r i e n t a t i o n d o e s n o t p a y . Th e i l l u s i o n t h e g o a l - o r i e n t e d i n d i v i d u a l b e l i e v e s i n i s r e i n f o r c e d b y t h e c o mp e t i t i v e s p i r i t . Fu r t h e r o n i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n ( p .1 8 3 ) Smi t h s a y s : “An d i t i s we l l t h a t n a t u r e i mp o s e s u p o n u s i n t h i s ma n n e r . I t i s t h i s d e c e p t i o n wh i c h r o u s e s a n d k e e p s i n c o n t i n u a l mo t i o n t h e i n d u s t r y o f ma n k i n d . ” Th e i n d i v i d u a l wh o s e e k s we a l t h a n d e s t e e m a n d i s e v e n p r e p a r e d t o c h e a t o t h e r s , d e c e i v e s h i ms e l f ; a s i f a n i n v i s i b l e h a n d p u s h e d h i m o n t o a c o u r s e o f s e l f - s a c r i f i c e f o r t h e s a k e o f a p e r s o n a l e n d : An a t t r a c t i v e a n d a we i n s p i r i n g v i s i o n o f we a l t h a n d e s t e e m; t h e i n v i s i b l e h a n d t h u s d i r e c t s h i m t o wa r d s t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a h i s t o r i c a l i d e a l , a k i n d o f a e s t h e t i c v i s i o n o f c i v i l i z a t i o n ' s p r o g r e s s . Fo r a e s t h e t i c r e a s o n s Smi t h p r e f e r s p r o g r e s s a l o n g t h e h i s t o r i c a l c o u r s e p a v e d b y i l l u s i o n s a n d s u f f e r i n g t o wa r d s a p e r f e c t ma t e r i a l c i v i l i z a t i o n , t o a s t u t e i d l e n e s s .

Notes 355


96. I n a n c i e n t At h e n s t h e p r o p o s a l o f a l a w t h a t c o n t r a d i c t e d a n e x i s t i n g l a w wa s a n o f f e n s e . I n i t i a l l y t h e Ar e o p a g u s h a d t h e t a s k t o p r e v e n t t h e t a b l i n g o f s u c h mo t i o n s a t t h e g e n e r a l me e t i n g . Th e t r a n s f e r o f a u t h o r i t y f r o m t h e n Ar e o p a g u s t o t h e p o p u l a r a s s e mb l y e n a b l e d e v e r y c i t i z e n t o s u e a n o t h e r c i t i z e n i f h e p r o p o s e d s u c h a l a w. Th e t e r m “ g r a p h e p a r a n o mo n ” d e s i g n a t e s s u c h a l a ws u i t . Ev e n wh e n t h e g e n e r a l me e t i n g h a d a c c e p t e d a n d c o n f i r me d a l a w, t h e p e r s o n wh o h a d p r o p o s e d i t c o u l d s t i l l b e s u e d . Th e p u n i s h me n t f o r s u c h a p r o p o s a l wa s s e v e r e : e x i l e o r d e a t h . Th e s e d e t a i l s we r e t a k e n f r o m Mo s h e Ami t , Hi s t o r y o f Cl a s s i c a l Gr e e c e , ( He b r e w) . J e r u s a l e m: Ma g n e s , He b r e w Un i v e r s i t y Pr e s s , 1 9 8 4 . p .3 2 4 . Th e m a t t e r wa s b r o u g h t t o my a t t e n t i o n b y Dr . Av n e r Co h e n .

