Michael Johnston Corruption and Reform: One Size … Johnston Corruption and Reform: One Size Does Not Fit All ----- LEGAL NOTICE All articles are copyright of IACA and can be used

Michael Johnston

Corruption and Reform: One Size Does Not Fit All

IACSA - International Anti-CorruptionSummer Academy

Publication 2012

IACSA Publication 2012 Michael Johnston

2

IACA - INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION ACADEMY

IACSA - International Anti-Corruption Summer Academy

Publication 2012

Michael Johnston

Corruption and Reform: One Size Does Not Fit All

----------------------------------- LEGAL NOTICE

All articles are copyright of IACA and can be used solely for personal educational, non-commercial purposes,

provided that they are used in their original form, as published by IACA, and that the source (IACA), including its copyright, is acknowledged in an appropriate manner.

Any other use is subject to prior written permission of IACA.

Unless otherwise indicated, all views, opinions, conclusions or interpretations of any kind, reflected in the articles

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Table of Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 3

1 Corruption in its context ........................................................................................................................... 3 1.1 Four syndromes .............................................................................................................................. 3 1.2 Contrasts in participation and institutions ........................................................................................ 4 1.3 Influence Market corruption ............................................................................................................ 5 1.4 Elite Cartel corruption ..................................................................................................................... 6 1.5 Oligarch-and-Clan corruption .......................................................................................................... 6 1.6 Official Mogul corruption ................................................................................................................. 7 1.7 Where do countries fit in? ............................................................................................................... 8

2 The syndromes in action ......................................................................................................................... 8 2.1 From the inside out ......................................................................................................................... 9 2.2 A “forced choice” approach ........................................................................................................... 10

3 Implications for reform ........................................................................................................................... 11

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 12

References ................................................................................................................................................. 13

Introduction

The pursuit, uses, and exchange of wealth and power takes place in a historical and cultural context, and

in specific climates of opportunities, resources, risks, uncertainties, and constraints. Those factors, and the

kinds of corruption they engender, can vary not only among societies but within them. The choice of

specific reforms critical, but lasting reform requires the sustained support from real groups of many types,

involving political processes that can vary considerably. Urging corruption-plagued societies to implement

whatever controls they appear to lack when compared to better-governed countries ‒ countries that have

had generations to deal with the problem, and whose safeguards are outcomes rather than the causes of

reform ‒ is futile. But if there are contrasting kinds of corruption, what might they be, and can we say which

kinds are most important in a given society?

1 Corruption in its context

1.1 Four syndromes

I explored these and related questions several years ago in a book (Johnston, 2005) on the ways various

countries’ corruption problems differ in kind. Using statistical indicators and case studies, the book offered

the argument that four major syndromes of corruption can be observed in countries around the world:

Influence Markets: in a climate of active, well-institutionalized markets and democratic politics, private

wealth interests seek influence over specific processes and decisions within strong public institutions, not

only bribing officials directly but channeling funds to and through political figures who put their access and

connections out for rent. The United States, Japan, and Germany were discussed as case studies (Ibid.:

Ch. 4).

Elite Cartels: in a setting of only moderately strong state institutions, colluding elites ‒ political,

bureaucratic, business, military, and so forth ‒ build high-level networks by sharing corrupt benefits, and


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are able to stave off rising political and economic competition. Examples presented were Italy, South

Korea, and Botswana (Ibid.: Ch. 5).

Oligarchs and Clans: a small number of contentious elites backed by personal or family followings pursue

wealth and power in a climate of very weak institutions, rapidly expanding opportunities, and pervasive

insecurity, using bribes and connections where they can and violence where they must. Opponents of

corruption, and of dominant parties and politicians, face major risks and uncertainties. Distinctions

between public and private sectors, and between personal and official loyalties and agendas, are very

weak in this syndrome. Case studies included Russia, the Philippines, and Mexico (Ibid.: Ch. 6).

