MICHAEL MCDERMOTT Quine's Holism and Function a List Holism

8/3/2019 MICHAEL MCDERMOTT Quine's Holism and Function a List Holism

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Mind Association

Quine's Holism and Functionalist HolismAuthor(s): Michael McDermottSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 110, No. 440 (Oct., 2001), pp. 977-1025Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association

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Quine'sHolism and Functionalist HolismMICHAEL MCDERMOTT

One central strand in Quine's criticism of common-sense notions of linguisticmeaningis an argument romthe holism of empiricalcontent. Thispaperexplores(with many digressions) he severalversionsof the argument,and discovers hemtobe uniformlybad. Thereis a kernel of truth in the idea that 'holism',n some sense,'undermines he analytic-syntheticdistinction',n some sense;but it has little to dowith Quine'sradicalempiricism,or his radicalscepticismaboutmeaning.

Quine'sattackon intuitive semantics s no seamlessweb.The two mainthreads,separateand independent,arethe argumentfrom behaviour-ism and the argumentfromthe holism of empiricalcontent.Theyareof verydifferentstrengths.Ifyou grantits premiss,the argumentfrombehaviourismis good-simple, tight and to the point. But the holismespoused in ?5 of 'TwoDogmas of Empiricism'is no threat at all tointuitivenotions of synonymyandanalyticity.If the key argument of 'Two Dogmas' was no good, what was thesecret of its success?The explanation is that there is a kindof holismwhich does indeed implya kind of demolition or demotion of the ASD(analytic-synthetic distinction). There was something real aroundwhereQuine waspointing;but nothing big enough, by light of day,toworryfriendsof meaning.In section1the argument rombehaviourism s reviewed,alongwithcertain esserargumentsof Quine's.Our main topic, Quine'sholism ofempirical content, is introduced in section 2. Succeeding sectionsexamine the differentversionsof that doctrine, and the differentver-sions of the argumentfrom holism againstthe ASD.Quine'sslogan isthat the 'unit of empiricalsignificance' s the theory;his argument,atits simplest,is that thereforesmaller inguisticitems have no semanticproperties. In section 8 we notice a non-Quinean kind of holism(although some havemistakenlyattributed t to Quine), accordingtowhich wordsand sentences do havemeaning afterall,but their mean-ing is determinedbysome theory.I focus on one ratherplausibleviewof this kind, and examineitsconsequences or the ASD.

Mind,Vol. 110 . 440 . October2001 ? OxfordUniversityPress 2001


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978 MichaelMcDermott

1.1.1 Common-sense semantics s mentalistic. t sees verbalbehaviourasa product of two distinct causal factors,belief and linguistic compe-tence. 'Belief' here is to be understoodnon-linguistically.Manyphilos-ophersthink that if such notions as belief and desirecan be madesenseof at all, it will be, as a firststep, in terms of some notion of linguisticmeaning (i.e. forpublic anguage).WhatI callmentalismholds, on thecontrary, hatthoughtis conceptuallypriorto language.On the basis of this distinctionit defines such notions as synonymyand analyticity.Twosentences are synonymous, in a broad intuitivesense, if they command assent and dissent concomitantly, and this isdue strictlyto word usagerather than to non-linguistic belief. A sen-tence is analytic f it commands universalassent,and this is due strictlyto wordusagerather hannon-linguisticbelief.This is intralinguistic synonymy. Quine thinks that the intuitivenotion of interlinguisticsynonymyis also defective. His argument,inrough outline, is that the closestapproximation o the intuitive notionthat can be formulatedin behavioural terms is not close enough: fortherewill alwaysbe translationsof a givensentencethat areequallycor-rectbythe behavioural tandardbut not equallycorrectbythe intuitivestandard. t seems to have been establishedbeyondneed of furtherdis-cussion, however, hat Quine'snumerousattemptsto clarifythis inde-terminacy of translation thesis, and to argue for it, have beenunsuccessful. shallthereforeconcentrateon intralinguistic ynonymy.Also it is broadsynonymy.Forexample, anytwo analyticsentencesaresynonymous n this sense.Similarly,oranysentences andanyana-lyticsentencet, s is synonymouswithsAt.In intuitiveterms,this is per-haps equivalenceby meaningrather hanequivalencen meaning.Sucha broadconceptof synonymymightbe unsuitable or some philosoph-icalpurposes.Butit is uncontroversial hat a morefine-grainednotionof synonymycan be definedin terms of the broad intuitive sense. See,for example, ?14 of Word and Object (Quine 1960): given a broad syn-onymynotion forwholes,we coulddefinesynonymyforpartsas inter-changeabilityalvameaning; hen a narrownotion of synonymyfor thewholes could be defined by appeal to synonymy of the homologousparts. 'So let us concentrateon the broaderand more basic notion ofsentencesynonymy.'(p. 2)My formulations of the mentalistic concepts are Quine's, nearenough. (For synonymy, Quine's actual words are '... rather than tohow things happen in the world' (Quine 1960, p. 62). I presume this isjust a slip:he does not mean that the mentalistthinks that our assent-


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ings reflecthow the world actuallyis (perhapsunbeknown to us), buthowwe believe t to be. Foranalyticitywe getthe oppositecombination:'truepurelyby meaning and independentlyof collateral nformation'(p. 65). I presume Quine meant to say 'assented to purely by meaningand independently of collateral information' There are two acceptableways of aligning the relevant concepts: (i) truth as a product of lan-guage and fact, (ii) assent as a product of language and belief. The sec-ond group of concepts have to do with language users;the first do not.Quine says 'One usually hears the matter described in terms rather oftruth values than of assent and dissent; but I warp it over to the latterterms in order to maximise chances of making sense of the relation onthe basis of verbal behavior'. (p. 62) Good idea: but warp it over consist-ently.)

Many mentalists would protest that our formulations of analyticityand synonymy are defective because we need to bring in a notion ofrule as well: meaning is a matter of what people should say, given theirbeliefs, not what they do say. But this refinement would not help thementalist meet Quine's attack.'Quine rejects the distinction between verbal habit and non-linguisticbelief (or 'collateral information', to use Quine's characteristic phrase).What we have, objectively, is just the observable verbal behaviour, and

dispositions to behave. The distinction between the two causal factorsis illusory. This is what I call Quine's behaviourism.Quine's behaviourism has been obscured from many readers by hisattempts to make it seem less controversial. Quine is prepared to con-sider attempts to analyse intuitive semantic concepts in behaviouralterms. For example, suppose that someone dissents from the sentence'Brutus killed Caesar'. From a common-sense point of view, there aretwo possible explanations: (i) historical ignorance, (ii) linguisticincompetence. Hoping to preserve some contact with common sense,Quine suggests that he too can distinguish two kinds of case, dependingon how the speaker would assent to and dissent from other sen-tences.That is compatible with behaviourism. What the mentalistasserts, and the behaviourist denies, is that the distinction is a distinc-tion between possible inner causes of verbal behaviour, not betweenpossible patterns of verbal behaviour.

'A mentalistmight rejectthesedefinitions on other grounds,too. Forexample,there is a cur-rentlyfashionable view accordingto which such notions as analyticityand synonymy apply (ifthey makesense at all) in the first instance to beliefs (independentof publiclanguage):two sen-tences aresynonymous,forexample, f they expressnot the samebelief,but 'synonymous'beliefs!This curious view is commonly associated with the languageof thought hypothesis, thoughperhapsnot actuallyentailedby it.


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Quine'sdoctrinemight be bettercharacterized s 'verbalbehaviour-ism',sinceit has no placeforanyother behaviour hanassenting o sen-tences (when stimulated). (This has strikingconsequencesfor Quine'saccount of translation, or example. Supposewe havea tentativetrans-lation manualequatingnative sentenceS with 'It is going to rain'.Wewill be pleasedto observe that assentto Scorrelateswith umbrella-car-rying. But for Quine such non-verbal behaviour is objectivelyirrele-vant.)Behaviourisms sometimes saidto be the thesis that semanticknowl-edge and worldly knowledgearemutually 'inextricable', hat our lin-guistic dispositions are never 'pure'.Quine'sview is that there is nodistinctionbetween semantic and worldly knowledge, not that theyalways go together.The weaker thesis might be enough to imply thatthere are no analytic sentences; but it would cast no doubt on themeaningfulnessof 'analytic',or of 'synonymous',or on the claim thatsome pairsof terms aresynonymous.Now it certainly eemsto followfrombehaviourism hatthe mental-istic definitionsof 'synonymous'and 'analytic' ail:they are based on afalsepresupposition. can see no wayof avoidingthis conclusion.As far asI cansee,anyonewho hopes to defend mentalisticsemanticsmust attack Quine's case for behaviourism. I would not arguewithQuine'sdemand that any acceptable linguistic or psychologicalcon-cepts must be in some waylinked to behaviour. The further demandthat they be linked exclusivelyto verbalbehaviour, and that they beanalysable s simple dispositionso verbalbehaviour,however, s unrea-sonable.If the intuitiveconceptof belief is an integralpartof a theorywhich explains non-linguistic behaviour,2hat should be enough. Onsuch an analysis,belief wouldbe available or use in the analysisof lin-guisticmeaning.Thereare,of course,groundson which to questionthe explanatorypretensionsof mentalisticpsychology,and Quine givesmanyof them.The issueshere cannotbe avoided,I think,bythe defenderof mentalis-tic semantics.Buttheywill not be discussed n thispaper.I will be dis-cussing certainattemptsto define the intuitive semantic concepts innon-mentalisticterms, and Quine'sarguments, from holism, againstthem.1.2 Mentalisticsemanticshadbeen out of favouramong philosophers

2This is meant to includethe explanationof verbalbehaviourunder a descriptionnot presup-posing the conceptof linguistic meaning:he made such-and-suchnoises becausehe believedthatmakingsuch-and-suchnoises wouldgethim somethinghe desired.