97. Eq u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f a g i v e n ( p h y s i c a l ) q u a n t i t y o f a p r o d u c t i n -

c r e a s e s i t s u s e f u l n e s s ( t h e p r o d u c t wi l l b e mo r e u s e f u l t o t h e p o o r t h a n t o t h e r i c h ) . On t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e r e i s t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t t h e a b s e n c e o f a p l e d g e t o d i s t r i b u t e e q u a l p o r t i o n s ma y i n c r e a s e t h e e f f o r t s ma d e b y t h e me mb e r s o f a s o c i e t y , a n d t h u s i n c r e a s e t h e q u a n t i t i e s o f p r o d u c e d . On t h e ma t t e r o f s e t t i n g o f f t h e s l a v e ' s s u f f e r i n g b y t h e ma s t e r ' s p l e a s u r e i n o v e r a l l , u t i l i t a r i a n s o c i a l a c c o u n t i n g s e e : J o h n R a wl s , “ J u s t i c e a s Fa i r n e s s ,” § 7 .

98. I n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f e t h i c s a n d a e s t h e t i c s Ni c o l a i Ha r t ma n n a d o p t s

t h e v a n t a g e p o i n t o f t h e i n t e n t ' s o wn p u r e l o g i c , i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o t h o s e o f t h e i n t e n d e r a n d t h e i n t e n t i o n . Fr o m t h i s v a n t a g e p o i n t o n e s e e s s i g h t s d e v o i d o f i mp e d i me n t s , o f i n t e r f e r e n c e b y a l i e n f a c t o r s ; l o o k i n g o u t f r o m t h e r e o n e r e c e i v e s a c l e a r d e s c r i p t i o n o f c o mp l e x ma t t e r s i n t h e s p h e r e o f e t h i c s a n d a e s t h e t i c s . No t e c h n i q u e o f a b s t r a c t i o n c o u l d ma k e t h i s c o mb i n a t i o n o f p r o f o u n d n e s s a n d c l a r i t y p o s s i b l e . Th e p r i c e Ha r t ma n n p a y s f o r t h i s a d v a n t a g e i s t wo f o l d : A. I t l e a v e s n o r o o m f o r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t we e n t h e v a l u a t i v e a n d t h e me t a - v a l u a t i v e l e v e l a n d t h u s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n n o r ma t i v e a n d p h e n o me n o l o g i c a l d i s c u s s i o n o f v a l u e s . Ga d a me r ' s c r i t i c i s m o f Ha r t ma n n a r i s e s f r o m t h i s p o i n t . Se e : G a d a me r , “ We r t e t h i k u n d ' p r a k t i s c h e Ph i l o s o p h i e ' ,” p p . 1 1 5 - 1 1 8 .

B. I t l e a v e s n o r o o m f o r a t h e o r e t i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f r e a l ( n o t me r e l y h y p o t h e t i c a l ) v a l u e o p p o s i t i o n , l i k e o p p o s i t i o n wi t h i n a c o h e r e n t a n d h i s t o r i c a l s y s t e m. De t a c h me n t o f a v a l u e f r o m t h e i n t e n t i o n t o wa r d s i t t r a i l s i t s d e t a c h me n t f r o m t h e v a l u e - s y s t e m. Hy p o s t a s i s t r a i l s a b s o l u - t i z a t i o n o f t h e v a l u e a n d i t s o p p o s i t i o n t o o t h e r v a l u e s , a n d t h i s a b s o - l u t i z a t i o n l e a v e s r o o m n e i t h e r f o r s y n t h e s e s t h a t b r i d g e t h e g a p b e t we e n o p p o s i n g v a l u e s , n o r f o r Ar i s t o t l e ' s me s o t e s , i .e . , t h e me a n , wh i c h i s o n e o f t h e s y n t h e s e s a n d f u l f i l l s a n i mp o r t a n t r o l e i n Ha r t ma n n ' s e t h i c s .Ka r s r u h e n , i n h i s r e s e a r c h o n v a l u e o p p o s i t i o n a n d o b j e c t i v i s m i n Ha r t ma n n ' s wo r k , s h o ws t h a t t h e l a t t e r u p h o l d s t h r e e p r o p o s i t i o n s o u t o f wh i c h e v e r y t wo a r e c o mp a t i b l e wi t h e a c h o t h e r , b u t b y n o me a n s a r e a l l