Official Moguls: powerful individuals and small groups, either dominating undemocratic regimes or

enjoying the protection of those who do, use state and personal power ‒ at times, a distinction of little

importance ‒ to enrich themselves with impunity. The primary loyalties and sources of power are personal

or political, rather than official in nature; anti-corruption forces, like opposition to the regime generally, are

very weak. In this final group China, Kenya, and Suharto’s Indonesia were examined in detail (Ibid.: Ch. 7).

These four syndromes are “ideal types” (Coser, 1977: 223-224) highlighting important similarities and

contrasts, and do not necessarily describe any one country’s situation in complete detail. Some problems

such as police corruption occur everywhere. These syndromes refer to types of corruption problems, not to

system or regime types, and are intended to classify those problems in terms of deeper underlying causes.

Similarly, they are not categories of more or less corruption, by other names. After all, we have no valid or

reliable ways of comparing amounts of corruption among societies. Another is that while the categories do

differ in, for example, the extent of impunity and the strength of restraints upon corrupt dealings, it is

entirely possible for a country to have a great deal of Influence Market corruption (for example, Japan) and

another to experience only a moderate amount of Elite Cartel abuses (Botswana), or to have Official Mogul

corruption that is extensive yet tightly-controlled (Kuwait). In addition, the syndromes do not collectively

define a path of development: it is not assumed that countries move from Official Moguls to Oligarchs to

Elite Cartels to Influence Markets. Several kinds of transitions are possible.

A country may experience more than one syndrome at once, depending upon the levels of government,

regions of the country, and/or economic sectors we are considering. At the same time, because the

syndromes reflect contrasting underlying patterns of participation and institutions, they do not readily mix

or combine. Influence Markets and Official Moguls, for example, reflect fundamental differences in political

hegemony and openness; Elite Cartels, and Oligarchs and Clans, to cite just two more possible pairings,

embody stark contrasts in relationships among top-level elites.

1.2 Contrasts in participation and institutions

These four syndromes reflect underlying trends in, and balances or imbalances between, participation and

institutions: that is, the ways people pursue, use, and exchange wealth and power, and the climate of

social, political, economic and state institutions within which they do so. Participation also refers to a

society’s balance of political and economic opportunities. As Huntington (1968: 59-72) suggested, where

economic opportunities are more plentiful than political ones, people are likely to use wealth to buy power,

while in places where political opportunities outnumber the economic, power will more often be used to

pursue wealth. Institutions can be of several types: social, such as customs of reciprocity, the values and

strength of civil society, and systems of norms; political, as for example parties, electoral systems, and

patterns of leadership and followership; and public institutions broadly defined, including not only laws,

courts, and bureaucracies, but also banking systems, capital markets, regulatory bodies, and so on.

Participation and institutions vary in many ways, but certain combinations are most common. Table 1

(based on Johnston, 2005: Ch. 3) summarizes these broad patterns:


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Table 1. Four syndromes of corruption

Syndrome Participation Institutions Examples

Political Opportunities

Economic Opportunities

State/Society Capacity

Economic Institutions

(cases in bold were case studies in Syndromes of Corruption)

Influence Markets

Mature democracies Liberalized, steady competition and participation

Mature markets Liberalized, open; steady competition; affluent

Extensive Strong

United States, Japan, Germany, Australia, France, UK, Uruguay

Elite Cartels Consolidating/ reforming democracies Liberalized; growing competition and participation

Reforming markets Largely liberalized and open; growing competition; moderately affluent

Moderate Medium Italy, South Korea, Botswana, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Israel, Poland, Portugal, S. Africa, Zambia

Oligarchs and Clans

Transitional regimes Recent major liberalization; significant but poorly-structured competition

New markets Recent major liberalization; extensive inequality and poverty

Weak Weak Russia, Philippines, Mexico, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Colombia, India, Malaysia, Niger, Senegal, Turkey

Official Moguls

Undemocratic Little liberalization or openness

New markets Recent major liberalization; extensive inequality and poverty

Weak Weak China, Kenya, Indonesia, Algeria, Chad, Haiti, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Rwanda, Syria, Uganda