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long before Quine. Its popular replacement was truth-conditionalsemantics.On this approachmeaning is a relation between wordsandthe world, rather than between words and thought. It sees truth as ingeneralaproductof two factors, anguageand theworld;whereasmen-talism sees linguisticbehaviouras in generala product of two factors,languageand thought. Truth-conditionalsemanticsprovidesobviousparallelsto the mentalistic definitions of synonymy and analyticity.Two sentences are synonymous (in the broad sense) if they have thesame truthvalue in virtueof meaningsalone andindependentlyof fact.A sentence is analytic f it is true in virtue of meaningsalone and inde-pendentlyof fact.Quine'smain objectionto the classicaltruth-conditional definitionof 'analytic' s very simpleand, I think,veryeffective.What does 'inde-pendently of fact' mean? Is the truth of 'Everything s self-identical'dependent on the fact the everythingis self-identical?Whynot? Thedefinition seems to be irremediablyunclear.I think Quine's argument is effective-against the classicaltruth-conditional definition of 'analytic'.t does not workagainst he mental-istic definition. The problemwas to saywhythe fact that everything sself-identical s not a genuinefact,when the fact thatBrutuskilledCae-sar is. Youmightbe inclined to wonder,analogously,whythebelief thateverything s self-identical s not a genuinebelief,when the belief thatBrutuskilledCaesar s. Butthere is a natural,non-circularcriterionforthe mentalist to appealto: the role of the allegedbelief in the explana-tion of non-linguistic behaviour. Folk psychology can tell us whatwould cause someone to believe that Brutus killed Caesar,and whateffects the belief would have in variouscircumstances.Butwhatcausesthe belief that everythingis self-identical? What effects does it have?How would someone behave who did not believe that? If a manbelieved that his wife, say,was not self-identical,how would he behavetowardsher?(The manwho thought his wife was a hat is not relevant:he never thought 'Mywife =:my wife'.)It is not just that no one doesthink that anything s non-self-identical:no one doesbelievethat therehave never been black dogs, but psychology can tell us what kind ofexperiencewould produce that belief, and what kind of behaviour itwould produce in various circumstances. A non-self-identical wife,however,is literallyinconceivable;nd the responsiblecontraceptive sthe nature of psychological explanation. The point is that there is nonon-linguistic behaviour, no matter how crazy, which would beexplainedas aproductof the beliefthatsomethingis non-self-identical;and hence no non-linguistic behaviour, no matter how sane, which


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would be explainedas a product of the belief that everythingis self-identical.Quine'sargument againstthe truth-conditionaldefinition is ratheruntypicalof his central concerns. One sign of this is that the focus ofthe unclarityallegationis on 'fact' ratherthan 'meaning'.This is actu-allythewayone wouldexpectan argumentagainst heASD to go. Ifweare aftera distinctionbetweenanalyticand syntheticsentences, t doesnot seem crucial to clarify he featurewhich they aresupposedto havein common, namelythattheir truthvaluedependson the meaningsoftheircomponent words. 'Brutuskilled Caesar'would be falseif 'killed'happenedrather o have the sense of 'begat'; Everythings self-identi-cal'would be falseif 'everything'happenedratherto have the senseof'nothing'.The intendeddistinguishingpoint is that 'BrutuskilledCae-sar'wouldbe falseif the non-linguisticworldhad been different.Quine'sargument is in 'Carnapand LogicalTruth'(Quine 1966a,p. 106). Although the definition at which it is aimed is prominent in'TwoDogmas',Quine'streatmentof it there is not very easyto follow.In ?1 Quine seemsto be rejecting the definition on the grounds thatthere areno such entities as meanings (p. 22; see also paragraph1 of

?4). But whenhe sums up the argumentso far in the finalparagraphof?4, he still does not deny(indeedhe saysit is 'obvious')that 'language'is a factor,along with 'extralinguisticfact', n the truth of sentences:then is it still OK to define 'analytic' as 'true in virtue of languagealone'?Fromhere on the keypoint becomes holism-that the distinc-tion between the two factors n the truth of sentencesappliesonly col-lectively, not to individual sentences. The question of whethermeaningsare entitieswas a redherring,as Quine made clear ater(e.g.'Reply o Alston'Quine1986a,p. 73).Anotherpuzzleis thatQuine seems to thinkthat the definition 'truein virtue of meanings alone' is somehow discreditedby the failure ofthe otherdefinitions discussed between ?1 and ?4 (e.g. 'reducibleto alogicaltruthby puttingsynonymsforsynonyms').ButI cannot tellwhyhe might think this. The textualevidencethat he does think it is (i) thelast paragraphof ?4, and (ii) the second-lastparagraphof ?5. In eachplacehe saysthat on a certainnaturalassumption-namely, the falsityof holism-we coulddefine'analytic' n thisway,andthen:(i) 'But,forall its a priori reasonableness,a boundary between analytic and syn-thetic statementssimply has not been drawn';(ii) 'But I hope we arenow impressedwith how stubbornlythe distinction between analyticand synthetichas resistedanystraightforwarddrawing.'The 'but' cer-tainly seems to suggest that the demonstrated difficulty of defining


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'analytic'n the waysdiscussedcounts againstthis definition too. (Gib-son seesQuine'spoint as an argument.He worries at great ength(Gib-son 1988p. 33-42) whetherQuine can both arguefrom holism againstthe ASD(ashe clearlydoeselsewhere)and use herea reductio rgumentfor holism from the non-existenceof the ASD.I thinkQuine'spurposeis to explainhow people could have come to believe in an ASD,and tocriticizetheirreasoning,not to argueforholism.In anycase,the argu-ment here,if therewereone, would be much worsethan Gibsonrecog-nizes: Quine would be arguing 'If holism were false we could define'analytic'as 'trueby meaningsalone';but we have found it impossibleto define'analytic'n various otherways; hereforeholism is true'.)1.3 Other definitions of analyticity(and synonymy) are criticized byQuine also on the groundsof their unclearness.In each case he meansthat it is not apparenthow it will lead us to the ultimategoal of a clari-fication in terms of behaviour; or, more strictly, in terms of verbalbehaviour.On the less strictmeaning, I think this is a good objection.It seemscertain that, in the long run at least, facts about linguistic meaningmust turn out to be facts about languageusers.FromQuine'spoint ofview the truth-conditionalapproach o meaningimproveson mental-ism by leaving out the mind, but it goes wrong in leaving out verbalbehaviouras well.That the criterionof clarity s a link to verbalbehaviour s madeclearby Quine in Word nd Object Quine 1960,p. 207), responding o Griceand Strawson's riticismof'Two Dogmas'Explicitreferences o behaviour n 'TwoDogmas'are few. At page24Quine saysthat synonymy needs to be clarified'presumablyn termsrelating to linguistic behavior'. Similarlyat page 36, except that theeffect there is spoilt by the allowedalternatives:mentalor behavioralorcultural'.Perhapsthe summary at the end of ?4 points in the samedirection. Quine saysthat the firstdogma is 'unempirical'and 'meta-physical', which means, for a verificationist, that it has not beenexplained n terms of observables; ndforlinguisticormentalconceptsthe relevantobservablesaresurelybehavioural.In 'TwoDogmas' the unclaritypoint was ratherthat an acceptableclarificationmust get out of the intentional circle.Griceand Strawsonobjected that some perfectlygood concepts can only be explainedinterms of eachother.At one time Quine's nclinationwasto concede thepoint: 'Inrecent classicalphilosophythe usualgesturetowardsexplain-ing "analytic" mounts to somethinglike this: a statement s analytic f


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it is true solely by meaningsof words and independentlyof matters offact. It can be objected,in a somewhatformalistic and unsympatheticspirit, that the boundarywhich this definition draws is vague or thatthe definienss asmuch in need of clarificationas the definiendum.Thisis an easylevel of polemic in philosophy,and no seriousphilosophicaleffort is proof against it' ('Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory',Quine1966cp. 136).ByWord ndObjecthe sawthingsmoreclearly:t is essen-tial to get out of the intentional circle;and, moreover,to establish anexplanatory onnection to behaviour.1.4 The ultimate fate of any intuitive semantic notion depends, forQuine, on whether t can be explained n purelybehavioural erms.Foranalyticity,Quine thinks that the leadingcandidate for a behaviouralaccount is social stimulusanalyticity.(A sentence is socially stimulusanalytic f it would be assented o by anyspeakerof the language,underanyconditionsof currentstimulation.)But it getsthe extensionwrong:'There have been blackdogs' is sociallystimulus analytic,but it is notanalytic.Similarly ocial stimulussynonymy social stimulusanalyticityof the biconditional) is a poor approximationto sentence synonymy:'Brutus killed Caesar'and 'Brutuskilled Caesarand there have beenblackdogs'aresociallystimulus synonymous,but not synonymous ineven a broad intuitive sense. Analyticityand synonymy are no goodbecausethe closest behaviouralapproximation s in each case not closeenough.1.5 Quine'sthesis is that thereis no wayto makesense of the ASD.Analternative nterpretationhas also become popular,mainlybecauseofthe influence of Harman(1967).On this alternative iew,Quine's hesisis that all sentencesaresynthetic.(According o Harman,Quine'sdefi-nition of 'analytic' s 'true in virtue of meanings alone': he holds thatthe truth valueof everysentence is partlydependenton non-linguisticreality.)Harman seems to be well awarethat what Quine actually sayssup-portsthe orthodoxinterpretation.Forthe only defencehe offersfor hisown interpretation s that it is not reallyan alternativenterpretation:the thesesrespectivelyattributed o Quine ((i) 'analytic'and 'synthetic'aremeaningless;(ii) all sentencesaresynthetic)do not reallyconflict!In support of this no-conflict claim, Harman argues as follows: 'Ifsomeone appears o hold that there areanalytictruths,but also agreeswith Quine's argument that meaning lacks the required explanatorypower, ... then an empiricist like Quine will say that this person has