t h r e e c o mp a t i b l e . Th e s e a r e : A. Va l u e s e x i s t i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . B. Th e r e i s o p p o s i t i o n b e t we e n v a l u e s ( i n c l u d i n g a n t i n o mi e s ) . C. Th e r e a r e s y n t h e s e s b e t we e n t h e o p p o n e n t s . Se e : Ka r l s r u h e n , We r t wi d e r s t r e i t u n d We r t o b j e k t i v i s mu s , p p . 1 7 4 - 2 0 4 , a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r , p p . 1 8 8 - 1 8 9 .


99. J . El s t e r , Ul y s s e s a n d t h e S i r e n s , p p . 3 7 , 9 4 - 9 6 , 1 0 3 .

100. Se e A. M e l e , I r r a t i o n a l i t y , p . 5 .101. Th e r e a d e r c a n g a i n a p i c t u r e o f t h e ma z e o f d i s c u s s i o n a b o u t

a k r a s i a wi t h o u t b e i n g c a u g h t u p i n t h e s c h o l a s t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h e ms e l v e s , i n : Wi l l i a m Ch a r l t o n , We a k n e s s o f Wi l l .

Part II I , Ch ap ter 11 (p gs . 265 -272)

102. Se e i b i d , p . 1 2 4 , h e a d i n g : “ Th e wh o l e b o d y o f t h e p e o p l e i s a b o v e

t h e k i n g .” I t i s g e n e r a l l y t h o u g h t t h a t t h e a u t h o r o f t h e b o o k wa s Hu b e r t La n g u e t . T h e p s e u d o n y m d e r i v e s f r o m t h e n a me o f t h e ma n wh o e x p e l l e d t h e l a s t k i n g f r o m Ro me : Lu c i u s J u n i u s , c a l l e d Br u t u s .

103. Wi t h r e g a r d t o i d e o l o g y , Le o n Fe s t i n g e r ' s t h e o r y o n c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e i s r e l e v a n t . He r e o n e s h o u l d n o t e t h a t Fe s t i n g e r e mp l o y s t h e wo r d s “ c o g n i t i o n ” a n d “ k n o wl e d g e ” i n a v e r y b r o a d me a n i n g ; v a l u e s a n d v a l u a t i o n s a r e a l s o “ c o g n i t i o n s ,” o r “ k n o wl e d g e s .” Se e A Th e o r y o f Co g n i t i v e Di s s o n a n c e , p . 1 0 .

104. A s t o r y r e l e v a n t t o o u r t r e a t me n t o f h y p n o s i s a p p e a r s i n : Er i c h Fr o mm, Es c a p e f r o m Fr e e d o m, p p . 1 8 7 - 1 8 9 .

105. Si g mu n d Fr e u d , “ Th e Fu t u r e o f a n I l l u s i o n ,” p . 1 1 .

Part IV, Ch ap ter 2 (p gs . 285-2 88)

106. Re g a r d i n g f o r ma l i s m a n d a n t i - f o r ma l i s m, s e e : M. St r a u s s , Emp - f i n d u n g , I n t e n t i o n u n d Ze i c h e n , p p . 1 9 7 - 2 2 0 .


107. Sp i n o z a h e l d t wo o p p o s i n g p o s i t i o n s o n g o o d a n d e v i l : On e i s d o mi n a n t i n p a r t I I I o f Et h i c s , t h e o t h e r i n p a r t I V. He d i d n o t s u c c e e d i n b r i d g i n g t h e g a p b e t we e n t h e m.