1.3 Influence Market corruption

Most Influence Market societies are mature, well-institutionalized market democracies. Competition is

relatively orderly in each arena, and legitimate paths of access exist between them. Neither politicians nor

wealth interests are clearly dominant, but yet each side has things the other wants. Businesses, wealthy

individuals and well-funded interest groups have the money politicians and parties need to fund their

campaigns (or to line their own pockets); political figures have valuable influence over policy, not only in

legislatures but also within bureaucracies. Some money finds its way directly into the hands of

bureaucrats, via bribery and extortion, but more often corruption involves political figures who put their

connections out for rent.

Constitutional and legal frameworks, free news media, strong civil societies and judiciaries, and open

economies check some of the worst abuses in these societies. Outright bribery and extortion are usually

the exception in day-to-day dealings, not the rule, and corruption is unlikely to halt economic development

or destabilize politics. Influence Market corruption is more often a matter of pushing familiar, and often

desirable, processes and connections to unacceptable extremes. Contributions to election campaigns, for

example, are an accepted part of the democratic process in most Influence Market societies, but

contributions that are too large or kept secret are likely to be corrupt. Often the issue is the openness or

fairness of a process: Warren (2004), for example, argues that the essence of corruption in a democracy is

the violation of norms of inclusion.

Most Influence Market abuses revolve around specific outcomes ‒ winning a contract or an election, or

rewriting a regulation, not massive theft or violence. In fact, the very strength of public institutions raises

the value of influence within them: decisions are likely to be carried out effectively, meaning that routine

policy processes can deliver large benefits. Much Influence Market corruption works through the system

(an imaginative analysis is in Lessig, 2011), rather than undermining it: after all, Influence Market

participants are generally well served by existing arrangements.

It is tempting to see these societies as having prevailed over corruption, or at least as having rendered it a

much less serious problem. But that would be a mistake. The other three syndromes, as we shall see,

generally revolve around the exploitation and abuse of a particular state; even though their corruption can

have regional and international implications, the corrupt processes themselves are generally rooted in


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specific places and agencies. Much Influence Market corruption, by contrast, takes place internationally,

beyond the reach of any one state, and its spread is driven by a variety of market principles ‒ often

enjoying substantial political, normative, and institutional support ‒ that have a way of “crowding out” other

values (Sandel, 2012). Moreover, banks and investment markets in Influence Market countries are often

the repositories, or participate in the laundering, of corrupt gains from elsewhere. Multinational businesses

make deals abroad that would be prohibited at home (on the activities of British Aerospace in Saudi

Arabia, as just one example, see Guardian Unlimited, 2008; House of Lords, 2008). Other problems are

domestic: both economic and political interests have a stake in limiting competition and protecting their

advantages. The costs of their dealings may thus come in the form of political competition that is more

apparent than real, economic and policy alternatives that are kept off the public agenda, and the

concentration of wealth and power in fewer and fewer hands.

1.4 Elite Cartel corruption

In other societies ‒ many of them moving into post-conflict or post-dictatorial stages ‒ institutions are

weaker, yet politics and markets are gradually becoming more competitive. Political, business,

bureaucratic, military, media elites, and others, unable to capitalize upon a strong institutional framework

and unable or unwilling to dominate through coercion, find collusion attractive. The result, often, is

pervasive sharing of corrupt rewards to maintain networks strong enough to fend off challengers. In some

cases those elite networks are strong enough to govern relatively effectively, at least as compared to the

likely, as opposed to ideal, alternatives.

Societies marked by Elite Cartel corruption are not wholly undemocratic or uncompetitive, but power and

wealth are in flux, creating both new opportunities and risks. More than in our other syndromes corruption

often has important defensive aspects: power and self-enrichment depend upon protecting existing

advantages. Official positions will be particularly valuable, but collusion often links top figures in many

segments of society. Laws, bureaucracies, and rights that have only moderate credibility weaken anti-

corruption efforts, and make life more difficult for opposition elites and news media. Civil society and many

social institutions are likely to be even weaker and driven by distrust.