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made his view meaningless ...'(p. 127).What is 'the required explanatorypower'?Lackof it is apparentlysupposed to makea view 'meaningless'for an 'empiricist'Harmanispresumablyreferringto the verificationist principle that a sentencewith no implicationsfor experience s (if not analytic)meaningless.Sohe apparentlyreadsQuine as arguing'My opponent claims that somesentences are analytic; but he concedes, or should concede, that hisclaim has no implicationsfor experience; hereforehis claim is mean-ingless'.This is a ratheruncharitable nterpretationof Quine-to see him asusing againsthis opponent the (non-holistic) verificationprincipleheexplicitlyrejects.But let us supposethat the interpretations not too farfrom the truth. The questionis, how does this supportthe no-conflictclaim? Harman has Quine arguingthat the claim 'Some sentences areanalytic' is meaningless.That has not the slightest tendency to showthat Quine also argues,or could consistently argue,that the claim 'Allsentencesaresynthetic' s true.1.6 In this section we have looked at a number of Quine'sargumentsagainstthe ASD.They are all argumentsthat deserve to be takenseri-ously.Butnone of them hasanything o do withholism.2.The empiricisttheoryof contentsays,in generalterms,that the factual(or 'cognitive')content (or 'significance',or 'meaning') of a linguisticitem of the relevantkind is determinedbythe experiences o which it isrelatedin the relevantway.Quine embraces the empiricisttheory oncondition thatthe relevantkind of linguistic temis takento be a wholetheory(not a wordor a sentence).This is Quine'sholism.As to the relevantrelationto experience, here are two mainoptions.(i) It maybe held that in generalsentences/theoriesare true n virtueoffactssolelyabout experience.On this view two sentences/theorieshavethe same contentif anycourse of experiencewhich would makethe firsttruewould make the secondtrue,and viceversa;a sentence/theoryhasno content if its truth value is independentof experience;and so on.This isphenomenalism. ii) It maybe held that in general he content ofa sentence/theoryis determinedby how differentpossibleexperiencesrelate to it evidentially.On this view two sentences/theorieshave thesame content if anycourse of experiencewhichwould confirm/discon-firm the first would confirm/disconfirmthe second, and vice versa;a


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sentence/theory has no content if no possible course of experiencewould confirm/disconfirmt;and so on. Thisis verificationism.My terminology here is largely stipulative. 'Phenomenalism' forinstance, s often usedfor whatQuinecalls 'radicalreductionism'-thethesis that everysentence is translatable nto a sentence about experi-ence. Butwe need some term for the weaker hesis (i).Wemightwonder, also,whether verificationism's historically usti-fied for (ii). Ayer'sposition in Language,TruthandLogic (Ayer1936),for example, was considerablymore subtle. Ayerthought that somekinds of confirmationdid not count. Forexample, Ihaveblood on mycoat'mightconfirm the hypothesis Ihave committed a murder',but hedid not want it to follow that it was 'part of the meaning' of thathypothesis.(p. 19)Similarly,observingthat you werebehavingas I dowhen in pain might confirm the hypothesisthatyou werein pain, on a'metaphysical' (non-behaviourist) understanding, but that was notenough to show that the hypothesis would actuallyhave any factualcontent, so understood.(p. 170)Moregenerally, Apreviouslyreliableauthority saysthatp' seems to confirmp, for any p, but we would notwant it to followthatp has factualcontent,foranyp. How to define the

desired,more restrictive,concept of confirmation?If it had not beenfor certain considerations o do with holism, Ayerwould have definedit simplyas the converseof entailment.(pp. 51-2) The attemptto takeaccount of the holistic considerations led to his famously disastrousformulationof the verificationcriterion:h has factual content iff thereis a backgroundpropositionb suchthat,forsome experientialproposi-tion e, bAhentailse, and b alone does not entail e. Such subtletiesweresuperseded,however,by Quine'smore radicalholism.Verificationism,n our sense,is of course not the same as behaviour-ism. It could be combined, indeed, with a franklymentalist view ofmeaning, as follows: We have beliefs (and desires), which are aboutnothing but the future course of our own experience;our sentencesexpress hesebeliefs,andhence can differ n contentonly if theywouldbe confirmedor disconfirmedby differentexperiences.I mention this point because Quine's verificationism eventuallycomes to takeon a decidedlybehaviourist inge.As a reasonablebehav-ioural approximation o the idea that a certainexperiencewould con-firm/disconfirma sentence,he adopts the idea that a certain stimuluswould prompt assent/dissent to/from the sentence; verificationismbecomes the thesis that meaning is determinedby stimulus meaning.Bythe time of 'EpistemologyNaturalized',Quine finds himselfofferingin defence of 'the verification heoryof meaning'considerationswhich


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seem more relevantto the behaviourist part of the package:the lan-guagelearner has 'no data but the concomitancesof... utteranceandobservable timulussituation'(Quine 1969,p. 81).Quinehimselfwasaverificationist,not aphenomenalist.(Seepartic-ularly'On the VeryIdeaof a ThirdDogma',Quine 1981d,p. 39.) Butinthe centraltext for Quine'sholism, ?5 of 'TwoDogmas',the argumentdoes not relyon that choice. He moves backandforthbetween verifica-tionism andphenomenalism.The verificationistpath givesthe sectionits title, and is favouredsomewhat overall. But the particularexampleQuine givesof aholistictheoryof empiricalcontent,theAufbau heory(fromwhichQuine sayshis holism 'issuesessentially'), s phenomenal-ist, not verificationist.And in the crucial last three paragraphsof ?5experience figuresmore often as the 'factualcomponent [in] the truthof statements' than as the confirmer/disconfirmer.We can see whyQuine might have wanted to keep both alternatives n play.Verifica-tionism is generally elt to be much moreplausiblethan phenomenal-ism, irrespectiveof whether the unit of significanceis the sentenceorthe theory.On the other handphenomenalismhas a more obvious rel-evance to the definition of 'analytic'which Quine seems to have mostsquarely n his sights-'true in virtue of meaningsand independentlyof fact'.Thephenomenalism-verificationismuestioncould best be leftopen, Quine apparentlyelt, for the purposesof 'TwoDogmas':holismwas the crucialthing.Now what is the connection supposedto be, in ?5,between holisticempiricismand analyticity?One possible interpretationsees Quine asrebuttingwhat he takes to be an influentialargument or the ASD (orfor the adequacyof some particulardefinitionof 'analytic'):because ofholism, the argument's premiss is false. On another interpretation,Quine is offering an argument-a new argument, from holism-against he ASD (or againstsome particulardefinitionof'analytic').I think there is some truth in the firstinterpretation. It is explicitin'Mr Strawson' (Quine 1966c). Quine says that 'misgivings over thenotion of analyticityare warrantedalso at a deeperlevel,where a sin-cere attempt has been made to guess the unspoken Weltanschauungfromwhich the motivation andplausibilityof a division of statementsinto analyticand syntheticarise.My guess is that that Weltanschauungis a more or less attenuatedholdoverof phenomenalisticreductionism'(p. 136).If Quine'sdiagnosis and rebuttalwerecorrect,it would be offairly imitedsignificance:rue views are oftenaccepted or bad reasons.But in fact the diagnosis seems obviously wrong. Not many of thosewho acceptedan ASD also accepted phenomenalism, or verification-


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ism, or any version of the empiricist theory of content. And evenamong those who did, there is no reason to think that the two viewswerecausallyor rationallyconnected.)But the secondinterpretations the one we want. No one doubts thatthere is an argument from holism againstthe ASD in 'TwoDogmas',and it is obviouslynot before?5. (In 'MrStrawson'also,Quine impliesthat there is also an argument rom holism against he ASD:the holisticempiricist 'maybe expected to find no way of [defining 'analytic']'.(Quine 1966cp. 137))So,leavingasideQuine'sotheraims,let us pursuethe argument.Theargumentseems to be that the targetdefinitionof'analytic'hasafalsepresupposition: amely, hat the unit of significances the sentence.Givenempiricism,we must take the unit of significance i.e. 'empiricalsignificance')o be the theory,not the sentence;and on holisticempiri-cism the targetdefinition fails.And what is the target definition? There are two targetdefinitions.The first is 'truein virtue of meanings alone';in arguingagainst thisdefinitionQuineuses the truth-conditional ormulationof empiricism,the phenomenalistversion-he takes his opponent to be a phenome-nalist,and goes alongwith that for the durationof the argument.Thesecondis 'vacuouslyconfirmed,pso facto,come what may'; n arguingagainst this definition Quine uses the verificationist formulation ofempiricism. Letme consider the two versions of the argument sepa-rately.3.3.1 For the truth-conditionalargument he main text is the second-lastparagraph f ?5. Quinedeniesthat 'thetruthof a statement s somehowanalysable into a linguistic component and a factual component',though he acceptsthat 'in generalthe truth of statementsdoes obvi-ouslydependboth upon languageandupon extralinguisticact';andofcourse'The factualcomponentmust, ifwe areempiricists,boil downtoa rangeof confirmatoryexperiences'.He thinks it is 'nonsense,andtheroot of much nonsense, to speakof a linguistic component and a fac-tual component in the truth of any individual statement',though heacceptsthat 'Takencollectively,science has its double dependenceonlanguage and experience'.(The second formulation seems to get theintended contrastbetter:experiencemakes sentencestrue collectivelyratherthan individually; t is not a matter of generalversusparticular.)And the targetdefinitionof'analytic'is 'the extremecase where the lin-