108. Se e h i s b o o k , Ma n f o r h i ms e l f .109. Sc h o p e n h a u e r s a y s ( On t h e Ba s i s o f Mo r a l i t y , p .1 3 6 ) t h a t n o

h u ma n b e i n g i s e n t i r e l y wi t h o u t s o me t h i n g o f a l l t h r e e mo t i v e s .110. Se e : Fr i e d r i c h Ni e t z s c h e , On t h e Ge n e a l o g y o f Mo r a l s , p p . 3 9 - 4 2 .111. No t e Sc h o p e n h a u e r ' s f o l l o wi n g s e n t e n c e : “ No t e v e r y o n e i s

c a p a b l e o f c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t we e n t h e p u r e l y t h e o r e t i c a l s e a r c h

Notes 357

f o r o b j e c t i v e t r u t h , a s e a r c h d i s s o c i a t e d f r o m a l l i n t e r e s t , e v e n f r o m t h a t o f mo r a l i t y a s p r a c t i c e d , a n d a s a c r i l e g i o u s a t t a c k o n t h e h e a r t ' s h a l l o we d c o n v i c t i o n ” ( On t h e Ba s i s o f Mo r a l i t y , p . 4 0 ) .

112. On t h e Ba s i s o f Mo r a l i t y , p . 1 4 6 .113. Ad a m Smi t h wr i t e s : “ Sy mp a t h y d o e s n o t a r i s e s o m u c h f r o m t h e

v i e w o f t h e p a s s i o n a s f r o m t h a t o f t h e s i t u a t i o n wh i c h e x c i t e s i t . We s o me t i me s f e e l f o r a n o t h e r a p a s s i o n o f wh i c h h e h i ms e l f s e e ms t o b e a l t o g e t h e r i n c a p a b l e ; b e c a u s e , wh e n we p u t o u r s e l v e s i n h i s c a s e , t h a t p a s s i o n a r i s e s i n o u r b r e a s t … Of a l l t h e c a l a mi t i e s t o wh i c h t h e c o n - d i t i o n o f mo r t a l i t y e x p o s e s ma n k i n d , t h e l o s s o f r e a s o n a p p e a r s t o t h o s e wh o h a v e t h e l e a s t s p a r k o f h u ma n i t y , b y f a r t h e m o s t d r e a d f u l , a n d t h e y b e h o l d t h a t l a s t s t a g e o f h u ma n wr e t c h e d n e s s wi t h d e e p e r c o mmi s e r a t i o n t h a n a n y o t h e r . Bu t t h e p o o r w r e t c h , wh o i s i n i t , l a u g h s a n d s i n g s ... Th e c o mp a s s i o n o f t h e s p e c t a t o r mu s t a r i s e a l t o g e t h e r f r o m t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f wh a t h e h i ms e l f wo u l d f e e l i f h e wa s r e d u c e d t o t h e s a me u n h a p p y s i t u a t i o n , a n d , wh a t p e r h a p s i s i mp o s s i b l e , wa s a t t h e s a me t i me a b l e t o r e g a r d i t wi t h h i s p r e s e n t r e a s o n a n d j u d g e me n t .” Th e Th e o r y o f Mo r a l S e n t i me n t s , p .1 2 .

114. Se e Fr a n z Br e n t a n o , Th e Or i g i n o f o u r Kn o wl e d g e o f Ri g h t a n d Wr o n g , p . 2 0 ( e n d o f § 2 6 ) ; F. Br e n t a n o , Th e Fo u n d a t i o n a n d Co n s t r u c - t i o n o f Et h i c s , p p . 1 2 6 - 1 3 2 , 1 3 6 - 1 3 7 , a n d a l s o b y t h e s a me a u t h o r Gr u n d z ü g e d e r Äs t h e t i k , p p . 7 2 - 7 4 . As t o c r i t i c i s m o f Br e n t a n o ' s v a l u e p h i l o s o p h y s e e : E. To p i t s c h , “ Kr i t i k d e r p h ä n o me n o l o g i s c h e n We r t l e h r e , ” We r t u r t e i l s s t r e i t , S. 1 6 - 1 9 .