Elite Cartels can maintain a working order of sorts and a gradual pace of change, even if they accomplish

both out of self-serving motives. On the whole they are more successful economically than Oligarch-and-

Clan cases (Johnston, 2005: Appendix), as their relative stability may attract some investors. Several, such

as South Korea, Botswana, Israel, Spain, South Africa, and some of the formerly communist states of

Eastern Europe, have built sustainable democracies too. Reasons for such success vary from case to

case; for now it is worth suggesting that an Elite Cartels alignment might have advantages as a transitional

“halfway” situation.

Still, Elite Cartels are hardly an ideal: their stabilizing function derives from elites’ stake in fending off

competition. Confronted with stress they may not so much bend as break: during the 1997-98 Asian

financial crisis, for example, the collusive and unaccountable business practices of Korea’s politically

privileged chaebols (huge family-owned industrial combines) were revealed as an economic house of

cards.

1.5 Oligarch-and-Clan corruption

In other societies rapid change ‒ often, simultaneous if poorly integrated political and economic transitions

‒ and very weak institutions put large stakes on the table in a setting of few constraints. Would-be

business people and political leaders ‒ categories that may extensively overlap ‒ have much to gain and,

potentially, everything to lose in a setting of profound insecurity. The strongest institutions are personal


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followings, gangs, or families; official bodies have little credibility, and citizens who might elsewhere build a

strong civil society find it prudent to focus on survival.

Corruption in such settings is likely to consist of a disorderly, sometimes violent scramble among

contending Oligarchs and their personal Clans. In a setting of high stakes, brutal competition and porous

boundaries between public and private sectors, contending elites parlay personal clout into wealth and

power. Indeed, each is needed in order to win and protect the other. Unlike Elite Cartel situations,

corruption does not underwrite an overarching network, and is anything but stabilizing. Indeed violence,

organized crime, and protection rackets may be integral parts of the corruption picture (Varese, 2001).

Oligarch-and-Clan corruption is not only extensive but also unpredictable, and thus particularly disruptive

to development (Campos, Lien, and Pradhan, 1999). Investors, in Oligarch-and-Clan settings, face

unpredictable and even conflicting corrupt demands, have little assurance that paying up will produce

lasting benefits, yet risk violence if they do not comply. That state of affairs can devastate economic

development. Corrupt gains too will frequently be shipped out of the country to places with harder

currencies and safer banks. Anyone confronting the Oligarchs will be taking on powerful factions

answerable to no one but themselves, and will have few meaningful rights to fall back upon. The resulting

poverty and insecurity inhibit democratizing trends and interests, and further weaken resistance to

corruption.

Oligarchs may be victims as well as perpetrators of corrupt deals, depending upon who commands what

advantages in a given sector, and followers may bolt from one clan to another. Indeed, it may be difficult to

say just what is public and what is private, who is a politician and who is an entrepreneur. Post-conflict and

post-dictatorial societies in a state of overall insecurity, with weak institutional frameworks and high levels

of distrust, will be particularly vulnerable to Oligarch and Clan corruption, and thus to self-perpetuating

cycles of insecurity, corruption, poverty, and violence.

1.6 Official Mogul corruption

A final group of countries is characterized by undemocratic rule, growing economic opportunities, and ‒

again ‒ very weak institutions. There, powerful figures or inner circles plunder the economy, often with

impunity. Opposition forces and civil society, to the extent that either term is meaningful, are weak,

intimidated, or manipulated by official patronage. In smaller or more unified societies the key figures may

be a dictator, family, or tight ruling circle, and power is personal in its sources and use. In more complex

settings multiple groups, monopolizing fragments of state authority, may operate more independently. Of

our four syndromes this one is least focused upon influence within official state processes: institutions and

offices may be merely useful tools in the search for wealth.

Economies in most such societies are liberalizing to some extent, if only in response to global incentives.