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guisticcomponent is all thatmatters';his is evidentlya trivialvariationon 'truein virtue of meaningsalone'Wemay agree,I think, that holistic phenomenalismis preferable onon-holisticphenomenalism.Quine'sargumentdoes depend,though,on his opponent'sacceptanceof phenomenalism: t requiresmore thanjust the assumptionthat there are two separatecomponents,linguisticand non-linguistic, in truth. If the factualcomponent in the truth ofsentences/theories were taken to be the external world, rather than

experience,holism would not seem plausible.It would seem plausibleto saythat 'Brutus killed Caesar'was true, as an isolatedsentence, invirtueof a singlehistoricalevent.Quine'sargument s that if you wantto be a phenomenalistyou should be a holisticphenomenalist,but thetargetdefinitiononlyworksif you are a non-holisticphenomenalist.My objectionis that the targetdefinitiondoes not fail on the holisticassumption. How do things work, on Quine's picture?We have thefacts,thefull factsof experience.We have a true theory;that is to say,acertain infinite set of sentencesaretrue. If the facts of experiencehadbeen different (but the languagethe same), a differenttheory wouldhave been true. If the facts had been differentagain,a thirdset of sen-tences would havebeen true. Considerall the possiblewaysexperiencemighthavegone-all possibilitiesregardinghe fullfactsof experience.Keepingfixed the other component, 'language',consider the corre-sponding true theory,the correspondingset of true sentences,in eachcase.Now considerthe sentenceswhich are membersof every ruethe-ory:theyare trueindependentlyof experience. fthe languagewere dif-ferent,these sentencescould be false;but they aretrue in virtue of thelanguage only.There is no reason to doubt, on Quine's assumptions,thatthe targetdefinitionpicksout a definiteclass of sentences,or that itcaptures he intentionsof thosewho use the word'analytic'.Ifwe assume that in generaleach sentencehasits own truthmaker nexperience-the bit of experience n virtue of which it is true-we candefine'analytic'as the specialcase of truthin virtue of meaningsalone.And if we assume that truesentencesaretypicallyall made trueby thesamething, the full actualcourseof experience,we can stilldefine 'ana-lytic' as truth in virtue of meanings alone. As we saw,there are otherobjectionsto defining'analytic' n thisway.Andthewholeideaof a dis-tinction betweenlanguageandexperienceas two factors n the truth ofsentences/theories s rejected n Quine'slater work.But as long as youaccept that distinction, as Quine does in this part of 'TwoDogmas',holism makes no difference.


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3.2 Let me illustrate hepoint with reference o theAufbau.Thepartweare interestedin is the 'construction'of the external world (PartIV,Aand B). Carnap,beginningwith a primitiverelation of similarity-and-temporal-precedencebetween elementaryexperiences,has assembledenough defined terms to enablehim to talk about the assignment ofcolours to points in the two-dimensional visual field,at various times.As a small-scalemodel of the externalworld,he takesthe assignmentofcolours to points in four-dimensionalspace-time.He has the colours;the space-timepoints he construesas simply quadruplesof real num-bers.The nextstepis the crucialone.He introduces wo newpredicates-'c [acolour] is atp[a space-timepoint]' and 'the observer's iewpoint s atp' And he givesa set of rulesaccording o whichthe truth valuesof sentences n the new vocabularyare determined on the basis of the truth values of sentencesin the oldvocabulary. There are many such rules, but their overall effect,described in 'realistic' language, is that (i) truth values are to beassignedso that the actualvisualexperiencematches asnearlyaspossi-ble what the observer 'should' get when viewing the resultantworldfrom the specifiedpoint of view;(ii) the resultantworldis to be as sta-ble (with respectto colourchangeovertime, colour variationbetween'seen'and 'unseen'points,motion of colouredpoints,etc.) aspossible.As Quine points out, Carnapwas wrong to think that these rulesamount to definitions.They do not providetranslations of individualsentences. The model is phenomenalist, in our terminology, but notreductionist.Toapplythe rulesone would take allpossible theoriesofthe externalworld(atheory= anassignmentof truth value to eachsen-tence in the new vocabulary)and give each a score on the basis of cer-tain overall features-some purely internal, others concerning thetheory's match with the actual visual experience. Then the highest-scoring theory is the truetheory.The truth of the theory'sindividualsentencesfollows;but the true theory is arrivedat first,not by assem-bling the sentences individually certified as true. This is the holismwhichQuine admires.

Despiteitsholism,however, heAufbaumodel raisesno difficulty orthe definition of 'analytic'as 'trueby meaningsalone'.The model restson an explicitdistinctionbetween the factsof experienceand the lin-guistic rules. If there are sentences which turn out to be assignedthetruth value 'true'bythehighest-scoring heoryhowever xperiencemaygo, these areanalytic.But are there anysuch sentences?Given the extremeartificialityofthe model, I do not think it woulddiscredit he definitionof'analytic'if


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it turnedout that no sentenceswereanalytic.Butthere is in anycasenoreason to think thatthe model has this consequence.AlthoughCarnapsays that his rules are, collectively, to be 'satisfiedas far as possible',some of them seem to be absolutely necessary.Forexampleseveralofthe rules would be completelyinapplicable or a theorywhich put theobserver'sviewpointin two differentplacesat the same time: suchthe-oriesareapparentlymeant to be definitelyexcludedfrom the compari-son. If so, 'not-(theobserver's iewpointis at (x,y,z,t)andthe observer'sviewpoint is at (x+i,y,z,t))' is analytic.Or consider the ordinary ruth-functional tautologies. Although Carnapdoes not explicitly sayso, heobviously ntends that the linguisticrules should include the usualrulesfor the truth-functional connectives, so that all tautologies wouldappear n anytheoryselected as true.Carnap'spictureis holistic:the book of rulespicksout the truephys-ical theory,for the givenfacts of experience,as that which scoreshigh-est overall.But there is still a distinction betweenanalytic ruths,whosetruth value is determinedby the rule book alone, and syntheticones,whose truth value dependsalso on experience.Although all syntheticsentencesshare the same truth-maker-the full facts of experience-not all sentencesaresynthetic.4.4.1 Now to the verificationistversion of the argument.Quine acceptsholisticverificationism: e combinesverificationismwiththe thesis that the unit of confirmation s not the sentencebut the the-ory.He saysit is 'not significant' o speakof an isolated sentencebeingconfirmed or disconfirmed;but we can speak of a theorybeing con-firmed or disconfirmed.Quine'sfocus is on the unit of confirmation.He does not attempttoanalyseor criticize he notion of confirmation n anyotherrespect.Theargumentapparentlyuses an intuitive notion of confirmation,appliedto theories.The thesis that the unit of confirmation is not the sentence but thetheory, by itself, is 'confirmationholism'.It was promoted by Duhem,and accepted by the positivists (e.g. Carnap1937,p. 318;Ayer1936,p. 125f.).But Quine was the first to argue that confirmation holismmakesimpossible a verificationprinciple applicable o individual sen-tences:he was the first 'holisticverificationist'.Now the only placewhere a connection is explicitlymade betweenverificationism and analyticity is the third-last paragraph. And all


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Quine sayshere is that the dogma of non-holistic verificationismsup-portsthe dogmaof the ASD-not the otherwayround: aslong as it istakento be significant o speakof the confirmationandinfirmationof astatement, t seemssignificant o speakalso of a limiting kind of state-ment which is vacuously confirmed, ipso facto, come what may; andsuch a statement is analytic.' s this the argumentagainstthe ASD thatwe areseeking-'If the unit of confirmationwerethe sentence,the def-inition 'analytic= vacuouslyconfirmed'would be satisfactory;but theunit isn't the sentence;so the definition isn'tsatisfactory'? No. I thinkQuine should be read as assertinga biconditional. For the converseofthe above conditionalnot onlyprovidesabasisforsuch an argument, tis also pretty obviously true: for if it is not significantto speakof theconfirmationof an isolatedsentence, t ispresumablynotsignificant ospeakof an isolatedsentenceasbeingconfirmedbyeverypossibleexpe-rience;and a definitionaccording o which it is not significant o call asentenceanalytic s clearlyno good.Quine'sotherpremiss,that the unit of confirmationis not the sen-tence, seems uncontroversial. The argumentrequiresonly confirma-tion holism, not verificationism. Verificationism is only needed tomake the argument interesting,by making the targetdefinition lookplausible.)So Quine seemsto havea good argumentagainst analytic=vacuously confirmed'.However, (i) this definition of 'analytic' is soutterlyunmotivated,so obviouslydefective,evenon the assumptionofnon-holistic verificationism,hat the additionalargumentprovided byholism is of little importance.And (ii) a rather obvious variant of thedefinitionwill, on Quine'sassumptions, work adequatelyeven underholism.4.2 First(i): I knowof no empiricistbeforeQuinewho even considereddefining'analytic'on the basis of the VerificationPrinciple.A typicalformulationof the PrinciplewasAyer's:a statement s held to be liter-allymeaningfulif andonly if it is eitheranalyticor empiricallyverifia-ble'(Ayer1936p. 12). SimilarlyHempel:'a sentencemakes a cognitivelymeaningfulassertion .. only if it is either(1)analyticor self-contradic-tory or (2) capable,at least in principle,of experientialtest' (Hempel1950p. 108).The ASD wastakenassomethingalready ettled,and avail-able for use in formulating he VerificationPrinciple:not vice versa.Certainlyanalyticsentencesweresupposedto havevacuousverifica-tion conditions. But this was also (and, in the positivist programme,more importantly)a featureof metaphysicalnonsense.It wasnot sup-posed to follow that there wasno difference.But the distinctionhad to


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appeal o somethingotherthan verificationconditions.(Averification-ist believerin linguisticrules,for example,might have said that a sen-tenceis meaningless,or not fullymeaningful, f the rulesof languagedonot alwaysdeterminethe truth value (or acceptability)of the sentence,given the facts of experience;whereas a sentenceis analytic f the rulesof languagedeterminethat it is true (or acceptable)whatever he factsof experience.)Sloganisticformulationsof verificationismoften saidsimply'mean-ing = verification conditions'. But all this meant was that, for fullymeaningfulsentences,verificationconditionsdeterminedmeaning: womeaningfulsentences could not differ in meaning (theywould be syn-onymous in the broad sense) if they had the same verification condi-tions.