115. Se e : N. Ha r t ma n n , Et h i c s , I , p p . 2 2 2 - 2 3 1 .116. I n Ca d wa l l a d e r ' s S e a r c h l i g h t o n Va l u e s o n e f i n d s a n

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d a g o o d d e f e n s e o f Ha r t ma n n ' s v a l u e p h i l o s o p h y .


117. Wi t t g e n s t e i n a t a me e t i n g wi t h t h e Vi e n n a Ci r c l e . Se e Wi t t g e n s t e i n a n d t h e Vi e n n a Ci r c l e — Co n v e r s a t i o n s r e c o r d e d b y Fr i e d r i c h Wa i s ma n n , p . 1 1 8 . On t h e i mp o s i b i l i t y o f a f o u n d a t i o n o f e t h i c s s e e a l s o A. Öl z e l t - Ne wi n : Di e Un l ö s b a r k e i t d e r e t h i s c h e n Pr o b l e me .

118. We ma y c o n s i d e r Ge o r g Si mme l a s t h e f i r s t e x p o n e n t o f a v a l u e - n e u t r a l a p p r o a c h i n a x i o l o g y a n d a p r a g ma t i c a p p r o a c h t o v a l u e f o u n d a - t i o n . Se e h i s Ei n l e i t u n g i n d i e Mo r a l wi s s e n s c h a f t .

119. Se e h i s b o o k : Mi n d a n d t h e Wo r l d Or d e r .120. I b i d . p . 3 5 0 .121. On t h i s ma t t e r Le wi s s a i d d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s wh i c h c a n n o t a l wa y s

s i mp l y b e a l i g n e d wi t h e a c h o t h e r . Fo r i n s t a n c e , i n h i s a r t i c l e “ APr a g ma t i c Co n c e p t i o n o f t h e A Pr i o r i ” h e wr i t e s ( p . 2 3 1 ) t h a t t h e a p r i o r i d o e s n o t d i c t a t e a n y t h i n g t o e x p e r i e n c e .

122. Th e s e c o n d t y p e o f p r a g ma t i s m i s c o mp a t i b l e wi t h t r u t h i n t h e c l a s s i c a l s e n s e , t h o u g h n o t i n t h e s e n s e i n wh i c h c o g n i t i o n a n d i t s o b j e c t


a r e i d e n t i c a l , b u t i n t h e s e n s e Le i b n i z e x p l a i n s a s a k i n d o f p r o j e c t i v e

s i mi l a r i t y wh e n h e d i s c u s s e s s e n s a t i o n . Se e : G. W. Le i b n i z , Ne w Es s a y s o n Hu ma n U n d e r s t a n d i n g , p . 1 3 1 .

123. An e x c e l l e n t c r i t i q u e o f t h e c o mp a r i s o n b e t we e n e t h i c a l v a l u e s a n d a g a me a p p e a r s i n : M. Mi d g l e y , He a r t a n d Mi n d , Ch a p t e r 8 : “ Th e Ga me ,”

p p . 1 3 3 - 1 5 0 .


124. Theodor Geiger assumes a position typical for the Vienna Circle (or abranch of it). He advocates a distinction between an objective property,attributed to a thing in a theoretical sentence (cognitively legitimate) and avalue-sentence, which is an illegitimate objectification of a personal,subjective response. See: Geiger, “Das Werturteil — eine ideologischeAussage”