Officials can exploit emerging economic opportunities with impunity if they enjoy top-level status or

protection, and at least avoid scrutiny from above. The integration into the world economy that often

accompanies liberalization may help check corruption (Larraín and Tavares, 2004; Sandholtz and Koetzle,

2000; Treisman, 2000; for important qualifications, see Zhu, 2009) for reasons ranging from the influx of

advanced management techniques and enhanced international scrutiny to the emergence of alternatives

to doing business with official moguls. But for poor, undemocratic countries just beginning to open up

markets ‒ especially those dependent upon the export of basic commodities ‒ such integration is often on

unfavorable terms. That makes it easier for authoritarian rulers to monopolize cross-border flows of goods

and capital and to cut lucrative personal deals with international businesses. But even in poor countries a

political monopoly can be the source of great wealth, if only from tapping into aid, loans, and any

investment flowing in from outside.

Mature market democracies resemble each other in many ways ‒ not least, their relatively dispersed


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power structures ‒ but in Official Mogul cases much depends upon the personalities and agendas of those

at the top. Some may seek reform or at least refrain from the worst corruption, and where that is the case

considerable growth may occur. Others ruthlessly exploit both state and economy with devastating results.

Official Mogul societies are not necessarily stable, however: those who hold power without rules may face

enemies, rather than competitors or political oppositions. Elite insecurity, in turn, may drive egregious

“hand over fist” corruption (Scott, 1972) as leaders facing threats but few institutional constraints take as

much as they can, as fast as they can take it.

1.7 Where do countries fit in?

The 2005 analysis employed a statistical cluster analysis (Ibid.: Ch. 3) of national-level participation and

institutional indicators (not including corruption indices) to show that across nearly a hundred countries the

four combinations of attributes presented in Table 1 do seem to exist. Table 2 (source: Johnston, 2005:

Appendix A) shows the results of that classification process for about one hundred countries ‒ results that

have been consistent across several subsequent replications:

Table 2. Country groupings by syndrome, 2005

Influence Markets (N=18) Australia Finland Netherlands UK Austria France New Zealand Uruguay Canada Germany Norway USA Costa Rica Ireland Sweden Denmark Japan Switzerland Elite Cartels (N=21) Argentina Czech Rep South Korea Portugal Belgium Greece Namibia Slovak Rep Bolivia Hungary Panama South Africa Botswana Israel Paraguay Spain Brazil Italy Poland Zambia Chile Oligarchs and Clans (N=30) Albania Guatemala Nepal Senegal Bangladesh Honduras Nicaragua Sri Lanka Benin India Niger Thailand Bulgaria Jamaica Pakistan Trinidad & Tobago Colombia Madagascar Peru Turkey Ecuador Malaysia Philippines Venezuela El Salvador Mali Romania Ghana Mexico Russia Official Moguls (N=29) Algeria Guinea-Biss. Malawi Togo Cameroon Haiti Morocco Tunisia Central Afr. Rep. Indonesia Myanmar Uganda Chad Iran Nigeria UAE China Ivory Coast Oman Zimbabwe Congo, Rep. of Jordan Rwanda Egypt Kenya Syria Gabon Kuwait Tanzania

Statistical groupings, by themselves, do not confirm that certain kinds of corruption take place; the real

test, in corruption terms, came through case studies (Ibid.: Ch. 4-7) which generally confirmed the

existence of the expected patterns of corruption.

2 The syndromes in action

The syndromes scheme is, of necessity, a simplification. Can we distinguish among the four types of

corruption in practice?


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One way to do that involves looking at the big picture in a society ‒ that is, at the corrupt dealings that

seem predominant ‒ and assessing participation and institutional factors. Our concern is not which corrupt

techniques are most frequent; as noted earlier, some varieties like police corruption occur more or less

everywhere and may not tell us anything distinctive about a given country. Nor are we asking which cases

have made the biggest headlines or involved the largest amounts of money. We might ask, what sorts of

corrupt processes have most to do with patterns of wealth and power in a given country. Our answers are

likely to be educated guesses, and will inevitably involve many exceptions, but are still useful

assessments.