(Much confusion was causedby a certain terminological difficultythe verificationistsexperienced.Sinceanalyticsentences and nonsensewere both incapableof experientialconfirmation,they werecertainlyregardedashavingsomethingimportant n common:theyboth lacked... what?Meaning?Then what is it that analytic sentences have andnonsense lacks?Wittgensteinsaid tautologies 'lackedsense',but werenot 'nonsense'.Hempel distinguishes logicalmeaning'from'empiricalmeaning'.Ayertends to saythat analyticsentences lack'factualmean-ing'but have 'literalmeaning'.No standardusageemerged.Perhaps hisencouragedunsympathetic nterpreterso thinkthat confirmationcon-ditions were supposed to exhaust 'meaning' in the broadest sense.(Quine, in 1986, attributed to his opponents a distinction between'meaning'and'content'('Reply o Hellman',Quine 1986b,p. 207))).4.3 Secondly(ii): Quine holds that the unit of empiricalsignificance sthe theory.But thatdoes not mean thatsynonymy, orexample,cannotbe defined forsentences: t justmeansthatsynonymy orsentencescan-not be defined by directappeal to the verificationistprinciple. It maystill be definable ndirectly.The point is the same as that which Quine makes when he empha-sizes thattakingthe unit of empiricalsignificanceas the sentenceratherthan the term does not preventus defining synonymyfor terms indi-rectly:if we saythat sentencesaresynonymous (in the broad sense-equivalentbymeaning)ifftheyhave the same confirmationconditions,we can say that terms are synonymous iff replacementof one by theotherin a sentence(i.e. in anysentence of the relevantlanguage)yieldsa synonymous sentence (TwoDogmas pp. 37-8). (In ?3 of'Two Dog-mas' Quine showedthat interchangeabilityalva veritate s not an ade-


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quate criterionof synonymy of terms-unless the languagecontainssuitablenon-extensionalcontexts,in particular he adverb necessarily'What is now being discussed is interchangeabilitywhich preservesmeaning-within contextslargeenough to havemeaning, i.e. a mean-ing determinedbyverificationconditions.) Quine'sholisticposition isthat theories resynonymous(in thebroadsense)ifftheyhavethe sameconfirmationconditions.Whycan'twe say,then,that sentences resyn-onymousiffreplacementof one bythe other in a theory(i.e. in anythe-orystatedin the relevantlanguage)yieldsa synonymoustheory?Analogyaside,there is reason to think that if the account of synon-ymy for theories is intuitivelyadequate,the replaceability riterion forsentence synonymy must be too. For, assuming the desired broadnotions of synonymy,we canargueas follows.If two sentencesaresyn-onymous,replacementof one bythe otherin atheorymust yielda syn-onymous theory.If two sentences are notsynonymous, then there is anon-self-contradictory theory in which one is affirmed and the otherdenied;butreplacementof one bythe otherin this theorywouldyieldaself-contradictory,ndhencenon-synonymous, theory.Given sentence synonymy, analyticitycould be defined in the wayQuine explains:as synonymywith some paradigmatically nalyticsen-tence,e.g. 'Pigsarepigs'.A verificationistwho held that only sentences,and nothing smaller,had verification conditions should not infer that nothing smaller hadmeaning:on the contrary,Quine says,it would follow that terms didhave semanticpropertiesand relations such as synonymy.But,believ-ing that only theories, and nothing smaller,have verification condi-tions, Quinehimself infersthatnothing smallercan havemeaning.34.4 My analogical argument againstQuine rested on the premissthattermsaresynonymous ffreplacementof one by the otherin a sentenceyields a synonymous sentence ('Two Dogmas' pp. 37-8). This state-ment, and similar statements in Word and Object (Quine 1960) ?14 andelsewhere,areapparentlyretractedin ?22 of Pursuitof Truth(Quine1990).Quinethere advancesan argumentagainstany attemptto definesynonymy of terms as interchangeabilitywhich preserves meaning(withinsuitably argecontexts).But the argument s transparently ad.Quine saysthat the interchangeability riterion cannot work unlessthe languagecontains suitablenon-extensional contexts, in particularthe specialkind of de dictobelief-ascriptionwhichQuinecalls'desensu.

3 It is sometimes debatedwhetherQuineis a meaningholist or a meaningnihilist. The answeris that he is a nihilistaboutword and sentencemeaning, deducingthis fromhis meaningholism.


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(Suppose that, unbeknown to Tom, 'Hesperus' means 'the EveningStar';then 'Tom knows that Hesperus is the EveningStar' is true desensubut falsede voce.)A criterion of term synonymywhich requiredinterchangeabilityn devoceposition would be too strict. But we can'tconfineour attentionto de repositions, Quine argues:we must requireinterchangeabilityn de sensupositions.But how to distinguishdesensufrom de vocewithout assumingsynonymy?Whycan't the interchangeabilityest be confined to de repositions?Quine does not arguethat we can'tobjectivelydistinguishdere fromdedicto.Hisargument s:'Ifinterchanges f terms wereallowed oronly inde reuse, we would end up definingsamenessof meaning of terms asmere samenessof reference-a clearnotion, but not what we arelook-ing for'.Quine is apparently orgetting hat the criterionof termsynonymyatissue requiresthat the interchangespreservemeaning,not just truth.(Forexample,he would accept, n PursuitofTruth, hat the observationsentence 'This is a unicorn' is a big enough linguistic item to have ameaningof its own, that the position occupiedby 'unicorn' s dere,that'goblin' is coextensive with 'unicorn',andyet that 'This is a goblin' isnot synonymous.)(Quine'sargumentwas, I suspect,the productof panic inducedby arealization hat he had blundered n 'Use and itsPlace n Meaning'(Quine1981)-see below.)4.5 Griceand Strawson(1956)also arguethat statementsynonymycanbe defined on the assumption of holistic verificationism.'Quine doesnot deny', they say, 'that individual statements are regardedas con-firmed or disconfirmed ... in the light of experience. He denies onlythat these relations between single statements and experience holdindependentlyof our attitudes to otherstatements.'So we can saythattwo statements aresynonymous iff 'any experienceswhich, on certainassumptionsaboutthe truth-valuesof otherstatements,confirmor dis-confirm one of the pair,also, on the sameassumptions, onfirmor dis-confirm the other to the samedegree'(p. 156).However, their argument seems to rest on a misinterpretation ofQuine. I think Quine doesdenythat it makessense to talk of the con-firmation or disconfirmationof individualstatements,even'on certainassumptions about the truth-values of other statements'.Certainlyhewould deny that 'e confirms s' can be true, irrespectiveof whetheritstruth value is supposedto depend on the truthvalues of certainotherstatements.


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(When Quine considers Grice and Strawson'sproposal, n WordandObject,his interest s in seeingwhether t suggestsa definitionof synon-ymyin behaviouralermswhich does better than social stimulussynon-ymy. He argues (correctly,I think) that it does not (p. 64). My ownproposal s also not meantto address hatchallenge.4)5.5.1 1havebeen discussing?5of'Two Dogmas'What about?6?Thesec-tion as a whole is ostensiblydevoted to givingsome positivecharacteri-sation of a view which, while rejecting the two dogmas, is stillempiricist,and to drawingthe consequencesfor ontological questionsof rejectingthe ASD. But the second paragraphseems to contain anargument, perhapsa new argument, against the ASD. 'If this view iscorrect',Quine says-i.e. the view summarised in paragraphi-'itbecomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic ... and analyticstatements ...'; and the following sentences appear to say why.Let us begin by looking at the firstparagraph.It sketchesa distinc-tively Quinean version of verificationism. There are four main ele-ments:(i) Deductive tructureOurknowledgeof the world('so-called') s encompassed n a deductivesystem.Weacceptnot only sentences,but alsoformalrulesof inferenceaccordingto which acceptanceof a set of sentences mayrequireus toaccept certain other sentences-and according to which, therefore,rejectionof a sentencemay requirerejectionof (at least one memberof) a certainset of sentences. (It ispossible o acceptthe implying sen-tencesandrejectthe impliedsentences,but this constitutesrejectionofthe rule.)Quine does not say'rules of inference'.He says'entails',ruthvalues'haveto' be redistributed,we 'must' re-evaluatea sentence,and so on.ButQuine's erminologytends to createa suspicionthat he is implicitlyacknowledgingan ASD: doesn't 'pentailsq' mean that 'Ifp then q' isanalytic?Doesn't'haveto' mean 'ifyou don'tchange meanings'? hopeto avoidthis suggestionby puttingthe point in terms of 'rulesof infer-

4Gibson, incidentally,misinterprets he Griceand Strawsonproposal.Asthey-and Quine-understandit, si and s2are to be synonymous if, for any assumption about the truth values ofotherstatements, 1ands2havethe same confirmationconditions on thatassumption.For Gibson(1988,p. 94), theproposal s for a relativised otion of synonymy: , ands2are to be synonymous nan assumptionabout the truthvaluesof other statements f theyhave the sameconfirmationcon-ditions on thatassumption.


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ence'. After all, even an uninterpreteddeductive system has rules ofinference.I sayformalrules to emphasizethat the user doesnot have toknow the 'meaning'of a sentenceto applythe rule.Quine tries to avoid the suggestion by saying that 'the logical laws[are]simplyfurtherstatementsof the system'.This can'tbe literallycor-rect,as Lewis Carrollshowed.I think Quine could be understoodherein either of two ways.(i) Perhapshe is just ignoringfor the sakeof sim-plicitythe system'sactual rules (i.e. itsprimitiverules).These will nor-mallybe veryfew,perhaps ust modusponens.The vastbulk of allegedlyanalytic nferenceswill requireas additionalpremissescertainallegedlyanalyticsentences, nd thesearewhat he is referringo as'simply urtherstatements of the system'. Forexample,if MP is the sole rule,we can'tinferp from 'pand q';we need the furtherpremiss'Ifp and q thenp'.)(ii) Perhapshe means that there is no needto distinguishrulesand sen-tences because a rule of inference,just as much as a sentence, can beintuitively synthetic'. thinkthis is correct:as an alternative o accept-ing the sentence 'Allravensareblack', ou could nclude in your systema primitiverule of inference x is a ravenF-x s black'.NeitherQuine's anguagenor mine is explicitlybehavioural.