125. Th e q u e s t i o n , wh a t t h e r e l a t i v e we i g h t o f a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r s o me t h i n g i s , wh e n t h e r e a r e mo r e t h a n o n e s u c h c o n d i t i o n , i s i r r e l e - v a n t . On e c a n p o s e a n o t h e r q u e s t i o n — a n d r e me mb e r t h a t i t d i f f e r s f r o mt h e f i r s t — wh i c h i s : Wh a t h a p p e n s wh e n we f i x a t e o n e f a c t o r t h a t ma k e s u p o n e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n , a n d i mp l e me n t a v a r i a t i o n i n t h e s e c o n d ( wh e n t h e r e a r e t wo ) . Wh e n t h e r e a r e t wo f r e e v a r i a b l e s ( a r g u me n t s ) i n a f u n c t i o n a n d o n e d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e ( t h e v a l u e o f t h e f u n c t i o n ) , o n e s h o u l d n o t a s k wh i c h f r e e v a r i a b l e i s mo r e i mp o r t a n t . Th e s a me h o l d s f o r a f a t h e r , a mo t h e r a n d o n e o f t h e i r d e s c e n d a n t s , a n d f o r t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f h e r e d i t y a n d c i r c u ms t a n c e s t o a n i n d i v i d u a l , e t c .

126. Se e : C. I . Le wi s , An An a l y s i s o f Kn o wl e d g e a n d V a l u a t i o n , Bo o k I I I . Ev e n t h o u g h Le wi s c l a i ms t h e r e i s a n a n a l o g y a n d a r r a n g e s h i s a r g u - me n t s p r o p e r l y a c c o r d i n g t o i t , h e i s i n c o n s i s t e n t i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e i mp l i e d c o n c l u s i o n s t o t h e s p h e r e o f v a l u e s . W h i l e Le wi s b e l i e v e s t h a t i n t h e ( p u r e ) c o g n i t i v e s p h e r e t h e r e i s c l e a r l y r o o m f o r t h e r e - p l a c e me n t o f a - p r i o r i s y s t e ms , wi t h t h e c h o i c e b e t we e n t h e m ma d e a c - c o r d i n g t o p r a g ma t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f a - p r i o r i s y s - t e ms i s n o t e mp h a s i z e d i n t h e s p h e r e o f v a l u e s . Le wi s n o t o n l y f a i l s t o s p e a k o f a s c r a p - b a s k e t c a t e g o r y i n t h e s p h e r e o f v a l u e s , h e d o e s n o t p a y a n y a t t e n t i o n t o t h e o p p o s i t i o n t h a t p r e v a i l s b e t w e e n v a l u e s . Th a t i s t o s a y , wh i l e i n t h e s p h e r e o f c o g n i t i o n Le wi s d e c l a r e s t h a t t h e a - p r i o r i i s a n a l y t i c a l , b e i n g a wa r e a t t h e s a me t i me o f t h e p r o b l e ms a t t h e r o o t o f c o g n i t i o n s e e k i n g t h o u g h t , h e i s n o t a wa r e o f t h e p r o b l e ms a t t h e r o o t o f v a l u e t h o u g h t .

127. On t h e m a t t e r o f t h e a c t o r s e e : Na t h a n Ro t e n s t r e i c h , Re f l e c t i o n a n d Ac t i o n , p p . 8 8 - 8 9 .

Part IV, Chapter 7 (pgs. 321-326)

128. I n h i s b o o k Th e Na t u r e o f S y mp a t h y ( p p . 9 - 1 0 ) , Ma x Sc h e l e r c h a r a c t e r i z e s e m o t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , wh i c h ( i n t h e Ge r ma n o r i g i n a l ) h e

Notes 359

c a l l s “ Na c h f ü h l e n .” By t h i s n a me h e e x p r e s s e s t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e c h a r - a c t e r o f t h i s k i n d o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g . He s t r e s s e s t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t we e n t h i s a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l - c o n c e p t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n o n e h a n d , a n d t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t we e n e mo t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d a c t u a l l y e x p e r i e n c i n g a n e mo t i o n o n t h e o t h e r . As a s o u r c e o f k n o wl e d g e r e g a r d i n g o t h e r p e o p l e ' s e mo t i o n s , Sc h e l e r p o i n t s t o t h e i r i mme d i a t e s u r r e n d e r t h r o u g h s e n s o r y e x p r e s s i o n ( f a c i a l e x p r e s s i o n , g e s t u r e s , e t c .)

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