2.1 From the inside out

Another approach is to start with specific cases and work outward to the broader influences shaping them.

To take this route, again begin by asking what kinds of corrupt dealings are the most typical of the broader

economic and political arenas. Table 3 offers a more general breakdown of how those factors can

combine, breaking down each syndrome by typical participants, stakes, techniques, and targets of

corruption, and concluding with the general sorts of corruption vulnerabilities associated with each. It will

be noted that a particular vulnerability may arise in more than one syndrome; electoral corruption, for

example, may be common in both Influence Markets and Elite Cartel situations, although it would be likely

to involve contrasting participants and agendas. As suggested above, working backwards from corrupt

practices to causal factors without considering deeper causes can yield confusion.

Table 3. Recognizing corruption syndromes in practice

Who? Seeking what? How? Where? Corrupt activities Syndrome…

Myriad private interests: businesses, lobby groups Politicians, bureaucrats

Bureaucratic and political access Influence over specific decisions Money

Political contributions; personal gifts; bribes, networking Trading access, influence for money

Bureaucracy, less public aspects of legislative process, nominations and pardon processes

Influence peddling Abusive patronage Electoral corruption Campaign finance violations Conflicts of interest

Influence Markets

Networked colluding elites -- political, bureaucratic, business, military, facing growing political, economic competition “Connected” wealth interests

To preserve power, status quo To fend off rising competitors To solidify elite networks Mutual enrichment Favorable policy, decisions

Political collusion: sharing corrupt $$, rigging elections Politicizing bureaucracy, courts; bringing selected private interests into elite circles Large payments, kickbacks

Control over: electoral politics, state/parastatal sectors, public contracting, procurement Privatization, development, regulatory, nationalization decisions Communications media Military

Electoral corruption, collusion Politicized judicial, law enforcement processes Corruption via patronage, charitable “contributions” Politicized lending, regulation, oversight

Elite Cartels

A few “Big Men”; their personal followings and clients; private armies or security forces Organized crime

Rapid, major gains in wealth and power Protecting those gains from state, each other More predictability in business, government Capitalizing on weak institutions

Theft, fraud, patronage abuses; bribery or intimidation of officials, rivals Capitalizing on insecurity, fear Violence

Liberalizing economic sectors; energy, natural resources; privatizations Trading in state assets; banking, currency, money laundering Security services (formal and illicit)

Natural resource, public asset theft Judicial, law enforcement corruption High-level political (grand) corruption Money laundering Illicit trafficking Violence, terror

Oligarchs and Clans

Monopolistic leadership (dictator, juntas); bureaucratic rings Inner circle; family, political clients

Major gains in wealth To exploit dominance To tap into capital flows Enrichment of selves, clients; rewarding political backers

Official theft of public or private assets Misappropriation of investment, aid Phony privatizations Patronage

Investment, aid; public works, contracting, procurement, military spending Extractive industries Land ownership, banking

Monopolistic abuses of state, personal power, patronage with impunity; Grand corruption in extractive, international aid/trade sectors

Official Moguls


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Table 3 can be used beginning with any column, depending upon what is known about corruption cases.

The cell entries are meant to be suggestive, not definitive; some judgment will be needed in order to

reconcile contrasts.

2.2 A “forced choice” approach

A final method consists of a set of deliberately simplified choices about participation and institutions.

Particularly given its forced-choice design, results from this approach should be judged with some caution.

It involves answering three questions:

• Is this case an Established democracy; a New or reforming democracy now, or recently, undergoing

significant liberalization; or Undemocratic?

• Does this case have Established markets and general affluence; Reforming or liberalizing markets

and moderate affluence; or New/weak markets with considerable poverty and inequality?

• Are political and economic institutions Strong and legitimate; only Moderately strong or reforming; or

Weak and lacking in credibility?