As well as rulesrelatingsentences o sentences, here arerules accord-ing to whichexperiencemayrequire he rejectionof a certainset of sen-tences; or, to put it the other way round, in virtue of which a set ofsentencesmayhaveimplicationsfor experience.(The secondformula-tion is intended to be equivalentto the first.I do not mean that Quinethinks that statements or beliefs about future experience can beinferred from other sentences of the system.Quine does indeed sayinparagraph4 that science is a 'tool ... for predictingexperience';and a'prediction'is, in ordinarylanguage, a statement or belief about thefuture. But in the light of Quine's overallview the use of this term isbest seen as an aberration.No statementsare'about'experience.('TwoDogmas'p. 43)And he would presumablynot wantto saythatwe havenon-linguistic beliefsabout future(or past) experience.Such a mental-ist position maybe compatiblewith the positiveclaimsof paragraph1,but does not seem to be requiredbythem.)There is no reason to assume that theserulesmust be 'analytic'either.Forexample my system might have a rule linking 'This is John'withparticularvisual experiences:getting recalcitrantexperienceswouldrequireabandonmentof 'This is John', r abandonmentof the rule. Butif I did abandon the rule I might have no inclination to describetherevisionas a changein 'themeaningof "John"':t might justbe a revi-sion in my 'beliefsabout whatJohn ooks like'.


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In ?6 Quine seems to use the phrase 'empirical content' to meanwhat a sentenceor set of sentences mpliesaboutexperience,directlyorindirectly,n virtueof such rules.(ii) HolismA singleisolated sentencetypically mplies nothingaboutexperience.Asufficiently argeset of sentencesmayhaveimplicationsfor experience(perhaps ndirectly,via the implicationof certainothersentences); hatis to say, he occurrenceof the recalcitrant xperiencewill requirerejec-tion of atleastone member of the set;but not of any particularmember-there will be a choice. (Therewill also be the option of rejecting herelevantrules.)Ifwe identifythe factualcontent of a sentence or theorywith its implications for experience, this amounts to a holism ofcontent-sentences typicallydon't have factualcontentin isolation.This is not the same as the holistic verificationism of ?5, whichapparentlyrested on an intuitive conception of confirmation. Con-firmationis, intuitively,a matter of meaning.Ifwe assume an ASD,wecan reconstructan intuitiveconcept of confirmation as follows: e dis-confirmsk (a set of sentences)iff the conjunctionof k with all the ana-lytic sentences of the language implies (via such of the rules as areanalytic, f not allare)the non-occurrenceof e.I don'tthinkQuinereally ntends to saythatonly a whole theorycanhave empiricalcontent. It is hard to see how a deductivelystructuredsystem could possibly have rules on which nothing short of a wholetheoryhadexperientialmplicationsandyet a theorydid.Thenwhat of all the passages n whichQuineinsists that scienceis, inprinciple at least, linked to experience 'as a whole',since 'the logicaltruths at least ... aregermane to all topics and thus provide connec-tions' (Quine 1960, pp. 12-13)?Quine's point, I think, is that when expe-rience requiresthat some member of a (limited) set of sentences berevised,the decision whichmember to revisewill rationallydepend onconsiderationsaffectingthe wholesystem-what else will have to berevised,how it will affectoverallsimplicity,and so forth. There are twoaggregates, f different izes,which arerelevant o holism:(i) the small-est aggregatewhich has implications for experience;(ii) the smallestaggregatewhich'willembodyall the connectionsthat are ikelyto affectour adjudicationof a givensentence'. t is the secondwhich, at least inprinciple,equalsthe whole theory.(The degree of holism in Quine's picture is thus pretty modest incomparison with the Aufbau. There, nothing short of a completeassignmentof coloursto spatialpoints at a giventime can be reliedon


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Quine'sHolism ndFunctionalistolism 999

to have implicationsfor experience, n anysense. TheAufbauexamplealso highlightsthe differencebetween holism and deductivestructure.Despite its extremeholism, there is no significantdeductivestructurein anAufbau heory.)Quine'sposition allows, I think, that even a single sentence couldhaveempiricalcontent-a sufficiently ong conjunction. In later workQuine also saysthat an observation sentence has an empiricalcontentof its own, but 'TwoDogmas'showsno signsof awarenessof a need toweakenthe doctrineof holism on this account.(iii) Universal evisabilityForanyacceptedsentenceor rule,there areexperientialcircumstancesin which its abandonmentwould be rational.This claim is often seen as an immediate consequence of Quine'sholism. I don't know why.Holism impliesthat there is alwaysa choicewhat to revise,but that does not implythatanythingcanbe revised.Quine seems to think there is a connection. But the only hint as tohis reason is the final alternativein this sentence from paragraph2:'Evena statementvery close to the peripherycan be held true in thefaceof recalcitrantexperienceby pleadinghallucination or by amend-ing certain statementsof the kind called logical laws'.This is hardtofathom. If I want to maintain 'There areno centaurs', or example, inthe face of recalcitrantexperience,how could amendingcertain state-ments of the kind calledlogicallawshelp?In 'Replyto Vuillemin'Quine explicitlydescribes the 'doctrine thateverysentenceis vulnerable'as 'holistic'.The only hint of a reason forthe description comes when he continues, 'Even a truth of logic ormathematics could be abandoned in order to hold fast some casualstatement of ephemeralfact';he gives intuitionist logic and quantumlogic as actualexamples.But how coulda switch to intuitionist/quan-tum logic enable us to hold fast some casual statement of ephemeralfact?And surelythis was not actuallythe motive of its proponents,ineither case!(iv) Peripheral scentralSentences differin how likely they are to be abandoned in the event ofrecalcitrantexperience.Moreprecisely,a sentence is peripheral o theextent that, for some possible (not necessarily likely) experience, itwouldprobablybe abandoned f that experienceoccurred.Claims (i)-(iii) areabout rules or norms,of formaldeduction or ofrationality,andwhat they permit or prohibit.(iv) is about the relative


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1000MichaelMcDermott

likelihood,n practice,of various movesallowedbythe rules.

5.2 Oursystemof knowledge,as described n (i)-(iv), is saidby Quineto be analogousto afabric, o a field of force,andto a network.The firsttwo analogiesareobviouslyweak. Whatwould the threadsof the fabric be? Statements?But everythreadin a fabricis, typically,directly accessible at the periphery. A typical thread touches everythreadrunningatrightangles,plus its two neighbours;does this repre-sentany interestingrelationamongstatements? What is the peripheryof a force field?Whatin the fielddo the statementsof the theorycorre-spond to?Themost popularanalogyhasbeen the net. The nodes arepresuma-bly supposedto be our theory'sstatements.Presumably hey are con-nected by paths representing relations of formal deducibility(accordingto the system'sprimitive rule/s). So a typical path will befromtwo points to a third.That'sonepath,not two separatepaths.Canwe understand that?Maybewe need something like nerve cells, eachwith several nput lines and one output line, rather hanpaths.Now thestatementsat the peripheryare those which imply something aboutexperience.What is distance rom theperiphery?A connection consist-ing of manysteps?No, 'There are centaurs or there are no centaurs' ssupposedto be at the centre,though it will be deducibleprettydirectlyfrom 'There areno centaurs',at the periphery.We'dbetter mean dis-tanceby 'distance':we can push nodes around,stretchingconnectionswherenecessary, o get all the nodes wherewe want them. (Formoredetailson the relationof the net to experience,Quinerefersus, in Wordand Object, o Hempel. But Hempel'snet floatsparallelto the ground(experience):we can ascend fromexperience o theory,and descendata differentpoint, via strings ('rulesof interpretation') inking certainpoints in the net to the ground.)Whatis recalcitrantxperience?Whatis a revisionof the theory?What featureof a net corresponds o thepos-sibility of alternativeadjustmentsto experience?It is hard to believethat the wide appealof the analogycomes fromits being a genuineaidto understanding.Could it perhapsbe functioning as a substituteforunderstanding?5.3 Claims(i)-(iv) all seemto be fairlyplausible,givena fundamentallyverificationistorientation.A defender of the ASD would want to notethat the changesreferred o in (iii) might constitutechangesin mean-ings, but he would not deny that language can change, does change,and shouldchangein responseto empiricaldiscoveries.