Now, track your answers using Figure 1:

Figure 1. Participation, Institutions, and Corruption Syndromes

The arrows are not intended to imply causation, but rather to indicate how the answers work together to

produce a classification. The forced-choice format makes each answer an approximation, but again

suggests ways participation and institutions might shape corruption. It also provides a useful reminder of

the deeper influences and contrasts highlighted by the syndromes: we are not relying upon personalities,

short-term temptations, or specific administrative problems to account for contrasts, nor are we

differentiating among them primarily in terms of the specific corrupt tactics.

If a society does not fit anywhere in the scheme we might look at its regions or sectors. And if that

approach still produces a muddle, by that point we may have a sense of why the case does not fit, and of

what factors set it apart. That, by itself, is still a useful advance over a single index score or impressionistic

claims about amounts of corruption.


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3 Implications for reform

If we are confident in our classifications, then what? Can the typology steer us toward useful reforms and

away from serious mistakes? Reform is an immensely complex topic in its own right, but the syndromes

typology is intended to provide some general guides for action, as well as some suggestions of what not to

do. It can also give us a rough sense of desirable sequencing. Some reforms that seem attractive in an

Influence Market case ‒ decentralization, for example ‒ may, in an Oligarchs-and-Clans situation, add fuel

to the fire. Often our early measures must be indirect ‒ not frontal assaults on corruption, which may well

endanger reform-oriented citizens while accomplishing little. More gradual and indirect approaches, by

contrast, might keep us from pushing a society from one syndrome of corruption over into a much more

disruptive one by, for example, undercutting existing institutions too aggressively. Indeed, some of the

most promising strategies may not be explicitly aimed at corruption at all; for example, literacy

programmes or guarantees of civil liberties may build valuable institutional strength.

Thus, in an Official Moguls situation our first task may well be to open up some measure of public or civic

“space”, and to encourage the formation of grassroots organizations, even if they are explicitly non-

political, in order to lay the groundwork for future countervailing political forces. That agenda will often

have to be pursued gradually, lest reform call down repression by the regime. In an Oligarchs-and-Clans

situation, we will need to ease the sense of insecurity and risk before we ask citizens and civil society

groups to take serious action against corruption. More predictable and credible law enforcement, courts,

and taxation may well be required before an anti-corruption movement can take shape.

In Elite Cartels and Influence Market cases, formal institutions are stronger; particularly in the latter the rule

of law, civil liberties, and accountability already have some meaning. There, more direct anti-corruption

action is possible, although reform movements will need to link corruption control to the enduring self-

interests of citizens. For Influence markets, broader-based political participation, more credible and

decisive electoral competition, and stronger economic rules and limits might be of the essence ‒ measures

that would make little sense for some of our other syndromes. In all cases we must remember that many

citizens may benefit from corruption ‒ or think they do ‒ and may well not trust their neighbors to give up

their shares. Reform efforts will need to offer diverse incentives and appeals (one analysis of such appeals

is offered in Johnston and Kpundeh, 2002).

A full analysis of reform strategies, tactics, and sequencing lies well beyond the scope of this discussion.

But as a beginning, consider Tables 4A and 4B, below:

Table 4A. Reform Recommendations, Influence Markets and Elite Cartels

Syndrome Strategic Goals Strategic Reform Targets

Tactical Reform Targets

Measures to Avoid Strategic Progress Indicators

Influence Markets

• Increase political competition

• Increase legitimate access to government

• Check corrupt access

• Enhance citizens’ sense of fairness

• Electoral systems • Party/campaign

Finance • Freedom of Info

legislation • Public $, other

incentives to increase political competition

• Increase political participation

• Avoid party, incumbent monopolies

• Private $ to challengers as well as incumbents

• Extensive ethics, financial disclosure

• Conflict of Interest rules

• Reform lobbying rules

• Creative matching of small contributions

• Civic education on lobbying, pol finance

• Too-low limits on political funding

• Replacing all private funding with public $

• Excessive disclosure, conflict of interest monitoring

• Too much access to bureaucracy

• Pol funding systems encouraging “one-stop shopping” at the top

• Reduced incumbent advantages

• Slowing growth of large-scale campaign, lobbying spending

• Improved levels of public trust, expectations

• More citizen participation at polls, in campaign finance

• Stronger civil society

Elite Cartels

• Strengthen public/private boundaries

• Smaller state role in economy

• More decisive

• Electoral systems, stronger parties

• More bottom-up political participation

• More secure

• Conflict of Interest, Freedom of Information legislation

• Increasing legitimate party

• Rapid increase in pol competition

• Rapid de-regulation, privatization, while pol collusion

• Elections produce meaningful policy change, particularly in the economy

• Bureaucracy,


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elections • Greater

bureaucratic autonomy

• More free political space for citizens

• Democratization at a moderate pace

property rights • Selective

privatization/ deregulation

• Constitutional reform: checks, balances, stronger judiciary

• Strong, politically independent capital markets, news media

funding, and grassroots bases

• Procurement, bidding, contracting reform and oversight

• Higher bureaucratic professionalization, pay, status

• Strengthen civil service systems, protections

persists • Starving pol

process of legitimate funding

• Measures sharply increasing elite insecurity

media become more autonomous

• Parties sink roots in civil society, become less personalized

• More independent watchdog, pol groups

• Higher mass pol participation, trust

Table 4B. Reform recommendations, oligarchs and clans, and official Moguls

Syndrome Strategic Goals Strategic Reform Targets

Tactical Reform Targets

Measures to Avoid Strategic Progress Indicators

Oligarchs and Clans

• Reduce violence, insecurity

• Credible official policy, processes

• More secure property rights

• Reducing violence • Reduce “informal”

econ, pol activity • Enhance rule of

law

• Moderate the expansion of pol, econ opportunities

• Strengthen, professionalize courts, police

• Weaken organized crime, private armies, elite followings

• Enhance credibility of basic state functions in citizens’ eyes

• Amnesties for illicit gains, followed by prosecution

• Better, timely public-sector pay

• Easier, more credible titling of property

• Financial disclosure, conflict-of-interest rules

• Improve banking system

• Stronger currency • Simplified taxation

• (Further) rapid privatization

• Rapid entry of int’l businesses

• Public management

• improvements without top-level ownership

• Elections without procedural safeguards

• Anti-corruption crusades becoming factional conflicts

• Reforms needlessly endangering citizens

• Reduced crime • Reduced capital

flight • Civil society

independent, less intimidated

• Public/private boundaries clearer

• Investors plan for the longer term

• Improved popular trust, expectations

Official Moguls

• Gradual growth of political competition

• Credible official roles, institutions

• Increased pluralism of pol resources, action

• Strengthen press, civil society gradually

• Shield private sector from official raids

• Emergence of “civic space”

• Improved civil liberties

• Improved, fairer taxation

• Independent political social orgs

• Enhance security of int’l business

• Enhance bureaucratic autonomy, professionalism

• Reduce political dominance of “inner circle” or top families

• Transparency in dealings with int’l orgs and business

• Conditional rewards for strategic reforms

• Conditional incentives for public management improvement

• Strengthen property rights

• Growth of politically independent businesses, organizations

• Rapid economic, political liberalization, democratization

• Public management improvements without top-level backing

• Public morality campaigns

• Reforms with short-term timelines

• Reforms that greatly increase elite insecurity

• Reforms needlessly endangering citizens, regime critics

• Gradual growth in pol competition, economic openness

• Power, policy, accountability become more public, less personal

• Signs of elite, social pluralism

• Less political intrusion into economy

• Emergence of independent grassroots organizations, initiatives

Conclusion

The primary goal of any anti-corruption programme must be enabling those who suffer from the problem to

oppose it in ways that cannot be ignored. That suggests that rather than setting a reform agenda and then

seeking citizen support, we should choose anti-corruption measures that seem most likely to strengthen

citizens’ ability to advocate and defend their own best interests. Looked at that way, reform is a problem of

accountability, fairness, and justice ‒ ultimately, the main reasons why we should worry about corruption in

the first place.


13

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