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Now how, according o paragraph2, does this view give groundsforrejecting he ASD?Wemayconcede thatnothing in (i)-(iv) entailsthatthere is an ASD;but does it entailthat there is not?WhatQuine saysis:'it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements,which hold contingentlyon experience,and analyticstatements,whichhold come what may.Anystatement can be held true come what may... Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune from revi-sion. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has beenproposed ... and what difference is there in principle between such ashift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy ...?'There seem to be two separatearguments.(i) Anysentence,evenan allegedlysyntheticsentence,can be held truecome what may, and hence holds true come what may, and hence isanalyticaccording o the targetdefinition('analytic= true in virtue ofmeaningsalone').The premiss is true: because of holism-or, separately,because ofuniversalrevisability-any synthetic sentence can be held true comewhat may.But the argumentis obviously invalid. If 'holds true comewhat may' is to have any relevance at all to the premiss, it must beunderstood in terms of what peoplehold true, hence, presumably,as'must be held true'. But 'can' does not imply 'must'. (This is truewhetherQuine's 'can' and 'must' mean accordingto the system'srulesof inference, or according to standards of rationality-or even,although this couldn't be what Quine means, according to rules ofmeaning.)(ii) Any sentence, even an allegedly analyticsentence,can be revised,andhence is syntheticaccording o the targetdefinition.Again the premiss is true-not because of holism, but because ofuniversalrevisability.But this argument s alsoobviouslyinvalid.Thereis no inconsistency n maintaining(asCarnap,andjustabouteveryoneelse, did) that a sentence true in virtue of meanings alone can berevised.5 f Quine had meant 'can be revisedwithout changingmean-ings' the argument would be valid. But of course that can'tbe whatQuine meant, sincehe thinks it senseless o talk about'changingmean-

5 The point was madeby Griceand Strawson.Gibson(1988p. 95)has offeredan ingenious re-ply on Quine'sbehalf.He points out that Grice and Strawson admitthat if you acceptboth theASD and universalrevisabilityyou must accept a distinction between sentence revisions whichchange meaningsand ones whichdon't. 'Then,saysGibson,'whyall this hocus pocus?'His point,he explains, s thatacceptinga distinctionbetween sentence revisionswhichchangemeaningsandones which don't is tantamountto accepting he ASD.So if you acceptboth the ASD anduniversalrevisability, ou havethereby,n effect,accepted he ASD.Cop that,GriceandStrawson!


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ings';and in anycase the premissis completelywithout support if sounderstood.There is also the rhetoricalquestion at the end. Quine means thatthere is no differencen principlebetween the revisionsof theorywhichallegedly nvolve a changein meaningsand the ones which don't. If hecould establishthis, it would be veryrelevant: t would undermine theASD. But saying 'What difference s there?'does nothing to show thatthere is no difference.

6.6.1 Yetthere remainsa stubbornfeelingthatsomething nterestingandimportant s beingsaidagainst he ASDin ?6. What is it?The hidden argumentconcerns,I think, the importance f the ASD.Quine's targetis certaindefinitionsof 'analytic'.He is not reallycon-cernedto criticizeour intuitive,non-philosophical alk of synonymyortruth by meaning, or to deny that it can be explained, or clarified,ortidiedup. Thenotion of distancefrom the periphery s offered, ndeed,asan accountof this intuitive use. It is actually n Quine's nterest o beableto givesuch an account,because t providesan answer o theobjec-tion 'If there is no ASD,why do we think thereis one?' The answeris,'Becauseyou aremisperceiving he real differenceamong sentencesindistancefrom the periphery'. f someone proposedto define 'analytic'as, say, 'maximallydistantfromthe periphery',Quine'smain responsewould not be that the definition wasunclear,or that it had a falsepre-supposition,or that it did not capture he intuitive use of the term,butthatit made it turn out thateverythingphilosophers ad said about ana-lyticitywas falseor trivial. (PerhapsQuine would objectthat distancefrom the periphery is 'only a distinction of degree'-meaning thatthere is no extremeposition, no sentenceshave zero likelihood of beingrevisedin responseto recalcitrant xperience.Would this be consistentwith holding that some sentences aresociallystimulusanalytic?)Thedefinitionsof 'analytic'which Quine is concernedto attack are thosewhich makeanalyticity eemphilosophically mportant.The hidden argument s, I think,a generalargumentfor the conclu-sion thatthere cannotbe an epistemologicallymportantASD.Epistemology is about the rationality of theory construction andadjustment.Quine'spremiss is that a theory is 'a tool, ultimately,forpredictingfutureexperiencein the light of past experience'.He infersthat the rationalwayto revise a theoryin responseto recalcitrant xpe-rience ispragmatically-do whateveryieldsa theorywhichmakesmany


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experientialpredictions,makes trueexperientialpredictions,which issimple,clear,etc., etc.Now supposethat there are'rulesof meaning', othatthereis a distinctionbetweentheoryrevisionswhichchangemean-ings and theoryrevisionswhich do not. How is this supposeddistinc-tion relevant?Considerfor example the question whether we shouldacceptsuch sentences as 'Numbersexist', o 0 1'and so on. 'Weshould',says Quine's empiricistopponent (Carnap, say), 'because(i) they areanalytic-acceptance of such sentences is requiredby certain rules ofmeaning;furthermore ii) thesearegood rules-acceptance of the sen-tencesin questionenablesus to havea systemwhichis empiricallyade-quate, simple, and so on'. To which Quine responds, 'The last part ofthis is byitselfa full answer to the original question:we should acceptthe sentences in questionbecause that is a rationalwayto achieve thepurpose of our system. The detour via rules of meaning contributesnothing. The right way to make the revisions which you regard aschangingmeaningsis, we agree,pragmatically.But also the right waytomake revisions which you do not regardas changing meanings is-pragmatically. The supposed distinction between revisions whichchange meaningsand revisionswhichdo not is of no importance'.6

Thepremiss,aboutwhat theories are'for',would not appealto non-empiricists.A realist,for example,might want to askwhetheraccept-ance of sentences about numbers achievesthe rationaltheoreticalpur-pose of correctlyrepresentinga reality ndependentof our experience.But even an empiricist might object that the argument completelyignoresthe function of language n communication. n Quine'spictureeach of us is constantlyadjustingan inheritedverbalstructure o fithisown continuing experience.Quine's 'rationality'relates to this essen-tiallyprivate pursuit.7 magine,then, a theoristwho decides to simplyinterchange wo predicates hroughouthis theory, say'buttermilk'and'arsenic' Hempel).Thiswill not affectthe theory'spredictionsof expe-rience,or its overallsimplicity.On Quine'sassumptions,there is noth-ing against t. But in realitythereis something against t (evenfromanempiricistviewpoint),because the languageof science is also a tool for

6 Churchland gives a version of this argument (1979,pp. 49-51), and it seems clear that hethinks the essence of it is in 'TwoDogmas'.Churchland's ersion is actuallyspoilt by an unneces-sary overstatement. He imagines two theorists who accept all the same sentences but differ inwhich ones they call analytic, and arguesthat they do not differ in which sentencesthey shouldabandon n responseto the samerecalcitrant xperience.But he adds,unnecessarily, hat one the-orist callsall his non-observationsentencesanalytic.This impliesthat the 'analytic' entencescol-lectively mply observationsentences.Clearly his theorist is using'analytic' n a wayno defenderof the notion wouldcondone.7Dummett describesQuine'sview-in 'TwoDogmas',not in Word nd Object-as 'solipsis-tic'


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communication.As well as rules of inferenceand generalprinciplesofrationality, here seems to be a placefor 'rulesof meaning', ulesrequir-ing us to acceptcertain inferencesand/or sentences,and to not aban-don them without specialpublic notice. The pragmaticvalue of suchrules would be that a hearer could get useful information about theempiricalcontent of a speaker's heory from a single remark('Butter-milk is bad for Baby'),because a sharedbackgroundould be relied on.Primafacie,the existenceof rules of meaningseemsto be explicableasa rationalresponseto the need for an effective ool of communication.It could, perhaps,be repliedthat the obvious irrationalityof the lin-guisticbehaviour described abovecan be explainedby generalprinci-ples of rationality, once we admit that language is a tool forcommunication,even in the absence of any separaterulesof meaning;or that theseallegedrules cannot be explained n behavioural erms;oretc. But it hardlyseems reasonable o just ignore he use of language ncommunication.

Quine might replythat his argumentwasonly intended to showtheunimportanceof analyticity or epistemology, ot for the theoryof lan-guagein general.If the argumentis correct,'The notion of analyticitythenjust subsides nto the humbler domain whereits supporting ntui-tions hold sway: he domainof language earningandempiricalseman-tics'.('Reply o Hellman',Quine1986bp. 208)On thatunderstandinghe argumentseems to me to be asgood as itsempiricist premiss. But the question is, now, is it an argument fromholism?Apparentlynot. A non-holisticsystemwould have ruleslinkingeachof its sentences,directlyor indirectly,with certainexperiences,sothat occurrenceof those experienceswould requireabandonment ofthe sentence.These rules would be rationallyrevisable n pursuitof asystemwhich was simpler,clearer,and empiricallyadequate.If, in theinterests of easy communication, it proveduseful to classifysome ofthese rules as 'rules of meaning',that would still be irrelevant to themeritsof revisinga rule in pursuitof the aims designatedby Quine asepistemologicallyelevant-just as in the holistic case.Sowe still do not havea good Quineanargument romholismagainsttheASD (evenin the presentweak sense of 'against').6.2As I mentioned,Quinewishes to explainawayour intuitivebeliefinan ASD. The 'TwoDogmas'explanation, n terms of a misperceivingof'distancefrom the periphery', eemsto be a ratherpoor one. Intuitionsaysthat 'There have been black dogs' is not analytic,despite its lowlikelihood of beingrevised.8


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Quineand othershave offeredotherexplanationsof our intuitionsofsynonymy and analyticity (explanationswhich do not imply that thenotions arephilosophically mportant). One favourite s that we intui-tively judgea sentence to be analytic f the utilityin communication ofone of its wordsdependson generalacceptanceof the sentence.Whydowe feel that 'Bachelorsareunmarried', or example, is analytic? Onelooks to "unmarried man" as semantically anchoring "bachelor"because there is no sociallyconstant stimulus meaning to govern theuse of the word;sever its tie with "unmarriedman" andyou leave it noveryevident social determination,hence no utilityin communication'(Quine 1960,p. 56). Quinepresumably hinks that this explanationcanbe cashed out in behavioural erms,buthe does not suggesthow. In anycase, the explanation seems to be simply false. Evenif 'married'and'unmarried'werebanishedfrom the language,the meaningand utilityof 'bachelor'need not be affected.Perhapswe could do better if we saidthat a sentence is intuitively analytic if the utility in communicationdepends on its not being denied. But not much better: whatever thepurposesof communicationaresupposedto be, in termsof which'util-ity' is measured,I will presumablyhavedifficultyachievingthem with'black' dog'etc. if I deny'Therehave beenblackdogs'.AnotherexplanationQuine offers is that we intuitivelyjudge a sen-tence analyticif everybody'learnsthat it is true by learningits words'(Quine 1973, ?21). This is a real puzzler, since the essence of Quine'sbehaviourism s thatthere is no distinctionbetweenlearning hat a sen-tenceis true andlearning tswords.'[Thetroubleis] that we have madeno generalexperimental ense of a distinctionbetween whatgoes into anative's earningto applyan expressionand whatgoes into his learningsupplementary matters about the objects concerned.' (Quine 1960,p. 38) Fora behaviourist,the presentdeflationaryaccountof 'analytic'can amount to nothingmore than sayingthat every competentspeakerhas learnt,somehow,to assent to the sentence.Andyet Quine saysthatwe have herea closerapproximation o the intuitivenotion than socialstimulusanalyticity.6.3 I said that the definitionsof'analytic' which Quine is concerned toattack arethose which make analyticityseem philosophically impor-tant. Quine came to consciously see matters this way much later:

8However, cannot endorseChurchland's riticism(p. 59)of Quine'sexplanation.He saysthat'Bachelorsareunmarried'comes out as not intuitivelyanalyticon Quine'saccount. But this is be-causehe wrongly nterpretsQuineassayingthata sentence is relatively entral f its abandonmentwouldrequiremanyfurther evisionsof the theory.


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'Moreover I now perceive that the philosophically important questionabout analyticity ... is not how to explicate [it]; it is the question ratherof [its] relevance to epistemology'. ('Reply to Hellman' Quine 1986b,p. 207) But I am suggesting that the idea may have been subtly at workalready in 'Two Dogmas'.The argument in 'Reply to Hellman' is that, given holism, there is noneed to explicate analyticity, because the main philosophical questionwhich was supposed to be answered by appeal to the ASD no longerarises. The question, according to Quine, was how to 'account for themeaningfulness of logical and mathematical truths, which are clearlydevoid of empirical content'.

Quine's historical reconstruction seems to be pretty wonky. Howcould the analyticity of mathematical truths ever have been supposedto explain their having meaning but no content? Analyticity just is hav-ing meaning but no content. The orthodox view, which I see no reasonto doubt, is that the main issue to which analyticity was relevant wasthe traditional dispute between rationalists and empiricists. The empir-icist says that there is no a priori knowledge of the world; the rationalistobjects 'What about mathematics?'; to which the empiricist replies thatmathematical knowledge is not knowledge of the world, i.e. mathemati-cal truths are analytic. I can't see that holism makes that dispute goaway. I know of nothing Quine has said which even seems relevant tothe question of the respective claims of reason and experience assources of knowledge. In fact Quine is so little aware of the strand in theempiricist tradition which emphasizes the importance of experience asa source of knowledge that he can imagine that the relevant alternativeto experience is not reasonbut extrasensoryperception! (E.g. Quine 199opp. 19-21) Quine's 'empiricism' is wholly concerned with the empiricisttheory of content (verificationism, phenomenalism etc.), not the empir-icist theory of justification ('no a priori knowledge of the world').9(Quine does mention, in 'Epistemology Naturalized', the thesis that alltruths about the world can be deduced, with certainty, from knowntruths about experience; but this is not the same thing at all-or, forthat matter, an authentic part of the empiricist tradition. Quine's 'natu-ralism', also, is sometimes seen as a restatement of the traditionalempiricist doctrine that there is no a priori knowledge. But wrongly:Quine says that it is futile to try to evaluate scientific methods of arriv-ing at knowledge (futile because the attempt would presuppose some

9 For a seminalpresentationof the distinction, see Stace(1944?11); ndorsedby Hempel (1950n.i).


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firmerplaceto stand);this does not imply that reasonings not amongthose scientificmethods.)7.7.1 Quine'sholism is a thesis about the unit of empiricalcontent.Wehave so far looked at three conceptions of empiricalcontent used byQuine in 'TwoDogmas',basedrespectivelyon truth-in-virtue-of,on anintuitivenotion of confirmation,and on a relationof formal implica-tion accordingto the rules of a deductive system. In his later work asomewhatdifferentconceptionbecomesprominent,and hence a some-what differentversionof holism. Letus consider now what appears obe a new argument against intuitive semantics, depending on thismatureversionof holism.An observation entence s defined,behaviourally,as one for whichassent or dissent is always prompted by current stimulation, in thesamewayfor every speaker. n his laterworkQuinetends to regard heobservation sentence as the fundamentalpossessorof empiricalcon-tent. Its empirical content is defined as its stimulus meaning. Theempiricalcontent of a sentence or theory in generalis defined as theobservation sentences it implies, accordingto the formal rules of thesystem. (The theory of empiricalcontent in 'TwoDogmas' ?6 is thusmodified by splitting the connection between theory and experienceinto two parts,one described n terms of formalimplication,the otherin behavioural erms.)Holism is now the thesis that most solatedsentenceshave no empiri-cal content. The observation sentence is the exception-it 'has anempiricalcontent all its own and wears it on its sleeve'. f all sentenceswere observation sentences, holism would not apply. What makesholism true (in aparticularanguage) s thatnot allsentencesareobser-vation sentences.Now the argument Quine uses against one candidate definition ofsynonymy depends, he thinks, on the fact that not all sentences areobservation sentences. As we saw,Quine argues that social stimulussynonymyis not a good approximation o the intuitive notion of syn-onymy.Forexample'BrutuskilledCaesar' s sociallystimulussynony-mous with 'Brutuskilled Caesar and there havebeen blackdogs',butthey arenot synonymous.But he thinksthat socialstimulussynonymyis a good approximation to synonymy for observation sentences,indeed for occasionsentencesgenerally.Whenthe sentences are occa-sion sentences, he envisagednotion of synonymy s prettywell realized


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in intrasubjective timulus synonymy, especiallyas socialized.'(Quine1960, p. 62) But if that is so, then if all sentences were observation sen-tences, and there were no sentences like 'Brutus killed Caesar' and soon, the objection to social stimulus synonymy would go away. Soapparently we have here an argument against a suggested definition ofan intuitive semantic notion which actually depends on the truth ofholism.

However, holism is still not a premiss of the argument: all the argu-ment needs is an example of a pair of sentences which are socially stim-ulus synonymous but not synonymous, not a general principle whichimplies that there are such examples.And, more important, Quine is wrong to think that social stimulussynonymy is a good approximation to synonymy for observation sen-tences. 'Here is a rabbit',for example, is socially stimulus synonymouswith 'Here is a rabbit and there have been black dogs', but they are notsynonymous. The inadequacy of social stimulus synonymy does notapply only to standing sentences: holism, once again, makes no differ-ence.

(Similar considerations seem to refute Quine's claim that indetermi-nacy of translation does not apply to observation sentences. Let usdefine the word 'quabbit' as follows: x is a quabbit iff (i) x is a rabbit,and (ii) there have been black dogs. ('Define'? We are provisionallyadopting the standpoint of intuitive semantics, for purposes of reductioad absurdum.) Consider a manual of translation which differs from thehomophonic only in translating John's 'rabbit' as 'quabbit'. It seemsclear that no plausible behavioural concept of correct translation (noplausible set of 'constraints') could prefer the homophonic scheme tothis alternative. Yet there is, by intuitive standards, a fact of the matteras to whether John really means 'quabbit' when he says 'rabbit'-evenin the observation sentence 'This is a rabbit'.)

Quine argues that in this case the mentalist should be satisfied withsocial stimulus synonymy: 'For we can argue [qua mentalists] that onlyverbal habit can plausibly account for concomitant variation of twooccasion sentences, in point of assent and dissent, over the wholegamut of possible stimulations. There is still the unscreened effects ofcommunity-wide collateral information, but there is no evident reasonnot to count such information simply as a determinant of the verbalhabit' Well, that's all very well for Quine to say: he thinks there is no dif-ference between the hypothesis that a concomitance of assent condi-tions is due to current verbal habit, and the hypothesis that it is due tocurrent community-wide collateral information. But the essence of our


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intuitive mentalism-its essentialerror,according o Quine-is to dis-tinguishcollateral information, even community-wide, from verbalhabit, as factors in currentlinguisticbehaviour.That is why we don'tcount 'There have been black dogs' as analytic. Why should Quineexpectthe mentalist to suddenly give up the distinction,just for occa-sion sentences?

(Quine's identificationof cognitive synonymywith social stimulussynonymy,for occasion sentences, is repeatedin 'Use and its Place inMeaning',with a remarkableaddition. He claims there that a word iscognitively synonymous with a word or phrase if replacementof theone by the otherin anyoccasion entence ieldsa synonymoussentence.Thisclaim is intuitivelyplausible.But,asQuinepointsout, it implies,ifsynonymyof occasion sentences s definable, hat the generalnotion ofcognitive synonymy for termsis definable-contrary to 'Two Dog-mas'!)7.2 In the foregoing account of the observationsentence I omitted adetailwhich,whilenot relevant o the mainargument, s of some inde-pendent interest. Moreprecisely,Quine'sconcept is 'observationsen-tence modulo n seconds',meaningthateveryspeakerwill givethe sameverdict when given a stimulus of length n seconds.A sentencemaybean observation sentence modulo n seconds and not be an observationsentence modulo n-1 seconds. The empiricalcontent of a sentence ortheory,in general,consists in the impliedobservationsentences mod-ulo n seconds,for a suitablen.Now if two theories differin factualcontent,thereis an observationsentencemodulo n seconds impliedby one theorythat is not impliedbythe other,and hence a stimulus of lengthn secondswhich woulddis-confirm one theorybut not the other.Quine'stheoryof contentthere-fore has the following consequence:any factualdisagreementcan besettled in n second

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MICHAEL MCDERMOTT Quine's Holism and Function a List Holism